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SECTION A

KENTUCKY GENERAL ASSEMBLY UPDATE
New Kentucky Legislative Enactments
I. Introduction. The materials included in this summary were accumulated as of April 1,
2003 and based upon bills introduced in the Kentucky 2003 General Session. The bills
summarized here include issues of particular importance to financial institutions doing business
in Kentucky. Detailed information will be provided to financial institutions next month in a
booklet produced by the Kentucky Bankers Association entitled 2003 Session in Summary.
Most of the bills summarized are included with these materials. Bills not included may be
obtained through the LRC Website at \V\vw.lrc.state.ky.us or by contacting Debra Stamper at
502-582-2453 or dstamper@kybanks.com .
II. Unclaimed Property (HB211-Signed by the governor on March 18). This bill makes a
number of changes to the escheat laws:
-Creates an abandoned property fund for payment to the state for expenses necessary for
administration of the chapter.
-Exempts from the coverage of the chapter wages of$50 or less.
-Of most significance, the bill reduces from 7 to 3 years, the period after which the
following properties are presumed abandoned: insurance company demutualization
proceeds; property devised or bequeathed; life insurance proceeds; stock, dividends or
similar corporate proceeds; intangible property held in trust for another; public utility
refunds; and, payment made to secure payment for services rendered. The traditional
bank account provisions were not amended.
III. Predatory Lending/High Cost Loans (HB 287-signed by the Governor on March 12).
This is a very detailed bill covering a number of areas of concern that contribute to the growing
problem of predatory lending. The Kentucky Bankers Association (representing its bank and
thrift members) worked with other industry group representatives, including mortgage brokers,
mortgage lenders, credit unions, consumer finance companies and the OF! to develop an
approach to predatory lending that works towards specific, targeted problems rather than the
broad brush approach taken without success and with some disaster in other states. There are
four general topics covered by the bill:
• Sections 1-8 and Section 15 provide for education and regulatory oversight of mortgage
brokers. Predatory lending problems have been tracked again and again to out-of-state or
fly-by-night "brokers" who are often transacting business in the state without any regulatory
oversight whatsoever. This bill requires mortgage brokers and loan officers (except those
working as employees of exempt institutions) doing business in Kentucky to register with
and provide evidence of completion of at least 12 hours of classroom work on mortgage
loans to the Department of Financial Institutions prior to and as ·an ongoing condition of
transacting business in the state. Failure to comply with the registration or licensure
requirements may result in penalties, including a prohibition on doing business in Kentucky.
In addition, this bill requires mortgage brokers to disclose to the borrower whether or not the
broker is operating as an agent of the borrower, similar to the disclosure now required for
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real estate agents. Section 15 requires mortgage brokers to have a physical location in
Kentucky.
• Sections 10-11 provide that municipalities are pre-empted from passing ordinances or other
official resolutions in the area of lending. This ensures a consistent and even enforcement of
lending violations within the Commonwealth.
• Section 12 contains the traditional predatory lending provisions. These provisions only
apply in the case of "high-cost home loans."
"High-cost" loans are defined as loans between $15,000 and $200,000, where the borrower is a
natural person, the debt is incurred primarily for a consumer purpose, the loan is secured by the
borrower's principal residence and the loan hits the HOEPA triggers on rates and fees. (Under
HOEPA, for a first-lien loan, the APR trigger is more than eight percentage points over Treasury
securities of comparable maturity. For a second-lien loan, the APR exceeds by more than 10
percentage points the rates in Treasury securities of comparable maturity. Or, for all loans, the
total fees and points payable by the consumer at or before closing exceed the larger of $488 or
eight percent of the total loan amount. (The $488 figure is for 2003. The FRB adjusts this
amount annually.) The definition specifically exempts reverse mortgages and open-end credit,
but is also broader in some respects than HOEPA because it covers purchase money transactions
as well. The controls contained in the bill apply to all lenders and brokers. Assignees will be
liable for violations only if apparent on the face of the disclosures or underlying note.
The limitations on "high-cost" loans are:
1) Limitation on prepayment penalties (3 years on reducing scale of 3%, 2%, 1%).
2) No lender directed acceleration, other than in the case of default, due on sale clause or
other loan term.
3) No scheduled payments more than twice as large as average of earlier payments,
except to assist for borrower's irregular or seasonal income.
4) No negative amortization.
5) No increased interest rate after or triggered by default.
6) No finance of and payment in advance of more than 2 periodic payments.
7) Limitation on workout fees to Y2 of fees, which would be charged for a refinance,
unless the borrower is in default, and it would be in his best interest.
8) YOU CAN LOSE YOUR HOME/Credit counseling disclosure.
9) Reasonable belief that borrower will be able to repay the loan-presumption of
ability to repay if 50% debt to income.
10) Limitation on financing certain points and fees on "high-cost" refinance to another
"high-cost" loan by the same lender.
11) Flipping prohibition-by prohibiting the charging of points and fees by any lender on
a "high-cost" to "high-cost" refinance within one year of the consummation of the
first loan. Additional limitation on points and fees that can be charged by the same
lender after the first year.
12) No payment to contractor without borrower's agreement.
13) No refinance of a zero interest or subsidized loan to a "high-cost" loan.
14) No finance of single premium credit insurance.
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15) Make available a "counseling" video approved by DFL
16) No unfair arbitration clause.
17) Limitation on late fees to greater of 5% or $10.
18) Limitation on charges for first two written, payoff calculations.
19) No foreclosure proceedings without demand to cure.
20) No recommendation or encouragement of default.
The "high-cost" provisions are included in the usury chapter and are subject to the penalties
provided therein, as well as to the penalties of the Consumer Protection Act. In addition to direct
violation, it is considered a violation of the section to structure a transaction intentionally to
avoid the limitations of the section. The Attorney General, the Department of Financial
Institutions or the borrower may bring an enforcement action. A lender may avoid liability under
this bill if the violation was a mistake made in good faith and "appropriate restitution" is made to
the borrower with the statutorily provided time.
• Sections 13 and 14 include language that insures that mortgage loans, which are both
solicited and closed in the home, are covered under the existing home solicitation act and
allows consumers who feel pressured into signing a loan at their home to have 3 days after
closing to reverse the transaction.
IV. Discharge of Motor Vehicle Liens (HB 388-signed by the Governor March 18). This
bill provides that once good funds (in the form of certified check, cashier's check or wire
transfer) are received, sufficient to satisfy the outstanding debt, a lien on a motor vehicle shall be
released within 10 days. If the secured party fails to release the lien, the debtor may initiate an
action in Circuit Court to have the lien released and a new title issued.
v. Corporate License Tax (HB 390-Subject to veto until April 5, 2003). In December
2002, the Franklin Circuit Court ruled on a case brought by Illinois Tool Works against the
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet. In that case, the Franklin Circuit Court ruled that a provision in
Kentucky's license tax statute (KRS 136.071), which allowed for Kentucky domiciled
companies to deduct from capital calculations certain investments in subsidiaries, was
unconstitutional. The court also ordered that the Revenue Cabinet pay refunds to out-of-state
holding companies and that the deduction from capital calculation no longer be available to any
company, foreign or domestic, beginning in the 2004 tax year.
Under an amendment to this bill, which was literally passed on the last day of session, holding
companies that hold more than 50% of the outstanding stock of a subsidiary will report only 10%
of the subsidiary stock value in capital calculation for purposes of computing the license tax
under KRS 136.070. This law applies only for tax year 2004 (the court case specified that the
ruling would take effect beginning 2004)-meaning that we will be lobbying this same issue in
2004. However, of more primary concern, the Governor has threatened to veto the bill and has
until April 5 to do so. A veto would put the full burden of the tax on all holding companies
located in the state.
Debra Stamper
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AN ACT relating to unclaimed property.
Amend KRS 393.010 to define "abandoned property fund"; amend KRS 393.110 to
establish the procedure for advertising the annual report on abandoned property;
amend KRS 393.160 to provide for an administrative hearing for persons aggrieved by
a decision or inaction on the part of the Department of Treasury regarding unclaimed
property; amend KRS 393.250 to require expenses for administration of Chapter 393 to
be paid out of the abandoned property fund; amend KRS 393.280 to permit the State
Treasurer to promulgate administration regulations.
HJ32JJ - AMENDMENTS
HFA (1, M. Denham) - Amend KRS 393.280 to permit the State Treasurer to
delegate duties of the program to any employee of the department.
SCS/FN - Retain the original provisions and amend to exempt from abandoned
property wages and salaries of $50 or less that are not claimed by an employer within 1
year of the date the wages or salaries are earned; create a new section of KRS
Chapter 393 to provided that unclaimed property payable or distributable in the course
of a demutalizaiton of an insurance company is presumed abandoned the earlier of 3
years after the date of the last contact with the policy holder or the date the property
became payable or distributable; amend KRS 393.020, 393.062, 393.064, 393.066,
393.080, and 393.010 to reduce from 7 to 3 years when property is presumed
abandoned.
Jan 10-introduced in House
Feb 4-to State Government (H)
Feb 5-posted in committee
Feb 21-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar; floor amendment (1) filed
Feb 24-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 26-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Thursday, February
27,2003
Feb 27-3rd reading, passed 93-0 with floor amendment (1 )
Feb 28-received in Senate
Mar 3-to Appropriations and Revenue (S)
Mar 4-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with Committee Substitute
Mar 5-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 6-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Thursday, March 6,
2003; 3rd reading, passed 38-0 with Committee Substitute
Mar 10-received in House; posted for passage for concurrence in Senate
Committee Substitute; House concurred in Senate Committee Substitute; passed 84-
10
Mar 11-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer; delivered to Governor
Mar 18-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 95)
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AN ACT relating to unclaimed property.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 393.010 is amended to read as follows:
(l) As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:
(a) "Banking organization" means any bank, trust company, savmgs bank,
industrial bank, land bank, safe deposit company, or a private banker engaged
in business in this state;
(b) "Business association" means any corporation, joint stock company, business
trust, partnership, or any association for business purposes of two (2) or more
individuals;
(c) "Financial organization" means any savings and loan association, building and
loan association, credit union, cooperative bank, or investment company,
engaged in business in this state;
(d) "Life insurance corporation" means any corporation or association transacting
within this state the business of insurance on the lives of persons or insurance
appertaining thereto, including, but not by way of limitation, endowments and
annuities;
(e) "Claim" means to demand payment or surrender of property from the person
whose duty it is to pay the claimant, or surrender to him the property involved;
(f) "Treasurer" means the State Treasurer;
(g) "Department" means the Department of the Treasury;
(h) "Person" means any individual, state or national bank, partnership, joint stock
company, business, trust, association, corporation, or other form of business
enterprise, including a receiver, trustee, or liquidating agent,' and
(i) "Abandoned property fund" means the fund in which moneys are placed
that are paid to the department pursuant to this chapter.
(2) This chapter does not apply to money, funds, or any other property held by or owing
ENROLLED
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to any nonprofit, Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3), tax-exempt hospital, or
to bonds of counties, cities, school districts, or other tax-levying subdivisions of this
state or to any money, funds, or other intangible property at any time held or owing
for any minerals or other raw materials capable of being used for fuel in the course
of manufacturing, processing, production, or mining, or to wages or salaries of{ifty
dollars ($50) or less that are not claimed by an employee within one (1) year of
the date the wages or salaries were earned. The provisions of this subsection shall
be effective retroactively to all such moneys, funds, or other intangible property
held or owing by any person on June 1, 1960, or thereafter.
Section 2. KRS 393.110 is amended to read as follows:
(1) A holder of property presumed abandoned shall make an annual report to the
department concerning the property. The report shall be filed on or before
November 1 of each year and shall cover the twelve (12) months ending on July 1
of that year. All property so reported shall be turned over by November 1 to the
department. The report shall be verified and shall include:
(a) Except with respect to travelers' checks and money orders, the name, if
known, and last known address, if any, of each person appearing from the
records of the holder to be the owner of any property of value of one hundred
dollars ($100) or more presumed abandoned under this chapter and in the case
of unclaimed funds of life insurance corporations, the full name of the insured
or annuitant and his last known address according to the records of the life
insurance corporation;
(b) The nature and identifying number, if any, or description of the property and
the amount appearing from the records to be due, except that items of value
under one hundred dollars ($100) each may be reported in the aggregate. The
holder of abandoned property shall maintain its records for a period of five (5)
years from the date of its report for items reported in the aggregate. If the
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owner of property reported in the aggregate makes a valid claim within five
(5) years, the holder shall refund the property and deduct the amount refunded
from the next report due to the department;
(c) The date when the property became payable, demandable, or returnable, and
the date of the last known transaction with the owner with respect to the
property if readily available; and
(d) Any other information which the department prescribes by administrative
regulations necessary for the administration of this chapter.
The report shall be retained by the department. The department shall publish, in
accordance with KRS Chapter 424, an annual advertisement listing the names of
persons included in the report[made in duplicate; the original shall be retained by
the department, and the copy shall be mailed to the sheriff of the county where the
property is located or held. It shall be the duty of the sheriff to post for not less than
twenty (20) consecutive days this copy on the courthouse door or the courthouse
bulletin board, and also to publish the copy pursuant to KR8 Chapter 424; except
the sheriff shall not be required to publish any item with a fair cash value of one
hundred dollars ($100) or less. The list shall be published ,{lithin thirty (30) days of
its receipt by the sheriff and this publication shall constitute compliance with the
requirements ofKR8 Chapter 424]. The cost of the publication shall be paid by the
state.EThe sheriff shall immediately certify in writing to the department the dates
,{lhen the list was posted and published.] The list shall beE posted and] published as
required on or before October I followingfeff the year when it is made, and thef
posting and] publishing shall be constructive notice to all interested parties.
(2) The holder of property presumed abandoned shall send written notice to the
apparent owner, not more than one hundred twenty (120) days or less than sixty (60)
days before filing the report, stating that the holder is in possession of the property
subject to this section; except the holder shall not be required to mail a notice to any
ENROLLED
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apparent owner where the fair cash value of the property is one hundred dollars
($100) or less. The notice shall contain:
(a) A statement that according to a report filed with the department properties are
being held to which the addressee appears entitled;
(b) The name and address of the person holding the property and any necessary
information regarding changes ofname and address ofthe holder; and
(c) A statement that, if satisfactory proofof claim is not presented by the owner to
the holder by the date specified in the published notice, the property will be
placed in the custody of the department to whom all further claims must be
directed.
(3) Any person who has made a report of any estate or property presumed abandoned,
as required by this chapter, shall, by November 1 of each year, tum over to the
department all property so reported; but if the person making the report or the
owner of the property shall certify to the department that any or all of the statutory
conditions necessary to create a presumption of abandonment no longer exist or
never did exist, or shall report the existence of any fact or circumstance which has a
substantial tendency to rebut the presumption, then, the person reporting or holding
the property shall not be required to tum the property over to the department except
on order of court. If a person files an action in court claiming any property which
has been reported under the provisions of this chapter, the person reporting or
holding the property shall be under no duty while the action is pending to tum the
property over to the department, but shall have the duty of notifying the department
of the pendency of the action.
(4) The person reporting or holding the property or any claimant of it shall always have
the right to a judicial determination of his rights under this chapter, and nothing in
this chapter shall be construed otherwise. The Commonwealth may institute an
action to recover the property presumed abandoned, whether it has been reported or
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not, and may include in one (1) petition all the property within the jurisdiction of
the court in which the action is brought if the property of different persons is set out
in separate paragraphs.
Section 3. KRS 393.160 is amended to read as follows:
Any person dissatisfied with the decision of the State Treasurer or whose claim has not
been acted upon within ninety (90) days after its filing may request in writing an
administrative hearing that shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of
KRS Chapter 13B[may, within sixty (60) days, appeal from it to the Franklin Circuit
Court or file an action in that court to vacate the decision. In either event the proceedings
shall be de novo, and no transcript of the record before the State Treasurer shall be
required to be kept unless requested by the claimant. In the proceeding the State Treasurer
shall be made a party defendant, and all other persons required by law to be made parties
in actions in rem or quasi in rem shall be made parties. Any party adversely affected by
the decision of the Franklin Circuit Court may appeal to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon an appeal .the state shall not be
required to make a supersedeas bond. The provisions of this section relating to the
decision of the State Treasurer and appeals therefrom shall also apply to a decision of the
State Treasurer rendered under authority ofKRS 393.11Q].
Section 4. KRS 393.250 is amended to read as follows:
(1 ) Any necessary expense required to be paid by the state III administering and
enforcing this chapter shall be paid out of the abandoned property fund[receipts].
(2) The county attorney shall act as agent of the department for the collection of all
judgments recovered in actions prosecuted by him under this chapter. He shall
promptly remit the judgment recovered to the department with the information
relating thereto as the department requires.
Section 5. KRS 393.280 is amended to read as follows:
(1) The department, through its employees, may at reasonable times and upon
ENROLLED
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reasonable notice examine all relevant records of any person except any banking
organization or financial organization where there is reason to believe that there has
been or is a failure to report property that should be reported under this chapter
during the preceding reporting period. Records shall be considered relevant to the
examination of the preceding reporting period if they document the period
necessary, for that type of property, to establish presumed abandonment.
(2) The Department of Financial Institutions may at reasonable times and upon
reasonable notice examine all relevant records of any banking organization or
financial organization if there is reason to believe that there has been or is a failure
to report property that should be reported under this chapter during the preceding
reporting period.
(3) Documents and working papers obtained or compiled by the department or the
Department of Financial Institutions in the course of conducting an examination are
confidential and are not open records under KRS 61.870 to 61.884.
(4) The State Treasurer may promulgate administrative regulations pursuant to KRS
Chapter 13A and any reasonable and necessary rules for the enforcement of this
chapter, and govern hearings held before him. He may delegate in writing to anyf
regular] employee of the department authority to perform any of the duties imposed
on him by this chapter, except the promulgation of rules.
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 393 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
Unclaimed property payable or distributable in the course of a demutalization of an
insurance company is presumed abandoned three (3) years after the earlier ofthe date
of the last contact with the policyholder or the date the property became payable or
distributable.
Section 7. KRS 393.020 is amended to read as follows:
If any property having a situs in this state has been devised or bequeathed to any person
ENROLLED
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and is not claimed by that person or by his heirs, distributees, or devisees within three
Ql[seven (7)] years after the death of the testator, or if the owner of any property having a
situs in this state dies without heirs or distributees entitled to it and without disposing of
it by will, it shall vest in the state, subject to all legal and equitable demands. Any
property abandoned by the owner, except a perfect title to a corporeal hereditament, shall
vest in the state, subject to all legal and equitable demands. Any property that vests in the
state under this section shall be liquidated, and the proceeds, less costs, fees, and
expenses incidental to all legal proceedings of the liquidation shall be paid to the
department.
Section 8. KRS 393.062 is amended to read as follows:
(1) "Unclaimed funds," as used in this section, means all moneys held and owing by
any life insurance corporation unclaimed and unpaid for more than three (3)[seven
f7t} years after the moneys became due and payable as established from the records
of the corporation under any contract which has matured or terminated. A life
insurance policy not matured by actual proof of the death of the insured is deemed
to be matured and the proceeds thereof are deemed to be due and payable if such
policy was in force when the insured attained the limiting age under the mortality
table on which the reserve is based, unless the person appearing entitled thereto has
within the preceding three (3)[seven (7)] years, (a) assigned, readjusted, or paid
premiums on the policy, or subjected the policy to loan, or (b) corresponded in
writing with the life insurance corporation concerning the policy. Moneys otherwise
payable according to the records of the corporation are deemed due and payable
although the policy or contract has not been surrendered as required.
(2) Unclaimed funds, as defined in this section, held and owing by a life insurance
corporation shall be presumed abandoned if the last known address, according to
the records of the corporation, of the person entitled to the funds is within this state.
If a person other than the insured or annuitant is entitled to the funds and no address
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of such person is known to the corporation or if it is not definite and certain from
the records of the corporation what person is entitled to the funds, it is presumed
that the last known address of the person entitled to the funds is the same as the last
known address of the insured or annuitant according to the records of corporation.
Section 9. KRS 393.064 is amended to read as follows:
Except as provided in KRS 272.291, any stock or other certificate of ownership, or any
dividend, profit, distribution, interest, payment, or principal, or other sum held or owing
by a business association for or to a shareholder, certificate holder, member, bondholder,
or other security holder, or a participating patron of a cooperative, who has not claimed it,
or corresponded in writing with the business association concerning it, within three
m[seven (7)] years after the date prescribed for payment or delivery, is presumed
abandoned if:
(1) It is held or owing by a business association organized under the laws of or created
in this state; or
(2) It is held or owing by a business association doing business in this state, but not
organized under the laws of or created in this state, and the records of the business
association indicate that the last known address of the person entitled thereto is in
this state.
Section 10. KRS 393.066 is amended to read as follows:
All intangible personal property and any income or increment thereon, held in a fiduciary
capacity for the benefit of another person is presumed abandoned unless the owner has,
within three (3)[seven (7)] years after it becomes payable or distributable, increased or
decreased the principal, accepted payment of principal or income, corresponded in
writing concerning the property, or otherwise indicated an interest as evidenced by a
memorandum on file with the fiduciary:
(l) If the property is held by a banking organization or a financial organization, or by a
business association organized under the laws of or created in this state; or
ENROLLED
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(2) If it is held by a business association doing business in this state, or any agent or
fiduciary acting for or under contract with a business association doing business in
this state, but not organized under the laws of or created in this state, and the
records of the business association indicate that the last known address of the
person entitled thereto is in this state; or
(3) Ifit is held in this state by any other person.
Section 11. KRS 393.080 is amended to read as follows:
The following funds held or owing are presumed abandoned:
(1) Any deposit of money, stocks, bonds, or other credits made to secure payment for
services rendered or to be rendered, or to guarantee the performance of services or
duties, or to protect against damage or harm, and the increments thereof, unless
claimed by the person entitled thereto within three (3)[seven (7)] years after the
occurrence of the event that would obligate the holder or depository to return it or
its equivalent.
(2) Except as provided in KRS 272.291, any sum which a public utility has been
ordered to refund and which was received for utility services rendered in this state,
together with any interest thereon, less any lawful deductions, that has remained
unclaimed by the person appearing on the records of the utility entitled thereto for
more than three (3)[seven (7)] years after the date it became payable in accordance
with the final determination or order providing for the refund.
(3) If there remains a total of one million dollars ($1,000,000) or more in unclaimed
sums one (1) year after a public utility refund became payable in accordance with
the final determination or order providing for the refund, excepting sums that may
eventually be claimed pursuant to KRS 272.291, and less any lawful deductions, the
Finance and Administration Cabinet shall enter into an agreement or agreements
with the public utility that will allow the public utility to pay the unclaimed sums,
minus the exceptions noted above, to the Kentucky State Treasurer immediately if
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the Attorney General determines by written opinion that a reasonable relationship
exists between the source of and reason for the refund, and the workers'
compensation liability of a bankrupt employer who purportedly was self-insured,
either individually or through a self-insurance group, under KRS Chapter 342.
Payment of the unclaimed sums to the Kentucky State Treasurer shall constitute a
complete release of the public utility from any further responsibility for the sums so
paid, and from liability to any person who may have a claim to any of such sums.
(4) The Kentucky Workers' Compensation Funding Commission shall preserve the
rights of persons or ratepayers entitled to claim a refund under this section, and may
utilize any funds available to the agency for the purpose of preserving those rights.
Section 12. KRS 393.090 is amended to read as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in KRS 393.010, all intangible property, not otherwise
covered by this chapter, including any income or increment thereon and deducting any
lawful charges, that is held or owing in this state by any person and has remained
unclaimed by the owner for more than three (3)[seven (7)] years after it became payable
or distributable is presumed abandoned.
ENROLLED
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.H!i2~I (BR 315) - R. Damron, S. Westrom, A. Arnold, P. Bather, S. Baugh, J.
Coleman, K. Hall, C. Hoffman, D. Pasley, A. Simpson
AN ACT relating to mortgage loans.
Amend KRS 294.010 to define "loan officer', "originator", "loan processor", and
"classroom"; amend KRS 294.020 to clarify who is exempt from KRS Chapter 294;
amend KRS 294.030 to make it unlawful to act as a mortgage loan broker or loan
officer unless registered with the Department of Financial Institutions; amend KRS
294.032 to provide that a license issued to a mortgage loan company or a mortgage
loan broker entitles all officers and employees, association members and employees,
partnerships, natural persons, or trusts to engage in the mortgage loan business,
subject to registration requirements; amend KRS 294.034 to increase the license
reinstatement fee from $100 to $250; create new sections of KRS Chapter 294 to
provide that beginning July 1, 2004, and annually thereafter, mortgage loan brokers
and loan officers must register with the Department of Financial Institutions and pay a
registration fee of $50; require in the case of initial registrations of loan officers that the
applicant must complete 12 hours of education courses; provide that beginning JUly 1,
2005, renewals of registration of mortgage loan brokers and loan officers must include
evidence of completion of continuing education courses and a renewal fee of $50;
provide that beginning July 2,2004, all registered mortgage brokers and registered
loan officers must complete at least 12 hours of continuing professional education by
June 30, 2005, and annually thereafter; require that at least six of the hours must be
classroom hours; permit up to 12 hours to be carried forward to the next education
year; require each registered mortgage loan broker and registered loan officer to
provide the Commissioner with written certification as to courses completed; require
courses to be approved by the Department; permit the Commissioner to grant an
extension of up to one year for good cause shown; provide that failure to comply with
the continuing education requirement will result in termination of registration; authorize
the Commissioner to deny, suspend, or revoke the registration or license of a mortgage
loan company, mortgage loan broker, or loan officer if, after a hearing, the
Commissioner finds failure to comply with this Act; list other grounds for denial,
suspension, and revocation of registration and license; permit a mortgage loan broker
to act as an agent for the individual or individuals attempting to obtain a mortgage loan
and require disclosure as to whether the broker is acting as an agent; amend KRS
287.010 to define "municipality" and "political subdivision"; create a new section of KRS
Chapter 287 to prohibit political subdivisions from enacting or enforcing ordinances,
resolutions, and regulations pertaining to financial or lending activities of persons or
entities which are subject to KRS Chapter 287 or to the Department of Financial
Institutions, or are subject to the listed federal regulatory authorities, or who originate,
purchase, sell, assign, securitize, assist, facilitate, or se.rvice property interests or
obligations created by financial transactions or loans made, executed, or originated by
the persons regulated by the listed state or federal authorities; create new sections of
KRS Chapter 360 to define "high-cost home loan"; prohibit a high-cost home loan from
containing a provision allOWing the lender to charge or collect prepayment fees or
penalties more than 36 months after the loan closing or which exceed three percent of
amount prepaid during the first 12 months, two percent during the second 12 months,
or one percent during the third 12 months; prohibit a provision allowing the lender to
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accelerate the indebtedness; prohibit a scheduled payment that is more than twice as
large as the average of earlier scheduled payments; prohibit a payment schedule with
regular periodic payments that cause the principal balance to increase; prohibit a
provision which increases the rate after default; prohibit terms under which two or more
periodic payments are consolidated and paid in advance from the loan proceeds;
provide that a lender cannot charge a borrower fees to modify, renew, extend, or
amend a high-cost home loan or to defer any payment, unless the fees are less than
one-half of any fees that would be charged to refinance, or unless the borrower is in
default, and it is in the best interest of the borrower; provide that a lender cannot make
a high-cost home loan unless the borrower has been provided a written notice that the
borrower could lose the home if the borrower fails to meet his or her obligations under
the loan; require the notice to explain that mortgage rates and closing costs and fees
vary based on many factors, including credit and employment history, loan-to-value
requested, and the type of property; require the notice to suggest consulting a qualified
independent credit counselor or other experienced financial advisor; require the notice
to point out that the borrower is not required to complete the loan agreement, that
homeowners insurance and property taxes are the responsibility of the borrower, and
that payments on existing debts affect aperson's credit rating; prohibit a lender from
making a high-cost home loan unless the lender reasonably believes that one or more
borrowers will be able to make the scheduled payments based upon consideration of
their current and expected income, current obligations, current employment status, and
other financial resources; provide that there shall be a presumption that the borrower
can make the scheduled payments if the borrower's total monthly debts, inclUding
amounts owed under the loan, do not exceed 50% of the borrower's monthly gross
income; provide that if the proceeds of the high-cost home loan are used to refinance
an existing high-cost home loan held by the same lender, the lender may not finance
any prepayment penalties or fees payable by the borrower or finance points and fees
which in the aggregate exceed four percent of the total amount financed; prohibit a
lender or mortgage loan broker, within one year of the consummation of a high-cost
home loan, from charging the borrower points and fees in connection with a high-cost
home loan if the proceeds of the high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing
high-cost home loan; prohibit a lender from paying a contractor under a home-
improvement contract from the proceeds of a high-cost home loan other than by an
instrument payable to the borrower or jointly to the borrower and the contractor, or at
the election of the borrower, through a third-party escrow agent in accordance with a
written agreement signed by the borrower, lender, and contractor; prohibit a lender
from refinancing, replacing, or consolidating a zero interest rate or low interest rate loan
made by a governmental or nonprofit lender with a high-cost home loan; prohibit a
lender from financing single premium credit life, accident, health, disability, or loss of
income insurance in connection with a high-cost home loan; provide that a high-cost
home loan that violates certain provisions of this Act is usurious and is an unfair and
deceptive act or practice in violation of KRS 367.170; provide that the Attorney
General, the Commissioner of the Department of Financial Institutions, or any party to a
high-cost home loan may enforce certain provisions of this Act; provide that a lender
acting in good faith will not be deemed to be in violation if certain conditions are met;
provide that any extension of credit shall be deemed to have been made in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and subject to this Act if the lender offers or agrees in
Kentucky to lend to a borrower who is a Kentucky resident on real property located in
Kentucky or if the borrower accepts or makes the offer withifl Kentucky to borrow
regardless of the situs of the contract; amend KRS 367.410 to include consumer loans
in the definition of "home solicitation sale"; amend KRS 367.420 to provide that, for
home solicitation sales on loans in which a security interest is taken in the principal
dwelling of the buyer, the buyer has the right to rescind or cancel the transaction until
midnight of the third business day following the later of the consummation of the loan
transaction or the delivery of the material disclosures required under the federal Truth
in Lending Act.
HE32~7 - AMENDMENTS
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tlCSJU - Retain original provisions of the Act; create a new section of KRS Chapter
294 to require each licensed mortgage loan broker to maintain a physical office in
Kentucky; allow 90 day period for compliance by brokers licensed on the effective date
of this Act who do not currently maintain a physical office in Kentucky; amend KRS
294.034 to prohibit the commissioner from approving license renewal if the information
on office location is not received; amend KRS 294.032, relating to the application for a
license and renewals, to include information on the location of the physical office
location in Kentucky and whether the location is a residence; require photographs of
exterior. interior, and exterior sign; require the lease of any nonresidence location to be
for a term of at least 1 year; require proof of residence that must confirm the mortgage
loan broker owns or leases the residence and lives in the residence as the broker's
main residence; require at least 10 days' notice of the address change at the physical
office location; create new provisions in Section 12 on high cost home loans to require
the lender to make available a videotape or similar audio-video media to explain the
borrower's rights and responsibilities; prohibit a lender from making the loan subject to
mandatory arbitration that is oppressive, unfair, unconscionable, or substantially in
derogation of the rights of consumers; restrict the late payment fee a lender may
charge; restrict the fee that may be charged for a written payoff calculation; require at
least 30 days prior notice of initiation of foreclosure; prohibit a lender from
recommending or encouraging default on an existing loan or other debt in connection
with the high cost home loan that refinances all or a portion of the existing loan or debt.
HCS (2) - Retain original provisions of House Committee Substitute 1; prohibit
violation of civil rights by local government units under section 11; change the definition
of high-cost home loan in section 12 to comply with the federal Home Ownership and
Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) on annual percentage rate and points and fees.
t:!FAf1. P. Bather) - Amend Section 11 to prohibit violation of civil rights by local
government units by virtue of this section.
tlfAJ2, R. Damron) - Change the definition of high cost home loan to comply with
the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA) on annual
percentage rate and points and fees.
HEA{~. R. Webb) - Amend to insert a provision that prohibits lenders from
refinancing, replacing, or consolidating an existing home loan if the primary tangible
benefit of the refinancing to the borrower isan interest rate lower than the interest rate
of debts satisfied or refinanced in connection with the home loan, and it will take more
than four years for the borrower to recoup the costs of the points and fees and other
closing costs through savings resulting from the lower interest rate.
tlFAH, R. Webb) - Define "lender" to provide that a person who purchases or is
assigned a high-cost home loan is subject to certain claims and defenses.
HEAJ;;. R. Webb) - Establish a points and fees threshold for determining whether a
home loan is a high-cost home loan.
HFA (6, R. Webb) - Prohibit financing points or fees.
HFA (7, R. Webb) - Permit recovery of attorney's fees.
SFA_(l. R. Jones II) - Prohibit financing points or fees.
SFA (2. R. Jones II) - Establish a points and fees threshold for determining whether
a home loan is a high-cost home loan.
$FAfl, R. Jones II) - Permit recovery of attorney's fees.
Feb 4-introduced in House
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Feb 5-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 7-posted in committee
Feb 12-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with Committee Substitute
Feb 13-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 14-f1oor amendments (1) and (2) filed to Committee Substitute
Feb 19-f1oor amendments (3) (4) (5) (6) and (7) filed to Committee Substitute;
recommitted to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 20-reported favorably, to Rules with Committee Substitute (2) ; posted for
passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Friday, February 21,2003
Feb 21-3rd reading, passed 96-0 with Committee Substitute (2)
Feb 24-received in Senate
Feb 26-to Banking and Insurance (S)
Mar 4-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Consent Calendar
Mar 5-2nd reading, to Rules; floor amendments (1) (2) and (3) filed
Mar 6-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Thursday, March 6,
2003
Mar 10-3rd reading; floor amendments (1) (2) and (3) withdrawn; passed 34-0;
received in House
Mar 11-enrolled, signed by each presiding officer; delivered to Governor
Mar 12-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 64)
Kentucky Legislature Home Page I Record Front Page
A·20
Page 4 of4
AN ACT relating to mortgage loans.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 294.010 is amended to read as follows:
Unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Affiliate" means any person who directly or indirectly through one (l) or more
intermediaries, controls, or is controlled by, or is under common control with
another person;
(2) "Department" means the Department of Financial Institutions;
(3) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions;
(4) "Mortgage loan" means any loan secured by a mortgage on residential real property
or any loan secured by collateral which has a mortgage lien interest in residential
real property;
(5) "Residential real property" means any single family residence or multiple dwelling
structure containing four (4) or less single dwelling units for four (4) or less family
units, living independently of each other, or any single family condominium unit;
(6) "Person" means an individual, a corporation, a partnership, an association, a joint-
stock company, a trust where the interest of the beneficiaries is evidenced by a
security, an unincorporated organization, a government, a political subdivision of a
government, or any other group however organized;
(7) "Mortgage loan company" means any person who directly or indirectly:
(a) Holds himself out as. being able to make or purchase loans secured by
mortgages on residential real property;
(b) Holds himself out as being able to service loans secured by mortgages on
residential real property; and
(c) Holds himself out as being able to buy or sell notes secured by mortgages on
residential real property;
(8) "Mortgage loan broker" means any person who for compensation or gain, or in the
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expectation ofcompensation or gain, directly or indirectly:
(a) Holds himself out as being able to serve as an agent for any person in an
attempt to obtain a loan which will be secured by a mortgage on residential
real property; or
(b) Holds himself out as being able to serve as an agent for any person who has
money to loan, which loan is or will be secured by a mortgage on residential
real property.
"Mortgage loan broker" does not mean a person who performs functions ofa
loan processor, nor does it mean a person who performs only clerical functions
such as delivering a loan application to a mortgage loan broker or mortgage loan
company or gathering information related to a mortgage loan application on
behalf of the prospective borrower, mortgage loan broker, or mortgage loan
companw
(9) "Loan officer" or "originator" means an individual who discusses or negotiates
the rates, terms, and conditions of a loan with a borrower or prospective
borrower. The term does not mean a person who performs functions of a loan
processor, nor does it mean an individual who performs only clerical functions
such as delivering a loan application to a mortgage loan broker or mortgage loan
company or gathering information related to a mortgage loan application on
behalf of the prospective borrower, mortgage loan broker, or mortgage loan
company,·
(10) "Loan processor" means an individual who works under the instruction ofa
loan officer or mortgage loan broker and performs only clerical functions such
as gathering information, requesting information, word processing, sending
correspondence, or assembling filesj and
(11) "Classroom" means a physical classroom environment in which teachers and
participants are physically present for the teaching of a course. Courses taught
GA
A- 22
through the Internet. mail. or correspondence classes shall not be considered to
be courses taught in a classroom.
Section 2. KRS 294.020 is amended to read as follows:
(1) The following shall be exempt from this chapter:
(a) Any person duly licensed, chartered, or otherwise subject to regular
examination at least once every two (2) years by a state or federal financial
institution regulatory agency under the laws of this state or any other state or
the United States as a bank, bank holding company, trust company, credit
union, savings and loan association, service corporation subsidiary of savings
and loan associations, consumer loan or finance company, industrial loan
company, insurance company, real estate investment trust as defined in 26
U.S.C. sec. 856, an institution of the farm credit system organized under the
Farm Credit Act of 1971 as amended, or any wholly owned subsidiary !!!.
affiliate. or any mortgage loan broker. loan officer. originator. or loan
processor employed by any such person. or by a subsidiary or affiliate of any
institution listed in this paragraph if the institution maintains a place of
business in Kentucky;
(b) An attorney-at-law licensed to practice law in Kentucky who is not.principally
engaged in the business of negotiating mortgage loans, when the person
renders services in the course ofhis practice as an attorney-at-law;
(c) Any person doing any act under order of any court;
(d) The United States of America, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, or any other
state, and any Kentucky city, county, or other political subdivision, and any
agency, division, or corporate instrumentality of any of the foregoing;
(e) The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC), and the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA); and
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(f)[ 'Nith the approval of the commissioner, an independent contractor that solicits
mortgage loans for only one (1) licensed mortgage loan company or licensed
mortgage loan broker may be exempted from obtaining a license under this
chapter if:
1. The licensed mortgage loan company or licensed mortgage loan broker
notifies the department that it will assume legal responsibility for the
actions of the independent contractor in complying ':lith the provisions
ofKR8 Chapter 294; and
2. The licensed mortgage loan company or licensed mortgage loan broker
provides the department with proof that its bond will cover the
independent contractor; and
fgH Any mortgage loan involving housing initially transferred by certificate of title
under KRS Chapter 186A.
(2) The following shall be exempt from all the provisions of this chapter except that
they shall be subject to the examination or investigation provisions of KRS
294.170(4), (5), and (6),294.180, and 294.190 ifit appears on grounds satisfactory
to the commissioner, on written complaint, that an examination or investigation is
necessaryiH and they shall be subject to the prohibited acts provisions of KRS
294.220; and any mortgage loan broker, loan officer, or originator who is an
employee ofa mortgage loan company or mortgage loan broker regulated by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development shall be subject to Sections 6
and 7 ofthis Act:
(a) Mortgage loan compames or mortgage loan brokers regulated by the
Department ofHousing and Urban Development;
(b) Any natural person making a mortgage loan with his or her own funds for the
person's own investment without intent to resell the mortgage loan;
(c) Any person doing business under the laws of this state or the United States
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relating to any broker-dealer, agent, or investment adviser duly registered with
the Department of Financial Institutions;
(d) Any person licensed in this state as a real estate broker or real estate sales
associate, not actively engaged in the business of negotiating loans secured by
real property, when the person renders the services in the course of his or her
practice as a real estate broker or real estate associate; and
(e) Any person making less than five (5) mortgage loans per year. who shall
notify the Department ofFinancial Institutions ofeach loan made. in such
written form and manner as required by the department.
(3) Any person relying upon an exemption under subsection (2)!!Y..z. (c)l, or (d) of this
section shall file with the commissioner a claim of exemption. The commissioner
shall thereafter determine the availability of the claimed exemption and he shall not
disallow an exemption that is validly claimed.
(4) Any person listed in subsection (l)(a), (b), (c), (d), or (e) of this section shall not be
required to file with the commissioner a claim of exemption.
(5) (a) Any natural person making a loan under subsection (2)(b) of this section shall
make the following disclosure, on a separate sheet of paper in minimum
eighteen (18) point type, to the borrower:
DISCLOSURE
(Name and address of lender) is not licensed or regulated by the Kentucky
Department 0 f Financial Institutions.
(Name of lender) is making this mortgage loan with his or her own funds, for
the person's own investment, without intent to resell the mortgage loan.
(The phone number and address of the Kentucky Department of Financial
Institutions.)
(b) A copy of the disclosure, signed by the borrower, shall be maintained by the
natural person for a period not to exceed three (3) years after the date the
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mortgage loan is paid in full.
(c) This subsection shall not apply to a natural person under subsection (2)(b) of
this section making less than five (5) mortgage loans per year.
Section 3. KRS 294.030 is amended to read as follows:
(1) (a) It is unlawful for any person to transact business in this state, either directly or
indirectly, as a mortgage loan company or mortgage loan broker if he is not
licensed under this chapter and registered in accordance with Section 6 of
this Act, unless that person is exempt under KRS 294.020 and, if required by
KRS 294.020(3) to file a claim of exemption, has filed a claim of exemption
and the filed claim of exemption has been allowed by the commissioner.
(b) It is unlawful for any natural person to make a loan under KRS 294.020(2)(b)
without making the disclosure required by KRS 294.020(5).
(c) It is unlawful for any loan officer, unless otherwise exempted, to originate
mortgage loans in Kentucky if the loan officer is not registered in
accordance with Section 6 ofthis Act.
(2) Neither the fact that a license has been issued nor the fact that any person, business,
or company is effectively registered, constitutes a finding by the commissioner that
any document filed under this chapter is true, complete, and not misleading. Nor
does such fact directly or indirectly imply approval of the registrant by the
commissioner or the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It is unlawful to make or cause
to be made to any prospective customer or client any representation inconsistent
with this subsection.
(3) Any person who willfully transacts business in this state in violation of subsection
(1) of this section shall have no right to collect, receive, or retain any interest or
charges whatsoever on a loan contract, but the unpaid principal of the loan shall be
paid in full.
Section 4. KRS 294.032 is amended to read as follows:
GA
A- 26
j
(1) A license as a mortgage loan company or a mortgage loan broker may be obtained
by filing a written application with the commissioner.
(2) The application shall:
(a) Be sworn to;
(b) State the name ofthe applicant and each of the applicant's affiliates engaged in
business as a mortgage loan company or a mortgage loan broker;
(c) State the name under which the applicant will conduct business in Kentucky;
(d) State the location of the applicant's principal office and branch offices III
Kentucky;
(e) List the name, residence, and business address of each person having an
interest in the business as principal, partner, officer, trustee, and director,
specifying the capacity and title ofeach;
(f) Indicate the general plan and character of the business;
(g) Contain a corporate surety bond or other instrument as prescribed by KRS
294.060;
(h) If applying for a mortgage loan broker license, contain a compiled financial
statement of the applicant; or, if applying for a mortgage loan company
license, contain a reviewed or audited financial statement of the applicant
prepared by a licensed or certified public accountant;
(i) Require payment of the appropriate registration fees; and
CD Require such other information as the commissioner determines necessary.
(3) No mortgage loan company license may be granted unless the applicant has and
maintains, so long as the license is in effect, a minimum, documented funding
source of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000). If a mortgage loan company
has a net worth in excess of five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000), an additional
funding source is not required.
(4) A[If a licensee is a person other than a natural person, the] license issued to !!
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mortgage loan company or a mortgage loan brokerfitt shall entitle all officers and
employees of the person, if a corporation, and all members, partners, trustees, and
employees, if an association, partnership, natural person, or trust, to engage in the
mortgage loan business licensed pursuant to this chapter, subject to the applicable
registration requirements ofSections 6 and 7ofthis Act.
(5) If a licensee desires to establish a branch office in Kentucky not already approved,
the licensee shall file a registration statement with the commissioner that includes
the address and telephone number of the branch office, the name of the prospective
manager, the anticipated opening date, and any other information prescribed by the
commissioner.
(6) All applicants for a mortgage loan broker license shall have successfully completed
an educational training course, approved by the department, of not less than thirty
(30) classroom hours' duration. Mortgage loan brokers who have held a license for
at least one (1) year shall be exempt from this requirement. This section shall not
become effective until the department has approved at least one (1) educational
training course. This section shall not apply to renewals of existing licenses.
(7) (a) On and after the effective date of this Act, the application for a mortgage
loan broker license shall state the address ofthe physical location where the
business is to be located in compliance with Section 15 of this Act and
whether such location is a residence. Photographs of the exterior, interior,
and exterior sign of each location shall accompany the application. If the
physical location is not a residence and is leased, the lease shall be for a
term ofat least one (l) year and a copr of the lease and the names ofall
employees conducting business under the lease shall accompany the
application. If the physical location is a residence, proofthat the location is
a residence, in a form as required by the commissioner, shall accompany
the application. Proof of residence shall confirm that the mortgage loan
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broker owns or leases the residence and lives in the residence as the
mortgage loan broker's main residence. Proof of physical location shall
include proofthat local zoning requirements are satisfied.
rb) The information required bv paragraph ra) of this subsection shall be
required for renewals of existing licenses which will expire on June 30,
2004, and for all renewals oflicenses thereafter.
rc) At least ten (10) days prior to the effective date ofan address change ofthe
mortgage loan broker's physical location, the mortgage loan broker shall
notify the commissioner in writing ofthe address change and shall include
the information required by paragraph ra) ofthis subsection.
Section 5. KRS 294.034 is amended to read as follows:
(1) An applicant for a license under this chapter shall provide the commissioner with
separate checks payable to the Kentucky State Treasurer for:
(a) An investigation fee of three hundred dollars ($300) for the principal office
and one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each branch office; and
(b) A license fee of four hundred fifty dollars ($450) for the principal office and
two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for each branch in Kentucky if the applicant
applies for a license on or between July 1 and December 31 or of one hundred
fifty dollars ($150) for the principal office and one hundred dollars ($100) for
each branch if the applicant applies for a license on or between January 1 and
June 30.
(2) A license under this chapter shall expire June 30 next after the date of issuance if it
is not renewed.
(3) A license may be renewed by paying the annual fee for renewing a license which is
three hundred fifty dollars ($350) for the main office and two hundred fifty dollars
($250) for each branch office in Kentucky, and submitting an annual report of
activity as prescribed by the commissioner, and any other information required by
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the commissioner. The commissioner shall not approve the renewal ofa mortgage
loan broker's license if the commissioner has not received the information on
physical location as required in subsection (7) ofSection 4 o[this Act.
(4) the infonnation and payment shall be received by the commissioner on or before
June 20 prior to the June 30 expiration date. The commissioner may reinstate the
license if the licensee pays the filing fee and a reinstatement fee of two hundred
fifty dollars ($250)[one hundred dollars ($100)].
(5) The department shall provide a licensee with a duplicate copy of any license upon a
satisfactory showing of its loss and payment of a ten dollar ($10) replacement fee.
SECTION 6. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 294 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Beginning July 1, 2004, and annually thereaOer, no mortgage loan broker and
no loan officer shall originate mortgage loans in Kentucky unless such mortgage
loan broker or loan officer is registered with the department and has been issued
a certificate of registration by the department. The department shall maintain a
registry of all mortgage loan brokers and loan officers originating mortgage
loans in Kentuckv. The department shall issue a certificate of registration to all
registered mortgage loan brokers and loan officers.
(2) The registration shall:
(a) Be on a form prescribed by the commissioner;
(b) Be accompanied by a registration fee in the amount of fiftv dollars ($50)
which shall be used solely by the department to establish and maintain the
registry system required by this section and any excess funds shall be
retained by the department and shall not lapse to the general fund,·
(c) In the case of initial registrations of loan officers, be accompanied by
satisfactory evidence that the applicant has successfully completed twelve
(12) classroom hours of education courses related directly to the mortgage
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loan process or brokerage business, as approved by the commissioner. This
paragraph shall not apply to renewals ofexisting certificates ofregistration,'
and
(d) Beginning July 1, 2005, in the case of renewals of certificate of
registrations by registered mortgage loan brokers and registered loan
officers, be accompanied by satisfactory evidence that the individual has
successfully met the continuing education requirements ofSection 70fthis
Act and by a renewal fee in the amount of fifty dollars ($50). The renewal
fee shall be used solely by the department to establish and maintain the
registry system required by this section and any excess funds shall be
retained by the department and shall not lapse to the general fund.
(3) All mortgage loan brokers and loan officers subject to the registration
requirements of this section shall also be subject to KRS 294.090(1), (3), (6), (7),
(8), (10), (1n, and (12),294.220(1) and (2), and 294.990.
SECTION 7. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 294 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Beginning July I, 2004, all registered mortgage loan brokers and registered loan
officers shall complete at least twelve (12) hours of continuing professional
education, a minimum ofsix (6) ofwhich must be classroom hours, by June 30,
2005, and annually thereafter.
(2) Up to twelve (12) hours of continuing professional education may be carried
forward (rom one (1) continuing education year to the next continuing education
year. The continuing education year shall begin on July 1 and end on June 30 of
the following year.
(3) Fifty (50) minutes of classroom contact shall equal one (1) hour of continuing
professional education. Each continuing professional education course, other
than classroom hours, shall equal the number ofhours approved and designated
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by the Department of Financial Institutions for that course. Course sponsors
shall maintain records of attendees (or two (2) years after completion of the
course.
(4) Every registered mortgage loan broker and every registered loan officer subject to
this section shall furnish to the commissioner written certification as to each
continuing professional education course satisfactorily completed. The
certification shall be signed by the teacher or sponsoring organization of the
course showing the number of hours of the course and the number of hours
attended. The certification shall be on a (orm prescribed by the commissioner.
(5) Only courses approved by the department shall qualify to satisfy the continuing
professional education requirement oUhis section.
(6) An individual teaching any approved continuing professional education course
shall qualify (or the same number ofhours ofcontinuing professional education
as would be granted to a mortgage loan broker or loan officer taking and
satisfactorily completing the course.
(7) For good cause shown, the commissioner may grant an extension during which
the continuing education requirement of this section may be completed, but the
extension may not exceed one (1) year. What constitutes good cause (or the
extension oUime rests within the discretion ofthe commissioner.
(8)
It
\.~f'
The certificate of registration ofany mortgage loan broker and any loan officer
failing to comply with the continuing professional education requirements oUhis
section and who has not been granted an extension of time to comply in
accordance with subsection (7) of this section shall terminate and shall be
promptly surrendered to the commissioner without demand. The mortgage loan
broker or loan officer shall not originate any mortgage loans while not
registered. The commissioner may reinstate the certificate of registration if the
mortgage loan broker or loan officer submits proof of compliance with the
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professional education requirements and pays a reinstatement fee in the amount
oftwo hundred fiftr dollars ($250).
SECTION 8. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 294 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The commissioner mar. afier notice and an opportunity to be heard. deny.
suspend. or revoke the registration or license of a mortgage loan companv.
mortgage loan broker. or a loan officer. if the commissioner finds that the
mortgage loan companv. mortgage loan broker. or loan officer:
(a) Does not meet or has failed to comply with the provisions ofSection 6 or 7
o(this Act.·
(b) Has been found guiltv offraud in connection with any transaction governed
by this chapter, or is the subject ofan administrative cease and desist order
or similar order. or a permanent or temporary injunction of any court of
competent jurisdiction entered under any other federal or state act
applicable to the registrant. The commissioner may not institute a
proceeding under this subsection more than one (1) year from the date of
the order or injunction relied on. and he may not enter an order under this
subsection on the basis of an injunction entered under any other state act
unless that order or injunction was based on facts which would currently
constitute grounds for an order under this section;
(d Has made any misrepresentations or false statements to. or concealed any
essential or material fact from. any person in the course of acting as a
mortgage loan broker or loan officer. or has engaged in a course of
business which has worked or tended to work a fraud upon any person or
would so operate;
(d) Has been convicted ofor pled guilty to any felony crime;
(e) Has failed to comply with the requirements of this chapter and the
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administrative regulations ofthe commissioner promulgated thereunder,·
(0 Has knowingly or recklessly hired a person who has had a license or
registration denied, revoked, or suspended under this section; or
(g) Has knowingly made or caused to be made to the commissioner any false
representation of material fact or has suppressed or withheld from the
commissioner any information which the mortgage loan broker or loan
officer possesses, and which ifsubmitted by the mortgage loan broker or the
loan officer would have rendered the mortgage loan broker or loan officer
ineligible to be registered or licensed under this chapter.
(2) Persons whose registration or license has been denied, suspended, or revoked
under this section are prohibited from participating in any business activity ofa
registrant or licensee under this chapter and from engaging in any business
activity on the premises where a licensee or registrant under this chapter is
conducting its business.
(3) Whenever the commissioner revokes or suspends a license or registration issued
pursuant to this chapter, the commissioner shall execute a written order to that
effect. The commissioner shall serve the written order upon the licensee or
registrant, which order shall be sent by registered mail, return receipt requested,
postage prepaid, to the principal business address of such licensee or registrant,
as set forth in the records ofthe commissioner, and shall be deemed to have been
received three (3) business days following mailing thereof.
(4) Any person who continues to participate in any business activity covered by this
chapter aRer such person's registration or license has been revoked, suspended,
or denied shall be subject to the penalties ofKRS 294.990 and shall be considered
to be in violation ofKRS 367.170.
(5) The provisions of this section shall be in addition to any other penalties or
remedies available, including the penalties ofKRS 294.990.
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SECTION 9. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 294 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
A mortgage loan broker may act as agent for the person or persons, ifan individual or
individuals, attempting to obtain a mortgage loan. The mortgage loan broker shall
clearly and conspicuously disclose to the person or persons attempting to obtain a
mortgage loan whether the mortgage loan broker is acting as an agent for that person
or persons, in a separate writing, and provide such disclosure to the person or persons
attempting to obtain the mortgage loan before any personal financial information may
be obtained by the mortgage loan broker. If a mortgage loan broker is obtaining
personal information from the person or persons obtaining the mortgage loan over the
telephone, the mortgage loan broker shall give the disclosure verbally at that time and
mail the written disclosure within two (2) business days.
Section 10. KRS 287.010 is amended to read as follows:
As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Bank or state bank" means any bank which is now or may hereafter be organized
under the laws of this state or a combined bank and trust company;
(2) "National bank" or "national bank association" means a bank created by Congress
and organized pursuant to the provisions of federal law, including savings and loan
associations;
(3) "Out-of-state bank" means a bank chartered under the laws of any state other than
Kentucky;
(4) "Horne state" means:
(a) With respect to a state bank or out-of-state state bank, the state by which the
bank is chartered; and
(b) With respect to a national bank, the state in which the main office of the bank
is located;
(5) "Horne state regulator" means, with respect to an out-of-state state bank, the bank
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supervisory agency of the state in which such bank is chartered;
(6) "Host state" means a state, other than the home state, in which the bank maintains,
or seeks to establish and maintain, a branch;
(7) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of financial institutions;
(8) "Department" means the Department ofFinancial Institutions;
(9) "Population" means the population as indicated by the latest regular United States
census;
(10) "Trust company" includes every corporation authorized by this chapter to do a trust
business;
(11) "Undivided profits" means the composite of the bank's net retained earnings from
current and prior years' operations;
(12) "Capital stock" shall mean, at any particular time, the sum of:
(a) The par value of all shares of the corporation having a par value that have
been issued;
(b) The amount of the consideration received by the corporation for all shares of
the corporation that have been issued without par value except such part of the
consideration as has been allocated to surplus in a manner permitted by law;
and
(c) Such amounts not included in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this subsection as have
been transferred to stated capital of the corporation, whether through the
issuance of stock dividends, resolution of the bank's board of directors under
applicable corporate law or otherwise by law;f-aOO1
(13) "Surplus" means the amount of consideration received by the corporation for all
shares issued without par value that has not been allocated to capital stock or the
amount of consideration received by the corporation in excess of par value for all
shares with a par value or bothi
(14) "Municipality" means a county, city, or urban-county government,' and
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(15) "Political subdivision" means a municipalitv. school district, or other municipal
authority.
SECTION 11. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 287 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) All political subdivisions ofthe Commonwealth shall be prohibited (rom enacting
and (rom enforcing ordinances, resolutions, and regulations pertaining to the
financial or lending activities ofpersons or entities which:
(a) Are subject to the jurisdiction of the department or the provisions of this
chapter;
(b) Are subject to the jurisdiction or regulatory supervision of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union
Administration, the Farm Credit Administration, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, or the United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development; or
(c) Originate, purchase, sell, assign, securitize, assist, facilitate, or service
property interests or obligations created by financial transactions or loans
made, executed, or originated by persons or entities referred to in paragraph
(a) or (b) oUhis subsection.
(2) The requirements of this section shall apply to all ordinances, resolutions, or
regulations pertaining to lending activities, including any ordinances,
resolutions, or regulations which limit or disqualifv persons or entities (rom
doing business with a political subdivision based upon financial or lending
activities or the imposition of additional reporting requirements or other
obligations on such persons or entities seeking to do business with a political
subdivision.
(3) Any provision oOhis chapter preempted by federal law with respect to a national
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bank or federal savings association shall not apply to the same extent to an
operating subsidiary ofa national bank or federal savings association.
(4) The provisions oUhis chapter shall be interpreted and applied to the fullest extent
practicable in a manner consistent with applicable federal laws and regulations
and with applicable policies and orders of federal regulatory agencies and shall
not be deemed to constitute an attempt to override federallaw.
(5) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as preventing the enforcement of
ordinances, regulations, or resolutions of political subdivisions of the
Commonwealth pertaining to civil rights.
SECTION 12. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 360 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) The following definitions apply for the purposes ofthis section:
(a) "High-cost home loan" means a loan other than an open-end credit plan or
a reverse mortgage transaction in which:
1. The principal amount of the loan is greater than fifteen thousand
dollars ($15,000) and does not exceed two hundred thousand dollars
($200,000),·
2. The borrower is a natural person,·
3. The debt is incurred by the borrower primarily for personal, family. or
household purposes;
4. The loan is secured by a mortgage on residential real property or
secured by collateral which has a mortgage lien interest in residential
real property, which is or will be occupied by the borrower as the
borrower's principal dwelling,· and
5. Without regard to whether the loan transaction is or may be a
"residential mortgage transaction" as defined in 12 CFR 226.2(a)(24),
as amended yom time to time, the loan at the time the loan is
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consummated is such that the loan is considered a "mortgage" under
section 152 of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of
1994, Pub. Law 103-325, 15 U.S.c. § 1602(aa), as the same may be
amended from time to time, and regulations adopted pursuant thereto
by the Federal Reserve Board, including 12 CFR 226.32, as the same
may be amended from time to time.
(b) "Lender" means any person who funds or negotiates the terms of a high-
cost home loan or acts as a mortgage broker or lender. finance company, or
retail installment seller with respect to a high-cost home loan. However. any
person who purchases or is otherwise assigned a high-cost home loan shall
be subject to an action (or violation of this section only if the violation (or
which the action or proceeding is brought is apparent on the face of the
disclosure or the underlying promissory note.
(2) A high-cost home loan shall be subject to the (0110wing limitations:
(a) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which permits the
lender to charge or collect prepayment fees or penalties more than thirty-six
(36) months after the loan closing or which exceed three percent (3%) ofthe
amount prepaid during the first twelve (12) months, two percent (2%) ofthe
amount prepaid during the second twelve (12) months, or one percent (1%)
ofthe amount prepaid during the third twelve (12) months.
(b) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which permits the
lender, in its sole discretion, to accelerate the indebtedness. This provision
does not apply when repayment ofthe loan has been accelerated by default,
pursuant to a due-on-sale provision, or pursuant to some other provision of
the loan documents unrelated to the payment schedule.
(c) A high-cost home loan may not contain a scheduled payment that is more
than twice as large as the average of earlier scheduled payments. This
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provision does not apply when the payment schedule is adjusted to the
seasonal or irregular income ofthe borrower.
(d) A high-cost home loan may not contain a payment schedule with regular
periodic payments that cause the principal balance to increase.
(e) A high-cost home loan may not contain a provision which increases the
interest rate after default. This provision does not apply to interest rate
changes in a variable rate loan otherwise consistent with the provisions of
the loan documents. provided the change in the interest rate is not triggered
by the event ofdefault or the acceleration ofthe indebtedness.
(0 A high-cost home loan may not include terms under which more than two
(2) periodic payments required under the loan are consolidated and paid in
advance (rom the loan proceeds provided to the borrower.
(g) A lender may not charge a borrower any fees to modifv. renew. eXtend. or
amend a high-cost home loan or to defer any payment due under the terms
ofa high-cost home loan. unless the fees are less than one-half(l/2) ofany
fees that would be charged for a refinance or unless the borrower is in
default and it is in the borrower's best interest.
(M A lender may not make a high-cost home loan unless the borrower has been
provided the following notice or a substantially similar notice. in writing.
not later than the time that notice provided by 12 CFR 226.3l(c). as
amended (rom time to time. is required:
NOTICE TO BORROWER
IF YOU OBTAIN THIS LOAN. THE LENDER WILL HAVE A
MORTGAGE ON YOUR HOME. YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND
ANY MONEY YOU PUT INTO IT IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.
MORTGAGE LOAN RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES VARY
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BASED ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR PARTICULAR
CREDIT AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES, YOUR EMPLOYMENT
HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE REQUESTED AND THE TYPE OF
PROPERTY THAT WILL SECURE YOUR LOAN. THE LOAN RATE
AND FEES COULD ALSO VARY BASED ON WHICH LENDER OR
BROKER YOU SELECT. YOU SHOULD SHOP AROUND AND
COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES.
YOU SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER CONSULTING A QUALIFIED
INDEPENDENT CREDIT COUNSELOR OR OTHER EXPERIENCED
FINANCIAL ADVISOR REGARDING THE RATE, FEES AND
PROVISIONS OF THIS MORTGAGE LOAN BEFORE YOU PROCEED.
YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT FOR A LIST OF CREDIT
COUNSELORS AVAILABLE IN YOUR AREA.
YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN
AGREEMENT MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED THESE
DISCLOSURES OR HAVE SIGNED A LOANAPPLICATION.
REMEMBER, PROPERTY TAXES AND HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE
ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY. NOT ALL LENDERS PROVIDE
ESCROW SERVICES FOR THESE PAYMENTS. YOU SHOULD ASK
YOUR LENDER ABOUT THESE SERVICES.
ALSO, YOUR PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS CONTRIBUTE TO
YOUR CREDIT RATINGS. YOU SHOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY ADVICE
TO IGNORE YOUR REGULAR PAYMENTS TO YOUR EXISTING
CREDITORS.
(i) A lender may not make a high-cost home loan unless the lender reasonably
believes at the time the loan is consummated that one (l) or more of the
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borrowers, when considered individually or collectivelv. will be able to make
the scheduled payments to repay the loan based upon a consideration of
their current and expected income, current obligations, current employment
status, and other financial resources, other than the borrower's equity in
the dwelling which secures repayment of the loan. A borrower shall be
presumed to be able to make the scheduled payments to repay the loan if. at
the time the loan is consummated, the borrower's total monthly debts,
including amounts owed under the loan, do not exceed fifty percent (50%)
ofthe borrower's monthly gross income as verified by the credit application,
the borrower's financial statement. a credit report, financial information
provided to the lender by or on behalf of the borrower, or any other
reasonable means. No presumption of inability to make the scheduled
payments to repay the obligation shall arise solely (rom the fact that, at the
time the loan is consummated, the borrower's total monthly debts, including
amounts owed under the loan, exceed fifty percent (50%) of the borrower's
monthly gross income.
(j) If the proceeds ofthe high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing
high-cost home loan held by the same lender as noteholder, the lender may
not directly or indirectly finance:
1. Any prepayment fees or penalties payable by the borrower,' or
2. Points and fees, excluding those provided for in 12 CFR 226.4(c)(7),
which in the aggregate are in excess of four percent (4%) ofthe total
amount financed.
(k) A lender or mortgage loan broker may not, within one (l) year of the
consummation ofa high-cost home loan, charge a borrower points and fees
in connection with a high-cost home loan if the proceeds of the high-cost
home loan are used to refinance an existing high-cost home loan on which
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points were charged. A lender may not. at any time. charge a borrower
points and fees in addition to those allowed by 12 CFR 226.4(c)(7) if the
proceeds ofthe high-cost home loan are used to refinance an existing high-
cost home loan. on which points were charged. held by the same lender as
noteholder. However. points and fees in accordance with this section may be
charged on any proceeds of a high-cost home loan which are in excess of
the amount refinanced on the existing high-cost home loan.
(l) A lender may not pay a contractor under a home-improvement contract
from the proceeds of a high-cost home loan other than by an instrument
payable to the borrower or jointly to the borrower and the contractor. or at
the election of the borrower, through a third-party escrow agent in
accordance with terms established in a written agreement signed by the
borrower, the lender, and the contractor prior to the disbursement.
(m) A lender shall not refinance. replace. or consolidate a zero interest rate or
low interest rate loan made by a governmental or nonprofit lender with a
high-cost home loan. For purposes of this paragraph, a low interest rate
loan is defined as a loan that carries a current interest rate that is two (2)
percentage points or more below the current yield on United States Treasury
securities with a comparable maturity.
(n) A lender shall not finance single premium credit life, credit accident, credit
health, credit disability, or credit loss of income insurance in connection
with a high-cost home loan.
(0) A lender shall not make a high-cost home loan unless the lender has made
available to the borrower a videotape, or other similar audio-video media
format such as D VD or CD, approved by the Department of Financial
Institutions. which explains the borrower's rights and responsibilities with
regard to this section or high-cost home loans. A lender shall have available
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for viewing at least one (1) copy ofthe video in the principal office and each
branch office ofthe lender.
(p) A lender shall not make a high-cost home loan subject to a mandatory
arbitration clause that is oppressive, unfair, unconscionable, or
substantially in derogation of the rights of consumers. Arbitration clauses
that comply with the standards set forth in the Statement ofPrinciples ofthe
National Consumer Dispute Advisory CommiUee of the American
Arbitration Association in effect on the effective date of this Act shall be
presumed not to violate this subsection.
(q) A lender shall not charge a late payment fee on a high-cost home loan
except in accordance with the following:
1. The late payment fee may not be in excess of five percent (5%) ofthe
amount of the payment past due or ten dollars ($10), whichever is
greateri
2. The late payment fee may only be assessed for a payment past due
fifteen (15) days or morej and
3. The late payment fee may only be charged once with respect to a
single late payment.
(r) A lender may not charge a borrower a fee in excess often dollars ($10) or
actual costs, whichever is greater, per request for a written payoff
calculation on a high-cost home loan for the first two (2) requests by a
borrower in a calendar year.
(s) A lender shall not initiate a foreclosure or other judicial process to
terminate a borrower's interest in residential real property subject to a high-
cost home loan without first providing the borrower, at least thirty (30) days
prior to the initiation of any process, written notice of default and of the
borrower's right to cure. The notice shall include a statement ofthe amount
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needed to be paid by the borrower in order to cure the default and the date
by which the payment is due to cure the default. I(the amount needed to be
paid will change during the thirty (30) day notice period, the notice shall
provide information sufficient to enable a calculation o(the daily change.
(t) A lender shall not recommend or encourage default on an existing loan or
other debt in connection with the closing of a high-cost home loan that
refinances all or a portion o(the existing loan or debt.
(3) Except as provided in paragraph (e) ofsubsection (2) ofthis section, the making
ofa high-cost home loan which violates any provisions of subsection (2) ofthis
section is usurious. subject to the penalties of this chapter. and unlawful as an
unfair and deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce in violation of the
provisions of KRS 367.170. The provisions of this section shall apply to any
person who in bad faith attempts to avoid the application o(this section by:
(a) The structuring of a loan transaction as an open-end credit plan for the
purpose and with the intent of evading the provisions of this section when
the loan would have been a high-cost home loan if the loan had been
structured as a closed-end loan; or
(b) Dividing any loan transaction into separate parts for the purpose and with
the intent ofevading the provisions ofthis section; or
(d Any other such subterfuge.
The Attorney General. the commissioner of the Department of Financial
Institutions. or any party to a high-cost home loan may enforce the provisions of
this section. Any person seeking damages or penalties under the provisions ofthis
section may recover damages under either this chapter or KRS Chapter 367, but
not both.
(4) A lender ofa high-cost home loan who. when acting in good faith. fails to comply
with subsection (2) o(this section. will not be deemed to have violated this section
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ifthe lender establishes that either:
(a) Within thirty (30) days of the loan closing the borrower is notified of the
compliance failure. appropriate restitution is made. and whatever
adjustments are necessary are made, at the choice of the borrower. to the
loan to either:
1. Make the high-cost home loan satisfv the requirements of subsection
(2) ofthis section.· or
2. Change the terms of the loan in a manner beneficial to the borrower
so that the loan will no longer be considered a high-cost home loan
subject to the provisions ofthis section; or
(b) The compliance failure was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide
error notwithstanding the maintenance ofprocedures reasonably adopted to
avoid such errors. and within sixty (60) days after the discovery of the
compliance failure. the borrower is notified of the compliance failure,
appropriate restitution is made, and whatever adjustments are necessary are
made to the loan to either. at the choice ofthe borrower, make the high-cost
home loan satisfv the requirements of subsection (2) of this section or
change the terms ofthe loan in a manner beneficial to the borrower so that
the loan will no longer be considered a high-cost home loan subject to the
provisions of this section. Examples of a bona fide error include clerical.
calculation. computer malfunction and programming, and printing errors.
(c) For purposes of this subsection. "appropriate restitution" means the
reimbursement by the lender of any points. fees. interest. or other charges
made by the lender and received from the borrower necessary to put the
borrower in the same position as he or she would have been had the loan. as
adjusted in accordance with paragraphs (a) and (b) ofthis subsection, been
originally made.
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(5) For purposes ofthis section, any extension ofcredit shall be deemed to have been
made in the Commonwealth ofKentucky, and therefore subject to the provisions
of this section, if the lender offers or agrees in Kentucky to lend to a borrower,
who is a resident ofKentucky, on real property located within the Commonwealth
of Kentucky, or if such borrower accepts or makes the offer in Kentucky to
borrow, regardless of the situs of the contract as specified therein. Any oral or
written solicitation or communication to lend originating outside of Kentucky,
but forwarded to and received in Kentucky by a borrower who is a resident of
Kentucky, shall be deemed to be an offer or agreement to lend in Kentucky and,
therefore, subject to this section. Any oral or written solicitation or
communication to borrow originating within Kentucky, from a borrower who is a
resident of Kentucky, but forwarded to and received by a lender outside of
Kentucky, shall be deemed to be an acceptance or offer to borrow in Kentucky.
Any oral or written offer, acceptance, solicitation, or communication to lend or
borrow, made in Kentucky to, or received in Kentucky from. a borrower who is
not a resident of Kentucky, shall be subject to the provisions of this section,
applicable federal law, law ofthe situs ofthe contract, or law ofthe residence of
the borrower, as the parties may elect. The provisions of this section shall be
severable and if any phrase, clause, sentence, or provision is declared to be
invalid, the validity oUhe remainder oUhis section shall not be affected thereby.
Section 13. KRS 367.410 is amended to read as follows:
As used in KRS 367.410 to 367.450, unless the context otherwise requires:
"Home solicitation sale" means a sale of goods or services, including consumer loans, in
which the seller or a person acting for him engages in a personal solicitation of the sale at
a residence of the buyer and the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is there given to
the seller or a person acting for him. It does not include a sale made pursuant to prior
negotiations between the parties, by telephone initiated by the buyer or at a business
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establishment at a fixed location where goods or services. including loans. are offered or
exhibited for sale.
Section 14. KRS 367.420 is amended to read as follows:
(1) Except for home solicitation sales on loans in which a security interest is taken in
the principal dwelling of the buyer as provided in subsection (6) of this section.
and except as provided in subsection (5) for other goods and services. including
all other consumer loans, in addition to any right otherwise to revoke an offer, the
buyer has the right to cancel a home solicitation sale until midnight of the third
business day after the day on which the buyer signs an agreement or offer to
purchase which complies with this part.
(2) Cancellation occurs when the buyer gives written notice of cancellation to the seller
at the address stated in the agreement or offer to purchase.
(3) Notice of cancellation, if given by mail, is given when it is deposited in a mailbox
properly addressed and postage prepaid.
(4) Notice of cancellation given by the buyer need not take a particular form and is
sufficient if it indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the buyer
not to be bound by the home solicitation sale.
(5) The buyer maynot cancel a home solicitation sale if the buyer requests the seller to
provide goods or services without delay because of an emergency, and
(a) The seller in good faith makes a substantial beginning of performance of the
contract before the buyer gives notice ofcancellation, and
(b) In the case of goods, the goods cannot be returned to the seller in substantially
as good condition as when received by the buyer.
(6) For home solicitation sales on loans in which a security interest is taken in the
principal dwelling oUhe buyer. the buyer shall have the right to rescind or cancel
the transaction until midnight oUhe third business day following the later oUhe
consummation of the loan transaction or the delivery of the material disclosures
GA
A - 48
1
I
required under the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.e. 1601 et seq.
SECTION 15. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 294 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) For purposes of this section, "phvsical location" means an actual office where
the business ofmortgage lending or the business oUaking or soliciting mortgage
loan applications is conducted. The office shall have a street address. A post
office box or similar designation shall not meet the requirements ofthis section.
The office shall be accessible to the general public as a place of business and
shall hold itself open on a regular basis during posted hours, unless the office is
in the residence of the mortgage loan broker and proof of residence has been
submitted as required bv subsection (7) ofSection 4 oUhis Act.
(2) (a) Each mortgage loan broker licensed under this chapter shall maintain a
phvsicallocation in this state.
(b) Any mortgage loan broker licensed under this chapter who, on the effective
date of this Act, does not maintain a physical location in this state shall
have ninety (90) days after the effective date oUhis Act in which to establish
one. After the ninety (90) day period, a mortgage loan broker licensed under
this chapter on the effective date of this Act shall not transact business in
Kentucky ifthe licensed mortgage loan broker does not maintain a physical
location in this state.
(3) The license certificate ofa mortgage loan broker shall be at all times prominently
displayed at the mortgage loan broker's physical location.
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..KENTUCKY LEGISLATURE
HB388
WWWVersion
tu?.~a.a (BR 1381) - T. Pullin, S. Riggs
AN ACT relating to the discharge of a security interest.
Amend KRS 186.045 to establish when a perfected security interest on a motor
vehicle has been discharged; establish the process a debtor may follow to have a
security interest discharged if a termination statement or discharge has not been filed
by the secured party with the county clerk; amend KRS 186A.190, 186A.210, 138.470,
186.990, and 186A.205 to conform.
1:I1;L3a.a - AMENDMENTS
SCS - Maintain original provisions; amend KRS 186.045 to require the circuit court
to order the county clerk to note the termination on the title and to remove the lien from
AVIS upon a debtor proving to the circuit court that the security interest has been paid
in full; require the county clerk to discharge the security interest, but remove the
requirement that he must do so immediately.
Feb 7-introduced in House
Feb 10-to Banking and Insurance (H)
Feb 11-posting waived; posted in committee
Feb 12-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar
Feb 13-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 19-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Thursday, February
20,2003
Feb 21-3rd reading, passed 93-0
Feb 24-received in Senate
Feb 26-to Banking and Insurance (S)
Mar 4-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Consent Calendar with Committee
Substitute
Mar 5-2nd reading, to Rules
Mar 6-posted for passage in the Consent Orders of the Day for Thursday, March 6,
2003
Mar 10-3rd reading, passed 38-0 with Committee Substitute; received in House;
posted for passage for concurrence in Senate Committee Substitute
Mar 11-House concurred in Senate Committee Substitute; passed 94-0; enrolled,
signed by each presiding officer; delivered to Governor
Mar 18-signed by Governor (Acts ch. 103)
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AN ACT relating to the discharge of a security interest.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly ofthe Commonwealth ofKentucky:
Section 1. KRS 186.045 is amended to read as follows:
(1) A perfected securitv interest in a motor vehicle that has been satisfied br parment
in full shall be deemed to have been discharged ifone (1) or both ofthe following
events has occurred:
(a) The funds to par in full and discharge the security interest have been
provided to the secured party in the form ofa cashier check. certified check.
or wire transfer; or
(b) The debt has been paid to a secured party who is no longer in existence or
has failed to file the necessary documents to discharge the lien.
(2) If parment in full has been made under subsection (1)(a) of this section. the
discharge ofthe lien shall be made not later than ten (10) dars from the receipt of
the parment.
(3) When a security interest has been paid in full and a termination statement or
discharge has not been filed. the debtor mar petition the Circuit Court in the
county of the debtor's residence to order the discharge of the security interest.
The debtor shall present written evidence to the Circuit Court that the security
interest has been paid in full. If the evidence presented to the Circuit Court
proves to the court's satisfaction that the security interest has been paid in full.
the court shall order the county clerk to note the termination on the title and to
remove the lien from the Automated Vehicle Information Srstem (A VIS). A copy
of the court's order shall immediately be sent to the county clerk in the county
where the security interest was originally filed and the county clerk shall
discharge the security interest and remove the lien information from A VIS in
accordance with the provisions oUhis section.
(1J. Whenever a security interest has been discharged, other than by proceedings under
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Part 6 of Article 9 of KRS Chapter 355 or similar proceedings, the secured party
shall deliver a termination statement in the manner required by KRS 355.9-513 to
the county clerk of the county in which the title lien statement was submitted. The
secured party shall also deliver a copy of the termination statement to the debtor or
the debtor's transferee. For failure to file the termination statement within the
allowable time, the secured party shall be subject to the penalty provided in KRS
186.990(1). Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section. within five (5)
days after the receipt of such documents, the county clerk shall note the filing in the
index, in language prescribed by the cabinet, that the termination statement has been
filed. Upon presentation of the owner's title showing !![such] security interest to the
county clerk where the termination statement was submitted, and with the copy of
the termination statement submitted by the secured party, the clerk shall discharge
the security interest by noting on thefsueh} title that the termination statement has
been filed and place the seal of the county clerk thereon. The clerk shall return the
owner's title to the owner. The county clerk shall then file the termination statement
in the place from which the title lien statement was removed. Termination
statements shall[must] be retained in the clerk's files for a period of two (2) years
subsequent to the date of filing !!fsueh} statement, at which time they may be
destroyed. The fee for these services are included in the provisions of KRS
186A.190.
illWH Upon presentation of anfthe]- owner's title showing !![such] security interest to
the county clerk of a county where the termination statement was not delivered, the
county clerkE of that county] shall access the automated system to determine
whether a record of termination of the security interest has been entered into the
automated system by the county clerk where the termination statement was
delivered by the secured party as provided in KRS 186A.210. If!!fs-ueh]- record of
termination has been entered into the automated system, the county clerk of the
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county where the termination statement was not delivered, shall note the discharge
of the security interest on the certificate of title by noting that the termination
statement has been delivered, the county where it was delivered, and placing the
seal of the county clerk thereon and may rely on the automated system to do so. If
!!fs:oob1 record of termination has not been entered into the automated system,[ in no
case shall] the county clerk of the county other than where the termination statement
was delivered shall notf;} make any notation upon the certificate of title that the
security interest has been discharged or that a termination statement has been
delivered to the county where the title lien statement was submitted.
@~ Whenever any secured party repossesses a vehicle titled in Kentuckvfthis
CommowNealth], for which a security interest is in existence at the time of
repossession, and disposes of thefs:oob1 vehicle pursuant to the provisions of KRS
Chapter 355, he shall[must] present, within fifteen (15) days after such disposition,
an affidavit in !! form prescribed by the department and a termination statement or
proof that !!fsueh]- termination statement has been filed. The new owner shall pay all
applicable fees for titling and transferring the vehicle to the county clerk. Upon
receipt of such documents, the county clerk who issued the lien shall then omit from
the title he makes application for any information relating to the security interest
under which the vehicle was repossessed or any security interest subordinate
thereto. However, any security interest, as shown by such title which is superior to
the one under which the vehicle was repossessed, shall[must] be shown on the title
issued by the clerk unless the prior secured party has discharged thefs:oob1 security
interest in thefs:oob1 clerk's office or proof of termination is submitted, ifthe[in case
sueht prior security interest was discharged in another clerk's office.
il1.H4» Whenever any vehicle brought into Kentucky[this Commomvealth] IS
required to be titled and the[in this Commonwealth and such] vehicle is then
subject to a security interest in another state as shown by the out-of-state documents
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presented to the clerk, the county clerk is prohibited from processing the application
for title on the vehicle unless the owner obtains from the secured party a financing
statement or title lien statement and presents same to the clerk along with the fees
required in KRS 186A.190. The clerk shall note the out-of-state security interest on
the certificate of title. This provision does not apply to vehicles required to be
registered in Kentucky under forced registration provisions under KRS 186.145.
@~ The fees provided for in this section are in addition to any state fee provided
for by law.
ill~ Any person violating any provision of this section or any person refusing to
surrender a certificate of title registration and ownership or transfer certificate upon
request of any person entitled thereto, is subject to the penalties provided in
subsection (1) ofKRS 186.990.
(lO)ff+» The county clerk is prohibited from noting any security interest on a certificate
of title on any vehicle subject to the provisions of KRS Chapter 186A if a certificate
of title therefor is presented to him which has all the spaces provided thereon for
noting security interests fully exhausted. The owner is responsible for
ensuring[must see to it] that a discharge is noted on the certificate of title for each
security interest and then a duplicate title as provided for in KRS 186A.180
shall[must] be obtained from the clerk by the owner of the vehicle.
allff8jj Security interests in vehicles sold to or owned by residents of other states
shall[must] be perfected in the state of thefsooh]- nonresident and repossession of
the vehicle shall[must] be taken pursuant to the laws of thatfsooh]- state, unlessi.f
the vehicle]
ra) The vehicle is principally operated in KentuckYi.f-tmd]-
rb) The vehicle is properly titled in Kentuckv[herein] under KRS Chapter 186Ai.
and
{fl The security interest is authorized to be noted on the certificate of title by the
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county clerk under KRS Chapter 186A.
Section 2. KRS 186A.190 is amended to read as follows:
(1) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, the perfection and discharge of
a security interest in any property for which has been issued a Kentucky certificate
of title shall be by notation on the certificate of title. The notation of the security
interest on the certificate of title shall be in accordance with this chapter and shall
remain effective from the date on which the security interest is noted on the
certificate of title for a period of seven (7) years, or, in the case of a manufactured
home, for a period of thirty (30) years, or until discharged under this chapter and
KRS Chapter 186. The filing of a continuation statement within the six (6) months
preceding the expiration of the initial period of a notation's effectiveness extends
the expiration date for seven (7) additional years.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (4) ofthis section, the notation of security interests
relating to property required to be titled in Kentucky through the county clerk shall
be done in the office of the county clerk of the county in which the debtor resides. If
the debtor is other than a natural person, the following provisions govern the
determination of the county of the debtor's residence:
(a) . A partnership shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal
place of business in this state is located. If the debtor does not have a place of
business in this state, then the debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for
purposes of filing in this state;
(b) A limited partnership organized under KRS Chapter 362 shall be deemed a
resident of the county in which its office is located, as set forth in its
certificate of limited partnership or most recent amendment thereto filed
pursuant to KRS Chapter 362. If such office is not located in this state, the
debtor shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state;
(c) A limited partnership not organized under the laws of this state and authorized
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to do business in this state under KRS Chapter 362 shall be deemed a resident
of the county in which the office of its process agent is located, as set forth in
the designation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of
State of the Commonwealth ofKentucky;
(d) A corporation organized under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274 or a limited
liability company organized under KRS Chapter 275 shall be deemed a
resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set forth in
its most recent corporate filing with the Secretary of State which officially
designates its current registered office;
(e) A corporation not organized under the laws of this state, but authorized to
transact or do business in this state under KRS Chapter 271B, 273, or 274, or
a limited liability company not organized under the laws of this state, but
authorized to transact business in this state under KRS Chapter 275, shall be
deemed a resident of the county in which its registered office is located, as set
forth in its most recent filing with the Secretary of State which officially
designates its current registered office;
(t) A cooperative corporation or association organized under KRS Chapter 272
shall be deemed a resident of the county in which its principal business is
transacted, as set forth in its articles of incorporation or most recent
amendment thereto filed with the Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky;
(g) A cooperative corporation organized under KRS Chapter 279 shall be deemed
a resident of the county in which its principal office is located, as set forth in
its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the
Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
(h) A business trust organized under KRS Chapter 386 shall be deemed a resident
of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as evidenced
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by the recordation of its declaration of trust in that county pursuant to KRS
Chapter 386;
(i) A credit union organized under KRS Chapter 290 shall be deemed a resident
of the county in which its principal place of business is located, as set forth in
its articles of incorporation or most recent amendment thereto filed with the
Secretary of State of the Commonwealth of Kentucky; and
(j) Any other organization (defined in KRS 355.1-201) shall be deemed a
.~ resident of the county in which its principal place of business in this state is
located, except that any limited partnership or corporation not organized under
the laws of this state and not authorized to transact or do business in this state
shall be deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state. If the
organization does not have a place of business in this state, then it shall be
deemed a nonresident for purposes of filing in this state.
If the debtor does not reside in the Commonwealth, the notation of the security
interest shall be done in the office of the county clerk in which the property is
principally situated or operated. Notwithstanding the existence of any filed
financing statement under the provisions of KRS Chapter 355 relating to any
property registered or titled in Kentucky, the sole means of perfecting and
discharging a security interest in property for which a certificate of title is required
by this chapter is by notation on thefsHeh} property's certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter or in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3)
of Section 1 of this Act. In other respects the security interest is governed by the
provisions ofKRS Chapter 355.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, before ownership of property
subject to a lien evidenced by notation on the certificate of title may be transferred,
the transferor shall obtain the release of the prior liens in his name against the
property being transferred. Once a security interest has been noted on the owner's
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title, !!fne1 subsequent title shall notfmay! be issued by any county clerk free of
thefsuehf notation unless the owner's title is presented to the clerk and it has been
noted thereonf;} that the security interest has been discharged. If this requirement is
met, information relating to any security interest shown on the title as having been
discharged may be omitted from the title to be issued by the clerk. If information
relating to the discharge of a security interest is presented to a clerk under the
;If provisions ofsubsection (3) ofSection 1 of/his Act, the clerk shall discharge the
;t
'I security interest and remove the lien information from A VIS.
i
(4) Notwithstanding subsections (1), (2), and (3) of this section, a county clerk shall,
following inspection of the vehicle by the sheriff, to determine that the vehicle has
not been stolen, issue a new title to a vehicle, clear of all prior liens, to a person
after he provides to the county clerk an affidavit devised by the Transportation
Cabinet and completed by the person. In the affidavit, the person shall attest that:
(a) He possesses the vehicle;
(b) A debt on the vehicle was owed him for more than thirty (30) days before he
provided the notices required by paragraphs (c) and (d) of this subsection;
(c) More than fourteen (14) days before presenting the affidavit to the county
clerk, the person attempted to notify the owner of the vehicle and all known
lienholders, including those noted on the title, by certified mail, return receipt
requested, of his name, address, and telephone number as well as his intention
to obtain a new title, clear of all prior liens, unless the owner or a lienholder
objected in writing;
(d) More than fourteen (14) days before presenting the affidavit to the county
clerk, the person had published a legal notice stating his intention to obtain
title to the vehicle. The legal notice appeared at least twice in a seven (7) day
period in a newspaper published, and with a statewide circulation, in
Kentucky. The legal notice stated:
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1. The person's name, address, and telephone number;
2. The owner's name;
3. The names of all known lienholders, including those noted on the title;
4. The vehicle's make, model, and year; and
5. The person's intention to obtain title to the vehicle unless the owner or a
lienholder objects in writing within fourteen (14) days after the last
publication of the legal notice; and
(e) Neither the owner nor a lienholder has objected in writing to the person's right
to obtain title to the vehicle.
(5) No more than two (2) active security interests may be noted upon a certificate of
title.
(6) In noting a security interest upon a certificate of title, the county clerk shall ensure
that the certificate of title bears the lienholder's name, mailing address and zip code,
the date the lien was noted, the notation number, and the county in which the
security interest was noted. The clerk shall obtain the information required by this
subsection for notation upon the certificate of title from the title lien statement
described in KRS 186A.195 to be provided to the county clerk by the secured party.
(7) For all the costs incurred in the notation and discharge of a security interest on the
certificate of title, the county clerk shall receive the fee prescribed by KRS 64.012.
The fee prescribed by this subsection shall be paid at the time of submittal of the
title lien statement described in KRS 186A.195.
(8) A copy of the application, certified by the county clerk, indicating the lien will be
noted on the certificate of title shall be forwarded to the lienholder.
Section 3. KRS 186A.210 is amended to read as follows:
(1) When a security interest has been discharged under the provisions ofsubsection
(3) ofSection 1 ofthis Act, the county clerk shall discharge the security interest
and remove the lien information from A VIS.
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(2) When['Nhenever] a security interest[ to a'lehicle] has been discharged as provided
by KRS 186.045m~, the county clerk of a county that is operating under
automated procedures shall, upon receiving a termination statement, within five (5)
days enter the record of termination into the automated system. The automated
system shall be programmed to allow a county clerk in a county where the
termination statement was not received to access the automated system to determine
the county and date that the record of termination was entered into the automated
system. The clerk of the county where the termination statement was received shall
then release the lien recorded upon the title in the manner directed by the
Department of Vehicle Regulation, and take such other action with respect to a
termination as is directed by the Department of Vehicle Regulation.
Section 4. KRS 138.470 is amended to read as follows:
There is expressly exempted from the tax imposed by KRS 138.460:
(1) Motor vehicles sold to the United States, or to the Commonwealth of Kentucky or
any of its political subdivisions;
(2) Motor vehicles sold to institutions of purely public charity and institutions of
education not used or employed for gain by any person or corporation;
(3) Motor vehicles which have been previously registered and titled in any state or by
the federal government when being sold or transferred to licensed motor vehicle
dealers for resale. The[8uch] motor vehicles shall not be leased, rented, or loaned to
any person and shall be held for resale only;
(4) Motor vehicles- sold by or transferred from dealers registered and licensed in
compliance with the provisions of KRS 186.070 and KRS 190.010 to 190.080 to
nonresident members of the Armed Forces on duty in this Commonwealth under
orders from the United States government;
(5) Commercial motor vehicles, excluding passenger vehicles having a seating capacity
for nine (9) persons or less, owned by nonresident owners and used primarily in
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interstate commerce and based in a state other than Kentucky which are required to
be registered in Kentucky by reason of operational requirements or fleet proration
agreements and are registered pursuant to KRS 186.145;
(6) Motor vehicles previously registered in Kentucky, transferred between husband and
wife, parent and child, stepparent and stepchild, or grandparent and grandchild;
(7) Motor vehicles transferred when a business changes its name and no other
transaction has taken place or an individual changes his or her name;
(8) Motor vehicles transferred to a corporation from a proprietorship or limited liability
company, to a limited liability company from a corporation or proprietorship, or
from a corporation or limited liability company to a proprietorship, within six (6)
months from the time that the business is incorporated, organized, or dissolved;
(9) Motor vehicles transferred by will, court order, or under the statutes covering
descent and distribution of property, if the vehicles were previously registered in
Kentucky;
(10) Motor vehicles transferred between a subsidiary corporation and its parent
corporation if there is no consideration, or nominal consideration, or in sole
consideration of the cancellation or surrender of stock;
(11) Motor vehicles transferred between a limited liability company and any of its
members, if there is no consideration, or nominal consideration, or in sole
consideration of the cancellation or surrender of stock;
(12) The interest of a partner in a motor vehicle when other interests are transferred to
him;
(13) Motor vehicles repossessed by a secured party who has a security interest in effect
at the time of repossession and a repossession affidavit as required by KRS
186.045C1ff41f. The repossessor shall hold the vehicle for resale only and not for
personal use, unless he has previously paid the motor vehicle usage tax on the
vehicle; and
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(14) Motor vehicles transferred to an insurance company to settle a claim. These vehicles
shall be junked or held for resale only.
Section 5. KRS 186.990 is amended to read as follows:
(1) Any person who violates any of the provisions ofKRS 186.020, 186.030, 186.040,
186.045ill{f2j}, 186.050, 186.056, 186.060, 186.110, 186.130, 186.140, 186.160,
186.170,186.180(1) to (4)(a), 186.210, 186.230, or KRS 186.655 to 186.680 shall
be guilty of a violation.
(2) Any person who violates any of the provisions of KRS 138.465, 186.190, or
186.200 shall be guilty ofa Class A misdemeanor.
(3) A person who violates the provisions of KRS 186.450(4) or (5) shall be guilty of a
violation. A person who violates any of the other provisions of KRS 186.400 to
186.640 shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
(4) Any clerk or judge failing to comply with KRS 186.550(1) shall be guilty of a
violation.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the trial court that any offender under KRS
186.400 to 186.640 has a driver's license but in good faith failed to have it on his or
her person or misplaced or lost it, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the
charges against the defendant without fine, imprisonment, or cost.
(6) Any person who steals a motor vehicle registration plate or renewal decal shall be
guilty of a Class D felony. Displaying a canceled registration plate on a motor
vehicle shall be prima facie evidence of guilt under this section.
(7) Any person who violates the provisions of KRS 186.1911 shall be guilty of a Class
A misdemeanor.
(8) Any person who makes a false affidavit to secure a license plate under KRS
186.172 shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
(9) Any person who violates any provision of KRS 186.070 or 186.150 shall be guilty
of a Class A misdemeanor.
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(10) Any person who operates a vehicle bearing a dealer's plate upon the highways of
this Commonwealth with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or registration
fee shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor for the first offense and a Class D
felony for each subsequent offense.
(11) Any person, other than a licensed dealer or manufacturer, who procures a dealer's
plate with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or registration fee shall be
guilty of a Class D felony.
(12) Any resident who unlawfully registers, titles, or licenses a motor vehicle in any state
other than Kentucky with intent to evade the motor vehicle usage tax or the
registration fee shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if the amount of tax due is
less than one hundred dollars ($100), or of a Class D felony if the amount of tax due
is more than one hundred dollars ($100), and in addition shall be liable for all taxes
so evaded with applicable interest and penalties.
Section 6. KRS 186A.205 is amended to read as follows:
Whenever a security interest is assigned as provided by KRS 186.045{11H-lj}, the county
clerk of a county that is operating under automated procedures shall, in addition to
carrying out his requirements stated therein, enter the record of lien assignment into the
automated system in the manner directed by the Department 0 f Vehicle Regulation.
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.tIJL~§iQ/FN (BR 1029) - R. Thomas, R. Wilkey, L. Clark, J. Richards, G. Stumbo
AN ACT relating to the enforcement of the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement,
making an appropriation therefor and declaring an emergency.
Amend and create various sections of KRS Chapter 131 with regard to the Tobacco
Master Settlement Agreement and the state's enforcement of noncompliant
nonparticipating manufacturers to: (1) define the terms "brand family", "distributor" and
"stamping agent"; (2) prohibit the sale of cigarettes of nonparticipating manufacturers
unless they: (a) are in compliance with all escrow fund requirements, to include
providing account numbers, current account balance, withdrawal and deposit history,
and the name and address of the financial institution for which the accounts are held,
(b) have provided certification to the Revenue Cabinet and the Attorney General of
current and past cigarette sales by brand family, (c) have certified that they are
registered to do business in Kentucky, and (d) are properly listed on the brand family
'directory'; (3) require that the failure of nonparticipating manufacturers to meet the
above requirements and certifications shall result in their stamping activities being
deemed unlawful, and classified as a class A misdemeanor, and their products deemed
as contraband; (4) appropriate to the Revenue Cabinet from the tobacco settlement
agreement fund, for each year of the biennium, $175,000 dollars to carry out the
provisions of KRS Chapter 131; (5) declare an emergency.
t:!e~~Q - AMENDMENTS
H£;l>JEN - Retain original provisions; make technical corrections; clarify that
participating and non-participating manufacturers must deliver a supplemental
certification to the Attorney General; require the Attorney General to develop and make
available the "directory" and establish criteria for validating the appointment of an
agent; require that cigarettes in violation of Section 5 of the Act be seized and forfeited
and that cigarettes in violation of Section 10 of the Act be destroyed; prohibit
distributors from knowing violating Section 5 of the Act; allow the secretary to suspend
the sale of cigarette stamps to a distributor upon violation of Section 5; prohibit the
Attorney General from removing a non-participating manufacturer or its brand families
from the directory unless a non-participating manufacturer has been given 30 days'
notice of the intended action and allow a non-participating manufacturer 30 days from
receipt of notice to comply; require the Attorney General at the time of its intent to
remove a non-participating manufacturer from the "directory" to post notice of the intent
on the directory; delete provision allowing the Attorney General to promulgate
administrative regulations requiring tobacco manufacturers to produce information
sufficient to enable the Attorney General to determine the adequacy of the amount of
the escrow installment deposits; allow the Attorney General to recover, from stamping
agents and distributors, the costs of investigation, costs of the action, and reasonable
attorney fees due to injunctions to restrain a violation of Sections 5 or 7 of the Act;
allow the loss of the ability to sell tobacco products as a result of removal from the
directory to be deemed to constitute irreparable harm for the purposes of a temporary
injunction sought pursuant to Section 11 of the Act; allow stamping agents or
distributors to possess unstamped containers of cigarettes held in inventory for delivery
to, or for sale in, another state; and allow any person aggrieved by a determination of
\ (l!5
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the Attorney General to not include in or to remove from the directory to appeal the
determination to the circuit court of the county in which the person aggrieved resides or
conducts.
HFA (1, L. Napier) - Retain original provisions of HB 390/HCS; redefine the term
"tobacco product manufacturer" to exempt a tobacco product manufacturer who is
organized, exists, transacts their business, produces tobacco products and has their
principal place of business in Kentucky.
Page 2 of2
~Q_S. - Retain original provisions of HB 390/GA; delete the allowance of the
secretary to disclose to the Attorney General any information received under the Act
but allow the secretary to disclose to the Attorney General the name and address of a
stamping agent or distributor and the number of sticks by brand name that have been
purchased from a nonparticipating manufacturer and have been stamped with
Kentucky stamps by that agent or distributor; delete disclosure for public record; create '~
a new section of KRS Chapter 136 to provide that a corporation that holds securities in
other corporations equal to 50% or more of total assets may compute capital employed
either by filing a consolidated return or by deducting the book value of the investment;
provide that the section applies only to returns with due dates between April 15, 2004
and April 15, 2005; repeal KRS 136.071.
SJ~6_tL E. Harris) - Retain original provisions of HB 390/GA; delete the allowance of
the secretary to disclose to the Attorney General any information received under the
Act but allow the secretary to disclose to the Attorney General the name and address of
a stamping agent or distributor and the number of sticks by brand name that have been
purchased from a nonparticipating manufacturer and have been stamped with
Kentucky stamps by that agent or distributor; delete disclosure for public record.
SCA (2/Title, R. Sanders Jr) - Make title amendment.
Feb 7-introduced in House
Feb 1O-to Appropriations and Revenue (H)
Feb 13-posted in committee
Feb 19-reported favorably, 1st reading, to Calendar with Committee Substitute;
floor amendment (1) filed to Committee Substitute
Feb 20-2nd reading, to Rules
Feb 21-posted for passage in the Regular Orders of the Day for Monday, February
24,2003
Feb 25-3rd reading; floor amendment (1) defeated; passed 93-1 with Committee
Substitute
Feb 26-received in Senate
Feb 28-to Agriculture and Natural Resources (S)
Mar 4-reported without opinion; 1st reading, to Calendar
Mar 5-2nd reading, to Rules; recommitted to Agriculture and Natural Resources (S)
Mar 6-reported favorably, to Rules with committee amendment (1)
Mar 24-recommitted to Appropriations and Revenue (S); reported favorably, to
Rules with Committee Substitute, committee amendment (2-titJe) ; posted for passage
in the Regular Orders of the Day for Monday, March 24, 2003; 3rd reading; committee
amendment (1) withdrawn; passed 34-0 with Committee Substitute, committee
amendment (2-tit/e) ; received in House; posted for passage for concurrence in Senate
Committee Substitute, committee amendment (2-title)
Mar 25-House concurred in Senate Committee Substitute, committee amendment
(2-title) ; passed 91-4; enrolled, signed by each presiding officer; delivered to Governor
.p
SECTION 14. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 131 IS CRE
READ AS FOLLOWS:
1 In addition to or in lieu 0
administrative re ulation
an
'2 Each stam
violation. The secreta
a violation 0
SECTION 15. A NEW SECTION OF KRS CHAPTER 136 IS CREATED TO
READ AS FOLLOWS:
(1) Notwithstanding KRS 136.070. a corporation that holds directly or indirectly
stock or securities in other corporations equal to or greater than fifty percent
(50%) of its total assets may, at the option of the taxpayer. compute capital
employed in the business using one ofthe following options:
(a) The corporation and its subsidiaries may file a consolidated license tax
return which computes capital employed by the business under KRS
136.070(2) and (3) and includes the parent corporation and all subsidiary
corporations in which the parent corporation owns more than fifty percent
(50%) of the outstanding stock. The consolidated capital of the parent
corporation and its subsidiaries shall be increased by an amount equal to
ten percent (10%) of the difference between the total capital employed as
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apportioned to Kentucky if the parent corporation and each taxable
subsidiary filed a separate license tax return, and the total capital
apportioned to Kentucky computed on a consolidated basis; or
(b) The corporation may file a separate license tax return and deduct from its
capital, determined in accordance with KRS 136.070(2), the book value of
its investment in the stock and securities ofany corporation in which it owes
more than fifty percent (50%) of the outstanding stock. The capital of the
corporation shall be increased by an amount equal to ten percent (lO%) of
the difference between total capital apportioned to Kentucky without the
deduction provided by this paragraph, and the total capital apportioned to
Kentucky computed with the deduction provided by this paragraph.
(2) For purposes ofdetermining the ratio of stock and securities to total assets, the
value shall be the value of the accounts as reflected on financial statements
prepared for book purposes as of the last day of the calendar or fiscal year. The
term "stock and securities" as used in this section means shares ofstock in any
corporation, certificates of stock or interest in any corporation, notes, bonds,
debentures, and evidences of indebtedness. The term "book value" means the
value as shown on financial statements prepared for book purposes as oUhe last
day oUhe calendar or fiscal year.
Section 16. For the year 2003, the certifications by a tobacco product manufacturer
described in Section 3 of this Act shall be due forty-five (45) calendar days after the
effective date; and the directory described in Section 4 of this Act shall be published or
made available within ninety (90) calendar days after such effective date.
Section 17. There is appropriated to the Revenue Cabinet, before making
distributions from the tobacco settlement agreement fund pursuant to KRS 248.654, for
each year of the 2002-2004 biennium, and notwithstanding the temporary emergency
expenditures of state funds in Executive Order 2002-727, one hundred seventy-five
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thousand ($175,000) dollars to carry out the provisions of KRS 131.600, 131.602, and
Sections 1 to 14 of this Act.
Section 18. The provisions of Section 15 of this Act shall be effective for tax
periods for which a corporation license tax return is due, without regard to extension, on
or after April 15, 2004. The provisions of Section 15 of this Act shall not apply to any tax
period for which a corporation license tax return is due, without regard to extension, on or
after April 15,2005.
Section 19. The following KRS section is repealed:
136.071 Corporation license tax -- Apportionment of capital when corporation holds
stock in other corporations.
Section 20. Whereas the General Assembly is dedicated to protecting Kentucky's
receipt of funds under the Master Settlement Agreement, an emergency is declared to
exist, and the provisions of Sections 1 through 14 and Sections 16 and 17 of this Act take
effect upon its passage and approval by the Governor or upon its otherwise becoming
law.
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
AUDITS, AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Insured
Depository Institutions
Corporate Governance Beyond Sarbanes-Oxley
o The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 are primarily directed toward those
companies, including insured depository
institutions, that have a class of securities
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) or the appropriate federal
banking agency under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, i.e., public
companies.
Banks That Are Public Companies or
Subsidiaries of Public Companies
o FDIC-supervised banks that have registered
their securities with the FDIC pursuant to Part
335 of the FDIC's regulations.
o Subsidiaries of bank holding companies that
are public companies.
o These public companies and their independent
public accountants must comply with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
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Non-public FDIC-Supervised Banks with
Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets
[J Not subject to the annual audit and reporting requirements of
Section 36 ofthe Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
[J Generally do not fall within the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and the SEC's implementing regulations.
[J Nevertheless, certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
mirror existing policy guidance related to corporate
governance that the FDIC and the other bankmg agencies
have issued.
Non-public FDIC-Supervised Banks with
Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets
Other provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act represent sound
corporate governance practices that
are not mandatory, however the
FDIC encourages non-public
institutions to follow to the extent
feasible. taking into account their
size and complexity.
Insured Depository InstitutIOns WIth
$500 Million or More in Total Assets
o Subject to the annual audit and reporting
requirements of Section 36 of the FDI Act as
implemented by Part 363 of the FDIC's
regulations.
o Some institutions subject to Part 363 currently
satisfy the requirements ofthis regulation on a
holding company basis.
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APPLICABILITY OF SELECTED
PROVISIONS OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
2002
Title II - Auditor Independence
Section 201. Services Outside the Scope of
Practice of Auditors.
• To be considered independent, a registered public
accounting finn that audits a public company's
financial statements would not be permitted to
provide, contemporaneously with the audit, any
of the non-audit services listed in Section 20I or
any other service the Oversight Board determines
by regulation to be impermissible.
Title II - Auditor Independence
Section 202. Preapproval Requirements.
• In general, a registered independent public accountant can
provide non-audit services that are not otherwise
prohibited, including tax services, to a public company
audit client only if the activity is approved in advance by
the company's audit committee.
• Similarly, the audit committee ofa public company
generally must preapprove all audit and permissible non-
audit services to be provided by the company's external
auditor.
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Auditor Independence - Section 201
Sound Corporate Governance Practices for Banks
• The FDIC encourages each bank whose financial
statements are audited and its accounting finn to follow
the internal audit outsourcing prohibition in Section 201.
• Nevertheless, the benefits may not exceed the cost of
having a full time internal auditor.
• Hiring separate finns to perfonn internal and external
audit work may not be cost effective.
• In this regard, for a bank with less complex operations
and limited staff, the use of the independent public
accountant to perfonn both an external audit and some or
all of the bank's internal audit activities may achieve its
safety and soundness objectives.
Title II - Auditor Independence
Section 204. Auditor Reports to Audit Committees
• The auditor should report on a timely basis to the
company's audit committee.
Sound Corporate Governance Practices for Banks
• Effective communication assists the audit committee in
carrying out its responsibilities.
• Accordingly, the FDIC encourages each bank to institote
these auditor reporting practices by incorporating them
into its engagement letter with the auditor.
Title III - Corporate Responsibility
Section 301. Publie Company Audit Committees.
o The audit committee would be responsible for the
appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of the
auditor.
• Each member ofsuch an audit committee must be independent.
• Audit committee member cannot accept any consulting, advisory. or
compensatory fee from the public company, other than fees for
serving as a board or committee member, or be affiliated with the
company or a subsidiary ofthe company.
• The audit committee must establish procedures for processing
complaints.
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Corporate Responsibility - Section 301.
Related Policy Guidance for Banks
• The FDIC encourages the board ofdirectoYll ofeach institution that is
not otherwise required to do so to establish an audit committee
consisting entirely ofoutside di_.
• The policy statement defines "outside directors"
c "not officers, eIq)loyecs, or principal stockholders ofthe institution, its
subsidiaries, or its affiliates, and who do not have any material business
dealings with the institution, its subsidiaries, or its affiliates."
Sound Comorate Governance Practices for Banks
• It is a sound corporate governance practice for a bank to establish
procedures for processing complaints and employee submissions.
Title III - Corporate Responsibility
Section 302. Corporate Responsibility for Financial
Reports.
• A public company's principal executive officer and
principal fmancial officer must include a certification in
each quarterly and annual report filed under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
Sound COlllorate Governance Practices for Banks
• When a bank files its Call Report,
c an authorized officer ofthe bank must sign a declaratioo that the
reports are true to the best ofthe officer's knowledge and belief
c In addition, two bankdi_ must declare that they have
examined the report and attest to its correctness.
Title IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Section 401. Disclosures in Periodic Reports.
• Financial reports filed with the SEC must reflect material
correcting adjustments identified by a registered public
accounting firm.
Sound CO!J!orate Governance Practices for Banks
• The FDIC strongly encourages banks to make all material
correcting adjustments identified by external auditors.
• If the bank issues audited financial statements, the FDIC
encourages disclosure ofmaterial off-balance sheet
transactions.
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Title IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Section 402. Enhanced Conflict of Interest
Provisions.
• Public companies would be prohibited from extending
credit in the fonn ofa loan to any director or executive
officer. This provision does not apply to any loan made by
an insured depository institution if the loan is subject to
the insider lending restrictions under section 22(h) of the
Federal Reserve Act and Federal Reserve Regulation O.
Related Policy Guidance for Banks
• All banks should continue to comply with Regulation 0 in
their lending to directors and executive officers.
Title IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Section 404. Management Assessment of Internal
Controls.
• In their annual reports, public companies must include an
internal control report that states that management is
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate
internal control structure and procedures for financial
reporting.
• The report must also contain an assessment of the
effectiveness of the company's internal control structure
and procedures for financial reporting.
• The company's registered public accounting finn must
attest to and report on management's assessment.
Title IV - Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Section 404. Management Assessment of Internal Controls.
Related Policy Guidance for Banks
• The 1999 Interagency Policy Statement identifies a management
~sessment of internal controls over financial reporting and an
independent public accountant's attestation on management's
assessment as ao acceptable alternative external auditing program for
an institution that chooses not to have an audit of its financial
statements.
Sound Comorate Governance Practices for Banks
• The FDIC encourages baoks to consider supplementiog the audit with
an internal control assessment by management and an attestation of
this assessment by the baok's indepeodent public accountaot.
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Section 404. Management Assessment of Internal Controls.
Institutions with $500 Million or More in Total Assets
• Section 36 and Part 363 require a covered institution's
independent public accountant tu examine, attest to, and
report separately on management's assertion conceming
internal control. This attestation report must be included
in the annual report the covered institution files with the
FDIC, its primary federal regulator (if other than the
FDIC), and any appropriate state supervisor.
The FDIC is considering possible amendments to
Part 363 of its regulations that would extend certain
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to all insured
Institutions with $500 million or more in total assets
(covered institutions), whether or not they are public
companies or subsidiaries ofpublic companies. Any
amendments to Part 363 would be developed in
consultation with the other banking agencies and
would be published in proposed form for public
comment In the Federal Register.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE,
AUDITS, AND REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
Corporate Governance Beyond Sarbanes-
Oxley
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o Sound Corporate Governance Penneates
Many Activities Beyond Those Addressed in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
• Encompasses an institution's strategic mission,
processes, relationships, and control structure
that significantly influence its overall condition,
performance, prospects, and risk profile.
Best Practices
o Select directors and officers with the
knowledge, skills, and integrity to represent
and serve the depositors, shareholders, and
other stakeholders
o Establish appropriate separations between
individual's personal interests and the best
interests of the institution.
Best Practices
o Establish effective methods and practices by
which the management team will operate.
• Committee and Management structure
o Design processes and standards that require
transparent and objective analysis.
• Analysis based on relevant information
B-S
Best Practices
o Design processes and standards that require
analysis and recommendations.
• Reports are in writing
• Provided in advance and in timely manner
o Design decision making processes that are
deliberate and controlled.
• Proper delegations
• Fully understand new products & services
Best Practices
o Establish criteria by which periodic business
assessments will be conducted.
• Level ofdetail & frequency of reports
o Avoid all preferential transactions involving
insiders and their related interests.
• Compliance with laws and regulations
o Provide for independent reviews.
• Third party review and testing.
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FDICi
TO:
SUBJECT:
Summary:
SITEMAP SEARCH HELP HOME
Financial Institution Letters
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
FIL-13-2003
February 13, 2003
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
FDIC Adopts Final Rule on Federal Deposit Insurance Eligibility for State Banks
Chartered as Limited Liability Companies (Part 303 of FDIC's Rules and
Regulations)
A new amendment to Part 303 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations clarifies that a
state bank that is chartered as a limited liability company could be considered
"incorporated" for the purposes ofbeing eligible for federal deposit insurance.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has adopted the attached final rule regarding the
criteria it will use to determine the eligibility of a state bank chartered as a limited liability company
(LLC) for federal deposit insurance.
One of the statutory requirements for a state bank to be eligible for federal deposit insurance is that it
must be "incorporated" under the laws of any state. The final § 303.15 provides that a bank that is
chartered as an LLC under state law would be considered to be "incorporated" under state law if all
four of the following requirements are met. Generally, the LLC must:
• Have no automatic termination features,
• Have no restrictions on the free transferability of an owner's interest,
• Provide limited liability for its owners, and
• Provide for a board of managers.
We encourage institutions considering possible conversion to an LLC structure to first contact the
appropriate FDIC office to discuss federal deposit insurance eligibility.
For more information about the final rule, please contact Mindy West in the FDIC's Division of
Supervision and Consumer Protection on 202-898-7221 or Robert C. Fick in the FDIC's Legal Division
on 202-898-8962.
This Financial Institution Letter supersedes FIL-106-2002, dated September 6,2002. For your
reference, FDIC Financial Institution Letters may be accessed from the FDIC's Web site at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financiaI/2003/index.html.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Attachment: February 13, 2003, Federal Register, pages 7301-7309
HTML I PDF (73KB File - PDF Help or Hard Copy)
Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings)
NOTE: Paper copies of FDIC financial institution letters may be obtained through the FDIC's Public
Information Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (1-877-275-3342, option
5, or 202-416-6940).
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AUDITS, AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
FIL-17-2003
March 5, 2003
TO:
SUBJECT:
Summary:
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (also of interest to Chief Financial Officer and
Members of the Board)
Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on Insured Depository Institutions
The FDIC is providing guidance to institutions about selected provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, including the actions the FDIC encourages institutions to take
to ensure sound corporate governance. The guidance also discusses the
applicability of the auditor independence provisions of the Act and the Securities
and Exchange Commission's implementing regulations to institutions with $500
million or more in total assets.
The provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are primarily directed toward those companies,
including insured depository institutions, that have a class of securities registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the appropriate federal banking agency under Section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, i.e., public companies. Since enactment of the Act, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has received questions about the applicability of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to insured depository institutions. The answers to these questions depend, in large part, on
an institution's size and whether it is a public company or a subsidiary of a public company.
FDIC-Supervised Banks That Are Public Companies or Subsidiaries of Public Companies
Some FDIC-supervised banks have registered their securities with the FDIC pursuant to Part 335 of
the FDIC's regulations and are, therefore, public companies. Other FDIC-supervised banks are
subsidiaries of bank holding companies that are public companies. These public companies and their
independent public accountants must comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act - inclUding those
provisions governing auditor independence, corporate responsibility and enhanced financial
disclosures - and the implementing regulations. The SEC is at various stages in the adoption of these
regulations. For banks whose securities are registered with the FDIC, Part 335 currently incorporates
applicable SEC regUlations by reference, but the FDIC expects that certain amendments to Part 335
will be necessary.
Non-public FDIC-Supervised Banks With Less Than $500 Million in Total Assets
FDIC-supervised banks that have less than $500 million in total assets as of the beginning of their
fiscal year are not subject to the annual audit and reporting requirements of Section 36 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act. Banks in this size range that are not public companies, or subsidiaries of
public companies, generally do not fall within the scope of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the SEC's
implementing regulations. Nevertheless, certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mirror existing
policy guidance related to corporate governance that the FDIC and the other banking agencies have
issued. Other provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act represent sound corporate governance practices.
Attachment I presents a summary of selected provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that the FDIC
believes are of relevance to FDIC-supervised banks with less than $500 million in total assets that are
not public companies. The sound corporate governance practices detailed in Attachment I are not
mandatory for smaller, non-public institutions; however, the FDIC recommends that each institution
consider implementing them to the extent feasible given its size, complexity, and risk profile.
Insured Depository Institutions With $500 Million or More in Total Assets
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Institutions that have $500 million or more in total assets as of the beginning of their fiscal year are
subject to the annual audit and reporting requirements of Section 36 of the FDI Act as implemented by
Part 363 of the FDIC's regulations. Some of these large institutions are public companies or
subsidiaries of public companies. Some institutions subject to Part 363 currently satisfy the
requirements of this regulation on a holding company basis. The applicability of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act to institutions with $500 million or more in total assets is discussed in Attachment II.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act can be accessed at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=107 cong bills&docid=f:h3763enr.txt.pdf (204KB File - PDF Help or Hard Copy). For further
information on the applicability of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act provisions, please contact Examination
Specialist Mike Jenkins (202-898-6896) or Senior Staff Accountant Dennis Chapman (202-898-8922)
of the Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection's Risk Management Policy and Examination
Support Branch.
For your reference, FDIC Financial Institution Letters may be accessed on the FDIC's Web site at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2003/index.html.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Attachments: Applicability of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to FDIC-
Supervised Banks With Less Than $500 Million In Total Assets That Are Not Public
Companies
Applicability of Selected Provisions of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Insured
Institutions With $500 Million Or More In Total Assets
Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings) and Insured Depository Institutions
with $500 Million or More in Total Assets
NOTE: Paper copies of FDIC financial institution letters may be obtained through the FDIC's Public
Information Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (1-877-275-3342, option
5, or 202-416-6940).
Last Updated 02/26/2003
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SUBJECT:
Summary:
SITEMAl' SEARCH HELP HOME
Financial Institution Letters
INTERNAL AUDITS
FIL-21-2003
March 17, 2003
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER (also of interest to the Internal Audit Manager and
Members of the Board)
Interagency Policy Statement on the Internal Audit Function and Its Outsourcing
The federal banking agencies have revised their 1997 internal audit policy
statement to update guidance (in light of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) on the
independence ofan accountant who provides both external audit and internal audit
services to an institution. Other parts of the 1997 policy statement also have been
revised.
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the other federal banking agencies have
issued the attached Interagency Policy Statement on the Internal Audit Function and Its Outsourcing.
The policy statement, which replaces a policy issued in 1997 (see FIL 13397, dated December 22,
1997), updates the agencies' guidance on the independence of an accountant who provides both
external and internal audit services to an institution as a result of the auditor independence provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The updated policy statement also reflects the agencies'
experience with the 1997 policy and incorporates recent developments in internal auditing.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recently adopted Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules
prohibit an accounting firm from acting as the external auditor of a public company during the same
period that the firm provides internal audit outsourcing and certain other non-audit services to the
company. In addition, if a public company's external auditor will be performing auditing and permitted
non-audit services, its audit committee must pre-approve each of these services. These SEC rules
generally become effective on May 6, 2003, although a one-year transition period is provided for
contractual arrangements in place as of that date. The revised policy statement separately discusses
the applicability of these requirements to:
• Institutions that are public companies;
• Insured depository institutions with $500 million or more in ?,ssets, which are subject to the
annual audit and reporting requirements of Section 36 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act;
and
• Non-public institutions that are not subject to Section 36.
For institutions subject to Section 36, whether or not they are public companies, the FDIC's existing
guidelines provide for their external auditors to comply with the SEC's auditor independence
requirements that are in effect during the period covered by the audit. These requirements include the
non-audit service prohibitions and audit committee pre-approval requirements.
The policy statement encourages non-public institutions not subject to Section 36, which includes non-
public banks with less than $500 million in assets, to follow the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's internal audit
outsourcing prohibition. However, if such an institution decides to use the same firm for both internal
and external audit work, the audit committee should document both that it has pre approved the
internal audit outsourcing to its external auditor and has considered the independence issues
associated with this arrangement.
In addition to changes related to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the agencies revised the 1997 policy
statement's discussion of the responsibilities of the board of directors and senior management with
respect to the internal audit function and its placement within an organization, its management and
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staffing. and the communication of concerns and weaknesses in accounting and internal control.
Expanded guidance has been provided on the use of independent reviews of significant internal
controls by small institutions that do not have a formal internal audit manager or staff. The policy
statement also includes guidance for examiners on addressing concerns about the adequacy of the
internal audit function.
This Financial Institution Letter (FIL) replaces FIL-133-97, dated December 22, 1997.
For further information, please contact Robert F. Storch, Chief Accountant (202 898 8906), in the
Division of Supervision and Consumer Protection.
For your reference, FDIC Financial Institution Letters may be accessed on the FDIC's Web site at
www.fdic.gov/news/news/financiaI/2003/index.html. To learn how to automatically receive FDIC
Financial Institution Letters through e-mail, please visit
www.fdic.gov/news/news/announcements/index.html.
Michael J. Zamorski
Director
Attachment
Distribution: FDIC-Supervised Banks (Commercial and Savings)
NOTE: Paper copies of FDIC financial institution letters may be obtained through the FDIC's Public
Information Center, 801 17th Street, NW, Room 100, Washington, DC 20434 (1-877-275-3342, option
5, or 202-416-6940).
Last Updated 03/17/2003
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FDIC SEEKS COMMENT ON DRAFT PAYDAY LENDING GUIDANCE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Media Contact:
PR-5-2003 (1-29-03) Phil Battey (202) 898-6993
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has developed guidelines for payday lending. A
draft of this guidance, which the FDIC intends to issue on March 31,2003, is attached.
Payday loans are small dollar, short-term, unsecured loans that borrowers promise to repay out of their
next paycheck or regular income payment. Although the number of known insured depository
institutions involved in payday lending is small, third-party payday lenders are actively seeking
relationships with insured financial institutions.
The draft guidance would apply to all institutions under the FDIC's supervision that offer payday lending
programs. It describes the FDIC's expectations for prudent risk-management practices for payday
lending activities, particularly with regard to capital, allowance for loan and lease losses, and
classifications. The draft also addresses guidelines for recovery practices, income recognition, and
managing risks associated with third-party relationships, as well as consumer protection issues.
As the FDIC completes its review of the draft document, it is interested in the views of affected
institutions and other interested parties as to whether the draft provides clear guidance concerning the
FDIC's expectations about payday lending practices. Institutions and other parties that choose to
respond should provide their views electronically no later than 5:00 p.m. on March 14,2003.
Responses should be submitted by fax to (202) 898-3827 or electronic mail to
PaydayComments@fdic.gov. All comments should refer to "Draft Guidelines for Payday Lending."
###
Attachment: Draft Guidelines for Payday Lending
Congress created the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 1933 to restore public confidence in the
nation's banking system. The FDIC insures deposits at the nation's 9,415 banks and savings
associations and it promotes the safety and soundness of these institutions by identifying, monitoring
and addressing the risks to which they are exposed. The FDIC receives no tax dollars - insured financial
institutions fund its operations.
FDIC press releases and other information are available on the Internet at www.fdic.gov or through the
FDIC's Public Information Center (877-275-3342 or 202-416-6940.)
Last Updated 1/29/2003
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REGULATION W
(12 CFR Part 223)
April, 2003
by
Walter R. Byrne, Jr.
Stites & Harbison, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
I. General Purpose. On December 12,2002, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ("Federal Reserve") published Regulation W, a final rule that is effective
on April 1, 2003. The purpose of Regulation W is to comprehensively implement
sections 23A (12 USC § 371c) and 23B (12 USC § 371c-1) of the Federal Reserve Act.
Sections 23A and 23B, along with Regulation W, govern transactions between "banks"
and their "affiliates" and are relevant to member banks, non-member banks and thrifts.
While sections 23A and 23B specifically apply to member banks, Congress has
specifically passed statutes extending these sections to state, non-member banks and to
thrifts as if they were member banks.
In general, section 23A imposes quantitative and qualitative limits on the ability
of a bank to extend credit, or engage in certain other transactions with its affiliates; and
section 23B imposes a requirement that transactions subject to its provisions be
conducted on market or arm's length terms and conditions. The Federal Reserve
interpretations and exemptions were contained in 12 CFR Part 250 and have been largely
replaced by provisions of Regulation W.
Regulation W is divided into eight subparts, A - H, which combine statutory
restrictions with numerous Federal Reserve interpretations and exemptions in a purported
effort to simplify compliance with sections 23A and 238. The rule contains thirty-eight
definitions that must be read carefully and are critical in properly applying the rule and is
drafted in plain English.
The purpose of this outline is to provide a brief overview of the general
application of the rule and introduce several provisions of Regulation W. This outline is
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not intended to furnish a detailed review or analysis of all of the various sections of the
rule. A copy of the complete final rule for Regulation W, along with explanations for the
final rule, is contained in Exhibit A attached following this outline.
II. When Does Regulation W Apply? In determining whether Regulation W applies to a
transaction, the bank must first determine if the transaction is with one of its "affiliates"
and secondly, determine whether the transaction is a "covered transaction" within the
meaning of Regulation W.
III. What Is An Affiliate? The definition of "affiliate" with respect to a bank is contained in
12 CFR Part 223.2 and includes the following:
1. parent companies
2. companies under common control by a parent company
3. companies under other common control
4. companies with interlocking directorates
5. sponsored and advised companies
6. investment companies
7. depository institution subsidiaries
8. financial subsidiaries
9. companies held under merchant banking or insurance company investment
authority
10. partnerships associated with the member bank or any affiliate
11. subsidiaries of affiliates and
12. any company determined by regulation or order by appropriate federal
banking regulators to have a relationship with the bank needing the
protection of Regulation W
IV. What Constitutes Control? The definition of "control" is contained in 12 CFR
Part 223.3(g) and includes:
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1. the company or shareholder, directly or indirectly, or acting through one
or more other persons, owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 percent or
more of any class of voting securities of the other company
2. the company or shareholder controls in any manner the election of a
majority of the directors, trustees, or general partners (or individuals
exercising similar functions) of the other company; or
3. the Federal Reserve determines, after notice and opportunity for hearing,
that the company or shareholder, directly or indirectly, exercises a
controlling influence over the management or policies of the other
company; or
4. The definition additionally addresses the following control issues:
a. ownership or control of shares as fiduciary
b. ownership or control of securities by subsidiary
c. ownership or control of convertible instruments; and
d. ownership or control of nonvoting securities
V. What Types Of Companies Are Excluded From The Definition Of Affiliate? The
following types of companies are excluded from the definition of "affiliate" by 12 CFR
Part 223.2(b):
1. most operating subsidiaries
2. holding bank premises
3. conducting a safe deposit business
4. holding U.S. government securities
5. companies acquired via a bona fide debt previously contracted, as long as
restricted time frames are adhered to; and
6. for section 238 only, an affiliate relationship does not include a
transaction with any depository institution
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VI. What Is The Definition Of A Covered Transaction? Under 12 CFR Part 223.3(h) of
Regulation W, a "covered transaction" means one of the following:
1. an extension of credit to an affiliate
2. a purchase of, or an investment in, a security issued by the affiliate
3. a purchase of an asset from an affiliate, including an asset subject to
recourse or an agreement to repurchase
4. the acceptance of a security issued by an affiliate as collateral for an
extension of credit to any person or company; and
5. the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance or letter of credit, including an
endorsement or standby letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate; a
confirmation of a letter of credit issued by an affiliate; and a cross-affiliate
netting arrangement
VII. What Exemptions Are Available From Section 23A? Subpart E of Regulation W (12
CFR Part 223.41, et seq.) contains the following type exemptions:
1. covered transactions that are exempt from quantitative and collateral
requirements
a. depository institution/80% owned depository institution subsidiary
transaction
b. transaction between a bank and a depository institution which is
80% owned by the same holding company
c. certain loan purchases from an affiliated depository institution
d. internal corporate reorganization transactions.
2. Covered transactions that are exempt from quantitative limits, collateral
requirements, and low-quantity asset prohibition
a. making correspondent banking deposits in ordinary course of
business
b. giving credit for uncollected items in ordinary course of business
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c. transactions secured by cash or U. S. Government securities
d. purchasing securities of a servicing affiliate
e. purchasing certain liquid assets
f. purchasing certain marketable securities
g. purchasing municipal securities
h. purchasing an extension of credit subject to a repurchase
agreement
1. asset purchases by a newly formed bank
J. transactions approved under the Bank Merger Act
k. purchases of an extension of credit from an affiliate, subject to
certain conditions
1. intraday extensions of credit, subject to certain conditions
m. riskless principal transactions, subject to certain conditions
VIII. Quantitative Ceiling On Covered Transactions. Subpart B of Regulation W, 12 CFR
Part 223.11 and 223.12 prohibit a bank from initiating a covered transaction with an
affiliate if the maximum amount of the transaction exceeds:
1. The aggregate amount of the bank's covered transactions with that
particular affiliate (other than a financial subsidiary of the bank) would
exceed 10% of the bank's capital stock and surplus; or
2. The aggregate amount of the bank's covered transactions with all affiliates
would exceed 20% of the bank's capital stock and surplus
IX. Collateral Requirements And Qualitative Safeguards.
1. Collateral requirements. Any credit transaction between a bank and its
affiliate must be secured with the statutorily required amount of collateral
set forth in 12 CFR Part 223 .14, which equals at least 100% of the amount
and may be up to 130% depending upon the type of collateral.
a. Ineligible collateral includes:
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1. low-quality assets
11. securities issued by an affiliate
111. equity securities or debt issued by the bank that represent
regulatory capital
IV. intangible assets
v. guarantees, letters of credit, or similar instruments.
b. all collateral must provide a perfected security interest that is
enforceable under applicable law
2. Attribution. Any transaction by a bank with any non-affiliate that benefits
an affiliate of the bank are covered by the statute and the rule. Regulation
W contains certain exemptions from attribution for certain specific type
transactions (e.g. general purchase credit cards and agency transactions,
subject to certain requirements).
3. Safe and Sound Banking Practices. All covered transactions and exempt
transactions are required to be undertaken on conditions consistent with
safe and sound banking practices.
4. Purchase of Low Quality Asset. Section 23A generally prohibits a bank
from purchasing a low-quality asset, as defined in 12 CFR Part 223.3(u)
from an affiliate. There is an exemption under 12 CFR Part 223.42 for
certain transactions and, also, for renewals of loan participations involving
problem loans contained in 12 CFR Part 223 .15(b) based upon certain
requirements being undertaken.
X. Valuation And Timing Rules. Regulation W in Subpart C (12 CFR Part 223.21, et seq.)
establishes certain valuation and timing rules that are crafted to determine the actual
amount of a covered transaction subject to the quantitative limits and collateral
requirements of the rule and establish the time a transaction becomes subject to the rule.
Special valuation rules apply to a bank's financial subsidiary.
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XI. Section 23B. Regulation W in Subpart F (12 CFR Part 223.51, et seq.) generally
describes section 23B and requires that transactions between a bank and its affiliates be in
good faith and on tenns that are no less favorable to the bank than would be entered into
by the bank with an unrelated party. The rule prohibits or restricts fiduciary purchases of
assets from an affiliate or the purchase of a security underwritten by an affiliate.
XII. Significant Issues Addressed By Regulation W. The Federal Reserve, in SR 03-2,
January 9,2003 on "Adoption ofRegulation W Implementing Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act" (attached hereto as Exhibit B) describes how the Federal
Reserve resolved the below listed nine significant issues addressed by the final rule:
1. derivatives
2. intraday credit
3. financial subsidiaries
4. general purpose credit card exemption
5. foreign banks
6. Section 250.250 exemptions
7. affiliated mutual funds
8. corporate reorganizations
9. valuation rules
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 223
[Regulation W; Docket No. R-1103]
Transactions Between Member Banks
and Their Affiliates
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board) is
adopting a final rule (Regulation W) to
implement comprehensively sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
and provide several new exemptions
consistent with the purposes of the
statute. The final rule combines
statutory restrictions on transactions
between a member bank and its
affiliates with numerous Board
interpretations and exemptions in an
effort to simplify compliance with
sections 23A and 238.
DATES: The final rule is effective April
1,2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Pamela G. Nardolilli, Senior Counsel
(202/452-3289], or Mark E. Van Der
Weide, Counsel (202/452-2263], Legal
Division; or Michael G. Martinson,
Associate Director (202/452-3640), or
Molly S. Wassom, Associate Director
(202/452-2305], Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation; Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, 20th Street and Constitution
Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20551.
For users of Telecommunications
Device for the Deaf ("TDD") only,
contact 202/263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Introduction
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal
Reserve Act are important statutory
provisions designed to protect against a
depository institution suffering losses in
transactions with affiliates. They also
limit the ability of a depository
institution to transfer to its affiliates the
subsidy arising from the institution's
access to the Federal safety net. Sections
23A and 23B apply, by their terms, to
banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System ("member banks").
Other Federal law subjects insured
nonmember banks and insured thrifts to
sections 23A and 23B in the same
manner and to the same extent as if they
were member banks.
Although sections 23A and 23B each
explicitly grant the Board broad
authority to issue regulations to
administer the section,l the Board has
112 U.S.C. 371c(f). 371c-l(e).
never issued a regulation fully
implementing either section. Instead,
depository institutions seeking guidance
on how to comply with the statute have
relied on a series of Board
interpretations and informal staff
guidance. Institutions have increasingly
sought guidance from the Board on
section 23A issues in recent years as a
result of the increasing scope of
activities conducted by modern
financial holding companies and the
growing complexities ofthe U.S.
financial markets,
On May 11, 2001, the Board issued a
proposed Regulation W to implement
comprehensively sections 23A and
23B,2 The Board decided to issue such
a rule for several reasons. First, the new
regulatory framework established by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLB Act") 3
emphasizes the importance of sections
23A and 23B as a means to protect
depository institutions from losses in
transactions with affiliates. In addition,
adoption of a comprehensive rule would
simplify the interpretation and
application of sections 23A and 23B,
ensure that the statute is consistently
interpreted and applied, and minimize
burden on banking organizations to the
extent consistent with the statute's
goals. Finally, issuing a comprehensive
proposed rule allowed the public an
opportunity to comment on Board and
staff interpretations of sections 23A and
23B, many of which were adopted
without the benefit of public comment.
Among other things, the GLB Act
required the Board to adopt final rules,
by May 12, 2001, to address under
section 23A credit exposure by a
member bank to its affiliates on
derivative transactions and intraday
credit extensions. The Board issued
interim final rules to fulfill this
statutory mandate on May 11, 2001
(concurrently with proposed Regulation
W). The interim final rules became
effective January 1, 2002. The Board
also sought public comment as part of
the Regulation W rulemaking process on
how these types of transactions should
be treated under section 23A.
The Board received approximately
120 public comments on the proposed
Regulation Wand the interim final rules
on derivative transactions and intraday
extensions of credit. Commenters
included 3 Members of Congress, 75
banking organizations, 20 trade
·associations representing the banking or
financial services industry, 5 state
banking departments or other
governmental agencies, 9 law firms or
individuals, and several other
266 FR 24186, May 11, 2001.
3 Pub. L. 106-102,113 Stat. 1338 (1999J.
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organizations. Nearly all the
commenters supported the Board's
decision to issue Regulation Wand the
interim rules but opposed or raised
concerns about one or more aspects of
the regulations.
The Board has carefully reviewed and
analyzed the issues raised by
commenters and has decided to issue a
final Regulation W that is substantially
similar to the proposed rule. The Board
has modified the proposed rule in many
important respects, however, to reflect
the concerns of commenters and further
analysis by the Board. The final rule
supersedes any Board interpretations or
staff opinions of sections 23A and 23B
that are inconsistent with the rule. In a
separate rulemaking concurrent with the
issuance of final Regulation W, the
Board is rescinding its existing
interpretations of and exemptions from
section 23A contained in part 250 of
title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations because all such
interpretations and exemptions are
included within Regulation W.
The Board expects each depository
institution with affiliates that is subject
to sections 23A and 23B to implement
policies and procedures to ensure
compliance with the final rule.
Background
As noted above, sections 23A and 23B
by their terms limit the risks to a
member bank from transactions with
affiliates and limit the ability of a
member bank to transfer its Federal
subsidy to affiliates. Section 23A
achieves these goals in four major ways.
First, it limits a member bank's
"covered transactions" with any single
"affiliate" to no more than 10 percent of
the bank's capital stock and surplus,
and transactions with all affiliates
combined to no more than 20 percent of
the bank's capital stock and surplus.
"Covered transactions" include
purchases of assets from an affiliate,
extensions of credit to an affiliate,
investments in securities issued by an
affiliate, guarantees on behalf of an
affiliate, and certain other transactions
that expose the member bank to an
affiliate's credit or investment risk. A
member bank's "affiliates" include,
among other companies, any companies
that control the bank, any companies
under common control with the bank,
and certain investment funds that are
advised by the bank or an affiliate of the
bank.
Second, the statute requires all
transactions between a member bank
and its affiliates to be on terms and
conditions that are consistent with safe
and sound banking practices. Third, the
statute prohibits a member bank from
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purchasing low-quality assets from its
affiliates. Finally, section 23A requires
that a member bank's extensions of
credit to affiliates and guarantees on
behalf of affiliates be appropriately
secured by a statutorily defined amount
of collateral.
Section 23B protects a member bank
by requiring that certain transactions
between the bank and its affiliates occur
on market terms; that is, on terms and
under circumstances that are
substantially the same, or at least as
favorable to the bank, as those
prevailing at the time for comparable
transactions with unaffiliated
companies. Section 23B applies this
restriction to any covered transaction (as
defined in section 23A) with an affiliate
as well as certain other transactions,
such as (i) any sale of assets by the
member bank to an affiliate; (ii) any
payment of money or furnishing of
services by the member bank to an
affiliate; and (iii) any transaction by the
member bank with a third party if an
affiliate has a financial interest in the
third party or if an affiliate is a
participant in the transaction.
Section 23A originally was enacted as
part of the Banking Act of 1933, and the
restrictions of section 23A applied only
to member banks. Since 1933, Congress
has amended the statute several times,
including a comprehensive revision in
1982. 4 Congress also amended the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDI
Act") in 1966 to apply section 23A to
insured nonmember banks in the same
manner and to the same extent as if they
were member banks.s In addition,
Congress revised the Home Owners'
Loan Act ("HOLA") in 1989 to apply
section 23A to insured savings
associations in the same manner and to
the same extent as if they were member
banks.6 Congress enacted section 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act as part of the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987,7 and has subsequently expanded
its scope to cover the same set of
depository institutions as are covered by
section 23A. Consequently, sections
23A and 23B now apply to all insured
depository institutions and uninsured
member banks.
The GLB Act amended the Federal
Reserve Act in 1999 so that sections 23A
and 23B would apply to transactions
4 Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982. Pub. L. No. 97-320. § 410.96 Stat. 1515
(1982J (codified at 12 U.S.c. 371c).
5 Pub. L. 89-485. § 12(cl. 80 Stat. 242 (1966)
(codified at 12 U.S.c. 1828(j)).
G Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery. and
Enforcement Act of 1989. Pub. L. 101-73. §301.103
Stat. 342 (1989J (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1468(a)).
7 Pub. L. 100-86. § 102.101 Stat. 552. 564 (1987)
(codified at 12 U.S.c. 371c-l).
between a bank and its "financial
subsidiaries." Section 23A, as amended
by the GLB Act, defines a financial
subsidiary as any subsidiary of a bank
that would be a financial subsidiary of
a national bank under section 5136A of
the Revised Statutes of the United
States. Section 5136A ofthe Revised
Statutes generally defines a financial
subsidiary as a subsidiary of an insured
depository institution that engages in
activities that are not permissible for
national banks to engage in directly
(unless national banks are authorized by
the express terms of a Federal statute to
own or control the subsidiary).8 The
GLB Act provides that a financial
subsidiary of a bank, unlike most other
subsidiaries of a bank, is considered an
"affiliate" ofthe bank for purposes of
sections 23A and 23B. The GLB Act also
establishes certain special rules under
section 23A for financial subsidiaries.
Explanation of Final Rule
I. Format of Regulation
Regulation W provides users with a
single, comprehensive reference tool for
complying with and analyzing issues
arising under sections 23A and 23B.9
The regulation restates the statutory
definitions, restrictions, and
exemptions, and also includes Board
interpretations of the sections.
Commentel's agreed that including the
statutory provisions in the rule would
make understanding and using the rule
easier.
The regulation first provides, in
subpart A, a comprehensive glossary of
the terms used in the regulation and the
statute. The regulation then sets forth, in
subpart B, the principal restrictions and
requirements imposed by section 23A.
Next, in subpart C, the regulation
discusses the appropriate valuation and
timing principles for covered
transactions. Subpart D discusses the
appropriate treatment under section
23A for transactions with financial
subsidiaries, bank-affiliate derivative
transactions, and certain bank-affiliate
merger and acquisition transactions.
Subpart E sets forth available
exemptions from certain of the
requirements of section 23A. Subpart F
lays out the operative provisions of
section 23B. Subpart G discusses the
application of sections 23A and 23B and
8 See 12 U.S.c. 24a(gJ.
9 The regulation implements sections 23A and
238 of the Federal Reserve Act. The regulation does
not contain or implement statutory or regulatory
restrictions on transactions between nlember banks
and their affiliates that may be applicable under
other provisions of law. including those that may
apply to member banks subject to prompt corrective
action under section 38 ofthe FDI Act (12 U.S.c.
18310).
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the rule to U.S. branches and agencies
of foreign banks. Subpart H contains the
Board's miscellaneous interpretations of
the statute.
The regulation also includes examples
illustrating how several of the rule's
provisions would apply in particular
circumstances. The examples included
in the rule are considered part of the
rule and compliance with an example,
to the extent applicable, would
constitute compliance with the rule.
Each example included in the rule
illustrates only the scope and
application of the particular topic
addressed by the example and does not
illustrate any other topic or issue that
may arise under the rule.
II. Scope ofRegulation
As noted above, although sections
23A and 23B apply by their terms only
to member banks, the FDI Act subjects
insured nonmember banks to the
restrictions of sections 23A and 23B as
if they were member banks. In order to
clarify how sections 23A and 23B
applied to each type of bank, the
proposed Regulation W applied by its
terms to member banks and insured
nonmember banks. The Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC")
objected to the scope of the proposed
rule and urged the Board to amend the
rule so that it would not apply by its
terms to insured nonmember banks. The
Board has decided to revise the rule to
apply by its terms only to member
banks. Notwithstanding this restriction
of the scope of Regulation W, insured
nonmember banks must comply with
the rule as if they were member banks.10
As noted above, HOLA subjects
insured savings associations to sections
23A and 23B as if they were member
banks. HOLA also imposes several
restrictions on transactions between an
insured savings association and certain
of its affiliates that are not contained in
section 23A 11 and provides the Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS") with
authority to impose additional
restrictions on transactions between an
insured savings association and its
affiliates.12 In light of the stricter
regulatory regime governing
transactions between an insured savings
association and its affiliates and in light
10 Accordingly. an insured nonmember bank also
may take advantage of Regulation W's exemptions
as if it were a member bank.
11 HOLA prohibits an insured savings association
from (i) making loans or extending credit to any
affiliate unless that affiliate is engaged solely in
activities that the Board has determined to be
permissible under section 4(c) of the Bank Holding
Company Act (12 U.S.c. 1843(c)); and (ii) investing
in securities issued by any affiliate other than
shares issued by a subsidiary. 12 U.S.C. 1468(aJ(l).
12 12 U.S.C. 1468(a)(4).
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of a request by the OTS that Regulation
W not specifically cover such
institutions, the final rule (like the
proposed rule) does not apply by its
terms to insured savings associations.
The Board notes, however, that because
insured savings associations are subject
to sections 23A and 23B as if they were
member banks, insured savings
associations must comply with
Regulation W as if they were member
banks.13 Moreover, any parallel
regulation adopted by the OTS to govern
transactions with affiliates must be at
least as strict on insured savings
associations as Regulation W is on
member banks.
IIl. Definitions-Subpart A
Subpart A of Regulation W sets forth
definitions of the terms used in sections
23A and 23B and the rule. Terms that
are defined in the regulation as they are
defined in the statute generally are not
discussed below. Material terms that the
Board proposes to define or clarify for
purposes of the regulation are discussed
below.
A. Definition of Affiliate (§ 223.2)
1. Investment Funds Advised by the
Member Bank or an Affiliate of the
Member Bank (§223.2(a)(6))
Section 23A includes as an affiliate
any company that is sponsored and
advised by the member bank or any of
its affiliates.14 Section 23A also includes
as an affiliate any investment company
for which the member bank or its
affiliate serves as an investment advisor,
as defined in the Investment Company
Act of 1940 ("1940 Act").15 The
proposed regulation included these
provisions and also included as an
affiliate any investment fund-even if
not an investment company for
purposes of the 1940 Act-for which the
member bank or an affiliate of the bank
serves as an investment advisor, if the
bank or an affiliate of the bank owns or
controls more than 5 percent of any
class of voting securities or similar
interests of the fund. 16
A number of commenters expressed
opposition to this proposal. According
to these commenters, the proposal
would violate the careful statutory
13 Accordingly, an insured savings association
also may take advantage of Regulation W's
exemptions as if it were a member bank.
14 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(l)(D)(i).
15 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(l)(O)(ii).
16 As noted above. proposed Regulation W
applied by its terms to "banks." and the final rule
applies by its terms only to member banks.
Nevertheless. to make comparisons of the proposed
and final rules easier for readers, the remainder of
this preamble discusses the proposed rule as if it
applied only to member banks.
framework established by Congress for
determining which investment funds
are affiliates of banks. In addition, these
commenters claimed that there is little
potential for conflicts of interest, and no
evidence of abuse, in transactions
between banks and unregistered funds.
One commenter urged the Board to
deem an unregistered investment fund
to be an affiliate of a bank only if the
bank or an affiliate controls the fund.
The Board has determined to adopt
this proposal. Most investment funds
that are advised by a member bank (or
an affiliate of a member bank) are
affiliates of the bank under section 23A
because the funds either are investment
companies under the 1940 Act or are
sponsored by the member bank (or an
affiliate of the member bank). In some
instances, however, the member bank or
its affiliate may advise but not sponsor
an investment fund that is not an
investment company under the 1940
Act. Although such a fund would not fit
within the statutory definition of
affiliate, section 23A also authorizes the
Board to determine, by regulation or
order, that any company is an affiliate
of a member bank if the company has
"a relationship with the member bank
or any subsidiary or affiliate of the
member bank, such that covered
transactions by the member bank or its
subsidiary with that company may be
affected by the relationship to the
detriment of the member bank or its
subsidiary. "17
The Board believes that the advisory
relationship of a member bank or
affiliate with an investment fund
presents the same potential for conflicts
of interest regardless of whether the
fund is an investment company under
the 1940 Act,lB An investment fund
typically escapes from the definition of
investment company under the 1940
Act because it (i) sells interests only to
a limited number of investors or only to
sophisticated investors; or (ii) invests
primarily in financial instruments that
are not securities. 19 The Board does not
believe that the private nature or
17 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(1)(E).
16 In fact. a member bank may face greater risk
from the conflicts of interest arising from its
relationships with an investment fund that is not
registered as an investment company under the
1940 Act because the 1940 Act restricts transactions
between a registered investment company and
entities affiliated with the company's investment
advisor. See 15 U.S.c. BOa-17.
19 The term "investment company" in the 1940
Act does not include a company that is owned by
qualified persons or by no more than 100 persons.
provided that the company does not engage in a
public offering of its securities. See 15 U.S.c. BOa-
3(c)(l). (7). The term also generally does not include
investment funds that are engaged primarily in
investing in financial instruments other than
securities. See 15 U.S.c. BOa-3(a)(1).
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investment strategy of a fund should
have a substantial effect on the fund's
affiliate status under section 23A
because these factors do not alter the
conflicts of interest presented in the
advisory relationship between the
member bank or its affiliate and the
fund. 20
2. Financial Subsidiaries (§§ 223.2(a)(8)
and 223.3(p))
Congress amended section 23A in
1982 to provide that subsidiaries of a
member bank are not affiliates of the
bank under the statute. Congress
adopted this approach on the premise
that subsidiaries of a member bank
generally are consolidated with the bank
and engage only in those activities that
the bank itself could engage in directly,
and hence that such a subsidiary was
more like a department of the bank than
a separate company. In order to prevent
evasions of section 23A, the 1982
amendments gave the Board explicit
authority to treat as an affiliate of a
member bank any subsidiary if the
relationship between the bank and the
subsidiary could affect transactions
between the companies to the detriment
of the bank,21
In 1997, in light of the expanding
powers of subsidiaries of banks, the
Board relied on this statutory authority
to issue for comment a proposal to
extend section 23A to transactions
between a member bank and a
subsidiary of the bank engaged in
activities not permissible for the bank to
engage in directly. The Board took no
final action on this proposal in light of
Congressional consideration of financial
modernization legislation. In 1999, the
GLB Act authorized banks to own
"financial subsidiaries" that engage in
activities not permissible for the parent
bank to conduct directly, such as
underwriting and dealing in bank-
ineligible securities. The GLB Act also
amended section 23A to define a
financial subsidiary of a bank as an
affiliate of the bank and, thus, subjected
transactions between the bank and a
financial subsidiary to the limitations of
sections 23A and 23B.
Section 23A, as amended by the GLB
Act, defines a financial subsidiary as a
subsidiary of any bank (state or
national) that is engaged in an activity
2°The Board also believes that investment funds
organized outside the United States for which a
member bank or affiliate serves as investment
advisor are affiliates of the bank for purposes of
section 23A. See Letter dated luly 24.1990. from
I. Virgil Mattingly, Ir.• General Counsel of the
Board. to Anne B. McMillen. The term "investment
company" in the 1940 Act does include investment
funds organized under the laws of a non-U.S.
jurisdiction.
21 12 U.S.C. 371c(b)(2)(A).
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that is not permissible for national
banks (other than a subsidiary that
Federal law specifically authorizes
national banks to control).22 Proposed
Regulation W defined financial
subsidiary by repeating the definition of
the term in section 23A. The proposed
rule also noted that many state banks
have authority to engage in activities
that would not be permissible for
national banks and sought comment on
how to apply the section 23A definition
of financial subsidiary to state banks. In
addition, the proposal requested
comment on whether to exempt from
the definition of financial subsidiary
any subsidiary of a bank that engages
solely in agency activities.
a. Subsidiaries of state banks.-
Commenters offered a wide variety of
alternative ways for the Board to apply
the statute's definition of financial
subsidiary to state banks. One set of
commenters (including the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors and the
American Bankers Association) asked
the Board to define a financial
subsidiary of a state bank to include
only those subsidiaries that are engaged
in activities that the parent state bank
could not engage in directly. Another
set of commenters argued that the Board
should define a financial subsidiary of
a state bank to include only those
subsidiaries subject to section 46 of the
FDI Act; that is, those subsidiaries that
are engaged in principal activities that
may only be conducted by a national
bank through a financial subsidiary
(currently, only subsidiaries engaged in
underwriting and dealing in bank-
ineligible securities). Other commenters
advocated for a complete exemption for
all subsidiaries of a state bank. Over 30
commenters-the largest number of
commenters on any issue raised by the
proposed rule-urged the Board to
define financial subsidiary to exclude
those subsidiaries of state banks that are
engaged in grandfathered securities
22 Specifically. section 23A defines a "financial
subsidiary" as "any company that is a subsidiary
of a bank that would be a financial subsidiary of
a national bank under section 5136A of the Revised
Statutes ofthe Vnited States." 12 U.S.c. 371c{e)(1).
Section 5136A. in turn. defines a financial
subsidiary as any company that is controlled by one
or more insured depository institutions, other than
(i) a subsidiary that engages solely in activities that
national banks are permitted to engage in directly
or Iii) a subsidiary that national banks are
specifically authorized to control by the express
terms of a Federal statute (other than section
5136AJ, such as an Edge Act corporation or a SBlC.
12 V.S.c. 24a{gJ(3). Section 5136A also generally
prohibits a financial subsidiary of a national bank
from engaging in insurance underwriting, real estate
investment and development, or merchant banking
activities. 12 V.S.C. 24a{a){2).
investment activities under section 24(f)
of the FDI Act. 23
The Board believes that the literal
terms of section 23A provide that a
subsidiary of a state bank that engages
in an activity that is not permissible for
national banks to conduct directly is a
financial subsidiary of the state bank
(unless Federal law specifically
authorizes national banks to control
such a subsidiary). This conclusion
holds regardless of whether the activity
(i) is permissible for the state bank to
conduct directly; (ii) is an agency or
principal activity; (iii) was approved by
the FDIC under section 24 of the FDI
Act; or (iv) was conducted by the
subsidiary before the enactment of the
GLB Act.
The final rule defines financial
subsidiary in this manner but also
contains exemptions for two classes of
subsidiaries of state banks. First, the
final rule exempts any subsidiary of a
state bank that engages in activities that
the parent state bank may engage in
directly under Federal and state law. 24
In the Board's view, if a state bank has
authority under applicable law to
conduct an activity directly in the bank,
section 23A normally should not apply
to transactions between the bank and a
subsidiary engaged in the activity. In
these circumstances, the bank could
conduct the activity directly in the bank
and fund the activity free of section
23A. The Board is aware of no material
supervisory reason to create a
disincentive for the bank to conduct
such a bank-permissible activity
through a subsidiary if the bank has
determined-for tax, liability, or other
reasons-that the activity is most safely
and efficiently conducted through a
subsidiary. This approach is consistent
with the spirit of the GLB Act and with
the Board's 1997 rulemaking on
subsidiaries of member banks.
Second, the final rule exempts any
subsidiary of a state bank that engages
in activities that the subsidiary was
legally conducting before issuance of
final Regulation W. Among other things,
this exemption would remove from the
definition of financial subsidiary those
23 12 V.S.c. 1831a{f). Section 24(f) of the FDI Act
permits state banks that had lawfully made certain
liquid equity investments in 1990-91 to continue to
engage in such equity investment activities so long
as such equity investments do not exceed an
amount equal to the bank's capital.
24 For purposes of applying this exemption, a
state bank may directly engage in an activity under
Federal law if Federal law does not prohibit the
state bank from directly engaging in the activity. If,
on the other hand, Federal law prohibits a state
bank from directly engaging in an activity-such as
equity investment (see 12 V.S.c. 1831a{c) and (f))-
a subsidiary of a state bank that engaged in the
activity could not qualify for this exemption.
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subsidiaries of state banks that are
engaged in the limited, grandfathered
securities investment activities
authorized under section 24(f) of the
FDI Act. The Board does not believe that
this exemption would apply to a
significant number of other material
subsidiaries of state banks. The
exemption would be appropriate,
however, so as not to impose a hardship
on the existing business operations and
structures of state banks,25
As noted above, some commenters
argued that the only section 23A
financial subsidiaries of state banks are
those subsidiaries that are subject to
section 46 of the FDI Act. The Board
does not believe that this argument is
convincing. Although section 46 of the
FDI Act specifically notes that sections
23A and 23B apply to transactions
between a state bank and a section 46
subsidiary, section 46 does not change
the definition of financial subsidiary
contained in section 23A or, by its
terms, limit the coverage of section
23A's financial subsidiary provisions to
only section 46 subsidiaries.
Several commenters also argued that
the Board should exempt any subsidiary
of a state bank (other than a section 46
subsidiary) approved by the FDIC under
section 24 of the FDI Act. Section 24 of
the FDI Act prevents a subsidiary of an
insured state bank from engaging in any
principal activity that is not permissible
for a subsidiary of a national bank
unless (il the FDIC has made a
determination that the activity would
pose no significant risk to the Federal
deposit insurance funds; and (ii) the
state bank remains in compliance with
the capital guidelines of its appropriate
Federal banking agency.26 As noted
above, the final rule contains an
exemption for any subsidiary of a state
bank that engages in activities
permissible for the parent state bank to
conduct directly. Accordingly, the
principal effect of granting an
exemption for section 24 subsidiaries
would be to exempt from section 23A
transactions between a state bank and
2S Neither of these exemptions would be available
for any subsidiary of a state bank that engages in
principal activities that the GLB Act requires a
national bank to conduct in a financial subsidiary,
such as underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible
securities. Section 46 of the FDI Act explicitly
provides that such subsidiaries of a state bank are
to be treated as section 23A affiliates of the bank.
12 V.S.C. 1831w.
The GLB Act authorizes the Board and the
Treasury Department to determine jointly, on or
after November 12, 2004, that financial subsidiaries
may engage in merchant banking activities. GLB Act
§ 122. If the Board and Treasury were to make such
a determination, the merchant banking subsidiaries
of banks would be section 23A financial
subsidiaries under the final rule.
26 12 V.S.C. 1831a(d).
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its section 24 subsidiaries engaged in
activities the parent bank may not
conduct directly. Such subsidiaries
would include those engaged in equity
investment (which Federal law
prohibits insured state banks from
engaging in) 27 or real estate investment
and development (in those states that do
not permit state banks to conduct such
activities directly).
Commenters argued that various
considerations support granting an
exemption for section 24 subsidiaries
that conduct activities not permissible
for their parent state bank. First,
commenters contended that section 24
of the FDI Act and the FDIC's
regulations thereunder establish a
reasonably comprehensive system for
protecting insured state banks that
engage, or propose to engage, in
principal activities not permissible for
national banks. In this regard, the
FDIC's section 24 regulations impose
restrictions on transactions between a
state bank and many types of section 24
subsidiaries (including subsidiaries
engaged in real estate investment and
development).28 In addition, the FDIC
has approved only a few hundred
section 24 subsidiaries since Congress
added section 24 to the FDI Act in 1991,
and the FDIC has received very few
requests under section 24 in the past
couple of years. Finally, a large majority
of section 24 subsidiaries represent a
small part of the capital of their parent
state banks, and section 24 subsidiaries
have not to date materially affected the
safety and soundness of state banks.
The Board believes that there are
important reasons, however, not to
include in the final rule an exemption
for section 24 subsidiaries that engage in
activities their parent bank may not
conduct directly. First, Congress
provided a definition of financial
subsidiary in section 23A that, by its
terms, covers section 24 subsidiaries. 29
27 Federal law generally prohibits insured state
banks from making equity investments of a type or
in an amount that is not permissible for national
banks. See 12 U.S.C. 1831a(c) and (f).
26 See 12 CFR 362.4(b)(5) and (d).
29 Some commenters argued that section 24
subsidiaries engaged in real estate investment and
development or equity investment are not section
23A financial subsidiaries because (i) section 23A
defines a financial subsidiary as a subsidiary that
"would be a financial subsidiary of a national bank
under section 5136A of the Revised Statutes" and
(ii) section 5136A prohibits financial subsidiaries of
national banks from engaging in real estate
investment and development and merchant
banking. The Board finds this argument
unpersuasive. Although section 5136A prohibits
financial subsidiaries of national banks from
engaging in real estate investment and development
or equity investment. a subsidiary engaged in such
activities would meet the terms of the financial
subsidiary definition in section 23A and section
5136A.
In addition, coverage of section 24
subsidiaries that engage in activities not
permissible for their parent bank (and,
by definition, activities not permissible
for national banks) is consistent with an
important purpose of the GLB Act-
constraining the ability of a bank to
transfer the subsidy arising from the
bank's access to the Federal safety net
to affiliates engaged in activities that the
bank cannot conduct directly.
Furthermore, the activities conducted
by many section 24 subsidiaries,
including in particular real estate
investment and development, increase
the risk profile of their parent bank and
historically have caused significant
losses to the Federal deposit insurance
funds. 30 Although section 24
subsidiaries have not to date imperiled
their parent banks, banks have been
operating in a favorable economic
environment since Congress enacted
section 24 of the FDI Act. Moreover, the
section 24 restrictions imposed by the
FDIC are not as comprehensive as those
in section 23A 31 and could be removed
or relaxed by the FDIC at any time.32
Furthermore, although the Board could
revoke any exemption granted to section
24 subsidiaries if the exemption were to
have adverse safety and soundness
consequences, such a future revocation
may be difficult to effect because it
would come at a time when state banks
are least able to comply with the
requirements of section 23A. For these
,0 As noted above. Congress expressed specific
concern in the GLB Act about real estate investment
and development by prohibiting the financial
subsidiaries of national banks from engaging in
these activities. 12 U.S.C. 24a(a)(2). It is also worth
noting that. because the final rule includes an
exemption for subsidiaries of a state bank engaged
in activities that the parent state bank could engage
in directly. the principal beneficiaries of a separate
exemption for section 24 subsidiaries would be
subsidiaries of a state bank engaged in activities
that state or Federal law has determined are too
risky to be conducted directly in the bank.
"The FDIC's restrictions. among other things. do
not (i) include a 10 percent quantitative limit on
covered transactions between the bank and any
single section 24 subsidiary; (ii) restrict the ability
of a bank to finance a third party's purchase of
assets from a section 24 subsidiary of the bank; or
(iii) treat a purchase of assets from a section 24
subsidiary or the issuance of a guarantee or letter
of credit on behalf of a section 24 subsidiary as
covered transactions.
"In many past cases, the FDIC required state
banks to deduct from tier 1 capital the full amount
of their equity investments in most section 24
subsidiaries (including real estate investment and
development subsidiaries). Consistent with the
interagency capital rule on nonfinancial equity
investments adopted on January 25, 2002, however,
the FDIC now requires that state banks deduct from
tier 1 capital between 8 percent and 25 percent of
an equity investment in most section 24
subsidiaries. See 12 CFR part 325, Appendix A,
§ II.B.6.ii. The FDIC retains authority under the
nonfinancial equity investment capital rule to apply
a higher capital charge on these investments, but
the FDIC has not chosen to do so at this time.
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reasons, the final rule does not contain
an exemption for section 24 subsidiaries
of a state bank that engage in activities
their parent bank may not conduct
directly.
b. Agency subsidiaries ofnational
banks and state banks.-Section 23A's
definition of financial subsidiary does
not exclude subsidiaries of banks that
are engaged solely in agency activities. 33
As a result, insurance agency
subsidiaries of national banks that
operate outside a town of 5,000, for
example, are financial subsidiaries of
their parent banks under the statute.
A large number of commenters urged
the Board to exclude subsidiaries
engaged in agency activities from the
definition of financial subsidiary. The
Board has decided to exempt from the
definition of financial subsidiary any
subsidiary of a national bank or state
bank that would be considered a
financial subsidiary solely because the
subsidiary engages in insurance agency
activities that are not permissible for the
parent bank. The Federal banking
agencies have had significant
experience in supervising insurance
agency subsidiaries of banks, and such
subsidiaries do not pose the kind of
threat to bank safety and soundness that
section 23A was designed to prevent. In
addition, because insurance agency
subsidiaries are not capital-intensive,
they require little funding from the
parent bank and, hence, stand to benefit
less from the subsidy implicit in the
Federal safety net than would a
subsidiary engaged in activities as
principal. Under the final rule,
therefore, subsidiaries of banks engaged
in insurance agency activities or agency
activities permissible for the bank to
engage in directly are not section 23A
financial subsidiaries.
The Board does not believe that it is
appropriate at this time to grant an
exemption for all subsidiaries engaged
exclusively in agency activities because
defining what constitutes an agency
activity is problematic, and some agency
activities involve significant risk. In the
unusual circumstance where a
subsidiary of a bank conducts a non-
insurance agency activity that is not
permissible for the bank to conduct
directly, the bank may request that the
Board grant a specific exemption for the
subsidiary.
33 Some commenters argued that agency
subsidiaries of state banks cannot be financial
subsidiaries under section 23A because (i) the only
section 23A financial subsidiaries of state banks are
subsidiaries that qualify as financial subsidiaries
under section 46 of the FDI Act and (ii) agency
subsidiaries cannot qualify as financial subsidiaries
under section 46. For the reasons discussed above,
the Board does not believe that this argument is
convincing.
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The Board notes that it retains
discretion under section 23A to
determine, by regulation or order, that
any subsidiary of a member bank (even
a subsidiary that qualifies for a
regulatory exemption from the
definition of financial subsidiary) is an
affiliate of the bank if the relationship
between the bank and the subsidiary is
such that covered transactions between
the bank and the subsidiary may be
affected by the relationship to the
detriment of the bank. 34
c. Subsidiaries of thrifts.-Although
section 23A applies by its terms only to
member banks, HOLA subjects every
thrift to section 23A "in the same
manner and to the same extent as if the
[thrift) were a member bank."35 As
noted above, section 23A defines a
financial subsidiary as "any company
that is a subsidiary of a bank that would
be a financial subsidiary of a national
bank." Because all "member banks"
under section 23A are also "banks"
under section 23A, and because HOLA
subjects every thrift to section 23A as if
the thrift were a "member bank," one
could read the financial subsidiary
definition in section 23A as covering
any subsidiary of a thrift that would be
a financial subsidiary of a national bank.
On the other hand, the OTS argued
that thrifts generally are not "banks"
under section 23A and, hence, that
thrifts do not have financial subsidiaries
under section 23A. The OTS also
pointed out that, although the GLB Act
contains explicit and detailed
provisions (unrelated to section 23A)
regarding financial subsidiaries of
national banks and state banks, the GLB
Act does not contain any explicit
reference to financial subsidiaries of
thrifts. In addition, HOLA already
contains numerous. provisions that
protect thrifts in their transactions with
subsidiaries. For example, HOLA
requires thrifts to deduct from their
capital all investments in, and
extensions of credit to, any subsidiary
engaged in activities that are not
permissible for national banks. 36 HOLA
also prohibits a thrift from investing
more than 3 percent of its assets in
service corporation subsidiaries.37 The
Board further notes that there is little
empirical evidence to date that
subsidiaries of thrifts have had a
34 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(1)(E) and (b)(2)(A). As
discussed below in part IILA.5. of this preamble,
§ 223.2(a)(12) of the final rule also authorizes the
appropriate Federal banking agency for a depository
institution to determine by order that a subsidiary
of the institution is an affiliate.
35 12 U.S.c. 1468(a).
36 12 U.S.c. 1464(t)(5); 12 CFR 559.3(j)(2) and part
567.
37 12 U.S.C. 1464(c)(4)(B).
material adverse effect on the safety or
soundness of their parent thrifts since
becoming subject to heightened Federal
regulation in 1989,
In light of the statutory ambiguities,
the protections contained in HOLA, and
a request by the OTS that the final rule
not treat subsidiaries of thrifts as
financial subsidiaries, the final rule
does not address financial subsidiaries
of thrifts.
3. Companies Held Under Merchant
Banking or Insurance Company
Investment Authority (§ 223.2(0)(9))
The GLB Act amended the Bank
Holding Company Act ("BHC Act") to
permit bank holding companies
("BHCs") and foreign banks that qualify
as financial holding companies
("FHCs") to engage in merchant banking
and insurance company investment
activities. 38 If a FHC owns or controls
more than 25 percent of a class of voting
shares of a company under the merchant
banking or insurance company
investment authority, the company is an
affiliate of any member bank controlled
by the FHC by operation of the statutory
definitions contained in section 23A.
The GLB Act also added paragraph
(b)(l1) to section 23A, which creates a
rebuttable presumption that a company
is an affiliate of a member bank for
purposes of section 23A if the bank is
affiliated with a FHC and the FHC owns
or controls 15 percent or more of the
equity capital of the company pursuant
to the FHC's merchant banking or
insurance company investment
authority.39
The regulation includes within the
definition of "affiliate" any company
subject to this rebuttable presumption.
The regulation also provides a
definition of equity capital, identifies
three situations or "safe harbors" where
the statute's presumption would be
deemed to be rebutted, and clarifies the
application of the presumption to
private equity funds. The Regulation W
provisions that implement the statutory
presumption are substantially identical
to those contained in the Board's
merchant banking rule,40
38GLB Act § 103(a); 12 U,S,c. 1843(k)(4)(H) and
(I),
39 GLB Act § 121(b)(2), As noted above, this
rebuttable presumption applies only ifthe affiliated
FHC owns or controls 15 percent or more of the
company's equity capital under the new merchant
banking or insurance company investment
authorities. The Board notes, however. that under
existing Board precedents a BHC may not own any
shares of a company in reliance on section 4(c)(6)
or 4(c)(7) of the BHC Act where the holding
company owns or controls, in the aggregate under
a combination of authorities, more than 5 percent
of any class of voting securities of the company,
40 See 12 CFR 225,176(b).
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The statute does not provide a
definition of equity capital. The
regulation defines equity capital roughly
in accordance with the GAAP definition
of stockholders' equity. Equity capital
includes a company's preferred stock,
common stock, capital surplus, retained
earnings, and accumulated other
comprehensive income, less treasury
stock. 41 The definition of equity capital
also makes clear that any other account
of the company that constitutes equity
should be included in the company's
equity capital. Accordingly, the Board
retains its authority on a case-by-case
basis to require a holding company to
treat a subordinated debt investment in
a company as equity capital of the
company for purposes of applying the
15 percent presumption.
The regulation also provides three
specific regulatory safe harbors from the
15 percent presumption. These safe
harbors apply in situations where the
holding company owns or controls more
than 15 percent of the total equity of the
company under the merchant banking
or insurance company investment
authority (thereby triggering the
statutory presumption) and less than 25
percent of any class of voting securities
of the company (thereby not meeting the
statutory definition of control). The
three situations are substantially
identical to those listed in the Board's
merchant banking regulation.42
The first exemption applies where no
director, officer, or employee of the
holding company serves as a director (or
individual exercising similar functions)
of the company. The second exemption
applies where an independent third
party controls a greater percentage of the
equity capital of the company than is
controlled by the holding company, and
no more than one officer or employee of
the holding company serves as a
director (or individual exercising
similar functions) of the company. The
third exemption applies where an
independent third party controls more
than 50 percent of the voting shares of
the company, and officers and
employees of the holding company do
not constitute a majority of the directors
(or individuals exercising similar
functions) of the company.43
41 Although the proposed rule only explicitly
included perpetual preferred stock in a company's
equity capital. the final rule includes all forms of
preferred stock. The Board believes that any
instrument in the form of equity should be treated
as equity capital for purposes of Regulation W.
42 See 12 CFR 225,176(b)(2) and (3).
4.1 For purposes of these safe harbors, the rule
provides that the term "holding company" includes
any subsidiary of the holding company. including
any subsidiary bank of the holding company.
Accordingly, if a director of a subsidiary bank or
Continued
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These safe harbors do not require
Board review or approval. Moreover, the
safe harbors are not intended to be a
complete list of circumstances in which
the 15 percent presumption may be
rebutted. The regulation also provides,
consistent with the GLB Act, that a
holding company may rebut the
presumption with respect to a portfolio
company by presenting information to
the Board that demonstrates, to the
Board's satisfaction, that the holding
company does not control the portfolio
company. The Board notes that a
company that qualifies as an affiliate
under the 15 percent presumption and
under another prong of the regulation's
definition of affiliate cannot avoid
affiliate status through a rebuttal of the
15 percent presumption (either by
qualifying for one of the three regulatory
safe harbors or by obtaining an ad hoc
rebuttal of the presumption from the
Board).
A FHC generally is considered to own
or control only those shares or other
ownership interests that are owned or
controlled by itself or by a subsidiary of
the holding company. The rule clarifies
that, for purposes of applying the
presumption of affiliation described
above, a FHC that has an investment in
a private equity fund (as defined in the
Board's merchant banking rule) will not
be considered indirectly to own the
equity capital of a company in which
the fund has invested unless the FHC
controls the private equity fund (as
described in the Board's merchant
banking rule).
4. Partnerships (§ 223.2(a)(4) and (10))
The proposed rule generally deemed
partnerships for which the member
bank or an affiliate of the bank serves as
a general partner to be an affiliate of the
bank. Several commenters expressed
concern that this interpretation of
section 23A would eliminate bank
funding of legitimate commercial and
community development transactions.
This concern of commenters is
unwarranted. Although partnerships for
which a member bank serves as a
general partner are on the section
223.2(a) list of entities that generally are
affiliates, such partnerships typically
will be excluded from the definition of
affiliate in section 223.2(b) as
subsidiaries of their parent bank. The
Board traditionally has considered the
general partner interest in a limited
partnership to be a separate class of
voting securities of the partnership.
Accordingly, a limited partnership
nonbank subsidiary of a FHC also serves as a
director of a portfolio company, the first safe
harbor, for example, would be unavailable.
would be considered an operating
subsidiary of a member bank (that is, a
subsidiary of a member bank that is not
a section 23A affiliate of the bank) in the
typical circumstances where the
member bank owns or controls more
than 25 percent of the general partner
interests in the partnership and the
partnership is not a financial subsidiary
of the bank.
The final rule amends the proposed
rule on general partners in one respect
to prevent evasion. The proposed rule
defined as an affiliate of a member bank
any partnership if the member bank or
an affiliate of the bank causes any
officer or employee of the bank or
affiliate to serve as a general partner of
the partnership (unless the partnership
is an operating subsidiary of the bank,
as discussed above). The final rule
expands the proposed rule to provide
that a partnership also will be
considered an affiliate of the member
bank if the bank or an affiliate of the
bank causes any director of the bank or
affiliate to serve as a general partner of
the partnership (unless the partnership
is an operating subsidiary of the bank).
5. Subsidiaries of Affiliates
(§ 223.2(a)(ll))
In the proposal, the Board invited
public comment on whether to add to
the definition of affiliate any company
controlled by an investment fund that is
an affiliate of the member bank. A few
commenters objected to this proposal on
the grounds that it would have little
section 23A benefit and would require
banks to implement complex
monitoring and aggregation systems.
The Board has decided to accord
affiliate status to any company
controlled by an investment fund
affiliate of a member bank. The conflicts
of interest that exist between a member
bank and any investment fund that it or
its affiliate advises also would appear to
exist between the bank and a portfolio
company controlled by the fund. A
member bank would have an incentive
to provide financial assistance to such a
portfolio company in order to enhance
the returns of the investment fund
affiliate of the bank. As a result, covered
transactions between the member bank
and such a portfolio company may be
affected by the control relationship
between the investment fund and the
portfolio company to the detriment of
the bank.
The Board also has determined, more
broadly, to deem an affiliate any
company controlled by another affiliate
of the member bank. This regulatory
position is consistent with the long-
standing view of Board staff. Although
section 23A by its terms defines as
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affiliates most subsidiaries of an affiliate
of the member bank, there are a few
exceptions to the rule. In addition to
covering subsidiaries of investment
fund affiliates, this action will make
clear, for example, that subsidiaries of
interlocking directorate affiliates
(§ 223.2(a)(4)) and sponsored and
advised affiliates (§ 223.2(a)(5)) also are
treated as affiliates ofthe member bank.
Again, the control relationship between
such statutory affiliates and their
subsidiaries may affect covered
transactions between the member bank
and such subsidiaries to the detriment
of the bank.
6. Companies Designated by the
Appropriate Federal Banking Agency
(§ 223.2(0)(12))
As noted above, section 23A
authorizes the Board to determine that
any company that has certain
relationships with a member bank or an
affiliate of the bank is itself an affiliate
of the bank. Unlike the proposed rule,
final Regulation W provides that these
determinations may be made by the
Board or by the appropriate Federal
banking agency for the relevant
depository institution (under authority
delegated by the Board). The Board
believes that this delegation of authority
should enhance the ability of the
Federal banking agencies to protect
depository institutions in their
transactions with associated companies.
A depository institution may petition
the Board for review of any such
affiliate determination made by the
institution's appropriate Federal
banking agency under the general
procedures established by the Board for
review of actions taken under delegated
authority.44
7. Certain Joint Venture Companies
(§ 223.2(b)(l)(iii))
As noted above, under the terms of
section 23A, subsidiaries of a member
bank generally are not treated as
affiliates of the bank, even if they would
otherwise qualify as affiliates.45 The
statute contains two specific exceptions
to this general rule: "Financial
subsidiaries" of a member bank and
"bank" subsidiaries of a member bank
are treated as affiliates of the parent
44 See 12 CFR 265.3.
45 See 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)(A).
Section 23A defines a subsidiary of a specified
company as a company that is controlled by the
specified company. Under the statute, a company
controls another company if the first company owns
or controls 25 percent or more of a class of voting
securities of the other company, controls the
election of a majority of the directors of the other
company, or exercises a controlling influence over
the policies of the other company. 12 V.S.c.
371c(b)(3) and (4).
Federal Register/Vol. 67, No. 239/Thursday, December 12, 2002/Rules and Regulations 76567
bank. As also noted above, the statute
provides that the Board may determine
that other subsidiaries of a member bank
should be treated as affiliates in
appropriate circumstances.46
Pursuant to this authority, the Board
proposed that two additional classes of
subsidiaries of a member bank should
be treated as affiliates: (i) Certain joint
venture companies; and (ii) employee
benefit plans. This section of the
preamble discusses joint venture
companies; the following section
addresses employee benefit plans.
First, the proposed regulation
provided that any subsidiary of a
member bank in which an affiliate of the
bank directly owns or controls 25
percent or more of any class of voting
securities would be considered an
affiliate of the bank. For example, under
the proposed rule, a joint venture
company that is 50 percent owned by a
BHC directly and 50 percent owned by
one of its subsidiary member banks,
would be treated as an affiliate of the
bank.
One commenter objected to this
provision in light of the fact that such
joint venture companies and their
investors are supervised by the Federal
banking agencies. The Board does not
believe that supervision of the joint
venture company or the affiliated
investor is sufficient to protect the
member bank. Although such a joint
venture company qualifies as a
subsidiary of the member bank under
section 23A because the bank owns
more than 25 percent of the company's
voting stock, an affiliate's substantial
direct interest in the company creates
the potential for conflicts of interest that
may endanger the bank. The Board
notes that, with the limited exception of
sister banks, Congress did not exempt
entities from the definition of affiliate
under section 23A because of their
supervisory status.47
The Board has determined to modify
the joint venture rule in several
respects. The proposed rule only treated
a subsidiary of a member bank as an
affiliate of the bank if one or more
affiliates of the bank directly owned or
controlled 25 percent or more ofany
class of voting securities of the joint
venture. The final rule, however, treats
a subsidiary of a member bank as an
46 12 U.S.c. 371c(bj(2)(A).
47 Several other commenters asked that the final
rule not exclude joint venture subsidiaries of a bank
so long as the bank owns more than 50 percent of
the voting securities ofthe joint venture company.
The Board declines to adopt this position because.
notwithstanding the bank's controlling voting
interest in the subsidiary, the bank's less-than-100
percent interest and the affiliate's substantial direct
interest in the company may provide the bank with
inappropriate incentives to support the company.
affiliate if one or more affiliates of the
bank, or one or more controlling
shareholders of the bank, directly
control the joint venture. The Board
intends this expansion of the joint
venture exclusion to cover situations
where an affiliate exercises direct
control over the joint venture through a
manner other than ownership of voting
securities (for example, through
majority interlock or ownership of
nonvoting securities). This expansion
also covers situations where a
controlling natural person shareholder
or group of controlling natural person
shareholders of the member bank (who,
as natural persons, are not themselves
section 23A affiliates of the bank)
exercise direct control over the joint
venture company.
This regulatory treatment of certain
bank-affiliate joint ventures as affiliates
does not apply to joint ventures between
a member bank and any affiliated
insured depository institutions. For
example, if two affiliated member banks
each own 50 percent of the voting
common stock of a company, the
company would continue to qualify as
a subsidiary and not an affiliate of each
bank (despite the fact that an affiliate of
each bank owned more than 25 percent
of a class of voting securities of the
company). Such a special rule for joint
ventures between a member bank and
affiliated insured depository institutions
is consistent with the purpose behind
the sister-bank and affiliated-bank
exemptions contained in section 23A.
The Board does not believe that
transactions between a member bank
and a company that is wholly owned by
the member bank and its affiliated
insured depository institutions
generally pose material risks to the
safety and soundness of the
shareholding institutions or to the
Federal deposit insurance funds. The
Board would retain authority to treat
such joint ventures as affiliates under
section 23A on a case-by-case basis.
8. Employee Benefit Plans
(§ 223.2(b)(l)(iv))
The second proposed regulatory
exception to the general rule that
subsidiaries of a member bank are not
treated as affiliates of the bank relates to
employee benefit plans. Board staff
traditionally has taken the position that
most employee stock option plans,
trusts, or similar entities that exist to
benefit shareholders, members, officers,
directors, or employees of 11 member
bank or its affiliates ("ESOPs") should
be treated as affiliates of the bank for
purposes of sections 23A and 23B. In
most cases, the ESOP's share ownership
or the interlocking management
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between the ESOP and its associated
member bank or BHC exceeds the
statutory thresholds for determining that
a company is an affiliate. Some
institutions have argued, however, that
ESOPs should be considered
subsidiaries of the member bank and
therefore exempt from coverage. The
proposed rule provided that the ESOP of
a member bank or an affiliate of the
bank cannot itself avoid classification as
an affiliate of the bank by also
qualifying as a subsidiary of the bank.
Although one commenter supported
the proposed rule's approach to ESOPs,
several commenters objected to the
approach. These commenters
principally argued that (i) ESOPs are
regulated by the Department of Labor
and transactions between a bank and an
associated ESOP are adequately
governed by ERISA; (ii) Congress has
expressed support for ESOPs; (iii)
regulating bank-ESOP transactions
under section 23A would prevent banks
from effectively using ESOPs to
compensate employees and would put
banks at a competitive disadvantage to
nonbank firms; and (iv) treating ESOPs
as affiliates of their associated bank may
prevent some banks from establishing
ESOPs because third-party lenders to an
ESOP generally require the employer to
guarantee the loan and ESOPs often
would have no collateral to pledge for
the bank guarantee other than
unacceptable affiliate-issued securities.
Notwithstanding these considerations,
the Board believes that the relationship
between a member bank and its or its
affiliate's ESOP generally warrants
coverage by sections 23A and 23B. In
the past, banks have made unsecured
loans to their ESOPs or their affiliates'
ESOPs or have guaranteed loans to such
ESOPs that were made by a third party.
These ESOPs, however, generally have
no means to repay the loans other than
with funds provided by the bank. In
addition, the issuance of holding
company shares to an ESOP that is
funded by a loan from the holding
company's subsidiary bank could be
used as a vehicle by the bank to provide
funds to its parent holding company
when the bank is unable to pay
dividends or is otherwise restricted in
providing funds to its holding company.
9. Securitization Vehicles and Other
Special Purpose Entities ("SPEs")
In the proposal, the Board sought
comment on whether additional
clarification is necessary in the area of
securitizations. The Board specifically
requested comment on the question of
whether securitization SPEs should in
any circumstances be deemed to be
affiliates of the member bank involved
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in the securitization. The Board
received a significant amount of
comment on this issue. Commenters
uniformly recommended that the Board
not treat SPEs as affiliates of any bank
associated with the securitization. Due
to the complexities of this issue and the
pending proposal by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB")
on the consolidation of SPEs,48 the
Board is deferring at this time any
rulemaking with respect to the
relationships between member banks
and SPEs.
The Board reminds banking
organizations that any company
sponsored and advised on a contractual
basis by a member bank or an affiliate
of the bank is an affiliate of the bank
under the express terms of section 23A
and the final rule. The legislative
history of the statute suggests that such
"sponsored and advised" companies
would include, at a minimum, any
company that receives investment
advice and administrative services on a
contractual basis from a member bank,
whose trustees or managers are selected
by the bank, and that has a name similar
to that of the bank. The Board expects
that member banks, at a minimum,
would treat companies meeting or
substantially meeting these three indicia
of sponsorship and advice as affiliates
under section 23A.
B. Other Definitions (§ 223.3)
1. Capital Stock and Surplus (§ 223.3(d]J
Under section 23A, the quantitative
limits on covered transactions are based
on the "capital stock and surplus" of the
member bank.49 The proposed
regulation included a definition of
capital stock and surplus that the Board
previously adopted as an interpretation
of section 23A.50 Under this definition,
capital stock and surplus is the sum of
the member bank's tier 1 capital and tier
2 capital and the balance of the bank's
allowance for loan and lease losses not
included in its tier 2 capital. This
definition employs familiar concepts
contained in the Federal banking
agencies' capital adequacy guidelines,51
and is consistent with the lending limits
applicable to national banks 52 and the
Board's Regulation 0, which limits
lending to a member bank's insiders. 53
The final rule, consistent with a
discussion in the preamble to the
46 FASB Proposed Interpretation, Consolidation
ofCertain Special-Purpose Entities, an
Interpretation of ARB No. 51 (June 28, 2002).
49 12 U.S.c. 371c(a)(1).
50 See 61 FR 19805, May 3,1996.
51 See, e.g.,12 CFR part 225, appendiX A.
52 12 CFR 32.2(b).
53 12 CFR 215.2(i}.
proposed rule, alters the definition of
capital stock and surplus in one regard.
The National Bank Act requires a
national bank, "in determining
compliance with applicable capital
standards," to deduct from its capital
the aggregate amount of any outstanding
equity investments, including retained
earnings, of the bank in all its financial
subsidiaries. 54 The FDI Act imposes the
same capital deduction requirement on
insured state banks that establish
financial subsidiaries.55 In determining
compliance with the quantitative limits
of section 23A, a bank is required by
statute to include in its covered
transactions any equity investments
(excluding retained earnings) of the
bank in its financial subsidiaries. It
would be unfair to compel a bank to
include such investments in its covered
transaction amount (the numerator of
the fraction in section 23A's
quantitative limits) but to exclude such
investments from capital stock and
surplus (the denominator of the
fraction). Accordingly, the final rule
explicitly permits a member bank with
a financial subsidiary to add back to its
section 23A capital stock and surplus
the amount of any investment in a
financial subsidiary that counts as a
covered transaction and is required to
be deducted from the bank's capital for
regulatory capital purposes.
2. Control (§ 223.3(g]J
Section 23A provides that a company
or shareholder shall be deemed to have
control over another company if, among
other things, such company or
shareholder controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the "directors
or trustees" of the other company. 56
Regulation W expands this prong of the
control definition to conform it to the
control definition contained in the
Board's Regulation Y by adding that
control also exists when a company or
shareholder controls the election of a
majority ofthe "general partners (or
individuals exercising similar
functions)" of another company. This
expansion of the control definition is
intended to ensure that banking
organizations understand that a
company or shareholder would be
deemed to control another company
(including a partnership, limited
liability company, or other similar
organization) under section 23A if the
company or shareholder controls the
election of a majority ofthe principal
policymakers of such other company.
54 12 U.S.c. 24a(c)(1).
5512 U.S.c. 1831w(a)(2l.
5(; 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(3)(A)(ii).
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The regulation also includes two
additional presumptions of control that
are similar to presumptions contained
in Regulation Y. First, a company will
be deemed to control securities, assets,
or other ownership interests controlled
by any subsidiary ofthe company.57
Second, a company that controls
instruments (including options and
warrants) that are convertible or
exercisable, at the option of the holder
or owner, into securities, will be
deemed to control the securities.58
One commenter asked the Board to
clarify that a company or person may
rebut the convertibility presumption of
control. The Board agrees with this
position and has amended the final rule
to provide that, as under Regulation Y,
this presumption is rebuttable.
Commenters also suggested that the
convertibility presumption should
apply only to convertible instruments
that are immediately convertible, or
convertible within a short time frame,
into the underlying securities.
Consistent with the Board's
interpretations of the parallel Regulation
Y provision, the Board declines to adopt
this approach. Establishment of any
kind of regulatory safe harbor for
warrants, options, and other convertible
instruments that cannot be exercised or
converted for some short period of time
is likely to facilitate evasion of the
presumption. A company or person that
wishes to rebut this presumption based
on the specific features of a convertible
instrument should present their
arguments to the Board for a case-by-
case decision.
The final rule supplements the
control presumptions contained in
proposed Regulation W with one
additional rebuttable presumption. The
final rule provides that a company or
shareholder that owns or controls 25
percent or more of the equity capital of
another company controls the other
company unless the company or
shareholder demonstrates otherwise to
the Board based on the facts and
circumstances of the particu lar case.
This rebuttable presumption is similar
to a presumption applied by the Board
under the control provisions of the BHC
ACt,59 Such a presumption of control is
particularly appropriate in the section
57 See 12 CFR 225.2(e)(2)(i).
56 See 12 CFR 225.31(d)(l)(i). The proposed rule
referred to "securities" (rather than "instruments")
that are convertible into other securities. The final
rule refers more generically to convertible
"instruments" to clarify that the convertibility
presumption app lies regardless of whether the right
to convert resides in a financial instrument that
technically qualifies as a "security" under section
23A or the Federal securities laws.
"See, e.g.• 12 CFR 225.143 (Board Policy
Statement on Nonvoting Equity Investments).
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23A context because a BHC, for
example, may have incentives to divert
the resources of a subsidiary bank to any
company in which the holding company
has a substantial financial interest.
regardless of whether the holding
company owns any voting securities of
the company.
3. Covered Transaction (§ 223.3(h))
The restrictions of section 23A do not
apply to every transaction between a
member bank and its affiliates. The
section only applies to "covered
transactions" between a member bank
and its affiliates. The statute defines a
covered transaction as (i) an extension
of credit to an affiliate; (ii) a purchase
of or investment in securities issued by
an affiliate; (iii) a purchase of assets
from an affiliate; (iv) the acceptance of
securities issued by an affiliate as
collateral for an extension of credit to
any person; and (v) the issuance of a
guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit
on behalf of an affiliate.60 Among the
transactions that generally are not
subject to section 23A are dividends
paid by a member bank to its holding
company, sales of assets by a member
bank to an affiliate, an affiliate's
purchase of securities issued by a
member bank, and many service
contracts between a member bank and
an affiliate. This section of the preamble
discusses whether certain classes of
transactions between a member bank
and an affiliate are covered transactions
for purposes of section 23A.
a. Confirmation of a letter of credit
issued by an affiliate (§ 223.3(hJ(5)).-
As noted, section 23A includes as a
covered transaction the issuance by a
member bank of a letter of credit on
behalf of an affiliate. The proposed
regulation provided that a member
bank's confirmation of a letter of credit
issued by an affiliate is also a covered
transaction.
One commenter noted staffs
traditional position that certain
confirmations of a documentary letter of
credit issued by an affiliate are not
covered transactions and asked the
Board to clarify that such confirmations
would not be treated as covered
transactions under Regulation W.61 The
Board has decided to reverse the staff
position on this issue and to treat all
confirmations of a letter of credit issued
by an affiliate as a covered transaction.
Under the current law applicable to
letters of credit, when a bank confirms
60 12 U.S.C. 371c(b)(7).
61 See Letter dated May 5. 1981. from Robert E.
Mannion. Deputy General Counsel of the Board, to
Andrew T. Moore, Ir.; see also Letter dated luly 17,
1980. from Rohert E. Mannion. Deputy General
Counsel ofthe Board. to Baldwin B. Tuttle.
a letter of credit, it assumes the risk of
the underlying transaction to the same
extent as if it had issued the letter of
credit.62 Accordingly, the rule treats
confirmations of a letter of credit issued
by an affiliate in the same fashion as
issuances of a letter of credit on behalf
of an affiliate.
b. Credit enhancements supporting a
securities underwriting.-The Board has
confirmed previously and hereby
reconfirms that section 23A's definition
of guarantee would not include a
member bank's issuance of a guarantee
in support of securities issued by a third
party and underwritten by a securities
affiliate ofthe bank.63 Such a credit
enhancement would not be issued "on
behalf of' the affiliate. In addition,
although the guarantee does provide
some benefit to the affiliate (by
facilitating the underwriting), this
benefit is indirect. Accordingly, the
proceeds of the guarantee would not be
transferred to the affiliate for purposes
of the attribution rule of section 23A.64
Of course, section 23B would apply to
the transaction and, where an affiliate
was issuer as well as underwriter, the
transaction would be covered by section
23A because the credit enhancement
would be on behalf of the affiliate.
c. Cross-guarantee agreements and
cross-affiliate netting arrangements
(§ 223.3(h)(5)).-Board staff has
confirmed previously that a cross-
guarantee agreement among a member
bank, an affiliate, and a nonaffiliate in
which the nonaffiliate may use the
bank's assets to satisfy the obligations of
a defaulting affiliate is a guarantee for
purposes of section 23A.65 The Board
believes that such cross-guarantee
arrangements among member banks and
their affiliates should be subject to the
quantitative limits and collateral
requirements of section 23A.
Similarly, the Board understands that
some member banks have entered into
or are contemplating entering into cross-
affiliate netting arrangements
("CANAs"). These include
arrangements among a member bank,
one or more affiliates of the bank, and
one or more nonaffiliates of the bank,
where a nonaffiliate is permitted to
deduct obligations of an affiliate of the
bank to the nonaffiliate when settling
the nonaffiliate's obligations to the
bank. These arrangements also would
include agreements where a member
bank is required or permitted to add the
62 See U.e.e. 5-107(2).
63 See 62 FR 45295, Aug. 27, 1997.
64 See 12 U.S,e. 371c(a)(2).
65 See Letter dated Aug. 6, 1993, from I. Virgil
Mattingly, Ir., General Counsel of the Board. to
Richard Lasner.
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obligations of an affiliate of the bank to
a nonaffiliate when determining the
bank's obligations to the nonaffiliate,
These types of CANAs expose a
member bank to the credit risk of its
affiliates because the bank may become
liable for the obligations of its affiliates,
Because the exposure of a member bank
to an affiliate in such an arrangement
resembles closely the exposure of a
member bank when it issues a guarantee
on behalf of an affiliate, the final rule
explicitly includes such arrangements
in the definition of covered transaction.
Accordingly, the quantitative limits of
section 23A would prohibit a member
bank from entering into such a CANA to
the extent that the netting arrangement
does not cap the potential exposure of
the bank to the participating affiliate(s).
Several commenters urged the Board
to withhold judgment on CANAs until
standardized documentation is
developed by the industry. These
commenters advised that CANAs are of
many types and, therefore, that the
Board should not adopt a fixed rule for
all CANAs, One commenter encouraged
the Board to clarify in particular that
CANAs that do not make the bank liable
for the obligations of its affiliates or
otherwise cause any detriment to the
bank are not covered transactions, By
only addressing the CANAs described
above, the rule only treats CANAs as
covered transactions in situations where
the member bank may become liable for
the obligations of its affiliates. The
Board intends to monitor industry
developments in this area and will
revisit this aspect of Regulation W or
issue further interpretive guidance on
CANAs as warranted.
d. Keepwell agreements.-Banking
organizations have asked for guidance
on the question of whether a "keepwell"
agreement should be considered a
guarantee for purposes of section 23A.
In a keepwell agreement between a
member bank and an affiliate, the bank
typically commits to maintain the
capital levels or solvency of the affiliate.
The credit risk incurred by the member
bank in entering into such a keepwell
agreement is similar to the credit risk
incurred by a member bank in
connection with issuing a guarantee on
behalf of an affiliate. As a consequence,
keepwell agreements generally should
be treated as guarantees for purposes of
section 23A and, if unlimited in
amount, would be prohibited' by the
quantitative limits of section 23A.
4. Extension of Credit (§ 223.3(0))
Although section 23A includes a
"loan or extension of credit" to an
affiliate as a covered transaction, the
statute does not define these terms. The
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regulation defines "extension of credit"
to an affiliate to mean the making or
renewal of a loan to an affiliate, the
granting of a line of credit to an affiliate,
or the extending of credit to an affiliate
in any manner whatsoever, including on
an intraday basis. The regulation also
provides a nonexhaustive list of
transactions that the Board deems to be
extensions of credit to an affiliate,
including an advance to an affiliate by
means of an overdraft, cash item, or
otherwise; a lease that is the functional
equivalent of an extension of credit to
an affiliate;66 an acquisition of a note or
other obligation of an affiliate, including
commercial paper or other debt
securities issued by an affiliate; and any
increase in the amount of, extension of
the maturity of, or adjustment in the
interest rate term or other material term
of an extension of credit to an affiliate.67
The final rule also includes a sale of
Federal funds to an affiliate on the list
of examples. This position reflects the
long-standing view of the Board about
the nature of Federal funds
transactions.68
In addition to these examples, the
final rule specifies that other similar
transactions that result in an affiliate
owing money to a member bank are
extensions of credit by the member bank
to the affiliate. This aspect of the
definition of extension of credit is
consistent with the definition of the
same term in Regulation 0 and would
cover, among other things, situations
where an affiliate fails to pay on a
timely basis for services rendered to the
affiliate by the member bank.
As noted, the regulation provides that
a member bank's purchase of a debt
security issued by an affiliate is an
extension of credit by the bank to the
affiliate for purposes of section 23A.69
Several commenters objected to this
interpretation of the statute and argued
that a purchase of an affiliate's debt
securities is a "purchase of or
investment in securities issued by an
affiliate" for purposes of section 23A,
and that such a purchase cannot also
66The Board would consider a full-payout, net
lease permissible for a national bank under 12
U.S.c. 24(Seventh) and 12 Cf'R part 23 to be the
functional equivalent of an extension of credit.
67 A floating-rate loan does not become a new
covered transaction whenever there is a change in
the relevant index (for example. LIBOR or the
member bank's prime rate) from which the loan's
interest rate is calculated. If the member bank and
the borrower. however. amend the loan agreement
to change the interest rate term from "LIBOR plus
100 basis points" to "LIBOR plus 150 basis points."
the parties have engaged in a new covered
transaction.
68 See 12 CFR 250.160.
6"This position is consistent with the Board's
long-standing view. See 37 Federal Reserve Bulletin
960 (1951).
then be an "extension of credit" for
purposes of section 23A. Other
commenters criticized this position on
the grounds that (il it often would not
be feasible (due to negative pledge
covenants) for the bank to obtain
collateral for the security after the terms
of the security are fixed at inception;
and (ii) requiring collateral for
purchases of debt securities but not for
purchases of equity securities is
perverse,
The Board does not find any of these
objections persuasive. Although the
Board is aware that section 23A's
definition of covered transaction
separately includes a member bank's
purchase of securities issued by an
affiliate and a member bank's loan to an
affiliate, the fact that a holder of debt
securities expects repayment of
principal upon maturity makes debt
securities closely resemble loans for
purposes of section 23A and the
statute's objective of protecting the
member bank. There is nothing in the
text or legislative history of section 23A
that indicates that a particular
transaction may be slotted only into one
category of covered transaction.
Although the Board recognizes the
incongruities of requiring collateral for
debt investments by a member bank in
an affiliate but not equity investments
by a member bank in an affiliate, this is
an unalterable aspect of the statutory
framework. The prevalence of these
incongruities, moreover, is constrained
by the limited ability of member banks
to make equity investments.
Importantly, the Board's action on this
matter removes an incongruity more
likely to occur-treating differently
under section 23A two transaction
forms (loans and debt securities) that are
substantially equivalent from a credit
risk perspective.
For all these reasons, therefore,
Regulation W provides that a member
bank that buys debt securities issued by
an affiliate has made an extension of
credit to an affiliate under section 23A
and must collateralize the transaction in
accordance with section 23A's collateral
requirements. As discussed below, the
final rule provides an exemption from
the collateral requirements in situations
where a member bank purchases an
affiliate's debt securities from a third
party in a bona fide secondary market
transaction. 70
5. Low-Quality Asset (§ 223.3(v))
Two provisions of section 23A restrict
a member bank's ability to engage in
transactions with affiliates that involve
low-quality assets, First, the statute
70 See part IV.B.5. of this preamble.
C - 21
prohibits a member bank from
purchasing a low-quality asset from an
affiliate unless the bank performs an
independent credit evaluation and
commits to purchase the asset before the
affiliate acquires the asset. 71 Second, the
statute prohibits a member bank from
counting a low-quality asset toward
section 23A's collateral requirements for
credit transactions with an affiliate,72
Section 23A defines a low-quality
asset to include (i) an asset classified as
"substandard," "doubtful," or "loss," or
treated as "other loans especially
mentioned," in the most recent report of
examination or inspection by a Federal
or State supervisory agency (a
"classified asset"); (ii) an asset in
nonaccrual status; (iii) an asset on
which payments are more than thirty
days past due; or (iv) an asset whose
terms have been renegotiated or
compromised due to the deteriorating
financial condition of the obligor. 73 The
Board notes that any asset meeting one
of the above four criteria, including
securities and real property, is a low-
quality asset. 74
The regulation broadens the
definition of low-quality asset in three
ways. First, the regulation provides that
an asset identified by examiners as an
"other transfer risk problem" ("OTRP")
is a low-quality asset. 75 Such assets
represent credits to countries that are
not complying with their external debt-
service obligations, but are taking
positive steps to restore debt service
through economic adjustment measures,
generally as part of an International
Monetary Fund program. Although
OTRP assets are not considered
classified assets, examiners are
instructed to consider these assets in
their assessment of a bank's asset
quality and capital adequacy. 76
Second, the regulation reflects the
increasing use by financial institutions
of their own internal asset classification
systems. A 1998 Board study of the 50
largest U.S. banks demonstrated that all
use internal loan classifications, and a
substantial proportion of such
71 12 U.S.c. 371c(a)(3).
72 12 U.S.c. 371c(c)(3).
73 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(10).
74 The Federal banking agencies generally
consider non-investment grade securities to be
classified assets. See, e.g., "Uniform Agreement on
the Classification of Assets and Appraisal of
Securities Held by Banks' (May 7,1979); Federal
Reserve Commercial Bank Examination Manual
§ 2020.1. Assets identified by examiners through
the Shared National Credit and International
Country Exposure Review Committee processes also
should be considered classified assets for purposes
of section 23A.
75 No commenter objected to this provision of the
proposed rule.
76 See Federal Reserve Commercial Bank
Examination Manual § 7040.1.
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institutions have relatively advanced
internal rating systems. 77 There is
considerable variance in how large
banks rate performing assets; however,
banks are required to use the same
categories employed by the Federal
banking agencies for rating classified
assets.
Because examinations may be twelve
months apart-eighteen months for
smaller banks-these internal
classification systems may cause a bank
to regrade an asset long before its next
examination. Accordingly, the rule
includes within the definition of low-
quality asset not only assets classified
during the last examination but also
assets classified or treated as special
mention under the institution's internal
classification system (or assets that
received an internal rating that is
substantially equivalent to classified or
special mention in such an internal
system).
Several commenters objected to this
aspect of the proposed rule. They
argued that the statute provides a highly
articulated definition of low-quality
asset that should not be supplemented
by the Board. They also cautioned that
the rule would penalize banks with
careful internal classification systems
and would create perverse incentives for
banks to avoid internally classifying bad
assets. The Board acknowledges these
concerns but believes that the rule is
consistent with the text and intent of
section 23A and that the supervisory
benefits of the rule would outweigh any
adverse effects. The purchase by a
depository institution from an affiliate
of assets that have been internally
classified raises potentially significant
safety and soundness concerns.
The Board shares the concern of
commenters that this provision of the
rule may induce companies to avoid or
defer reclassification of an asset in order
to allow its sale to an affiliated
depository institution, but believes that
such evasions can be addressed through
the examination process. The Board
expects companies with internal rating
systems to use the systems consistently
over time and over similar classes of
assets and will view as an evasion of
section 23A any company's deferral or
alteration of an asset's rating to facilitate
sale of the asset to an affiliated
institution.
Finally, the proposed rule defined
low-quality asset to include foreclosed
property designated "other real estate
owned" ("aREa"), until it is reviewed
by an examiner and receives a favorable
77 William F. Treacy & Mark S. Carey. Credit Risk
Rating at Large U.S. Banks. 84 Federal Reserve
Bulletin 897 (1998).
classification. One commenter criticized
this interpretation and represented that
aREa is often good collateral collected
from a bad borrower. This commenter
further advised that a bank should be
allowed to purchase aREa from an
affiliate if the bank uses the aREa as
premises.
The final rule contains an expanded
version of the proposed rule's aREa
provision. The final rule defines as a
low-quality asset any asset (not just real
estate) that is acquired in satisfaction of
a debt previously contracted (not just
through foreclosure) if the asset has not
yet been reviewed in an examination or
inspection. In the Board's experience,
property acquired from a borrower in
default is often of such poor quality that
its ownership poses the same risk to the
bank as a classified loan. In response to
the concerns expressed by the
commenter, the Board notes that, under
the rule, if a particular asset is good
collateral taken from a bad borrower, the
asset should cease to be a low-quality
asset upon examination.
6. Member Bank (§223.3(w))
As discussed above, although
proposed Regulation W applied by its
terms to all "banks," the final rule
applies by its terms to all "member
banks." Consistent with section 1 of the
Federal Reserve Act, the final rule
defines "member bank" to mean "any
national bank, State bank, banking
association, or trust company that is a
member of the Federal Reserve System."
The definition of member bank in the
regulation also states that most
subsidiaries of a member bank are to be
treated as part of the member bank itself
for purposes of sections 23A and 23B.
The only subsidiaries of a member bank
that are excluded from this treatment
are financial subsidiaries, insured
depository institution subsidiaries,
certain joint venture subsidiaries, and
ESOPs-eompanies that are deemed
affiliates of the member bank under the
regulation. This treatment of
subsidiaries reflects the fact that the
statute typically does not distinguish
between a member bank and its
subsidiaries, and all the significant
restrictions of the statute apply to
actions taken by a member bank "and its
subsidiaries." Defining the term
"member bank" as described above and
using the term "member bank"
wherever the statute says "member bank
and its subsidiaries" makes the
regulation shorter and easier to
understand. The definition also should
help to remind member banks that
certain subsidiaries should not be
treated as part of the member bank for
purposes of the statute.
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7. Obligations of, or Fully Guaranteed as
to Principal and Interest by, the United
States or Its Agencies (§ 223.3(z))
Section 23A accords special treatment
to extensions of credit secured by
"obligations ofthe United States or its
agencies" or "obligations fully
guaranteed by the United States or its
agencies as to principal and interest"
(collectively, "U.S. government
obligations"). First, the statute imposes
the lowest collateral requirement, 100
percent of the loan amount, on
extensions of credit secured by U.S.
government obligations. 78 Second, the
statute provides an exemption for
extensions of credit fully secured by
U.S. government obligations,79
The proposed rule did not provide
guidance as to what financial
instruments qualify as U.S. government
obligations. Several commenters asked
the Board to clarify that U.S.
government obligations for section 23A
purposes would include, at a minimum,
all the obligations identified in the
Board's Regulation A as eligible to serve
as collateral for advances by Federal
Reserve Banks to member banks under
section 13(8) of the Federal Reserve
Act. 8o The final rule provides this
clarification, which is consistent with
staff's long-standing position under
section 23A. The final rule also
indicates that U.S. government
obligations do not include mortgage
loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration or the Veterans
Administration because the backing of
the U.S. government for these loans is
not a full and unconditional guarantee
of the principal and interest of the
underlying mortgage loans. This
exclusion also is consistent with staff's
traditional interpretation of section 23A.
8. Purchase ofAssets (§223.3(dd))
The proposed rule defined a purchase
of an asset as the acquisition of an asset
in exchange for cash or any other
consideration, including an assumption
of liabilities. The preamble to the
proposed rule indicated the Board's
view that merging an affiliate with and
into a member bank generally would
constitute a purchase of assets by the
bank from the affiliate. Consistent with
78 12 U.S.C. 371c(c)(l)(A)(i) and (ii).
79 12 U.S.c. 371c(d)(4)(A) and (B).
80 See 12 CFR 201.108(b). Section 13(8) ofthe
Federal Reserve Act authorizes Federal Reserve
Banks to make advances to member banks secured
hy. among other things. U.S. government
obligations eligible for purchase by a Federal
Reserve Bank under section 14(b) ofthe Federal
Reserve Act. 12 U.S.C. 347. The description of U.S.
government obligations in section 14(b) of the
Federal Reserve Act is virtually identical to the
description of U.S. government obligations in
section 23A. See 12 U.S.c. 355.
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the preamble to the proposed rule, the
final rule also provides that the merger
of an affiliate into a member bank is a
purchase of assets by the bank from the
affiliate if the bank assumes any
liabilities of an affiliate or pays any
other form of consideration in the
transaction.
9. Securities (§ 223.3{ff))
Section 23A defines "securities" to
mean "stocks, bonds, debentures, notes,
or other similar obligations. "81 Because
of the ambiguous nature of this
definition, the Board generally has
looked to the Federal securities laws for
guidance in determining which
financial instruments should be
considered securities for purposes of
section 23A. In light of the similarities
between commercial paper and
debentures and notes and the
countervailing fact that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 excludes some
forms of commercial paper from its
definition of security,82 the regulation
clarifies that commercial paper is a
security for purposes of section 23A.83
One commenter on the proposed rule
asked the Board to indicate whether
annuities are securities for purposes of
section 23A. The Board would consider
annuities that are securities for purposes
of the Federal securities laws to be
securities for purposes of Regulation W.
10. Voting Securities (§ 223.3{jj))
Section 23A uses both the terms
"voting shares" and "voting securities."
To remove ambiguity and enhance
regulatory consistency, Regulation W
replaces all statutory uses of the term
"voting shares" with the term "voting
securities" and defines "voting
securities" to have the same meaning as
"voting securities" in Regulation Y.84
IV. General Provisions of Section 23A-
Subpart B
Subpart B of the regulation sets forth
the principal restrictions of section 23A,
including the quantitative limits, the
safety and soundness requirement, the
collateral requirement, and the
prohibition on the purchase of low-
quality assets. This subpart also
includes section 23A's attribution rule,
which provides that any transaction
with a nonaffiliate will be considered a
transaction with an affiliate to the extent
that the proceeds of the transaction are
81 12 U.S.c. 371c(b)(9).
82 See 15 U.S.c. 78c(a)(1O).
8" As noted above in part III.BA. of this preamble.
the Board considers a member bank's investment in
commercial paper issued by an affiliate to be both
an investment in securities issued by an affiliate
and an extension of credit to an affiliate.
84 See 12 CFR 225.2(q),
used for the benefit of, or transferred to,
that affiliate. In addition, subpart B
incorporates previous Board and staff
interpretations of these provisions, and
a few new interpretations of these
provisions. These interpretations of the
statute are discussed below.
A. Quantitative Limits (§§ 223.11 and
223.12)
Section 23A(a)(1) provides that a
member bank may engage in a covered
transaction with an affiliate only if,
upon consummation of the proposed
transaction, the aggregate amount of the
bank's covered transactions (i) with any
single affiliate would not exceed 10
percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus and (ii) with all affiliates would
not exceed 20 percent of the bank's
capital stock and surplus.85 Sections
223.11 and 223.12 of the regulation set
forth these quantitative limits. The
quantitative limits of Regulation W
(consistent with section 23A) only
prohibit a member bank from engaging
in a new covered transaction if the bank
would be in excess of the 10 or 20
percent threshold after consummation
of the new transaction. The regulation
(consistent with section 23A) generally
does not require a member bank to
unwind existing covered transactions if
the bank exceeds the 10 or 20 percent
limit because its capital declined or a
preexisting covered transaction
increased in value.
Section 23A(a)(1)(A) states that a
member bank "may engage in a covered
transaction with an affiliate only if
* * * in the case of any affiliate," the
aggregate amount of covered
transactions of the bank would not
exceed 10 percent of the capital stock
and surplus of the bank. The proposed
rule interpreted this limitation to
prevent a member bank from engaging
in a new covered transaction with an
affiliate if the aggregate amount of
covered transactions between the bank
and any affiliate (not only the particular
affiliate with which the bank proposes
to engage in the new covered
transaction) would be in excess of 10
percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus after consummation of the new
transaction. Several commenters argued
that this reading of the 10 percent limit
is inconsistent with the statutory
language of section 23A and existing
bank practice:;. These commenters urged
the Board to interpret the 10 percent
limit to prohibit a bank from engaging
in a covered transaction with an affiliate
only when the aggregate amount of
covered transactions between the bank
85 12 U,S.c. 371c(a)(I).
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and that affiliate would exceed 10
percent of the bank's capital.
The Board believes that both the
interpretation of the 10 percent limit set
forth in the proposed rule and the
interpretation advocated by commenters
are consistent with the statutory
language. In light of the numerous other
existing safeguards in sections 23A and
23B, including in particular the 20
percent quantitative limit and the
collateral requirements, and the other
supervisory tools available to the
Federal banking agencies, the Board has
determined to adopt the interpretation
advocated by commenters in the final
Regulation W. Notwithstanding this
more liberal interpretation of the 10
percent limit, the Board strongly
encourages member banks with covered
transactions in excess of the 10 percent
threshold with any affiliate to reduce
those transactions before expanding the
scope or extent of the bank's
relationships with other affiliates.
Another commenter asked the Board
to clarify in section 223.11 that
transactions between a bank and a
financial subsidiary of the bank are not
subject to the 10 percent limit of section
23A. Although proposed Regulation W
made this point in the section of the
rule relating to financial subsidiaries,
the Board agrees that clarity would be
enhanced if the final rule also made this
point in the section of the rule that sets
forth the 10 percent limit. Accordingly,
section 223.11 of the final rule states
that transactions between a member
bank and its financial subsidiary are not
subject to the 10 percent limit.
B. Collateral Requirements (§ 223.14)
Section 223.14 of the regulation sets
forth the collateral requirements
established by section 23A(c) for loans
and extensions of credit to an affiliate,
and guarantees, acceptances, and letters
of credit issued on behalf of an affiliate
(collectively, "credit transactions"). As
a general matter, section 23A requires
any credit transaction by a member bank
with an affiliate to be secured with a
statutorily prescribed amount of
collateral. The required collateral varies
from 100 percent of the value of the
credit extended (when the collateral is
a deposit account or U.S. government
obligations) to 130 percent of the credit
extended (when the collateral is stock,
leases, or certain other "real or personal
property' ').86
1. Deposit Account Collateral
{§ 223. 14{b)(1}(i)(D}}
Under section 23A, a member bank
may satisfy the collateral requirements
86 12 U.S.c. 371c(c)(I).
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of the statute by securing a credit
transaction with an affiliate with a
"segregated, earmarked deposit
account" maintained with the bank in
an amount equal to 100 percent of the
credit extendedP The proposed
regulation clarified that. to satisfy the
statute's "segregated, earmarked"
requirement, the account must exist for
the sole purpose of securing the credit
extended and be so identified.
Numerous commenters asked the
Board to remove this regulatory gloss
and explicitly state that banks may
satisfy the collateral requirements of
section 23A by (i) using a single deposit
account to collateralize one or more
covered transactions with one or more
affiliates or (ii) entering into a cross-
collateralization agreement with one or
more affiliates under which all of such
affiliates' deposit accounts are pledged
as collateral for all of such affiliates'
credit transactions with the bank.
According to these commenters. such
collateral arrangements are a common.
safe. and efficient means of satisfying
the letter and spirit of the collateral
requirements of section 23A.
The Board has analyzed the claims of
these commenters and has decided not
to require a member bank accepting
deposit account collateral to establish a
separate segregated, earmarked deposit
account to secure each covered
transaction with an affiliate. The Board
recognizes that such a strict reading of
the "segregated. earmarked"
requirement is not required by the
statute and would impose a substantial
compliance burden on member banks
that engage in a significant number of
covered transactions with affiliates.
Moreover, in some circumstances. using
an omnibus deposit account for
multiple affiliates and multiple covered
transactions may have prudential
advantages for the member bank as
compared to using separate deposit
accounts for each outstanding covered
transaction.
Although the final rule does not
include the proposed regulatory gloss.
the Board expects that member banks
that secure covered transactions with
omnibus deposit accounts will take
steps to ensure that such accounts fully
secure the relevant covered transactions.
Such steps might include substantial
overcollateralization or the use of
subaccounts or other recordkeeping
devices to match deposits with covered
transactions. In addition. as required by
the final rule. to obtain full credit for
any deposit accounts taken as section
23A collateral. member banks must
ensure that they have a perfected. first
87 12 U.S.c. 371c(c)(l}(A)(iv).
priority security interest in the
accounts.
Several commenters asked the Board
to replace the "segregated. earmarked"
requirement for deposit accounts with a
requirement that banks have a perfected.
first priority security interest in the
accounts. These commenters explained
that. although the "segregated.
earmarked" requirement made sense
before the adoption of revised Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code. the
revised Article 9 has rendered
segregation and earmarking of a deposit
account legally irrelevant to ensuring
that a bank has a perfected. first priority
security interest in the account. Despite
the revisions to Article 9, the final rule
maintains the "segregated. earmarked"
requirement because it is required by
the plain language of section 23A and
because segregating and earmarking
deposit account collateral is a prudent
practice even under revised Article 9.
2. Ineligible Collateral (§ 223. 14(c}}
The purpose of section 23A's
collateral requirements is to ensure that
member banks that engage in credit
transactions with affiliates have legal
recourse, in the event of affiliate default.
to tangible assets with a value at least
equal to the amount of the credit
extended. The statute recognizes that
certain types of assets are not
appropriate to serve as collateral for
credit transactions with an affiliate. In
particular. the statute provides that low-
quality assets and securities issued by
an affiliate are not eligible collateral for
such covered transactions.BB
The proposed rule provided that
intangible assets (as defined by
generally accepted accounting
principles ("GAAP")), including
servicing assets. are not acceptable
collateral to secure credit transactions
with an affiliate. Several commenters
supported the proposed rule's
categorical exclusion of intangible
assets. A larger number of commenters
argued. however, that banks should be
permitted to use certain intangible
assets as section 23A collateral, in
particular assets. such as servicing
assets and purchased credit card
relationships. that count as capital
under the Board's capital adequacy
guidelines.
The final rule retains the categorical
exclusion of intangible assets.B9 In the
8812 U.S.c. 371c(c)(3) and (4)
89 The final rule. however, does not define
intangible assets by reference to GAAP. Upon
further review, the Board has determined that the
GAAP definition of intangible asset may be
underinclusive for section 23A purposes. If a
member bank has doubts as to whether a particular
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Board's view. intangible assets are
particularly hard to value, and a
member bank may have significant
difficulty in collecting and selling such
assets in a reasonable period of time.
The Board believes that these reasons
justify the exclusion of intangible assets
from the types of collateral eligible to
satisfy the requirements of section 23A.
The Board notes that the identifiable
intangible assets that are not deducted
from capital under the capital adequacy
guidelines (namely, servicing assets and
purchased credit card relationships) are
limited quantitatively in the extent to
which they count as capita1.9o The
Board is willing to consider requests, on
a case-by-case basis, to permit particular
types of intangible assets to serve as
section 23A collateral. and has amended
the proposed rule to allow for such ad
hoc exceptions to the categorical
exclusion.
In addition, the proposed rule
provided that guarantees and letters of
credit are not eligible collateral for
section 23A purposes. Several
commenters argued that the rule should
permit banks to satisfy the collateral
requirements of section 23A with letters
of credit. These commenters stated that
letters of credit are less likely to
fluctuate in value than many other types
of eligible section 23A collateral,
represent senior claims on banks, are
not subject to an automatic stay in
bankruptcy, involve lower
administrative costs than most other
types of collateral. convey an immediate
right to cash rather than a possibly
illiquid piece of collateral, and are
recognized under the net capital rule of
the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"). Other
commenters argued that banks should
be allowed to use guarantees to comply
with section 23A's collateral
requirements. These commenters noted
that the Board's capital adequacy
guidelines recognize the value of
guarantees as a credit risk mitigation
device.
The final rule continues to provide
that guarantees and letters of credit are
not acceptable section 23A collatera1.91
Letters of credit and guarantees are not
balance sheet assets under GAAP and,
accordingly, would not constitute "real
or personal property" under section
asset is an intangible asset. the bank should consult
with Board staff.
90 See 12 CFR part 225, appendix A, § rLB.1.d--e.
91 The final rule also provides that instruments
"similar" to guarantees and letters of credit are
ineligible collateral. For example. in the Board's
view, a member bank cannot satisfy section 23A's
collateral requirements by purchasing credit
protection in the form of a credit default swap
referencing the affiliate's obligation.
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23A. Moreover, section 23A(c) requires
that credit transactions with an affiliate
be "secured" by collateral. A credit
transaction between a member bank and
an affiliate supported only by a
guarantee or letter of credit from a third
party would not appear to meet the
statutory requirement that the credit
transaction be secured by collateral. Of
course, the Board could grant an
exemption that would permit guarantees
or letters of credit to count as collateral
or to serve as a replacement for
collateral. The Board has decided not to
do so at this time because guarantees
and letters of credit often are subject to
material adverse change clauses and
other covenants that allow the issuer of
the guarantee or letter of credit to deny
coverage. Moreover, in the Board's view,
there is a particularly significant risk,
highlighted by recent events, that a
member bank may have difficulty
collecting on a guarantee or letter of
credit provided by a nonaffiliate on
behalf of an affiliate of the bank.
As noted above, section 23A prohibits
a member bank from accepting
securities issued by an affiliate as
collateral for an extension of credit to an
affiliate. The proposed rule clarified that
securities issued by the member bank
itself also are not eligible collateral to
secure a credit transaction with an
affiliate. Most commenters supported
the exclusion of bank-issued equity
securities but urged the Board to permit
banks to take their own debt securities
as section 23A collateral. These
commenters pointed out that bank
deposits (another form of bank liability)
count as a preferred form of collateral
under section 23A and that selling or
retiring bank-issued debt securities
would provide real benefit to the bank
upon foreclosure.
The Board has determined to modify
the proposed rule to address these
comments. Under the final rule, equity
securities issued by the lending member
bank, and debt securities issued by the
lending member bank that count as
regulatory capital of the bank, are not
eligible collateral under section 23A. If
a member bank were forced to foreclose
on a credit transaction with an affiliate
secured by such securities, the bank
may be unwilling to liquidate the
collateral promptly to recover on the
credit transaction because the sale might
depress the price of the bank's
outstanding securities or result in a
change in control of the bank. In
addition, to the extent that a member
bank is unable or unwilling to sell such
securities acquired through foreclosure,
the transaction would likely result in a
reduction in the bank's capital, thereby
offsetting any potential benefit provided
by the collateral.
3. Perfection and Priority (§ 223. 14(d))
To ensure that a member bank has
good access to the assets serving as
collateral for its credit transactions with
affiliates, the final regulation provides
(as did the proposed rule) that a member
bank's security interest in any collateral
required by section 23A must be
perfected in accordance with applicable
law. This requirement is consistent with
court decisions on the issue 92 and
ensures that the member bank has the
legal right to realize on the collateral in
case of default, including a default
resulting from the affiliate's insolvency
or liquidation. Commenters supported
this provision.
For similar reasons, the final rule
requires (as did the proposed rule) that
a member bank either obtain a first
priority security interest in the required
collateral or deduct from the amount of
collateral obtained by the bank the
lesser of (i) the amount of any security
interests in the collateral that are senior
to that obtained by the bank or (ii) the
amount of any credits secured by the
collateral that are senior to that of the
bank. For example, if a member bank
lends $100 to an affiliate and takes as
collateral a second lien on a parcel of
real estate worth $200, the arrangement
would only satisfy the collateral
requirements of section 23A if the
affiliate owed the holder of the first lien
$70 or less (a credit transaction secured
by real estate must be secured at 130
percent of the amount of the
transaction). Commenters also
supported this provision. At the request
of a commenter, the final rule includes
an example of how to compute the
section 23A collateral value of a junior
lien.
4. Unused Portion of an Extension of
Credit (§223.14(f)(2))
Section 23A requires that the
"amount" of an extension of credit be
secured by the statutorily prescribed
levels of collateral. Board staff
traditionally has advised that a member
bank that provides a line of credit to an
affiliate must secure the full amount of
the line of credit throughout the life of
the credit. That is, staff has not viewed
section 23A as permitting a member
bank to satisfy the collateral
requirements of the statute by securing
only the portion of a credit line that has
been drawn down by the affiliate. In an
acknowledgment that this treatment
may be too strict for some lines of
.2 See Fitzpatrick v. FDTC. 765 F.2d 569 (6th Cir.
1985).
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credit, the proposed rule provided that
the collateral requirements of section
23A would not apply to the unused
portion of an extension of credit to an
affiliate so long as the member bank
does not have any legal obligation to
advance additional funds under the
credit facility until the affiliate has
posted the amount of collateral required
by the statute with respect to the entire
used portion of the extension of credit.93
In such credit arrangements, securing
the unused portion of the credit line is
unnecessary from a safety and
soundness perspective because the
affiliate cannot require the member bank
to advance additional funds without
posting the additional collateral
required by section 23A.
Numerous commenters endorsed this
provision of the proposed rule, and the
final rule maintains the provision.94 The
Board notes that, if a member bank
voluntarily advances additional funds
under such a credit arrangement
without obtaining the additional
collateral required under section 23A to
secure the entire used amount (despite
its lack of legal obligation to make such
an advance), the Board would view this
action as a violation of the collateral
requirements of the statute.
5. Purchasing Affiliate Debt Securities in
the Secondary Market (§ 223. 14(f)(3))
As described above, the rule treats a
member bank's investment in the debt
securities of an affiliate as an extension
of credit by the bank to the affiliate that
is subject to section 23A's collateral
requirements. In the preamble to the
proposed rule, the Board sought
comment on whether the rule should
permit member banks in certain
circumstances to purchase debt
securities issued by an affiliate without
satisfying the collateral requirements of
section 23A. In particular, the Board
invited comment on whether it should
require section 23A collateralization in
circumstances where a member bank
purchases an affiliate's debt securities
(i) from a third party in a bona fide
secondary market transaction or (ii)
pursuant to a registered public offering
document or a private placement
memorandum in an offering in which
the affiliate receives significant
participation from third parties. A large
number of commenters expressed
93 This proposed treatment would not apply to
guarantees, acceptances, and letters of credit issued
on behalf of an affiliate, which must be fully
collateralized at inception.
•• The final rule uses the terms "used" and
"unused" in place of the proposed rule's "drawn"
and "undrawn" to conform to more standard
regulatory usage. See, e.g., Schedule RC-L to the
bank Call Report.
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support for the first of the proposed
exemptions; only a few commenters
advocated for (and one commenter
criticized) the second proposed
exemption.
The Board has decided to adopt the
first of the two exemptions described
above. When a member bank buys an
affiliate's debt securities in a bona fide
secondary market transaction, the risk
that the purchase is designed to shore
up an ailing affiliate is reduced.
Moreover, any purchase of affiliate debt
securities that qualifies for this
exemption would remain subject to the
quantitative limits of section 23A and
the market terms requirement of section
23B. In analyzing a member bank's good
faith under this exemption, the Board
would expect examiners to look at the
time elapsed between the original
issuance of the affiliate's debt securities
and the bank's purchase, the existence
of any relevant agreements or
relationships between the bank and the
third party seller of the affiliate's debt
securities, any history of bank financing
of the affiliate, and any other relevant
information.
C. Prohibition on the Purchase of Low-
Quality Assets (§ 223.15)
Section 223.15 of the regulation
restates the statute's general prohibition
on the purchase by a member bank of
low-quality assets from an affiliate.95
Several commenters on the proposed
rule argued that the Board should
exempt a bank's purchase of low-quality
assets from an insured sister bank.
These commenters stated that the cross-
guarantee provisions in section 5(e) of
the FDI Act eradicate any concern about
low-quality asset transactions between
sister banks.96
The Board has consulted with the
other Federal banking agencies on this
matter and has determined not to grant
the requested exemption for several
reasons. First, when Congress added the
sister-bank exemption to section 23A in
1982, it specifically and affirmatively
left sister banks subject to the
prohibition on the purchase of low-
quality assets.97 When Congress added
the cross-guarantee provisions to the
FDI Act in 1989, it did not amend the
sister-bank exemption in section 23A to
permit a member bank to buy low-
quality assets from a sister bank. In light
of such evidence of Congressional
intent, the Board should not exempt a
member bank's purchase of low-quality
95 12 U.S.C. 371c(a)(3). Section 23A does not
prohibit an affiliate from donating a low-quality
asset to a member bank. so long as the bank
provides no consideration for the asset.
96 See 12 U.S.c. 1815(e).
97 See 12 U.S.c. 371c(d)(I).
assets from a sister bank in the absence
of compelling evidence that the
exemption would be in the public
interest.
The Board does not believe that such
compelling evidence exists.
Importantly, the FDI Act's cross-
guarantee provisions would only assist
the FDIC to recoup losses in the event
of the failure of a sister bank, and would
not ensure that sister banks continue to
operate in a safe and sound manner as
going concerns. Moreover, the FDI Act's
cross-guarantee provisions would not
apply to all sets of section 23A sister
banks. For example, the cross-guarantee
provisions would not apply to section
23A sister banks if the sister banks were
not subsidiaries of a BHC or a thrift
holding company.98 Finally, the cross-
guarantee provisions would not prevent
sister banks from using the requested
exemption to transfer low-quality assets
back and forth among themselves to
escape examination.
The proposed rule provided an
exception, based on a long-standing staff
interpretation, to the general prohibition
on purchasing low-quality assets from
an affiliate.99 The exception allowed a
member bank that purchased a loan
participation from an affiliate to renew
its participation in the loan, or provide
additional funding under the existing
participation, even if the underlying
loan had become a low-quality asset, so
long as certain criteria were met. The
proposed rule provided this exception
because these renewals or additional
credit extensions may enable both the
affiliate and the participating member
bank to avoid or minimize potential
losses. It would be inconsistent with the
purposes of section 23A to bar a
member bank from using sound banking
judgment to take the necessary steps
(consistent with the criteria established
in the rule) to protect itself from harm
in such a situation.
Under the proposed rule, the
exception was available only if the
underlying loan was not a low-quality
asset at the time the member bank
purchased its participation and the
proposed transaction would not
increase the member bank's
proportional share of the credit facility.
The member bank also had to obtain the
prior approval of its board of directors
for the transaction and provide its
appropriate Federal banking agency
with 20 days' prior notice of the
transaction.
98 See 12 U.S.C. 1813(w), 1815(e)(1) and (9), and
184l(c)(2).
99 See Letter dated Aug. 10, 1984. from Michael
Bradfield, General Counsel of the Board, to Margie
Goris.
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Commenters expressed support for
preserving this exemption in Regulation
W but asked the Board to soften three
of the conditions to the exemption.
Several commenters argued for the
removal of the "no increase in the
bank's share" requirement on the
ground that lead banks involved in a
credit restructuring often are required to
repurchase participations previously
sold to smaller banks, thereby
increasing their proportionate share of
the problem credit. Another commenter
recommended that banks be allowed to
increase their share of a problem credit
by 5-10 percent.
Commenters also criticized the board
of directors' approval requirement on
the grounds that it is time consuming
and that renewals of problem credits are
not sufficiently important to require
board-level attention in most cases.
Commenters offered several alternatives,
including approval by an executive
committee of the bank's board of
directors, approval by senior bank
management, approval under the bank's
normal approval process for
restructuring problem credits, and
approval by bank management under
policies adopted by the bank's board of
directors.
Moreover, commenters expressed
significant opposition to the 20 days'
prior notice requirement. They asked
the Board to remove the requirement or
replace it with an after-the-fact notice
requirement. According to these
commenters, speed is often of the
essence in workout situations, and there
is no evidence that this exemption has
been abused by hanks in the nearly
twenty years that it has been available.
Under proposed Regulation W, this
restructuring exemption only applied
when a member bank renewed a
participation in a loan originated by an
affiliated depository institution. Some
commenters expressed a view that the
exemption should be expanded to
permit a bank to renew a participation
in a loan originated by any affiliate (not
just an affiliated depository institution).
According to these commenters, such an
expansion of the exemption would
enhance a bank's ability to protect itself
from troubled borrowers by
restructuring loans.
In response to these comments, the
Board has decided to revise the rule in
several respects. First, the final rule
contains a 20 days' post-consummation
notice requirement in replacement of
the proposed rule's 20 days' prior notice
requirement. Second, the final rule
permits a member bank to increase its
proportionate share in a restructured
loan by 5 percent (or by a higher
percentage with the prior approval of
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the bank's appropriate Federal banking
agency). Third, the final rule expands
the scope of the exemption to include
renewals of participations in loans
originated by any affiliate of the member
bank (not just affiliated depository
institutions). Fourth, the final rule
softens the board of directors' prior
approval requirement as follows. For
renewals of loans originated by a
nondepository affiliate of the member
bank, the renewals must be approved,
consistent with current practice, by the
entire board of directors of the bank. For
renewals of loans originated by
depository institution affiliates of the
member bank, however, the rule
provides several different ways to
comply with the requirement. The
member bank may obtain the prior
approval of the entire board of directors,
of an executive committee of the board
of directors, or of selected senior
management officials (so long as, in the
case of approvals by management
officials, the board of directors of the
member bank establishes policies and
procedures for such renewals, any
approvals by bank management are
consistent with such policies and
procedures, and the board of directors
periodically reviews the policies and
procedures and any approvals by
management). The Board believes that
the conditions to the exemption
contained in the final rule should be
sufficient to ensure that any exempted
problem loan restructurings do not pose
a safety and soundness risk to the
member bank.
D. Attribution Rule (§ 223.16]
Section 23A provides that any
transaction between a member bank and
any person is deemed to be a transaction
with an affiliate to the extent that the
proceeds of the transaction are used for
the benefit of, or transferred to, that
affiliate. loo For example, a member
bank's loan to a customer for the
purpose of purchasing securities from
the inventory of a broker-dealer affiliate
of the bank would be a covered
transaction under section 23A. This
"attribution rule" was included in
section 23A to prevent a member bank
from evading the restrictions in the
section by using intermediaries and to
limit the exposure that a member bank
has to customers of affiliates of the
bank. The proposed regulation restated
this provision and provided several
exemptions from the attribution rule.
1. In General
Commenters offered a few general
suggestions on the scope of section
100 12 U.S.c. 371c(a)(2),
23A's attribution rule. Several
commenters recommended that the
Board include a "bona fide, ordinary
course transactions" exemption to the
attribution rule, similar to the
exemption that the Board adopted in
Regulation 0. 101 In addition, a number
of commenters contended that the
attribution rule should not apply to
transactions where the bank does not
know, or have reason to know, that the
proceeds are transferred to or used for
the benefit of an affiliate. Some of these
commenters argued that the purpose of
the attribution rule is to prevent sham
transactions, not to prevent an affiliate
from receiving unintended or accidental
benefits from bank action. A few
commenters even asked the Board to
remove all the particular exemptions
from the attribution rule included in
Regulation W because, in the view of
these commenters, the exemptions
create the negative implication that all
other transactions with third parties in
which money flows to an affiliate are
covered.
The Board has decided not to include
any such general exemptions from the
scope of the attribution rule in final
Regulation W. The Board considers an
exemption for transactions where the
member bank does not know, or have
reason to know, that the proceeds will
flow to an affiliate as too broad in light
of the important place of section 23A in
the bank regulatory framework. The
Board is not willing to make the
applicability of the attribution rule
contingent in all cases on subjective
factors such as a member bank's
knowledge of the purpose of a
transaction or on such ambiguous,
though objective, factors such as a
member bank's reason to know of the
purpose of a transaction.
The'Board also does not believe that
a Regulation a-like exemption, for
transactions by a member bank with a
third party the proceeds of which are
used by the third party in a bona fide
transaction to acquire goods or services
from an affiliate of the member bank,
would be appropriate in the context of
section 23A. Regulation a's exemption
meshes well into that rule's underlying
statutory scheme because sections 22(g]
and 22(h) of the Federal Reserve Act do
not generally cover asset purchases from
an insider; section 23A, on the other
hand, generally does restrict asset
purchases from an affiliate. Moreover,
Regulation a's exemption reflects an
underlying policy concern not to
discourage qualified business owners
from serving as management officials of
101 See 12 CFR 215.3(f).
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banks. This sort of concern is not
present in the section 23A context.
2. Agency and Riskless Principal
Transactions (§ 223. 16(b) and (c)(1-2))
Concurrently with proposed
Regulation W, the Board issued a final
interpretation that exempted from
section 23A a loan from a member bank
to a nonaffiliate who uses the loan
proceeds to purchase securities from a
broker-dealer affiliate of the bank acting
exclusively as a riskless principal. 102
Proposed Regulation W also included
this exemption and sought additional
public comment on its terms. Numerous
commenters recommended extending
the riskless principal exemption to
include assets other than securities and
selling affiliates other than broker-
dealers. These commenters did not
provide specific information to the
Board about other asset classes that are
routinely purchased and sold on a
riskless principal basis. In light of this
absence of evidence, the Board declines
at this time to expand the riskless
principal exemption to include other
assets or other affiliates.
Unlike the final interpretation and
proposed Regulation W, final Regulation
W contains a definition of "acting
exclusively as a riskless principal." The
definition generally tracks language in
Regulation Y and provides that, for
pl,lfposes of Regulation W, a company
acts exclusively as a riskless principal if
the company, after receiving an order to
buy (or sell) a security from a customer,
purchases (or sells] the security in a
secondary market transaction for its
own account to offset a
contemporaneous sale to (or purchase
from] the customer. 103
Several commenters stated that
Regulation W should clarify that a loan
from a bank to a nonaffiliate who uses
the loan proceeds to purchase assets
through an affiliate of the bank acting
solely as an agent is not subject to the
attribution rule. Concurrently with the
issuance of proposed Regulation W, the
Board issued a final interpretation of
section 23A confirming, with some
conditions, this view.104 The Board has
decided to include this interpretation
within the text of Regulation W to
advance the goal of making the
regulation a single, comprehensive
source for the Board's views on sections
23A and 238.
The final rule clarifies one of the
conditions to both the agency and
riskless principal exemptions. Under
the final interpretations adopted in May
102 66 FR 24226, May 11. 2001.
103 See 12 CFR 225.28(b)(7)(ii),
104 66 FR 24226, May 11, 2001.
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2001, neither of these exemptions was
available to a member bank if the asset
purchased by the nonaffiliate was sold
"out of the inventory oP' any affiliate of
the bank. The Board is concerned that
users of the regulation may read the
"out of the inventory" language so
narrowly as to allow a member bank to
use these exemptions in situations
where the asset purchased by the
nonaffiliate was sold as principal by an
affiliate of the bank that did not have an
inventory of the sold asset. Whether the
selling affiliate has accumulated an
inventory of the asset sold to the
nonaffiliate is not important from
section 23A's perspective; what matters
is whether the asset purchased by the
nonaffiliate was sold as principal by an
affiliate of the member bank. The final
rule replaces the "out of the inventory"
standard with an "as principal"
standard to remove this ambiguity.
Accordingly, under the final rule, these
two exemptions are not available if the
asset purchased by the nonaffiliate was
sold as principal (other than as riskless
principal) by an affiliate of the member
bank.
3. Preexisting Lines ofCredit
(§223.16(c)(3))
Concurrently with proposed
Regulation W, the Board issued a final
interpretation that exempted from
section 23A an extension of credit by a
member bank to a nonaffiliate who uses
the credit to purchase securities
underwritten by or otherwise sold as
principal by a broker-dealer affiliate of
the bank, if the extension of credit is
made pursuant to a preexisting line of
credit not entered into in contemplation
of transactions with an affiliate of the
bank.105 Proposed Regulation W also
included this exemption and sought
additional public comment on its terms.
Commenters requested that the Board
expand the exemption to cover
purchases of any asset from any affiliate.
In the view of these commenters, an
extension of credit pursuant to a general
purpose, preexisting line of credit
should be exempt from the attribution
rule regardless of the type of asset being
purchased by the customer. Final
Regulation W's version of this
exemption is substantially identical to
the one contained in the May 2001 final
interpretation (and proposed Regulation
W). The Board may expand the
exemption in the future, however, after
it acquires additional supervisory
experience with its use.
105 66 FR 24226, May 11. 2001.
4. General Purpose Credit Cards
(§ 223.16(c)(4))
a. Proposed rule and public
comments.-Section 23A's attribution
rule, by its terms, covers an extension of
credit by a member bank to an
individual who uses the proceeds to
purchase a product or service from an
affiliate of the bank. Proposed
Regulation W exempted from the
attribution rule an extension of credit by
a member bank to a nonaffiliate
pursuant to a general purpose credit
card in such a situation. The proposed
rule defined a general purpose credit
card as a credit card issued by a member
bank that is widely accepted by
merchants that are not affiliates of the
bank (such as a Visa card or Mastercard)
if less than 25 percent of the aggregate
amount of purchases with the card are
purchases from an affiliate of the
bank. lOB Under the proposed rule,
extensions of credit to unaffiliated
borrowers pursuant to special purpose
credit cards (that is, credit cards that
may only be used or are substantially
used to buy goods from an affiliate of
the member bank) remained subject to
the attribution rule. l07
The Board proposed this exemption
because the funding benefit received by
the member bank's affiliate from the use
of general purpose credit cards by
unaffiliated borrowers is likely to be
minimal, and a member bank's decision
to issue a general purpose credit card
(and make loans pursuant to such a
credit card) to an unaffiliated borrower
likely would be based on independent
credit standards unrelated to any
possible affiliate transaction.
Commenters strongly supported
inclusion of an exemption for
extensions of credit to nonaffiliates
pursuant to a general purpose credit
card, but a large number of commenters
criticized the rule's definition of general
purpose credit card. lOB These
commenters contended that the 25
percent limit in the definition of general
purpose credit card would impose
substantial monitoring and
106 The proposed rule also required that a general
purpose credit card be eligible for use to purchase
products or services from nonaffiliates of the card-
issuing bank. The Board has deleted this
requirement from the final rule because of its
redundance on the "widely accepted" condition.
107 As noted above, most special purpose credit
card banks comply with section 23A by selling their
receivables or establishing a segregated, earmarked
deposit account to collateralize their receivables at
the end of each day.
108 Many commenters urged the Board to expand
the exemption for general purpose credit cards to
cover other forms of general revolving consumer
debt, including home equity lines of credit,
overdraft lines on checking accounts, and margin
loans.
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recordkeeping burden on banks. Some
of these commenters also alleged that
the limit is not needed for safety and
soundness given that the card must be
widely accepted by merchants and
given the virtual impossibility of a bank
using credit card transactions to assist a
troubled affiliate. These commenters
argued that the possibility that
customers may use a widely accepted
credit card to buy goods from a
nonaffiliate should ensure that credit is
granted on market terms, and pointed
out that credit card transactions expose
the bank to the credit risk of thousands
or millions of individual unaffiliated
credit card customers and do not
directly expose the bank to the credit
risk of any affiliate.
Several commenters made suggestions
about how the Board should modify, or
clarify the application of, the
quantitative limit in the definition of
general purpose credit card. A couple of
commenters believed that the rule
should raise the 25 percent limit to 50
percent. In addition, several
commenters asked the Board to provide
banks with a cure period if they exceed
the limit and requested that the Board
provide guidance as to whether banks
must do continuous or only periodic
compliance checks with the limit.
b. Final Rule.-The Board continues
to believe that the definition of general
purpose credit card should include the
25 percent limit. If more than 25 percent
of the purchases effected through a
credit card are purchases of products
and services from affiliates of the card-
issuing bank, the bank has significant
incentives to relax its credit
underwriting standards to facilitate the
sale of goods and services by its
affiliates. The Board believes that a limit
should be placed on the ability of a bank
to use the Federal safety net to subsidize
the financing of the sales activities of
affiliates of the bank.
The final rule contains several
adjustments to ease the burden of
complying with the general purpose
credit card exemption. First, the final
rule provides several different methods
for a member bank to demonstrate that
its credit card meets the 25 percent test.
For a member bank that has no
commercial affiliates (other than those
permitted for a FHC under section 4 of
the BHC Act), the bank would be
deemed to satisfy the 25 percent test if
the bank has no reason to believe that
it would fail the test. 109 Such a member
100 A member bank could use this method of
complying with the 25 percent test even if, for
example, the bank's FHC controls. under seGlion
4(a)(2], 4(c)(2], or 4(k)(4)(Hl of the BHC Act. several
companies engaged in nonfinancial activities.
76578 Federal Register/Vol. 67, No. 239/Thursday, December 12, 2002/Rules and Regulations
bank would not be obligated to establish
systems to verify strict, ongoing
compliance with the 25 percent test. For
a member bank that has commercial
affiliates (beyond those permitted for a
FHC under section 4 of the BHC Act),
the bank would be deemed to satisfy the
25 percent test if (i) the bank establishes
systems to verify compliance with the
25 percent test on an ongoing basis and
periodically validates its compliance
with the test; or (ii) the bank presents
information to the Board demonstrating
that its card would comply with the 25
percent test. 110
The final rule adopts a stricter
compliance standard for member banks
with commercial affiliates because
banks with commercial affiliates
typically are the banks whose credit
cards are used substantially to purchase
goods or services from affiliates. The
Board believes that the stricter standard
for member banks with commercial
affiliates will help constrain the mixing
of banking and commerce by limiting
the ability of such banks to use the
Federal safety net to subsidize the
commercial activities of their affiliates.
Second, the final rule provides
member banks that fall out of
compliance with the 25 percent test a
three-month grace period to return to
compliance before extensions of credit
under the card become covered
transactions. Third, the final rule gives
member banks that are required to
validate their ongoing compliance with
the 25 percent test a fixed method, time
frames, and examples for computing
compliance.
The Board does not expect that
member banks whose cards fail to meet
the terms of the general purpose credit
card exemption would be compelled to
discontinue the cards. Most banks that
issue special purpose credit cards
historically have complied with section
23A by selling their credit card
receivables to an affiliate at the end of
each day.111 Under such arrangements,
which also would be permissible under
final Regulation W, the bank does not
provide continuous financing for its
commercial affiliates; rather, it obtains
funding from outside sources on a daily
basis for its affiliate-related credits.
Member banks that issue VISA cards
and Mastercards that fail to satisfy the
1 '0 One way that a member bank could
demonstrate 1hat its card would comply with the 25
percent test would be to show that the total sales
of the bank's affiliates are less than 25 percent of
the total purchases by cardholders.
111 As discussed below, the Board has not
historically treated intraday credit extensions as
covered transactions under section 23A. Section
223.42(1) of the final Regulation W provides a fairly
comprehensive exemption for intraday extensions
of credit.
25 percent test would be able to use the
same mechanisms to comply with
section 23A as do banks that currently
issue special purpose credit cards.
V. Valuation and Timing Principles
Under Section 23A-Subpart C
Subpart C of the regulation sets forth
the rules that member banks must use
to calculate the value of covered
transactions for purposes of determining
compliance with the quantitative limits
and collateral requirements of section
23A. This subpart also sets forth several
rules that member banks must employ
to determine when a transaction
becomes or ceases to be a covered
transaction.
A. Credit Transactions With an Affiliate
(§ 223.21)
1. Valuation (§223.21(a))
The proposed regulation provided
generally that a credit transaction
between a member bank and an affiliate
initially must be valued at the amount
of funds provided by the member bank
to, or on behalf of, the affiliate plus any
additional amount that the bank could
be required to provide to, or on behalf
of, the affiliate. The final rule
supplements the proposed rule by
providing that the section 23A value of
a credit transaction between a member
bank and an affiliate is the greater of (i)
the principal amount of the credit
transaction; (ii) the amount owed by the
affiliate to the member bank under the
credit transaction; or (iii) the result
produced by application of the formula
set forth in the proposed rule.
The first prong of the final rule's
valuation formula for credit transactions
("the principal amount of the credit
transaction") likely would determine
the valuation of a transaction in which
a member bank purchased a zero-
coupon note issued by an affiliate. The
Board believes that a member bank
should value such an extension of credit
at the principal, or face, amount of the
note (that is, the amount that the
affiliate ultimately must pay to the
bank) rather than the amount of funds
initially advanced by the bank. For
example, assume a member bank
purchased from an affiliate for $50 a 10-
year zero-coupon note issued by the
affiliate with a face amount of $100. The
proposed rule's valuation formula
permitted the member bank to value this
transaction at $50-the amount
provided to the affiliate by the bank in
the transaction. The final rule requires
the member bank to value this
transaction at $100.
The second prong of the final rule's
valuation formula for credit transactions
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("the amount owed by the affiliate")
likely would determine the valuation of
a transaction in which an affiliate fails
to pay a member bank when due a fee
for services rendered by the bank to the
affiliate. This prong of the valuation
formula is not intended to include
within section 23A's quantitative limits,
however, items such as accrued interest
not yet due on a member bank's loan to
an affiliate or credit exposure of a
member bank to an affiliate on a
derivative transaction that is not the
functional equivalent of a credit
transaction (unless and until the affiliate
defaults in making a required payment
to the bank on a settlement date).
Member banks will be able to
determine the section 23A value for
most credit transactions under the third
prong of the rule's valuation formula.
Under this prong, for example, a $100
term loan is a $100 covered transaction,
a $300 revolving credit facility is a $300
covered transaction (regardless of how
much of the facility the affiliate has
drawn down), and a guarantee
backstopping a $500 debt issuance of
the affiliate is a $500 covered
transaction. 112 Several commenters
contended that the unused portion of a
line of credit should not count toward
the quantitative limits of section 23A,
especially not if the bank is only
conditionally obligated to advance
additional funds. In the Board's view,
the entire amount (both the used and
unused portions) of a line of credit or
other loan commitment counts toward a
member bank's quantitative limits under
section 23A regardless of whether the
line of credit contains a "material
adverse change" clause or any other
provision that is intended to relieve the
bank of its funding obligation under
certain conditions. This position is
consistent with the treatment of
commitments under the Board's capital
adequacy guidelines and is particularly
appropriate in the section 23A context
because of the risk that a member bank
may not use every contractual escape
hatch available to avoid funding a
troubled affiliate.113
Under section 23A and the regulation,
a member bank has made an extension
of credit to an affiliate if the bank
purchases from a third party a loan
previously made to an affiliate of the
bank. The rule provides a different
valuation formula for these indirect
credit transactions. For these credit
transactions, the member bank must
value the transaction at the price paid
by the bank for the loan plus any
"2 These examples are included in the text of the
final rule.
113 See 12 CFR part 225, appendix A, § III.D.2.
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additional amount that the bank could
be required to provide to, or on behalf
of, the affiliate under the terms of the
credit agreement.
For example, if a member bank pays
a third party $90 for a $100 term loan
that the third party previously made to
an affiliate of the bank (because, for
example, the loan was at a fixed rate
and has declined in value due to a rise
in the general level of interest rates), the
covered transaction amount is $90
rather than $100.114 The lower covered
transaction amount reflects the fact that
the member bank's maximum loss on
the transaction is $90 rather than the
original principal amount of the loan.
For another example, if a member bank
pays a third party $70 for a $100 line of
credit to an affiliate of which $70 had
been drawn down by the affiliate, the
covered transaction amount would be
$100 (the $70 purchase price paid by
the bank for the credit plus the
remaining $30 that the bank could be
required to lend under the credit line).
Although a member bank's purchase
of, or investment in, a debt security
issued by an affiliate is considered an
extension of credit to an affiliate under
the regulation, these transactions are not
valued like other extensions of credit.
The valuation rules for purchases of,
and investments in, the debt securities
of an affiliate are set forth in section
223.23 of the rule, which is discussed
below in part IV.C. of this preamble.
2. Timing (§ 223.21 (b](l]]
The proposed regulation also made
clear that a member bank has entered
into a credit transaction with an affiliate
at the time during the day that the bank
becomes legally obligated to make the
extension of credit to, or issue the
guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit
on behalf of, the affiliate. This timing
rule represented a departure from the
industry practice of complying with
section 23A only with respect to
overnight positions. This timing rule
also clarified that a covered transaction
occurs at the moment that the member
bank executes a legally valid, binding,
and enforceable credit agreement or
guarantee, and does not occur only
when a member bank funds a credit
facility or makes payment on a
guarantee.
Many commenters objected that
forcing banks to keep track of extensions
of credit to an affiliate on an intraday
basis would present serious compliance
burdens for banks. These commenters
believed that banks would have little
trouble ensuring that credit transactions
114 The final rule includes this example of the
valuation of indirect credit transactions.
satisfy the collateral requirements of
section 23A or the market terms
requirement of section 23B at the
intraday time of the transactions.
According to these commenters,
however, banks currently record loans
and measure loan exposures at the end
of each business day, and requiring
intraday loan amount tracking would
impose a significant cost on banks.
The Board has decided to retain
proposed Regulation W's general timing
rule for credit transactions. The burden
of the timing rule should be
significantly mitigated, however, by the
exemption for intraday extensions of
credit in section 223.42(1) of the
regulation. 115 The Board further notes
that the burden of the timing rule
should be lessened by the fact that
Regulation W, consistent with section
23A, only requires a member bank to
compute compliance with its
quantitative limits when the bank is
about to engage in a new covered
transaction. Accordingly, Regulation W
does not require a member bank to
compute compliance with the rule's
quantitative limits on a continuous
basis.
3. Credit Transactions With
Nonaffiliates That Become Affiliates
(§223.21(b](2]]
Banks sometimes lend money to, or
issue guarantees on behalf of,
unaffiliated companies that later
become affiliates of the bank. The
proposed regulation provided that credit
transactions with a nonaffiliate become
covered transactions at the time that the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate of the
member bank. Specifically, the
proposed rule required that a member
bank (i) ensure that any such credit
transaction satisfies the collateral
requirements of section 23A promptly
after the nonaffiliate becomes an
affiliate; and (ii) include the amount of
any such transaction in the aggregate
amount of the bank's covered
transactions for purposes of determining
whether any future covered transactions
would comply with the quantitative
limits of section 23A. The proposal did
not require a member bank to reduce the
amount of its covered transactions with
115 As discussed in more detail below in part
VII.L. of this preamhle, however. the intraday credit
exemption generally applies only to extensions of
credit that a member bank expects to be repaid.
sold, or terminated by the end of its U.S. business
day. Hence, the final rule generally requires a
member bank to ensure its intraday compliance
with section 23A when making a loan to an affiliate
during the day that the bank expects to remain
outstanding and on its books overnight.
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any affiliate at the time the nonaffiliate
becomes an affiliate, 116
Many commenters criticized this
approach. They contended that loans to
a nonaffiliate that later becomes an
affiliate should be eternally exempt
from the quantitative limits and
collateral requirements of section 23A
because the loans were made on arm's-
length terms at inception and the terms
of the loans would not change when the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate. Several
of these commenters argued that the
proposed rule's approach to these loans
is highly burdensome, especially for
banking organizations that have a
significant equity investment business
(where new companies are constantly
becoming, and ceasing to be, 15 percent-
owned portfolio company affiliates).
According to these commenters, banks
currently treat these loans as
grandfathered, and the proposed rule's
approach would put banks and their
merchant banking affiliates at a serious
disadvantage to nonregulated lenders
and their venture firm affiliates. Other
commenters contended that the
"prompt" collateral requirement would
be burdensome because it may be
difficult to obtain collateral if the new
affiliate is less than wholly owned or
has other debt outstanding with
negative pledge covenants.
The Board continues to subscribe to
the general approach of the proposed
rule in these situations. Although
commenters may be correct in asserting
that transactions with a nonaffiliate
would be on market terms and would
stay on market terms after the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate, section
23A requires more than that covered
transactions with affiliates be on market
terms. Section 23A supplements the
market terms requirement of section 23B
with, among other things, quantitative
limits and collateral requirements. If the
Board did not treat credit transactions
with a nonaffiliate as covered
transactions at the time that the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate, a
member bank could incur
uncollateralized exposure to affiliates
well beyond the 20 percent aggregate
quantitative limit in section 23A.117
116 The proposed rule also set forth a stricter set
of compliance rules, which are discussed below, for
situations in which a member bank entered into a
credit transaction with a nonaffiliate "in
contemplation of" the nonaffiliate becoming an
affiliate.
117 Although the lending limits applicable to
national and State memher banks would apply to
these credit transactions at inception, these lending
limits permit loans to a single corporate group in
amounts up to 50 percent of the bank's capital stock
and surplus. 12 ern 32.5(d). The lending limits also
would cease to apply to these credit transactions
Continued
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The Board agrees, however, that relief
from the collateral requirements of
section 23A would be appropriate in
certain circumstances. Accordingly, the
final rule exempts credit transactions
from the collateral requirement in
situations where the member bank
entered into the transaction with the
nonaffiliate at least one year before the
nonaffiliate became an affiliate of the
bank. In such circumstances, it is
unlikely that the member bank engaged
in the transaction with the nonaffiliate
in anticipation of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank. The
Board advises member banks, however,
that such transactions must comply
with the market terms requirement of
section 23B.
As noted above, in cases where the
member bank entered into the credit
transaction with the nonaffiliate "in
contemplation of" the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank, the
proposed rule imposed a more strict set
of requirements. In these cases, the
proposed rule required the member
bank, at or before the time the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate, (i) to
ensure compliance with the collateral
requirements of section 23A and (ii) to
reduce the aggregate amount of its
covered transactions with affiliates if
necessary so as not to exceed the
quantitative limits of section 23A.
Although commenters did not object
to the proposed rule's stricter approach
to "in contemplation" transactions,
some commenters argued that the "in
contemplation" standard in the rule is
too vague. Several of these commenters
believed the "in contemplation"
standard should be replaced with a
more objective standard that focuses on
whether the nonaffiliate has entered
into a binding agreement under the
terms of which the nonaffiliate would
become an affiliate or whether there has
been a publicly announced transaction
in which the nonaffiliate would become
an affiliate. Other commenters
contended that the Board should clarify
that a transaction will be deemed "in
contemplation of" a nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate only if the bank
personnel involved in approving the
transaction were aware of negotiations
concerning the nonaffiliate's future
affiliation with the bank. According to
these commenters, any other
formulation would require a banking
organization to disseminate broadly
throughout the firm prospective merger
information (in contravention of good
securities law compliance policies).
after the nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate. 12 CFR
32.1(c)(l).
The Board does not believe that the
above-described circumstances
constitute a complete set of the
situations in which a member bank
might make a loan to a nonaffiliate "in
contemplation of" the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank. To
provide some clarity to banking
organizations, however, the final rule
specifies that a transaction between a
member bank and a nonaffiliate is
presumed to be "in contemplation of'
the nonaffiliate becoming an affiliate if
the bank enters into the transaction with
the nonaffiliate after the execution of, or
commencement of negotiations
designed to result in, an agreement
under the terms of which the
nonaffiliate would become an affiliate.
The exemption from the collateral
requirements discussed above does not
apply to "in contemplation"
transactions. If a member bank engages
in a credit transaction with a
nonaffiliate in contemplation of the
nonaffiliate becoming an affiliate of the
bank, the bank must ensure that the
transaction complies with the collateral
requirements of the rule at the time the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate
(regardless of whether a year elapsed
between the inception of the credit
transaction and the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate).
B. Asset Purchases From an Affiliate
(§ 223.22)
Regulation W provides that a
purchase of assets by a member bank
from an affiliate initially must be valued
at the total amount of consideration
given by the bank in exchange for the
asset. This consideration can take any
form, and the regulation makes clear
that it would include an assumption of
liabilities by the member bank. The
regulation also indicates that an asset
purchase remains a covered transaction
for a member bank for as long as the
bank holds the asset, and that the value
of the covered transaction after the
purchase may be reduced to reflect
amortization or depreciation of the
asset, to the extent that such reductions
are consistent with GAAP and are
reflected on the bank's financial
statements.
The final rule, like the proposed rule,
also clarifies that certain asset purchases
by a member bank from an affiliate are
not valued in accordance with the
general asset purchase valuation
formula. First, if the member bank buys
from one affiliate a loan to a second
affiliate, the bank must value the
transaction as a credit transaction with
the second affiliate under section 223.21
C - 31
of the final rule. llB Second, if the
member bank buys from one affiliate a
security issued by a second affiliate, the
bank must value the transaction as an
investment in securities issued by the
second affiliate under section 223.23 of
the final rule. 119 Third, if the member
bank engages in a constructive asset
purchase described in section 223.31 of
the final rule, the bank must value the
transaction under that section. l20
The final rule (unlike the proposed
rule) also sets forth a special valuation
rule for a member bank's purchase of a
line of credit or loan commitment from
an affiliate. A member bank initially
must value such asset purchases at the
purchase price paid by the bank for the
asset plus any additional amounts that
the bank is obligated to provide under
the credit facility.l2l The Board has
crafted this special valuation rule to
ensure that there are limits on the
amount of risk a company can shift to
an affiliated bank. Without the rule, a
company would be able to transfer
substantial amounts of unfunded
obligations to an affiliated bank in a
manner that barely affected the bank's
quantitative limits under section 23A.
Under the regulation, in contrast with
credit transactions, an asset purchase
from a nonaffiliate that later becomes an
affiliate generally does not become a
covered transaction for the purchasing
member bank. If a member bank
purchases assets from a nonaffiliate in
contemplation of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank,
however, the asset purchase becomes a
covered transaction at the time the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate. In
addition, the member bank must ensure
that the aggregate amount of the bank's
covered transactions (including any
such asset purchase from the
nonaffiliate) would not exceed the
quantitative limits of section 23A at the
time the nonaffiliate becomes an
affiliate.
The regulation provides several
examples designed to assist member
banks in valuing purchases of assets
from an affiliate.
118 The valuation rule for credit transactions is
discussed above in part V.A. of this preamble.
119 The purchase by a member bank of a security
issued by an affiliate is discussed below in part V.c.
of this preamble.
120 These transactions are discussed below in part
VLA. of this preamble.
121 A member bank would not be required to
include unfunded. but committed. amounts in the
value of the covered transaction if (i) the credit
facility being transferred from the affiliate to the
bank is unconditionally cancelable (without cause)
at any time by the bank; and (ii) the bank makes
a separate credit decision before each drawing
under the facility.
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Several commenters requested
confirmation that if a bank receives an
encumbered asset from an affiliate, it is
not forever a covered transaction in the
amount of the encumbrance. The Board
has modified an example in the
regulation to clarify that a member
bank's receipt of an encumbered asset
from an affiliate ceases to be a covered
transaction when, for example, the bank
sells the asset.
C. Purchases of and Investments in
Securities Issued by an Affiliate
(§ 223.23)
Section 23A includes as a covered
transaction a member bank's purchase
of, or investment in, securities issued by
an affiliate. Proposed Regulation W
required a member bank to value a
purchase of, or investment in, securities
issued by an affiliate (other than a
financial subsidiary of the bank) 122 at
the greater of the bank's purchase price
or carrying value ofthe securities.123
Under the rule, a member bank that paid
no consideration in exchange for
affiliate securities would nevertheless
have to value the covered transaction at
no less than the bank's carrying value of
the securities.124 In addition, under the
rule, if the member bank's carrying
value of the affiliate securities increased
or decreased after the bank's initial
investment (due to profits or losses at
the affiliate), the amount of the bank's
covered transaction would increase or
decrease to reflect the bank's changing
financial exposure to the affiliate, but
could not decline below the amount
paid by the bank for the securities.
A number of commenters objected to
this valuation formula and offered
alternatives. Several commenters argued
that investments in an affiliate's
securities should be valued at the lower
of purchase price or carrying value.
Under this formula, a contribution of
affiliate securities to a bank would be
valued at zero, and the bank would be
permitted without limit to reduce the
covered transaction amount for a
purchase of affiliate securities as the
value of the securities declined. These
commenters justified their formula's
treatment of bank investments in a
declining affiliate by pointing out that a
bank's capital would be reduced to
reflect the decline in value of the
122The valuation rule for investments in
securities issued by a financial subsidiary is
discussed below in part VI.B.2. of this preamble.
123 Staff traditionally advised member banks to
value a purchase of securities issued by an affiliate
at the purchase price paid by the bank for the
securities.
124 Carrying value refers to the amount at which
the securities are carried on the GAAP financial
statements of the member bank.
affiliate's securities and by noting that
their approach more accurately reflects
the bank's actual remaining financial
exposure to the affiliate.
Under the commenters' proposed
formula, a bank's section 23A value for
an investment in affiliate securities also
would not increase as the value of the
securities increased. These commenters
argued that an increase in the value of
an investment does not create additional
risk of loss for the investor and that
there is no justification for restricting
section 23A lending as an affiliate
increases in financial strength. One of
these commenters contended that the
proposed regulation's valuation rule is
inconsistent in increasing the section
23A value of an investment as the
affiliate prospers but not decreasing the
section 23A value of the investment as
the affiliate declines.
Other commenters argued that
investments in an affiliate's securities
always should be valued at the purchase
price or, at a minimum, that a
contribution of affiliate securities
initially should be valued at zero.
The Board has determined to adopt
the valuation rule contained in the
proposed regulation. The Board
continues to believe that several
important considerations support the
general carrying value approach of this
valuation rule. First, the approach is
consistent with GAAP, which would
require a bank to reflect its investment
in securities issued by an affiliate at
carrying value throughout the life of the
investment, even if the bank paid no
consideration for the securities. Second,
the approach is supported by the terms
of the statute, which defines both a
"purchase of' and an "investment in"
securities issued by an affiliate as a
covered transaction. The statute's
"investment in" language indicates that
Congress was concerned with a member
bank's continuing exposure to an
affiliate through an ongoing investment
in the affiliate's securities.
Third, amendments to section 23A
made by the GLB Act support the
approach. The GLB Act defines a
financial subsidiary of a bank as an
affiliate of the bank, but specifically
provides that the section 23A value of
a bank's investment in securities issued
by a financial subsidiary does not
include retained earnings of the
subsidiary. The negative implication
from this provision is that the section
23A value of a bank's investment in
other affiliates includes the affiliates'
retained earnings, which would be
reflected in the bank's carrying value of
the investment under the rule.
Finally, the carrying value approach
is consistent with the purposes of
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section 23A-limiting the financial
exposure of banks to their affiliates and
promoting safety and soundness. The
valuation rule requires a member bank
to revalue upwards the amount of an
investment in affiliate securities only
when the bank's exposure to the affiliate
increases (as reflected on the bank's
financial statements) and the bank's
capital increases to reflect the higher
value of the investment. In these
circumstances, the valuation rule
merely reflects the member bank's
greater financial exposure to the affiliate
and enhances safety and soundness by
reducing the bank's ability to engage in
additional transactions with an affiliate
as the bank's exposure to that affiliate
increases.
As noted above, this valuation rule
also provides that the covered
transaction amount of a member bank's
investment in affiliate securities can be
no less than the purchase price paid by
the bank for the securities, even if the
carrying value of the securities declines
below the purchase price. Although this
aspect of the valuation rule is not
consistent with GAAP, using the
member bank's purchase price for the
securities as a floor for valuing the
covered transaction is appropriate for
several reasons. First, it ensures that the
amount of the covered transaction never
falls below the amount of funds actually
transferred by the member bank to the
affiliate in connection with the
investment. In addition, the purchase
price floor limits the ability of a member
bank to provide additional funding to an
affiliate as the affiliate approaches
insolvency. If the regulation were to
value investments in securities issued
by an affiliate strictly at carrying value,
then the member bank could lend more
funds to the affiliate as the affiliate's
financial condition worsened. As the
affiliate declined, the member bank's
carrying value of the affiliate's securities
would decline, the section 23A value of
the bank's investment likely would
decline, and, consequently, the bank
would be able to provide additional
funding to the affiliate under section
23A. This type of increasing support for
an affiliate in distress is precisely what
section 23A was intended to restrict.
The regulation provides several
examples designed to assist member
banks in valuing purchases of and
investments in securities issued by an
affiliate.
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D. Posting Securities Issued by an
Affiliate as Collateral (§ 223.24)
1. General Valuation Rule (§ 223.24{a)
and (b))
Section 23A defines as a covered
transaction a member bank's acceptance
of securities issued by an affiliate as
collateral for a loan or extension of
credit to any person or company.125
This type of covered transaction has two
classes: one in which the only collateral
for the loan is affiliate securities; and
another in which the loan is secured by
a combination of affiliate securities and
other collateral. Section 23A does not
explain how these different types of
covered transactions should be valued
for purposes of determining compliance
with the quantitative limits of the
statute.
As a general rule, Regulation W
values covered transactions of the first
class, where the credit extension is
secured exclusively by affiliate
securities, at the full amount of the
extension of credit. This approach
reflects the difficulty of measuring the
actual value of typically untraded and
illiquid affiliate securities, and
conservatively assumes that the value of
the securities is equal to the full value
of the loan that the securities
collateralize. This position also reflects
the traditional advice given by Board
staff on this issue. Regulation W
contains an exception to the general rule
where the affiliate securities held as
collateral have a ready market. In that
case, the transaction may be valued at
the fair market value of the affiliate
securities. The exception grants relief
from staffs traditional position in those
circumstances where the value of the
affiliate securities is independently
verifiable by reference to transactions
occurring in a liquid market,126
Regulation W values covered
transactions of the second class, where
the credit extension is secured by
affiliate securities and other collateral,
125 12 u.s.c. 371c(b)(7)(D). This covered
transaction only arises when the member bank's
loan is to a nonaffiliate. Under section 23A, the
securities issued by an affiliate are not acceptable
collateral for a loan or extension of credit to any
affiliate. See 12 U.S.c. 371c(c)(4]. Moreover, if the
proceeds of a loan that is secured by an affiliate's
securities are transferred to an affiliate by the
unaffiliated borrower (for example, to purchase
assets or securities from the inventory of an
affiliate), the loan should be treated as a loan to the
affiliate. The loan must then be secured with
collateral in an amount and of a type that meets the
requirements of section 23A for loans by a member
bank to an affiliate.
12(; In either case, the transaction must comply
with section 23B; that is, the member bank must
obtain the same amount of affiliate securities as
collateral on the credit extension that the bank
would obtain if the collateral were not affiliate
securities.
at the lesser of (i) the total value of the
extension of credit minus the fair
market value of the other collateral or
(ii) the fair market value of the affiliate
securities (if the securities have a ready
market). Until 1999, staff advised
member banks to value this class of
covered transactions at the total amount
of the extension of credit. In January
1999, the staff modified its position on
mixed collateral loans to permit member
banks to value these transactions in a
manner similar to the rule.127
The Board believes that where a loan
is secured by securities of an affiliate
and other collateral, it is reasonable to
reflect the fair market value of the other
collateral in determining whether, and
to what extent, the loan should count
toward the member bank's section 23A
quantitative limits. Under the rule's
method of calculation for mixed-
collateral loans, if a loan is fully secured'
by nonaffiliate collateral with a fair
market value that equals or exceeds the
loan amount, then the loan would not
be included in the member bank's
quantitative limits for purposes of
section 23A.128 If the loan is not fully
secured by other collateral, then the
maximum amount that the member
bank must count against its quantitative
limits is the difference between the full
amount of the loan and the fair market
value of the nonaffiliate collateral.
The approach taken in Regulation W,
however, is different from that of the
1999 interpretation in two respects.
First, although the 1999 interpretation
allowed member banks to use the fair
market value of the affiliate securities as
an upper limit on the value of the
transaction regardless of the liquidity of
the affiliate securities, the regulation
only allows member banks to use the
value of the affiliate securities as an
upper limit if the affiliate securities
have a ready market. The Board is
concerned that a member bank could
understate the market value of affiliate
securities that do not have a ready
market in order to shrink the size of the
covered transaction. Second, the
regulation's ready market requirement
replaces an implicit condition of the
127 See Letter dated January 21. 1999, from J.
Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel of the Board,
to Bruce Moland. This letter set forth an opinion of
Board staff that, for purposes of applying the
quantitative limits in section 23A, such mixed-
collateral loans should be valued at the lesser of (i)
the total amount of the loan less the fair market
value of nonaffiliate collateral (if any) or (ii) the fair
market value of the affiliate's securities that are
used as collateral.
128 The Board notes, however, that section 23A
requires a loan by a member bank that is secured
with any amount of an affiliate's securities to be
consistent with safe and sound banking practices.
12 U.S.c. 371c(a)(4).
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1999 interpretation that only a small
amount of the total collateral could be
affiliate securities. The valuation rule in
Regulation W applies regardless of the
amount of affiliate collateral. 129
Commenters did not criticize the
proposed rule's general valuation
formulas for these covered transactions,
and the general formulas contained in
the final rule are substantially identical
to those in the proposal. Commenters
did, however, suggest several new
exemptions for this type of covered
transaction: (i) Transactions in which
the affiliate securities serving as
collateral meet the (d)(6) exemption and
(ii) transactions in which the affiliate
securities serving as collateral represent
less than 50 percent of the total
collateral. The final rule does not
include either of these suggested
exemptions. In the Board's view, a loan
by a member bank that is secured by
affiliate securities could be used to
provide indirect financing to an affiliate
and exposes the bank (albeit
secondarily) to the credit risk of an
affiliate regardless of whether the
affiliate securities are traded in a liquid
market or constitute a minority of the
total collateral for the loan.
2. Exemption for Shares Issued by an
Affiliated Mutual Fund (§ 223.24{c))
In connection with the proposed rule,
the Board specifically sought comment
on whether to exempt from section 23A
loans to third parties secured by
affiliate-issued mutual fund shares. A
large number of commenters advocated
granting this exemption and offered the
following principal arguments in
support of their position: (i) The bank is
not funding an affiliate in these
transactions; (ii) although section 23A
includes as a covered transaction a loan
to a third party collateralized by affiliate
securities, the purpose of including this
covered transaction was to prevent
evasion, and evasion is implausible
when the collateral taken by the bank is
affiliate-issued mutual funds; (iii)
tracking these loans can be very
burdensome as many of the loans are
small and the value of the mutual fund
collateral changes daily; (iv) the assets
of an affiliated mutual fund generally
are shares of nonaffiliates, which could
otherwise serve as collateral for the loan
without creating a covered transaction
under section 23A; and (v) mutual funds
129 One commenter asked for clarification that a
member bank may use the higher of the two
valuation options for these transactions if, for
example. tho bank does not have the procedures
and systems in place to verify the fair market value
of affiliate securities. The Board has adjusted the
language of the rule to clarify that a member bank
may choose to use the higher valuation option.
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are highly regulated, their shares are
highly liquid and can only be purchased
at their daily net asset value, and
mutual funds are required by law to
have boards of directors that are largely
independent of the bank and its
affiliates.
In the proposal, the Board asked for
comment on five potential conditions to
the availability of this exemption: (i)
The borrower does not use the proceeds
ofthe loan to purchase shares of the
affiliated mutual fund; (ii) the borrower
is not an executive officer of the
member bank or its affiliates; (iii) the
price of the mutual fund shares is
quoted routinely in a widely
disseminated news source; (iv) the
shares of the mutual fund are widely
held by the public; and (v) the member
bank and its affiliates do not own in the
aggregate more than 5 percent of the
shares of the mutual fund. A few
commenters recommended that the
Board drop all five of these conditions.
Other commenters specifically endorsed
or specifically objected to particular
conditions.
One commenter supported the use of
proceeds condition, but other
commenters objected to the condition
because the use of loan proceeds is hard
to monitor and contro!' Several
commenters expressed opposition to the
executive officer condition. Many of
them noted that Regulation 0 already
comprehensively regulates bank lending
to executive officers. A number of other
commenters expressed a willingness to
support the condition if it were
modified to cover only executive
officers that are subject to Regulation 0
restrictions.
A few commenters supported the
pricing mechanism condition. One
commenter opposed the condition on
the grounds that major newspapers only
report on large mutual funds, and even
small mutual funds are liquid (and must
redeem shares upon request at all times)
and have prices quoted on internet sites
and in other news sources. Several
commenters asked the Board to widen
this condition to explicitly permit
mutual fund price quotes to be obtained
from Morningstar, Lipper, Bloomberg,
fund supermarket websites, or any other
unaffiliated, real-time, electronic pricing
system.
Some commenters expressly
supported the widely held condition.
Several other commenters criticized the
condition. These commenters noted that
the daily redemption requirement to
which mutual funds are subject should
satisfy any liquidity concerns that the
Board may have. They advised that
concentrated ownership of a fund
would not adversely impact the fund's
liquidity or the reliability of pricing
information.
One commenter supported the 5
percent ownership limit condition.
Many commenters opposed the
condition, largely because of its
purported redundance on the widely
held condition. Some of these
commenters asked the Board to replace
the 5 percent condition with a "no
control" condition.
The Board has decided to include in
the final rule an exemption for
extensions of credit by a member bank
that are secured by shares of an
affiliated mutual fund. To qualify for the
exemption, the transaction must meet
several conditions. First, to ensure that
the affiliate collateral is liquid and
trades at a fair price, the affiliated
mutual fund must be an open-end
investment company that is registered
with the SEC under the 1940 Act.
Second, to ensure that the member bank
can easily establish and monitor the
value of the affiliate collateral. the
affiliated mutual fund's shares serving
as collateral for the extension of credit
must have a publicly available market
price. Third, to reduce the member
bank's incentives to use these
extensions of credit as a mechanism to
support the affiliated mutual fund, the
member bank and its affiliates must not
own more than 5 percent of the fund's
shares (excluding certain shares held in
a fiduciary capacity). Finally, the
proceeds of the extension of credit must
not be used to purchase the affiliated
mutual fund's shares serving as
collateral or otherwise used to benefit
an affiliate. In such circumstances, the
member bank's extension of credit
would be covered by section 23A's
attribution rule.
Instead of creating a separate
exemption for these transactions in
subpart E of the rule, the Board has
decided to effect this exemption by
adjusting the valuation rule for
extensions of credit secured by affiliate-
issued securities. Inserting the
exemption into the valuation rule for
this type of covered transaction will
enable users of the regulation to
determine more easily the non-exempt
covered transaction amount for loans
secured in part by affiliate-issued
securities and in part by other collateral.
The final rule effects the exemption by
providing that an affiliated mutual
fund's shares that meet the above-
mentioned criteria do not count as
affiliate-issued securities for purposes of
the valuation rule for extensions of
credit secured by affiliate-issued
securities.
C - 34
VI. Other Requirements Under Section
23A-Subpart D
Subpart 0 of the rule provides
guidance to banking organizations on
three issues under section 23A: (i)
Merger and acquisition transactions
between a member bank and an affiliate;
(ii) financial subsidiaries of a member
bank; and (iii) derivative transactions
between a member bank and an affiliate.
A. Merger and Acquisition Transactions
Between a Member Bank and an
Affiliate (§ 223.31)
1. The General Rule (§ 223.31 (a-e))
As noted above, section 23A includes
a member bank's purchase of assets
from an affiliate and a member bank's
purchase of, or investment in, securities
issued by an affiliate within the
definition of covered transaction. In the
past, the Board has been required to
apply these provisions to transactions
where a member bank directly or
indirectly acquires an affiliate. There are
three principal methods by which a
member bank acquires an affiliate. The
first method is where a member bank
directly purchases or otherwise acquires
the affiliate's assets and assumes the
affiliate's liabilities. In this case, the
transaction is treated as a purchase of
assets, and the covered transaction
amount is equal to the amount of any
separate consideration paid by the
member bank for the affiliate's assets (if
any) plus the amount of any liabilities
assumed by the bank in the transaction.
The second method is where a
member bank acquires an affiliate by
merger. Because a merger with an
affiliate generally results in the member
bank acquiring all the assets of the
affiliate and assuming all the liabilities
of the affiliate, this transaction is
effectively equivalent to the purchase
and assumption transaction described in
the previous paragraph. Accordingly,
the merger transaction also is treated as
a purchase of assets, and the covered
transaction amount is again equal to the
amount of any separate consideration
paid by the member bank for the
affiliate's assets (if any) plus the amount
of any liabilities assumed by the bank in
the transaction. 130
The third method involves the
contribution or sale of a controlling
block of an affiliate's shares to a member
bank. The Board previously has treated
these. transactions as a purchase of
assets covered by section 23A if the
member bank paid consideration for the
shares or the affiliate whose shares were
130 As noted above, section 223.3(dd) of the final
rule makes explicit the Board's view that these
merger transactions generally involve the purchase
of assets by a member bank from an affiliate.
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contributed to the member bank had
liabilities to any affiliate ofthe bank. 131
The proposed rule did not alter the
treatment of the first two types of
transaction described above. The
proposed rule did set forth, however, a
new treatment for the third type of
transaction. The proposed rule provided
that the acquisition by a member bank
of securities issued by a company that
was an affiliate of the bank before the
acquisition is treated as a purchase of
assets from an affiliate if (i) as a result
of the transaction, the company
becomes an operating subsidiary of the
bank; and (ii) the company has
liabilities, or the bank gives cash or any
other consideration in exchange for the
securities. The proposed rule also
provided that these transactions must be
valued initially at the sum of (i) the total
amount of consideration given by the
member bank in exchange for the
securities; and (ii) the total liabilities of
the company whose securities have
been acquired by the member bank. In
effect, the proposed rule required
member banks to treat such share
donations and purchases in the same
manner as if the member bank had
purchased the assets of the transferred
company at a purchase price equal to
the liabilities of the transferred
company (plus any separate
consideration paid by the bank for the
shares).
A number of commenters objected to
this approach. Many of them
complained that the approach would
prevent banks from efficiently
reorganizing their operations and,
therefore, would put BHCs at a
competitive disadvantage to other less
regulated companies. These commenters
also contended that the approach
ignores the reality of the corporate
limited liability shield.
Some of these commenters simply
asserted that the rule should not treat a
donation of shares as a covered
transaction because the bank is
obtaining an asset (shares) at no cost.
Other commenters offered a variety of
alternative formulas for valuing these
transactions. The principal alternatives
offered were to value these covered
transactions at (i) the purchase price
131 See, e.g., Letter dated June 11, 1999. from
Robert deY. Frierson, Associate Secretary of the
Board. to Mr. Robert L. Anderson. The Board
adopted this view of these internal reorganizations
principally because the transactions often were
motivated by funding problems at the transferred
affiliate or the member bank's parent holding
company and by a desire to use the bank's resources
to alleviate those funding needs. Soon after
consummating such reorganizations, bank funds
typically were used to pay down liabilities that the
transferred company had to the parent holding
company of the member bank.
paid by the bank for the shares plus any
liabilities of the transferred company
minus the value of the assets of the
transferred company (as verified by an
independent third party); (ii) the
purchase price paid by the bank for the
shares; (iii) the GAAP net worth of the
transferred company; or (iv) the
purchase price paid by the bank for the
shares plus any liabilities owed by the
transferred company to affiliates of the
bank (staffs traditional approach).
For the following reasons, the Board
is adopting a valuation rule for these
transactions that is substantially
identical to the formula set forth in the
proposed rule.132 Regulation W's
treatment of these transactions is
consistent with the approach that
section 23A takes on subsidiaries of
member banks and with economic and
marketplace realities. Section 23A treats
member banks and their operating
subsidiaries as a single unit.
Transactions between a member bank
and its operating subsidiaries are not
treated as covered transactions between
a member bank and an affiliate under
section 23A; rather, they are treated as
transactions entirely inside the member
bank. Similarly, a transaction between a
member bank's operating subsidiary and
an affiliate of the member bank is
treated as a covered transaction between
the member bank itself and an affiliate
under section 23A. Ignoring the separate
corporate form of operating subsidiaries
of member banks and treating the assets
and liabilities of operating subsidiaries
of member banks as assets and liabilities
of the member bank itself is, therefore,
consistent with the structure of section
23A. Accordingly, under section 23A,
these share transfers in which an
affiliate of a member bank becomes an
operating subsidiary of the bank are
properly viewed as a purchase of an
affiliate's assets and an assumption of
an affiliate's liabilities by the bank. 133
132 The final rule differs from the proposed rule
in one small respect. The final rule explicitly
addresses situations in which the assets of the
transferred company include securities issued by an
affiliate. extensions of credit to an affiliate, or other
covered transactions. fn these situations, the final
rule clarifies that a member bank initially must
value these transactions at the greater of (i) the
purchase price paid by the bank for the shares of
the transferred company plus the total liabilities of
the transferred company; or (ii) the total value of
all covered transactions acquired by the bank as a
result of the transaction. For example. assume the
transferred company has $100 of assets ($25 of
which are loans to an affiliate) and $40 of liabilities.
Upon donation of the company's shares to the
member bank, the bank would have a $40 covered
transaction. If $45 of the transferred company's
assets are loans to an affiliate, however, the member
bank would have a $45 covered transaction upon
donation of the company's shares to the bank.
133 One commenter contended that the rule's
approach to these reorganization transactions
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Regulation W's treatment of affiliate
share transfers is also consistent with
the Board's supervisory experience, The
Board has found that banks often
operate their consolidated
organizations-because of capital
requirements, financial reporting
requirements, and reputational risk
concerns-as if the assets and liabilities
of subsidiaries were assets and
liabilities of the bank itself. Banks often
attempt to shore up their subsidiaries in
times of financial stress, despite the
limited liability inhering in the
corporate form. Accordingly, the rule
treats the assets and liabilities of an
operating subsidiary of a member bank
as assets and liabilities of the bank itself
for purposes of section 23A.134
The rule only imposes asset purchase
treatment on affiliate share transfers
where the company whose shares are
being transferred to the member bank
was an affiliate of the bank before the
transfer. If the transferred company
were not an affiliate before the transfer,
it would not be appropriate to treat the
share transfer as a purchase of assets
from an affiliate. Similarly, the rule
only requires asset purchase treatment
for affiliate share transfers where the
transferred company becomes a
subsidiary and not an affiliate of the
member bank through the transfer. If the
transferred company were not a
subsidiary of the member bank after the
transfer (because, for example, the bank
acquired less than 25 percent of a class
of voting securities ofthe company) or
if the company were an affiliate ofthe
member bank after the transfer (because,
for example, the bank's holding
company continued to own 25 percent
or more of a class of voting securities of
the company or because the company
became a financial subsidiary of the
bank after the transfer), the Board does
not believe it would be appropriate to
treat the liabilities of the company as
the liabilities of the bank for purposes
of section 23A. In those circumstances,
section 23A would not treat the member
bank and the transferred company as a
single unit.
unfair!y counts 100 percent of the liabilities of the
transferred company even if only 25 percent of the
shares of the company are transferred. As noted
above, this outcome is consistent with the structure
of section 23A, which treats 25-percent-owned
operating subsidiaries as part of the member bank
itself.
134 Because a member bank usually can merge a
subsidiary into itself, transferring all the shares of
an affiliate to a member bank often is functionally
equivalent to a transaction in which the bank
direct!y acquires the assets and assumes the
liabilities of the affiliate. As noted above, in a direct
acquisition of assets and assumption of liabilities,
the covered transaction amount would be equal to
the total amount of liabilities assumed by the
member bank.
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One commenter speculated that this
approach to affiliate share transfers
would create an eternal covered
transaction. Under the rule, affiliate
share transfers are deemed to be an asset
purchase by the member bank from an
affiliate and would diminish over time
in the same manner as any other asset
purchase. That is, the amount of the
covered transaction would decline over
time as the assets of the transferred
company were sold or amortized. The
amount of the covered transaction
would not decline over time, however,
as the member bank paid off the
liabilities ofthe transferred company. A
valuation example in the final rule will
help to explain how the covered
transaction amount of these affiliate
share transfers winds down over time.
Another commenter asked the Board
to clarify that a BHC could reduce the
covered transaction amount for an
affiliate share transfer by making a cash
contribution to the transferee bank in
the amount of the liabilities of the
transferred company. The Board agrees
that an affiliate share transfer would not
be a covered transaction if, in addition
to receiving the affiliate shares, the
transferee member bank received a cash
contribution equal to the amount of the
liabilities of the transferred company. In
this situation, the member bank should
not be deemed to have "purchased" the
assets of the transferred company.
The Board notes that a member bank
that proposes to purchase assets from an
affiliate as part of an internal corporate
reorganization of a banking organization
(including in a transaction that is
treated as a purchase of assets under
section 223.31 of the rule) may qualify
for a regulatory or case-by-case
exemption from section 23A. Section
223.41(d) ofthe final rule sets forth a
general regulatory exemption for these
covered transactions, and part VII.C. of
this preamble discusses both the general
regulatory exemption and the Board's
practice of granting case-by-case
exemptions for these covered
transactions. In addition, section
223.31(d) of the final rule, which is
discussed in the following section of the
preamble, provides an exemption for
certain step transactions that are treated
as asset purchases under section
223.31(a) of the rule.
2. Step Transaction Exemption
(§223.31(d-e))
The proposed regulation also
contained a regulatory exemption for
certain merger and acquisition
transactions that result in the transfer of
an affiliate to a member bank. Section
223.3l(d) of the proposed rule provided
an exemption from the requirements of
section 23A (other than the safety and
soundness requirement) for transactions
in which, for example, a BHC acquires
the stock of an unaffiliated company
and, immediately after consummation of
the acquisition, transfers the shares of
the acquired company to the holding
company's subsidiary member bank.
Although these transactions technically
would be treated as an asset purchase by
a member bank from an affiliate-and
the member bank would be required to
value the covered transaction at the total
amount of the liabilities of the acquired
company (plus any separate
consideration paid by the bank for the
company)-the Board believed that it
would be inappropriate to require a
member bank to count these
transactions toward its section 23A
quantitative limits. If the member bank
had acquired the target company
directly, there would have been no
covered transaction, and the mere fact
that the bank's holding company owned
the target company for a moment in
time does not change the fundamental
nature of the transaction.
Consequently, the proposed
regulation exempted these "step"
transactions under certain conditions.
First, the member bank had to acquire
the target company immediately after
the company became an affiliate (by
being acquired by the bank's holding
company. for example). Second, the
member bank had to acquire the entire
ownership position in the target
company that its holding company
acquired. Finally, the entire transaction
had to comply with the market terms
requirement of section 23B.
Many commenters objected to the
immediate transfer requirement, mostly
on the basis that a BHC may want to
hold the target company at the holding
company level for some time for tax,
business line integration, or regulatory
approval reasons. Some commenters
advised that the immediate transfer
requirement could be replaced with a
requirement that the target company be
acquired by the BHC "in contemplation
of' being put under the bank. Other
commenters recommended that the
immediate transfer requirement be
replaced with a 3-month, 6-month, or 1-
year requirement.
As noted in the preamble to the
proposed rule, to the extent that the
member bank acquires the target
company some time after the company
becomes an affiliate, the transaction
looks less like a single transaction in
which the bank acquires the target
company and more like two separate
transactions, the latter of which
involves the bank acquiring assets from
an affiliate. Nevertheless, in order to
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provide banking organizations with a
reasonable amount of time to address
legal, tax, and business issues relating to
an acquisition, the Board has decided to
permit member banks to avail
themselves of the step transaction
exemption if they acquire the target
company within three months after the
target company becomes an affiliate (so
long as the appropriate Federal banking
agency for the bank has approved the
longer time period). To protect the
transferee member bank from a decline
in the financial condition or asset
quality of the target company during the
time that the acquired company is an
affiliate of the bank, the final rule adds
two conditions to the applicability of
the step transaction exemption. First, a
member bank must notify its
appropriate Federal banking agency and
the Board. at or before the time that the
target company becomes an affiliate of
the bank, of its intent ultimately to
acquire the target company. Second.
there must be no material change in the
business or financial condition of the
target company during the time between
when the company becomes an affiliate
of the member bank and the bank's
receipt of the company.
Several commenters also objected to
the "bank must acquire all ofthe target
company" requirement. These
commenters alleged that there are
legitimate business, regulatory, and tax
reasons to distribute a target company's
assets and subsidiaries to various bank
and nonbank subsidiaries of the holding
company. Some of these commenters
advocated replacing the 100 percent
requirement with a 25-50 percent
requirement. The Board has decided to
keep the 100 percent requirement in
order to prevent a holding company
from keeping the good subsidiaries of
the target company and transferring the
bad subsidiaries of the target company
to the holding company's subsidiary
member bank.
Of course, if a banking organization
fails to meet the terms of the step
transaction exemption, the organization
may be able to satisfy the conditions of
Regulation W's internal corporate
reorganization exemption or may be
able to obtain a case-by-case exemption
from the Board.
B. Financial Subsidiaries (§ 223.32)
As noted above, the GLB Act
amended section 23A to treat a financial
subsidiary of a bank as an affiliate of the
bank and to establish several special
rules that apply to transactions with
financial subsidiaries. The regulation
combines all of the special rules that
apply to transactions with financial
subsidiaries in a single section.
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1. Applicability of the 10 Percent
Quantitative Limit to Transactions With
a Financial Subsidiary (§ 223.32(a))
First, consistent with the GLB Act, the
regulation provides that the 10 percent
quantitative limit in section 23A does
not apply with respect to covered
transactions between a member bank
and any individual financial subsidiary
of the bank. Accordingly, a member
bank's aggregate amount of covered
transactions with any individual
financial subsidiary of the bank may
exceed 10 percent of the bank's capital
stock and surplus.135 A member bank's
covered transactions with its financial
subsidiaries, however, are subject to the
20 percent quantitative limit in section
23A. T~us, a member bank may not
engage m a covered transaction with
any affiliate (including a financial
subsidiary) if the bank's aggregate
amount of covered transactions with all
affiliates (including financial
subsidiaries) would exceed 20 percent
of the bank's capital stock and surplus.
The Board notes that the exemption
from the 10 percent limit for
investments by a member bank in its
0w:n financial subsidiary does not apply
to mvestments by a member bank in the
financial subsidiary of an affiliated
~eposi.tory ins.ti~ution. Although the
fmanclal subSidiary of an affiliated
depository institution is an affiliate of
the ~ember bank for purposes of
sechons 23A and 23B, the GLB Act
states that only "covered transactions
~etwe~n a bank and any individual
fmanclal subsidiary of the bank" are not
subject to the 10 percent limit in section
23A.136 Accordingly, a member bank
may not engage in a covered transaction
wit~ the financial subsidiary of an
affihated depository institution ifthe
aggregate amount of the member bank's
covered transactions with that financial
subsidiary would exceed 10 percent of
the bank's capital stock and surplus.
2. Valuation of Investments in Securities
Issued by a Financial Subsidiary
(§ 223.32(bJ)
Because financial subsidiaries of a
member bank are considered affiliates of
the bank for purposes of section 23A, a
member bank's purchases of and
investments in the securities of its
financial subsidiary are covered
transactions under the statute. The GLB
Act further provides that a member
bank's investment in its own financial
1:15 As noted above, in response to the request of
a c~mmenler, section 223.11 of the Unal rule also
mdlcates that covered transactions between a
member bank and its financial subsidiary are
exempt from the 10 percent limit.
136 12 U.S.C. 371c(e](3](A) (emphasis added).
subsidiary, for purposes of section 23A,
shall not mclude the retained earnings
of.the financial subsidiary.137 In light of
thIS statutory provision, the regulation
contains a special valuation rule for
investments by a member bank in the
securities of its own financial
subsidiary.13B Such investments must be
valued at the greater of (i) the price paid
by the member bank for the securities'
or (ii) the carrying value of the securit'ies
on the financial statements of the
member bank (determined in
accordance with GAAP but without
reflecting the bank's pro rata share of
any earnings retained or losses incurred
by the financial subsidiary after the
bank:s acquis~tion of the securities),139
ThiS valuatIOn rule differs from the
general valuation rule for investments in
securities issued by an affiliate only in
that ~he financial subsidiary rule
reqUIres, consistent with the GLB Act
that the carrying value of the investm~nt
be computed without consideration of
the retained earnings or losses of the
financial subsidiary since the time of
the member bank's investment. As a
result of this rule, the covered
transaction amount for a member bank's
investment in securities issued by its
~inancial subs~diary generally would not
lllcrease after It was made except in the
event that the member bank made an
additional capital contribution to the
subsidiary or purchased additional
securities of the subsidiary.
The regulation provides several
examples designed to assist member
banks in valuing investments in
securities issued by a financial
subsidiary.
One commenter criticized this
valuation rule and asserted that a
donation of shares of a financial
subsidiary to a bank should never have
a section 23A value. For the reasons
discussed above in part V.C. of this
preamble, the Board does not believe
that such an approach to valuation
would be consistent with the purposes
and structure of section 23A.
137GLB Act § 121(b](1) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
371c(e)(3)(B)).
138 Consistent with the GLB Act. the special
valuatiOn formula in Regulation W for investments
by a member bank in its own financial subsidiary
~oes ?ot a!:,ply to investments by a member bank
m afmanclal subsidiary of an affiliated depository
lllstltutiOn. Such i.nvestments must be valued using
the general valuatiOn formula set forth in section
223.23 of the final rule for investments in securities
Iss\,ed by an afnliate and, further, may trigger the
antl-evasiOn rule contained in section 223.32(c)(1)
of the rule.
'''"The regulation also makes clear that if a
financial subsidiary is consolidated with its parent
member ?ank under GAAP. the carrying value of
the bank s lllvestment in the financial subsidiary
shall be determined based on parent-only financial
statements of the bank.
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3. Anti-Evasion Rules (§ 223.32(c))
Section 23A generally applies only to
transactions between a member bank
and an affiliate of the bank and
transactions between a member bank
and a third party where some benefit of
the transaction accrues to an affiliate of
the bank. The statute generally does not
apply to transactions between two
affiliates. The GLB Act establishes two
special anti-evasion rules, however, that
govern transactions between a financial
subsidiary of a member bank and
another affiliate of the bank. 140 First, the
GL.B Act provi~es that any purchase of,
or lllvestment lil, securities issued by a
membe: bank's financial subsidiary by
an affihate of the bank will be deemed
to be a purchase of, or investment in
such securities by the bank itself. '
Second, the GLB Act authorizes the
Board to deem an extension of credit
made by a member bank's affiliate to
any financial subsidiary of the bank to
be an extension of credit by the bank to
the financial subsidiary, if the Board
determine~ that such action is necessary
or appropnate to prevent evasions of the
Federal Reserve Act or the GLB Act. The
regulation incorporates both of these
provisions.
In the proposed regulation, the Board
exercised its authority under the second
anti-evasion rule by stating that an
extension of credit to a financial
subsidiary of a member bank by an
affiliate of the bank would be treated as
an extension of credit by the bank itself
to the ~inancial subsidiary if the
extensIOn of credit is treated as
regulatory capital of the financial
subsidiary. An example of the kind of
cred~t ~xtensioncovered by this
provISIOn would be a subordinated loan
to a financial subsidiary that is a
securities broker-dealer where the loan
is treated as capital of the subsidiary
under the SEC's net capital rules.
Although several commenters opposed
this provision of the proposed rule, and
argued that it would impede a BHC's
ability to serve as a source of strength
for a subsidiary bank, the Board has
~ecided to retain this provision in the
fmal rule. The Board believes that
treating such an extension of credit as
a covered transaction is appropriate
because the extension of credit by the
affiliate has a similar effect on the
sub~idi.ary's regulatory capital as an
~qUlty lilvestment by the affiliate, which
IS treated as a covered transaction by the
terms of the GLB Act (as described
above). The Board notes that the final
rule generally does not prevent a BHC
14°GLB Act § 121(b](1) (codified at 12 USC
371c(e](4)). . ..
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or other affiliate of a member bank from
providing financial support to a
financial subsidiary of the bank in the
form of a senior or secured loan.
One commenter asked the Board to
determine that loans from an affiliate to
a financial subsidiary of a member bank
that count as regulatory capital of the
financial subsidiary are treated as
investments in the equity securities of
an affiliate rather than loans to an
affiliate, or to otherwise exempt such
transactions from the collateral
requirements of section 23A. According
to this commenter, such a determination
would be consistent with the reason for
extending the GLB Act's anti-evasion
principle to cover these loans-that the
loans are equivalent to equity
investments. The Board disagrees with
this comment and believes that such
loans by an affiliate to a member bank's
financial subsidiary should be treated,
consistent with the GLB Act's anti-
evasion provisions, as if they were made
by the member bank itself. If the
member bank itself had made a
subordinated loan counting as
regulatory capital to its financial
subsidiary, the loan would be subject to
the quantitative limits and collateral
requirements of section 23A as an
extension of credit. Accordingly, under
the final rule, such a loan by an affiliate
of the member bank to the financial
subsidiary also would be subject to the
quantitative limits and collateral
requirements of section 23A as an
extension of credit.
In addition, the proposed regulation
provided an exception to the anti-
evasion rules for transactions between a
member bank's financial subsidiary and
another affiliate if the other affiliate
were itself a depository institution
subject to section 23A. The exception
would have avoided treating certain
transactions as covered transactions
both for the parent member bank of the
financial subsidiary and for the other
affiliated depository institution. After
further analysis, the Board has decided
to remove this proposed exception to
the anti-evasion rule because the
exception also would have allowed the
financial subsidiary of a member bank
to obtain funding from the entire
banking organization in amounts that
exceeded 20 percent of the parent
bank's capital and surplus. Congress
designed the anti-evasion rules to
prevent a bank from funding its
financial subsidiaries by paying
dividends to its parent and having its
parent, directly or indirectly, reinvest
the funds into the financial subsidiary
of the bank. The potential for such
"round-tripping" exists whether or not
the parent routes such funding flows to
a subsidiary bank's financial subsidiary
through a sister depository institution of
the bank.
The Board may find certain other
extensions of credit by an affiliate to a
financial subsidiary to be covered
transactions under section 23A on a
case-by-case basis.
C. Derivative Transactions (§ 223.33)
1. Background
Derivative transactions between a
bank and its affiliates generally arise
either from the risk management needs
of the bank or the affiliate. Transactions
ar~sing from the bank's needs typically
anse when a bank enters into a swap or
other derivative contract with a
customer but chooses not to hedge
directly the market risk generated by the
deri~ativ~contract or is unable to hedge
the nsk dIrectly because the bank is not
authorized to hold the hedging asset. In
order to manage the market risk, the
bank may have an affiliate acquire the
hedging asset. The bank would then do
a "bridging" derivative transaction
between itself and the affiliate
maintaining the hedge.
Other derivative transactions between
a bank and its affiliate are affiliate-
driven. A bank's affiliate may enter into
an interest-rate or foreign-exchange
derivative with the bank in order to
accomplish the asset-liability
management goals of the affiliate. For
example, a SHC may hold a substantial
amount of floating-rate assets but issue
fixed-rate debt securities to obtain
cheaper funding. The BHC may then
enter into a fixed-to-floating interest-rate
swap with its subsidiary bank to reduce
the holding company's interest-rate risk.
Banks and their affiliates that seek to
enter into derivative transactions for
hedging (or risk-taking) purposes could
enter into the desired derivatives with
unaffiliated companies. Banks and their
affiliates often choose to use each other
as their derivative counterparties,
however, in order to maximize the
profits of and manage risks within the
consolidated financial group.
2. Actions Already Taken by the Board
As noted above, the GLB Act required
the Board to adopt, by May 12, 2001, a
final rule to address as covered
transactions under section 23A the
credit exposure arising from derivative
transactions between member banks and
their affiliates ("bank-affiliate
derivatives").141 Determining the
141 At the time of enactment of the GLB Act. the
Board had not ruled on whether derivatives
between a member bank and an affiliate were
covered transactions under section 23A or subject
to the market terms requirement of section 23B.
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appropriate treatment for bank-affiliate
derivatives under section 23A is a
complex and important endeavor. In
light of the complexities of the subject
matter and in light of the statutory
deadline in the GLB Act, the Board took
the following two steps on May 11,
2001, to address under section 23A the
credit exposure arising from bank-
affiliate derivatives.
First, the Board published an interim
final rule (concurrently with proposed
Regulation W) that subjected bank-
affiliate derivatives to the market terms
requirement of section 23B.
Accordingly, the interim rule required
each member bank to (i) have in place
credi~ ~imits on its derivatives exposure
to affIliates that are at least as strict as
the credit limits the bank imposes on
unaffiliated companies that are engaged
in similar businesses and are
substantially equivalent in size and
credit quality; (ii) monitor derivatives
exposure to affiliates in a manner that
is at least as rigorous as it uses to
monitor derivatives exposure to
comparable unaffiliated companies; and
(iii) price, and require collateral in,
derivative transactions with affiliates in
a way that is at least as favorable to the
bank as the way the bank prices, or
requires collateral in, derivatives with
compa~able.unaffiliated companies.
The mtenm rule also required, under
section 23A, that a member bank
establish and maintain policies and
procedures reasonably designed to
manage the credit exposure arising from
the bank's derivative transactions with
affiliates. The policies and procedures,
at a minimum, had to provide for
monitoring and controlling the credit
exposure arising from the member
bank's derivative transactions with
affiliates and ensuring that the bank's
derivative transactions with affiliates
complied with section 23B. The interim
final rule had a delayed effective date of
January 1, 2002.
The second step that the Board took
to address credit exposure on bank-
affiliate derivatives under section 23A
was to ask for public comment in the
preamble to proposed Regulation W on
a set of questions regarding the
appropriate treatment of these
transactions under section 23A,
including whether to subject the
transactions to the quantitative limits
and collateral requirements of the
statute. The preamble made clear that
the Board would not take additional
steps to address bank-affiliate
Although industry practice generally treated bank-
~filiate derivatives as subject to section 238,
mdustry practice did not treat bank-affiliate
derivatives as subject to section 23A.
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derivatives without seeking further
public comment on a concrete proposal.
3. Public Comments
About 16 commenters wrote in
support of the interim rule approach to
bank-affiliate derivatives. One
commenter argued, however, that the
interim rule was ineffective and
insufficiently detailed to satisfy the GLB
Act requirement that the Board issue a
final rule addressing bank-affiliate
derivatives as covered transactions.
Another commenter objected to the
interim rule on a different ground,
arguing that, as long as a BRC manages
derivatives credit risk effectively, each
subsidiary bank of the BRC should not
be required to have separate policies
and procedures on bank-affiliate
derivatives.
Commenters uniformly argued against
subjecting bank-affiliate derivatives to
the quantitative limits and collateral
requirements of section 23A. The
principal arguments advanced by
commenters were that (i) derivatives do
not fit within any of the five categories
of covered transaction in section 23A;
(ii) section 23B and the well-developed
risk management practices in the
institutional derivatives market are
sufficient protection to banks; (iii)
derivatives generally are not entered
into for funding purposes; and (iv)
covering derivatives under section 23A
would be burdensome and may reduce
the ability of a banking organization to
centralize its risk management in the
unites) best able to bear the risk.
4. Current Actions
The Board is not prepared at this time
to subject credit exposure arising from
bank-affiliate derivatives to all the
requirements of section 23A. The Board
continues to collect information
regarding the derivatives practices of
banks and believes that more time is
needed to determine whether the
general approach of the interim rule on
bank-affiliate derivatives will suffice to
prevent banks from incurring
problematic levels of credit exposure to
affiliates in these transactions.
Federal Reserve examiners recently
conducted a limited survey of a number
of large banking organizations to
ascertain their compliance with the
Board's interim rule on bank-affiliate
derivatives. 142 The survey suggested
that reliance on bank-designed policies
and procedures, section 23B, and active
examiner supervision to regulate bank-
14' Federal Reserve examiners also surveyed these
same banking organizations to assess their
compliance with the Board's interim rule on
intraday credit. The results of this survey are
discussed below in part VII.L. of this preamble.
affiliate derivatives is appropriate and
should be continued. The Board expects
member banks to comply strictly with
section 23B in their derivative
transactions with affiliates. In this
regard, the Board reminds member
banks that section 23B requires a
member bank to treat an affiliate no
better than a similarly situated
nonaffiliate. Section 23B generally does
not allow a member bank to use with an
affiliate the terms and conditions it uses
with its most creditworthy unaffiliated
customer (unless the bank can
demonstrate that the affiliate is of
comparable creditworthiness as the
bank's most creditworthy unaffiliated
customer). Instead, section 23B requires
that an affiliate be treated comparably
(with respect to terms, conditions, and
credit limits) to the majority of third-
party customers engaged in the same
business, and having comparable credit
quality and size, as the affiliate. Because
a bank generally has the strongest credit
rating within a holding company, the
Board generally would not expect an
affiliate to obtain better terms and
conditions from a member bank than the
member bank receives from its major
unaffiliated counterparties. In addition,
the Board notes that market terms for
derivatives among major financial
institutions generally include daily
marks to market and two-way
collateralization above a relatively small
exposure threshold.
The Board also is taking two
additional regulatory steps at this time
to address bank-affiliate derivatives.
a. Covering derivatives that are the
functional equivalent of a guarantee.
First, the Board is incorporating into
Regulation W the Board's previously
expressed view that credit derivatives
between a member bank and a
nonaffiliate in which the bank protects
the nonaffiliate from a default on, or
decline in value of, an obligation of an
affiliate of the bank are covered
transactions under section 23A. In the
preamble to proposed Regulation W, the
Board stated that such derivative
transactions are guarantees by a member
bank on behalf of an affiliate (and,
hence, covered transactions) under
section 23A.
A number of commenters discussed
the appropriate treatment of these
derivatives under section 23A. A few
commenters supported treating these
derivatives as a guarantee on behalf of
an affiliate under section 23A. Several
other commenters argued that the Board
should not treat these derivatives as
section 23A guarantees if the bank has
hedged its exposure to the affiliate with
a third party. Some commenters also
expressed the view that the rule should
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not treat these derivatives as section
23A guarantees if the affiliate's
obligations represent a small portion of
the reference assets for the credit
derivative.
The final Regulation W provides that
these credit derivatives are covered
transactions under section 23A and
gives several examples,143 Consistent
with the Board's traditional views on
hedging under section 23A, the rule
does not allow a member bank to reduce
its covered transaction amount for these
derivatives to reflect hedging positions
established by the bank with third
parties. In addition, the Board does not
agree with commenters that an
exception to the rule should be created
for a credit derivative in which affiliate
obligations represent a small portion of
the reference assets underlying the
credit derivative. The Board intends to
interpret this provision of the rule,
however, so as to treat such a credit
derivative as a covered transaction only
to the extent that the derivative provides
credit protection with respect to
obligations of an affiliate of the member
bank.
b. Including the interim rule in
Regulation W. Second, in order to
consolidate all the Board's views on
sections 23A and 23B into one place,
the Board is incorporating the
provisions of the separate interim final
rule on bank-affiliate derivatives into
Regulation W. Under Regulation W,
therefore, each member bank that
engages in bank-affiliate derivatives
must (i) have policies and procedures to
monitor and control the bank's credit
exposure to affiliates in derivative
transactions (including by imposing
appropriate credit limits, mark-to-
market requirements, and collateral
requirements); and (ii) ensure that its
derivative transactions with affiliates
comply with section 23B.
5. Future Actions
The Board expects to issue, in the
near future, a proposed rule that would
invite public comment on how to treat
as covered transactions under section
23A certain derivatives that are the
functional equivalent of a loan by a
member bank to an affiliate or the
functional equivalent of an asset
purchase by a member bank from an
affiliate. Although the Board has not yet
adopted a rule that explicitly addresses
these types of derivatives under section
23A, the Board will treat as a covered
transaction, as appropriate on a case-by-
case basis, any derivative between a
143 In most instances, the covered transaction
amount for such a credit derivative would be the
notional principal amount of the derivative.
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member bank and an affiliate that is
entered into for the purpose of evading
the requirements of section 23A.
VII. Exemptions-Subpart E
Section 23A exempts several types of
transactions from the statute's
quantitative and collateral requirements
and other types of transactions from the
statute's quantitative, collateral, and
low-quality asset requirements.144 The
regulation sets forth the statutory
exemptions, clarifies certain of these
exemptions, and exempts a number of
additional types of transactions. The
clarifications and additional exemptions
are discussed below.
The Board reserves the right to revoke
or modify any additional exemption
granted by the Board in Regulation W if
the Board finds that the exemption is
resulting in unsafe or unsound banking
practices. The Board also reserves the
right to terminate the eligibility of a
particular member bank to use any such
exemption if the bank's use of the
exemption is resulting in unsafe or
unsound banking practices.
A. Sister-Bank Exemption (§ 223.41(a)
and (b))
Section 23A(d)(1) exempts any
transaction between a member bank and
a "bank" if the member bank controls 80
percent or more of the voting securities
of the bank, the bank controls 80
percent or more of the voting securities
of the member bank, or a company
controls 80 percent or more of the
voting securities of both the member
bank and the bank. 145 Section 23A
states that the term "bank" includes
"any State bank, national bank, banking
association, and trust company," and
other Federal law provides that an
insured savings association should be
treated as a "bank" for purposes of the
sister-bank exemption. 146 Section 23A
also provides the Board with authority
to issue definitions consistent with the
section as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of the section and to
prevent evasions thereof.147 In addition,
the statute provides that covered
transactions between sister banks must
be consistent with safe and sound
banking practices. 148
The proposed rule clarified that the
sister-bank exemption generally applies
144 12 U.S.c. 371c{d).
145 The sister-bank exemption in section 23A does
not allow a member bank to avoid any restrictions
on sister-bank transactions that may apply to the
bank under the prompt corrective action framework
set forth in section 38 ofthe FDI Act (12 U.S.c.
18310) and regulations adopted thereunder by the
bank's appropriate Federal banking agency.
146 12 U.S.C. 371c{b){5). 1468{a){2).
147 12 U.S.C. 371c(f)(l).
148 12 U.S.c. 371c(aJ(4).
only to transactions between insured
depository institutions. Although one
commenter wrote in support of this
restriction of the sister-bank exemption,
many other commenters objected to this
action. The protestants argued that
restricting the sister-bank exemption to
insured depository institutions is
inconsistent with the statutory language
and the primary purpose behind the
exemption, which focused not on the
insured status of the sister depository
institutions but on the regulated status
of the institutions. In addition, several
of these commenters expressed the view
that the Board does not have rulemaking
authority to restrict the sister-bank
exemption to insured depository
institutions.
The final rule continues to restrict the
availability of the sister-bank exemption
to insured depository institutions.149 In
the view of the Board, this restriction is
consistent with the legislative intent
behind the exemption, which was to
permit the flow of funds from one
insured depository institution to
another insured depository institution.
In this regard, the Board notes that,
under the cross-guarantee provisions of
the FDI Act, an insured depository
institution is generally liable for any
loss incurred by the FDIC in connection
with the default of a commonly
controlled insured depository
institution. 15o Moreover, without such
an interpretation of the sister-bank
exemption, a member bank would be
able to engage in unlimited covered
transactions with certain uninsured
depository affiliates. Permitting a
member bank to provide an unlimited
amount of funding to an uninsured
depository affiliate would facilitate an
unsafe and unsound banking practice
and would contravene one of the
principal purposes of the statute-
protecting the deposit insurance funds
from loss.151
A number of commenters contended
that, if the final rule restricts the
149 For reasons of verbal economy, the final rule
uses the term "depository institution" rather than
"insured depository institution" to signify the set
of institutions eligible for the sister-bank exemption
{and for certain other purposes]. The final rule
defines "depository institution," however, to mean
an "insured depository institution" as defined in
the FDiAcl.
150 See 12 U.S.c. 1815(e].
151 As noted above, a member bank and its
operating subsidiaries are considered a single unit
for purposes of section 23A. Accordingly, under the
statute and the regulation, transactions between a
member bank (or its operating subsidiary] and the
operating subsidiary of a sister insured depository
institution generally qualify for the sister-bank
exemption. A few commenters suggested that the
proposed rule was ambiguous on this point. The
Board has amended the final rule's definition of
"depository institution" to eliminate any such
ambiguity.
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availability of the sister-bank exemption
to insured depository institutions, the
rule also should confirm that an
uninsured depository institution
subsidiary of a member bank would be
considered an operating subsidiary (and
not an affiliate) of the bank. According
to these commenters, there is no
compelling reason under section 23A to
treat an uninsured depository
institution subsidiary of a member bank
any differently than other uninsured
subsidiaries (for example, mortgage
lending or investment advisory
subsidiaries) of the bank. The Board
agrees with this position and has
revised the rule's definition of affiliate
generally to exclude uninsured
depository institution subsidiaries of a
member bank. Accordingly, under the
final rule, covered transactions between
a member bank and a parent uninsured
depository institution or a commonly
controlled uninsured depository
institution generally would be subject to
section 23A whereas covered
transactions between a member bank
and a subsidiary uninsured depository
institution would not be subject to
section 23A.
B. Purchases of Loans on a Nonrecourse
Basis (§ 223.41(c))
Under section 23A(d)(6), a member
bank may purchase loans on a
nonrecourse basis from an affiliated
"bank" exempt from section 23A, even
ifthe transaction does not qualify for
the sister-bank exemption.152 The rule
clarifies that the scope of this exemption
parallels that of the sister-bank
exemption by stating that this
exemption applies only to a member
bank's purchase of a loan from an
affiliated insured depository institution.
Section 23A(d)(6) also exempts the
purchase from an affiliate of assets that
have a readily identifiable market
quotation. This exemption is set forth
separately in the regulation for purposes
of clarity and is discussed in detail
below in part VII.F. of this preamble.
C. Internal Corporate Reorganizations
(§ 223.41(d))
The Board has granted numerous
section 23A exemptions, on a case-by-
case basis, for asset purchases by a bank
from an affiliate that are part of a one-
time internal corporate reorganization of
a banking organization. 153 The Board
typically has approved such exemptions
only if certain conditions are met,
including (i) the bank's parent holding
152 12 u.s.c. 371c{dJ(6).
15'See. e.g., Travelers Graup Inc. and Citicorp, 84
Federal Reserve Bulletin 985, 1013-14 (1998) and
Letter dated November 14, 1996, from William W.
Wiles, Secretary of the Board, to John Byam.
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company provides certain assurances
concerning the quality of the transferred
assets; (H) the disinterested directors of
the bank approve the transaction in
advance; (Hi) the transfer does not
include any low-quality assets; and (iv)
the bank's appropriate Federal banking
agency and the FDIC inform the Board
that they have no objection to the
transaction.
Several commenters requested that
the Board include such an exemption in
the final rule, and the Board has done
so. Under this exemption, a member
bank would be permitted to purchase
assets (other than low-quality assets)
from an affiliate (including in
connection with an affiliate share
transfer that section 223.31 of the rule
treats as a purchase of assets) exempt
from the quantitative limits of section
23A if the following conditions are met.
First, the asset purchase must be part
of an internal corporate reorganization
of a holding company that involves the
transfer of all or substantially all of the
shares or assets of an affiliate or of a
division or department of an affiliate.
Stated another way, the asset purchase
must not be part of a series of periodic,
ordinary course asset transfers from an
affiliate to a member bank. Second, the
member bank's holding company must
provide the Board with
contemporaneous notice of the
transaction and must commit to the
Board to make the bank whole, for a
period of two years, for any transferred
assets that become low-quality assets.1S4
Third, a majority of the member bank's
directors must review and approve the
transaction before consummation.
Fourth, the section 23A value of the
covered transaction must be less than 10
percent of the member bank's capital
stock and surplus (or up to 25 percent
of the bank's capital stock and surplus
with the prior approval of the bank's
appropriate Federal banking agency).
Fifth, the member bank's holding
company and all its subsidiary
depository institutions must be well
capitalized and well managed and must
remain well capitalized upon
consummation of the transaction.
Although these criteria are stricter
than what the Board traditionally has
applied in connection with its case-by-
case exemptions for asset purchases, the
heightened strictness is appropriate in
exchange for the flexibility that the
regulatory exemption grants member
banks. Although the regulatory
exemption would limit the Board's
154 The notice also must describe the primary
business activities of the affiliate whose shares or
assets are being transferred to the member bank and
must indicate the anticipated date of the
reorganization.
opportunity to block certain internal
reorganizations of a banking company
based on an ad hoc analysis of the
condition of the bank or the nature or
quality of the assets being transferred to
the bank, the Board believes that the
well-capitalized and well-managed
requirements, the two-year buyback
commitment, and the quantitative limit
in the rule should prevent banking
companies from abusing their banking
units in reorganization transactions.
D. Correspondent Banking (§ 223.42(a))
Section 23A exempts from its
quantitative limits and collateral
requirements any deposit by a member
bank in an affiliated bank or affiliated
foreign bank that is made in the
ordinary course of correspondent
business, subject to any restrictions that
the Board may impose.1ss The final rule
(like the proposed rule) further provides
that such deposits must represent
ongoing, working balances maintained
by the member bank in the ordinary
course of conducting the correspondent
business. Although one commenter
argued that the Board should eliminate
this regulatory "ongoing, working
balances" requirement, in the Board's
view, an occasional deposit in an
affiliated institution would not be in the
ordinary course of correspondent
business. Failure to impose this
restriction on the correspondent
banking exemption could enable
member banks to abuse the exemption
to provide one-off funding to an
affiliated bank or foreign bank.1s6
Although not required by section 23A
or HDLA, the final rule also provides
that correspondent deposits in an
affiliated insured savings association are
exempt if they otherwise meet the
requirements of the exemption.
E. Secured Credit Transactions
(§ 223.42(c))
Section 23A exempts any credit
transaction by a member bank with an
affiliate that is "fully secured" by U.S.
government obligations or by a
"segregated, earmarked" deposit
account,1S7 The rule clarifies that a
deposit account meets the "segregated,
earmarked" requirement only if the
account exists for the sole purpose of
securing credit transactions between the
155 12 U.S.C. 371c(d)(2).
156 Unlike the sister-bank exemption. the
exemption for correspondent banking deposits
would apply to deposits placed by a member bank
in an uninsured depository institution or foreign
bank. Because the statutory exemption by its terms
covers deposits made in a foreign bank. Congress
must not have intended to restrict this exemption
to deposits made in an insured depository
institution.
157 12 U.S.C. 371c(d)(4).
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member bank and its affiliates and is so
identified. This requirement would
parallel the provision in section
223.14(b)(I)(i)(D) of the rule relating to
which deposits count toward the
collateral requirements of section 23A.
A few commenters requested
confirmation that a credit transaction
partially secured by U.S. government
obligations or deposit accounts would
be exempt under this section to the
extent of such collateral. As noted
above, under section 23A, if U.S.
government obligations or deposit
accounts are sufficient to fully secure a
credit transaction, then the transaction
is completely exempt. Under the statute,
however, if the U.S. government
obligations or deposit accounts
represent less than full security for the
credit transaction, then the amount of
U.S. government obligations or deposits
counts toward the collateral
requirements of section 23A, but no part
of the transaction is exempt from the
statute's quantitative limits.
In response to the request of
commenters, the Board has decided to
grant an additional exemption
consistent with the spirit ofthe (d)(4)
exemption in section 23A. Under this
expanded form of the (d)(4) exemption,
a credit transaction with an affiliate will
be exempt "to the extent that the
transaction is and remains secured" by
appropriate (d)(4) collateral. This
exemption is consistent with the
Board's treatment of similar transactions
under Regulation 0 and the DCC's
interpretations of the national bank
lending limits.1s8
Accordingly, under the final rule, if a
member bank makes a $100 non-
amortizing term loan to an affiliate that
is secured by $50 of U.S. Treasury
securities and $75 of real estate, the
value of the covered transaction will be
$50. If the market value of the U.S.
Treasury securities falls to $45 during
the life of the loan, the value of the
covered transaction would increase to
$55. The Board expects member banks
that use this expanded (d)(4) exemption
to review the market value of their U.S.
government obligations collateral
regularly to ensure compliance with the
exemption.
F. Purchases of Assets With Readily
Identifiable Market Quotes (§ 223.42(e))
Section 23A(d)(6) exempts the
purchase of assets by a member bank
from an affiliate if the assets have a
"readily identifiable and publicly
available market quotation" and are
purchased at their current market
158 See 58 FR 26507-26508. May 4, 1993; 12 CFR
32.3(i).
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quotation.159 The Board generally has
limited the availability of this
exemption (the "(d)(6) exemption") to
purchases of assets with market prices
that are recorded in widely
disseminated publications that are
readily available to the general public,
such as newspapers with a national
circulation. Because as a general matter
only exchange-traded assets are
recorded in such publications, the test
has ensured that the qualifying assets
are traded actively enough to have a true
"market quotation" and that examiners
can verify that the assets are purchased
at their current market quotation.
Regulation W codifies this Board
interpretation of the (d)(6) exemption
and clarifies that the exemption applies
to a member bank's purchase from an
affiliate of an asset that has a readily
identifiable and publicly available
market quotation if the asset is
purchased at or below the asset's current
market quotation. 160
A number of commenters requested
that the Board clarify that certain assets
would be eligible for purchase by a
member bank under the statutory (d)(6)
exemption. These assets included (i)
assets whose prices are quoted on an
internet web site that is generally
available to the public (with or without
a subscription fee) and that provides
actual prices of securities traded on at
least a daily basis; (ii) securities issued
by an affiliate or at least affiliate-issued
securities that are fully guaranteed by
the U.S. government or its agencies; and
(iii) OTC securities, loans, and
derivative contracts.
With respect to the first asset class,
commenters have failed to demonstrate
that an asset whose price is quoted on
an internet web site but is not otherwise
recorded in a widely disseminated
publication is traded in a sufficiently
liquid market to ensure that a member
bank's purchase of that asset from its
affiliate would be at a fair market price.
With respect to the second asset class,
the Board has decided to remove the
provision of the proposed rule that
rendered the (d)(6) exemption
unavailable for purchases of affiliate-
issued securities. As discussed in more
detail in part X of this preamble (and
subpart H ofthe final rule), however, if
159 12 U.S.c. 371c(d)(6).
160 The proposed rule provided that all U.S.
government obligations were eligible (d)(6) assets.
The final rule provides that a U.S. government
obligation is an eligible (d)(6) asset only if the
obligation's price is quoted routinely in a widely
disseminated publication that is readily available to
the general public. The Board has tightened the rule
in this regard because. although all U.S. government
obligations have low credit risk. not all U.S.
government obligations trade in liquid markets at
publicly available market quotations.
a member bank purchases from one
affiliate securities issued by another
affiliate, the bank has engaged in two
types of covered transaction. Under the
final rule, although the (d)(6) exemption
may exempt the one-time asset purchase
from the first affiliate, it would not
exempt the ongoing investment in
securities issued by the second affiliate.
With respect to the third asset class,
the Board confirms that the (d)(6)
exemption may apply to a purchase of
assets that are not traded on an
exchange. In particular, purchases of
gold and silver, and purchases of OTC
securities, loans, and derivative
contracts whose prices are recorded in
widely disseminated publications, may
qualify for the (d)(6) exemption.
G. Purchases of Securities With a Ready
Market From a Securities Affiliate
(§ 223.42(f))
Concurrently with the issuance of
proposed Regulation W, the Board
adopted a final rule that provided an
additional exemption from section 23A
for certain purchases of securities by a
member bank from an affiliate (the
"Final (d)(6) Rule").161 The Final (d)(6)
Rule expanded the statutory (d)(6)
exemption to allow a member bank to
purchase securities from an affiliate
based on price quotes obtained from
certain electronic screens so long as,
among other things, the selling affiliate
is a broker-dealer registered with the
SEC; the securities are traded in a ready
market and eligible for purchase by
State member banks; the securities are
not purchased within 30 days of an
underwriting (if an affiliate of the bank
is an underwriter of the securities); and
the securities are not issued by an
affiliate. Proposed Regulation W also
contained this exemption, and the
Board sought further comment on the
scope and conditions of the exemption.
Commenters expressed general support
for the new exemption but criticized
many of the particular conditions to the
exemption.
1. Broker-Dealer Requirement
Some commenters believed that the
new (d)(6) exemption should not
contain a U.S. registered broker-dealer
requirement. Several other commenters
urged the Board, in light of the
increasing globalization of fixed-income
markets and the rigorous supervisory
frameworks for securities firms in many
foreign jurisdictions, to allow banks to
purchase securities from a registered
foreign broker-dealer under the new
(d)(6) exemption.
161 66 FR 24220. May 11. 2001.
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The Board has decided to retain the
U.S. registered broker-dealer
requirement. Broker-dealers that are
registered with the SEC are subject to
supervision and examination by the SEC
and are required by SEC regulations to
keep and maintain detailed records
concerning each securities transaction
conducted by the broker-dealer. In
addition, SEC-registered broker-dealers
have experience in determining whether
a security has a "ready market" under
SEC regulations. The Board believes that
these factors will help ensure that
member banks satisfy the requirements
of the expanded exemption and will
assist the Federal banking agencies in
monitoring such compliance.
The Board does not believe it is
appropriate at this time to expand the
exemption to include securities
purchases from foreign broker-dealers
because such entities may be subject to
different levels of supervision and
regulation and because of the increased
difficulties associated with monitoring
compliance by foreign entities. The final
rule explicitly provides, however, that a
member bank may request that the
Board exempt securities purchases from
a particular foreign broker-dealer, and
the Board would consider these requests
on a case-by-case basis in light of all the
facts and circumstances. In any event,
the Board expects to evaluate the
continued need for this requirement as
banks and the Board gain experience
with this expanded exemption.
2. Securities Eligible for Purchase by a
State Member Bank
A number of commenters asked the
Board to eliminate the requirement in
the new (d)(6) exemption that the
securities be eligible for purchase by a
State member bank. These commenters
noted that certain depository
institutions (notably State nonmember
banks) and certain overseas (for
example, Edge corporation) and
domestic subsidiaries of banks have
broader investment powers, including
equity investment powers, than State
member banks. Moreover, according to
these commenters, this requirement
would impose a high recordkeeping and
compliance burden on State nonmember
banks that are not subject to the State
member bank investment rules but are
already subject to a host of State and
Federal investment regulations.
The Board believes that the statutory
and other restrictions placed on a State
member bank's ownership of securities
also are appropriate limits on the
securities eligible for the new (d)(6)
exemption. Although this requirement
may impose some additional burden on
certain State nonmember banks, the
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Board believes that it is important to
provide a level section 23A playing field
and to prevent the new (d)(6) exemption
from being used to move volatile assets
from an affiliate's balance sheet to that
of the bank.
In addition, one commenter requested
clarification that this requirement
would not prevent a bank from using
the new (d)(6) exemption to purchase
securities permissible for a State
member bank to purchase and hold as
a hedge (even if not otherwise
permissible under a State member
bank's general investment powers). For
example, the OCC recently determined
that a national bank, subject to certain
conditions and OCC review and
approval, may acquire equity securities
solely for the purpose of hedging the
bank's exposure arising from customer-
driven equity derivative transactions
lawfully entered into by the bank.162
The Federal Reserve also recently
determined that it would not prohibit a
State member bank from acquiring
equity securities to hedge the bank's
customer-driven equity derivative
transactions, subject to the same
conditions and restrictions applicable to
national banks.163 In light of the
hedging purpose of these securities
purchases, and the remaining
conditions to the availability of the new
(d)(6) exemption, the Board agrees that
a member bank may purchase equity
securities from an affiliate under the
new (d)(6) exemption if the purchase is
made to hedge the bank's permissible
customer-driven equity derivative
transaction (and the purchase meets all
the other requirements of the
exemption).
3. No Purchases Within 30 Days of the
Underwriting
The Final (d)(6) Rule generally
prohibited a member bank from using
the new (d)(6) exemption to purchase
securities within 30 days of their
underwriting if an affiliate of the bank
is an underwriter of the securities. One
commenter argued that the new (d)(6)
exemption should allow banks to
purchase debt securities within 30 days
of the underwriting because the market
price of debt securities is easily
verifiable during this time period. A few
commenters argued that the new (d)(6)
exemption should allow banks to
purchase securities within 30 days of
the underwriting if the purchase is pre-
approved by the bank's board of
directors and does not amount to more
than 50 percent of the total offering.
162 See acc Interpretive Ltr. No. 892 (Sept. 13.
2000).
163 See Board press release dated Feb. 21, 2002.
The Board has maintained the
underwriting period restriction in the
final Regulation W because of the
uncertain and volatile market values of
securities during and shortly after an
underwriting period and because of the
conflicts of interest that may arise
during and after an underwriting period,
especially if an affiliate has difficulty
selling its allotment. Commenters did
not provide any evidence as to the
reliability of pricing data on debt
securities during an underwriting
period, and the Board is not convinced
that capping at 50 percent of the total
offering the amount of securities a
member bank may purchase would
materially ameliorate the conflicts of
interest inherent in the underwriting
process.
One commenter requested
clarification, in light of the fact that an
argument can be made that mutual
funds are continuously underwritten, as
to whether the new (d)(6) exemption
could apply to the purchase of mutual
fund shares distributed by an affiliate of
the purchasing member bank. The price
uncertainty and conflicts of interest
concerns that motivated the
underwriting period restriction in the
new (d)(6) exemption do not apply in
the context of mutual fund distribution.
The 1940 Act and SEC rules thereunder
require mutual funds to sell shares at a
public net asset value computed each
day,164 and distributors of mutual funds
do not bear the same sorts of market
risks that underwriters of corporate debt
and equity securities typically bear. In
view of the special nature of mutual
funds, the Board does not believe that
the underwriting period restriction in
the new (d)(6) exemption should be read
to prevent a member bank from
purchasing shares of a mutual fund
distributed by an affiliate of the bank.165
4. No Securities Issued by an Affiliate
Commenters generally supported
limiting the availability of the new
(d)(6) exemption to purchases of
securities that are not issued by an
affiliate. Several commenters argued,
however, that the new (d)(6) exemption
should allow banks to purchase affiliate-
issued asset-backed securities because
ofthe liquidity of the market for asset-
backed securities. One commenter
contended, on the other hand, that the
new (d)(6) exemption is not the right
164 15 V.S.c. 80a-22(c); 17 CFR 270.22c-1.
165 The Board notes that neither the old nor the
new (d)(6) exemption exempts a member bank's
purchase of mutual fund securities that are not only
underwritten by an affiliate of the bank but also are
issued by a mutual fund affiliate of the bank. See
part X of this preamble and § 223.71 of the final
rule.
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vehicle for allowing banks to buy
affiliate-issued asset-backed securities
because most of these securities do not
have a listed market price.
A number of commenters argued that
the new (d)(6) exemption should allow
banks to purchase affiliate-issued
mutual fund shares, especially if the
mutual fund is an affiliate simply
because the bank or an affiliate is the
advisor to the fund. These commenters
noted that mutual funds have public
prices, the SEC regulates mutual funds
and mutual fund pricing, and expanding
the ability of banks to purchase mutual
funds would enhance the ability of
banks to diversify their investment
portfolios.
Similar to the final rule's approach to
the statutory (d)(6) exemption, the
Board has decided to remove from the
new (d)(6) exemption the requirement
that the asset purchased not be a
security issued by an affiliate. The
Board notes, however, that if a member
bank purchases from one affiliate
securities issued by another affiliate,
although the new (d)(6) exemption may
exempt the asset purchase from the first
affiliate, it would not exempt the
investment in securities issued by the
second affiliate.
5. Price Verification Methods
The new (d)(6) exemption, as set forth
in the Final (d)(6) Rule, applied only in
situations where the member bank is
able to obtain price quotes on the
purchased securities from an
unaffiliated electronic, real-time pricing
service. Many commenters expressed a
view that the new (d)(6) exemption
should allow banks to purchase
securities based on price quotes from
two independent dealers. These
commenters made the following
principal arguments: (i) Independent
dealers have no incentive to quote an
artificial price; (ii) the Board has
determined that two dealer bids are an
acceptable pricing mechanism for
exempt purchases of municipal
securities; (iii) the SEC allows mutual
funds to purchase securities from an
affiliate at the lowest offer price from a
disinterested third party after a
reasonable inquiry by the mutual fund;
(iv) NASD rules require the use of dealer
quotes to price certain securities where
multiple quotes from an interdealer
quotation system are not available; (v)
dealer quotes are routinely used by
securities traders because some
seasoned corporate and mortgage-
backed securities are traded
infrequently; and (vi) dealer quotes are
used to establish the value of securities
for close-out and netting purposes in
ISDA derivatives master agreements.
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Notwithstanding these comments, the
Board reaffirms its previous conclusion
that it would not be appropriate to use
independent dealer quotations to
establish a market price for a security
under the new (d)(6) exemption. The
Board is concerned that a security that
is not quoted routinely in a widely
disseminated news source or a third-
party electronic financial network may
not trade in a sufficiently liquid market
to justify allowing a member bank to
purchase unlimited amounts of the
security from an affiliate. In the absence
of recent. actual, publicly reported
transactions. the risks of price
manipulations and sham or reciprocal
quotation arrangements are too high.
6. Record Retention
ane commenter suggested that the
final rule expressly include the 2-year
record retention requirement set forth in
the preamble to the Final (d)(6) Rule.
The Board has supplemented Regulation
W to include this recordkeeping
requirement.
H. Purchasing Municipal Securities
(§ 223.42(g))
Regulation W exempts a member
bank's purchase of municipal securities
from an affiliate if the purchase meets
a streamlined version of the
requirements applicable to the new
(d)(6) exemption. l66 First, as in the new
(d)(6) exemption, the member bank
must purchase the municipal securities
from a broker-dealer affiliate that is
registered with the SEC. Second. also as
in the new (d)(6) exemption. the
municipal securities must be eligible for
purchase by a State member bank, and
the member bank must report the
transaction as a securities purchase in
its Call Report. Third, the municipal
securities must either be rated by a
nationally recognized statistical rating
organization or must be part of an issue
of securities that does not exceed $25
million in size. Finally, the price for the
securities purchased must be (il quoted
routinely on an unaffiliated electronic
service that provides indicative data
from real-time financial networks; (ii)
verified by reference to two or more
actual independent dealer quotes on the
securities to be purchased or securities
that are comparable to the securities to
be purchased; or (iii) in the case of
securities purchased during the
166 The regulation defines municipal securities by
reference to section 3(a)(29) of the Securities
Exchange Act, which defines municipal securities
as direct obligations of, or obligations guaranteed as
to principal or interest by. a State or agency,
instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof,
and certain tax-exempt industrial development
bonds. See 17 U.S.c. 78c(a)(29).
underwriting period, verified by
reference to the price indicated in the
syndicate manager's written summary of
the underwriting.167 Under any of the
three pricing options. the member bank
must purchase the municipal securities
at or below the quoted or verified price.
The Board believes that the
streamlined set of requirements for
purchases of municipal securities is
appropriate because municipal
obligations generally have
comparatively low default risks. In
addition. these relaxed requirements are
consistent with the expressed desire of
Congress to support local communities'
use of municipal securities to help meet
their financing needs.
I. Purchases of Assets by Newly Formed
Banks (§ 223.42(i))
The rule exempts a purchase of assets
by a newly chartered member bank from
an affiliate if the appropriate Federal
banking agency for the bank has
approved the purchase. This exemption
would allow companies to charter a new
bank and transfer assets to the bank free
of the quantitative limits and low-
quality asset prohibition of section 23A.
Currently, if a company (usually a BHC)
establishes a new subsidiary bank. the
newly chartered institution cannot
acquire a critical mass of assets from its
parent company because of the
quantitative limits of section 23A.
Commenters generally agreed that
applying the restrictions of section 23A
to a newly formed bank is unnecessary
because the chartering authority for the
new bank (and. in the case of a new
bank formed under a BHC, the Board)
reviews the transaction to ensure that
the asset transfer does not result in any
safety or soundness problems.
J. Transactions Approved Under the
Bank Merger Act (§ 223.420))
Before issuing proposed Regulation
W, the Board had provided a regulatory
exemption from section 23A for any
transaction between affiliated insured
depository institutions if the transaction
had been approved by the responsible
Federal banking agency under the Bank
Merger Act. l6B The Board had provided
this regulatory exemption because the
Bank Merger Act required the primary
Federal supervisor of the resulting
insured depository institution to review
these transactions using safety and
soundness and public interest standards
167 Under the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board's Rule G-11, the syndicate manager for a
municipal bond underwriting is required to send a
written summary to all members of the syndicate.
The summary discloses the aggregate par values and
prices of bonds sold from the syndicate account.
166 See 57 FR 41643, Sept. 11, 1992.
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similar to those that the Board would
apply in reviewing a section 23A
exemption request. Proposed Regulation
W included this exemption.
Several commenters argued that the
Board should expand the Bank Merger
Act exemption to include mergers
between a national bank and a nonbank
subsidiary or affiliate of the bank, which
are reviewed by the acc under the
National Bank Consolidation and
Merger Act ("NBCM Act").169 The
Board notes that a member bank should
not need a special exemption from
section 23A to merge with a nonbank
subsidiary (other than a financial
subsidiary and certain other nonbank
subsidiaries) because such transactions
generally will be deemed to be within
the bank for purposes of section 23A.
The Board has determined not to
grant a regulatory exemption for merger
transactions between a national bank
and its nonbank affiliate for a number of
reasons. First. the legislative history of
section 23A and Board experience
indicate that merger transactions
between banks and their nonbank
affiliates have a greater potential for risk
of loss to the bank than would similar
transactions between sister banks and
thus are appropriately subject to greater
regulatory scrutiny. In addition. such
transactions between banks and their
nonbank affiliates have a greater
potential for risk of loss to the Federal
deposit insurance funds because the
cross-guarantee provisions of the FDI
Act apply only between affiliated
insured depository institutions. l7o
Finally, although the NBCM Act
provides for acc review of such
transactions, the statute does not
establish criteria that a national bank
must satisfy to obtain acc approval,
and the acc has not yet issued
implementing regulations for the
statute. The Board may consider
including in Regulation W an
exemption for NBCM Act transactions
after reviewing any future implementing
regulations adopted by the acc. The
Board notes that any member bank
merging or consolidating with a
nonbank affiliate may be able to take
advantage of the regulatory exemption
for internal reorganization transactions
contained in section 223.41(d) of the
final rule,
A few other commenters urged the
Board to expand the Bank Merger Act
exemption to include Bank Merger Act
169 Section 1206(a) of the American
Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of
2000 amended the NBCM Act to provide that a
national bank may merge with one or more of its
nonbank subsidiaries or affiliates with the approval
of the Occ. See 12 U.S.c. 215a-3.
170 See 12 U.S.c. 1815(e).
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transactions with any affiliate (not just
an insured depository institution
affiliate) and any other transactions with
affiliates that are subject to approval by
the bank's primary Federal supervisor.
For the reasons discussed in the
previous paragraph, the Board is not
willing to grant a regulatory exemption
to any transaction between a member
bank and an affiliate that is subject to
approval by the bank's primary Federal
supervisor.
In light of the comments, however,
the final rule does include a partial
expansion of the traditional Bank
Merger Act exemption. As noted above,
the traditional Bank Merger Act
exemption only applied to transactions
between a member bank and an insured
depository institution affiliate. Although
the Board does not believe that
expanding the Bank Merger Act
exemption to include transactions with
any affiliate would be consistent with
the purposes of section 23A, the final
rule makes the Bank Merger Act
exemption available for merger and
other related transactions between a
member bank and a U.S. branch or
agency of an affiliated foreign bank. The
Bank Merger Act approval process,
combined with the ongoing regulation
and supervision of U.S. branches and
agencies of foreign banks by the Federal
banking agencies, should help ensure
that such transactions do not pose
significant risks to the member bank.
K. Purchases of Extensions of Credit
(§ 223.42(k))
In 1974, the Board issued a formal
interpretation of section 23A (codified
at 12 CFR 250.250) that exempted a
member bank's purchase of a loan from
an affiliate if (il the bank made an
independent evaluation of the
creditworthiness of the borrower before
the affiliate made the loan and (ii) the
bank committed to purchase the loan
before the affiliate made the loan (the
"250.250 exemption").I71 Although the
1974 interpretation did not impose a
strict dollar limit on the amount of an
affiliate's loans that a member bank
could purchase under the exemption,
the interpretation cautioned that the
purpose of the exemption was to allow
a member bank to take advantage of an
investment opportunity and not to
alleviate the working capital needs of an
affiliate.
By 1995, some BHCs were using the
250.250 exemption extensively to fund
their nonbank lending affiliates. In these
cases, banks were providing all or
nearly all of such affiliates' funding. In
response, staff indicated in an
171 See 39 FR 28975. Aug. 13, 1974.
interpretive letter that the 250.250
exemption was not available if the
dollar amount of the bank's purchases
from the affiliate represented more than
50 percent of the total dollar amount of
loans made by the affiliate. l72 Staff
reasoned that, in these circumstances,
the asset purchases looked less like the
bank taking advantage of an investment
opportunity brought to it by the affiliate
and more like the bank providing the
principal ongoing funding mechanism
for the affiliate. Staff intended that this
restriction would require the affiliate to
have alternative funding sources and
would reduce the pressure on the bank
to purchase the affiliate's extensions of
credit.
Proposed Regulation W included the
250.250 exemption. The proposed rule
also included staffs 50 percent test as
a condition to the availability of the
exemption and solicited comment on
whether to supplement the bright-line
50 percent test with a requirement that
the member bank not use the exemption
to provide "substantial, ongoing
funding" to the affiliate.
1. The Traditional 50 Percent Test
Several commenters explicitly
supported the Board's retention of a 50
percent limit on the amount of loans a
bank may purchase from an affiliate
under the 250.250 exemption. Other
commenters requested that the Board
remove the 50 percent test because, in
the view of these commenters, it is
unnecessary and burdensome and most
of these bank-affiliate arrangements are
designed to benefit the bank. A few
commenters asked the Board to modify
the 50 percent test. One of these
commenters stated that, if the rule
retains the 50 percent limit, the limit
should be revised to be 50 percent ofthe
total assets of the affiliate (not just the
credit portfolio of the affiliate). Another
commenter asked that the 50 percent
per affiliate limit be revised to be 50
percent of the loan portfolio of all
lending affiliates in the aggregate (to
reduce the burden of monitoring each
affiliate's compliance with the 50
percent test).
The Board has decided to retain the
50 percent test. The Board continues to
believe that if a member bank purchases
more than half of the extensions of
credit originated by an affiliate, the
purchases represent the principal
ongoing funding mechanism for the
affiliate. The member bank's status as
172 Letter dated April 24, 1995. from J. Virgil
Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel of the Board, to
William F. Kroener, Ill, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; see alsa Letter dated January 21,1987,
from Michael Bradfield, General Counsel ofthe
Board, to Jeffrey c. Gerrish.
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the predominant source of financing for
the affiliate calls into question the
availability of alternative funding
sources for the affiliate, places
significant pressure on the bank to
continue to support the affiliate through
asset purchases, and reduces the bank's
ability to make independent credit
decisions with respect to the asset
purchases. The final rule does not
expand the denominator of the 50
percent test to include all the assets of
the affiliate or all the credit portfolios of
all the lending affiliates of the member
bank. In the Board's view, the member
bank's underwriting integrity may be
compromised if any single affiliate
becomes dependent on the bank for
financing, even if that single affiliate is
a diversified company that becomes
dependent on the bank for financing of
only one portion of its business.
2. The "Substantial, Ongoing Funding"
Test
One commenter supported the rule's
inclusion of the "substantial, ongoing
funding" test. A large number of
commenters (including most of the
banking industry trade associations)
urged the Board to remove the
"substantial, ongoing funding" test.
These commenters contended that the
test is too vague and subjective, may
disrupt many existing operations, would
prevent banks and their affiliates from
accomplishing rational business
planning, and is unnecessary in light of
the lack of evidence that the existing 50
percent test has failed to check abuse.
A "substantial, ongoing funding" test
would provide examiners with the
flexibility to stop arrangements in
which a bank provides a significant
amount of funding to an affiliated
lending company but does not provide
a majority of the affiliate's working
capital. On the other hand, such a
subjective standard would create legal
uncertainty for banks that purchase a
substantial amount of assets from their
lending affiliates. In addition, use of a
"substantial, ongoing funding" standard
could result in inconsistentapplication
of the 250.250 exemption by the
different Federal banking agencies and
by different examiners within an
agency.
The final rule does not include such
a supplemental standard in the 250.250
exemption. The final rule, however,
does allow the appropriate Federal
banking agency for a member bank to
reduce the 50 percent threshold
prospectively, on a case-by-case basis,
in those situations where the agency
believes that the bank's asset purchases
from an affiliate under the exemption
may cause harm to the bank. Although
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this agency discretion to tighten the 50
percent threshold may result in some
inconsistency in application of the
exemption, the supervisory benefits of
the flexibility should outweigh its
potential adverse effects.
3. Test Based on Size of Bank
The proposed rule also sought
comment on whether to limit the
amount of assets that a member bank
may purchase from an affiliate pursuant
to the 250.250 exemption to some
percentage of the bank's total assets.
Many commenters objected to placing a
limit on the percentage of a bank's
assets that represent assets purchased
from an affiliate under the 250.250
exemption. These commenters argued
that case-by-case review is a better
approach to addressing situations where
a large portion of a bank's assets are
loans purchased from an affiliate. These
commenters believed that the remaining
conditions of the exemption should
suffice to prevent abuse of the bank.
One commenter, on the other hand,
recommended that the rule include a 50
percent limit based on the assets of the
bank.
In light of the comments and the fact
that the Board did not suggest a specific
limit based on the bank's size in
proposed Regulation W, the Board has
determined to issue a further proposed
rule (concurrently with final Regulation
W) that would seek public comment on
whether to deny the 250.250 exemption
to any member bank if assets purchased
by the bank from an affiliate under the
250.250 exemption represent more than
100 percent of the bank's capital stock
and surplus. A more detailed
explanation of the Board's reasons for
issuing the further proposed rule is set
forth in the preamble to the proposed
rule.
4. Independent Credit Review by the
Bank
To qualify for the 250.250 exemption,
a member bank must independently
review the creditworthiness of each
obligor before committing to purchase
each loan. 173 Several commenters
requested that the Board interpret the
"independent evaluation" requirement
so as not to require an actual evaluation
of each credit by the bank if the affiliate
uses the same credit underwriting
system as the bank. According to these
commenters, such an interpretation
would recognize appropriately that
banks and affiliates often use the same
'7JConsistent with the Board's 1974
interpretation. the member hank also must not make
a legally enforceable blanket advance commitment
to purchase a stipulated amount of loans from the
affiliate.
underwriting standards and would
encourage banks and affiliates to share
effective underwriting practices with
each other and to work toward
harmonization of underwriting practices
within a single organization. These
commenters indicated that, as currently
interpreted, the 250.250 exemption
interferes with efficient, centralized,
formula-based credit underwriting
processes. In addition, several
commenters contended that the Board
should interpret the "independent
evaluation" requirement so as not to
require an actual evaluation of each
credit by the bank if the affiliate uses
the underwriting standards of Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, or Ginnie Mae.
The Board does not believe that a
member bank can satisfy the
"independent evaluation" requirement
ofthe 250.250 exemption by simply
having its lending affiliates use the
bank's underwriting standards or the
underwriting standards of Fannie Mae
or any other government agency or
government-sponsored enterprise.
Under established Federal Reserve
guidance, a State member bank is
required to have clearly defined policies
and procedures to ensure that it
performs its own due diligence in
analyzing the credit and other risks
inherent in a proposed transaction. 174
This function is not delegable to any
third party, including affiliates ofthe
member bank or government-sponsored
enterprises. Accordingly, to qualify for
this exemption, the member bank,
independently and using its own credit
policies and procedures, must itself
review and approve each extension of
credit before giving a purchase
commitment to its affiliate.
5. Miscellaneous
One commenter asked the Board to
clarify whether the 250.250 exemption
could be used in connection with a
bank's purchase of loans from an
affiliate if the affiliate retained recourse
on the loans. Consistent with the fact
pattern underlying the original 250.250
exemption and staffs traditional
interpretation of the exemption, the
final rule specifies that the exemption
does not apply in situations where the
affiliate retains recourse on the loans
purchased by the member bank. In such
a circumstance, the member bank has
ongoing credit exposure to the affiliate.
If the Board were not to adopt this
position, a member bank arguably could
incur unlimited credit exposure to an
affiliate through exempt loan purchases
under the 250,250 exemption.
174 See. e.g., Federal Reserve SR Letter No. 97-21
(SUP) (July 11, 1997).
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The final rule also specifies,
consistent with the fact pattern
underlying the original 250.250
exemption and staffs traditional
interpretation of the exemption, that the
250.250 exemption only applies in
situations where the member bank
purchases loans from an affiliate that
were originated by the affiliate. The
exemption cannot be used by a member
bank to purchase loans from an affiliate
that the affiliate purchased from another
lender. The exemption is designed to
facilitate a member bank using its
affiliate as an origination agent, not to
permit a member bank to take off an
affiliate's books loans that the affiliate
purchased from a third party. Among
other concerns, a contrary
determination would increase the
likelihood that a member bank could
acquire low-quality assets from an
affiliate through the exemption.
L. Intraday Extensions of Credit
(§ 223.42(1))
As noted above, the GLB Act required
the Board to adopt, by May 12, 2001, a
final rule to address as covered
transactions under section 23A the
credit exposure arising from intraday
extensions of credit by member banks to
their affiliates,175 The Board took a two-
step approach, similar to the Board's
approach to bank-affiliate derivatives, to
fulfill this statutory mandate. First, the
Board published an interim final rule on
May 11, 2001, that (i) required, under
section 23A, that a member bank
establish and maintain policies and
procedures reasonably designed to
manage the credit exposure arising from
the bank's intraday extensions of credit
to affiliates; and (ii) clarified that
intraday extensions of credit by a
member bank to an affiliate are subject
to the market terms requirement of
section 23B. The policies and
procedures, at a minimum, had to
provide for monitoring and controlling
the member bank's intraday credit
exposure to affiliates and ensuring that
the bank's intraday credit extensions to
affiliates comply with section 23B. The
interim final rule had a delayed
effective date of January I, 2002.
Second, the Board requested comment
on a more detailed and more restrictive
proposed rule on intraday credit
extensions by member banks to affiliates
175 The text of section 23A does not indicate that
an extension of credit must extend overnight to
qualify as a covered transaction. Nevertheless, at
the time of enactment of the GLB Act, the Board
had not ruled on whether intraday credit extensions
by a member bank to an affiliate were covered
transactions under section 23A or subject to the
market terms requirement of section 23B. Industry
practice did not treat intraday credit extensions as
subject to section 23A or 23B.
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in Regulation W. Proposed Regulation
W treated all such intraday credit
extensions as covered transactions but
exempted those intraday credits that
arose in connection with the
performance by a member bank, in the
ordinary course of business, of
securities clearing and settlement
transactions or payment transactions on
behalf of an affiliate. The more limited
Regulation W exemption for intraday
credit was available only if the member
bank (i) had no reason to believe that
the affiliate would have difficulty
repaying the extension of credit; (ii)
established limits on the net amount of
intraday credit that the bank may extend
to affiliates; and (iii) maintained
policies and procedures for monitoring
each affiliate's compliance with the
limits. Under the Regulation W
proposal, intraday extensions of credit
by a member bank to an affiliate that did
not meet these conditions were subject
to the quantitative, collateral, and other
requirements of section 23A.
Importantly, under the proposed rule,
an intentional intraday loan by a
member bank to an affiliate outside of
the clearing context (for example, a loan
to allow an affiliate to meet a debt
obligation coming due during the day)
became fully subject to section 23A at
the time during the day that the bank
made the loan.
Most commenters on the intraday
credit issue expressed support for either
the interim rule or proposed Regulation
W approach to intraday credit, although
the interim rule approach garnered more
support. A few commenters rejected
both approaches, however, and urged
the Board to treat intraday credit as not
subject to section 23A.
Commenters generally advocated an
exemption for intraday credit by banks
to affiliates because, in the view of
commenters, (i) banks do not use
intraday credit to fund affiliates; (ii)
intraday credit becomes covered by
section 23A at the end of the day and,
therefore, banks have incentives to
monitor intraday overdrafts by affiliates;
(iii) banks do not have the systems to
monitor intraday credit transactions
with all accounts of all affiliates in real
time; and (iv) banks have not suffered
losses on intraday credit extensions to
affiliates. According to these
commenters, the minimal benefits of the
Regulation W approach would not
outweigh the substantial costs.
Many commenters urged the Board to
grant an exemption for intraday credit
arising from special purpose credit card
transactions if the Board were to decide
to treat intraday credit extensions as
covered transactions under section 23A.
These commenters explained that
special purpose credit card banks make
thousands of credit extensions each day
that are deemed to be credit extensions
to affiliates under section 23A's
attribution rule. These banks currently
comply with section 23A by either
selling their credit card receivables at
the end of each day or fully securing
them at the end of each day with
segregated, earmarked deposit accounts.
According to commenters, the
Regulation W approach to intraday
credit would significantly disrupt the
existing practices of special purpose
credit card banks and would create
substantial inefficiencies for these banks
(requiring thousands of sales of
receivables each day instead of one sale
at the end of each day). These
commenters emphasized that third-
party customers, not the affiliated
merchants, are liable for repayment to
the bank on these transactions, and that
the intraday risk to the bank on these
transactions is similar to the risk on
payment or settlement transactions.
In the Board's view, existing business
practices indicate that the potential risk
reduction benefits afforded by full
application of the requirements of
section 23A to intraday credit exposures
to affiliates would not justify the costs
to banking organizations of
implementing these requirements at this
time. Intraday overdrafts and other
forms of intraday credit generally are
not used as a means of funding or
otherwise providing financial support
for an affiliate. Rather, these credit
extensions typically facilitate the
settlement of transactions between an
affiliate and its customers when there
are mismatches between the timing of
funds sent and received during the
business day. Although some risk exists
that such intraday credit extensions
could turn into overnight funding of an
affiliate, this risk is sufficiently remote
that application of the strict collateral
and other requirements of section 23A
would not be warranted for the intraday
credit exposure. Moreover, mandating
that banks collateralize intraday
exposures would require banks not only
to measure exposures across multiple
accounts, offices, and systems on a
global basis but also to adjust collateral
holdings in real time throughout the
day. The Board is concerned that few
banks currently have these capabilities
and that they would be very costly to
implement. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that banks, including special
purpose credit card banks, have suffered
losses from intraday extensions of credit
to affiliates.
Federal Reserve examiners have
reviewed the policies and procedures
that a number of large banks adopted to
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comply with the Board's interim final
rule on intraday credit to affiliates. This
review confirmed that requiring banks
to adopt policies and procedures for
managing the credit exposure arising
from intraday credit extensions to
affiliates and subjecting such
transactions to section 23B is the most
workable solution for addressing
intraday credit exposure of banks to
affiliates. For the most part, the
surveyed banks treated intraday credit
to affiliates in the same manner as they
treated intraday credit to third parties.
In light of these considerations, the
Board is adopting an approach to
intraday credit that is a combination of
the approaches contained in the interim
rule and proposed Regulation W. Final
Regulation W provides that intraday
credit extensions by a member bank to
an affiliate are section 23A covered
transactions but exempts all such
intraday credit extensions from the
quantitative and collateral requirements
of section 23A if the member bank (i)
maintains policies and procedures for
the management of intraday credit
exposure and (ii) has no reason to
believe that any affiliate receiving
intraday credit would have difficulty
repaying the credit in accordance with
its terms.
The approach of the final rule should
impose substantially less burden on
banking organizations than the
proposed Regulation Wapproach. Most
significantly, whereas the proposed rule
exempted only intraday credit
extensions relating to clearing and
settlement, the final rule exempts all
types of intraday credit. In light of the
limited scope for, and limited history of,
abuse of intraday credit to affiliates and
the significant burden of verifying and
documenting the use of each intraday
credit extension to an affiliate, the
Board does not believe that the
regulatory benefits of this aspect of the
proposed rule would have outweighed
its regulatory burden. Unlike the
proposed rule, the global exemptive
approach of the final rule also should
avoid interrupting the existing,
unproblematic intraday business
practices of banks that issue special
purpose credit cards. In addition, the
approach of the final rule imposes more
discipline on banks than the interim
rule approach in that the final rule
requires a member bank to make
intraday assessments of the credit
quality of each affiliated borrower and
restricts a member bank's intraday
credit extensions to an affiliate if the
bank has any doubt as to the affiliate's
ability to repay the credit in accordance
with its terms.
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The proposed rule did not include a
definition of an intraday extension of
credit. The final rule, however, defines
an intraday extension of credit as an
extension of credit by a member bank to
an affiliate that the member bank
expects to be repaid, sold, or
terminated, or to qualify for a complete
exemption under the rule, by the end of
its business day in the United States. An
intraday extension of credit would
include, for example, a loan by a
member bank to an affiliate that (i) by
its terms must be repaid before the end
of the bank's U.S. business day; (ii) the
bank expects to sell at the end of the
bank's U.S. business day; or (iii) the
bank intends to fully secure with a
segregated, earmarked deposit account
at the end of the bank's U.S. business
day. On the other hand, if a member
bank makes a 30-day loan to an affiliate
at 2 p.m. on a particular day and does
not expect to sell the loan or to qualify
the loan for an exemption under the rule
by the end of its U.S. business day, the
intraday credit exemption would not
exempt the loan from 2 p.m. until the
end of the bank's U.S. business day.
Rather, the member bank must ensure
that the loan complies with the
requirements of Regulation W as of 2
p.m. on that day (unless the loan
qualifies for another exemption in the
rule at such time).
M. Riskless Principal Transactions
(§ 223.42(m))
The final rule contains an additional
exemption that was not part of the
proposed rule. Section 223.42(m) of the
final rule exempts the purchase by a
member bank of a security from a
securities affiliate of the bank if (i) the
bank or the securities affiliate is acting
exclusively as a riskless principal in the
transaction; and (ii) the security
purchased is not issued or underwritten,
or sold as principal (other than as
riskless principal), by any affiliate of the
bank.176 These riskless principal
securities transactions between a
member bank and an affiliate are
covered transactions under section 23A
because the member bank, acting as a
principal, has purchased an asset from
an affiliate, acting as a principal. The
Board does not believe that there is any
regulatory benefit to subjecting these
transactions to section 23A, however,
because riskless principal securities
transactions closely resemble securities
brokerage transactions.
The riskless principal in a riskless
principal securities transaction buys
176 This exemption parallels the exemption from
the attribution rule prOVided in section 223.16(cj(1)
of the final rule.
and sells the same security
contemporaneously. Accordingly, if a
member bank acts as a riskless principal
in purchasing a security from a
securities affiliate, the asset risk passes
promptly from the affiliate through the
bank on to the bank's customer, If the
securities affiliate acts as a riskless
principal in selling a security to the
member bank, the asset risk passes
promptly from a third party through the
affiliate to the bank. In neither case
would the securities affiliate be able to
transfer pre-existing asset risk from its
books to the books of the member bank.
Although the final rule exempts these
riskless principal transactions from
section 23A, such transactions would
remain subject to section 23B.
N. Additional Exemption Requests
Approximately 16 commenters asked
the Board to establish formal filing and
processing guidelines for section 23A
exemption requests. These commenters
offered a wide variety of suggested time
frames for Board action on such
requests, but most of them asked that
the Board commit to acting within 30 to
60 days of receiving a request. In light
of the policy importance and factual
intricacy of most section 23A exemption
requests, the Board has decided not to
adopt regulatory deadlines for
processing section 23A exemption
requests. The Board has indicated in the
final rule, however, that exemption
requests should describe in detail the
transaction or relationship for which the
member bank seeks exemption, explain
why the Board should exempt the
transaction or relationship, and explain
how the exemption would be in the
public interest and consistent with the
purposes of section 23A.
As noted above, although sections
23A and 23B apply by their terms only
to member banks, other Federal law
subjects insured nonmember banks and
insured thrifts to the sections as if they
were member banks. Accordingly,
insured nonmember banks and insured
thrifts must apply to the Board (rather
than their appropriate Federal banking
agency) for any additional exemptions
from section 23A or 23B.
VIII. General Provisions of Section
23B-Subpart F
Subpart F of the regulation sets forth
the principal restrictions of section 23B.
These include (i) a requirement that
most transactions between a member
bank and its affiliates be on terms and
circumstances that are substantially the
same as those prevailing at the time for
comparable transactions with
nonaffiliates; (ii) a restriction on a
member bank's purchase as fiduciary of
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assets from an affiliate; (iii) a restriction
on a member bank's purchase, during
the existence of an underwriting
syndicate, of any security if a principal
underwriter of the security is an
affiliate; and (iv) a prohibition on
publishing an advertisement or entering
into an agreement stating that a member
bank will be responsible for the
obligations of its affiliates. For the most
part, subpart F restates the operative
provisions of section 23B, and these
provisions are not discussed below. The
remainder of this section of the
preamble highlights four areas in which
Regulation W provides additional
guidance on section 23B.
A. Transactions Exempt From Section
23B (§ 223.52(a)(1))
The market terms requirement of
section 23B applies to, among other
transactions, any "covered transaction"
between a member bank and an
affiliate. l77 Section 23B(d)(3) makes
clear that the term "covered
transaction" in section 23B has the same
meaning as the term "covered
transaction" in section 23A, but does
not include any transaction that is
exempt under section 23A(d)-for
example, transactions between sister
banks, transactions fully secured by a
deposit account or U.S. government
obligations, and purchases of assets
from an affiliate at a readily identifiable
and publicly available market
quotation.178 Consistent with the
statute, the regulation exempts from
section 23B any transaction that is
exempt under section 23A(d).
Regulation W also excludes from
section 23B any covered transaction that
is exempt from section 23A under
section 223.42(i) or (j) of the regulation
(that is, asset purchases by a newly
formed member bank and transactions
approved under the Bank Merger Act).
The Board is excluding from section
23B this additional set of transactions
because, in each case, the appropriate
Federal banking agency for the member
bank involved in the transaction should
ensure that the terms of the transaction
are not unfavorable to the bank.
B. Purchases of Securities for Which an
Affiliate Is the Principal Underwriter
(§ 223.53(b))
The GLB Act amended section 23B in
one respect. Since its passage in 1987,
section 23B(b)(1)(B) has prohibited a
member bank, whether acting as
principal or fiduciary, from purchasing
securities during the existence of an
underwriting or selling syndicate if a
177 12 U.S.C. 371c-1(aj(2j(A).
178 12 U.S.C. 371c-l(d)(3).
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principal underwriter of the securities is
an affiliate of the bank. 179 Before the
GLB Act, a member bank could escape
this prohibition only if a majority of the
outside directors of the bank approved
the bank's securities purchase before the
securities were initially offered to the
public.180 The GLB Act amended
section 23B, however, to permit a
member bank to purchase securities
during an underwriting conducted by an
affiliate if the following two conditions
are met. First, a majority of the directors
of the member bank (with no distinction
drawn between inside and outside
directors) must approve the securities
purchase before the securit~esare
initially offered to the public. Second,
such approval must be based on a
determination that the purchase would
be a sound investment for the member
bank regardless of the fact that an
affiliate of the bank is a principal
underwriter of the securities.181 The
regulation incorporates this new
standard and clarifies that if a member
bank proposes to make such a securities
purchase in a fiduciary capacity, then.
the directors of the bank must base then
approval on a determination that the
purchase is a sound investment for the
person on whose behalf the bank is
acting as fiduciary.
Obviously, a member bank may
satisfy this director approval
requirement by obtaining speci~~ prior
director approval of each seCUrIties
acquisition otherwise prohibited by
section 23B(b)(1)(B). The regulation
clarifies, however, that a member bank
also satisfies this director approval
requirement if a majority of the directors
of the bank approves appropriate
standards for the bank's acquisition of
securities otherwise prohibited by
section 23B(b)(l)(B) and each such
acquisition meets the standards adopted
by the directors. In addition, a majority
of the member bank's directors must
periodically review such acquisitions to
ensure that they meet the standards and
must periodically review the standards
to ensure they meet the "sound
investment" criterion of section
23B(b)(2). The appropriate period of
time between reviews would vary
depending on the scope and nature of
the member bank's program, but such
reviews should be conducted by the
directors at least annually. Before the
passage of the GLB Act, Board staff
informally allowed member banks,
179 12 U.S.C. 371c-1(b)(l)(B).
180 Many smaller banking organizations had
difficulty meeting this standard because most or all
of their banks' directors were officers or employees
of the banks or affiliates of the banks.
181 GLB Act § 738 (codified at 12 V.S.c. 371c-
llb)(2)).
based on the legislative history of
section 23B, to meet the director
approval requirement in this fashion,
and there is no indication that Congress
in the GLB Act intended to alter the
procedures that a member bank could
use to obtain the requisite director
approval.182
For these reasons, the regulation
codifies staffs preexisting approach to
the director approval requirement,183
C. The Definition of Affiliate Under
Section 23B (§ 223.2(c))
Section 23B states that the term
"affiliate" under section 23B has the
meaning given to such term in section
23A except that the term "affiliate"
under section 23B does not include a
"bank," as defined in section 23A.184
Other Federal law provides that an
insured savings association should be
treated as a "bank" for purposes of
section 23B.185 As in the case of the
sister-bank exemption, proposed
Regulation W clarified that the only
companies that qualify for the "bank"
exception to section 23B's definition of
affiliate are insured depository
institutions.
One commenter objected to this
aspect of the proposed rule. Without
such an interpretation, however, a
member bank would be able to engage
in transactions with certain uninsured
depository affiliates on terms and
conditions that were highly unfavorable
to the bank. Entering into these kinds of
transactions would not be consistent
with bank safety and soundness and
would contravene one of the goals of
section 23B-protecting the Federal
deposit insurance funds. Accordingly,
the final rule continues to restrict the
"bank" exception from section 23B's
definition of affiliate to insured
depository institutions.
182 The Conference Report accompanying the
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 stated
that the prior approval requirement of section
23B(b) could be met "by the establishment in
advance of specific standards by the outside
directors for such acquisitions. If the outside
directors establish such standards, they must
regularly review acquisitions to assure that the
standards have been followed, and they must
periodically review the standards to assure that
they continue to be appropriate in light of market
and other conditions." See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-
261, at 133 (1987).
183 The rule also provides, consistent with
existing Board interpretations, that a U.S. branch,
agency, or commercial lending company of a
foreign bank may comply with this requirement by
obtaining the required approvals and reviews from
either a majority of the directors or a majority of the
senior executive officers of the foreign bank.
184 12 U.S.c. 371c-1(d)(1).
185 12 U.S.c. 1468(a)(2)(B).
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D. The Advertising restriction (§ 223.54)
Section 23B(c), the "advertising
restriction," prohibits a member bank
from publishing any advertisement or
entering into any agreement stating or
suggesting that the bank shall in any
way be responsible for the obligations of
its affiliates. 18B Read literally, this
provision appears to prohibit a member
bank from issuing a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit on behalf
of an affiliate. Because section 23A
includes as a permissible (though
limited) covered transaction the
issuance by a member bank of a
guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit
on behalf of its affiliates, Board staff
traditionally has read the advertising
restriction of section 23B in light of
section 23A. That is, Board staff has not
read section 23B(c) to prohibit a
member bank from issuing a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit on behalf
of an affiliate to the extent permitted
under section 23A. The regulation
contains this clarification.187 In
response to comments from several
banking organizations, the final rule
also clarifies that section 23B(c) does
not prohibit a member bank from
making reference to such a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit in a
prospectus or other disclosure
document, for example, if otherwise
required by law.
IX. Application of Sections 23A and 23B
to U.S. Branches and Agencies of
Foreign Banks-Subpart G
Subpart G discusses the application of
sections 23A and 23B to U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks. As noted
above, sections 23A and 23B apply by
their terms only to member banks of the
Federal Reserve System, and other
Federal banking laws have made
insured nonmember banks and insured
savings associations subject to the
sections. Federal banking law generally
does not subject the U.S. branches and
agencies of foreign banks to sections
23A and 23B.
Section 114(b)(4) of the GLB Act
explicitly authorizes the Board,
however, to impose restrictions or
requirements on relationships or
transactions between a branch, agency,
or commercial lending company of a
foreign bank in the United States and
any affiliate in the United States of such
foreign bank. The Board may impose
such prudential limits if it finds that the
186 12 U.S.C. 371c-1(c).
187 The Board also believes that if a member bank
and its affiliate enter into a joint undertaking with
a third party. the contract among the parties should
make clear that the bank is only responsible for its
own obligations under the contract.
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limits are appropriate to prevent an
evasion of certain Federal banking laws,
avoid a significant risk to the safety and
soundness of depository institutions or
any Federal deposit insurance fund, or
avoid other adverse effects, such as
undue concentration of resources,
decreased or unfair competition,
conflicts of interest, or unsound banking
practices.
In order to ensure competitive equity,
the Board has for years imposed certain
of the requirements of sections 23A and
23B on transactions between a u.s.
branch or agency of a foreign bank and
its U.s. affiliates engaged in
underwriting and dealing in bank-
ineligible securities ("section 20
affiliates"paa The Board also recently
applied sections 23A and 23B to
transactions between a U.s. branch or
agency of a foreign bank and affiliates
conducting merchant banking activities
under the GLB Act and portfolio
companies held under that authority.189
WIth one material exception, the
regulation applies sections 23A and 23B
to a U.s. branch or agency of a foreign
bank as if the branch or agency were a
member bank. The material exception is
that the only companies that are deemed
affiliates of such branch or agency of a
foreign bank are affiliates of the foreign
bank that are directly engaged in the
United States in the following GLB Act
financial activities: (i) Insurance
underwriting pursuant to section
4(k)(4)(B) ofthe BHC Act; (ii) securities
underwriting and dealing pursuant to
section 4(k)(4)(E) of the BHC Act; (iii)
merchant banking activities pursuant to
section 4(k)(4)(H) of the BHC Act; 190 or
188 The Board's Operating Standards for section
20 affiliates require (i) any intraday extensions of
credit by a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank
to its section 20 affiliates to comply with the market
terms requirement of section 23B; (ii) any
extensions of credit by a U.S. branch or agency of
a foreign bank to its section 20 affiliates and any
purchase by such branch or agency of securities for
which a section 20 affiliate is the principal
underwriter to comply with sections 23A and 23B;
and (iii) a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank
to refrain from advertising or suggesting that it is
responsible for the obligations of a section 20
affiliate. consistent with section 23B(c]. See 12 CFR
225.200; 62 FR 45295, Aug. 27, 1997. Prior to the
adoption of the Operating Standards, all U.S.
branches and agencies of a foreign bank (like all
member banks] were prohibited from extending
credit to. or purchasing assets from, a section 20
affiliate. Consequently, the Board's 1997 decision
partially to apply sections 23A and 23B to such
branches and agencies represented a liberalization
of the regulatory framework.
189 See 12 CFR 225.176(b](6); 66 FR 8466, Jan. 21,
2001.
190 Regulation W, consistent with the merchant
banking rule, imposes sections 23A and 23B on a
covered transaction between a U.S. branch or
agency of a foreign bank and its U.S. merchant
banking affiliate only to the extent the proceeds of
the covered transaction are used for the purpose of
funding the affiliate's merchant banking activities.
(iv) insurance company investment
activities pursuant to section 4(k)(4)(I)
of the BHC Act.l91
The regulation also treats as a section
23A affiliate of a U.s. branch or agency
any subsidiary of an affiliate of the
foreign bank directly engaged in the four
activities set forth above (regardless of
whether the subsidiary itself engages in
any ofthe four activities).192 In
addition, the rule treats as a section 23A
affiliate of a U.s. branch or agency any
portfolio company controlled by the
foreign bank under the GLB Act's
merchant banking or insurance
company investment authorities (and
any subsidiary of such a portfolio
company). The regulation does not treat
as a section 23A affiliate of a U.S.
branch or agency any other type of
affiliate of the foreign bank (for
example, foreign affiliates or U.S.
affiliates engaged in nonbanking
activities under section 4(c)(8) of the
BHC Act), and does not treat a foreign
bank's non-U.S. offices as member
banks subject to section 23A.193
Applying the restrictions of sections
23A and 23B to transactions between
the U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks and the specified U.S.
afftliates will help to ensure
maintenance of a competitive playing
field between U.S. banks and foreign
banks operating in the United States.
The issue of competitive equity arises
most strongly in connection with those
activities that a U.S. bank cannot engage
in directly or through an operating
subsidiary. A U.S. bank may affiliate
itself with a company engaged in the
financial activities specified above only
191 See 12 U.S.c. 1843(k](4](B), (E), (H), and (I).
192 The regulation covers subsidiaries of affiliates
directly engaged in the specified activities in order
to prevent evasion. If these subsidiaries were not
covered. the U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank
arguably could fund the foreign bank's U.S.
insurance underwriter outside the scope of sections
23A and 23B by, for example, lending money to a
subsidiary olthe underwriter and having the
subsidiary dividend or on-lend the loan proceeds to
the underwriter.
193The text and structure of the final rule on U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks are
somewhat different from that of the proposed rule.
The proposed rule provided that section 23A
applied to transactions between a U.S. branch or
agency of a foreign bank, on the one hand, and
certain U.S. affiliates of the foreign bank, on the
other hand. The Board has revised the proposed
rule to ensure that foreign banks treat certain
indirect affiliate transactions as covered
transactions under Regulation W. For example, an
argument could be made that when a U.S. branch
of a foreign bank accepts securities issued by a U.S.
insurance company affiliate of the foreign bank as
collateral for a loan to a nonaffiliate, there has been
no transaction between the branch and the
insurance affiliate. These transactions are, however,
covered transactions under section 23A. The text
and structure of the final rule make clear that such
indirect affiliate transactions by a U.S. branch or
agency of a foreign bank are subject to the rule.
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ifthe company is a holding company
affiliate of the bank or, in some cases,
a financial subsidiary of the bank. In
either case, covered transactions
between the U.S. bank and the company
would be subject to sections 23A and
23B, Without Regulation W's extension
of the scope of these statutory
provisions, a foreign bank's U.S. branch
or agency could fund and engage in
transactions with these types of
affiliates more freely than could a U.S.
bank. To the extent that a foreign bank's
U.S. branches and agencies are able to
fund these types of U.S. affiliates
outside of the restrictions of sections
23A and 23B, the affiliates are able to
compete for business in the United
States with a potential advantage not
available to the analogous affiliates of
U.S. banks.
The Board does not believe that it is
appropriate or necessary at this time to
impose the requirements of sections
23A and 23B on transactions between a
foreign bank's U.S, branch or agency
and its U.S. affiliates that are engaged
only in activities that were permissible
for BHCs before the passage of the GLB
Act (other than section 20 affiliates).
The Board recognizes the hardship this
might impose on foreign banks
conducting such activities in the United
States under previous law. Moreover,
most of these activities may be
conducted by a U.S. bank directly (or in
an operating subsidiary) and, hence,
may be funded by a U.S. bank in a
manner that is not subject to sections
23A and 238.194
The potential scope, nature, and risks
of transactions and relationships
between U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks and their affiliates
engaged in the United States in
insurance underwriting, full-scope
securities underwriting and dealing,
merchant banking, and insurance
company investment are unclear at this
time. At least until the Board acquires
more information and supervisory
experience regarding these transactions
194 One U.S. bank commenter contended that
Regulation W should be expanded to apply sections
23A and 23B to transactions between a foreign
bank's U.S. branch or agency and a U.S. affiliate of
the foreign bank engaged in any activities
permissible under section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act
but not permissible for U.S. banks or their operating
subsidiaries (for example, real estate leasing). The
Board has determined not to add such activities to
the rule's foreign bank activity list at this time
because of the hardship this would impose on
foreign banks and because the Board has substantial
supervisory experience with such activities and has
not observed any adverse competitive effects in the
relevant markets. The Board does not intend to add
such activities to the list in the future unless
adverse competitive effects develop in the relevant
markets that could be remedied by an expansion of
the scope of sections 23A and 23B to the U.S.
operations of foreign banks.
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and relationships, applying sections
23A and 23B will help ensure
competitive equity between foreign
banks and U.S. banking organizations in
the funding of certain of their U.S.
nonbank operations. The Board will
regularly review this section of
Regulation W, consistent with the
requirements of section 114(b)(3) of the
GLB Act, to determine whether there is
a continuing need for its restrictions and
will modify or eliminate any restrictions
that are no longer required to mitigate
potential or actual adverse effects.
The regulation also provides that the
Board may add to the list of affiliates of
a foreign bank that are subject to the
restrictions of sections 23A and 23B.
The Board intends generally to use this
reserved authority to ensure competitive
equity between foreign banks and U.S.
banks with respect to affiliates engaged
in the United States in new activities
that the Board may authorize for FHCs.
The Board also has considered the
issue of how to calculate the capital
stock and surplus of a foreign bank's
U.S. branch or agency for purposes of
section 23A. In light of the fact that
foreign banks do not separately
capitalize their U.S. branches or
agencies, the regulation defines the
capital stock and surplus of such
branches and agencies by reference to
the capital of the foreign bank as
calculated under its home country
capital standards. This definition is
consistent with the approach adopted
by the Board in its merchant banking
rule,19s and represents a relaxation from
the Board's current position with
respect to foreign banks that operate
section 20 affiliates in the United
States. 19B
A number of commenters strongly
objected to the foreign bank provisions
ofthe proposed rule, including the
Canadian Department of Finance, the
Institute of International Bankers, the
Canadian Bankers Association, and the
Swiss Bankers Association. Several of
these commenters challenged the
Board's authority under section 114 of
the GLB Act to apply section 23A to the
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks. According to these commenters,
the Board's action fails to meet the first
requirement of section 114 (consistency
with Federal banking law) because
195 See 66 FR 8466.8482, Jan. 31, 2001.
196 The Board's position on section 20 affiliates
requires U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks whose home country supervisor has not
adopted capital standards consistent with the Basle
Accord to calculate their section 23A capital stock
and surplus by reference to the capital of the foreign
bank parent as calculated under standards
applicable to U.S. banking organizations. See 62 fR
45304. Aug. 27. 1997.
Federal banking law does not generally
subject U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks to section 23A. In
commenters' view, the Board's action
also fails to meet the second prong of
section 114 (intention to prevent
adverse effects) because the Board has
not presented specific evidence of
actual abuse and is admittedly acting to
fight possible future abuse.
The Board believes that its partial
application of sections 23A and 23B to
the U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks is consistent with Federal
banking law. The Board is aware of, and
commenters cited, no Federal banking
laws that contradict or otherwise
conflict with the provisions of subpart
G of Regulation W. Moreover, the Board
disagrees with the implication of
commenters' views of section 114,
which would render section 114 useless
by preventing the Board from imposing
safeguards under the section unless
such safeguards were already present in
Federal banking law. Commenters also
have failed to present evidence to
support their claim that the Board may
only use section 114 to combat adverse
effects for which the Board has made
specific findings. Nothing in the text or
legislative history of the GLB Act
supports this position. The Board does
not believe that section 114 requires the
Board to wait, observe, and document
damage to U.S. financial institutions or
markets before it may take action under
the section to impose prudential
safeguards.
Some commenters argued that the
competitive equity justification for the
Board's partial application of sections
23A and 23B to the U.S. branches and
agencies of foreign banks does not fit
within the "unfair competition"
rationale in section 114 of the GLB Act.
According to these commenters, the
Board previously acknowledged that the
"unfair competition" prong of section
4(j) of the BHC Act did not authorize the
Board to consider disparities based on
the structure of the banking industry.197
Again, the Board is not aware of, and
commenters have not presented,
evidence that the phrase "unfair
competition" in section 114(b)(4)(B) of
the GLB Act cannot or should not be
read to include competitive advantages
based on regulatory environment.
Importantly, the Board is not bound by
its former interpretations ofthe BHC Act
when interpreting provisions of the GLB
Act. The Board notes that its former
interpretation of section 4(j) of the BHC
Act explicitly depended on the specific
legislative history of section 4(j) and
197 See BankAmerica Corporation. 69 federal
Reserve Bulletin 105. 111 (1983J.
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other sections of the BHC Act. The
legislative history of the GLB Act does
not similarly constrain the Board's
interpretation of section 114. Indeed,
the Congressional intent behind the GLB
Act strongly supports the Board's
position on this matter. The GLB Act
authorized an expanded set of
permissible activities for banking
organizations, but required such
activities to be conducted in section
23A affiliates of a bank (not directly in
the bank) in order to reduce risks to the
bank and to constrain the spread of the
government subsidy enjoyed by banks.
This Congressional concern to limit the
transference of the bank subsidy into
markets for other financial services is
the same competitive concern that has
motivated the Board to apply sections
23A and 23B to some portion of the U.S.
operations of foreign banks. 19B
Several commenters on the foreign
bank provisions of the proposed rule
advanced the proposition that foreign
banks do not enjoy a subsidy in the
United States and do not have a
competitive advantage over U.S.
banking organizations. In fact, according
to these commenters, U.S. banking firms
have a competitive "home field"
advantage in the United States. 199 The
Board's partial application of sections
23A and 23B to the U.S. branches and
agencies of foreign banks does not
depend for its justification on whether
foreign banks operating in the United
States generalIy have a competitive
advantage over U.S. banking firms.
Rather, as noted above, the Board has
chosen to extend the scope of sections
23A and 23B to address a specific
potential competitive imbalance: the
funding advantages enjoyed by the
specified types of affiliates of foreign
banks as compared to the same types of
affiliates of U.S. banks. Foreign banks
190 The Board also notes that the "adverse effects"
clause in section 114 of the GLB Act is broader than
the "adverse effects" clause in section 4(j) of the
BHC Act. Significantly. section 114. unlike section
4(j), explicitly authorizes the Board to consider
risks to the safety and soundness of U.S. depository
institutions. In the Board's view, the safety and
soundness of U.S. depository institutions could be
put at risk if certain of their affiliates are forced to
compete with the affiliates of foreign banks at a
significant regulatory disadvantage.
199 In support oftheir position. many ofthese
commenters referred to a study conducted by the
Federal Reserve System that concluded that section
20 affiliates of U.S. BHCs have outperformed
section 20 affiliates of foreign banks. In light of the
fact that the Board has imposed many of the
restrictions of sections 23A and 23B on transactions
between the U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks and their section 20 affiliates, this study does
not provide much evidence as to whether foreign
bank-owned securities underwriters and dealers
would enjoy a competitive advantage over U.S.
BHC-owned securities underwriters and dealers in
the absence of an extension of sections 23A and 23B
to cover foreign banks.
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are able to raise low-cost deposits
abroad and to use this low-cost funding
to finance, including through their U.S.
branches and agencies, the activities of
the specified U.S. affiliates without
having to comply with sections 23A and
23B. U.S. banks are limited by sections
23A and 23B in the extent to which they
are able to finance the operations of the
specified affiliates.
Commenters also pointed out alleged
inconsistencies in the Board's treatment
of the U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks under subpart G. First,
several commenters stated that it is
inconsistent and unfair to subject the
U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks to section 23A but then to deny
them the benefits of the sister-bank
exemption. Regulation W does not, as a
general matter, apply section 23A to
transactions between a U.S. branch or
agency and a sister U.S. branch, agency,
or depository institution. The rule only
applies section 23A to transactions
between the U.S. branch or agency and
a U.S. affiliate of the foreign bank
engaged in the United States in
insurance underwriting, securities
underwriting and dealing, merchant
banking, or insurance company
investment. Because these activities
generally are not permissible activities
for a U.S. branch, agency, or subsidiary
depository institution of a foreign bank,
subpart G of the rule generally does not
apply section 23A to transactions
between the U.S. branch or agency of a
foreign bank and any sister banks of the
branch or agency.
Second, commenters claimed that it is
inconsistent to permit a U.S. bank to
fund its non-U.S. subsidiaries through a
non-U.S. branch without complying
with section 23A, but to force a non-
U.S. bank to fund its U.S. subsidiaries
through a U.S. branch in compliance
with section 23A. As explained above,
the Board is adopting subpart G of
Regulation W in order to mitigate
potential competitive inequities in
certain nonbanking markets in the
United States. Non-U.S. financial
regulators are free to address any similar
inequities that exist in their nonbanking
markets due to disparate regulatory
treatment. The Board notes that section
23A generally would apply to
transactions between a U.S. bank and a
foreign affiliate of the U.S. bank engaged
in the four specified activities (other
than an Edge subsidiary of the U.S. bank
engaged in securities underwriting and
dealing or certain limited investment
activities) .
X. Miscellaneous lnterpretations-
Subpart H
The Board has decided to include a
subpart H in final Regulation W to
house Board interpretations of sections
23A and 23B that do not fit neatly
elsewhere in the regulation. Although
subpart H of the final rule contains only
a single section, the Board intends to
place future Board miscellaneous
interpretations of the statute into this
subpart.
Section 223.71 of the final rule
explains how sections 23A and 23B
apply to transactions in which a
member bank purchases from one
affiliate an asset relating to another
affiliate. In some situations in which a
member bank purchases an asset from
an affiliate, the asset purchase qualifies
for an exemption under Regulation W,
but the member bank's resulting
ownership of the purchased asset also
represents another covered transaction
(which mayor may not qualify for an
exemption under the rule). In these
situations, the transaction engaged in by
the member bank would qualify as two
different types of covered transaction.
Although an asset purchase exemption
may suffice to exempt the member
bank's asset purchase from the first
affiliate, the asset purchase exemption
does not exempt the bank's resulting
covered transaction with the second
affiliate.
For example, assume a member bank
purchases from one affiliate securities
issued by another affiliate in a purchase
that qualifies for the (d)(6) exemption in
section 23A. The member bank's asset
purchase from the first affiliate would
be exempt under § 223.42(e) of the rule;
but the bank also would have acquired
an investment in securities issued by
the second affiliate, which would be a
covered transaction between the bank
and the second affiliate that does not
qualify for the (d)(6) exemption. The
(d)(6) exemption, by its terms, only
exempts asset purchases by a member
bank from an affiliate; hence, the (d)(6)
exemption cannot exempt a member
bank's investment in securities issued
by an affiliate (even if the securities
would qualify for the (d)(6) exemption).
Section 223.71 sets forth this general
interpretation and includes several
examples to flesh out the interpretation
(including the example given in the
previous paragraph).20o
2UO In light of the inclusion of section 223.71 in
the final rule, the Board has removed certain
conditions to the (dll6)-related exemptions in
section 223.42(e) and (f) of the rule.
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Xl. Effective Date; Transition Rule
Many commenters urged the Board to
provide either a transition period for
banks to come into compliance with
Regulation W or a grandfather for
existing transactions that do not comply
with the rule. According to these
commenters, banks need such relief
because of the many ways in which the
rule is inconsistent with existing bank
practices or existing staff interpretations
of section 23A. Although most
commentel's did not propose a specific
time period, one commenter advocated
a transition period of 2 to 3 years.
The Board recognizes that Regulation
W tightens a number of traditional
Board and staff interpretations of
sections 23A and 23B. The Board also
believes that the changes effected by the
final rule are of substantial regulatory
importance, and that the burden on
member banks of full and prompt
compliance with the final rule will be
minimal in most cases. Accordingly, the
Board has decided to delay the effective
date of the rule only for the minimum
period of time required by law and to
provide member banks with only a
limited transition period and
grandfather authority for preexisting
transactions.
The Board has decided to make
Regulation W effective as of April 1,
2003. Accordingly, transactions entered
into on or after April 1, 2003, will be
immediately subject to the rule.
Transactions entered into after
December 12, 2002, but before April 1,
2003, will become subject to the rule on
April 1, 2003.
The Board also has determined to
adopt a limited transition rule for
transactions that consummate on or
before the date of publication of final
Regulation W in the Federal Register.
As a general matter, any transaction
engaged in by a member bank on or
before December 12, 2002 that would
become subject to section 23A or 23B
solely as a result of this rule, or whose
treatment under section 23A or 23B
would change solely as a result of this
rule, will not become subject to this rule
until July 1, 2003. The Board may, in its
discretion, extend this deadline in
circumstances where a member bank
has demonstrated to the Board's
satisfaction that compliance with the
deadline would impose regulatory
burden on the member bank that
outweighs the regulatory benefit of early
compliance.
For purposes of the transition rule, a
transaction is subject to section 23A or
23B solely as a result of Regulation W
if the transaction is subject to section
23A or 23B under the rule but was not
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subject to section 23A or 23B under the
terms of the sections or any written
interpretations of the sections by the
Board or its staff that predated
December 12, 2002. In addition, a
transaction's treatment under section
23A or 23B changes solely as a result of
Regulation W if the treatment of the·
transaction under the rule differs from
the treatment of the transaction under
the terms of sections 23A and 23B or
any written interpretations of the
sections by the Board or its staff that
predated December 12, 2002.
The transition rule has several
exceptions. First, any transaction that
qualifies for the transition rule but is
renewed, extended, or materially altered
on or after April 1, 2003, will be
immediately subject to the rule at the
time of such renewal, extension, or
material alteration. In addition, any
transaction that qualifies for the
transition rule but is a purchase of
assets by a member bank from an
affiliate that consummated on or before
December 12, 2002 will not be subject
to this rule.
The following examples are designed
to assist member banks in
understanding the transition rule. The
first example involves an extension of
credit that predates December 12, 2002,
Suppose that on February 18, 2002, a
member bank makes a loan to an
unregistered investment fund advised
(but not sponsored) by the bank. The
member bank does not control the fund,
but the bank's holding company owns
10 percent of the total equity of the
fund, The fund is not an affiliate of the
member bank under sections 23A and
23B and written interpretations of such
sections by the Board and its staff at the
time the loan is made. The fund would
become an affiliate of the member bank
under Regulation W, and the loan
would become a covered transaction, as
oOuly 1, 2003. 201 If the member bank
renews the loan on May 14, 2003,
however, the loan would become a
covered transaction as of May 14, 2003.
The second example involves an asset
purchase that predates December 12,
2002. Suppose that on August g, 2002,
a member bank purchases assets from an
uninsured depository institution
affiliate in a transaction that qualifies
for the sister-bank exemption in section
23A(d)(4). Although Regulation W
renders the sister-bank exemption
unavailable for transactions with
uninsured depository institution
affiliates as of April 1, 2003, the asset
201 The Board would expect member banks to
treat such a transaction, as of July 1, 2003. in
accordance with the timing rules set forth in section
223.21(b)(2) of Regulation W for a credit transaction
with a nonaffiliate that becomes an affiliate.
purchase would permanently qualify for
the sister-bank exemption.
The Board also has determined to
allow member banks to apply certain
provisions of Regulation W that relieve
regulatory burden before the rule's
effective date. 202 In particular,
notwithstanding the effective date and
transition rule provisions discussed
above, a member bank may choose to
apply any of the following provisions of
the rule beginning on December 12,
2002: (i) section 223.16(c)(4); (ii) section
223.24(a), (b), or (c); (iii) section
223.31(d); (iv) section 223.41(d); or (v)
section 223,42(c), (f), (g), (i), 0), or (k).
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with section 3(a) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.c.
604(a)), the Board must publish a final
regulatory flexibility analysis with this
rulemaking. Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act limit
transactions between a depository
institution and its affiliates and
authorize the Board to issue regulations
as necessary to administer and carry out
the purposes of the sections. 203 Sections
23A and 23B are two of the most
important statutory protections against a
depository institution suffering losses
from its transactions with affiliates and,
correspondingly, are two of the most
effective means of limiting the ability of
a depository institution to transfer to its
affiliates the subsidy arising from its
access to the Federal safety net.
Although sections 23A and 23B each
grant the Board authority to issue
regulations, the Board has never issued
a regulation fully implementing either
section. Instead, depository institutions
seeking guidance on how to comply
with sections 23A and 23B have relied
on a series of Board interpretations and
informal staff opinions. Banking
organizations have increasingly sought
guidance from the Board on section 23A
issues in recent years as a result of the
increasing scope of activities conducted
by modern FHCs and the growing
complexities of the U.S. financial
markets.
As noted above, the Board believes
that adoption of a comprehensive
regulation implementing sections 23A
and 23B is appropriate for several
reasons. First, the new regulatory
framework established by the GLB Act
emphasizes the importance of sections
23A and 23B as a means to protect
depository institutions from losses in
202 Permitting member banks to comply with
provisions of the final rule that relieve burden prior
to the rule's effective date is consistent with
applicable Federal law. See 5 U.S.C 553 and 12
V.S,c. 4802.
20'12 U.S.c. 371c(f) and 371c-1(e).
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transactions with affiliates. Moreover,
adoption of a comprehensive regulation
will simplify the interpretation and
application of sections 23A and 23B,
ensure that the statute is consistently
interpreted and applied, and minimize
burden to the extent consistent with the
statute's goals.
The Board received approximately
120 public comments in response to the
Board's proposed section 23A
rulemakings. As discussed above, nearly
all commenters supported the Board's
decision to issue Regulation W, but
raised specific concerns on certain
aspects of the regulation. The preamble
provides a detailed discussion of the
public comments. The Board considered
the alternatives proposed by the
comments, and the preamble describes
the numerous changes that the Board
made to the proposed rule as a result of
the comments.
Regulation W provides users with a
single, comprehensive reference tool for
complying with and analyzing issues
arising under sections 23A and 23B.
Accordingly, the regulation incorporates
Board and staff interpretations and also
restates the statutory definitions,
restrictions, and exemptions in order to
make understanding and using the
regulation easier.
The regulation first sets forth, in
subpart A, a comprehensive glossary of
the terms used in the regulation.
Subpart B then describes the principal
restrictions and requirements imposed
by section 23A. Next, in subpart C, the
regulation discusses the appropriate
valuation and timing principles for
covered transactions. Subpart D
discusses the appropriate treatment
under section 23A for transactions with
financial subsidiaries, derivative
transactions with affiliates, and certain
merger and acquisition transactions
with affiliates. Subpart E sets forth
available exemptions from certain of the
requirements of section 23A, Subpart F
lays out the operative provisions of
section 23B. Subpart G discusses the
application of the rule to U.S. branches
and agencies of foreign banks. Subpart
H contains an additional interpretation
of the statute. Regulation W also
includes examples illustrating how
several of the rule's provisions apply in
particular circumstances.
Regulation W applies, by its terms, to
all member banks regardless of their
size. The regula.tion affects all insured
depository institutions, however,
because other Federal law subjects
insured nonmember banks and insured
thrifts to sections 23A and 23B as if they
were member banks. The rule also
applies indirectly to the "affiliates" of
insured depository institutions. A
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depository institution's affiliates
include, among other companies, any
company that controls the institution,
any company under common control
with the institution, and certain
investment funds that are advised by the
institution or an affiliate of the
institution. The number of small entities
affected by Regulation W is estimated to
be a little over 6,500, including 3,292
depository institutions. For purposes of
this regulatory flexibility analysis, the
Board defines small entity as any
depository institution or other company
with less than $150 million in total
assets. The Board does not collect data
on all affiliates of depository
institutions at this time. Accordingly,
the exact number of small entities
affected by the rule would require
additional surveys or reports, which
would increase the burden on the public
and are not necessary for
implementation of the rule.
The vast majority of depository
institutions that are currently in
compliance with sections 23A and 23B
will also be in compliance with the rule.
The rule does not impose any new
compliance requirements and mainly
codifies existing practice and grants
new exemptions. The rule includes
several exemptions that will be
available to a depository institution only
if it notifies its primary Federal
supervisor. This notification, however,
allows the institution to engage in a
transaction that is otherwise prohibited
by law and replaces the current
requirement of a more time-consuming
case-by-case exemption request to the
Board. The primary Federal supervisor
of an institution also may require
additional documentation to ensure
compliance with the regulation.
Moreover, the Board has delegated
authority to the primary Federal
supervisors of depository institutions to
make certain determinations as to the
permissibility of certain transactions.
The rule does not result in significant
additional burden to the institutions
that must comply with its terms. The
provisions of Regulation W, in fact, may
be less burdensome than existing law
because of the increased number of
exemptions. One alternative to adopting
this rule is to maintain the current
collection of formal and informal Board
and staff interpretations. Most public
commenters believed, however, that the
adoption of Regulation W would reduce
burden by placing sections 23A and 23B
and the Board's interpretations thereof
in a single, comprehensive, public
document.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.c. 3506;
5 CFR 1320 Appendix A.l), the Board
reviewed the rule under the authority
delegated to the Board by the Office of
Management and Budget. The Federal
Reserve may not conduct or sponsor,
and an organization is not required to
respond to, an information collection
unless the Federal Reserve displays a
currently valid OMB control number.
The Federal Reserve will assign an OMB
control number.
The collection of information
requirements in this final rulemaking
are found in 12 CFR 223.15(bJ(4l,
223.31(d)(4l, 223.41(d)(2), and
223.43(b). This information is required
to evidence compliance with sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
(12 U.S.C. 371c and 371c-l). The
respondents are all insured depository
institutions and uninsured member
banks.
The notice requirement cited in 12
CFR 223.15(b)(4) is a condition to an
exemption for renewals of loan
participations involving problem loans.
The participating depository institution
must provide its appropriate Federal
banking agency with written notice of
the renewal or extension of additional
credit not later than 20 days after
consummation. There will be no
reporting form associated with this
information collection. The Board
estimates that approximately 10
depository institutions will file this
notice annually and that it will take
approximately 2 hours to prepare the
notice.
The notice requirement cited in 12
CFR 223.31(d)(4) is a condition to an
exemption for a depository institution's
acquisition of an affiliate that becomes
an operating subsidiary of the
institution after the acquisition. The
institution must provide its appropriate
Federal banking agency and the Board
with written notice of its intention to
acquire the company at or before the
time that the company becomes an
affiliate of the institution. There will be
no reporting form associated with this
information collection. The Board
estimates that approximately 10
depository institutions will file this
notice annually and that it will take
approximately 6 hours to prepare the
notice.
The notice requirement cited in 12
CFR 223.41(d)(2) is a condition to an
exemption for internal corporate
reorganization transactions. The
depository institution must provide its
appropriate Federal banking agency and
the Board with written notice of the
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transaction before consummation. The
notice must describe the primary
business activities of the affiliate and
indicate the proposed date of the
reorganization. There will be no
reporting form associated with this
information collection. The Board
estimates that approximately 20
depository institutions will file this
notice annually and that it will take
approximately 6 hours to prepare a
notice.
The notice requirement cited in 12
CFR 223.43(b) provides procedures for
requesting additional exemptions from
the requirements of section 23A. The
depository institution must submit a
written request to the General Counsel
of the Board. The request must describe
in detail the transaction or relationship
for which the institution seeks
exemption; explain why the Board
should exempt the transaction or
relationship; and explain how the
exemption would be in the public
interest and consistent with the
purposes of section 23A. There will be
no reporting form associated with this
information collection. The Board
estimates that approximately 5
depository institutions will file these
requests annually and that it will take
approximately 10 hours to prepare a
request.
The total estimated annual burden for
the depository institutions that must
comply with the above-mentioned
requirements is 250 hours. Based on a
rate of $50 per hour, the total annual
cost to the public for these collections
of information is estimated to be
$12,500.
In addition, there are existing reports
(such as the Bank Holding Company
Report of Insured Depository
Institutions' Section 23A Transactions
with Affiliates (FR Y-8; OMB No. 7100-
0126)) that will be modified to reflect
the adoption of this rule. The Board
expects to publish a separate notice
describing the changes to these reports.
The burden associated with these
collections of information will be
addressed at that time.
Comments are invited on (i) whether
the proposed notifications are necessary
for the proper performance of the
Board's functions, including whether
the information contained in the
notifications would have practical
utility; (ii) the accuracy of the Board's
estimate of the burden of the proposed
information collections, including the
cost of compliance; (iii) ways to
enhance the quality, utility, and clarity
of the information to be collected; and
(iv) ways to minimize the burden of
information collections on respondents,
including through the use of automated
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collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
Comments regarding any aspect of
these information collections, including
suggestions for reducing the burden,
must be submitted on or before February
10,2003, and may be sent to: Secretary,
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, 20th and C Streets,
NW., Washington, DC 20551; and to the
Office of Management and Budget,
Paperwork Reduction Project (7100-[to
be assigned]), Washington, DC 20503.
Solicitation of Comments Regarding
Use of "Plain Language"
Section 722 of the GLB Act requires
the Board to use "plain language" in all
proposed and final rules published after
January I, 2000. The Board invited
comments about how to make the
proposed rule easier to understand and,
in doing so, posed the following
questions:
(1) Has the Board organized the
material in an effective manner? If not,
how could the material be better
organized?
(2) Are the terms of the rule clearly
stated? If not, how could the terms be
more clearly stated?
(3) Does the rule contain technical
language or jargon that is unclear? If so,
which language requires clarification?
(4) Would a different format (with
respect to grouping and order of
sections and use of headings) make the
rule easier to understand? If so, what
changes to the format would make the
rule easier to understand?
(5) Would increasing the number of
sections (and making each section
shorter) clarify the rule? If so, which
portions of the rule should be changed
in this respect?
(6) What additional changes would
make the rule easier to understand?
The Board also provided examples in
the proposed rule to illustrate how
several of the rule's provisions would
apply in particular circumstances, and
solicited comment on what kinds of
additional examples should be added to
the rule.
Commenters generally expressed
support for the format of the regulation
and believed that the rule conveyed the
Board's interpretations of section 23A in
plain language. Several commenters did
recommend, however, that the Board
move the definitional sections of the
rule to the front. In response to these
comments, the Board has placed the
rule's definitions in the first subpart of
the rule.
Several commenters also
recommended clarification of several
examples contained in the proposed
rule and inclusion of additional
examples, particularly in the valuation
subpart of the rule. The final rule
modifies several of the proposed rule's
examples to enhance their illustrative
power and includes a number of new
examples to increase the ability of users
of the regulation to understand the
valuation formulas of the rule.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 223
Banks, Banking; Federal Reserve
System.
For the reasons set out in the
preamble, title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations is amended by adding a
new part 223 to read as follows:
PART 223-TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN MEMBER BANKS AND
THEIR AFFILIATES (REGULATION W)
Subpart A-Introduction and Definitions
Sec.
223.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
223.2 What is an "affiliate" for purposes of
sections 23A and 23B and this part?
223.3 What are the meanings of the other
terms used in sections 23A and 23B and
this part?
Subpart B-General Provisions of Section
23A
223.11 What is the maximum amount of
covered transactions that a member bank
may enter into with any single affiliate?
223.12 What is the maximum amount of
covered transactions that a member bank
may enter into with all affiliates?
223.13 What safety and soundness
requirement applies to covered
transactions?
223.14 What are the collateral requirements
for a credit transaction with an affiliate?
223.15 Maya member bank purchase a low-
quality asset from an affiliate?
223.16 What transactions by a member bank
with any person are treated as
transactions with an affiliate?
Subpart C-Valuation and Timing Principles
Under Section 23A
223.21 What valuation and timing
principles apply to credit transactions?
223.22 What valuation and timing
principles apply to asset purchases?
223.23 What valuation and timing
principles apply to purchases of and
investments in securities issued by an
affiliate?
223.24 What valuation principles apply to
extensions of credit secured by affiliate
securities?
Subpart D-Other Requirements Under
Section 23A
223.31 How does section 23A apply to a
member bank's acquisition of an affiliate
that becomes an operating subsidiary of
the member bank after the acquisition?
223.32 What rules apply to financial
subsidiaries of a member bank?
223.33 What rules apply to derivative
transactions?
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Subpart E-Exemptions from the
Provisions of Section 23A
223.41 What covered transactions are
exempt from the quantitative limits and
collateral requirements?
223.42 What covered transactions are
exempt from the quantitative limits,
collateral requirements, and low-quality
asset prohibition?
223.43 What are the standards under which
the Board may grant additional
exemptions from the requirements of
section 23A?
Subpart F-General Provisions of Section
23B
223.51 What is the market terms
requirement of section 23B?
223.52 What transactions with affiliates or
others must comply with section 23B's
market terms requirement?
223.53 What asset purchases are prohibited
by section 23B?
223.54 What advertisements and statements
are prohibited by section 23B?
223.55 What are the standards under which
the Board may grant exemptions from
the requirements of section 23B?
Subpart G-Application of Sections 23A
and 23B to U.S. Branches and Agencies of
Foreign Banks
223.61 How do sections 23A and 23B apply
to U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks?
Subpart H-Miscellaneous Interpretations
223.71 How do sections 23A and 23B apply
to transactions in which a member bank
purchases from one affiliate an asset
relating to another affiliate?
Authority: 12 U.S.c. 371c(bj(1j(EJ,
(b)(2j(A), and (fl, 371c-l(eJ, 18280), and
1468(a).
Subpart A-Introduction and
Definitions
§ 223.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
(a) Authority. The Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (Board)
has issued this part (Regulation W)
under the authority of sections 23A(f)
and 23B(e) of the Federal Reserve Act
(12 U.S.C. 371c(f), 371c-1(e)).
(b) Purpose. Sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.c. 371c,
371c-1) establish certain quantitative
limits and other prudential
requirements for loans, purchases of
assets, and certain other transactions
between a member bank and its
affiliates. This regulation implements
sections 23A and 23B by defining terms
used in the statute, explaining the
statute's requirements, and exempting
certain transactions.
(c) Scope. Sections 23A and 23B and
this regulation apply by their terms to
"member banks"-that is, any national
bank, State bank, trust company. or
other institution that is a member of the
Federal Reserve System. In addition, the
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Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. 18280)) applies sections 23A and
23B to insured State nonmember banks
in the same manner and to the same
extent as if they were member banks.
The Home Owners' Loan Act (12 U.S.c.
1468(a)) also applies sections 23A and
23B to insured savings associations in
the same manner and to the same extent
as if they were member banks (and
imposes two additional restrictions).
§223.2 What is an "affiliate" for purposes
of sections 23A and 236 and this part?
(a) For purposes of this part and
except as provided in paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this section, "affiliate" with
respect to a member bank means:
(1) Parent companies. Any company
that controls the member bank;
(2) Companies under common control
bya parent company. Any company,
including any subsidiary of the member
bank, that is controlled by a company
that controls the member bank;
(3) Companies under other common
control. Any company, including any
subsidiary of the member bank, that is
controlled, directly or indirectly, by
trust or otherwise, by or for the benefit
of shareholders who beneficially or
otherwise control, directly or indirectly,
by trust or otherwise, the member bank
or any company that controls the
member bank;
(4) Companies with interlocking
directorates. Any company in which a
majority of its directors, trustees, or
general partners (or individuals
exercising similar functions) constitute
a majority of the persons holding any
such office with the member bank or
any company that controls the member
bank;
(5) Sponsored and advised
companies. Any company, including a
real estate investment trust, that is
sponsored and advised on a contractual
basis by the member bank or an affiliate
of the member bank;
(6) Investment companies. (i) Any
investment company for which the
member bank or any affiliate of the
member bank serves as an investment
adviser, as defined in section 2(a)(20) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940
(15 U.S.c. 80a-2(a)(20)); and
(ii) Any other investment fund for
which the member bank or any affiliate
of the member bank serves as an
investment advisor, if the member bank
and its affiliates own or control in the
aggregate more than 5 percent of any
class of voting securities or of the equity
capital of the fund;
(7) Depository institution subsidiaries.
A depository institution that is a
subsidiary of the member bank;
(8) Financial subsidiaries. A financial
subsidiary of the member bank;
(9) Companies held under merchant
banking or insurance company
investment authority-(i) In general.
Any company in which a holding
company of the member bank owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, or acting
through one or more other persons, 15
percent or more of the equity capital
pursuant to section 4(k)(4)(H) or (I) of
the Bank Holding Company Act (12
U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(H) or (I)).
(ii) General exemption. A company
will not be an affiliate under paragraph
(a)(9)(i) of this section if the holding
company presents information to the
Board that demonstrates, to the Board's
satisfaction, that the holding company
does not control the company.
(iii) Specific exemptions. A company
also will not be an affiliate under
paragraph (a)(9)(i) of this section if:
(A) No director, officer, or employee
of the holding company serves as a
director, trustee, or general partner (or
individual exercising similar functions)
of the company;
(B) A person that is not affiliated or
associated with the holding company
owns or controls a greater percentage of
the equity capital of the company than
is owned or controlled by the holding
company, and no more than one officer
or employee of the holding company
serves as a director or trustee (or
individual exercising similar functions)
of the company; or
(C) A person that is not affiliated or
associated with the holding company
owns or controls more than 50 percent
of the voting shares of the company, and
officers and employees of the holding
company do not constitute a majority of
the directors or trustees (or individuals
exercising similar functions) of the
company.
(iv) Application ofrule to private
equity funds. A holding company will
not be deemed to own or control the
equity capital of a company for
purposes of paragraph (a)(9)(i) of this
section solely by virtue of an investment
made by the holding company in a
private equity fund (as defined in the
merchant banking subpart of the Board's
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.173(a))) that
owns or controls the equity capital of
the company unless the holding
company controls the private equity
fund under 12 CFR 225.173(d)(4).
. (v) Definition. For purposes of this
paragraph (a)(9), "holding company"
with respect to a member bank means a
company that controls the member
bank, or a company that is controlled by
shareholders that control the member
bank, and all subsidiaries of the
company (including any depository
C·56
institution that is a subsidiary ofthe
company).
(10) Partnerships associated with the
member bank or an affiliate. Any
partnership for which the member bank
or any affiliate of the member bank
serves as a general partner or for which
the member bank or any affiliate of the
member bank causes any director,
officer, or employee of the member bank
or affiliate to serve as a ~!lneral partner;
(11) Subsidiaries ofaJtiliates. Any
subsidiary of a company described in
paragraphs (a)(l) through (10) of this
section; and
(12) Other companies. Any company
that the Board determines by regulation
or order, or that the appropriate Federal
banking agency for the member bank
determines by order, to have a
relationship with the member bank, or
any affiliate of the member bank, such
that covered transactions by the member
bank with that company may be affected
by the relationship to the detriment of
the member bank.
(b) "Affiliate" with respect to a
member bank does not include:
(1) Subsidiaries. Any company that is
a subsidiary of the member bank, unless
the company is:
(i) A depository institution;
(ii) A financial subsidiary;
(iii) Directly controlled by:
(A) One or more affiliates (other than
depository institution affiliates) of the
member bank; or
(B) A shareholder that controls the
member bank or a group of shareholders
that together control the member bank;
(iv) An employee stock option plan,
trust, or similar organization that exists
for the benefit of the shareholders.
partners. members. or employees of the
member bank or any of its affiliates; or
(v) Any other company determined to
be an affiliate under paragraph (a)(12) of
this section;
(2) Bank premises. Any company
engaged solely in holding the premises
of the member bank;
(3) Safe deposit. Any company
engaged solely in conducting a safe
deposit business;
(4) Government securities. Any
company engaged solely in holding
obligations of the United States or its
agencies or obligations fully guaranteed
by the United States or its agencies as
to principal and interest; and
(5) Companies held DPG. Any
company where control results from the
exercise of rights arising out of a bona
fide debt previously contracted. This
exclusion from the definition of
"affiliate" applies only for the period of
time specifically authorized under
applicable State or Federal law or
regulation or, in the absence of such law
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or regulation, for a period of two years
from the date of the exercise of such
rights. The Board may authorize, upon
application and for good cause shown,
extensions oftime for not more than one
year at a time, but such extensions in
the aggregate will not exceed three
years.
(c) For purposes of subpart F
(implementing section 23B), "affiliate"
with respect to a member bank also does
not include any depository institution.
§ 223.3 What are the meanings of the other
terms used in sections 23A and 238 and
this part?
For purposes of this part:
(a) Aggregate amount of covered
transactions means the amount of the
covered transaction about to be engaged
in added to the current amount of all
outstanding covered transactions.
(b) Appropriate Federal banking
agency with respect to a member bank
or other depository institution has the
same meaning as in section 3 of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.c. 1813).
(c) "Bank holding company" has the
same meaning as in 12 CFR 225.2.
(d) "Capital stock and surplus" means
the sum of:
(1) A member bank's tier 1 and tier 2
capital under the risk-based capital
guidelines of the appropriate Federal
banking agency, based on the member
bank's most recent consolidated Report
of Condition and Income filed under 12
U.S.C. 1817(a)(3);
(2) The balance of a member bank's
allowance for loan and lease losses not
included in its tier 2 capital under the
risk-based capital guidelines of the
appropriate Federal banking agency,
based on the member bank's most recent
consolidated Report of Condition and
Income filed under 12 U.S.C. 1817(a)(3);
and
(3) The amount of any investment by
a member bank in a financial subsidiary
that counts as a covered transaction and
is required to be deducted from the
member bank's capital for regulatory
capital purposes.
(e) Carrying value with respect to a
security means (unless otherwise
provided) the value of the security on
the financial statements of the member
bank, determined in accordance with
GAAP.
(f) Company means a corporation,
partnership, limited liability company,
business trust, association, or similar
organization and, unless specifically
excluded, includes a member bank and
a depository institution.
(g) Control. (1) In general. "Control"
by a company or shareholder over
another company means that:
(i) The company or shareholder,
directly or indirectly, or acting through
one or more other persons, owns,
controls, or has power to vote 25
percent or more of any class of voting
securities of the other company;
(ii) The company or shareholder
controls in any manner the election of
a majority of the directors, trustees, or
general partners (or individuals
exercising similar functions) of the other
company; or
(iii) The Board determines, after
notice and opportunity for hearing, that
the company or shareholder, directly or
indirectly, exercises a controlling
influence over the management or
policies of the other company.
(2) Ownership or control of shares as
fiduciary. Notwithstanding any other
provision of this regulation, no
company will be deemed to control
another company by virtue of its
ownership or control of shares in a
fiduciary capacity, except as provided
in paragraph (a)(3) of § 223.2 or if the
company owning or controlling the
shares is a business trust.
(3) Ownership or control of securities
by subsidiary. A company controls
securities, assets, or other ownership
interests owned or controlled, directly
or indirectly, by any subsidiary
(including a subsidiary depository
institution) of the company.
(4) Ownership or control of
convertible instruments. A company or
shareholder that owns or controls
instruments (including options or
warrants) that are convertible or
exercisable, at the option of the holder
or owner, into securities, controls the
securities, unless the company or
shareholder presents information to the
Board that demonstrates, to the Board's
satisfaction, that the company or
shareholder should not be deemed to
control the securities.
(5) Ownership or control ofnonvoting
securities. A company or shareholder
that owns or controls 25 percent or more
of the equity capital of another company
controls the other company, unless the
company or shareholder presents
information to the Board that
demonstrates, to the Board's
satisfaction, that the company or
shareholder does not control the other
comfany.
(h Covered transaction with respect
to an affiliate means:
(1) An extension of credit to the
affiliate;
(2) A purchase of, or an investment in,
a security issued by the affiliate;
(3) A purchase of an asset from the
affiliate, including an asset subject to
recourse or an agreement to repurchase,
except such purchases of real and
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personal property as may be specifically
exempted by the Board by order or
regulation;
(4) The acceptance of a security
issued by the affiliate as collateral for an
extension of credit to any person or
company; and
(5) The issuance of a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit, including
an endorsement or standby letter of
credit, on behalf of the affiliate, a
confirmation of a letter of credit issued
by the affiliate, and a cross-affiliate
netting arrangement.
(i) Credit transaction with an affiliate
means:
(1) An extension of credit to the
affiliate;
(2) An issuance of a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit, including
an endorsement or standby letter of
credit, on behalf of the affiliate and a
confirmation of a letter of credit issued
by the affiliate; and
(3) A cross-affiliate netting
arrangement.
(j) Cross-affiliate netting arrangement
means an arrangement among a member
bank, one or more affiliates of the
member bank, and one or more
nonaffiliates of the member bank in
which:
(1) A nonaffiliate is permitted to
deduct any obligations of an affiliate of
the member bank to the nonaffiliate
when settling the nonaffiliate's
obligations to the member bank; or
(2) The member bank is permitted or
required to add any obligations of its
affiliate to a nonaffiliate when
determining the member bank's
obligations to the nonaffiliate.
(k) "Depository institution" means,
unless otherwise noted, an insured
depository institution (as defined in
section 3 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act (12 U.S.C. 1813)), but
does not include any branch of a foreign
bank. For purposes of this definition, an
operating subsidiary of a depository
institution is treated as part of the
depository institution.
(l) "Derivative transaction" means
any derivative contract listed in sections
lII.E.1.a. through d. of Appendix A to 12
CFR part 225 and any similar derivative
contract, including a credit derivative
contract.
(m) "Eligible affiliated mutual fund
securities" has the meaning specified in
paragraph (c)(2) of § 223.24.
(n) "Equity capital" means:
(1) With respect to a corporation,
preferred stock, common stock, capital
surplus, retained earnings, and
accumulated other comprehensive
income, less treasury stock, plus any
other account that constitutes equity of
the corporation; and
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(2) With respect to a partnership,
limited liability company, or other
company, equity accounts similar to
those described in paragraph (n)(l) of
this section.
(0) "Extension of credit" to an affiliate
means the making or renewal of a loan,
the granting of a line of credit, or the
extending of credit in any manner
whatsoever, including on an intraday
basis, to an affiliate. An extension of
credit to an affiliate includes, without
limitation:
(1) An advance to an affiliate by
means of an overdraft, cash item, or
otherwise;
(2) A sale of Federal funds to an
affiliate;
(3) A lease that is the functional
equivalent of an extension of credit to
an affiliate;
(4) An acquisition by purchase,
discount, exchange, or otherwise of a
note or other obligation, including
commercial paper or other debt
securities, of an affiliate;
(5) Any increase in the amount of,
extension of the maturity of, or
adjustment to the interest rate term or
other material term of, an extension of
credit to an affiliate; and
(6) Any other similar transaction as a
result of which an affiliate becomes
obligated to pay money (or its
equivalent).
(p) "Financial subsidiary"
(1) In general. Except as provided in
paragraph (p)(2) of this section, the term
"financial subsidiary" means any
subsidiary of a member bank that:
(i) Engages, directly or indirectly, in
any activity that national banks are not
permitted to engage in directly or that
is conducted under terms and
conditions that differ from those that
govern the conduct of such activity by
national banks; and
(ii) Is not a subsidiary that a national
bank is specifically authorized to own
or control by the express terms of a
Federal statute (other than 12 U.S.c.
24a), and not by implication or
interpretation.
(2) Exceptions. "Financial subsidiary"
does not include:
(i) A subsidiary of a member bank that
is considered a financial subsidiary
under paragraph (p)(I) of this section
solely because the subsidiary engages in
the sale of insurance as agent or broker
in a manner that is not permitted for
national banks; and
(ii) A subsidiary of a State bank (other
than a subsidiary described in section
46(a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (12 U.S.C. 1831w(a))) that is
considered a financial subsidiary under
paragraph (p)(l) of this section solely
because the subsidiary engages in one or
more of the following activities:
(A) An activity that the State bank
may engage in directly under applicable
Federal and State law and that is
conducted under the same terms and
conditions that govern the conduct of
the activity by the State bank; and
(8) An activity that the subsidiary was
authorized by applicable Federal and
State law to engage in prior to December
12, 2002, and that was lawfully engaged
in by the subsidiary on that date.
(3) Subsidiaries offinancial
subsidiaries. If a company is a financial
subsidiary under paragraphs (p)(I) and
(p)(2) ofthis section, any subsidiary of
such a company is also a financial
subsidiary.
(q) "Foreign bank" and an "agency,"
"branch," or "commercial lending
company" of a foreign bank have the
same meanings as in section l(b) of the
International Banking Act of 1978 (12
U.S.c. 3101).
(r) "GAAP" means U.S. generally
accepted accounting principles.
(s) "General purpose credit card" has
the meaning specified in paragraph
(c)(4)(ii) of § 223.16.
(t) In contemplation. A transaction
between a member bank and a
nonaffiliate is presumed to be "in
contemplation" of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the member
bank if the member bank enters into the
transaction with the nonaffiliate after
the execution of, or commencement of
negotiations designed to result in, an
agreement under the terms of which the
nonaffiliate would become an affiliate.
(u) "Intraday extension of credit" has
the meaning specified in paragraph
(1)(2) of § 223.42.
(v) "Low-quality asset" means:
(1) An asset (including a security) .
classified as "substandard," "doubtful,"
or "loss," or treated as "special
mention" or "other transfer risk
problems," either in the most recent
report of examination or inspection of
an affiliate prepared by either a Federal
or State supervisory agency or in any
internal classification system used by
the member bank or the affiliate
(including an asset that receives a rating
that is substantially equivalent to
"classified" or "special mention" in the
internal system of the member bank or
affiliate);
(2) An asset in a nonaccrual status;
(3) An asset on which principal or
interest payments are more than thirty
days past due;
(4) An asset whose terms have been
renegotiated or compromised due to the
deteriorating financial condition ofthe
obligor; and
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(5) An asset acquired through
foreclosure, repossession, or otherwise
in satisfaction of a debt previously
contracted, if the asset has not yet been
reviewed in an examination or
inspection.
(w) "Member bank" means any
national bank, State bank, banking
association, or trust company that is a
member of the Federal Reserve System.
For purposes of this definition, an
operating subsidiary of a member bank
is treated as part of the member bank.
(x) "Municipal securities" has the
same meaning as in section 3(a)(29) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (17
U.S.c. 78c(a)(29)).
(y) "NonaffiIiate" with respect to a
member bank means any person that is
not an affiliate of the member bank.
(z) "Obligations of, or fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest
by, the United States or its agencies"
includes those obligations listed in 12
CFR 201.108(b) and any additional
obligations as determined by the Board.
The term does not include Federal
Housing Administration or Veterans
Administration loans.
(aa) "Operating subsidiary" with
respect to a member bank or other
depository institution means any
subsidiary of the member bank or
depository institution other than a
subsidiary described in paragraphs
(b)(l)(i) through (v) of § 223.2.
(bb) "Person" means an individual,
company, trust, joint venture, pool,
syndicate, sole proprietorship,
unincorporated organization, or any
other form of entity.
(cc) "Principal underwriter" has the
meaning specified in paragraph (c)(l) of
§ 223.53.
(dd) "Purchase ofan asset" by a
member bank from an affiliate means
the acquisition by a member bank of an
asset from an affiliate in exchange for
cash or any other consideration,
including an assumption of liabilities.
The merger of an affiliate into a member
bank is a purchase of assets by the
member bank from an affiliate if the
member bank assumes any liabilities of
the affiliate or pays any other form of
consideration in the transaction.
(ee) Riskless principal. A company is
"acting exclusively as a riskless
principal" if, after receiving an order to
buy (or sell) a security from a customer,
the company purchases (or sells) the
security in the secondary market for its
own account to offset a
contemporaneous sale to (or purchase
from) the customer.
(ff) "Securities" means stocks, bonds,
debentures, notes, or similar obligations
(including commercial paper).
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(gg) ..Securities affiliate" with respect
to a member bank means:
(1) An affiliate of the member bank
that is registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission as a broker or
dealer; or
(2) Any other securities broker or
dealer affiliate of a member bank that is
approved by the Board.
(hh) ..State bank" has the same
meaning as in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.c. 1813).
(ii) "Subsidiary" with respect to a
specified company means a company
that is controlled by the specified
comfany.
OJ "Voting securities" has the same
meaning as in 12 CFR 225.2.
(kk) .. Well capitalized" has the same
meaning as in 12 CFR 225.2 and, in the
case of any holding company that is not
a bank holding company, "well
capitalized" means that the holding
company has and maintains at least the
capital levels required for a bank
holding company to be well capitalized
under 12 CFR 225.2.
(ll) "Well managed" has the same
meaning as in 12 CFR 225.2.
Subpart B'General Provisions of
Section 23A
§ 223.11 What is the maximum amount of
covered transactions that a member bank
may enter into with any single affiliate?
A member bank may not engage in a
covered transaction with an affiliate
(other than a financial subsidiary ofthe
member bank) if the aggregate amount of
the member bank's covered transactions
with such affiliate would exceed 10
percent of the capital stock and surplus
of the member bank.
§ 223.12 What is the maximum amount of
covered transactions that a member bank
may enter into with all affiliates?
A member bank may not engage in a
covered transaction with any affiliate if
the aggregate amount of the member
bank's covered transactions with all
affiliates would exceed 20 percent of the
capital stock and surplus of the member
bank.
§223.13 What safety and soundness
requirement applies to covered
transactions?
A member bank may not engage in
any covered transaction, including any
transaction exempt under this
regulation, unless the transaction is on
terms and conditions that are consistent
with safe and sound banking practices.
§223.14 What are the collateral
requirements for a credit transaction with
an affiliate?
(a) Collateral required for extensions
of credit and certain other covered
transactions. A member bank must
ensure that each of its credit
transactions with an affiliate is secured
by the amount of collateral required by
paragraph (b) ofthis section at the time
of the transaction.
(b) Amount of collateral required. (1)
The rule. A credit transaction described
in paragraph (a) of this section must be
secured by collateral having a market
value equal to at least:
(i) 100 percent of the amount of the
transaction, if the collateral is:
(A) Obligations of the United States or
its agencies;
(B) Obligations fully guaranteed by
the United States or its agencies as to
principal and interest;
(C) Notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or
bankers' acceptances that are eligible for
rediscount or purchase by a Federal
Reserve Bank; or
(D) A segregated, earmarked deposit
account with the member bank that is
for the sole purpose of securing credit
transactions between the member bank
and its affiliates and is identified as
such;
(ii) 110 percent of the amount of the
transaction, if the collateral is
obligations of any State or political
subdivision of any State;
(iii) 120 percent of the amount ofthe
transaction, if the collateral is other debt
instruments, including loans and other
receivables; or
(iv) 130 percent of the amount of the
transaction, if the collateral is stock,
leases, or other real or personal
property.
(2) Example. A member bank makes a
$1,000 loan to an affiliate. The affiliate
posts as collateral for the loan $500 in
U.S. Treasury securities, $480 in
corporate debt securities, and $130 in
real estate. The loan satisfies the
collateral requirements of this section
because $500 of the loan is 100 percent
secured by obligations of the United
States, $400 ofthe loan is 120 percent
secured by debt instruments, and $100
of the loan is 130 percent secured by
real estate.
(c) Ineligible collateral. The following
items are not eligible collateral for
purposes of this section:
(1) Low-quality assets;
(2) Securities issued by any affiliate;
(3) Equity securities issued by the
member bank, and debt securities issued
by the member bank that represent
regulatory capital ofthe member bank;
(4) Intangible assets (including
servicing assets), unless specifically
approved by the Board; and
(5) Guarantees, letters of credit, and
other similar instruments.
(d) Perfection and priority
requirements for collateral. (1)
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Perfection. A member bank must
maintain a security interest in collateral
required by this section that is perfected
and enforceable under applicable law,
including in the event of default
resulting from bankruptcy, insolvency,
liquidation, or similar circumstances.
(2) Priority. A member bank either
must obtain a first priority security
interest in collateral required by this
section or must deduct from the value
of collateral obtained by the member
bank the lesser of:
(i) The amount of any security interest
in the collateral that is senior to that of
the member bank; or
(ii) The amount of any credit secured
by the collateral that is senior to that of
the member bank.
(3) Example. A member bank makes a
$2,000 loan to an affiliate. The affiliate
grants the member bank a second
priority security interest in a piece of
real estate valued at $3,000. Another
institution that previously lent $1,000 to
the affiliate has a first priority security
interest in the entire parcel of real
estate. This transaction is not in
compliance with the collateral
requirements of this section. Due to the
existence of the prior third-party lien on
the real estate, the effective value of the
real estate collateral for the member
bank for purposes of this section is only
$2,000-$600 less than the amount of
real estate collateral required by this
section for the transaction ($2,000 x 130
percent = $2,600).
(e) Replacement requirement for
retired or amortized collateral. A
member bank must ensure that any
required collateral that subsequently is
retired or amortized is replaced with
additional eligible collateral as needed
to keep the percentage of the collateral
value relative to the amount of the
outstanding credit transaction equal to
the minimum percentage required at the
inception of the transaction.
(0 Inapplicability of the collateral
requirements to certain transactions.
The collateral requirements of this
section do not apply to the following
transactions .
(1) Acceptances. An acceptance that
already is fully secured either by
attached documents or by other
property that is involved in the
transaction and has an ascertainable
market value.
(2) The unused portion of certain
extensions of credit. The unused portion
of an extension of credit to an affiliate
as long as the member bank does not
have any legal obligation to advance
additional funds under the extension of
credit until the affiliate provides the
amount of collateral required by
paragraph (b) of this section with
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respect to the entire used portion
(including the amount of the requested
advance) of the extension of credit.
(3) Purchases of affiliate debt
securities in the secondary market. The
purchase of a debt security issued by an
affiliate as long as the member bank
purchases the debt security from a
nonaffiliate in a bona fide secondary
market transaction.
§ 223.15 Maya member bank purchase a
low-quality asset from an affiliate?
(a) In general. A member bank may
not purchase a low-quality asset from an
affiliate unless, pursuant to an
independent credit evaluation, the
member bank had committed itself to
purchase the asset before the time the
asset was acquired by the affiliate.
(b) Exemption for renewals of loan
participations involving problem loans.
The prohibition contained in paragraph
(a) of this section does not apply to the
renewal of, or extension of additional
credit with respect to, a member bank's
participation in a loan to a nonaffiliate
that was originated by an affiliate if:
(1) The loan was not a low-quality
asset at the time the member bank
purchased its participation;
(2) The renewal or extension of
additional credit is approved, as
necessary to protect the participating
member bank's investment by
enhancing the ultimate collection of the
original indebtedness, by the board of
directors of the participating member
bank or, ifthe originating affiliate is a
depository institution, by:
(i) An executive committee of the
board of directors of the participating
member bank; or
(ii) One or more senior management
officials of the participating member
bank, if:
(A) The board of directors of the
member bank approves standards for the
member bank's renewals or extensions
of additional credit described in this
paragraph (b), based on the
determination set forth in paragraph
(b)(2) of this section;
(B) Each renewal or extension of
additional credit described in this
paragraph (b) meets the standards; and
(C) The board of directors of the
member bank periodically reviews
renewals and extensions of additional
credit described in this paragraph (b) to
ensure that they meet the standards and
periodically reviews the standards to
ensure that they continue to meet the
criterion set forth in paragraph (b)(2) of
this section;
(3) The participating member bank's
share of the renewal or extension of
additional credit does not exceed its
proportional share of the original
transaction by more than 5 percent,
unless the member bank obtains the
prior written approval of its appropriate
Federal banking agency; and
(4) The participating member bank
provides its appropriate Federal banking
agency with written notice of the
renewal or extension of additional
credit not later than 20 days after
consummation.
§ 223.16 What transactions by a member
bank with any person are treated as
transactions with an affiliate?
(a) In general. A member bank must
treat any of its transactions with any
person as a transaction with an affiliate
to the extent that the proceeds of the
transaction are used for the benefit of,
or transferred to, an affiliate.
(b) Certain agency transactions. (1)
Except to the extent described in
paragraph (b)(2) of this section, an
extension of credit by a member bank to
a nonaffiliate is not treated as an
extension of credit to an affiliate under
paragraph (a) of this section if:
(i) The proceeds of the extension of
credit are used to purchase an asset
through an affiliate of the member bank,
and the affiliate is acting exclusively as
an agent or broker in the transaction;
and
(ii) The asset purchased by the
nonaffiliate is not issued, underwritten,
or sold as principal by any affiliate of
the member bank.
(2) The interpretation set forth in
paragraph (b)(1) of this section does not
apply to the extent of any agency fee,
brokerage commission, or other
compensation received by an affiliate
from the proceeds of the extension of
credit. The receipt of such
compensation may qualify, however, for
the exemption contained in paragraph
(c)(2) of this section.
(c) Exemptions. Notwithstanding
paragraph (a) of this section, the
following transactions are not subject to
the quantitative limits of §§ 223.11 and
223.12 or the collateral requirements of
§ 223.14. The transactions are, however,
subject to the safety and soundness
requirement of § 223.13 and the market
terms requirement and other provisions
of subpart F (implementing section
23B).
(1) Certain riskless principal
transactions. An extension of credit by
a member bank to a nonaffiliate, if:
(i) The proceeds of the extension of
credit are used to purchase a security
through a securities affiliate of the
member bank, and the securities affiliate
is acting exclusively as a riskless
principal in the transaction;
(ii) The security purchased by the
nonaffiliate is not issued, underwritten,
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or sold as principal (other than as
riskless principal) by any affiliate of the
member bank; and
(iii) Any riskless principal mark-up or
other compensation received by the
securities affiliate from the proceeds of
the extension of credit meets the market
terms standard set forth in paragraph
(c)(2) of this section.
(2) Brokerage commissions, agency
fees, and riskless principal mark-ups.
An affiliate's retention of a portion of
the proceeds of an extension of credit
described in paragraph (b) or (c)(l) of
this section as a brokerage commission,
agency fee, or riskless principal mark-
up, if that commission, fee, or mark-up
is substantially the same as, or lower
than, those prevailing at the same time
for comparable transactions with or
involving other nonaffiliates, in
accordance with the market terms
requirement of § 223.51.
(3) Preexisting lines of credit. An
extension of credit by a member bank to
a nonaffiliate, if:
(i) The proceeds of the extension of
credit are used to purchase a security
from or through a securities affiliate of
the member bank; and
(ii) The extension of credit is made
pursuant to, and consistent with any
conditions imposed in, a preexisting
line of credit that was not established in
contemplation of the purchaseof
securities from or through an affiliate of
the member bank.
(4) General purpose credit card
transactions.
(i) In general. An extension of credit
by a member bank to a nonaffiliate, if:
(A) The proceeds of the extension of
credit are used by the nonaffiliate to
purchase a product or service from an
affiliate of the member bank; and
(B) The extension of credit is made
pursuant to, and consistent with any
conditions imposed in, a general
purpose credit card issued by the
member bank to the nonaffiliate.
(ii) Definition. "General purpose
credit card" means a credit card issued
by a member bank that is widely
accepted by merchants that are not
affiliates of the member bank for the
purchase of products or services, if:
(A) Less than 25 percent of the total
value of products and services
purchased with the card by all
cardholders are purchases of products
and services from one or more affiliates
of the member bank;
(B) All affiliates of the member bank
would be permissible for a financial
holding company (as defined in 12
U.S.C. 1841) under section 4 ofthe Bank
Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843),
and the member bank has no reason to
believe that 25 percent or more of the
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total value of products and services
purchased with the card by all
cardholders are or would be purchases
of products and services from one or
more affiliates of the member bank; or
(e) The member bank presents
information to the Board that
demonstrates, to the Board's
satisfaction, that less than 25 percent of
the total value of products and services
purchased with the card by all
cardholders are and would be purchases
of products and services from one or
more affiliates of the member bank.
(iii) Calculating compliance. To
determine whether a credit card
qualifies as a general purpose credit
card under the standard set forth in
paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(A) ofthis section, a
member bank must compute compliance
on a monthly basis, based on cardholder
purchases that were financed by the
credit card during the preceding 12
calendar months. If a credit card has
qualified as a general purpose credit
card for 3 consecutive months but then
ceases to qualify in the following
month, the member bank may continue
to treat the credit card as a general
purpose credit card for such month and
three additional months (or such longer
period as may be permitted by the
Board).
(iv) Example of calculating
compliance with the 25 percent test. A
member bank seeks to qualify a credit
card as a general purpose credit card
under paragraph (c)(4)(ii)(A) of this
section. The member bank assesses its
compliance under paragraph (c)(4)(iii)
of this section on the 15th day of every
month (for the preceding 12 calendar
months). The credit card qualifies as a
general purpose credit card for at least
three consecutive months. On June 15,
2005, however, the member bank
determines that, for the 12-calendar-
month period from June 1, 2004,
through May 31,2005,27 percent of the
total value of products and services
purchased with the card by all
cardholders were purchases of products
and services from an affiliate of the
member bank. Unless the credit card
returns to compliance with the 25
percent limit by the 12-calendar-month
period ending August 31,2005, the card
will cease to qualify as a general
purpose credit card as of September 1,
2005. Any outstanding extensions of
credit under the credit card that were
used to purchase products or services
from an affiliate of the member bank
would become covered transactions at
such time.
Subpart C-Valuation and Timing
Principles Under Section 23A
§ 223.21 What valuation and timing
principles apply to credit transactions?
(a) Valuation. (1) Initial valuation.
Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2)
or (3) of this section, a credit transaction
with an affiliate initially must be valued
at the greater of:
(i) The principal amount of the
transaction;
(ii) The amount owed by the affiliate
to the member bank under the
transaction; ,or
(iii) The sum of:
(A) The amount provided to, or on
behalf of, the affiliate in the transaction;
and
(B) Any additional amount that the
member bank could be required to
provide to, or on behalf of, the affiliate
under the terms of the transaction.
(2) Initial valuation ofcertain
acquisitions of a credit transaction. If a
member bank acquires from a
nonaffiliate a credit transaction with an
affiliate, the covered transaction
initially must be valued at the sum of:
(i) The total amount of consideration
given (including liabilities assumed) by
the member bank in exchange for the
credit transaction; and
(ii) Any additional amount that the
member bank could be required to
provide to, or on behalf of, the affiliate
under the terms of the transaction.
(3) Debt securities. The valuation
principles of paragraphs (a)(l) and (2) of
this section do not apply to a member
bank's purchase of or investment in a
debt security issued by an affiliate,
which is governed by § 223.23.
(4) Examples. The following are
examples of how to value a member
bank's credit transactions with an
affiliate.
(il Term loan. A member bank makes
a loan to an affiliate that has a principal
amount of $100. The affiliate pays $2 in
up-front fees to the member bank, and
the affiliate receives net loan proceeds
of $98. The member bank must initially
value the covered transaction at $100.
(ii) Revolving credit. A member bank
establishes a $300 revolving credit
facility for an affiliate. The affiliate has
drawn down $100 under the facility.
The member bank must value the
covered transaction at $300 throughout
the life of the facility.
(iii) Guarantee. A member bank has
issued a guarantee to a nonaffiliate on
behalf of an affiliate under which the
member bank would be obligated to pay
the nonaffiliate $500 if the affiliate
defaults on an issuance of debt
securities. The member bank must value
the guarantee at $500 throughout the life
of the guarantee.
C - 61
(iv) Acquisition of a loan to an
affiliate. A member bank purchases
from a nonaffiliate a fixed-rate loan to
an affiliate. The loan has an outstanding
principal amount of $100 but, due to
movements in the general level of
interest rates since the time ofthe loan's
origination, the member bank is able to
purchase the loan for $90. The member
bank initially must value the credit
transaction at $90 (and must ensure that
the credit transaction complies with the
collateral requirements of § 223.14 at the
time of its acquisition of the loan).
(b) Timing. (1) In general. A member
bank engages in a credit transaction
with an affiliate at the time during the
day that:
(i) The member bank becomes legally
obligated to make an extension of credit
to, issue a guarantee, acceptance, or
letter of credit on behalf of, or confirm
a letter of credit issued by, an affiliate;
(ii) The member bank enters into a
cross-affiliate netting arrangement; or
(iii) The member bank acquires an
extension of credit to, or guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit issued on
behalf of, an affiliate.
(2) Credit transactions by a member
bank with a nonaffiliate that becomes
an affiliate of the member bank.
(i) In general. A credit transaction
with a nonaffiliate becomes a covered
transaction at the time that the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate of the
member bank. The member bank must
treat the amount of any such credit
transaction as part of the aggregate
amount of the member bank's covered
transactions for purposes of determining
compliance with the quantitative limits
of §§ 223.11 and 223.12 in connection
with any future covered transactions.
Except as described in paragraph
(b)(2)(ii) of this section, the member
bank is not required to reduce the
amount of its covered transactions with
any affiliate because the nonaffiliate has
become an affiliate. If the nonaffiliate
becomes an affiliate less than one year
after the member bank enters into the
credit transaction with the nonaffiliate,
the member bank also must ensure that
the credit transaction complies with the
collateral requirements of § 223.14
promptly after the nonaffiliate becomes
an affiliate.
(ii) Credit transactions by a member
bank with a nonaffiliate in
contemplation of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the member
bank. Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph (b)(2)(i) ofthis section, if a
member bank engages in a credit
transaction with a nonaffiliate in
contemplation of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the member
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bank, the member bank must ensure
that:
(A) The aggregate amount of the
member bank's covered transactions
(including any such credit transaction
with the nonaffiliate) would not exceed
the quantitative limits of § 223.11 or
223.12 at the time the nonaffiliate
becomes an affiliate; and
(B) The credit transaction complies
with the collateral requirements of
§ 223.14 at the time the nonaffiliate
becomes an affiliate.
(iii) Example. A member bank with
capital stock and surplus of $1,000 and
no outstanding covered transactions
makes a $120 unsecured loan to a
nonaffiliate. The member bank does not
make the loan in contemplation of the
nonaffiliate becoming an affiliate. Nine
months later, the member bank's
holding company purchases all the
stock of the nonaffiliate, thereby making
the nonaffiliate an affiliate of the
member bank. The member bank is not
in violation of the quantitative limits of
§ 223.11 or 223.12 at the time of the
stock acquisition. The member bank is,
however, prohibited from engaging in
any additional covered transactions
with the new affiliate at least until such
time as the value of the loan transaction
falls below 10 percent of the member
bank's capital stock and surplus. In
addition, the member bank must bring
the loan into compliance with the
collateral requirements of § 223.14
promptly after the stock acquisition.
§ 223.22 What valuation and timing
principles apply to asset purchases?
(a) Valuation. (1) In general. Except as
provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this
section, a purchase of an asset by a
member bank from an affiliate must be
valued initially at the total amount of
consideration given (including
liabilities assumed) by the member bank
in exchange for the asset. The value of
the covered transaction after the
purchase may be reduced to reflect
amortization or depreciation of the
asset, to the extent that such reductions
are consistent with GAAP.
(2) Exceptions. (i) Purchase ofan
extension of credit to an affiliate. A
purchase from an affiliate of an
extension of credit to an affiliate must
be valued in accordance with § 223.21,
unless the note or obligation evidencing
the extension of credit is a security
issued by an affiliate (in which case the
transaction must be valued in
accordance with § 223.23).
(ii) Purchase of a security issued by
an affiliate. A purchase from an affiliate
of a security issued by an affiliate must
be valued in accordance with § 223.23.
(iii) Transfer of a subsidiary. A
transfer to a member bank of securities
issued by an affiliate that is treated as
a purchase of assets from an affiliate
under § 223.31 must be valued in
accordance with paragraph (b) of
§ 223.31.
(iv) Purchase of a line of credit. A
purchase from an affiliate of a line of
credit, revolving credit facility, or other
similar credit arrangement for a
nonaffiliate must be valued initially at
the total amount of consideration given
by the member bank in exchange for the
asset plus any additional amount that
the member bank could be required to
provide to the borrower under the terms
of the credit arrangement.
(b) Timing. (1) In general. A purchase
of an asset from an affiliate remains a
covered transaction for a member bank
for as long as the member bank holds
the asset.
(2) Asset purchases by a member bank
from a nonaffiliate in contemplation of
the nonaffiliate becoming an affiliate of
the member bank. If a member bank
purchases an asset from a nonaffiliate in
contemplation of the nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the member
bank, the asset purchase becomes a
covered transaction at the time that the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate of the
member bank. In addition, the member
bank must ensure that the aggregate
amount of the member bank's covered
transactions (including any such
transaction with the nonaffiliate) would
not exceed the quantitative limits of
§ 223.11 or 223.12 at the time the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate.
(c) Examples. The following are
examples of how to value a member
bank's purchase of an asset from an
affiliate.
(1) Cash purchase ofassets. A
member bank purchases a pool of loans
from an affiliate for $10 million. The
member bank initially must value the
covered transaction at $10 million.
Going forward, if the borrowers repay $6
million of the principal amount of the
loans, the member bank may value the
covered transaction at $4 million.
(2) Purchase ofassets through an
assumption ofliabilities. An affiliate of
a member bank contributes real property
with a fair market value of $200,000 to
the member bank. The member bank
pays the affiliate no cash for the
property, but assumes a $50,000
mortgage on the property. The member
bank has engaged in a covered
transaction with the affiliate and
initially must value the transaction at
$50,000. Going forward, if the member
bank retains the real property but pays
off the mortgage, the member bank must
continue to value the covered
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transaction at $50,000. If the member
bank, however, sells the real property,
the transaction ceases to be a covered
transaction at the time of the sale
(regardless of the status of the
mortgage).
§ 223.23 What valuation and timing
principles apply to purchases of and
investments in securities issued by an
affiliate?
(a) Valuation. (1) In general. Except as
provided in paragraph (b) of § 223.32
with respect to financial subsidiaries, a
member bank's purchase of or
investment in a security issued by an
affiliate must be valued at the greater of:
(i) The total amount of consideration
given (including liabilities assumed) by
the member bank in exchange for the
security, reduced to reflect amortization
of the security to the extent consistent
with GAAP; or
(ii) The carrying value of the security.
(2) Examples. The following are
examples of how to value a member
bank's purchase of or investment in
securities issued by an affiliate (other
than a financial subsidiary of the
member bank).
(i) Purchase of the debt securities of
an affiliate. The parent holding
company of a member bank owns 100
percent of the shares of a mortgage
company. The member bank purchases
debt securities issued by the mortgage
company for $600. The initial carrying
value of the securities is $600. The
member bank initially must value the
investment at $600.
(ii) Purchase of the shares of an
affiliate. The parent holding company of
a member bank owns 51 percent of the
shares of a mortgage company. The
member bank purchases an additional
30 percent of the shares of the mortgage
company from a third party for $100.
The initial carrying value of the shares
is $100. The member bank initially must
value the investment at $100. Going
forward, if the member bank's carrying
value of the shares declines to $40, the
member bank must continue to value
the investment at $100.
(iii) Contribution of the shares of an
affiliate. The parent holding company of
a member bank owns 100 percent of the
shares of a mortgage company and
contributes 30 percent of the shares to
the member bank. The member bank
gives no consideration in exchange for
the shares. If the initial carrying value
of the shares is $300, then the member
bank initially must value the investment
at $300. Going forward, if the member
bank's carrying value of the shares
increases to $500, the member bank
must value the investment at $500.
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(b) Timing. (1) In general. A purchase
of or investment in a security issued by
an affiliate remains a covered
transaction for a member bank for as
long as the member bank holds the
security.
(2) A member bank's purchase of or
investment in a security issued by a
nonaffiliate that becomes an affiliate of
the member bank. A member bank's
purchase of or investment in a security
issued by a nonaffiliate that becomes an
affiliate of the member bank must be
treated according to the same transition
rules that apply to credit transactions
described in paragraph (b)(2) of
§ 223.21.
§ 223.24 What valuation principles apply to
extensions of credit secured by affiliate
securities?
(a) Valuation of extensions ofcredit
secured exclusively by affiliate
securities. An extension of credit by a
member bank to a nonaffiliate secured
exclusively by securities issued by an
affiliate of the member bank must be
valued at the lesser of:
(1) The total value of the extension of
credit; or
(2) The fair market value of the
securities issued by an affiliate that are
pledged as collateral, if the member
bank verifies that such securities meet
the market quotation standard contained
in paragraph (e) of § 223.42 or the
standards set forth in paragraphs (f)(l)
and (5) of § 223.42.
(b) Valuation of extensions of credit
secured by affiliate securities and other
collateral. An extension of credit by a
member bank to a nonaffiliate secured
in part by securities issued by an
affiliate of the member bank and in part
by nonaffiliate collateral must be valued
at the lesser of:
(1) The total value of the extension of
credit less the fair market value of the
nonaffiliate collateral; or
(2) The fair market value of the
securities issued by an affiliate that are
pledged as collateral, if the member
bank verifies that such securities meet
the market quotation standard contained
in paragraph (e) of § 223.42 or the
standards set forth in paragraphs (f)(1)
and (5) of § 223.42.
(c) Exclusion ofeligible affiliated
mutual fund securities. (1) The
exclusion. Eligible affiliated mutual
fund securities are not considered to be
securities issued by an affiliate, and are
instead considered to be nonaffiliate
collateral, for purposes of paragraphs (a)
and (b) ofthis section, unless the
member bank knows or has reason to
know that the proceeds of the extension
of credit will be used to purchase the
eligible affiliated mutual fund securities
collateral or will otherwise be used for
the benefit of or transferred to an
affiliate of the member bank.
(2) Definition. "Eligible affiliated
mutual fund securities" with respect to
a member bank are securities issued by
an affiliate of the member bank that is
an open-end investment company
registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.c. 80a-l et seq.), if:
(i) The securities issued by the
investment company:
(A) Meet the market quotation
standard contained in paragraph (e) of
§ 223.42;
(B) Meet the standards set forth in
paragraphs (f)(1) and (5) of § 223.42; or
(Cl Have closing prices that are made
public through a mutual fund
"supermarket" website maintained by
an unaffiliated securities broker-dealer
or mutual fund distributor; and
(ii) The member bank and its affiliates
do not own or control in the aggregate
more than 5 percent of any class of
voting securities or of the equity capital
of the investment company (excluding
securities held by the member bank or
an affiliate in good faith in a fiduciary
capacity, unless the member bank or
affiliate holds the securities for the
benefit of the member bank or affiliate,
or the shareholders, employees, or
subsidiaries of the member bank or
affiliate).
(3) Example. A member bank
proposes to lend $100 to a nonaffiliate
secured exclusively by eligible affiliated
mutual fund securities. The member
bank knows that the nonaffiliate intends
to use all the loan proceeds to purchase
the eligible affiliated mutual fund
securities that would serve as collateral
for the loan. Under the attribution rule
in § 223.16, the member bank must treat
the loan to the nonaffiliate as a loan to
an affiliate, and, because securities
issued by an affiliate are ineligible
collateral under § 223.14, the loan
would not be in compliance with
§ 223.14.
Subpart D-Other Requirements Under
Section 23A
§ 223.31 How does section 23A apply to a
member bank's acquisition of an affiliate
that becomes an operating subsidiary of the
member bank after the acquisition?
(a) Certain acquisitions by a member
bank of securities issued by an affiliate
are treated as a purchase ofassets from
an affiliate. A member bank's
acquisition of a security issued by a
company that was an affiliate of the
member bank before the acquisition is
treated as a purchase of assets from an
affiliate, if:
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(1) As a result of the transaction, the
company becomes an operating
subsidiary of the member bank; and
(2) The company has liabilities, or the
member bank gives cash or any other
consideration in exchange for the
security.
(b) Valuation. (1) Initial valuation. A
transaction described in paragraph (a) of
this section must be valued initially at
the greater of:
(i) The sum of:
(A) The total amount of consideration
given by the member bank in exchange
for the security; and
(B) The total liabilities of the
company whose security has been
acquired by the member bank, as of the
time of the acquisition; or
(ii) The total value of all covered
transactions (as computed under this
part) acquired by the member bank as a
result of the security acquisition.
(2) Ongoing valuation. The value of a
transaction described in paragraph (a) of
this section may be reduced after the
initial transfer to reflect:
(i) Amortization or depreciation of the
assets of the transferred company, to the
extent that such reductions are
consistent with GAAP; and
(ii) Sales of the assets of the
transferred company.
(c) Valuation example. The parent
holding company of a member bank
contributes between 25 and 100 percent
of the voting shares of a mortgage
company to the member bank. The
parent holding company retains no
shares of the mortgage company. The
member bank gives no consideration in
exchange for the transferred shares. The
mortgage company has total assets of
$300,000 and total liabilities of
$100,000. The mortgage company's
assets do not include any loans to an
affiliate of the member bank or any
other asset that would represent a
separate covered transaction for the
member bank upon consummation of
the share transfer. As a result of the
transaction, the mortgage company
becomes an operating subsidiary of the
member bank. The transaction is treated
as a purchase of the assets of the
mortgage company by the member bank
from an affiliate under paragraph (a) of
this section. The member bank initially
must value the transaction at $100,000,
the total amount of the liabilities of the
mortgage company. Going forward, if
the member bank pays off the liabilities,
the member bank must continue to
value the covered transaction at
$100,000. If the member bank, however,
sells $15,000 of the transferred assets of
the mortgage company or if $15,000 of
the transferred assets amortize, the
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member bank may value the covered
transaction at $85,000.
(d) Exemption for step transactions. A
transaction described in paragraph (a) of
this section is exempt from the
requirements of this regulation (other
than the safety and soundness
requirement of § 223.13 and the market
terms requirement of § 223.51) if:
(1) The member bank acquires the
securities issued by the transferred
company within one business day (or
such longer period, up to three months,
as may be permitted by the member
bank's appropriate Federal banking
agency) after the company becomes an
affiliate of the member bank;
(2) The member bank acquires all the
securities of the transferred company
that were transferred in connection with
the transaction that made the company
an affiliate of the member bank;
(3) The business and financial
condition (including the asset quality
and liabilities) of the transferred
company does not materially change
from the time the company becomes an
affiliate of the member bank and the
time the member bank acquires the
securities issued by the company; and
(4) At or before the time that the
transferred company becomes an
affiliate of the member bank, the
member bank notifies its appropriate
Federal banking agency and the Board
of the member bank's intent to acquire
the company.
(e) Example ofstep transaction. A
bank holding company acquires 100
percent of the shares of an unaffiliated
leasing company. At that time, the
subsidiary member bank of the holding
company notifies its appropriate Federal
banking agency and the Board of its
intent to acquire the leasing company
from its holding company. On the day
after consummation of the acquisition,
the holding company transfers all of the
shares of the leasing company to the
member bank. No material change in the
business or financial condition of the
leasing company occurs between the
time of the holding company's
acquisition and the member bank's
acquisition. The leasing company has
liabilities. The leasing company
becomes an operating subsidiary of the
member bank at the time of the transfer.
This transfer by the holding company to
the member bank, although deemed an
asset purchase by the member bank
from an affiliate under paragraph (a) of
this section, would qualify for the
exemption in paragraph (d) of this
section.
§ 223.32 What rules apply to financial
subsidiaries of a member bank?
(a) Exemption from the 10 percent
limit for covered transactions between a
member bank and a single financial
subsidiary. The 10 percent quantitative
limit contained in § 223.11 does not
apply with respect to covered
transactions between a member bank
and a financial subsidiary ofthe
member bank. The 20 percent
quantitative limit contained in § 223.12
does apply to such transactions.
(b) Valuation ofpurchases of or
investments in the securities of a
financial subsidiary. (1) General rule. A
member bank's purchase of or
investment in a security issued by a
financial subsidiary of the member bank
must be valued at the greater of:
(i) The total amount of consideration
given (including liabilities assumed) by
the member bank in exchange for the
security, reduced to reflect amortization
of the security to the extent consistent
with GAAP; and
(ii) The carrying value of the security
(adjusted so as not to reflect the member
bank's pro rata portion of any earnings
retained or losses incurred by the
financial subsidiary after the member
bank's acquisition of the security).
(2) Carrying value of an investment in
a consolidated financial subsidiary. If a
financial subsidiary is consolidated
with its parent member bank under
GAAP, the carrying value of the member
bank's investment in securities issued
by the financial subsidiary shall be
equal to the carrying value of the
securities on parent-only financial
statements of the member bank,
determined in accordance with GAAP
(adjusted so as not to reflect the member
bank's pro rata portion of any earnings
retained or losses incurred by the
financial subsidiary after the member
bank's acquisition of the securities).
(3) Examples of the valuation of
purchases of and investments in the
securities ofa financial subsidiary. The
following are examples of how a
member bank must value its purchase of
or investment in securities issued by a
financial subsidiary of the member
bank. Each example involves a
securities underwriter that becomes a
financial subsidiary of the member bank
after the transactions described below.
(i) Initial valuation. (A) Direct
acquisition by a member bank. A
member bank pays $500 to acquire 100
percent of the shares of a securities
underwriter. The initial carrying value
of the shares on the member bank's
parent-only GAAP financial statements
is $500. The member bank initially must
value the investment at $500.
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(B) Contribution ofa financial
subsidiary to a member bank. The
parent holding company of a member
bank acquires 100 percent of the shares
of a securities underwriter in a
transaction valued at $500, and
immediately contributes the shares to
the member bank. The member bank
gives no consideration in exchange for
the shares. The member bank initially
must value the investment at the
carrying value of the shares on the
member bank's parent-only GAAP
financial statements. Under GAAP, the
member bank's initial carrying value of
the shares would be $500.
(ii) Carrying value not adjusted for
earnings and losses of the financial
subsidiary. A member bank and its
parent holding company engage in the
transaction described in paragraph
(b)(3)(i)(B) of this section, and the
member bank initially values the
investment at $500. In the following
year, the securities underwriter earns
$25 in profit, which is added to its
retained earnings. The member bank's
carrying value of the shares of the
underwriter is not adjusted for purposes
of this part, and the member bank must
continue to value the investment at
$500. If, however, the member bank
contributes $100 of additional capital to
the securities underwriter, the member
bank must value the aggregate
investment at $600.
(c) Treatment of an affiliate's
investments in, and extensions of credit
to, a financial subsidiary of a member
bank. (1) Investments. Any purchase of,
or investment in, the securities of a
financial subsidiary of a member bank
by an affiliate of the member bank is
treated as a purchase of or investment
in such securities by the member bank.
(2) Extensions of credit that are
treated as regulatory capital of the
financial subsidiary. Any extension of
credit to a financial subsidiary of a
member bank by an affiliate of the
member bank is treated as an extension
of credit by the member bank to the
financial subsidiary if the extension of
credit is treated as capital of the
financial subsidiary under any Federal
.. or State law, regulation, or
interpretation applicable to the
subsidiary.
(3) Other extensions of credit. Any
other extension of credit to a financial
subsidiary of a member bank by an
affiliate of the member bank will be
treated as an extension of credit by the
member bank to the financial
subsidiary, ifthe Board determines, by
regulation or order, that such treatment
is necessary or appropriate to prevent
evasions of the Federal Reserve Act or
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
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§ 223.33 What rules apply to derivative
transactions?
(a) Market terms requirement.
Derivative transactions between a
member bank and its affiliates (other
than depository institutions) are subject
to the market terms requirement of
§223.51.
(b) Policies and procedures. A
member bank must establish and
maintain policies and procedures
reasonably designed to manage the
credit exposure arising from its
derivative transactions with affiliates in
a safe and sound manner. The policies
and procedures must at a minimum
provide for:
(1) Monitoring and controlling the
credit exposure arising at anyone time
from the member bank's derivative
transactions with each affiliate and all
affiliates in the aggregate (through,
among other things, imposing
appropriate credit limits, mark-to-
market requirements. and collateral
requirements); and
(2) Ensuring that the member bank's
derivative transactions with affiliates
comply with the market terms
requirement of § 223.51.
(c) Credit derivatives. A credit
derivative between a member bank and
a nonaffiliate in which the member bank
provides credit protection to the
nonaffiliate with respect to an obligation
of an affiliate of the member bank is a
guarantee by a member bank on behalf
of an affiliate for purposes of this
regulation. Such derivatives would
include:
(1) An agreement under which the
member bank, in exchange for a fee,
agrees to compensate the nonaffiliate for
any default of the underlying obligation
of the affiliate; and
(2) An agreement under which the
member bank, in exchange for payments
based on the total return of the
underlying obligation of the affiliate,
agrees to pay the nonaffiliate a spread
over funding costs plus any
depreciation in the value of the
underlying obligation of the affiliate.
Subpart E-Exemptions from the
Provisions of Section 23A
§ 223.41 What covered transactions are
exempt from the quantitative limits and
collateral requirements?
The following transactions are not
subject to the quantitative limits of
§§ 223.11 and 223.12 or the collateral
requirements of § 223.14. The
transactions are, however, subject to the
safety and soundness requirement of
§ 223.13 and the prohibition on the
purchase of a low-quality asset of
§ 223.15.
(a) Parent institution/subsidiary
institution transactions. Transactions
with a depository institution if the
member bank controls 80 percent or
more of the voting securities of the
depository institution or the depository
institution controls 80 percent or more
of the voting securities of the member
bank.
(b) Transactions between a member
bank and a depository institution owned
by the same holding company.
Transactions with a depository
institution if the same company controls
80 percent or more of the voting
securities of the member bank and the
depository institution.
(c) Certain loan purchases from an
affiliated depository institution.
Purchasing a loan on a nonrecourse
basis from an affiliated depository
institution.
(d) Internal corporate reorganization
transactions. Purchasing assets from an
affiliate (including in connection with a
transfer of securities issued by an
affiliate to a member bank described in
paragraph (a) of § 223.31), if:
(1) The asset purchase is part of an
internal corporate reorganization of a
holding company and involves the
transfer of all or substantially all of the
shares or assets of an affiliate or of a
division or department of an affiliate;
(2) The member bank provides its
appropriate Federal banking agency and
the Board with written notice of the
transaction before consummation,
including a description of the primary
business activities of the affiliate and an
indication of the proposed date of the
asset purchase;
(3) The member bank's top-tier
holding company commits to its
appropriate Federal banking agency and
the Board before consummation either:
(il To make quarterly cash
contributions to the member bank, for a
two-year period following the member
bank's purchase, equal to the book value
plus any write-downs taken by the
member bank, of any transferred assets
that have become low-quality assets
during the quarter; or
(ii) To repurchase, on a quarterly basis
for a two-year period following the
member bank's purchase, at a price
equal to the book value plus any write-
downs taken by the member bank, any
transferred assets that have become low-
quality assets during the quarter;
(4) The member bank's top-tier
holding company complies with the
commitment made under paragraph
(d)(3) ofthis section;
(5) A majority of the member bank's
directors reviews and approves the
transaction before consummation;
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(6) The value of the covered
transaction (as computed under this
part), when aggregated with the value of
any other covered transactions (as
computed under this part) engaged in by
the member bank under this exemption
during the preceding 12 calendar
months, represents less than 10 percent
of the member bank's capital stock and
surplus (or such higher amount, up to
25 percent of the member bank's capital
stock and surplus, as may be permitted
by the member bank's appropriate
Federal banking agency after conducting
a review ofthe member bank's financial
condition and the quality of the assets
transferred to the member bank); and
(7) The holding company and all its
subsidiary member banks and other
subsidiary depository institutions are
well capitalized and well managed and
would remain well capitalized upon
consummation of the transaction.
§ 223.42 What covered transactions are
exempt from the quantitative limits,
collateral requirements, and low-quality
asset prohibition?
The following transactions are not
subject to the quantitative limits of
§§ 223.11 and 223.12, the collateral
requirements of § 223.14, or the
prohibition on the purchase of a low-
quality asset of § 223.15. The
transactions are, however, subject to the
safety arid soundness requirement of
§223.13.
(a) Making correspondent banking
deposits. Making a deposit in an
affiliated depository institution (as
defined in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.c. 1813))
or affiliated foreign bank that represents
an ongoing, working balance maintained
in the ordinary course of correspondent
business.
(b) Giving credit for uncollected items.
Giving immediate credit to an affiliate
for uncollected items received in the
ordinary course of business.
(c) Transactions secured by cash or
u.s. government securities.
(1) In general. Engaging in a credit
transaction with an affiliate to the extent
that the transaction is and remains
secured by:
(i) Obligations of the United States or
its agencies;
(ii) Obligations fully guaranteed by
the United States or its agencies as to
principal and interest; or
(iii) A segregated, earmarked· deposit
account with the member bank that is
for the sole purpose of securing credit
transactions between the member bank
and its affiliates and is identified as
such.
(2) Example. A member bank makes a
$100 non-amortizing term loan to an
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affiliate secured by U.S. Treasury
securities with a market value of $50
and real estate with a market value of
$75. The value of the covered
transaction is $50. If the market value of
the U.S. Treasury securities falls to $45
during the life of the loan, the value of
the covered transaction would increase
to $55.
(d) Purchasing securities ofa
servicing affiliate. Purchasing a security
issued by any company engaged solely
in providing services described in
section 4(c)(1) of the Bank Holding
Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(1)).
(e) Purchasing certain liquid assets.
Purchasing an asset having a readily
identifiable and publicly available
market quotation and purchased at or
below the asset's current market
quotation. An asset has a readily
identifiable and publicly available
market quotation ifthe asset's price is
quoted routinely in a widely
disseminated publication that is readily
available to the general public.
(0 Purchasing certain marketable
securities. Purchasing a security from a
securities affiliate, if:
(1) The security has a "ready market,"
as defined in 17 CFR 240.15c3-
l(c)(ll)(i);
(2) The security is eligible for a State
member bank to purchase directly,
subject to the same terms and
conditions that govern the investment
activities of a State member bank, and
the member bank records the
transaction as a purchase of a security
for purposes of its Call Report,
consistent with the requirements for a
State member bank;
(3) The security is not a low-quality
asset;
(4) The member bank does not
purchase the security during an
underwriting, or within 30 days of an
underwriting, if an affiliate is an
underwriter of the security, unless the
security is purchased as part of an issue
of obligations of, or obligations fully
guaranteed as to principal and interest
by, the United States or its agencies;
(5) The security's price is quoted
routinely on an unaffiliated electronic
service that provides indicative data
from real-time financial networks,
provided that:
(i) The price paid by the member bank
is at or below the current market
quotation for the security; and
(ii) The size of the transaction
executed by the member bank does not
cast material doubt on the
appropriateness of relying on the
current market quotation for the
security; and
(6) The member bank maintains, for a
period of two years, records and
supporting information that are
sufficient to enable the appropriate
Federal banking agency to ensure the
member bank's compliance with the
terms of this exemption.
(g) Purchasing municipal securities.
Purchasing a municipal security from a
securities affiliate if:
(1) The security is rated by a
nationally recognized statistical rating
organization or is part of an issue of
securities that does not exceed $25
million;
(2) The security is eligible for
purchase by a State member bank,
subject to the same terms and
conditions that govern the investment
activities of a State member bank, and
the member bank records the
transaction as a purchase of a security
for purposes of its Call Report,
consistent with the requirements for a
State member bank; and
(3)0) The security's price is quoted
routinely on an unaffiliated electronic
service that provides indicative data
from real-time financial networks,
provided that: .
(A) The price paid by the member
bank is at or below the current market
quotation for the security; and
(B) The size of the transaction
executed by the member bank does not
cast material doubt on the
appropriateness of relying on the
current market quotation for the
security; or
(ii) The price paid for the security can
be verified by reference to two or more
actual, current price quotes from
unaffiliated broker-dealers on the exact
security to be purchased or a security
comparable to the security to be
purchased, where:
(A) The price quotes obtained from
the unaffiliated broker-dealers are based
on a transaction similar in size to the
transaction that is actually executed;
and
(B) The price paid is no higher than
the average of the price quotes; or
(iii) The price paid for the security
can be verified by reference to the
written summary provided by the
syndicate manager to syndicate
members that discloses the aggregate par
values and prices of all bonds sold from
the syndicate account, if the member
bank:
(A) Purchases the municipal security
during the underwriting period at a
price that is at or below that indicated
in the summary; and
(B) Obtains a copy of the summary
from its securities affiliate and retains
the summary for three years.
(h) Purchasing an extension of credit
subject to a repurchase agreement.
Purchasing from an affiliate an
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extension of credit that was originated
by the member bank and sold to the
affiliate subject to a repurchase
agreement or with recourse.
(il Asset purchases by a newly formed
member bank. The purchase of an asset
from an affiliate by a newly formed
member bank, if the appropriate Federal
banking agency for the member bank
has approved the asset purchase in
writing in connection with its review of
the formation of the member bank.
(j) Transactions approved under the
Bank Merger Act. Any merger or
consolidation between a member bank
and an affiliated depository institution
or U.S. branch or agency of a foreign
bank, or any acquisition of assets or
assumption of deposit liabilities by a
member bank from an affiliated
depository institution or U.S. branch or
agency of a foreign bank, if the
transaction has been approved by the
responsible Federal banking agency
pursuant to the Bank Merger Act (12
V.S.c. 1828(c)).
(k) Purchasing an extension of credit
from an affiliate. Purchasing from an
affiliate, on a nonrecourse basis, an
extension of credit, if:
(1) The extension of credit was
originated by the affiliate;
(2) The member bank makes an
independent evaluation of the
creditworthiness of the borrower before
the affiliate makes or commits to make
the extension of credit;
(3) The member bank commits to
purchase the extension of credit before
the affiliate makes or commits to make
the extension of credit;
(4) The member bank does not make
a blanket advance commitment to
purchase extensions of credit from the
affiliate; and
(5) The dollar amount of the extension
of credit, when aggregated with the
dollar amount of all other extensions of
credit purchased from the affiliate
during the preceding 12 calendar
months by the member bank and its
depository institution affiliates, does not
represent more than 50 percent (or such
lower percent as is imposed by the
member bank's appropriate Federal
banking agency) of the dollar amount of
extensions of credit originated by the
affiliate during the preceding 12
calendar months.
(I) In traday extensions of credit.
(1) In general. An intraday extension
of credit to an affiliate, if the member
bank:
(i) Has established and maintains
policies and procedures reasonably
designed to manage the credit exposure
arising from the member bank's intraday
extensions of credit to affiliates in a safe
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and sound manner, including policies
and procedures for:
(A) Monitoring and controlling the
credit exposure arising at anyone time
from the member bank's intraday
extensions of credit to each affiliate and
all affiliates in the aggregate; and
(B) Ensuring that any intraday
extension of credit by the member bank
to an affiliate complies with the market
terms requirement of § 223.51;
(ii) Has no reason to believe that the
affiliate will have difficulty repaying the
extension of credit in accordance with
its terms; and
(iii) Ceases to treat any such extension
of credit (regardless of jurisdiction) as
an intraday extension of credit at the
end of the member bank's business day
in the United States.
(2) Definition. Intraday extension of
credit by a member bank to an affiliate
means an extension of credit by a
member bank to an affiliate that the
member bank expects to be repaid, sold,
or terminated, or to qualify for a
complete exemption under this
regulation, by the end of its business
day in the United States.
(m) Riskless principal transactions.
Purchasing a security from a securities
affiliate of the member bank if:
(1) The member bank or the securities
affiliate is acting exclusively as a
riskless principal in the transaction; and
(2) The security purchased is not
issued, underwritten, or sold as
principal (other than as riskless
principal) by any affiliate of the member
bank.
§ 223.43 What are the standards under
which the Board may grant additional
exemptions from the requirements of
section 23A?
(a) The standards. The Board may, at
its discretion, by regulation or order,
exempt transactions or relationships
from the requirements of section 23A
and subparts B, C, and D of this part if
it finds such exemptions to be in the
public interest and consistent with the
purposes of section 23A.
(b) Procedure. A member bank may
request an exemption from the
requirements of section 23A and
subparts B, C, and D of this part by
submitting a written request to the
General Counsel of the Board. Such a
request must:
(1) Describe in detail the transaction
or relationship for which the member
bank seeks exemption;
(2) Explain why the Board should
exempt the transaction or relationship;
and
(3) Explain how the exemption would
be in the public interest and consistent
with the purposes of section 23A.
Subpart F-General Provisions of
Section 238
§ 223.51 What is the market terms
requirement of section 23B1
A member bank may not engage in a
transaction described in § 223.52 unless
the transaction is:
(a) On terms and under
circumstances, including credit
standards, that are substantially the
same, or at least as favorable to the
member bank, as those prevailing at the
time for comparable transactions with or
involving nonaffiliates; or
(b) In the absence of comparable
transactions, on terms and under
circumstances, including credit
standards, that in good faith would be
offered to, or would apply to,
nonaffiliates.
§ 223.52 What transactions with affiliates
or others must comply with section 23B's
market terms requirement?
(a) The market terms requirement of
§ 223.51 applies to the following
transactions:
(1) Any covered transaction with an
affiliate, unless the transaction is
exempt under paragraphs (a) through (c)
of § 223.41 or paragraphs (a) through (e)
or (h) through (j) of § 223.42;
(2) The sale of a security or other asset
to an affiliate, including an asset subject
to an agreement to repurchase;
(3) The payment of money or the
furnishing of a service to an affiliate
under contract, lease, or otherwise;
(4) Any transaction in which an
affiliate acts as an agent or broker or
receives a fee for its services to the
member bank or to any other person;
and
(5) Any transaction or series of
transactions with a nonaffiliate, if an
affiliate:
(i) Has a financial interest in the
nonaffiliate; or
(ii) Is a participant in the transaction
or series of transactions.
(b) For the purpose of this section,
any transaction by a member bank with
any person will be deemed to be a
transaction with an affiliate of the
member bank if any of the proceeds of
the transaction are used for the benefit
of, or transferred to, the affiliate.
§ 223.53 What asset purchases are
prohibited by section 23B1
(a) Fiduciary purchases ofassetsfrom
an affiliate. A member bank may not
purchase as fiduciary any security or
other asset from any affiliate unless the
purchase is permitted:
(1) Under the instrument creating the
fiduciary relationship;
(2) By court order; or
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(3) By law ofthe jurisdiction
governing the fiduciary relationship.
(b) Purchase ofa security
underwritten by an affiliate. (1) A
member bank, whether acting as
principal or fiduciary, may not
knowingly purchase or otherwise
acquire, during the existence of any
underwriting or selling syndicate, any
security if a principal underwriter of
that security is an affiliate of the
member bank.
(2) Paragraph (b)(l) ofthis section
does not apply ifthe purchase or
acquisition of the security has been
approved, before the security is initially
offered for sale to the public, by a
majority of the directors of the member
bank based on a determination that the
purchase is a sound investment for the
member bank, or for the person on
whose behalf the member bank is acting
as fiduciary, as the case may be,
irrespective of the fact that an affiliate
of the member bank is a principal
underwriter 0 f the security.
(3) The approval requirement of
paragraph (b)(2) of this section may be
met if:
(i) A majority of the directors of the
member bank approves standards for the
member bank's acquisitions of securities
described in paragraph (b)(l) of this
section, based on the determination set
forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section;
(ii) Each acquisition described in
paragraph (b)(l) of this section meets
the standards; and
(iii) A majority of the directors of the
member bank periodically reviews
acquisitions described in paragraph
(b)(I) of this section to ensure that they
meet the standards and periodically
reviews the standards to ensure that
they continue to meet the criterion set
forth in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(4) A U.S. branch, agency, or
commercial lending company of a
foreign bank may comply with
paragraphs (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this
section by obtaining the approvals and
reviews required by paragraphs (b)(2)
and (b)(3) from either:
(i) A majority of the directors of the
foreign bank; or
(ii) A majority of the senior executive
officers of the foreign bank.
(c) Special definitions. For purposes
of this section:
(1) "Principal underwriter" means any
underwriter who, in connection with a
primary distribution of securities:
(i) Is in privity of contract with the
issuer or an affiliated person of the
issuer;
(ii) Acting alone or in concert with
one or more other persons, initiates or
directs the formation of an underwriting
syndicate; or
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(iii) Is allowed a rate of gross
commission, spread, or other profit
greater than the rate allowed another
underwriter participating in the
distribution.
(2) "Security" has the same meaning
as in section 3(a)(10) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c.
78c(a)(10)).
§ 223.54 What advertisements and
statements are prohibited by section 23B?
(a) In general. A member bank and its
affiliates may not publish any
advertisement or enter into any
agreement stating or suggesting that the
member bank will in any way be
responsible for the obligations of its
affiliates.
(b) Guarantees, acceptances, letters of
credit. and cross-affiliate netting
arrangements subject to section 23A.
Paragraph (a) of this section does not
prohibit a member bank from:
(1) Issuing a guarantee, acceptance, or
letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate,
confirming a letter of credit issued by an
affiliate, or entering into a cross-affiliate
netting arrangement, to the extent such
transaction satisfies the quantitative
limits of §§ 223.11 and 223.12 and the
collateral requirements of § 223.14, and
is otherwise permitted under this
regulation; or
(2) Making reference to such a
guarantee, acceptance, letter of credit, or
cross-affiliate netting arrangement if
otherwise required by law.
§ 223.55 What are the standards under
which the Board may grant exemptions
from the requirements of section 23B?
The Board may prescribe regulations
to exempt transactions or relationships
from the requirements of section 23B
and subpart F of this part if it finds such
exemptions to be in the public interest
and consistent with the purposes of
section 23B.
Subpart G-Application of Sections
23A and 23B to U.S. Branches and
Agencies of Foreign Banks
§ 223.61 How do sections 23A and 238
apply to U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks?
(a) Applicability of sections 23A and
238 to foreign banks engaged in
underwriting insurance, underwriting or
dealing in securities. merchant banking,
or insurance company investment in the
United States. Except as provided in
this subpart, sections 23A and 23B of
the Federal Reserve Act and the
provisions of this regulation apply to
each U.S. branch, agency, or commercial
lending company of a foreign bank in
the same manner and to the same extent
as if the branch, agency, or commercial
lending company were a member bank.
(b) Affiliate defined. For purposes of
this subpart, any company that would
be an affiliate of a u.s. branch, agency,
or commercial lending company of a
foreign bank if such branch, agency, or
commercial lending company were a
member bank is an affiliate of the
branch, agency, or commercial lending
company if the company also is:
(1) Directly engaged in the United
States in any of the following activities:
(i) Insurance underwriting pursuant to
section 4(k)(4)(B) ofthe Bank Holding
Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(B));
(ii) Securities underwriting, dealing,
or market making pursuant to section
4(k)(4)(E) of the Bank Holding Company
Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(k)(4)(E));
(iii) Merchant banking activities
pursuant to section 4(k)(4)(H) of the
Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.c.
1843(k)(4)(H)) (but only to the extent
that the proceeds of the transaction are
used for the purpose of funding the
affiliate's merchant banking activities);
(iv) Insurance company investment
activities pursuant to section 4(k)(4)(I)
of the Bank Holding Company Act (12
U.S.c. 1843(k)(4)(I)); or
(v) Any other activity designated by
the Board;
(2) A portfolio company (as defined in
the merchant banking subpart of
Regulation Y (12 CFR 225.177(c)))
controlled by the foreign bank or an
affiliate of the foreign bank or a
company that would be an affiliate of
the branch, agency, or commercial
lending company of the foreign bank
under paragraph (a)(9) of § 223.2 if such
branch, agency, or commercial lending
company were a member bank; or
(3) A subsidiary of an affiliate
described in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of
this section.
(c) Capital stock and surplus. For
purposes of this subpart, the "capital
stock and surplus" of a U.S. branch,
agency. or commercial lending company
of a foreign bank will be determined by
reference to the capital of the foreign
bank as calculated under its home
country capital standards.
Subpart H-Miscellaneous
Interpretations
§223.71 How do sections 23A and 23B
apply to transactions in which a member
bank purchases from one affiliate an asset
relating to another affiliate?
(a) In general. In some situations in
which a member bank purchases an
asset from an affiliate, the asset
purchase qualifies for an exemption
under this regulation, but the member
bank's resulting ownership of the
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purchased asset also represents a
covered transaction (which mayor may
not qualify for an exemption under this
part). In these situations, the transaction
engaged in by the member bank would
qualify as two different types of covered
transaction. Although an asset purchase
exemption may suffice to exempt the
member bank's asset purchase from the
first affiliate, the asset purchase
exemption does not exempt the member
bank's resulting covered transaction
with the second affiliate. The
exemptions subject to this interpretation
include §§ 223.31(e), 223.41(a) through
(d), and 223.42(e), (£), (i), (j), (k), and
(m).
(b) Examples. (1) The (d)(6)
exemption. A member bank purchases
from Affiliate A securities issued by
Affiliate B in a purchase that qualifies
for the (d)(6) exemption in section 23A.
The member bank's asset purchase from
Affiliate A would be an exempt covered
transaction under § 223.42(e); but the
member bank also would have acquired
an investment in securities issued by
Affiliate B, which would be a covered
transaction between the member bank
and Affiliate B under § 223.3(h)(2) that
does not qualify for the (d)(6)
exemption. The (d)(6) exemption, by its
terms, only exempts asset purchases by
a member bank from an affiliate; hence,
the (d)(6) exemption cannot exempt a
member bank's investment in securities
issued by an affiliate (even if the
securities would qualify for the (d)(6)
exemption).
(2) The sister-bank exemption. A
member bank purchases from Sister-
Bank Affiliate A a loan to Affiliate B in
a purchase that qualifies for the sister-
bank exemption in section 23A. The
member bank's asset purchase from
Sister-Bank Affiliate A would be an
exempt covered transaction under
§ 223.41(b); but the member bank also
would have acquired an extension of
credit to Affiliate B, which would be a
covered transaction between the
member bank and Affiliate B under
§ 223.3(h)(l) that does not qualify for
the sister-bank exemption. The sister-
bank exemption, by its terms, only
exempts transactions by a member bank
with a sister-bank affiliate; hence, the
sister-bank exemption cannot exempt a
member bank's extension of credit to an
affiliate that is not a sister bank (even
if the extension of credit was purchased
from a sister bank).
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, November 27,2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
[FR Doc. 02-30634 Filed 12-11-02; 8:45 am]
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 223
[Regulation W; Docket No. R-1135l
Transactions Between Member Banks
and Their Affiliates
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System proposes to
amend an exemption in Regulation W
that permits a member bank to exclude
the purchase of an extension of credit
from an affiliate from the quantitative
limits imposed by section 23A of the
Federal Reserve Act if certain criteria
are met. The proposed amendment
would limit a member bank's ability to
buy an extension of credit from an
affiliate under the exemption to 100
percent of the capital stock and surplus
of the member bank.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
January 13, 2003.
ADDRESSES: Comments should refer to
docket number R-1135 and should be
sent to Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20551 or mailed electronically to
regs.comments@federalreserve.gov.
Comments addressed to Ms. Johnson
also may be delivered between 8:45 a.m.
and 5:15 p.m. to the Board's mail
facility in the west courtyard of the
Eccles Building, located on 21st Street
between Constitution Avenue and C
Street, NW. Members of the public may
inspect comments in accordance with
the Board's Rules Regarding the
Availability of Information (12 CFR part
261) in Room MP-500 of the Martin
Building on weekdays between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Pamela G. Nardolilli, Senior Counsel
(202/452-3289), or Mark E. Van Der
Weide, Counsel (202/452-2263), Legal
Division; for users of
Telecommunications Device for the Deaf
(TDD) only, contact 202/263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Section 23A is designed to protect
banks from misuse in financial
transactions with their affiliates. Section
23A attempts to accomplish this goal by
imposing safeguards on all "covered
transactions" between a bank and its
affiliates; this includes limiting all
covered transactions by a bank with any
single affiliate to no more than 10
percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus, and limiting a bank's covered
transactions with all affiliates to 20
percent of the bank's capital stock and
surplus.
In 1974, the Board issued a formal
interpretation that exempted from
section 23A a bank's purchase, on a
nonrecourse basis, of a mortgage note or
participation therein from a mortgage
banking affiliate, provided that the
bank's commitment to purchase was (i)
obtained by the affiliate within the
context of each proposed loan, (ii)
obtained prior to the affiliate's
commitment to make each loan, and (iii)
based upon the bank's independent
evaluation of the creditworthiness of
each mortgagor (the "Purchase
Exemption").1 Although this
interpretation did not impose a strict
dollar limit on the amount of an
affiliate's mortgage loans that a bank
could purchase under the exemption,
the interpretation cautioned that the
purpose of the exemption was to allow
a bank to take advantage of an
investment opportunity and not to
provide all the working capital needed
by an affiliate.
By 1995, some bank holding
companies were using the Purchase
Exemption extensively to fund their
nonbank lending affiliates. In those
cases, banks were providing all or
nearly all of such affiliates' funding. In
response, staff indicated in an
interpretive letter that the Purchase
Exemption was not available if the
dollar amount of the bank's loan
purchases from the affiliate represented
more than 50 percent of the total dollar
amount of loans originated by the
affiliate. Staff reasoned that, in these
circumstances, the asset purchases look
less like the bank taking advantage of an
investment opportunity brought to it by
the affiliate and more like the bank
providing an ongoing funding
mechanism for the affiliate. Staff
intended that this restriction would
require the affiliate to have alternative
funding sources and would reduce the
pressure on the bank to purchase the
affiliate's extensions of credit.
In 2001, the Board reviewed a
proposal where a leasing company
proposed to charter a bank for the
primary purpose of purchasing loans or
leases from the leasing company.2 The
Board was concerned that, under the
proposal, the new bank's credit
underwriting process could be
compromised as result of the complete
1 This exemption was codified at 12 CFR 250.250
(2002J.
2 Amplicon Inc., 87 Federal Reserve Bulletin 421
(2001).
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dependence of the bank on the affiliate
for asset growth. The Board conditioned
its approval ofthe proposal on the bank
limiting its purchases of leases or loans
from an affiliate to no more than 50
percent of the bank's credit portfolio.
Concurrently with the issuance of this
proposed rule, the Board is adopting
final Regulation W, which incorporates
the Purchase Exemption at 12 CFR
223.42(k) and formally expands the
exemption to cover the purchase of any
of type of extension of credit from an
affiliate.
The Purchase Exemption in
Regulation W also retains the limitation
previously imposed by staff that
prevents a bank from using the Purchase
Exemption to purchase more than 50
percent of the loans originated by any
affiliate. When the Board proposed
Regulation W, the preamble of the
regulation asked for comment on
whether the rule should include a
quantitative condition to the Purchase
Exemption based on the size of the
purchasing bank. 3 The Board, however,
did not propose a specific bank-based
limit at that time. Eleven commenters
objected to such a condition and argued
that case-by-case review is a better
approach to handling situations where
loans purchased from an affiliate
represent a large portion of a bank's
assets. These commenters believed that
the remaining conditions of the
Purchase Exemption should suffice to
prevent abuse of the bank. One
commenter, on the other hand,
recommended that the rule include a 50
percent limit based on the assets of the
bank.
In light of the comments and the fact
that the Board did not set forth a
specific limit based on the bank's size
in proposed Regulation W, the Board
now proposes to amend Regulation W to
impose a limitation on the Purchase
Exemption based on the capital stock
and surplus of the bank. Specifically,
the Board is requesting comment on a
condition that would limit the amount
of extensions of credit that a bank could
purchase from an affiliate under the
Purchase Exemption to 100 percent of
the bank's capital stock and surplus. All
other restrictions imposed by the
Purchase Exemption would still apply.
Although those restrictions include a
requirement that the bank conduct an
independent credit review prior to
purchasing assets under the Purchase
Exemption, sections 23A and 23B were
enacted in recognition that the bank
might relax its independent judgment
when making credit decisions involving
an affiliate. The Board believes that the
366 FR 24186,24199-00, May 11, 2001.
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§ 223.42 What covered transactions are
exempt from the quantitative limits,
collateral requirements, and low-quality
asset prohibition?
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 371c(bj(1)(E],
(b)(2j(A], and (fl, 371c-1(e), 1828(j), and
1468(a).
2. Section 223.42 would be amended
by adding a new paragraph (k)(6) to read
as follows:
(k) Purchasing an extension ofcredit
from an affiliate. * * *
(6) The dollar amount of the extension
of credit, when aggregated with the
dollar amount of all other extensions of
credit purchased by the member bank
from affiliates under this exemption and
currently owned by the member bank,
does not represent more than 100
percent (or such lower percent as is
imposed by the member bank's
appropriate Federal banking agency) of
the capital stock and surplus of the
member bank.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, November 27, 2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 02-30635 Filed 12-11-02; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6210--o1-P
100 percent limit will guard against a
bank acquiring an excessive
concentration of assets under the
Purchase Exemption, but still will
provide the bank with the flexibility to
purchase assets from an affiliate, within
prudential limitations, in an amount
well in excess of the statute's 10 and 20
percent quantitative limits.
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with section 3(a) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
603(a)) the Board must publish an initial
regulatory flexibility analysis with this
proposed regulation. As discussed
above, the purpose of the rule is to limit
the concentration of assets held by a
bank that are originated by an affiliate
and to reduce pressure on the bank to
make inappropriate credit decisions.
The Board does not collect data on the
number of institutions that take
advantage of the current exemption.
There are approximately 3,300 banks
below $100 million in assets, but the
Board does not believe that a significant
number of these institutions engage in
Purchase Exemption transactions
because most banks of that size do not
have affiliates engaged in credit-
extending activities. The requirements
of the proposed rule would be the same
for all depository institutions regardless
of their size. The Board knows of no
other regulations that overlap, conflict
with, or duplicate the proposed rule.
The Board solicits comment on the
likely impact the proposed rule would
have on depository institutions,
including small depository institutions.
The proposed rule contains no reporting
requirement.
Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.c. 3506;
5 CFR 1320 appendix A,l), the Board
has reviewed the proposed rule under
the authority delegated to the Board by
the Office of Management and Budget.
The proposed rule contains no new
collections of information and proposes
no substantive changes to existing
collections of information pursuant to
the Paperwork Reduction Act.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 223
Banks, Banking, Affiliates, Federal
Reserve System.
For the reasons stated in the
preamble, the Board proposes to amend
12 CFR part 223 as set forth below:
PART 223-TRANSACTIONS
BETWEEN MEMBER BANKS AND
THEIR AFFILIATES (REGULATION W)
1. The authority citation for part 223
continues to read as follows:
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FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 250
[Miscellaneous Interpretations]
Transactions Between Member Banks
and Their Affiliates
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: Sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act restrict the ability
of a member bank to engage in certain
transactions with an affiliate. Since its
initial passage in 1933, the Board and its
staff have issued numerous formal and
informal interpretations of section 23A.
On October 31, 2002, the Board adopted
a new Regulation W, which implements
sections 23A and 23B and incorporates
most of these interpretations.
Accordingly, the Board is rescinding
most of its formal interpretations of
section 23A and removing these
interpretations, as well as most staff
opinions relating to section 23A, from
the Federal Reserve Regulatory Service.
With the adoption of Regulation W,
most of the Board's previous section
23A interpretations are outdated or
unnecessary, and the Board believes
that reliance on the new Regulation W
will eliminate confusion and simplify
compliance with sections 23A and 238.
EFFECTIVE DATE: April 1, 2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Pamela G. Nardolilli, Senior Counsel
(202/452-3289), or Mark E. Van Der
Weide, Counsel (202/452-2263), Legal
Division; Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, 20th and C
Streets, NW., Washington, DC 20551.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Sections
23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act
are two of the most important statutory
protections against a bank suffering
losses because of its transactions with
affiliates and, correspondingly, are two
of the most effective means of limiting
the ability of a bank to transfer to its
affiliates the subsidy arising from the
bank's access to the Federal safety net.
Although sections 23A and 23B each
explicitly grant the Board broad
authority to issue regulations to
administer these sections, 1 the Board
never issued a regulation fully
implementing either section. Instead,
banks seeking guidance on how to
comply with sections 23A and 23B have
relied on a series of Board
interpretations and informal staff
guidance. Some of these Board
interpretations are codified in part 250
of title 12 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. Many of the staff
interpretations are publicly available,
and the summaries of the interpretations
can be found in the Board's loose-leaf
service, the Federal Reserve Regulatory
Service.
On October 31,2002, the Board
adopted Regulation W, which
comprehensively implements sections
23A and 23B. In order to avoid
confusion and simplify compliance with
sections 23A and 23B, the Board is
deleting the section 23A interpretations
that are codified in part 250 of title 12
of the Code of Federal Regulations. In
addition, the Board is deleting most of
the summaries of staff interpretations of
section 23A that are published in the
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service.
Below is a chart of the interpretations
of sections 23A and 23B found in the
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service
along with an indication of whether
each summary will be retained in the
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service or
removed. For those summaries that will
be removed, the chart identifies the
provision of Regulation W or an
appropriate statute that renders the
summary unnecessary or inconsistent
with current law. The Board believes
that a few existing interpretations of
section 23A would provide helpful
guidance to banking organizations, but
are too fact-specific to include in
Regulation W; the summaries of these
interpretations will remain in the
Federal Reserve Regulatory Service. All
new Board interpretations of sections
23A and 23B will be codified under part
223 instead of the Miscellaneous
Interpretations found in part 250, and
will be available on the Board's public
Web site, http://www.federalreserve.gov.
Persons desiring older written
interpretations will be able to obtain
them by filing a request pursuant to the
Freedom of Information Act.
FRRS No.
DELETIONS FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE REGULATORY SERVICE
[Board Interpretations]
Subject 12 CFR reference
3-1118,12 CFR 250.242
3-1120, 1934 Fed. Res. Bull. 391 ..
3-1121,1935 Fed. Res. Bull. 395 ..
3-1125,1936 Fed. Res. Bull. 324 ..
3-1126, S-285, 10/24/41 .
3-1127. 12 CFR 250.240
3-1128,12 CFR 250.241 ..
3-1128.1,12 CFR 250.245
3-1128.2,12 CFR 250.246
3-1130, 1934 Fed. Res. Bull. 391 ..
3-1131,1951 Fed. Res. Bull. 960 ..
3-1132,12 CFR 250.160(b) .
3'-1133, 12 CFR 250.250 .
3-1135, 1933 Fed. Res. Bull. 501 ..
3-1136,1934 Fed. Res. Bull. 391 ..
3-1137, 12CFR250.247 ..
'12 U.S.c. 371c(f), 371c-1(e).
Definition of Capital Stock and Surplus .
Collateral-Paper Eligible for Rediscount or Purchase by Federal Re-
serve Banks.
Collateral-Stock ..
Exemptions-Indebtedness for Unpaid Balances Due on Purchased
Assets.
Exemptions-Relationships Arising Out of Bona Fide Debt Previously
Contracted.
Exemptions-Loan to Bank Operations Subsidiary .
Exemptions-Transactions Subject to Review Under the Bank Merger
Act.
Exemptions-Loans and Extensions of Credit by Member Bank to
Third Party.
Exemptions-Purchase of Security by Insured Depository Institution
from an Affiliate.
Extension of Credit-Loan on Note Bearing Endorsement by Affiliate
Extension of Credit-Purchase of Affiliate's Notes ..
Extension of Credit-Federal Funds Transaction ..
Extension of Credit-Purchase of Mortgage Note or Participation
from Nonbank Affiliates.
Loans & Investments Made Before June 16, 1933 ..
Limitations on Amount-Loans Secured by Paper Eligible for Redis-
count by Federal Reserve Bank.
Market Terms Requirement-Derivatives .
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§223.3(d).
§223.14(b)(1).
§ 223.14(b)(1)(iv).
No exemption available.
§ 223.2(b)(5).
§§ 223.2(b) & (2).
§223.420).
§ 223.16(c)(3).
§ 223.42(f).
Retained.
§ 223.3(0)(4).
§223.3(o).
§223.42(k).
See Preamble For Grandfathering.
§ 223.14(b)(1)(C).
§223.33.
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FRRS No. Subject 12 CFR reference
3-1137.1,12 CFR 250.248
3-1140
3-1141
3-1142
3-1143
3-1144
3-1145
3-1146 .
3-1146.1 _ .
3-1146.2
3-1146.3
3-1146.4
3-1146.5 ..
3-1146.6 .
3-1146.61 .
3-1146.7 .
3-1150 ..
3-1151 .
3-1152 ..
3-1152.1 .
3-1152.2 .
3-1155 .
3-1156 .
3-1157 .
3-1158 .
3-1160 ..
3-1161 .
3-1162 .
3-1163 .
3-1164 .
3-1164.1 .
3-1164.2 .
3-1164.3 .
3-1167 ..
3-1167.1 .
3-1167.2 _ .
3-1167.3 .
3-1167.4 .
3-1167.5 .
3-1170 .
3-1171 .
3-1172 .
3-1173 .
3-1174 .
3-1175 .
3-1176 _ _ .
3-1177 .
3-1177.1 .
3-1177.2 _._ .._ ..
3-1177.3 .
3-1177.4 .
3-1180
3-1181
3-1182
3-1183
3-1184
3-1185
3-1186
3-1187
3-1188
Market Terms Requirement-Intraday Extensions of Credit by In- §223.42(1).
sured Depository Institutions to Their Affiliates.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Cotrustee or Coexecutor of Corpora- §223.2(b).
tion.
Affiliates to Which Applicable .. Retained.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Small Business Subsidiary of Bank § 223.2(a)(2).
Holding Company.
Affiliate to Which Applicable-Joint Venture in Which Subsidiary Has §223.2(b)(1)(iii).
50% Interest.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Corporation with Stock Held as Collat- §223.3(p)(1)(ii).
era!.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Corporation Owned by Affiliate Edge § 223.3(p)(1)(ii).
Corporation.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Trust Retained.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Foreign Affiliate of Domestic Bank § 223.2(a)(2).
Holding Company.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Less Than 25 Percent Control............ § 223.2(a)(3).
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Agricultural Credit Corporation §223.2(b)(1)(iii).
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Bank Subsidiaries of Bank Holding § 223.2(b)(1).
Company.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Purchaser of Subsidiary Banks § 223.16.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Common Shareholders Retained.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Partnership & Association Retained.
Affiliates to Which Applicable-Foreign Exchange Fund Retained.
Bank-Savings Loan 12 U.S.C. 1468.
Bank-Bank Whose Deposits Are Insured by the FDIC 12 U.S.C. 1828(j).
Bank-Foreign Bank 12 U.S.C. 371c(b)(5) & §223.18.
Bank-Domestic Branch of a Foreign Bank 12 U.S.C.371c(b)(5) & § 223.3(k).
Bank-National Bank Subsidiary 12 U.S.C. 371c(b)(5).
Collateral-Automobile Rental Contracts §223.14(b)(1)(iv).
Collateral-Stock §223.24.
Collateral-"Secured by" §223.14.
Collateral-Stock in Wholly Owned Subsidiary §223.14.
Collateral-FHA Mortgages § 223.3(y).
Collateral-U.S. Government Securities § 223.14.
Collateral-Stock Valuation Retained
Collateral-Stock Valuation Retained.
Collateral-Stock Valuation Retained.
Collateral-Stock of a SUbsidiary Bank § 223. 14(c)(2).
Collateral-Real Estate §223.14(b)(l)(iv).
Collateral-Mortgage Servicing Rights §223.14(c)(4).
Covered Transactions-Purchase of Affiliate's Securities § 223.3(h)(2).
Covered Transactions-Purchase of Assets Retained.
Covered Transactions-Purchase of Assets §223.42(k).
Covered Transactions-Acceptance of Securities Retained.
Covered Transactions-Issuance of Guarantee Retained.
Covered Transactions-Purchase of Leases §223.42(k) & Subpart F.
Exemptions-Indebtedness for Unpaid Balances Due on Purchased § 223.3(h).
Assets.
Exemptions--Corporation Holding Premises of Bank § 223.2(b)(2).
Exemptions-Investment in Agricultural Credit Corporation § 223.2.
Exemptions-Sale of Assets on Credit §223.3(h)(1).
Exemptions-Trust § 223.2.
Exemptions-Loans to Subsidiary Bank Premises § 223.2(b)(2).
Exemptions-Corporation Holding Premises of Bank §223.2(b)(2).
Exemptions-Bank Operations Subsidiary §223.2(b)(1).
Exemptions-Bank Controlled by Same Company............................... §§223.41(b) & 223.3(k) & (v).
Exemptions-Bank Premises Subsidiary §223.2(a)(3) & (b)(2).
Exemptions-Privately Issued Collateralized Mortgage Obligations Retained.
Exemptions-Bank Controlled by Same Company That Is Not Bank §223.41(b).
Holding Company.
Extension of Credit-Nonrecourse Acquisition of Promissory Note ..... §223.3(o)(4).
Extension of Credit-Transaction with Bank Holding Company........... §§223.3(0) & 223.42(h).
Extension of Credit-Guaranteed Debt of Holding Company............... §225.3(o).
Extension of Credit-Participation in Assets Pool................................ Deleted.
Extension of Credit-Purchase of Mortgage Note or Participation § 223.42(k).
from Nonba.nk Affiliate.
Extension of Credit-GNMA Certificate of Guarantee Retained.
Extension of Credit-Paid Letter of Credit §223.3(0).
Extension of Credit-Equipment Lease Agreement Retained.
Extension of Credit-Participation in Mortgage Loan Pool............ § 223.42(k).
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DELETIONS FROM THE FEDERAL RESERVE REGULATORY SERVICE-Continued
(Board Interpretations)
FRRS No. Subject 12 CFR reference
3-1189 Extension of Credit-Finance Company Loan Participation §223.42(k).
3-1189.1 Extension of Credit-Transactions Involving Funding, Letters of Cred- §§223.3(h)(1) & 223.3(h)(5).
it & Bankers Acceptance.
3-1189.2 Extension of Credit-Contingency, Negotiating or Accepting Letters of §223.3(h).
Credit.
3-1195 Limitations on Amount-Loans & Investments Made Before June 16, See Preamble Grandfathering.
1933.
3-1196 Limitations on Amount-Loan Secured by Paper Eligible for Redis- §223.14(b)(i)(C).
count or Purchase by Federal Reserve Bank.
3-1197 Limitations on Amount-Gapital Stock § 223.3(h)(2).
3-1198 Limitations on Amount-Stockholder Ownership & Capital Expendi- §§223.3(h) & 223.7(c)
tures.
3-1199 Limitations on Amount-Valuation of Transactions §223.24(b).
3-1199.5 Low-Quality Asset-Open-End Credit Card Account Retained.
3-1199.51 Low-Quality Assets-Renewal of a Loan §223.15(b).
Regulatory Flexibility Act
In accordance with section 3(a) of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C.
603(a)), the Board is not required to
publish a regulatory flexibility analysis
with this rulemaking.
Administrative Procedure Act
Pursuant to 5 U.S.c. 553, the Board is
issuing this deletion of the Board and
staffs existing section 23A
interpretations as a final rule. Most of
the interpretations in question are staff
opinions, which were not subject to
public comment pursuant to 5 U.S.c.
553(b)(2)(A). The deletion of the Board
interpretations from the Code of Federal
Regulations is part of the
implementation of Regulation W, which
the Board issued for public notice and
comment on May 11, 2001, and thus
further public comment on the deletions
is unnecessary. A review of the public
comments on Regulation W can be
found in the preamble to Regulation W,
67 FR (2002).
Paperwork Reduction Act
The Board has determined that the
removal of the interpretations from the
Code of Federal Regulations will not
involve a collection of information
pursuant to the provisions of the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.c. 3501 et seq.).
List of Subjects in 12 CFR part 250
Federal Reserve System.
For reasons set out in the preamble,
the Board amends 12 CFR part 250 as
follows:
PART 250-MISCELLANEOUS
INTERPRETATIONS
1. The authority citation for part 250
continues to read as follows:
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Authority: 12 U.S.C. 78, 248(i), 371c(f) and
371c-l(e).
§ 250.160 [Amended]
2. In § 250.160, remove paragraph (b).
§§ 250.240, 250.248 and § 250.250
[Removed]
3. Sections 250.240, 250.241, 250.242,
250.243,250.244,250.245,250.246,
250.247,250.248, and 250.250 are
removed.
By order of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, November 27, 2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary ofthe Board.
(FR Doc. 02-30636 Filed 12-11-02; 8:45 am)
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BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551
DIVISION OF
BANKING
SUPERVISION AND
REGULATION
SR 03-2
January 9, 2003
TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION AND APPROPRIATE SUPERVISORY AND
EXAMINATION STAFF AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK AND TO DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN BANKING ORGANIZATIONS SUPERVISED BY THE FEDERAL
RESERVE
SUBJECT: Adoption of Regulation W Implementing Sections 23A and 23B of the
Federal Reserve Act
On December 12,2002, Regulation W, the rule that comprehensively
implements sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act, was published in the
Federal Register.1 The rule is effective April 1,2003.
Sections 23A and 23B and Regulation W limit the risks to a bank from
transactions between the bank and its affiliates and limit the ability of a bank to transfer
to its affiliates the subsidy arising from the bank's access to the Federal safety net
(i.e., lower cost insured deposits, the payment system, and the discount window)} The
statute and rule accomplish these purposes by imposing quantitative and qualitative
limits on the ability of a bank to extend credit to, or engage in certain other transactions
with, an affiliate. Transactions between a bank and a nonaffiliate that benefit an
affiliate of the bank are covered by the statute and regulation as well, through the well-
established "attribution" principle. However, certain transactions that generally do not
expose a bank to undue risk or abuse the safety net are exempted from coverage under
Regulation W.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) increased the range of affiliations
permitted to banking organizations. A key premise of GLBA was that sections 23A
and 23B would limit the risk to depository institutions from these broader affiliations
and eliminate the need for extensive prior review by the bank regulatory agencies.
Given the enhanced role of sections 23A and 23B in risk management after GLBA, it is
essential that examiners and other supervisory staff review intercompany transactions
for compliance with the statutes and Regulation W. Reviews for compliance with the
affiliate transaction rules should be frequent and rigorous, and any violations or
potential violations should be resolved quickly.
A summary of significant issues addressed in the rule follows. The
attached appendix provides a comprehensive review of the rule.
Significant Issues Addressed in Regulation W
Regulation W includes 70 years' worth of interpretive guidance furnished
by the Board and its staff concerning statutory requirements that are fairly brief, but
extremely complex in application. The following summarizes how the Board resolved
EXHIBIT B
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nine significant issues addressed by the final rule.
1. Derivatives. The final rule (i) provides that derivative transactions
between banks and their affiliates are subject to the market terms requirement of
section 23B, and (ii) requires banks to adopt policies and procedures to manage the
credit exposure arising from their derivative transactions with affiliates. The final rule
does not subject credit exposure arising from bank-affiliate derivatives to the
quantitative limits and collateral requirements of section 23A. The final rule also
provides that credit derivatives between a bank and a nonaffiliate in which the bank
protects the nonaffiliate from a default on, or decline in value of, an obligation of an
affiliate of the bank are covered transactions under section 23A.
In the near future, the Board expects to issue a proposed rule that would
seek public comment on how, under section 23A, to treat derivative transactions that
are the functional equivalent of a loan by a bank to an affiliate or the functional
equivalent of an asset purchase by a bank from an affiliate.
2. Intraday Credit. The final rule (i) provides that intraday extensions of
credit by a bank to an affiliate are subject to the market terms requirement of
section 23B, and (ii) exempts intraday credit extensions by a bank to an affiliate from
the quantitative limits and collateral requirements of section 23A if the bank adopts
policies and procedures to manage the credit exposure arising from its intraday credit
extensions to affiliates and has no reason to believe that the affiliate would have
difficulty repaying the credit.
3. Financial Subsidiaries. The final rule provides that financial
subsidiaries of a bank are affiliates of the bank. Thus, under the final rule, transactions
between a bank and its financial subsidiary, as well as other affiliates, are subject to the
requirements of sections 23A and 23B.
In addition to transactions between a bank and its financial subsidiary,
certain transactions between an affiliate of a bank and a financial subsidiary of the bank
are subject to sections 23A and 23B. Any purchase of, or investment in, the securities
of a financial subsidiary of a bank by an affiliate of the bank is treated as a purchase of,
or investment in, such securities by the bank. An extension of credit to a financial
subsidiary of a bank by an affiliate of the bank is treated as an extension of credit by
the bank if the extension of credit is treated as regulatory capital of the financial
subsidiary. Other extensions of credit to a financial subsidiary of a bank by an affiliate
of the bank may be treated as an extension of credit by the bank to the financial
subsidiary if the Board determines, on a case-by-case basis, that such treatment is
necessary or appropriate to prevent evasions of the Federal Reserve Act or GLBA.
The final rule, consistent with the law, defines a financial subsidiary as any
subsidiary of a national or state chartered bank that engages in an activity not
permissible for national banks to conduct directly. The final rule, however, exempts
insurance agency subsidiaries of national and state chartered banks from the definition
of financial subsidiary because these subsidiaries usually require little funding from
their parent bank and generally do not pose a substantial threat to bank safety and
soundness. In addition, the final rule exempts subsidiaries of a state chartered bank
that engage only in (i) activities permissible for the state chartered bank to conduct
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directly, or (ii) activities they were lawfully conducting before issuance of the final rule
(a grandfather provision for existing subsidiaries).
4. General Puqwse Credit Card Exemption. The final rule exempts from
section 23A extensions of credit by a bank under a general purpose credit card where
the borrower uses the credit to purchase goods or services from an affiliate of the
bank. The final rule defines a general purpose credit card as a credit card issued by a
bank that is widely accepted by merchants (such as a Visa card or Mastercard) so long
as less than 25 percent of the aggregate amount of purchases with the card are
purchases from an affiliate of the bank.
The final rule generally exempts from the 25 percent test any bank that
does not have nonfinancial affiliates, because banks with retail commercial affiliates
typically are the banks whose credit cards are used substantially to purchase goods or
services from affiliates of the banks. The final rule also exempts from the 25 percent
test any widely accepted credit card if the issuer bank can establish to the Board's
satisfaction that a minimal percentage of purchases with the card would be purchases
from an affiliate of the bank.
5. Foreign Banks. For competitive equity reasons, the final rule applies
sections 23A and 23B to transactions between the U.S. branches and agencies of a
foreign bank and affiliates of the foreign bank engaged in the United States in several
new GLBA activities, including securities underwriting and dealing, insurance
underwriting, merchant banking, and insurance company investment. The regulation
does not apply sections 23A or 23B to transactions between a U.S. branch or agency of
a foreign bank and any other type of affiliate (for example, foreign affiliates or U.S.
affiliates engaged in pre-GLBA nonbanking activities), or to transactions between the
foreign bank's non-U.S. offices and its U.S. nonbank affiliates. This approach is
consistent with the Board's previous application of sections 23A and 23B to section 20
affiliates of foreign banks before GLBA and securities and merchant banking affiliates
of foreign banks after GLBA. Of course, sections 23A and 23B and Regulation W
apply to a U.S. bank subsidiary of a foreign bank in the same manner and to the same
extent as they would apply to any other U.S. bank.
6. Section 250.250 Exemption. Since 1974, a bank's purchase of loans
from an affiliate has not been subject to section 23A if (i) the bank makes an
independent evaluation of the creditworthiness of the borrower before the affiliate
makes the loan, and (ii) the bank commits to purchase the loan prior to the affiliate
making the loan (the "250.250 exemption"). The purpose of the exemption was to
allow a bank to take advantage of an investment opportunity and not to alleviate the
funding needs of an affiliate. By the 1990s, however, some banks were using this
exemption to provide nearly all their non-bank lending affiliates' funding. In 1995, to
ensure that banks used the 250.250 exemption consistently with its original purpose,
Board staff opined that the exemption was not available to any bank whose loan
purchases from an affiliate represented more than 50 percent of the loans made by the
affiliate.
The final rule retains the 50 percent test as a general matter but allows the
bank's primary federal regulator to reduce the 50 percent threshold prospectively, on a
case-by-case basis, if appropriate to protect the safety and soundness of the bank.
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Concurrent with the adoption of the final Regulation W, the Board is seeking comment
on a proposed rule that would limit a bank's purchases of extensions of credit from an
affiliate under the exemption to 100 percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus.
7. Affiliated mutual funds. The final rule includes an exemption for loans
by a bank to a third party secured by securities issued by a mutual fund affiliate of the
bank (subject to a number of conditions).
8. Corporate reorganizations. The final rule contains an exemption that
would permit a banking organization to engage more expeditiously in internal
reorganization transactions involving a bank's purchase of assets from an affiliate
(subject to a number of conditions, including those that the Board traditionally has
imposed when granting case-by-case exemptions for such transactions).
9. Valuation rules. The final rule contains new valuation rules for a
bank's investments in, and acquisitions of, affiliates.
Reserve Banks should distribute this letter and the attached review of
Regulation W to the domestic and foreign banking organizations supervised by the
Federal Reserve. Reserve Banks should also ensure that all central points of contact,
examiners, and other staff involved in the supervision of banking organizations'
lending and investing activities review this SR letter, the a1t(;l~hcd.£ui(.llm~~, and
Regulation W, and focus their supervisory activities accordingly.
Should you have any questions concerning this SR letter, please direct
them to an appropriate individual noted below. General policy questions should be
directed to Michael G. Martinson, Associate Director (202-452-3640), or
Molly S. Wassom, Associate Director (202-452-2305). Questions concerning
applications-related matters should be directed to Betsy Cross, Deputy
Associate Director (202-452-2574), or Katie Cox, Supervisory Financial Analyst (202-
452- 2721). All other supervision-related questions should be directed to
Mary Frances Monroe, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst (202452-5231), or
Michael 1. Schoenfeld, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst (202-452-2836).
Questions regarding legal interpretations should be directed to Pamela G. Nardolilli,
Senior Counsel (202-452-3289), or Mark E. Van Der Weide, Counsel (202-452-2263).
Richard Spillenkothen
Director
Attachment
Note:
1. 67 FR 76560, December 12,2002. The text of the regulation is contained on the
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Board's public website at
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/presslbcreg/2002/2007 1127/attachmentLndf.
Many of the Board's interpretations of, and staff opinions on, sections 23A
and 23B have been incorporated into Regulation W. Return tQ text
2. For ease ofreferen<~e, this SR letter refers to "banks," but insured savings
associations are also subject to sections 23A and 23B as if they are
banks. Return to text
Hon~ I Banking information and regulation
Accessibilitv IContact Us
Last update: January 9, 2003
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Appendix
Comprehensive Review of Regulation W
Overview of the Statute
Overview of Section 23A. Section 23A prohibits a bank from initiating a "covered
transaction" with an affiliate if, after the transaction, (i) the aggregate amount of the bank's
covered transactions with that particular affiliate would exceed 10 percent of the bank's capital
stock and surplus, or (ii) the aggregate amount of the bank's covered transactions with all
affiliates would exceed 20 percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus. Covered transactions
include loans and other extensions of credit to an affiliate, investments in the securities of an
affiliate, purchases of assets from an affiliate, and certain other transactions that expose the bank
to the risks of its affiliates. A bank's capital stock and surplus is defined in section 223.3(d} of
Regulation W as the sum of the bank's tier 1 and tier 2 capital under the risk-based capital
guidelines, plus the balance of the allowance for loan and lease losses not included in tier 2
capital, based on the bank's most recent Call Report. The amount of any investment by the bank
in a financial subsidiary that counts as a covered transaction and is required to be deducted from
regulatory capital is added back for purposes of calculating capital stock and surplus for purposes
of section 23A.
Section 23A requires all covered transactions between a bank and its affiliate to be on
terms and conditions consistent with safe and sound banking practices ("Safety and Soundness
Requirement"). Although the statute contains various exemptions, the Safety and Soundness
Requirement must always be met. Section 23A prohibits a bank from purchasing a low-quality
asset from an affiliate. Section 223.3(u} of Regulation W defines a low-quality asset to include
an asset that is classified or treated as "special mention" or "other transfer risk problems" in an
examination report or pursuant to the bank's or the affiliate's own internal asset classification
system, an asset in a non-accrual status, or an asset on which payments of principal and interest
are more than 30 days past due. In addition, an asset whose terms have been renegotiated or
compromised as a result of the obligor's deteriorating financial condition, and any asset acquired
through foreclosure, repossession, or otherwise in satisfaction of a debt previously contracted
that has not been satisfactorily reviewed in an examination or inspection, are included within the
definition of a "low-quality asset."
Extensions of credit to an affiliate and guarantees, letters of credit, and acceptances
issued on behalf of an affiliate ("credit transactions") must be secured by a statutorily defined
amount of collateral, ranging from 100 to 130 percent of the covered transaction amount.
Securities issued by an affiliate and low-quality assets are not acceptable collateral for any credit
transaction with an affiliate. In addition, the attribution rule provides that any transaction by a
bank with any person is deemed to be an affiliate transaction subject to section 23A to the extent
that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred to, an affiliate.
Overview of Section 23B. Section 23B requires that certain transactions, including all
covered transactions, be on market tenns and conditions ("Market Tenns Requirement"). In
addition to covered transactions, the Market Terms Requirement applies to: (i) any sale of assets
by the bank to an affiliate; (ii) any payment of money or furnishing of services by the bank to an
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affiliate; (iii) any transaction in which an affiliate acts as agent or broker for the bank or any
other person if the bank is a participant in the transaction; and (iv) any transaction by the bank
with a third party if an affiliate has a financial interest in the third party or an affiliate is a
participant in the transaction. In the absence of comparable transactions for identifying market
tenns, the bank must use tenus, including credit standards that are at least as favorable to the
bank as those that would be offered in good faith to nonaffiliated companies.
Determining Whether Regulation W Applies
Two initial questions need to be answered in detennining whether a transaction is subject
to Regulation W. The first is whether the transaction is between a bank and an "affiliate" of the
bank. The second is whether the transaction is a "covered transaction."
Affiliate Definition. Regulation W applies to covered transactions between a bank and an
affiliate of the bank.
The definition of an affiliate for purposes of Regulation W is set forth in section 223.2.
The definition is broad, and includes:
• Any company that controls the bank;
• Any company that is controlled by a company that controls the bank;
• Any company that is controlled, directly or indirectly, by trust or otherwise, by or for
the benefit of shareholders who beneficially or otherwise control, directly or
indirectly, by trust or otherwise, the bank or any company that controls the bank;
• Any company in which a majority of its directors, trustees, or general partners (or
individuals exercising similar functions) constitute a majority of the persons holding
any such office with the bank or any company that controls the bank;
• Any company, including a real estate investment trust, that is sponsored and advised
on a contractual basis by the bank or an affiliate of the bank;
• Any registered investment company for which the bank or any affiliate of the bank
serves as an investment adviser;
• Any unregistered investment fund for which the bank or any affiliate of the bank
serves as an investment adviser, if the bank and its affiliates own or control in the
aggregate more than 5 percent of any class of voting securities or more than 5 percent
of the equity capital of the fund I;
I Many private equity funds, foreign investment funds, and cOlmnodities funds that currently
escape treatment as an affiliate because they are not registered under the Investment Company
Act of 1940 (" 1940 Act") are covered under this definition. The Board believes that the advisory
relationship of a bank or affiliate with an investment fund presents the same potential for
conflicts of interest, regardless of whether the fund is an investment company registered with the
SEC under the 1940 Act. The Board also believes that investment funds organized outside of the
United States for which a bank or an affiliate serves as investment adviser are affiliates of the
bank for purposes of section 23A.
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• An insured depository institution2 that is a subsidiary of the bank;
• A financial subsidiary3 of the bank;
• Any subsidiary of the bank that is an employee stock option plan or similar entity
established for the benefit of the shareholders, partners, members, or employees of
the bank or an affiliate of the bank;
• Any subsidiary of the bank, if affiliates (other than insured depository institution
affiliates) or controlling shareholders of the bank also control the subsidiary through a
non-bank chain of ownership4;
• Subject to certain safe harbors5, any portfolio company in which a holding company
of the bank owns or controls, directly or indirectly, or through one or more other
persons, 15 percent or more of the equity capital of the company under the merchant
banking or insurance company investment authority of GLBA;
• Any partnership for which the bank or any affiliate of the bank serves as general
partner or for which the bank or affiliate causes any director, officer, or employee to
serve as general partner;
• Any subsidiary of an affiliate of the bank; and
• A "catch-all" provision for any company that the Board or other appropriate federal
banking agency determines by regulation or order to have a relationship with the bank
or an affiliate of the bank such that covered transactions by the bank with the
company may have a detrimental effect on the bank.
Regulation W continues the traditional section 23A exclusions from the definition of
affiliate for companies acquired as a result of rights acquired out of a bona fide debt previously
contracted and companies engaged solely in: (i) holding bank premises; (ii) conducting a safe
deposit business; or (iii) holding U.S. government obligations (as defined in the Board's
Regulation A).
2 An insured depository institution includes an operating subsidiary of the institution. Uninsured
depository institution subsidiaries generally are excluded from the definition of an affiliate.
3See "Special Rules and Exemptions under Regulation W - Special Rules for Financial
Subsidiaries" for exemptions from the definition of financial subsidiary.
4 For example, if a bank owns 50 percent of a joint venture company and an affiliate of the bank
owns the remaining 50 percent through a chain of ownership not running through the bank, the
company is deemed an affiliate, and not a subsidiary, of the bank for purposes of Regulation W.
5 These safe harbors are consistent with the Board's and Treasury's merchant banking rule and
include situations: (i) where no representative of the holding company serves as a director of the
portfolio company; (ii) where an independent third party owns a greater percentage of the equity
capital of the portfolio company than does the holding company, and no more than one
representative of the holding company s\?rves as director of the portfolio company; and (iii)
where an independent third party owns more than 50 percent of the voting shares of the portfolio
company, and representatives of the holding company do not constitute a majority of the
directors of the portfolio company.
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The Board decided to defer a detennination as to whether special purpose entities
("SPEs") associated with a bank should in any circumstances be deemed affiliates of the bank, in
light of the complexity of this issue and pending FASB proposals on the consolidation of SPEs.
However, a company sponsored and advised on a contractual basis by a bank or an affiliate of
the bank is an affiliate under section 23A and Regulation W.
In addition to section 23A's definition of control, section 223.3(g) of Regulation W
includes two control provisions that are similar to presumptions contained in Regulation Y.
First, a company is deemed to control securities, assets, or other ownership interests controlled
by a subsidiary of the company. Second, a company that controls instruments that are
convertible, at the option of the holder, into securities, will be deemed to hold those securities.
In addition, under Regulation W, a rebuttable presumption of control arises when a company
owns or controls more than 25 percent of the total equity of a second company.
If a bank proposes to engage in a transaction with an affiliate, the bank must detennine
whether the transaction would be a covered transaction. If the bank proposes to engage in a
covered transaction with an affiliate, the provisions of Regulation Wapply.
Definition of Covered Transaction. Under section 223.3(h) of Regulation W, a covered
transaction includes:
• An extension of credit to an affiliate;
• A purchase of, or investment in, a security issued by an affiliate;
• A purchase of an asset from an affiliate, including an asset subject to recourse or an
agreement to repurchase;
• The acceptance of a security issued by an affiliate as collateral for an extension of
credit to any person or company; and
• The issuance of a guarantee6, acceptance, or letter of credit, including: an
endorsement or standby letter of credit, on behalfof an affiliate7; a confinnation of a
letter of credit issued by an affiliate; and a cross-affiliate netting arrangement.
An extension ofcredit to an affiliate is broadly defined in section 223.3(0) of Regulation
W as the making or renewal of a loan, the granting of a lin~ of credit, or the extending of credit
in any manner whatsoever8, including on an intraday basis, to an affiliate. A bank's purchase of
6 A guarantee by a bank on behalfof an affiliate does not include a bank's issuance of a
guarantee in support of securities issued by a third party and underwritten by a securities affiliate
of the bank.
7 Regulation W clarifies that the section 23B prohibition on a bank publishing an advertisement
or entering into an agreement stating or suggesting that the banle will be in any way responsible
for the obligations of its affiliates does not preclude the bank from issuing a guarantee,
acceptance, or letter of credit on behalf of an affiliate in accordance with section 23A.
8 Including: any advance to an affiliate by means of an overdraft, cash item, or otherwise; a sale
of federal funds to an affiliate; a lease that is the functional equivalent of an extension of credit to
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a debt security issued by an affiliate is an extension ofcredit by the bank to the affiliate for
purposes of section 23A and Regulation W, and must, among other things, be collateralized in
accordance with the statute and the rule.
Cross-affiliate netting arrangements are defined in section 223 .3(j) of Regulation W as
arrangements among a bank, one or more affiliates of the bank, and one or more nonaffiliates,
where the nonaffiliate is permitted to deduct obligations of the affiliate to the nonaffiliate in
settling its obligations to the bank, or a bank is required or permitted to add affiliate obligations
to a nonaffiliate when detennining the bank's total obligations to the nonaffiliate. These
arrangements expose a bank to the credit risk of its affiliate because the bank may become
obligated to assume the obligation of the affiliate.
"Keepwell" agreements, under which a bank commits to maintain the capital levels or
solvency ofan affiliate, also are considered guarantees for purposes of section 23A and
Regulation W. The credit risk incurred by the bank in such arrangements is similar to the risk
incurred by the bank when it issues a guarantee on behalfof an affiliate.
Valuation and Timing Rules under Regulation W
Sections 223.21 through 223.24 of Regulation W set forth valuation and timing rules that
are designed to detennine the amount of a covered transaction subject to the quantitative
limitations and collateral requirements of the rule and the time at which a transaction becomes
subject to Regulation W limitations and requirements. Special valuation rules apply to financial
subsidiary affiliates of a bank. See "Special Rules and Exemptions under Regulation W -
Special Rules for Financial Subsidiaries."
Valuation Rules for Credit Transactions. Credit transactions with affiliates generally are
valued at the greater of: (i) the principal amount of the transaction; (ii) the amount owed by the
affiliate to the bank under the transaction; or (iii) the sum of the amount provided to, or on behalf
of, the affiliate in the transaction and any additional amount the bank could be required to
provide to, or on behalf of, the affiliate under the tenns of the transaction.
The value of a loan to an affiliate purchased by the bank from a nonaffiliate is the total
amount of consideration given by the bank in exchange for the loan and any additional amount
the bank could be required to provide to, or on behalf of, the affiliate under the tenns of the
transaction.
Although a bank's purchase of, or investment in, a debt security issued by an affiliate is
considered an extension of credit to the affiliate, these transactions are not valued like other
extensions of credit. Purchases of, or investments in, securities issued by an affiliate are valued
at the greater of the bank's purchase price or the carrying value of the securities.
an affiliate; an acquisition by purchase, discount, exchange, or otherwise of a note or other
obligation, including commercial paper or debt securities, of an affiliate; any increase in the
amount of, extension of the maturity of, or adjustment to the interest rate tenn or other material
term of an extension of credit to an affiliate; and any other similar transaction as a result of
which an affiliate becomes obligated to pay money or its equivalent.
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Special Timing Rules for Credit Transactions. A bank is deemed to enter into a credit
transaction with an affiliate at the time during the day that the bank becomes legally obligated to
enter into the transaction, not at the end of the day on which the loan agreement is signed or the
loan is funded. Credit transactions with nonaffiliates generally become covered transactions if
and when the nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate of the bank. If the nonaffiliate becomes an
affiliate within one year after the bank has entered into the credit transaction with it, the bank
must ensure that the collateral requirements of Regulation Ware met "promptly" after the
nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate. In all cases, the transaction must meet the Market Tenns
Requirement.
The leeway provided by the "promptly" standard is not available if the credit transaction
is made in contemplation of the nonaffiliate becoming an affiliate of the bank. Under section
223.3(t) of Regulation W, a transaction is presumed to be in contemplation ofa nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank if the bank enters into the transaction after the execution of, or
commencement of negotiations designed to result in, an agreement under which the nonaffiliate
would become an affiliate. If the credit transaction is in contemplation of a nonaffiliate
becoming an affiliate of the bank, the bank must ensure that the rule's quantitative limitations
and collateral requirements would be met at the time the nonaffiliate becomes an affiliate.
Loans Secured by Affiliate Securities. Loans by a bank to a third party that are secured
exclusively by affiliate securities are valued at the lesser of: (i) the total amount of the extension
of credit; and (ii) the fair market value of the pledged affiliate securities, if they have publicly
available price quotes.
Loans by a bank to a third party that are secured by both affiliate and nonaffiliate
securities are valued at the lesser of: (i) the total amount of the extension of credit, minus the fair
market value of nonaffiliate collateral; and (ii) the fair market value of the pledged affiliate
securities, if they have publicly available price quotes. Under this valuation rule, the maximum
amount that the bank must count against Regulation W's quantitative limits is the difference
between the full amount of the loan and the fair market value of the nonaffiliate collateral.
Securities of an eligible affiliated mutual fund are not considered securities issued by an
affiliate for purposes of this valuation rule, subject to certain conditions designed to ensure
liquidity and minimize the use of the exemption as a method of funding affiliates. Eligible
affiliated mutual fund securities are securities issued by an open-end investment company
registered with the SEC under the 1940 Act if:
• The securities have publicly available price quotes; and
• The bank and its affiliates do not own more than 5 percent of the fund's shares,
excluding shares held in good faith in a fiduciary capacity9.
9 Shares held by the bank or an affiliate of the bank in a fiduciary capacity for the benefit of the
bank or affiliate, or the shareholders, employees, or subsidiaries of the bank or affiliate, are not
eligible for this exclusion.
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Furthermore, the bank may not exclude affiliated mutual fund securities if it knows or has reason
to know that the proceeds of the extension of credit will be used to purchase the affiliated mutual
fund shares serving as collateral or otherwise will be used to benefit an affiliate.
Valuation Rules for Purchases of Assets from an Affiliate. Purchases of assets by a bank
from an affiliate generally are valued at the total consideration given, including liabilities
assumed, by the bank in exchange for the asset. The value may be reduced after the purchase to
reflect amortization or depreciation of the asset, consistent with GAAP.
Regulation W provides a special valuation rule for a bank's purchase of a line of credit or
loan commitment from an affiliate. A bank must value such an asset at the purchase price paid,
plus any additional amount that the bank is obligated to provide under the credit facility.
Without this special rule, a company would be able to transfer substantial amounts of unfunded
obligations to its affiliated bank without being subject to section 23A's quantitative limitations.
Valuation Rules for Purchases ofor Investments in Affiliate Securities. As noted above,
purchases of or investments in securities issued by an affiliate are valued at the greater of the
bank's purchase price or carrying value of the securities. This approach reflects the risk of
continuing exposure to an affiliate through an investment in securities, even if that investment
was made at a price below the carrying value of the securities. On the other hand, if the carrying
value of the investment declines below the purchase price as the affiliate's financial condition
worsens, the rule limits the ability of the bank to provide additional funding as the affiliate
approaches insolvency.
A bank may acquire securities of an affiliate in a transaction that results in the affiliate
becoming an operating subsidiary of the bank. These transactions are treated as a purchase of
assets and assumption of liabilities of an affiliate. The covered transaction amount for these
transactions is the total amount of consideration given by the bank for the shares, plus the total
liabilities of the transferred company. 10 The value of the covered transaction may be
subsequently reduced to reflect amortization or depreciation of the assets of the transferred
company consistent with GAAP, and sales of assets of the transferred company.
The Limitations and Requirements of Regulation W
Quantitative Limitations. A bank may not engage in a new covered transaction with an
affiliate if the aggregate amount of covered transactions between the bank and the affiliate would
be in excess of 10 percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus after consummation of the new
transaction. Aggregate covered transactions between the bank and all affiliates are limited to 20
percent of the bank's capital stock and surplus.
10 In the past, the Board has considered these transactions to be covered transactions only to the
extent that the transferred company has liabilities to another affiliate of the bank at the time of
the transaction. Regulation W, on the other hand, treats these transactions as covered
transactions to the extent that the transferred entity has obligations to any person.
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Consistent with GLBA, transactions between a bank and a financial subsidiary of the
bank are not subject to the 10 percent limitation. The exemption from the 10 percent limit
applies to investments by the bank in its own financial subsidiaries. Investments by the bank in
the financial subsidiaries of affiliated depository institutions are subject to the 10 percent
limitation. Aggregate covered transactions with all financial subsidiaries and other affiliates of
the bank are subject to the 20 percent limitation. Other provisions of Regulation W applicable to
financial subsidiaries are discussed under "Special Rules and Exemptions under Regulation W -
Special Rules for Financial Subsidiaries."
Consistent with existing interpretations of section 23A, Regulation W does not require
the unwinding of transactions if a bank's capital declines such that the 10 or 20 percent
quantitative limitation is exceeded. However, new transactions would be forbidden until the
quantitative limits could be met.
Collateral Requirements. Any credit transaction between a bank and its affiliate must be
secured with the statutorily required amount of collateral. Under section 223.14 of
Regulation W:
• A credit transaction must be secured by collateral having a market value equal to at
least:
• 100 percent of the amount of the transaction if the collateral is:
• obligations of the United States or its agencies;
• obligations fully guaranteed by the United States or its agencies as to
principal and interest;
• notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or bankers' acceptances that are
eligible for rediscount or purchase by a Federal Reserve Bank; or
• a segregated, earmarked deposit account with the bank that exists for
the sole purpose of securing credit transactions between the member
bank and its affiliates and is identified as suchII.
• 110 percent of the amount of the transaction if the collateral is obligations of
any State or political subdivision thereof.
• 120 percent of the amount of the transaction if the collateral is other debt
instruments, including loans or other receivables.
• 130 percent of the amount of the transaction if the collateral is stock, leases, or
other real or personal property.
• The following types of collateral are ineligible collateral under Regulation W:
• Low-quality assets;
• Securities issued by any affiliate;
• Equity securities issued by the bank and debt securities issued by the bank that
represent regulatory capital of the bankl2;
II This may be an omnibus deposit account for multiple affiliates and multiple covered
transactions, provided that the account fully secures all such covered transactions.
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• Intangible assets,13 unless specifically approved by the Board,
• Guarantees, letters of credit, and similar instruments.
In addition, a bank must maintain a perfected security interest in collateral securing credit
transactions. The security interest must be enforceable under applicable law, including in the
event of bankruptcy or similar default. If the bank does not have a first priority security interest
in the collateral, it must deduct from the value of the collateral the lesser of: (i) the amount of
any security interest in the collateral that is senior to the bank's interest; or (ii) the amount of
credit secured by the collateral that is senior to the bank's position. Any retired or amortized
collateral must be replaced with additional eligible collateral over the life of the credit
transaction.
Some transactions are exempt from the collateralization requirements. These include:
• An acceptance that is already fully secured either by attached documents I4 or other
property with an ascertainable market value that is involved in the transaction;
• The unused portion of an extension of credit to an affiliate if the bank does not have
any legal obligation to advance additional funds until required collateral is posted;
and
• Purchases of affiliate debt securities by the bank from a nonaffiliate in a bona fide
secondary market transaction.
Provisions Applicable to Foreign Banks
Section 223.61 of Regulation W applies sections 23A and 23B to transactions between a
U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank and affiliates of the branch or agency engaged directly
in the United States in the following activities: full-scope securities underwriting and dealing;
non-credit-related insurance underwriting; merchant banking; and insurance company
investments. 15 Regulation W also applies sections 23A and 23B to transactions between a U.S.
branch or agency of a foreign bank and any portfolio company controlled by the foreign bank
under GLBA's merchant banking or insurance company investment authorities. Regulation W
12 If the bank were forced to foreclose on credit transactions with affiliates secured by bank-
issued securities, the bank might be unwilling to liquidate the collateral promptly if its capital or
share price would decline or if the liquidation would trigger a change in control.
13 The definition of intangible assets includes but is not limited to, intangible assets for purposes
ofGAAP.
14 A security agreement that references specific assets.
15 The rule also applies to any subsidiary of an affiliate engaged in those activities. If these
subsidiaries were not covered, the U.S. branch arguably could fund the foreign bank's U.S.
operations outside of the scope of sections 23A and 23B and Regulation W by lending money to
a subsidiary of the affiliate and having the subsidiary dividend or re-lend the funds to the
affiliate.
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does not apply to transactions between a U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank and other
affiliates or to transactions between the foreign bank's non-U.S. offices and its U.S. affiliates.
Special Rules and Exemptions under Regulation W
Special Rules for Derivatives Transactions. Banks enter into derivatives transactions
with their affiliates most commonly to address the risk management needs of either the bank or
the affiliate. Banks and their affiliates typically use each other as derivatives counterparties in
order to maximize profits and manage risks within the consolidated organization.
GLBA required the Board to adopt by May 12,2001, a final rule addressing the
appropriate treatment of derivatives transactions with affiliates under section 23A. As an interim
measure l6, the Board required banks to adopt policies and procedures to manage the credit
exposure arising from such transactions and clarified that such transactions were subject to the
market terms requirement of section 23B. Under section 23B, banks may engage in derivatives
transactions with affiliates only on terms and under circumstances that are at least as favorable to
the bank as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with nonaffiliates.
Since the adoption of the interim rule, Federal Reserve staff has reviewed the compliance
with section 23B of a sampling of banks actively engaged in derivatives transactions with their
affiliates. This survey revealed a number of compliance issues as a result of varying
interpretations of the scope of section 23B as applied to derivatives transactions with affiliates.
Some banks took the view that the most liberal terms granted to the bank's most highly rated
nonaffiliate counterparties could be granted to bank affiliates. The preamble to Regulation W
emphasizes that this treatment of affiliates is not appropriate.
Under section 223.33 of Regulation W, a bank must establish policies and procedures
reasonably designed to manage the credit exposure arising from its derivatives transactions with
each affiliate and all affiliates in the aggregate. Specifically, the policies and procedures must at
a minimum provide for:
• Monitoring and controlling the credit exposure arising at anyone time from the
bank's derivatives transactions with each affiliate and all affiliates in the aggregate;
• Ensuring that the bank's derivatives transactions comply with the market tenns
requirement of section 23B. In particular, a bank must:
• Have in place credit limits on its derivatives exposures to affiliates that are at
least as strict as those imposed on unaffiliated companies engaged in similar
businesses and substantially equivalent in size and credit quality;
• Monitor its derivatives exposure to affiliates in a manner at least as rigorous
as used to monitor exposure to comparable unaffiliated companies; and
• Price, and require collateralization of, affiliate derivatives transactions in a
way that is at least as favorable to the bank as pricing and collateralization of
unaffiliated transactions.
16 66 FR 24229 (May 11,2001).
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Monitoring and controlling the credit exposure from derivatives transactions includes, at a
minimum, imposing appropriate credit limits, mark-to-market requirements, and collateral
requirements. The limits and requirements imposed by a bank should reflect the nature, volume,
and complexity of its derivatives transactions, and should be approved by the board of directors
of the bank or an appropriate board cOlmnittee. Going forward, Board staff will consider the
need for additional guidance on policies and procedures for derivatives transactions with
affiliates.
Regulation W does not subject credit exposures arising from bank-affiliate derivatives to
the quantitative limits and collateral requirements of section 23A. However, Regulation W treats
as a covered transaction subject to section 23A credit derivative transactions between a bank and
a nonaffiliate in which the bank protects the nonaffiliate from a default on, or decline in the value
of, an obligation ofan affiliate of the bank. 17 These transactions are the functional equivalent of
a guarantee by the bank on behalf of the affiliate. Regulation W does not allow the bank to
reduce its covered transaction amount for these transactions to reflect hedging transactions by the
bank with third parties. However, the Board intends to interpret this provision so as to treat such
a credit derivative as a covered transaction only to the extent that the derivative provides credit
protection with respect to obligations of an affiliate of the bank.
The Board anticipates issuing regulations to address derivatives transactions that are the
functional equivalent of a loan by a bank to an affiliate or the functional equivalent of a purchase
of an asset by a bank from an affiliate. An obvious example of a loan-equivalent derivative
would be the purchase of a deep-in-the-money option by a bank from an affiliate. An asset-
purchase-equivalent derivative could be a credit default swap under which the bank agrees to
compensate its affiliate for any default of a loan asset held by the affiliate.
Special Rules for Financial Subsidiaries. Regulation W treats financial subsidiaries of a
bank as affiliates of the bank, in contrast to the general treatment of subsidiaries of a bank as
nonaffiliates. A financial subsidiary is any subsidiary of a national or state bank that engages in
activities (whether as principal or agent) not permissible for national banks to conduct directly. 18
Financial subsidiaries do not, however, include insurance agency subsidiaries, as they usually
require little parent funding and generally do not pose safety and soundness concerns.
Regulation W also exempts from the definition of a financial subsidiary a subsidiary of a
state bank that engages only in activities pennissible for the state bank to conduct directly or
activities lawfully conducted prior to December 12,2002, the date of publication of final
Regulation W. However, neither of these exemptions is available for a financial subsidiary of a
state bank that engages in principal activities that GLBA requires a national bank to conduct in a
financial subsidiary. For example, a subsidiary of a state bank that is underwriting and dealing in
bank-ineligible securities would be a financial subsidiary.
17 Generally, the amount of the covered transaction would be the notional amount of the
derivative.
18 Regulation W does not address financial subsidiaries of thrifts, as subsidiaries of thrifts are
subject to a number of statutory prudential requirements.
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A bank's investment in securities issued by its own financial subsidiary is valued at the
greater of: (i) the total amount of consideration given by the bank in exchange for the security;
and (ii) the carrying value of the security as of the date of acquisition. The carrying value of the
bank's investment for purposes of this valuation rule is not adjusted going forward for any
earnings retained or losses incurred by the subsidiary after the bank's investment. If the financial
subsidiary is consolidated with the bank under GAAP, the carrying value of the securities of the
financial subsidiary shall be equal to the carrying value of the securities on the parent-only
GAAP financial statements of the bank (adjusted so as not to reflect the bank's pro rata portion
of any earnings retained or losses incurred by the financial subsidiary after the bank's acquisition
of the securities).
GLBA provides that any investment in the securities of a financial subsidiary of a bank
by an affiliate of the bank is treated as an investment by the bank in such securities. In addition,
under Regulation W, if an extension of credit to the financial subsidiary by an affiliate of the
bank is treated as regulatory capital of the financial subsidiary, the extension of credit by the
affiliate is attributed to the bank. Other extensions of credit to a bank's financial subsidiary by
an affiliate of the bank may be treated as an extension of credit by the bank, if the Board
determines such treatment to be appropriate.
Exemptions from the Attribution Rule. Regulation W provides certain exemptions from
the general rule that treats a transaction with any person as an affiliate transaction to the extent
that the proceeds of the transaction are used for the benefit of, or transferred to, an affiliate.
Notwithstanding these exemptions, these transactions are subject to the Safety and Soundness
and Market Terms Requirements of Regulation W.
Exemptionfrom the Attribution Rulefor General Purpose Credit Cards. Section
223.16(c) of Regulation W exempts from the attribution rule an extension of credit to a
nonaffiliate if (i) proceeds are used to purchase goods and services from an affiliate of the bank,
and (ii) the extension of credit is made pursuant to and consistent with the conditions of a general
purpose credit card. A general purpose credit card means a credit card issued by the bank that is
widely accepted by merchants that are not affiliates of the bank if less than 25 percent of the total
value of products and services purchased with the card are purchases of products and services
from an affiliate of the bank. The funding benefit received by the bank's affiliate from the use of
general purpose credit cards by unaffiliated borrowers is likely to be minimal, and a bank's
decision to issue a general purpose credit card and extend credit pursuant to the card likely would
be based on independent credit standards unrelated to possible affiliate transactions.
A bank has a number of methods for demonstrating that its credit card meets the
25 percent test.
• A bank that has no commercial affiliates would satisfy the test if it has no reason to
believe it would fail. Such a bank would not be required to establish systems to
compute compliance with the test.
• A bank with commercial affiliates can satisfy the test by:
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• Presenting infonnation to the Board demonstrating that the card should always
comply with the 25 percent test;19 or
• Establishing systems to compute compliance with the test on a monthly basis.
The computation of monthly compliance with the 25 percent test is based on cardholder
purchases over a rolling average of the preceding 12 months. Section 223.16(c)(4)(iv) of
Regulation W provides an example of computing compliance with the 25 percent test.
Banks that fall out of compliance with the 25 percent test generally have a three-month
grace period to return to compliance before they become subject to section 23A. Moreover,
banks that become subject to section 23A are eligible to re-test and regain the exemption the
following month.
Exemptionfrom the Attribution Rulefor Agency Transactions. Under section 223.16(b)
of Regulation W, an extension of credit by a bank to a nonaffiliate is not attributed to an affiliate
of the bank if the proceeds are used to purchase an asset through an affiliate that is acting
exclusively as an agent or broker in the transaction, and the asset is not issued, underwritten, or
sold as principal by any affiliate of the bank. However, the receipt of a fee, commission, or other
compensation by the affiliate agent or broker is subject to the Market Terms Requirement.
Exemptionfrom the Attribution Rulefor Riskless Principal Transactions. Under section
223 .16(c) of Regulation W, an extension of credit by a bank to a nonaffiliate is not attributed to
an affiliate of the bank if:
• The proceeds of the extension of credit are used to purchase a security through a
SEC-registered broker-dealer affiliate of the bank, and the affiliate is acting
exclusively as a riskless principal in the transaction;
• The security purchased is not issued, underwritten or sold as principal (other than as
riskless principal) by an affiliate of the bank; and
• Any mark-up or other compensation received by the affiliate is substantially the same
as, or lower than, those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with or
involving nonaffiliates.
A company is acting as a riskless principal if after receiving an order to buy (or sell) a
security from a customer, the company purchases (or sells) the security in the secondary market
for its own account to offset a contemporaneous sale to (or purchase from) the customer.
Exemptionfrom the Attribution Rulefor Pre-Existing Lines ofCredit. Section
223. 16(c)(3) of Regulation W provides that an extension of credit by a bank to a nonaffiliate is
not attributed to an affiliate of the bank from which the nonaffiliate purchases securities,
provided that the extension of credit is made pursuant to, and consistent with any conditions
imposed in, a pre-existing line of credit that was not established in contemplation of the purchase
of securities from or through an affiliate of the bank.
19 For example, by demonstrating that aggregate affiliate sales do not approach a level close to
25 percent of total sales under the card.
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Exemptions from the Quantitative Limits and Collateral Requirements. Certain
transactions are exempt from the quantitative limits and collateral requirements of Regulation W.
These transactions are subject, however, to the Safety and Soundness Requirement and the
prohibition on the purchase ofa low-quality asset from an affiliate.
Sister Bank Transactions. Transactions between a bank and an insured depository
institution, 80 percent or more of the voting securities of which are controlled by the holding
company that also controls 80 percent or more of the voting securities of the bank are exempt
from the quantitative limits and collateral requirements of Regulation W. In addition,
transactions between a bank and an insured depository institution where the bank controls 80
percent or more of the voting securities of the depository institution, or the depository institution
controls 80 percent or more of the voting securities of the bank, are exempt from the quantitative
limits and collateral requirements.
Exemption for Purchases ofMarketable Securities. Purchases of marketable securities
from a securities affiliate that is not a principal underwriter of the issue are exempt from the
quantitative limitations and collateral requirements of Regulation W, if:
• The securities affiliate is a SEC-registered broker-dealer;
• The security has a ready market;
• The security is eligible for a state member bank to purchase directllo and the bank
records the transaction as a purchase of a security for Call Report purposes;
• The security is not a low-quality asset or issued by an affiliate of the bank;
• The bank does not purchase the security during or within 30 days of an underwriting,
unless the security is purchased as part of an issue of obligations of, or obligations
fully guaranteed as to principal and interest by, the United States or its agencies;
• The price of the security is quoted routinely on an unaffiliated electronic, real-time
service, the price paid by the bank is at or below the current quotation, and the size of
the transaction does not cast material doubt on the appropriateness of relying on the
quotation; and
• The bank maintains, for two years, appropriate documentation in support of reliance
on the exemption.
Any such transaction must comply with the Market Tenns Requirement.
Exemption for Internal Corporate Reorganizations. Section 223.41 (d) of Regulation W
provides an exemption from the rule's quantitative limits and collateral requirements for certain
internal corporate reorganizations. Under this exemption, a bank is permitted to purchase assets
(other than low-quality assets) from an affiliate if the following conditions are met:
20 Including securities permissible for a state member bank to purchase and hold as a hedge of
permissible customer-driven equity derivatives transactions (even if not pennissible under a state
member bank's general investment powers).
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• The asset purchase is part of an internal corporate reorganization of a holding
company that involves the transfer of all or substantially all of the shares or assets of
an affiliate or of a division or department of an affiliate;
• The bank holding company provides the Board with contemporaneous notice of the
transaction and commits to the Board to make the bank whole, for a two-year period,
for any transferred assets that become low-quality assets;
• A majority of the bank's directors reviews and approves the transaction prior to
consummation;
• The section 23A value of the covered transaction is less than 10 percent of the bank's
capital stock and surplus (or up to 25 percent with the approval of the appropriate
federal banking agency); and
• The bank's holding company and each of its subsidiary depository institutions are
well capitalized and well managed and remain well capitalized upon consummation
of the transaction.
Any such transaction must comply with the Market Tenns Requirement.
Exemption/or Non-Recourse Loan Purchases. Section 223.41(c) of Regulation W
provides an exemption from the rule's quantitative limits and collateral requirements for
purchases of loans by a bank from an affiliated insured depository institution on a non-recourse
basis.
Exemptions from the Quantitative Limitations, Collateral Requirements, and Low-
Quality Asset Purchase Prohibition. A number of other transactions are exempt from the
quantitative limitations, collateral requirements, and prohibition on the purchase of a low-quality
asset contained in Regulation W. Each of these transactions must comply with the Safety and
Soundness Requirement.
Exemption/or Intraday Credit to Affiliates. GLBA required the Board to adopt, by May
12,2001, a final rule to address under section 23A credit exposure arising from intraday
extensions ofcredit by banks to their affiliates. Similar to the Board's approach to bank-affiliate
derivatives transactions, as an interim measure, the Board required banks to adopt policies and
procedures reasonably designed to manage the credit exposure from these transactions, and
clarified that the Market Tenns Requirement applies to these transactions.
Section 223.42(1) of Regulation W provides that intraday extensions of credit to an
affiliate by a bank are exempt from the quantitative limits and collateral requirements contained
in the rule, provided that:
• The bank establishes and maintains policies and procedures reasonably designed to
manage in a safe and sound manner the credit exposure arising from the bank's
intraday extensions of credit to affiliates, including policies and procedures that
address monitoring and controlling the credit exposure to affiliates from intraday
credit and ensure compliance with the Market Tenns Requirement.
• The bank has no reason to believe that the affiliate will be unable to repay the
extension of credit in accordance with its tenns.
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Monitoring and controlling the credit exposure from intraday extensions of credit include, at a
minimum, imposing appropriate credit limits (on a per-affiliate and aggregate basis) and
collateral requirements. The limits and requirements imposed by a bank should reflect the
volume of intraday credit transactions and the reasons for those transactions. Limits and
requirements on intraday credit transactions should be approved by the board of directors of the
bank or an appropriate board committee. Going forward, Board staff will consider the need for
additional guidance on policies and procedures for intraday extensions of credit to affiliates.
The final rule also defines an intraday credit extension by a bank to an affiliate as an
extension of credit by a bank to an affiliate that the bank expects to be repaid, sold, or
terminated, or to qualify for a complete exemption under the rule, by the end of the day.
Importantly, final Regulation W extends the section 23A intraday exemption to all intraday
extensions of credit to affiliates, and does not limit the exemption, as proposed Regulation W
would have done, to credit extensions relating to clearing and settlement. Board staff determined
that the limited potential for, and history of, abuse of intraday credit to affiliates, and the
significant burden on banks of subjecting some intraday credit transactions to section 23A,
outweighed regulatory benefits.
Provided no other exemption in Regulation W applies, any intraday credit outstanding as
of the end of the bank's U.S. business day will be treated as a non-exempt covered transaction at
such time.
Exemptionfor Riskless Principal Transactions. Section 223.42(m) of Regulation W
exempts from the quantitative limits, collateral requirements, and prohibition on the purchase of
a low-quality asset the purchase of securities by a bank from its securities affiliate if the bank or
the affiliate is acting exclusively in a riskless principal capacity and the security is not issued,
underwritten, or sold as principal (other than as riskless principal) by any affiliate of the bank.
All such transactions are subject to the Safety and Soundness and Market Tenus Requirements of
Regulation W.
Exemption for Purchases ofMunicipal Securities from a Securities Affiliate. Purchases
of municipal securities from a securities affiliate are exempt from the quantitative limitations,
collateral requirements, and prohibition on the purchase of a low-quality asset of Regulation W,
if:
• The securities affiliate is a SEC-registered broker-dealer;
• The security is rated by a nationally recognized statistical rating organization or is
part of an issue of securities that does not exceed $25 million;
• The security is eligible for purchase by a state member bank and the banle records the
transaction as a purchase of a security for Call Report purposes; and
• One of the following applies:
• The security price is quoted routinely on an unaffiliated electronic service that
provides indicative data from real-time financial networks, the price paid by
the bank is at or below the current market quotation, and the size of the
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transaction does not cast doubt on the appropriateness of relying on the
quotation, or
• The price paid can be verified by reference to two or more actual, current
price quotes from unaffiliated broker-dealers on the same or a similar security,
based on a similarly sized transaction, and the bank does not pay a price that
exceeds the average of the price quotes; or
• The price paid can be verified by reference to the written summary of
aggregate prices and par values provided to syndicate members by the
syndicate manager, and the bank purchases the security during the
underwriting period at a price at or below that indicated in the summary and
retains a copy of the sUlmnary in its books and records for a period of three
years.
Any such transaction must comply with the Market Terms Requirement.
Exemptionfor Nonrecourse Loan Purchases. Nonrecourse purchases by a bank from an
affiliate of extensions of credit made by the affiliate are exempt from the quantitative limitations,
collateral requirements, and prohibition on the purchase of a low-quality asset contained in
Regulation W if:
• The extension of credit was originated by the affiliate;
• The bank made an independent evaluation of the creditworthiness of the borrower and
committed to purchase the extension of credit before the affiliate made or committed
to make the extension of credit;
• The bank does not make blanket advance commitments to purchase loans from the
affiliate; and
• The dollar amount of all purchases over the preceding 12 months by the bank and its
insured depository institution affiliates does not represent more than 50 percent of the
dollar amount of all extensions of credit by the affiliate during such period. The
appropriate federal banking agency may impose a lower percentage threshold in its
discretion.
Additional Transactions Exempt from the Quantitative Limitations, Collateral
Requirements, and Low-Quality Asset Purchase Prohibition.
• Purchases ofLoans Subject to Repurchase. Purchases from an affiliate of extensions
of credit originated by the bank and sold to the affiliate subject to a repurchase
agreement or with recourse.
• Purchases ofSecurities ofa Servicing Affiliate. Purchasing a security issued by any
company engaged solely in providing services to a bank or bank holding company
under section 4(c)(l) of the BHCA.
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• Purchases ofLiquid Assets. Purchasing an asset, other than an affiliate-issued
security, having a readily identifiable and publicly available market quotation21 at a
price at or below the current market quotation.
• Purchases ofAssets by a Newly Formed Bank. Purchases of assets by a newly
fonned bank, as approved in writing by the appropriate federal banking agency.
• Mergers and Acquisitions. Mergers or acquisitions, or purchase and assumption
transactions, between a bank and an affiliated depository institution or U.S. branch or
agency of an affiliated foreign bank that has been approved by the responsible federal
banking agency under the Bank Merger Act.
• Correspondent Banking Deposits. Making a deposit in an affiliated depository
institution or affiliated foreign bank that represents an on-going working balance
maintained in the ordinary course of correspondent business.
• Giving Credit for Uncollected Items. Giving immediate credit to an affiliate for
uncollected items received in the ordinary course of business.
• Transactions Secured by Cash or U.S. Government Securities. A credit transaction
with an affiliate to the extent that the transaction is and remains secured by
obligations of the United States or its agencies, obligations fully guaranteed by the
United States or its agencies as to principal and interest, or a segregated, eannarked
deposit account with the bank that is for the sole purpose of securing credit
transactions between the bank and its affiliates and is identified as such.
Exemption from the Prohibition on Purchases of Low-Quality Assets. The general
prohibition on purchases of low-quality assets from affiliates does not apply to certain situations
in which a bank seeks to protect its interest in a distressed loan participation. Under section
223.15(b) of Regulation W, the prohibition does not apply to the renewal of, or extension of
additional credit with resEect to, a bank's participation in a loan to a nonaffiliate that was
originated by an affiliate 2 of the bank, if:
• The loan was not a low-quality asset at the time the bank purchased its participation;
21 An asset has a readily identifiable and publicly available market quotation if the asset's price is
quoted routinely in a widely disseminated publication that is readily available to the general
public. The asset need not be exchange-traded. Internet website quotes are not sufficient, by
themselves, to meet the "widely disseminated" standard.
22 Any affiliate of the bank, not only insured depository institution affiliates, as set forth in the
proposed rule.
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• The renewal or extension of additional credit is approved as necessary to protect the
bank's investment by the board of directors of the bank23 ;
• The participating bank's share of the renewal or extension of additional credit does
not exceed its proportional share of the original transaction by more than 5 percent,
unless the bank obtains the written approval of its appropriate federal banking
agency; and
• The bank provides its appropriate federal banking agency with written notice of the
renewal or extension of additional credit within 20 days.
23 If the affiliate originating the credit is a depository institution, the approval of the renewal or
extension of additional credit may be provided by an executive committee of the board, or one or
more senior management officials of the bank under, and in compliance with, board-approved
standards (so long as such standards and renewals or extensions approved under such standards
are periodically reviewed by the board).
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OVERVIEW
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002 (the "Act") was signed into law on July 30,2002. The
Act makes sweeping changes in the laws respecting corporate governance and disclosure and in
the oversight of the accounting profession. The Act directly impacts the operations and reporting
obligations ofpublic companies. The Act also substantially increases existing criminal penalties
and creates new criminal penalties for violations of the securities laws and for misconduct
relating to fraud perpetrated on the investing public.
The implications ofthe Act are far reaching, laying down new requirements impacting,
among other things
• certification ofquarterly and annual fmancial statements by the chief executive
officer and the chief financial officer,
• the role, composition and responsibilities ofthe audit committee,
• implementation and assessment by the CEO and the CFO of internal control
systems and disclosures regarding their adequacy,
• accelerated disclosure oftrading in company securities by officers and directors;
• standards ofprofessional conduct for attorneys,
• imposition of new penalties for accounting misstatements, including forfeiture of
bonuses or equity based compensation received by the CEO or CFO and enhanced
powers given to the SEC to prohibit violators from serving as officers or directors
of a public company;
• the adoption ofcorporate "codes ofethics", and
• oversight ofaccounting firms by a new Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board.
Application o/the Act. In general, the Act applies to public companies, that is,
companies, including banks and bank holding companies, that have a class of securities
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or are otherwise required to
file periodic reports under the Securities Exchange Act. Bank: holding companies and banks that
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meet these qualifications are subject to the requirements ofthe Act as well as any rules and
regulations the SEC adopts to implement the Act.
Privately held fmancial institutions may see the bank regulators apply many of these
same legal concepts in the context of the bank examination process. In addition, the
requirements reflect a new wave ofcorporate governance standards as well as standards by
which the performance ofboards of directors and their committees may be measured in the
future by shareholders, the public and the courts.
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT
I. Corporate Responsibility Reforms
Certification ofFinancial Reports. The Act contains two different sections that address
certification by CEOs and CFOs ofperiodic financial reports fIled with the SEC --Section 302 of
the Act and Section 906 ofthe Act. Section 302 contains detailed requirements ofwhat must be
certified. Section 906 sets forth criminal penalties for filing false certifications, and
affirmatively states that CEOs and CFOs must submit certain certifications in connection with
their companies periodic fmancial reports. The certifications in both Sections 302 and 906 apply
to all public companies.
The SEC adopted a fmal rule implementing Section 302 that became effective August 29,
2002. Section 302 requires a certification by the principal executive officer and the principal
financial officer in each quarterly and annual report that a public company files under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The final rule prescribes the specific wording ofthe
certification and the wording may not be changed in any respect. Under the rule, these officers
must certify that
• the signing officer has reviewed the report,
• based on the officer's knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading,
• based on the officer's knowledge, the financial statements and other fmancial
information included in the report fairly present in all material respects the
fmancial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the company,
• the signing officers are responsible for establishing and maintaining "disclosure
controls and procedures", have designed such disclosure controls and procedures
to ensure that material information is made known to them, particularly during the
period in which the periodic report is being prepared, have evaluated the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as ofa date within 90 days
prior to the fIling date of the report, and have presented in the report their
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conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures
based on the required evaluation as of that date,
• the signing officers have disclosed to the company's auditors and to the
company's audit committee all significant deficiencies in the design or operation
of internal controls which could adversely affect the company's ability to record,
process, summarize and report fmancial data and have identified for the
company's auditors any material weaknesses in internal control; and any fraud,
whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have
a significant role in the company's internal controls, and
• the signing officers have indicated in the report whether or not there were
significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could significantly
affect internal controls subsequent to the date of their evaluation, including any
corrective actions with regard to significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.
The Section 302 rules require companies to establish and maintain "disclosure controls
and procedures" and a periodic evaluation of such controls and procedures. The SEC uses this
term to mean controls and other procedures that are designed to ensure that information required
to be disclosed in the report is recorded, processed, summarized and reported within the
applicable time period. The controls and procedures must include those designed to ensure that
information required to be disclosed is accumulated and communicated to management as
appropriate to allow timely decisions regarding required disclosure. Disclosure controls and
procedures are distinct from "internal controls" which are already required to assure the quality
ofthe company's fmancial reporting.
Section 906 ofthe Act requires the company's CEO and CFO to certify that:
• the periodic report fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
• The information contained in the report "fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results ofoperations ofthe issuer".
Audit Committees. Section 301 of the Act imposes the following requirements on public
companies with listed securities:
• The audit committee ofthe company, in its capacity as a committee of the board
ofdirectors, must be directly responsible for the appointment, compensation and
oversight of the work ofany registered public accounting f]fm employed by the
company (including the resolution ofdisagreements between management and the
auditor regarding fmancial reporting) for the purpose ofpreparing or issuing an
audit report or related work, and the registered public accounting f]fm must report
directly to the audit committee;
• Each member of the audit committee must be a member of the board of directors
of the company, and must otherwise be independent;
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• In order to be considered independent, the audit committee member may not,
other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of
directors, or any other board committee, accept any consulting, advisory, or other
compensatory fee from the company, or be an affiliated person of the company or
any of its subsidiaries;
• The audit committee must establish procedures for the receipt, retention and
treatment ofcomplaints received by the company regarding accounting, internal
accounting controIs, or auditing matters, and the confidential, anonymous
submission by employees of the company ofconcerns regarding questionable
accounting or auditing matters;
• The audit committee must have the authority to engage independent counsel and
other advisors, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties;
• Each company must provide for appropriate funding, as determined by its audit
committee, in its capacity as a committee of the board ofdirectors, for payment of
compensation to the registered public accounting firm employed by the company
for the purpose of rendering or issuing an audit report, and to the advisers
employed by the audit committee; and
• Each public company must disclose whether or not (and ifnot, why not) at least
one member ofthe audit committee is a "fmancial expert".
Annual Internal Control Report. The Act requires that the company's annual report on
Form 10-K contain an "internal control report." This report must confirm that management is
responsible for establishing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure and
procedures for fmancial reporting and must contain an assessment, as of the end ofthe most
recent fiscal year ofthe effectiveness of that structure and those procedures. Moreover, the Act
requires the company's outside auditor to attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
management of the company.
Interference with the Auditor. The Act makes it illegal to fraudulently influence or
mislead the company's auditor. This section is in addition to existing provisions in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act making it illegal to make false statements 0 the company's auditors during
an audit.
Prohibition on Loans to Directors and Executive Officers. The Act prohibits a company,
directly or indirectly, from extending or maintaining credit, or arranging for an extension of
credit, in the form ofa personal loan to or for any director or executive officer. There are limited
exceptions to this rule for companies that offer consumer credit, such as banks, but such loans
must be made on terms that are no more favorable than the terms available to third parties.
Insider Trades During Pension Fund Blackout Periods. The Act prohibits officers and
directors from trading any equity securities ofa company during pension plan (401 (k)) blackout
periods that prohibit purchases, sales and other transfers ofthe security by at least half of the
plan participants for at least three consecutive business days.
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Implementation ofCodes ofEthics. The Act requires each company to disclose in it
periodic reports whether or not it has adopted a code ofethics for senior fmancial officers,
including its principal financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, and, ifnot, to
explain why not. If adopted, each company must also immediately disclose any change in or
waiver of its code ofethics, either through the filing of an 8-K report, or via the Internet or other
electronic means.
II. Auditor Independence Reforms
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board The Act creates the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board to regulate and police the public accounting profession. The Board
will be responsible for, among other things, registering each public accounting firm that prepares
audit reports for publicly-traded companies, establishing auditing standards and rules, and
conducting investigations and disciplinary proceedings with respect to registered public
accounting firms.
Prohibited and Permitted Non-Audit Services. The Act prohibits a registered public
accounting frrm from providing certain enumerated non-audit services to a public company
contemporaneously with an audit. The nine enumerated prohibited non-audit services include:
• bookkeeping and other services related to accounting records or fmancial
statements;
• fmancial information system design and implementation;
• appraisals, valuations and fairness opinions;
• actuarial services;
• internal audit outsourcing;
• management and human resources functions;
• broker, dealer, investment advisory and investment banking services;
• legal and other non-audit expert services; and
• any other services the Board determines should be prohibited.
The audit committee of a public company generally must pre-approve all audit and
permissible non-audit services to be provided by the company's external auditor. Such pre-
approval will not be required if the non-audit services will not exceed 5% ofthe revenues paid
by the company to the auditor, so long as the services are approved by the audit committee prior
to the completion of the audit. The company must disclose to investors any approval of a non-
audit service.
The SEC adopted final rules implementing the non-audit service prohibitions and audit
committee pre-approval requirements on January 22, 2003. According to these rules, an
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accountant is not independent if, at any point during the audit and professional engagement
period, the accountant provides internal audit outsourcing or other prohibited non-audit services
to a public company audit client. The rules generally become effective May 6, 2003, although a
one year transition period is provided for contractual arrangements in place at that date.
Lead Auditor Rotation. The Act requires accounting ftrms to rotate the lead or reviewing
partner for each public company so that no partner has primary responsibility for the engagement
for more than ftve consecutive years.
Conflicts ofInterest. The Act prohibits an accounting ftrm from performing audit
services for a public company ifa senior executive of the company was employed by the
accounting fum and participated in the audit of the company within the previous year.
Reports to the Audit Committee. An accounting frrm that performs an audit for a
reporting company is required to timely report to the company's audit committee
• all critical accounting policies and practices used,
• all alternative treatments of fmancial information within GAAP that have been
discussed with management, ramiftcations of the use of such alternative
disclosures and treatments, and the treatment preferred by the fum, and
• other material written communications between the accounting frrm and
management.
III. Civil and Criminal Enforcement and Remedies
Penalties. The Act creates or enhances criminal penalties for securities fraud and related
crimes and provides the government with new tools to prosecute these crimes and obtain and
return to investors ill-gotten funds. In addition to the increased criminal penalties, the Act also
contains enhanced civil penalties and remedies.
Forfeiture ofbonuses andprofits by CEO/CFO. If a public company restates its
ftnancials as a result of"misconduct", the Act provides that the CEO and CFO must reimburse
the company for any bonuses, stock proftts or other incentive pay received by the CEO and CFO
within one year ofthe ftling date of the restated fmancials.
Officer/Director Bars and Penalties. The SEC may bar an individual who has violated
the securities laws from serving as an offtcer or director of a public company ifthe SEC
demonstrates that person's ''unfttness'' to serve in that position.
Equitable Relief The Act expands the SEC's authority in an enforcement action to
request any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the beneftt of investors.
Non-dischargeable Debts. The Act amends the Bankruptcy Code to speciftcally provide
that individuals who ftle for personal bankruptcy will not be discharged in the bankruptcy
process from any liabilities incurred due to violations of federal or state securities laws.
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IV. Reports of Violations by Attorneys.
Final Rules. The Act directed the SEC to establish standards ofprofessional conduct for
all attorneys that appear and practice before the SEC in any way in the representation of issuers.
On January 29,2003, the SEC promulgated its final rules implementing ''up-the-Iadder''
reporting for lawyers who appear and practice before the SEC. Under the fmal rules:
• attorneys who appear and practice before the SEC in the representation ofa
company are required to report evidence of material violations of the securities
laws or a breach of fiduciary duty to the company's chief legal 0 fficer (CLO), or
CLO and CEO, or, alternatively, to report such evidence to a qualified legal
compliance committee (QLCC) of the company;
• attorneys (other than those who report directly to a QLCC) must then report ''up-
the-ladder" to the company's audit committee, another committee ofnon-
employee directors, or directly to the board ofdirectors in the event that the CLO
or CEO fails to respond appropriately;
• CLOs are required to investigate and take all reasonable steps to cause the issuer
to adopt an appropriate response to the evidence of material violations.
Attorneys Covered by the Rule. The rule applies to attorneys "appearing and practicing
before the Commission" in the representation ofa company. Attorneys are "appearing and
practicing before the Commission" if they
• transact any business with the SEC, including communication in any form,
• represent a company in an SEC proceeding or in connection with any SEC
investigation,
• provide advice regarding securities laws or the SEC's rules or regulations
regarding any document that the attorney has notice will be filed with or
submitted to or incorporated into any document that will be filed with or
submitted to the SEC, including the provision ofadvice in the context of
preparing any such document, or
• advise an issuer as to whether information or a statement, opinion or other writing
is required under the securities laws to be filed with or submitted to the SEC or
incorporated into such a document.
Up-the-Ladder Reporting Requirements. If an attorney becomes aware ofevidence ofa
material violation ofa federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising
under federal or state law or a similar material violation ofany federal or state law by an officer
director, employee or agent of the company, the attorney is expected (i) to report evidence ofa
material violation either to the CLO or its equivalent, or the CLO along with the CEO, or (ii) to
pursue an alternative reporting procedure by notifying the company's QLCC ifthe company has
previously formed such a committee.
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Ifthe attorney believes that it would be futile to report the evidence directly to the CLO or CEO
for any reason, the attorney may immediately report the evidence to an appropriate committee of
directors or the full board.
a. Evidence ofa Material Violation. The SEC adopted an objective standard for
measuring whether there is evidence of a material violation which triggers the initial reporting
obligation. "Evidence ofa material violation" is
"credible evidence, based upon which it would be unreasonable,
under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not
to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."
To be "reasonably likely", a violation must be more than a mere possibility, but need not
be "more likely than not." The "circumstances" are ''the circumstances at the time the attorney
decides whether he or she obligated to report" and may include the attorney's professional skills,
background and experience, the time constraints under which the attorney is acting, the
attorney's previous experience and familiarity with the client and the availability ofother
lawyers with whom the attorney may consult.
b. Chief Legal Officer's Duty to Investigate. Once a report has been made to the
CLO or CEO, the CLO must:
• initiate an inquiry into the evidence as he or she reasonably believes to be
appropriate;
• notify the reporting attorney ifhe or she determines that no material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or will occur, and the basis for such a determination;
• unless the CLO reasonably believes that no material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur, he or she shall take all reasonable steps to cause the
issuer to adopt an "appropriate response"; and
• advise the reporting attorney of such steps.
Alternatively, the CLO may report the suspected violation to the QLCC of the board of
directors in lieu ofconducting an inquiry ifthe company has duly established such a committee
prior to the report of evidence ofa material violation.
c. Duty to Report to Directors. If the reporting attorney reasonably believes that the
company has provided a timely "appropriate response" to the report, he or she has no further
obligations. However, if the CLO and CEO fail to respond appropriately to evidence ofa
material violation, the attorney is required to report the evidence further up-the-Iadder to the
audit committee, another committee ofnon-employee directors, or directly to the board itself if
the company has no such committee.
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d. Appropriate Responses. An "appropriate response" by the company is a response
to an attorney reporting evidence ofa material violation as a result of which the attorney
reasonably believes
• that no material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur,
• that the company has, as necessary, adopted appropriate remedial measures,
including appropriate steps or sanctions to stop any material violation which is
ongoing, to prevent any material violation that has yet to occur and to remedy or
otherwise appropriately address any material violation that has already occurred
and to minimize the likelihood of its recurrence, or
• that the company, with the consent of the board of directors, audit committee or
committee ofnon-employee directors or a QLCC has retained or directed another
lawyer to review the evidence of a material violation and either (i) has
substantially implemented any remedial recommendations made by such other
lawyer after a reasonable investigation and evaluation of the reported evidence, or
(ii) has been advised that such other lawyer may, consistent with his or her
professional obligations, assert a "colorable defense" on behalf ofthe company in
any investigation or judicial or administrative proceeding relating to the report.
e. Unsatisfactory Responses. Ifan attorney is not satisfied that his or her report was
appropriately and timely addressed by the CLO, CEO, board committee or full board, the
attorney shall give the reasons for his or her dissatisfaction to the CLO, CEO and any directors to
whom the attorney made such report.
f. When the Duty to Rq>ort Does Not Arise. An attorney who has been directed or
retained by the CLO to investigate a possible material violation is not under any obligation to
report evidence ofa material violation up-the-Iadder if the attorney reports the results ofthe
investigation to the CLO, and unless the CLO and investigating attorney agree that no material
violation has occurred, the CLO reports the results of the investigation to the full board of
directors, the audit committee or committee ofnon-employee directors or the QLCC.
g. The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee. If a QLCC has been established
prior to the report ofevidence of a material violation and the reporting attorney chooses to report
evidence of a material violation to the QLCC, a reporting attorney is relieved of his or her ''up-
the-ladder" reporting obligations. Once the attorney reports a suspected violation to a QLCC, the
attorney is not required to assess the company's response to the report and has no further
obligations.
A QLCC is a committee that:
• consists of at least one member of the company's audit committee and two or
more non-employee members ofthe board,
• has adopted written procedures for the confidential receipt and consideration of
any report of evidence of a material violation, and
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• has been duly established by the board ofdirectors, with the authority and
responsibility (i) to inform the CLO and CEO of any report of evidence of a
material violation, (ii) to determine whether an investigation ofevidence ofa
material violation is necessary, and if so, to notify the audit committee or the full
board, initiate such investigation and retain such experts as the committee deems
necessary; (iii) at the conclusion of such investigation, to recommend that the
company implement an appropriate response, and to inform the CLO and CEO
and the board of the results of the investigation and the appropriate remedial
actions to be adopted; and (iv) to take all other appropriate action.
Supervisory and Subordinate Attorneys. A subordinate attorney generally fulfills his or
her reporting obligation by reporting a suspected violation to a supervising attorney. At that
point, the supervisory attorney assumes responsibility for reporting the violation, ifwarranted,
either through the "up-the-Iadder" procedures or the alternative QLCC reporting procedures.
The subordinate attorney is permitted, but not required, to pursue all reporting avenues available
to non-subordinate attorneys if the subordinate attorney reasonably believes that a supervisory
attorney to whom he or she has reported evidence has failed to comply with either the ''up-the-
ladder" requirements or the QLCC alternative.
Disclosure ofCompany Confidences. Attorneys are permitted to disclose confidential
information under certain limited circumstances. In all cases, such disclosure is permissive, not
mandatory.
Preemption ofState Ethics Rules. The fmal rules preempt less rigorous, conflicting state
ethics rules. For the moment, the issue ofpreemption should not be significant. In the absence
of a "noisy withdrawal" provision, as discussed below, the fmal rules should not be in conflict
with state ethics rules. However, should a "noisy withdrawal" requirement be adopted, it is
expected that the SEC's position on preemption will be tested in the courts.
The "Noisy Withdrawal" Proposals. The SEC's original proposed rules included a
"noisy withdrawal" requirement - if the company did not take appropriate steps to remedy the
situation after an attorney reported evidence ofa material violation to the board of directors, in
certain circumstances outside counsel would be required both to withdraw from representing the
company and to "report out" to the SEC regarding the withdrawal, stating that the withdrawal
was for ''professional considerations". The rules also required both in-house and outside counsel
to disaffIrm public filings in which they participated that were ''tainted'' by the violation. Much
ofthe controversy over the noisy withdrawal requirement was over concerns that the
requirements violated the attorney-client privilege and attorneys' ethical duty to maintain client
confidences mandated by state ethical rules.
The "noisy withdrawal" requirement is the subject of a new proposed rule in which the
SEC included an alternative to noisy withdrawal. In a disclosure procedure like that required
when a company's auditor resigns, the SEC has proposed that the company, rather than the
attorney, publicly report that the attorney's withdrawal was for "professional considerations".
Because the company holds the attorney-client privilege, the company would not violate the
privilege by making the report, thereby forcing the issuer to reveal an otherwise confidential,
privileged dispute to the public.
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Sanctions. The SEC may discipline and sanction an attorney who violates the rule,
subjecting the attorney to the civil penalties and remedies for a violation of the federal securities
laws available in an action brought by the SEC. The SEC may also impose administrative
penalties on an attorney who violates the rule, including censure and a prohibition on appearing
or practicing before the SEC.
RESPONSES OF THE FEDERAL BANK REGULATORS TO THE ACT
In response to the Act, the bank regulators have issued guidance with respect to several
areas.
I. SR 02-20 issued October 29, 2002 by the Federal Reserve's Division of Banking
Supervision and Regulation.
• Describes provisions of the Act that bank examiners should be aware ofwhen
conducting examinations and inspections ofbanking organizations that are subject
to the Act.
• Reminds banking organizations that are not public companies that they may be
subject to similar requirements under other laws or Federal Reserve or FDIC
guidelines. For example, top-tier bank holding companies that are required to file
Forms FRY-6 and that have total assets of$500 million or more must have an
annual audit of their consolidated fmancial statements conducted by an
independent public accountant.
• States that the supervisory staffof the Fed will monitor Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance and provide ongoing regulatory guidance on its requirements and
notes that the federal banking agencies are working to develop policies for non-
public banking organizations ''that are in accord with the purposes and provisions
of the Act."
II. FIL-17-2003 issued March 2003 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
• Provides guidance to institutions about selected provisions of the Act, including
the actions the FDIC encourages institutions to take to ensure sound corporate
governance and the applicability of the auditor independence provisions.
• Advises that the FDIC is considering possible amendments to Part 363 of its
regulations that would extend certain provisions of the Act to all insured
institutions with $500 million or more in total assets (a "covered institution"),
whether or not they are public companies or subsidiaries ofpublic companies.
• With respect to a FDIC supervised bank with less than $500 million in total assets
that is not a public company or a subsidiary ofa public company:
1. Encourages banks whose financial statements are audited and its accounting fIrm
to follow the internal audit outsourcing prohibition in Section 201 of the Act but
recognizes that, for a bank with less complex operations and limited staff, the use
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of the independent public accountant to perform both an external audit and some
or all of the bank's internal audit activities may help the FDIC achieve its safety
and soundness objectives for the bank.
11. Encourages audit partner rotation and "time out" periods when a bank engages an
accounting firm that is not a small fIrm (fewer than 10 audit partners).
111. Encourages banks to institute auditor reporting practices prescribed by the Act by
incorporating them into its engagement letter with the auditor.
IV. Encourages each bank and its external auditing fum to comply with the auditor
conflicts of interest requirements of the Act.
v. Continues to encourage institutions to establish an audit committee consisting
entirely ofoutside directors. The 1999 Interagency Policy Statement on External
Auditory Programs defmes "outside directors" as directors who are not officers,
employees, or principal stockholders of the institution, its subsidiaries or
affiliates, and who do not have material business dealings with the institution, its
subsidiaries or affiliates.
VI. Advises that each bank's audit committee should establish a mechanism,
appropriate to the size and complexity of the bank, for employees to submit
confIdentially and anonymously concerns to the audit committee about
questionable accounting, internal accounting control or auditing matters. The
audit committee should also set up procedures for the timely investigation of
complaints received and the retention for a reasonable time period of
documentation concerning the complaint and its subsequent resolution.
V11. Banks that issue audited fmancial statements to their shareholders or others
should consider including a certifIcation by the bank's principal executive officer
and principal fmancial officer stating that they have reviewed the fmandal
statements and, based on their knowledge, the statements are true and fairly
present in all material respects the bank's fmancial condition, results ofoperations
and cash flows.
V111. Encourages compliance with Section 303 of the Act which prohibits officers and
directors from misleading, coercing, manipulating or fraudulently influencing the
accounting fIrm preparing the audit report.
IX. Encourages banks to make all material correcting adjustments identifIed by
external auditors regardless ofthe type of external auditing program the bank has
implemented.
x. Encourages banks to consider the benefIts and costs of supplementing the audit
with an internal control assessment by management and an attestation of this
assessment by the bank's independent public accountant.
D·12
Xl. Continues to encourage banks to adopt a code ofethics for senior fmancial
officers. If the bank decides not to do so, the FDIC encourages it to explain the
reasons why and provide periodic disclosure of the existence ofa code of ethics or
lack thereof to shareholders.
• With respect to covered institutions:
1. For purposes of Part 363 of the FDIC's regulations regarding auditor
independence, the accounting fmn for a covered institution, whether or not it is a
public company or a subsidiary ofa public company, must comply with the SEC's
auditor independence requirements and the SEC's audit partner rotation
requirements.
11. Covered institutions must continue to submit a management report in the annual
report it files with the FDIC, its primary federal regulator and any appropriate
state supervisor as required by Section 36 of the FDI Act and Part 363 of the
FDIC's regulations. An insured institution that is a public company, or a
subsidiary of a public holding company, may not submit a Section 302
certification in place ofthe management report.
111. Covered institutions must continue to comply with the relevant requirements of
Section 36 and Part 363 that require an independent accountant to examine, attest
to, and report separately on management's assertion concerning internal control.
The FDIC will review the rules adopted by the SEC under Section 404 ofthe Act
regarding the internal control report and accountant's attestation report, and then
determine whether covered institutions that are public companies can use the
Section 404 reports to satisfy the comparable Section 36 and Part 363
requirement.
IV. Covered institutions should review the guidance concerning corporate governance
practices that the FDIC encourages non-public institutions to implement to the
extent feasible given the institution's size, complexity and risk profile.
III. Interagency Policy Statement on the Internal Audit function and Its Outsourcing
issued March 17, 2003.
• As a result of the auditor independence provisions of the Act, on March 17,2003,
the federal banking agencies issued this Interagency Statement to update the
agencies' previous guidance on the internal audit function and its outsourcing.
The Interagency Statement also addresses the responsibilities ofthe board and
senior management for having an effective system of internal control and an
effective audit function and the independence ofthe independent public
accountant.
• The Interagency Statement encourages non-public institutions to follow the
internal audit outsourcing prohibition in Section 201(a) of the Act. Small non-
public institutions with less complex operations and limited staff can, in certain
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circumstances, use the same accounting firm to perform both an external audit
and some or all ofthe institution's internal audit services. These circumstances
include situations where
• splitting the audit activities poses significant costs or burdens,
• persons with the appropriate specialized knowledge and skills are diffIcult
to locate and obtain,
• the institution is closely held and investors are not solely reliant on the
audited fmandal statements to understand the financial position of the
institution, or
• the outsourced internal audit servIces are limited m either scope or
frequency.
• Where a small non-public institution hires the same firm to perform internal and
external audit work, the audit committee should document that it has pre-
approved the internal audit outsourcing to its external auditor and has considered
the independence issues associated with the arrangement. The agencies will not
consider an auditor who performs internal audit outsourcing services to be
independent unless the institution and the auditor have adequately addressed the
independence issues. In addition, the institution's board of directors and
management must retain ownership of and accountability for the internal audit
function and provide active oversight ofthe outsourced internal audit relationship.
• Ifa bank is considering having its external auditor perform any of the other non-
audit services prohibited by Section 201, the bank's audit committee is
encouraged to discuss the implications ofthe performance of these services on the
auditor's independence.
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I Enforcement Actions over $100 000 Kentucky Enforcement Actions
Date Agency Bank TURft State Action Amount
Date Agency Bank Tarilet Action Amount
06/2812000 OCC Providian Natiollal Bank B NH REST S300,OOO,000 U1/04/20UU OCC National City Bank F 1829
05/31/2001 FRB Laredo National Bancshares M TX CMP S40,000,000 02/03/2OOU OCC Bank One Kentucky F 1829
05/29/2001 FRB Incus Co., Ltd B VI BCMP S40,000,000 07l2112oou OCC National City Bank M 1829
01/1712002 OCC Bank of China B NY BCMP SIO,OOO,OOO 09/29/2UOO FRB Citizens Deposit Bank & Trust B FA
0711212001 FRB US Trust Corporation B NY BCMP S5,OOO,OOO U3/19/20UI OCC National City Bank of Kentucky F 1829
II!I3/2oo1 FRB State Bank of India B India BCMP S3,750,OOO 0l/2212UOI FDIC PBK Bank B CD
06/06/2000 OCC BNC National Bank F NO REST S473 ,400 04/03/2001 FDIC Peoples Bank of Murray B TOI
08/0612002 FDIC Farmers Bank of Vine Grove M KY CMP S304,000 04/03/2001 OCC Bank One Kentucky M 1829
04/05/2001 OCC First National Bank & Trust of M MN CMP S300,OOO
04/17/2001 FDIC Salt Lick Deposit Bank B PCADPipestone
03/10/2000 OCC First National Bank of Gonzales M LA REST S3OO,000 05/1512001 OTS Hopkinsville FB F REM
04/05/2002 OCC First National Bank of Garretson M SD CMP S300,ooO
U6/20/2001 OTS Family Bonk M PCD
0311012000 OCC First National Bank of Gonzales M LA CMP S150,000
06/2U/2001 OTS Family Bank M CMP
11/21/2001 OCC First National Bank of Lucedale M MS CMP S150,000
06/27/2001 FDIC Georgetown Bank & Trust B BCMP $2,000
02/01/2002 OCC East Texas National Bank of M TX REST SIOO,OOO
Marshall 07/1312001 OCC First National Bank of Northern Kentuck~ B FA
06/05/2000 OCC Malta National Bank M OH CMP SIOO,OOO
03113/2002 OCC Parish National Bank M LA CMP SIOO,OOO
08115/2001 OCC PNC Bank F 1829
L _____.__ ._...____ ._____•.• ._----~-------------_._.... __... -- ----------_ .. - -------_._.
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Kentucky Enforcement Actions Kentucky Enforcement Actions
I Date Agency Bank Target Action Amount Date Agency Bank Tar2et Action Amount
08/15/2001 OCC PNC Bank F 1829 07/09/2U02 OCC First National Bank of Clinton B FA
09113/2001 OCC first Nahonal Bank of Central City B FA 07/09/2002 OCC TransFinancial Bank F IlQ9
09113/2001 OCC First National Bank of Central City B FA 07/10/2002 OCC National City Bank M 1829
0911412001 FDIC Bank of Harlan B BCMP $2,600 0711U/2002 OCC National City Bank F 1829
07/10/2002 OCC Nationol Cit)' Bank F 1829
10/22/2001 OCC Cumberland Valley National Bank & Trust B FA
08/05/2002 FDIC Peoples State Bank B CD
11/29/2001 FDIC FlfSL SecuriLy Bank of Owensboro B CD
OH/06/2002 FDIC Farmers Bank of Vine Grove M CMP S304,000
05/03/2002 OTS First State B FA 08/06/2002 FDIC Farmers Bank of Vine Grove M REM
05/29/2002 OCC First National Bank & Trust F 1829
08/1312002 OCC PNC Bank F 1829
05/29/2002 OCC First National Bank & Trust F 1829
08/21/2002 OCC First National Bank of Mayfield B FA
06/05/2002 OCC TransFinancial Bank F 1829 09/04120U2 OCC Firsl National Bank ofNorthem Kentucky B PCAD
06/1012002 OCC Henderson Natianal Bank B FA 09111/2002 FDIC First State Bank of Pineville B BCMP SI,OOO
06112/2002 OCC US BankNA F 1829 09118/2002 OCC Bank One Kentucky M PCD
06/28/20U2 OCC National City Bank F 1829 10/2112002 OCC Cilizens Nation''ll Bank & Trust of Ha:tard M PCD
07/03/2002 OCC TransFinancial Bank F 1829 II/UI120U2 OCC First Nalional Bank & Trust Company M 1829l 07/05/2002 FDIC First Securi'y Bank & Trust B CD 12118/2002 OCC Citizens Nalional Bank & Trusl of Hal.8rd F REM
~_._------------------~-_ .._----~-
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On October 26, 2001, President Bush signed into law the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act or
what is more commonly known as the USA PATRIOT Act (the "Act"). The Act was enacted in
response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and is intended to make it easier to,
among other things, prevent, detect and prosecute international money laundering and the
financing of terrorism. Title III of the Act is known as the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001, and it imposes various significant new
anti-money laundering compliance obligations on "financial institutions" operating in the U.S.
The Act imposed numerous requirements upon financial institutions as well as upon the
regulatory agencies to further its stated goal of strengthening the tools to detect and prevent
international money laundering. Since the enactment of the Act there has been a flurry of
regulatory issuances from the various regulatory agencies that oversee financial institutions,
primarily from the Treasury Department. This article discusses the status of the Act's
requirements that were to be implemented by regulatory action and the regulatory agencies'
interpretations of the Act.
OVERVIEW
Title III of the Act makes significant changes to the Money Laundering Control Act of
1986, which sets forth criminal laws regarding money laundering, and the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970 (the "BSA"), which is a record keeping and reporting statute that applies to financial
institutions. The provisions of the Act that affect financial institutions are generally set forth as
amendments to the BSA. Generally, the Act imposes new compliance and due diligence
obligations on financial institutions and compels the production of documents in certain
instances. The Act also clarifies the extent of the safe harbor from civil liability. The Act
defines "financial institutions" very broadly to include institutions that are already subject to
federal regulation such as commercial banks, savings associations, credit unions, securities
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brokers and dealers, and futures commission merchants, as well as "non-traditional" financial
institutions such as dealers in precious metals, pawnbrokers, investment banks and bankers, trust
companies, insurance companies, loan and finance companies, individuals involved in real estate
closings and settlements, sellers of vehicles and credit card issuers or operators.
A more detailed summary of the Act's provisions that apply to financial institutions is set
forth below.
USA PATRIOT ACT PROVISIONS
THAT APPLY TO
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
1. "Special Measures" for Certain Jurisdictions, Financial Institutions,
International Transactions and Accounts (31 U.S.C. 5381A; Act section 311)
Section 311 gives the Treasury Department broad authority to impose requirements on
foreign jurisdictions, domestic financial institutions and agencies, a class of transactions or type
of account should it determine that such jurisdiction, institutions, class of transaction or account
are of "primary money laundering concern." In such event, the Treasury Department can impose
one or more of five "special measures" by regulation, order or otherwise. The Treasury
Department is required to consult with other regulators before imposing such special measures,
which may include:
(1) record keeping and reporting concerning aggregate or individual transactions;
(2) obtaining and retaining information concerning beneficial ownership of any account
opened or maintained in the U.S. by a foreign person or representative of a foreign person;
(3) discretionary authority to require information, as a condition of opening or
maintaining a payable-through account, on (i) identification of each customer permitted to use,
or whose transactions are routed through, the payable-through account; and (ii) information with
respect to each such customer that is "substantially comparable" to that which a depository
institution obtains in the ordinary course ofbusiness;
(4) discretionary authority to require similar information with respect to correspondent
accounts as to payable-through accounts; and
(5) discretionary authority, after consultation with the State Department, the Justice
Department and the Federal Reserve, to prohibit or impose conditions on the opening or
maintaining in the U.S. a correspondent or payable-through account.
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The Treasury Department also has authority, after consultation with other federal
functional regulators, to define the tenn "account" to apply it to financial institutions other than
banks, and to include within the definition arrangements similar to payable-through and
correspondent accounts. The Treasury Department must define "beneficial ownership" of an
account.
Status: On December 20, 2002, the Treasury Department, in consultation with other U.S.
agencies, invoked Section 311 authority for the first time by announcing that the countries of
Ukraine and Nauru are of "primary money laundering concern." According to Deputy Treasury
Secretary Ken Dam, these countries "do not take the fight against money laundering and
financial crime seriously." Accordingly, the Treasury Department will impose special measures
1 through 4 on U.S. financial institutions dealing either directly with Ukraine, or dealing with
those having direct dealings with Ukraine. The Treasury Department is soliciting comment from
U.S. financial institutions regarding the measures it has imposed. As for Nauru, it will impose
special measure 5, which will prohibit U.S. financial institutions from opening or maintaining
correspondent accounts with Nauru-licensed financial institutions.
2. Due Diligence for Correspondent/Private Banking Accounts
(31 USC 5318(i); Act Section 312)
Section 312 of the Act requires U. S. financial institutions to establish due diligence
policies, procedures, and controls designed to detect and report money laundering through
correspondent accounts of foreign banks or through private banking accounts of non-U.S.
citizens. The effective date 0 f Section 3 12 w as July 2 3, 2 002, whether 0 r not regulations to
provide guidance on compliance had been issued.
Status: On May 30, 2002, the Treasury Department and the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") published in the Federal Register a proposed rule
implementing Section 312. They then published an interim final rule that became effective on
July 23, 2002.
The interim final rule provides guidance as to a reasonable due diligence program for
foreign correspondent accounts. The program must focus compliance efforts on the
correspondent accounts that pose a high risk ofmoney laundering based on an overall assessment
of the those risks. Correspondent deposit accounts, correspondent accounts used to provide
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services to third parties, nonbank correspondent accounts, and accounts opened on or after July
23 should be given priority. The Treasury Department identified certain best practice standards,
such as those issued by the New York Clearing House in March 2002, and the Bank for
International Settlements in October 2001, as models for a reasonable due diligence policy.
Section 312 requires an enhanced due diligence program for certain foreign banks
designated as high risks. Such an enhanced due diligence program will be reasonable in
Treasury's view if it comports with existing best practice standards for banks that maintain
correspondent accounts for foreign banks. Secondly, it must also focus enhanced due diligence
measures on those accounts that are maintained by a foreign correspondent bank deemed high
risk by the Act. The Treasury Department expects special attention be given to accounts opened
on or after July 23,2002.
Finally, a special due diligence program is required for private banking accounts
maintained by non-U.S. persons. Accounts subject to this requirement are those that maintain a
minimum aggregate deposit of at least $1 million, that is established for one or more individuals,
and that is assigned to or administered by an officer, employee or agent of a financial institution
acting as a liaison between the financial institution and the direct or beneficial owner of the
account. A due diligence program for such accounts will be reasonable if the program is focused
on those private banking accounts that present a high risk of money laundering; if it is consistent
with applicable government guidance, and if it incorporates the minimum standards for private
banking accounts outlined in Section 312. Again, priority should be placed on accounts opened
after July 23, 2002.
The above-described guidance currently applies to banks, savings associations, credit
unions, securities brokers and dealers, futures commission merchants, and introducing brokers.
The interim rule deferred due diligence programs for other financial institutions.
The agencies stated that a final rule cannot reasonably have been completed by the
statutory effective date: "Without question, the proposed rule implementing section 312 is the
furthest reaching proposed regulation issued under Title III of the act thus far. The requirements
placed on financial institutions under this provision are significant, and commenters have raised
substantial and important concerns about the scope of the regulation." Although the Treasury
Department further stated that it anticipated issuing a final rule no later than October 25, 2002,
no final rule has yet been published.
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3. Prohibition on U.S. Correspondent Accounts with Foreign Shell Banks and
Recordkeeping Requirements as to Foreign Banks
(31 U.S.C. 5318(j); Act section 313; 31 U.S.C. 5318(k), Act section 319(b»
Section 313(a) ofthe Act prohibits a financial institution from establishing or maintaining
a correspondent account in the U.S. for or on behalf of a "foreign shell bank," which is, a foreign
bank that does not have a physical presence in any country. Financial institutions must take
"reasonable steps" to ensure that any correspondent account is not being used by a foreign bank
to indirectly provide banking services to a foreign shell bank. The prohibition was effective
December 26, 2001. Section 319(b) of the Act requires financial institutions that provide
correspondent accounts to a foreign bank to maintain records of the owners of the foreign bank,
including name and address of its agent for service of legal process. Section 319(b) also
authorizes the Treasury Department or the Attorney General to issue a summons or subpoena to
any foreign bank that maintains a correspondent account in the U.S. and to request records
relating to such account. If the foreign bank fails to comply with the subpoena or request, any
U.S. financial institution with which the foreign bank maintains a correspondent account must
terminate the account upon notice by the Treasury Department or the Attorney General.
Status: The Treasury Department issued interim guidance on November 20,2001, as to
both sections 319(a) and 319(b) of the Act, and on December 28, 2001 published a notice of
proposed rulemaking to codify the interim guidance. The Treasury Department issued final
regulations in September 2002, which provided that these sections could be satisfied by
obtaining from a foreign bank a certification in the form provided by the Treasury Department
that contained all the necessary information, or by otherwise obtaining documentation of the
required information. Failure to obtain the necessary information by December 26, 2002 meant
that the financial institution would be required to close the correspondent account.
"Correspondent account" was defined broadly in the final rule to mean "an account established
to receive deposits from, make payments on behalf of a foreign bank, or handle other financial
transactions related to such bank." This definition goes well beyond the commonly understood
definition of the term correspondent account because it could include many types of transactions
that do not involve accounts. 0 n March 24, 2002, F inCEN issued a final rule toe xtend the
deadline to March 31, 2003 upon learning that despite diligent efforts by financial institutions,
many had not been able to obtain all required certifications from their foreign bank customers by
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the December 26, 2002 deadline. The final rule also indicated that the Treasury Department and
FinCEN did not anticipate granting a further extension.
4. Government and Financial Institution Information Sharing (Act section 314)
Section 314 of the Act reqUIres the Treasury Department to issue regulations to
encourage further cooperation among financial institutions, their regulatory authorities and law
enforcement authorities with the specific purpose of encouraging regulatory authorities and law
enforcement authorities to share with financial institutions information regarding entities
engaged in terrorist acts or money laundering activities. Section 314(a) requires the Treasury
Department to implement regulations related to enhanced cooperation between financial
institutions and federal law enforcement agencies. Section 314(b) permits financial institutions,
upon providing notice to the Treasury Department, to share information with one another in
order to identify and report to the federal government activities that may involve money
laundering or terrorist activity.
Status of 314(a): On March 4,2002, the Treasury Department published its interim rule
on Section 314(a). The regulations set forth the requirements of two important information-
sharing provisions 0 f t he Act. First, in a proposed rule under Section 314(a), the regulations
utilize the existing communications resources of FinCEN to establish a communication link
between federal law enforcement and financial institutions to permit sharing information
concerning accounts and transactions that may involve terrorist activity.
The public comment period closed on May 1, 2002, and the final regulations took effect
on September 2 6, 2002. They soon generated several complaints from banking officials who
said they were being inundated with requests from law enforcement agencies. Treasury officials
stated that the rule was designed to codify the control list developed by the FBI shortly after the
September 11 attacks. The requests were supposed to be channeled through FinCEN acting as an
intermediary. The acc and other federal bank regulators called a hasty meeting with FinCEN,
which declared a moratorium November 26, 2002 on Section 314(a) information sharing
requests in order to formulate a mutually agreeable procedure. FinCEN cautioned financial
institutions, however, that it reserved the right to lift the moratorium in the event of an
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emergency. It also suggested that financial institutions be certain that they are included on the
control list, so that they are included in any future terrorist-related information requests.
On February 6, 2003, FinCEN announced that it was reinstating its information request
associated with Section 314(a) of the Act during the week of February 17, 2003. FinCEN
revised the 314(a) information request process during the moratorium to address a number of
logistical issues. These changes include the following:
(1) 3 14(a) r equests from F inCEN will b e bashed and issued e very two weeks, unless
otherwise indicated in the request;
(2) after receiving 314(a) requests, financial institutions will have two weeks, rather than
one week, to complete their searches and respond with any matches;
(3) searches will be limited to specific records and, unless otherwise noted, will be a one-
time search; and
(4) if a financial institution identifies a match for a named subject, the institution need
only respond to FinCEN that it has a match and provide p oint-of-contact information for the
requesting law enforcement agency to follow up directly with the institution.
Status of 314(b): In a regulation effective on March 4, 2002 implementing the
provisions of Section 314(b), upon notice to the Treasury Department, two or more financial
institutions and any association of financial institutions are permitted to share information with
one another regarding terrorist or money laundering activities without liability under U.S. law.
Financial institutions are required to file a yearly certification if they wish to share information
under this provision. The certification can be completed online at FinCEN's website
(www.fincen.gov).
5. Restrictions on Concentration Accounts (31 U.S.C. 5318(h); Act section 325)
Section 325 of the Act authorizes but does not require the Treasury Department to issue
regulations relating to maintenance of concentration accounts by financial institutions.
"Concentration accounts" is not defined by the Act, but are generally referred to as accounts in
which customer funds are commingled for overnight investments and other purposes. The
purpose of the regulations would be to prevent the use of such accounts to shield the identity of
an individual customer of a financial institution. Generally, the regulations would prohibit
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financial institutions from allowing customers to direct transactions through concentration
accounts; prohibit financial institution employees from informing customers of the existence of
concentration accounts; and require written procedures governing the documentation of
transactions moving through concentration accounts.
Status: To date, no regulations under Section 325 have been proposed.
6. Standards for Verification of Customer Identification (Modified Know Your
Customer) (31 U.S.C. 5318(1); Act section 326)
Section 326 of the Act requires the Treasury Department to issue regulations to be
effective October 26, 2002 setting forth minimum standards for customer identification III
connection with the opening of an account. At a minimum, the regulations must require
(1) verification of customer identification "to the extent reasonable and practicable,"
(2) maintenance ofrecords ofverification, and
(3) consultation of government lists of known and suspected terrorists or terrorist
organizations.
In issuing the regulations, in the case of financial institutions engaged in financial activities, the
Treasury Department must consult with the financial institutions' federal functional regulators.
Status: Despite the statutorily-mandated effective date for the regulations of October 26,
2002, the Treasury Department announced in October that financial institutions will not be
required to comply with Section 326 of the USA PATRIOT Act on that date. On July 23,2002,
the Treasury Department and the other federal functional regulators issued proposed rules to
assist financial institutions to establish minimum procedures for customer identification. When
finally adopted, the regulations will apply to banks, savings associations, credit unions, securities
brokers and dealers, mutual funds, futures commission merchants and introducing brokers, and
credit unions, private banks and trust companies that do not have a federal regulator to
implement programs for the identification and verification of customers who open new accounts.
The Treasury Department stated that the comments received on the proposed regulations
revealed substantial issues that the regulators are analyzing as a final rule is prepared. The
Treasury Department is apparently rethinking some of the more problematic compliance issues
raised by the proposed regulations. Final regulations would provide financial institutions a
reasonable period for implementation of the requirements. However, the Treasury Department
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stressed that financial institutions should already be taking steps to ensure proper customer
identification~ Recently, Daniel Stepano, deputy chief counsel for the acc, told participants in a
teleconference sponsored by the acc that the proposal to require banks to retain a physical copy
of identification documents used at account opening would probably not take effect.
7. Anti-Money Laundering Programs and Strategies
(31 USC 5318(h); Act Section 352)
Section 352 of the Act was effective April 24, 2002, and requires all financial institutions
to establish anti-money laundering programs. These anti-money laundering programs must
include, at a minimum:
(1) the development of internal policies, procedures and controls;
(2) the designation ofa compliance officer;
(3) an ongoing employee training program; and
(4) an independent audit function to test programs.
Status: On April 29, 2002, the Treasury Department issued a series of interim
final rules that (1) specify the requirements for the establishment of anti-money laundering
programs for "traditional" financial institutions and (2) temporarily exempt "non-traditional"
financial institutions. One of the interim final rules provided that any bank, savings association,
registered broker or dealer in securities, futures commission merchant, and casino will be deemed
to be in compliance with Section 352 of the Act if it establishes and maintains anti-money
laundering programs as required by existing FinCEN regulations or their respective federal
regulator or self-regulatory organization. The Treasury Department also issued new interim rules
for the establishment of anti-money laundering programs for money services businesses,
operators of credit card systems, and mutual funds. All other "financial institutions" were
temporarily exempted from the establishment of anti-money laundering programs. Since that
time, the Treasury Department has come out with proposed rules for some of these financial
institutions, including insurance companies, dealers in precious metals, stones and jewels,
businesses engaged in vehicle sales, and travel agencies. Failure to comply with the
implementation of adequate anti-money laundering programs can subject a company to fines of
$25,000 per day civilly or up to $250,000 per day for a willful criminal violation and may delay
approval of any regulatory applications. A company can also be criminally liable for up to
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$500,000 for willful violations of the Act if the company fails to implement proper anti-money
laundering programs and if the company is involved in a pattern of illegal activity involving more
than $100,000.
8. Filing of Suspicious Activity Reports by Securities Brokers and Dealers (31
U.S.C. 5318(g); Act section 356)
Section 356 of the Act requires the Treasury Department, in consultation with the Federal
Reserve Board and the SEC, to issue regulations requiring registered securities brokers and
dealers to file Suspicious Activity Reports ("SARs"). Regulations were to be published in
preliminary form by January 1, 2002 and in final form by July 1, 2002.
Status: On July 1, 2002, the Treasury Department published in the Federal Register a
final rule implementing this requirement, which became effective January 1, 2003. The Rule
requires brokers and dealers in securities to report suspicious transactions that are conducted or
attempted by, at, or through a broker-dealer, and involve or aggregate at least $5,000 in funds or
other assets. The report must be made if the broker-dealer knows, suspects, or has reason to
suspect that the transaction falls within one of four classes:
(1) transactions involving funds derived from, or intended or conducted in order to hide
or disguise funds, from an illegal activity;
(2) transactions designed, whether through structuring or other means, to evade the
requirements of the BSA;
(3) transactions that appear to serve no business or apparent lawful purpose, or which are
unusual for the particular customer based upon an examination ofthe available facts; or
(4) transactions intended to further a criminal purpose, but apparently involving legally-
derived funds.
Broker-dealers that are affiliates of banks or bank holding companies have been required
to report suspicious activity since April 1, 1996. Under the new rule, brokers or dealers, whether
they are affiliates or subsidiaries of banks or bank holding companies or independent of a bank
or bank holding company, are required to file SARs.
Section 356(c) requires that the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve and the SEC
jointly submit to Congress recommendations for regulations to apply the BSA reporting and
recordkeeping requirements to investment companies. Such a report was issued on January 31,
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2002 and again on December 31, 2002. Proposed rules imposing suspicious activity reporting on
unregistered investment companies were published for comment on September 26, 2002, with
the comment period closing on November 25,2002. Proposed rules imposing suspicious activity
reporting on mutual funds were published for comment on January 21,2003. The proposed rules
contain reporting requirements that are similar to broker-dealers.
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(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a
violation of a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give
due consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope and nature of the lawyer's
representation, the responsibility in the organization and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the
policies of the organization concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures taken
shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing information relating to the
representation to persons outside the organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) Asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) Advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentation to appropriate
authority in the organization; and
(3) Referring the matter to higher authority in the organization, including, if warranted by the
seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that can act in behalf of the organization
as determined by applicable law.
(c) If, despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest authority that can act on behalf of
the organization insists upon action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members, shareholders or other constituents,
a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to
those of the constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
(e) A lawyer representing an organization may also represent any of its directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, subject to the provisions of Rule 1.7. If the organization's consent to the dual
representation is required by Rule 1.7, the consent shall be given by an appropriate official of the organization
other than the individual who is to be represented, or by the shareholders.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
The Entity as the Client
[1] An organizational client is a legal entity, but it cannot act except through its officers, directors, employees,
shareholders and other constituents.
[2] Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the constituents of the corporate organizational client. The
duties defined in this Comment apply equally to unincorporated associations. "Other constituents" as used in this
Comment means the positions equivalent to officers, directors, employees and shareholders held by persons
acting for organizational clients that are not corporations.
[3] When one of the constituents of an organizational client communicates with the organization's lawyer in that
person's organizational capacity, the communication is protected by Rule 1.6. Thus, by way of example, if an
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organizational client requests its lawyer to investigate allegations of wrongdoing, interviews made in the course of
that investigation between the lawyer and the client's employees or other constituents are covered by Rule 1.6.
This does not mean, however, that constituents of an organizational client are the clients of the lawyer. The
lawyer may not disclose to such constituents information relating to the representation except for disclosures
explicitly or impliedly authorized by the organizational client in order to carry out the representation or as
otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6.
[4] When constituents of the organization make decisions for it, the decisions ordinarily must be accepted by the
lawyer even if their utility or prudence is doubtful. Decisions concerning policy and operations, including ones
entailing serious risk, are not as such in the lawyer's province. However, different considerations arise when the
lawyer knows that the organization may be substantially injured by action of a constituent that is in violation of
law. In such a circumstance, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to ask the constituent to reconsider
the matter. If that fails, or if the matter is of sufficient seriousness and importance to the organization, it may be
reasonably necessary for the lawyer to take steps to have the matter reviewed by a higher authority in the
organization. Clear justification should exist for seeking review over the head of the constituent normally
responsible for it. The stated policy of the organization may define circumstances and prescribe channels for such
review, and a lawyer should encourage the formulation of such a policy. Even in the absence of organization
policy, however, the lawyer may have an obligation to refer a matter to higher authority, depending on the
seriousness of the matter and whether the constituent in question has apparent motives to act at variance with the
organization's interest. Review by the chief executive officer or by the board of directors may be required when
the matter is of importance commensurate with their authority. At some point it may be useful or essential to
obtain an independent legal opinion.
[5] In an extreme case, it may be reasonably necessary for the lawyer to refer the matter to the organization's
highest authority. Ordinarily, that is the board of directors or similar governing body. However, applicable law may
prescribe that under certain conditions highest authority reposes elsewhere; for example, in the independent
directors of a corporation.
Relation to Other Rules
[6] The authority and responsibility provided in paragraph (b) are concurrent with the authority and responsibility
provided in other Rules. In particular, this Rule does not limit or expand the lawyer's responsibility under Rule 1.6,
1.8, 1.16, 3.3 and 4.1. If the lawyer's services are being used by an organization to further a crime or fraud by the
organization, Rule 1.2(d) can be applicable.
Government Agency
[7] The duty defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations. However, when the client is a
governmental organization, a different balance may be appropriate between maintaining confidentiality and
assuring that the wrongfUl official act is prevented or rectified, for public business is involved. In addition, duties of
lawyers employed by the government or lawyers in military service may be defined by statutes and regulation.
Therefore, defining precisely the identity of the client and prescribing the resulting obligations of such lawyers may
be more difficult in the government context. Although in some circumstances the client may be a specific agency,
it is generally the government as a whole. For example, if the action or failure to act involves the head of a
bureau, either the department of which the bureau is a part or the government as a whole may be the client for
purpose of this Rule. Moreover, in a matter involving the conduct of government officials, a government lawyer
may have authority to question such conduct more extensively than that of a lawyer for a private organization in
similar circumstances. This Rule does not limit that authority. See note on Scope.
Clarifying the Lawyer's Role
[8] There are times when the organization's interest may be or become adverse to those of one or more of its
constituents. In such circumstances the lawyer should advise any constituent, whose interest the lawyer finds
adverse to that of the organization of the conflict or potential conflict of interest, that the lawyer cannot represent
such constituent, and that such person may wish to obtain independent representation. Care must be taken to
assure that the individual understands that, when there is such adversity of interest, the lawyer for the
organization cannot provide legal representation for that constituent individual, and that discussions between the
lawyer for the organization and the individual may not be privileged.
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[9] Whether such a warning should be given by the lawyer for the organization to any constituent individual may
turn on the facts of each case.
Dual Representation
[10] Paragraph (e) recognizes that a lawyer for an organization may also represent a principal officer or major
shareholder.
Derivative Actions
[11] Under generally prevailing law, the shareholders or members of a corporation may bring suit to compel the
directors to perform their legal obligations in the supervision of the organization. Members of unincorporated
associations have essentially the same right. Such an action may be brought nominally by the organization, but
usually is, in fact, a legal controversy over management of the organization.
[12] The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that
the organization is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal
incident of an organization's affairs, to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if
the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise
between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's relationship with the board. In those
circumstances, Rule 1.7 governs who should represent the directors and the organization.
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(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly adverse to another client,
unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the relationship with
the other client; and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's
responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter
is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
Loyalty to a Client
[1] Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client. An impermissible conflict of interest may
exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation should be declined. If such a conflict
arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer should withdraw from the representation. See Rule
1.16. Where more than one client is involved and the lawyer withdraws because a conflict arises after
representation, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined by Rule 1.9. See
also Rule 2.2(c). As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing,
see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.
[2] As a general proposition, loyalty to a client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client
without that client's consent. Paragraph (a) expresses that general rule. Thus, a lawyer ordinarily may not act as
advocate against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if it is wholly unrelated. On the other
hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only generally adverse,
such as competing economic enterprises, does not require consent of the respective clients. Paragraph (a)
applies only when the representation of one client would be directly adverse to the other.
[3] Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate
course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. The conflict in effect
forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. Paragraph (b) addresses such situations. A
possible conflict does not itself preclude the representation. The critical questions are the likelihood that a conflict
will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional
judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf
of the client. Consideration should be given to whether the client wishes to accommodate the other interest
involved.
Consultation and Consent
[4] A client may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (a)(1)
with respect to representation directly adverse to a client, and paragraph (b)(1) with respect to material limitations
on representation of a client, when a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the
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representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide
representation on the basis of the client's consent. When more than one client is involved, the question of conflict
must be resolved as to each client. Moreover, there may be circumstances where it is impossible to make the
disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related
matters and one of the clients refuses to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an
informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent.
Lawyer's Interests
[5] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have adverse effect on representation of a client. For
example, a lawyer's need for income should not lead the lawyer to undertake matters that cannot be handled
competently and at a reasonable fee. See Rules 1.1 and 1.5. If the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a
transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.
A lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an
enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed interest.
Conflicts in Litigation
[6] Paragraph (a) prohibits representation of opposing partisan litigation. Simultaneous representation of parties
whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (b). An
impermissible conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in
positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement
of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for
conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should
decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having
similar interests is proper if the risk of adverse effect is minimal and the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.
Compare Rule 2.2 involving intermediation between clients.
[7] Ordinarily, a lawyer may not act as advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even
if the other matter is wholly unrelated. However, there are circumstances in which a lawyer may act as advocate
against a client. For example, a lawyer representing an enterprise with diverse operations may accept
employment as an advocate against the enterprise in an unrelated matter if doing so will not adversely affect the
lawyer's relationship with the enterprise or conduct of the suit and if both clients consent upon consultation. By the
same token, government lawyers in some circumstances may represent government employees in proceedings in
which a government agency is the opposing party. The propriety of concurrent representation can depend on the
nature of the litigation. For example, a suit charging fraud entails conflict to a degree not involved in a suit for a
declaratory judgment concerning statutory interpretation.
[8] A lawyer may represent parties having antagonistic positions on a legal question that has arisen in different
cases, unless representation of either client would be adversely affected. Thus, it is ordinarily not improper to
assert such positions in cases pending in different trial courts, but it may be improper to do so in cases pending at
the same time in an appellate court.
Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service
[9] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and
the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). For example,
when an insurer and its insured have conflicting interests in a matter arising from a liability insurance agreement,
and the insurer is required to provide special counsel for the insured, the arrangement should assure the special
counsel's professional independence. So also, when a corporation and its directors or employees are involved in
a controversy in which they have conflicting interests, the corporation may provide funds for separate legal
representation of the directors or employees, if the clients consent after consultation and the arrangement
ensures the lawyer's professional independence.
Other Conflict Situations
[10] Conflicts of interest in contexts other than litigation sometimes may be difficult to assess. Relevant factors in
determining whether there is potential for adverse effect include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's
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relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that
actual conflict will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict if it does arise. The question is often
one of proximity and degree.
[11] For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally
antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in
interest even though there is some difference of interest among them.
[12] Conflict questions may also arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon
to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances,
a conflict of interest may arise. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a
particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view the client is the estate or
trust, including its beneficiaries. The lawyer should make clear the relationship to the parties involved.
[13] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should
determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the
corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with
which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from
the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If
there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the
lawyer should not serve as a director.
Conflict Charged by an Opposing Party
[14] Resolving questions of conflict of interest is primarily the responsibility of the lawyer undertaking the
representation. In litigation, a court may raise the question when there is reason to infer that the lawyer has
neglected the responsibility. In a criminal case, inquiry by the court is generally required when a lawyer represents
multiple defendants. Where the conflict is such as clearly to call in question the fair or efficient administration of
justice, opposing counsel may properly raise the question. Such an objection should be viewed with caution,
however, for it can be misused as a technique of harassment. See Scope.
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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
SCR 3.130(1.8) CONFLICT OF INTEREST: PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership,
possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to
the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which can be
reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent counsel in the
transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless
the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as parent, child,
sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift, except where the client is related
to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving
the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on information relating to the
representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation,
except that:
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be
contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf
of the client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:
(1) Such compensation is in accordance with an agreement between the client and the third party or
the client consents after consultation;
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the
client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere
pleas, unless each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the
claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice
unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for
such liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that
independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in a
representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer except upon
consent by the client after consultation regarding the relationship.
U) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is
conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
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(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
Transactions Between Client and Lawyer
[1] As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and reasonable to the client. In
such transactions a review by independent counsel on behalf of the client is often advisable. Furthermore, a
lawyer may not exploit information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. For example, a
lawyer who has learned that the client is investing in specific real estate may not, without the client's consent,
seek to acquire nearby property where doing so would adversely affect the client's plan for investment. Paragraph
(a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products
or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical
services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer
has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and
impracticable.
[2] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a
simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If effectuation of a
substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance, however, the client should
have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. Paragraph (c) recognizes an exception where the
client is a relative of the donee or the gift is not substantial.
Literary Rights
[3] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation
creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in
the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation.
Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from
agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to
Rule 1.5 and paragraph 0).
Person Paying for Lawyer's Services
[4] Paragraph (f) requires disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third party unless
such payment is provided for in an agreement between the client and the third party. Such an arrangement must
also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality and Rule 1.7 concerning conflict of
interest. Where the client is a class, consent may be obtained on behalf of the class by court-supervised
procedure.
Limiting Liability
[5] Paragraph (h) is not intended to apply to customary qualifications and limitations in legal opinions and
memoranda.
Family Relationships Between Lawyers
[6] Paragraph (i) applies to related lawyers who are in different firms. Related lawyers in the same firm are
governed by Rules 1.7,1.9, and 1.10. The disqualification stated in paragraph (i) is personal and is not imputed to
members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated.
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Acquisition of Interest in Litigation
[7] Paragraph U) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest
in litigation. This general rule, which has its basis in common-law champerty and maintenance, is subject to
specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules, such as the exception for
reasonable contingent fees set forth in Rule 1.5 and the exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation
set forth in paragraph (e).
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KENTUCKY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
SCR 3.130(1.9) - CONFLICT OF INTEREST: FORMER CLIENT
A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(a) Represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that
person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the fonner client unless
the fonner client consents after consultation;
(b) Represent a person in the same or a substantially related matter in which a finn with
which the lawyer fonnerly was associated had previously represented a client
(1) whose interests are materially adverse to that person; and
(2) about whom the lawyer had acquired infonnation protected by Rules 1.6
and 1.9(c) that is material to the matter; unless the fonner client consents
after consultation.
(c) A lawyer who has fonnerly represented a client in a matter of whose present or fonner finn
has fonnerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use infonnation relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the fonner
client except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would pennit or require with respect to a
client or when the infonnation has become generally known; or
(2) reveal infonnation relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3
would pennit or require with respect to a client.
[Amended by order 99-1, eff. February 1,2000]
COMMENTARY
[1] After tennination of a client-lawyer relationship, a lawyer may not represent another client
except in confonnity with this Rule. The principles in Rule 1.7 detennine whether the interests of
the present and fonner client are adverse. Thus, a lawyer could not properly seek to rescind on
behalf of a new client a contract drafted on behalf of the fonner client. So also a lawyer who has
prosecuted an accused person could not properly represent the accused in a subsequent civil
action against the government concerning the same transaction.
[2] The scope of a "matter" for purposes of paragraph (a) may depend on the facts of a particular
situation or transaction. The lawyer's involvement in a matter can also be a question of degree.
When a lawyer has been directly involved in a specific transaction, subsequent representation of
other clients with materially adverse interests clearly is prohibited. On the other hand, a lawyer
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who recurrently handled a type of problem for a former client is not precluded from later
representing another client in a wholly distinct problem of that type even though the subsequent
representation involves a position adverse to the prior client. Similar considerations can apply to
the reassignment of military lawyers between defense and prosecution functions within the same
military jurisdiction. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the
matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the
matter in question.
[3] Information acquired by the lawyer in the course of representing a client may not
subsequently be used by the lawyer to the disadvantage of the client. However, the fact that a
lawyer has once served a client does not preclude the lawyer from using generally known
information about that client when later representing another client.
[4] Disqualification from subsequent representation is for the protection of clients and can be
waived by them. A waiver is effective only if there is disclosure of the circumstances, including
the lawyer's intended role in behalf of the new client.
[5] With regard to an opposing party's raising a question of conflict of interest, see Comment to
Rule 1.7. With regard to disqualification of a firm with which a lawyer is associated, see Rule
1.10.
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SCR 3.130(2.3) EVALUATION FOR USE BY THIRD PERSONS
(a) A lawyer may undertake an evaluation of a matter affecting a client for the use of someone other than the
client if:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes that making the evaluation is compatible with other aspects of
the lawyer's relationship with the client; and
(2) The client consents after consultation.
(b) Except as disclosure is required in connection with a report of an evaluation, information relating to the
evaluation is otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
Definition
[1] An evaluation may be performed at the client's direction but for the primary purpose of establishing information
for the benefit of third parties; for example, an opinion concerning the title of property rendered at the behest of a
vendor for the information of a prospective purchaser, or at the behest of a borrower for the information of a
prospective lender. In some situations, the evaluation may be required by a government agency; for example, an
opinion concerning the legality of the securities registered for sale under the securities laws. In other instances,
the evaluation may be required by a third person, such as a purchaser of a business.
[2] Lawyers for the government may be called upon to give a formal opinion on the legality of contemplated
government agency action. In making such an evaluation, the government lawyer acts at the behest of the
government as the client but for the purpose of establishing the limits of the agency's authorized activity. Such an
opinion is to be distinguished from confidential legal advice given agency officials. The critical question is whether
the opinion is to be made public.
[3] A legal evaluation should be distinguished from an investigation of a person with whom the lawyer does not
have a client-lawyer relationship. For example, a lawyer retained by a purchaser to analyze a vendor's title to
property does not have a client-lawyer relationship with the vendor. So also, an investigation into a person's
affairs by a government lawyer, or by special counsel employed by the government, is not an evaluation as that
term is used in this Rule. The question is whether the lawyer is retained by the person whose affairs are being
examined. When the lawyer is retained by that person, the general rules concerning loyalty to client and
preservation of confidences apply, which is not the case if the lawyer is retained by someone else. For this
reason, it is essential to identify the person by whom the lawyer is retained. This should be made clear not only to
the person under examination, but also to others to whom the results are to be made available.
Duty to Third Person
[4] When the evaluation is intended for the information or use of a third person, a legal duty to that person mayor
may not arise. That legal question is beyond the scope of this Rule. However, since such an evaluation involves a
departure from the normal client-lawyer relationship, careful analysis of the situation is required. The lawyer must
be satisfied as a matter of professional judgment that making the evaluation is compatible with other functions
undertaken in behalf of the client. For example, if the lawyer is acting as advocate in defending the client against
charges of fraud, it would normally be incompatible with that responsibility for the lawyer to perform an evaluation
for others concerning the same or a related transaction. Assuming no such impediment is apparent, however, the
lawyer should advise the client of the implications of the evaluation, particularly the lawyer's responsibilities to
third persons and the duty to disseminate the findings.
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Access to and Disclosure of Information
[5] The quality of an evaluation depends on the freedom and extent of the investigation upon which it is based.
Ordinarily a lawyer should have whatever latitude of investigation seems necessary as a matter of professional
jUdgment. Under some circumstances, however, the terms of the evaluation may be limited. For example, certain
issues or sources may be categorically excluded, or the scope of search may be limited by time constraints or the
noncooperation of persons having relevant information. Any such limitations which are material to the evaluation
should be described in the report. If after a lawyer has commenced an evaluation, the client refuses to comply
with the terms upon which it was understood the evaluation was to have been made, the lawyer's obligations are
determined by law, having reference to the terms of the client's agreement and the surrounding circumstances.
Financial Auditors' Requests for Information
[6] When a question concerning the legal situation of a client arises at the instance of the client's financial auditor
and the question is referred to the lawyer, the lawyer's response may be made in accordance with procedures
recognized in the legal profession. Such a procedure is set forth in the American Bar Association Statement of
Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information, adopted in 1975.
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SCR 3.130(4.1) TRUTHFULNESS IN STATEMENTS TO OTHERS
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to
a third person.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989:
Misrepresentation
[1] A lawyer is required to be truthful when dealing with others on a client's behalf, but generally has no affirmative
duty to inform an opposing party of relevant facts. A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or
affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure
to act.
Statements ofFact
[2] This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be regarded as one of fact can
depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a
transaction and a party's intentions as to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the
existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the principal would constitute fraud.
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Question:
Answer:
Question:
Answer:
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
Unauthorized Practice of Law Opinion U-58
Issued: September 1999
May real estate closings be conducted by persons who are not real parties in
interest without direct supervision ofa licensed attorney?
No.
May title agencies or title insurance companies conduct real estate closings?
No.
OPINION
Only licensed attorneys may practice law in Kentucky. The practice is regulated exclusively
by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The compelling reason for such regulation is to protect the public
against rendition of legal services by unqualified persons. Kentucky Rule of Professional Conduct
(RPC) 5.5. The practice oflaw is defined by SCR 3.020 as any service:
"involving legal knowledge or legal advice, whether ofrepresentation, counsel or
advocacy in or out ofcourt, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations,
liabilities, or business relations of one requiring the services."
The "unauthorized" practice of law is the performance of those services contained in the
definition by "non-lawyers" for "others".
It is not the unauthorized practice of law for a party to a real estate transaction to represent
himself or to prepare closing documents to which he is a real party in interest, provided that no fee
is charged to any other party. SCR 3.020. Otherwise only a licensed attorney may represent a
closing party, prepare conveyancing or mortgage instruments, or charge a fee for legal services
related to a reatestate transaction. Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778
(Ky. 1965); Federal Intermediate Credit Bank ofLouisville v. Kentucky Bar Association, 540
S.W.2d 14 (Ky. S.Ct. 1976).
Real Estate Closings
Real estate closings typically have either two or three real parties in interest: seller and
buyer, borrower and lender, or seller, buyer-borrower, and lender. Of these three, the least complex
are the two-party closings of single sale or loan transactions involving the transfer ofan interest in
real estate, by deed or mortgage, for purchase money or loan proceeds. The sale of real estate
financed by a third-party lender is the more complex because it involves separate sale and secured
loan transactions in a simultaneous closing.
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The "conduct" of a closing is the culmination of such transactions. Notwithstanding the
standardization ofreal estate closing documentation, it is unrealistic and naive to assume that, in all
instances, the settlement agent can present important legal documents to the seller, buyer, borrower,
and/or lender at a closing without legal questions being asked and without giving legal advice. The
preparation and presentation of closing documents is an implied representation that the documents
fulfill the requirements of the parties' contractual commitments and the law, and that the documents
have been reviewed and found to be legally sufficient. Real estate closings should be conducted
only under the supervision ofan attorney because questions of legal rights and duties are always
involved, and there is no way of assuring that lay settlement agents would raise, or would not
attempt to answer, the legal questions. State v. Buyer's Service Co., 357 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1987).
Whether stated or not, the person conducting the closing vouches for the legal sufficiency of the
documents, whether complex, simple, or pre-printed. It does not matter whether the instruments are
deemed simple or complex. As Judge Pound said when closing transactions were much less
complicated than today, "The most complex are simple to the skilled, and the simplest often trouble
the inexperienced." People v. Title Guaranty and Trust, 125 N.E. 666 (N.y. 1919).
The legal questions present at a closing, whether asked or should be asked, are endless, as
demonstrated by the attached appendix of issues affecting the quality of title and enforceability of
documents. In summary, the contract of sale or the loan commitment must be reviewed and
interpreted for contract compliance and remedies. Sufficiency of the legal description or survey
plat and access to public ways and utilities must be determined. The title opinion or title insurance
commitment must be reviewed and interpreted to inform the purchaser of its meaning and potential
risks, and the effect of restrictions, encumbrances, and other title exceptions. The closing
documents must be explained.
By its very nature a real estate closing involves substantial rights and liabilities. The parties
approach the closing having made commitments with other parties and invested time and money in
anticipation of a mutual understanding of their contractual obligations and trusting that all legal
issues have been properly addressed. If a problem arises during closing and there is no attorney-
client relationship, the parties are without the benefit of independent counsel and may lack the
leverage or will to halt a transaction that is not in their best interests.
Closing Supervision by Attorney
An attorney need not be physically present at the closing, so long as it is in fact conducted
under his supervision and control, but the responsible attorney must be familiar with the
documentation and be available at the time of closing for consultation. He bears ultimate
responsibility for the closing and is subject to disciplinary action for any act or omission which
otherwise would be misconduct by him or his closing employees, as well as being legally
accountable under the duty imposed by Seigle v. Jasper, 867 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. App. 1993). By
failing to attend or supervise a closing, the attorney who is responsible for the documentation or
who has examined and opined on the quality of title may be guilty of aiding or assisting lay
settlement agents in the unauthorized practice oflaw contrary to SCR 3.470.
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Closing by Institutional Lender
When an institutional lender is a real party in interest to a real 'estate transaction as
mortgagee, its lay employee or in-house attorney may preside over the mortgage closing with a
customer not represented by an attorney. Though institutional lenders, namely banks, savings and
loans, and Farm Credit Services are not subject to the same disciplinary action as attorneys, the
public is protected to some degree by state and federal requirements for licensure, capitalization,
oaths ofdirectors and officers, insured deposits, and other regulations. The lender's employee may
attend to the ministerial issues of financial matters, payments, and insurance related to the loan, as
these are commonly non-legal functions. KBA U-31.
The lender's employee may also prepare or select and complete necessary "form" loan
documents ifno fee is charged, directly or indirectly, for such service~, provided that the lender's
own attorney or some other licensed attorney passes judgment on and is responsible for the
documents as finally executed. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank ofLouisville, supra.
However, institutional lenders may not by their employees or salaried attorneys provide title
opinions to their borrowers because the "analysis of recorded interests in land coupled with an
opinion as to its legal status" is a service lawfully performed for others only by a licensed attorney.
Kentucky State Bar Association v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Covington, 342
S.W.2d 397 (Ky. 1961). Moreover, no lender's lay employee may undertake to give legal advice to
or answer any questions posed by the borrower or any other transaction party involving
interpretation of legal provisions ofclosing documents or other matters requiring legal knowledge
or skill. When a legal question is asked or becomes apparent, the institutional lender employee
should suspend the closing to consult legal counsel in order to avoid the unauthorized practice of
law. (See KBA U 31.) Such employee may not conduct any part ofa real estate closing other than
the mortgage loan.
Closing by Title Companies
A distinction must be made as to lay settlement agencies such as title companies and title
insurance companies which are not real parties in interest to the real estate or loan transactions.
Their only interest is the payment of settlement fees. They act only as a conduit to exchange funds
and documents. A lay settlement agency may compile and report factual information from the
public records, including abstracts of title, but may not render title opinions. They may act as an
agent or broker in connection with the issuance of title insurance commitments and policies, and
may provide clerical services for a closing. KBA U-21; U-31. They do not conduct a closing or
examine the required documents with an eye for protecting the independent legal rights of the
seller, buyer, or lender. Such agencies are not regulated and owe no legal duties to the parties other
than those imposed by agency or tort law. Their employees have no mandated educational
prerequisites for real estate transactions or disciplinary oversight. A title agency may not conduct
real estate closings or mask legal fees for closing services under the guise ofa "settlement fee" or
other charge. Their conduct of a closing absent independent legal counsel constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law. Virginia UPL Opinion #183 (1996); Annotation, 85 A.L.R. 2d 184.
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APPENDIX
Typical Questions at Real Estate Closings That May Involve Legal Advice
S the legal name, existence, and authority ofan entity-grantor;
S the nature of the estate and quality of title conveyed;
S the effect of survivorship title on estate plans;
S the difference between special and general warranties, or no warranty at all, and the purchaser's
remedies for title defects;
S generic deed exceptions for easements and other encumbrances of record;
S closure ofa metes and bounds description or other description deficiencies;
S rights ofaccess to public ways and utilities;
S interpretation and impact of zoning and other land use regulations;
S completion ofpromised improvements by the seller or subdivider;
S air and mineral rights;
S significance ofdeed covenants, conditions, and restrictions;
S upstream and downstream surface drainage;
S the presence of unacceptable dominant easements, or the lack ofnecessary servient easements
appurtenant;
S the effect ofadverse possession, prescriptive use, and the champerty statute;
S eviction of tenants and trespassers;
S release of statutory liens for labor and materials furnished, unemployment contributions and
federal and Kentucky death taxes;
S survey and other exceptions in the preliminary title opinion or title commitment;
S what title policies cover and what they exclude;
S the duties and liability of title attorneys, real estate agents, and lenders;
S the rights to and limitations of future advances under open-end loans;
S remedies against defaulting parties;
S interpretation of environmental site assessments and remediation ofcontamination;
S survival ofwarranties, representations, and covenants, and indemnification;
S claims for latent defects in buildings;
S disclaimers in homeowner's warranties and termite inspection reports;
S disclosures ofcondition ofproperty improvements, or of the agency and loyalty ofa broker;
S the tax consequences ofvarious matters in the closing;
S the effect of marital dissolution upon loan obligations; or
S the fine print of the so-called federal closing documents.
Note to Reader
This advisory opinion is presently under review by the Supreme Court ofKentucky,
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3.530(5), in a case styled as Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., et
al., v. Kentucky Bar Association, Case No. 2000-SC-206-KB.
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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
SCR 3.130(5.5) UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
A lawyer shall not:
(a) Practice law in a jurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; or
(b) Assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eft. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: The definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one jurisdiction to another.
Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of
legal services by unqualified persons. Paragraph (b) does not prohibit a lawyer from employing the services of
paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated work and
retains responsibility for their work. See Rule 5.3. Likewise, it does not prohibit lawyers from providing
professional advice and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law; for example,
claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institutions, social workers, accountants and persons
employed in government agencies. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers who wish to proceed pro se.
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ATTENTION
PAST AND PRESENT CUSTOMERS OF
First Family Financial Services, Inc., Associates Financial
Services, Inc., Transouth Financial Services, Inc., and
Kentucky Finance
If you borrowed money from any of the
above;.listed finance companies from December 1, 1995
through November 30, 2000, you may have a legal claim
which you need to protect.
There is a national class action settlement that may affect your
rights. If you wish to·protect any potential legal claims you may
have, you will be required to make an important legal decision
before February 7, 2003.
For a free consultation, please call:
Hamilton & Morgan, P.C.
Toll Free: 1-800-844-2787
"THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT"
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Notice For Comment
Proposed Regulations of the Attorneys' Advertising Commission,
pursuant to SCR 3.130-7.03 (5) (a)
As approved by the KBA Board ofGovernors
January 17,2003
Publisher's Note:
Supreme Court Rule SCR 3.130 contains the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct (KRPC) which include rules on
lawyer advertising. KRPC 7.03 establishes an Attorneys' Advertising Commission (Commission) which has general
responsibilities for implementing the lawyer advertising rules. In discharging its responsibilities, the Commission is given
authority to issue and promulgate regulations subject to prior approval by the Board ofGovernors. When proposed
regulations are issued, members of the Kentucky Bar Association are entitled at least sixty (60) days advance notice and
an opportunity to comment. The Commission has promulgated the following enumerated regulations which were ap-
proved by the Board of Governors on January 17,2003 subject to review and consideration of comments from the mem-
bership. Members wishing to comment on these proposed regulations must do so in writing. Any written comments must
be sent no later than June 1,2003 to the Attorneys' Advertising Commission, c/o Bruce K. Davis, KBA Executive Direc-
tor, 514 West Main Street, Frankfort, KY 40601-1883.
AAC Regulation No.1:
FALSE, DECEPTIVE AND MISLEADING
ADVERTISING
A. Authority, Purpose and Scope
1. SCR 3.130-7.03(5) provides in part that the
Attorneys' Advertising Commission [identified throughout
these regulations as "the Commission"] has general
responsibility for the implementation ofRule 7 of the
Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct (SCR 3.130-7.01
et seq.) SCR 3.130-7.03(5)(a) provides, further, that the
Commission may issue and promulgate regulations to
discharge its responsibility. This Regulation implements
SCR 3.130-7.15, prohibiting false, deceptive or misleading
communications, pursuant to the authority conferred upon
the Commission in SCR 3.130-7.03(5).
2. This Regulation No.1 identifies certain types
of content that render an advertisement false, deceptive or
misleading within the meaning and intent ofSCR 3.130-
7.15. However, this Regulation is not intended to be an
exhaustive listing ofall ways in which an advertisement
may be false, deceptive or misleading for purposes of SCR
3.130-7.15. Accordingly, this Regulation will not be
construed as limiting the provisions of that Rule or as
limiting the power ofthe Commission to determine that a
particular advertisement is false, deceptive or misleading
for reasons not specified in this Regulation. Further, it is
42 Bench & Bar, March 2003
not designed in any way to limit the authority of the Inquiry
Commission with regard to any of the rules of professional
conduct.
3. This Regulation No.1 applies only to
communications by or on behalf ofa lawyer or law firm
that concern legal services available from the lawyer or
firm and:
a. are disseminated over electronic broadcast
media, including television and radio
advertisements;
b. are published in public print media,
including advertisements in newspapers,
magazines and telephone directories;
c. appear in any print or electronic
publication disseminated by a third party,
including advertisements that appear in
programs for public events or in
newsletters, directories or other
publications ofcivic organizations,
charitable entities and educational
institutions;
d. are accessible to the public on the internet,
including home pages and World Wide
Web sites;
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e. are issued as unsolicited electronic mail
("e-mail") communications to one or more
persons with whom the lawyer or firm has
no family relationship or direct prior
professional relationship;
f. are contained in newsletters, brochures,
pamphlets or other printed materials
provided to prospective clients; or
g. constitute solicitation ofprofessional
employment from a prospective client
within the scope ofSCR 3.130-7.09.
B. Advertising That Constitutes a Material
Misrepresentation of Fact or Law
Under SCR 3.130-7.15(1)(a)
SCR 3.130-7.15 (l)(a) provides in part that a
communication about legal services is false, deceptive or
misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation of
fact or law. The Commission will consider an
advertisement to be misleading and to contain a material
misrepresentation of fact or law, in violation of the said
Rule, if the advertisement:
1. contains any material misrepresentation
regarding the nature of the services
offered in the advertisement or the
restrictions imposed upon those services
by the Rules of the Supreme Court of
Kentucky;
2. contains any material misrepresentation of
fact regarding a lawyer's educational
background, employment history,
professional experience or other
credentials;
3. contains any material misrepresentation of
fact regarding a law firm's collective
experience in a field of practice;
4. contains any material misrepresentation of
fact regarding the identity of the lawyer(s)
who will actually perform the legal
services or the location of the office
where the services will be performed;
5. includes an appearance by a non-lawyer in
a manner that suggests or implies that he
or she is a lawyer;
6. includes an appearance by an actor in a
manner that suggests or implies that he or
she is an actual client of the advertising
lawyer or law firm; or
7. displays any "prop" (including any motor
vehicle, product or other tangible item not
actually involved in a legal matter) in a
manner that suggests or implies that it was
actually involved in a particular legal
matter.
C. Information That Must Be Included in an
Advertisement to Avoid a Misleading
Omission Under SCR 3.130-7.15(1)(a)
SCR 3.130-7.15(l)(a) provides in part that a
communication about legal services is false, deceptive or
misleading if it omits a fact necessary to make the
communication as a whole not materially misleading. The
Commission will deem an advertisement to be misleading,
within the meaning and intent ofthe said Rule, if the
advertisement fails to include any information required by
this Part C.
1. Office location; telephone number.
a. Every advertisement must identify, by city,
town or county, one or more bona fide
office locations of the Kentucky lawyer or
lawyers who will actually perform the
services advertised. For the purposes of
this requirement, a bona fide office is a
physical location maintained by the lawyer
or law firm where the lawyer or law firm
reasonably expects to furnish legal
services in a substantial way on a regular
and continuing basis.
b. An advertisement must not include a
telephone number in a manner that
misrepresents the geographic location of
the office where the advertised legal
services will be performed. If an
advertisement includes a telephone number
with an area code for a geographic region
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in which the lawyer or law firm does not
maintain a bona fide office, the
advertisement must include a statement
that the lawyer or firm does not maintain an
office within the area code indicated by the
telephone number. In the event of the use
of a toll free number, the advertisement
must indicate the location of the bona fide
office(s) where a substantial amount of the
services will be performed.
c. The information referred to in (a) and (b) is
not required on advertisements by group
pre-paid legal plans or non-profit legal
services agencies that utilize an intake or
"hot-line" number for the purpose of
screening, referral or giving limited legal
advice, provided however, that the
advertisement must otherwise comply with
the Supreme Court Rules and these
regulations, including the requirement of
SCR 3.130-7.2(3) that a Kentucky lawyer,
or lawyer otherwise admitted as provided in
SCR 2.112, be listed.
2. Fair disclosure of legal requirements.
a. In every case where an advertisement
refers to the recovery of money, it must
include an appropriate explanation of the
legal requirements for such recovery. In
any reference to a tort case, or other case
in which monetary damages may be
recovered, the advertisement must include,
at a minimum, information that liability must
be proven, that recovery of money is
related to damages suffered by the plaintiff
that are recoverable by law, and that
recovery may be dependent on the ability to
collect from the responsible party(ies),
provided, however, that such statement
must be in reasonably understandable
language directed to the consumer. Failure
to include that information in a prominent
manner will be considered a misleading
omission.
b. In every case where an advertisement
refers to the defense of a claim for the
recovery ofmoney, it must include an
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appropriate explanation of the legal
requirements for such defense. In any
reference to a tort case, or other case in
which monetary damages are sought, the
advertisement must include, at a minimum,
an appropriate discussion ofliability and
damages. Failure to include that
information in a prominent manner will be
considered a misleading omission.
D. Advertising That Creates Unjustified
Expectations or Makes Unsubstantiated
Comparisons Under SCR 3.130-7.15(1)(b)
and (c)
SCR 3. 130-7.1 5(1)(b) and (c) provide that a
communication about legal services is false, deceptive or
misleading: ifthe communication is likely to create an
unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve, states or implies that the lawyer can achieve
results by means that violate the rules of professional
conduct or other law, or compares the lawyer's services
with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be
factually substantiated.
The Commission finds that it is misleading or
deceptive, and does constitute a material
misrepresentation, to lead a consumer of legal services to
have unrealistic expectations about those services. An
advertisement violates SCR 3.130-7.15(1)(b) and (c) ifit
fails to comply with this Part D.
1. Testimonials. An advertisement must not
contain or refer to a testimonial. For purposes of this
provision, a testimonial is a statement by any person, or by
an actor portraying any person, regarding any of the
following:
a. the quality oflegal services
rendered by the advertising lawyer
or law firm in a particular legal
matter,
b. the results obtained by the lawyer
or firm in a particular legal matter,
or
c. the client's level of satisfaction
with the result obtained in a
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particular legal matter.
2. Advertising that refers to particular matters
or results. An advertisement must not state or refer to any
ofthe following:
a. the dollar amount of a judgment, verdict or
settlement in any particular legal matter,
unless the reason for doing so is to
disseminate information regarding a
judgment, verdict or settlement in a class
action for the purpose ofnotifying persons
who may have a right to participate in the
proceeds thereof;
b. any result that the advertising lawyer or
law firm obtained in any particular legal
matter; or
c. the cumulative dollar value ofclaims that
the advertising lawyer or law firm has
prosecuted or defended.
3. Advertising that claims or implies a unique
level ofprior success.
a. An advertisement must not state or imply
that the advertising lawyer or law firm has
been more successful than other lawyers
or firms in obtaining satisfactory results for
clients, unless the statement or implication
is factually substantiated by information
provided to the Commission by the
advertising lawyer or law firm. In
determining whether the statement or
implication about prior success is factually
substantiated, the Commission will consider
all relevant factors. Factors that indicate
that an advertisement does not violate this
provision include:
(1) A showing that the statement or
implication about prior success refers
to an identifiable arena oflegal
practice in which the lawyer's or
firm's actual level of success can be
accurately assessed; and
(2) A showing that the statement or
implication about prior success is
supported by objective information and
a statistically meaningful volume of
data, as distinguished from information
that is subjective or anecdotal in
nature.
b. The following types of content do not
constitute statements or implications about
prior success within the meaning and
intent oftms regulation:
(1) Communications regarding fields of
practice that conform to the
requirements ofSCR 3.130-7.40;
(2) Factual information regarding a
lawyer's or law firm's experience in
legal matters of a particular nature, as
distinguished from statements or
implications regarding the lawyer's or
firm's level of success in those
matters.
4. Advertising that suggests a likelihood of
satisfactory results irrespective of the merits of the
particular matter. An advertisement must not state or
imply that the advertising lawyer or law firm will be able to
obtain satisfactory results for a client regardless of the
actual merits of the client's particular legal matter. In
determining whether an advertisement violates this
provision, the Commission will consider all relevant factors,
including any information submitted to the Commission by
the advertising lawyer or law firm. Factors that indicate
an advertisement violates this provision include:
a. Content that states, implies or suggests
that potentially adverse parties will be
more likely to cooperate in resolving the
client's legal matter because the client is
represented by the advertising lawyer or
law firm; or
b. Content that states, implies or suggests
that the client will more likely prevail in a
legal dispute if the client is represented by
the advertising lawyer or law firm,
irrespective of the merits of the client's
claim or defense.
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AAC Regulation No.2:
PERMISSIBLE CONTENT OF
ADVERTISEMENTS SUBMITTED
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH PUBLICATION
Pursuant to SCR 3. 130-7.05(1)(a)(26) the
Commission may specify additional infonnation that may
be contained in advertisements that are permitted to be
simultaneously submitted. The following additional
infonnation may be included in any ofthese
advertisements:
1. Participation by the lawyer in community
groups or clubs and nonprofit charitable
organizations or groups, either as a
member or officer;
2. Previous employment positions, including
governmental and non-governmental
employment;
3. Enlargements of business cards that are
not themselves advertisements under SCR
3. 130-7.02(1)(a), but if the advertisement
includes reference to a website, the
website is considered a separate
advertisement;
4. Listings of immediate family, such as
spouses, children and parents;
5. Infonnation identifying the offices of the
finn in several jurisdictions or cities within
or without the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, if such offices meet the
standards for an office contained in AAC
Reg. No. 1. C. (1);
6. The length of time any particular law finn
or lawyer has been in practice;
7. The types of infonnation listed in SCR
3.130-7.05(1)(a)(6)-(13) may include both
past and present participation or status, if
the advertisement discloses, when
necessary, that the lawyer is no longer a
participant or no longer holds that status;
8. A photograph of the lawyer with no
accompanying scene in the background of
the photograph;
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9. Words such as "congratulations" or "good
luck," when used in program
advertisements for charitable or
educational functions;
10. Such variations on the items contained
herein and in SCR 3.130-7.05(1)(a) (1-25)
that are minor or technical in nature and
may be reviewed and approved by the
designee of the Commission named herein.
AAC Regulation No.3:
COMMUNICATIONS THAT REQUIRE THE
DISCLAIMER
"THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT"
SCR 3.130-7.09(3) requires that certain types of
advertisements contain the disclaimer "THIS IS AN
ADVERTISEMENT." In addition, SCR 3.130-7.25
authorizes the Commission to require the disclaimer "THIS
IS AN ADVERTISEMENT". This Regulation No.3
clarifies the relationship between SCR 3.130-7.09(3) and
SCR 3.130-7.25.
1. SCR 3.130-7.09(3) does not apply to every
written, recorded or electronic communication from a
lawyer. Rather, it applies only to any such communication
that solicits "professional employment from a prospective
client known or reasonably believed to be in need oflegal
services in a particular matter, and with whom the lawyer
has no family or prior professional relationship." The term
"particular matter" includes any identifiable type or
category of legal matter as well as any specific case of
that consumer. An advertisement that is within the scope
ofSCR 3.130-7.09(3) must include the disclaimer "THIS
IS AN ADVERTISEMENT."
2. Even if an advertisement does not constitute
a solicitation ofprofessional employment within the scope
ofSCR 3.130-7.09, the Commission may require the
disclaimer "THIS IS AN ADVERTISEMENT", pursuant
to SCR 3.130-7.25, ifthe Commission concludes that the
advertisement may not be perceived by the consumer as a
quest for clients because of its fonnat, manner of
presentation or medium.
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AAC Regulation No.4:
DELEGATION OF ADMINSTRATIVE TASKS
Supreme Court Rule 3.130-7.03 provides that the
Commission may delegate to an employee of the KBA the
authority to approve advertisements submitted under SCR
3.130-7.05(2). The Commission hereby delegates this
function to the advertising paralegal, with the supervision
of the Office of Bar Counsel and the Director, to approve
such submissions in the limited circumstances as follows:
1. The Commission has granted prior
approval of the advertisement subject
to a condition and the lawyer is
making a resubmission to comply with
that condition;
2. The Commission has reached an
informal resolution and the attorney is
resubmitting the advertisement to
determine if the advertisement
complies with the terms of the
informal resolution;
3. To determine if a submission is
properly made as a simultaneous
submission. If it is determined not to
qualify, then the KBA would be
authorized, through its designee, to
issue a letter informing the attorney
that the submission does not qualify as
a simultaneous submission and should
be submitted under SCR 3.130-7.05(2)
to the Commission;
4. Advertisements submitted for review
which, on their face, comply with the
rules and regulations ofthis
Commission and contain no issues
requiring the individual attention ofthe
Commission;
5. If its designee determines a question
exists concerning compliance with
these regulations or the Supreme
Court rules that requires the
Commission's review, the
advertisement or videotape may be
submitted to the Commission by the
designee.
AAC Regulation No.5:
TIME PERIOD FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL
OF VIDEO ADVERTISEMENTS
1. SCR 3.130-7.05(2) allows the Commission a
period of thirty days to consider an advertisement. The
thirty-day period runs from the date ofsubmission of the
videotape, transcript and fees. If a transcript is
presented without three copies of the videotape, the
Commission will attempt to review and respond to the
submission within thirty days, but the thirty day period
set forth in SCR 3.130-7.05(2) will not to begin to run
and the advertisement will not be deemed approved if
the Commission fails to respond within thirty days.
2. If the Commission approves a transcript
subject to a review of the videotape, the thirty-day time
period set forth in SCR 3.130-7.05(2) will commence
upon the Commission's receipt of the three copies of the
videotape.
3. If a videotape is resubmitted to the
Commission with changes in order to comply with
suggestions by the Commission, the advertisement will
be deemed approved ifno notice of proposed disapproval
is issued within thirty days after the date of the re-
submission.
AAC Regulation No.6:
REQUEST FOR HEARING; INFORMAL
RESOLUTION PROCEDURE
1. If a lawyer or law firm desires a hearing
pursuant to SCR 3.130-7.06(1), a written request for
such a hearing must be made within fifteen days
following the date of the notice ofproposed disapproval.
The written request for a hearing must state whether the
lawyer or firm wishes to seek informal resolution of the
Commission's objections to the proposed advertisement
as authorized by SCR 3.130-7.06.
2. If a lawyer or law firm requests a hearing
and wishes to seek informal resolution, the following
procedure will apply:
a. Within seven days after the request
for hearing is received, the
advertising paralegal will assign the
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file to a member of the Commission
panel that reviewed the
advertisement.
b. Within fourteen days after receiving
such an assignment, the member of
the Commission will attempt to reach
a compromise with the advertiser. If
successful, that member will promptly
notify the other members of the
Commission (or panel thereot) of the
terms ofthe proposed resolution.
c. Within fourteen days ofbeing notified
of the proposed resolution, the other
members of the Commission (or panel
thereot) will state any concern or
objection to the proposed informal
resolution.
d. At the end of the time period set forth
in (c) above, or after an unsuccessful
resolution, the Commission will notify
the lawyer or law firm in writing
whether an informal resolution has
been reached.
e. Within fifteen days of the date of a
notice that an informal resolution
conference has not reached a
successful resolution, the lawyer or
law firm must notify the Commission
in writing if the lawyer or firm wishes
to proceed with a hearing.
AAC Regulation No.7:
HEARING PROCEDURE
1. If a notice of proposed disapproval is not
resolved through an informal resolution pursuant to
Regulation No.6, and if the lawyer or law firm wishes to
proceed with a hearing, the Commission, through its
designees, will appoint a hearing officer to preside over the
hearing. The hearing officer will be a member of the
panel of hearing officers designated by the Supreme Court
for the hearing of disciplinary matters, or such other
hearing officer as the Commission may select, under SCR
3.130-7.06(1) and SCR 3. 130-7.03(5)(d). The appointment
will be made within fifteen days after the lawyer or law
firm notifies the Commission:
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a. that the lawyer or firm does not wish
to pursue informal resolution, pursuant
to paragraph 1 of Regulation No.6; or
b. that the lawyer or law firm wishes to
proceed with a hearing after an
attempt at informal resolution has
failed, pursuant to paragraph 2(e) of
Regulation No.6.
2. In a proceeding under SCR 3.130-7.06(1), the
parties will be the advertising lawyer or law firm and the
Kentucky Bar Association ("KBA"). The KBA will be
represented in the proceeding by the Office of Bar
Counsel. Any notice to the advertiser will also be sent to
the Kentucky Bar Association Office of Bar Counsel.
3. Pursuant to SCR 3.130-7.06(1) and SCR
3.130-7.07, the hearing will be held within thirty days of
the date of the appointment of the hearing officer as
reflected in the notice to the parties.
4. The hearing officer may provide for pre-
hearing conferences, disclosures of witnesses, and
proposed exhibits. The hearing officer will conduct a
hearing to be recorded by a court reporter. The parties
will have the rights secured to a party by the Rules of Civil
Procedure and the Kentucky Rules of Evidence with
respect to the introduction of evidence, the right to compel
the attendance of witnesses and the production of books,
papers and documents and other writings except those
contained in the files of Bar Counsel, and the right to cross
examination. The hearing officer may also permit the filing
of simultaneous briefs by the Kentucky Bar Association
Office of Bar Counsel and by the lawyer or law firm. The
briefs must be filed within ten days after the hearing.
5. The hearing officer must issue written
recommended findings of fact and conclusions oflaw to
the Commission within twenty days from the last date for
filing simultaneous briefs. Ifno briefing schedule is
established, the hearing officer must issue written
recommended findings offact and conclusions of law
within twenty days after the hearing.
6. Under SCR 3.130-7.07(1), the Commission will
issue and serve a final decision on the parties and the
hearing officer within sixty days after the issuance of the
written recommended findings of fact and conclusions of
law by the hearing officer.
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AAC Regulation No.8:
TIME FOR FILING APPEAL
An appeal pursuant to SCR 3.130-7.07(1) must
be filed within thirty days after service of the
Commission's final decision.
AAC Regulation No.9:
PUBLICATION OF REGULATIONS
The Commission will provide copies of these
regulations upon request to any attorney or member of
the public.
AAC Regulation No. 10:
COPYING AND RETRIEVAL CHARGES
SCR 3.130-7.08 permits the records of the
Commission to be inspected and copied. The Kentucky
Bar Association may charge a reasonable fee for copies
of any Commission records that are requested, not to
exceed $.50 per page. It may also charge a search fee
of$25.00 per hour for staff time spent responding to
requests for inspection of records or making copies in the
event its designee determines such is appropriate given the
time required for the assembly or copying of the records.
AAC Regulation No. 11:
REQUIREMENT FOR COMPLETE
INFORMATION
In submitting an advertisement the lawyer or law
firm must provide sufficient information to the Commission
with the submission to enable the Commission to review
the advertisement, and must respond to any requests for
additional information that the Commission deems
necessary to the review of the advertisement.
AAC Regulation No. 12
OTHER PROCEEDINGS
Proceedings before the Commission do not
preclude or preempt other proceedings before the Court or
any of its agencies as authorized in the Supreme Court
Rules.
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SCR 3.130(1.15) SAFEKEEPING PROPERTY
(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a
representation separate from a lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in
the state where the lawyer's office is situated, or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. The
separate account referred to in the preceding sentence shall be maintained in a bank which has agreed to notify
the Kentucky Bar Association in the event that any overdraft occurs in the account. Other property shall be
identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property
shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the
representation.
(b) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly
notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with
the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or
third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full
accounting regarding such property.
(c) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which both the lawyer and
another person claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until there is an accounting and
severance of their interests. If a dispute arises concerning their respective interests, the portion in dispute shall be
kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved.
(d) A lawyer may deposit funds in an account for the limited purpose of minimizing bank charges. A lawyer may
also participate in an IOLTA program authorized by law or court rule.
[Amended by Order 98-1, eff. 10-1-98; adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: [1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities
should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special
circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons should be kept separate from the
lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts
may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities.
[2] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. If there is risk that the
client may divert the funds without paying the fee, the lawyer is not required to remit the portion from which the
fee is to be paid. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention.
The disputed portion of the funds should be kept in trust and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt
resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.
[3] Third parties, such as a client's creditors, may have just claims against funds or other property in a lawyer's
custody. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful
interference by the client, and accordingly may refuse to surrender the property to the client. However, a lawyer
should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party.
[4] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than rendering
legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating
to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction.
[5] A "clients' security fund" provides a means through the collective efforts of the bar to reimburse persons who
have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been
established, a lawyer should participate.
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SCR 3.180 INVESTIGATIONS AND TRIALS TO BE PROMPT;
SUBPOENA POWER
(1) All investigations and the trial of all disciplinary cases shall be begun, prosecuted, and completed as promptly
as the ends of justice will permit. Neither the unwillingness of the complainant to prosecute, nor an ofter of
settlement, compromise or restitution shall delay the investigation, trial or report to the Board.
(2) Proceedings may be deferred by the Inquiry Commission if there is pending civil or criminal litigation directly
involving the Respondent or proposed Respondent involving substantially similar material allegations to that or
those in the disciplinary proceedings, provided, however, that the Respondent-attorney proceeds with reasonable
dispatch to insure the prompt disposition of the pending litigation. Proceedings deferred pursuant to this
subsection shall be reviewed quarterly by the Inquiry Commission.
(3) Upon application of Bar Counsel to the Inquiry Commission and after a hearing of which Respondent is given
at least five (5) days' notice, for good cause shown the Inquiry Commission may authorize the Director to issue a
subpoena to a Respondent, or any other person or legal entity, to produce to Bar Counsel any evidence deemed
by the Inquiry Commission to be material to the investigation of a complaint. The person or entity so subpoenaed
will not divulge, except to his/her own attorney, that such a subpoena has been served nor what evidence is
sought or obtained. The Respondent may be present at the time the evidence or material is examined or obtained
by Bar Counsel and will be furnished copies of all documents obtained.
[Amended by Order 98-1, eft. 10-1-98; prior amendments eft. 4-1-82 (Order 82-1),1-1-78,7-2-71]
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KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
SCR 3.330 ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS AND BURDEN
OF PROOF
The Trial Commissioner shall determine and regulate the order of proceedings at the hearing. Upon the
application of a party or upon direction of the Trial Commissioner, the Disciplinary Clerk shall issue sUbpoenas for
the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence. The burden of proof shall rest upon the Association in
a disciplinary proceeding, and the facts must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In reinstatement
hearings the burden shall rest upon the Applicant, and he/she must demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence his/her sUitability for reinstatement. Before submission the Trial Commissioner may direct such oral
argument as he/she deems appropriate and receive briefs from all parties on such terms as he/she may impose.
[Amended by Order 98-1, eft. 10-1-98; prior amendments eft. 4-1-82 (Order 82-1),1-1-78,72-71]
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SEC Proposes Rules to Implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Provisions Concerning Standards of Professional
Conduct for Attorneys
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2002-158
Washington, D.C., November 6, 2002 - The Se.curities and Exchange
Commission voted today to propose rules implementing provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act that pre.scribe "minimum standards of professional
conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission in
any way in the representation of issuers." The standards must include a
rule requiring an attorney to report "evidence of a material violation of
securities laws or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the
company or any agent thereof' to the chief legal counsel (CLO) or the CLO
and the chief executive officer of the company (or the equivalent); and, if
they do not respond appropriately to the eVidence, requiring the attorney to
report the evidence to the audit committee, another committee of
independent directors, or the full board of directors.
The Commission voted to propose a new Part 205 to 17 CFR, Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing before the
Commission, that includes: (1) "up the ladder" reporting, and (2) other
related provisions the Commission believes are important components of an
effective reporting regime.
The proposed rule recognizes that attorneys interact with the Commission
on behalf of issuer clients in a number of ways, and reflects that Section
307 was intended to protect investors by imposing the "up the ladder"
reporting requirement on all attorneys who appear or practice before the
Commission on behalf of an issuer. Accordingly, the proposed rule would
adopt an expansive view of who is an attorney subject to the rule, covering
all attorneys who are admitted, licensed or otherwise qualified to practice
law whether employprj in-house by an issuer or retained to perform legal
work on behalf of an issuer. In addition, the proposed rule would cover
attorneys licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice, in foreign jurisdictions
who appear ilnd practice before the Commission, although it would seek
comment on how to ensure that the requirements of the rule do not conflict
or inappropriately interfere with the activities of non-U.S. lawyers. The
proposed rule would incorporate several additional provisions that the
Commission believes are important components of an effective "up the
ladder" reporting system. These provisions embody standards of conduct
that legal commentators and th~ American Bar Association have been
considering for years, and are similar in important respects to ethical rules
that have already been enacted in a number of jurisdictions.
Subsection 205.3 would represent the core of the proposed rule. Subsection
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20S.3(a) would affirmatively state that an attorney representing an issuer
represents the issuer as an entity rather than the officers or others with
whom the attorney interacts in the course of that representation, and that
the attorney is obligated to act in the best interests of the issuer and its
shareholders.
Subsection 20S.3(b) would prescribe the duty of an attorney who appears
or practices before the Commission in the representation of an issuer to
report evidence of a "material violation." The proposed rule would not
require an attorney to "know" that a violation has been committed. The
rule's reporting obligation would be triggered when an attorney "reasonably
believes" that a material violation has occurred, is occurring or is about to
occur, limiting the instances in which the reporting duty prescribed by the
rule will arise to those where it is appropriate to protect investors. The
attorney would be initially directed to make this report to the issuer's CLO,
or to the issuer's CLO and chief executive officer. The attorney also would
be obligated to take reasonable steps under the circumstances to document
the report and the response thereto, and to retain such documentation for
a reasonable time. Requiring the attorney to take such reasonable steps
would protect the attorney in the event his or her compliance with the
proposed rule is put in issue at some future proceeding.
When presented with a report of a possible material violation, the rule
would obligate the issuer's CLO to determine whether to conduct an inquiry
into the reported material violation to ascertain whether in fact a violation
has occurred, is occurring or about to occur. A CLO who reasonably
concludes that there has been no material violation would have to prOVide
notice to the reporting attorney of this conclusion, and take reasonable
steps to preserve relevant documentary evidence. A CLO who concludes
that a material violation has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur
would be reqUired to take reasonable steps to ensure that the issuer adopts
appropriate remedial measures and/or sanctions - including appropriate
disclosures. Furthermore, the CLO would be reqUired to report "up the
ladder" within the issuer what remedial measures have been adopted, and
to advise the reporting attorney of his or her conclusions.
A reporting attorney who receives an appropriate response within a
reasonable time and has documented his or her report and response would
have satisfied all obligations under the rule. The Commission believes that
most situations involVing reporting to the CLO or CLO and CEO by an
attorney will be resolved in this manner. In the event a reporting attorney
does not receive an appropriate response within a reasonable time, he or
she would be reqUired to report the evidence of a material violation to the
issuer's audit committee, another committee of independent directors, or to
the full board. Similarly, if the attorney reasonably believes that it would be
futile to report evidence of a material violation to the CLO and CEO, the
attorney may report directly to the issuer's audit committee, another
committee of independent directors, or to the full board. A reporting
attorney who has reported a matter all the way "up the ladder" within the
issuer and who reasonably believes that the issuer has not responded
appropriately would be reqUired to take reasonable steps under the
circumstances to document the response and to retain any such
documentation for a reasonable time.
Subsection 205.3(d) would deal with the obligation of an attorney who has
G - 42
SEC Proposes Rules to Implement Sarbanes-Oxley Act Provisions Concerning Standards ... Page 3 of 4
not received an appropriate response from the issuer and, in certain
instances, requires or permits a "noisy withdrawal." While this provision is
not specifically mandated by Section 307, a provision that obligates a
reporting attorney under certain circumstances to disaffirm a submission to
the Commission which the attorney believes has been tainted by a material
violation (and permits the attorney to disaffirm under other circumstances)
is important to the effective operation of the reporting obligation in those
instances where an issuer does not respond appropriately. The provision
would distinguish between outside attorneys retained by the issuer and
attorneys employed by the issuer because attorneys employed by an issuer
face greater potential obstacles to compliance, and because the personal
cost of compliance to an attorney employed by the issuer is greater. The
provision would impose an affirmative obligation on attorneys to disaffirm a
document or filing where they believe a violation is ongoing or prospective
because of the greater potential of harm to investors inherent in such
violations. The rule would prOVide that where an attorney files a notification
with the Commission as part of a "noisy withdrawal," no violation of the
attorney/client priVilege occurs (20S.3(d)(1)(iii), (d)(2)(iii). As an
alternative process for considering reports of material violations, an issuer
may (but is not reqUired to) establish a qualified legal compliance
committee (QLCC) comprised of at least one member of the issuer's audit
committee, and two or more members of the issuer's board, all of whom
must be independent, for the purpose of investigating reports made by
attorneys of evidence of a material violation. The QLCC would be authorized
to require the issuer to take remedial action. If the issuer were to fail to act
as directed by the QLCC, each QLCC member would have the responsibility
to notify the Commission. Attorneys who report evidence of a material
violation to a QLCC would not be subject to the rule's "noisy withdrawal"
requirement.
Subsection 20S.3(e) would set forth the specific circumstances under which
an attorney is authorized to disclose confidential information related to his
or her appearance and practice before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer. Pursuant to this provision, an attorney would
be allowed to use the contemporaneous records he or she creates to defend
against charges of attorney misconduct, a right which is similar to the "self-
defense" exception contained in the Model Rules and state ethical rules.
This provision would provide an incentive for attorneys to take adequate
steps to create the contemporaneous records prescribed under the rule.
Subsection 20S.3(e)(2) also would allow an attorney to reveal confidential
information to the Commission to the extent necessary to prevent the
commission of an illegal act which the attorney reasonably believes will
result either in perpetration of fraud upon the Commission or in substantial
injury to the financial or property interests of the issuer or another.
Similarly, the attorney would be allowed to disclose confidential information
to rectify an issuer's illegal actions when such actions have been advanced
by the issuer's use of the attorney's services.
Finally, Subsection 20S.3(e)(3) would provide that an issuer does not waive
any applicable priVileges by sharing confidential information regarding
misconduct by the issuer's employees or officers with the Commission
pursuant to a confidentiality agreement. The Commission believes that
allowing cooperative issuers and attorneys to produce internal reports
under a confidentiality agreement without waiving privilege will significantly
assist the expeditious conduct of Commission investigations.
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Responsibilities of Supervisory and Subordinate Attorneys
Subsections 205.4 and 205.5 would detail the respective responsibilities of
supervisory and subordinate attorneys, both those employed in-house by
the issuer and those serving as outside counsel retained by the issuer.
Sanctions for Violations of the Rule
Subsection 205.6 would describe the manner in which violations of the rule
would be prosecuted by the Commission. Pursuant to Section 3(b) of the
Act, a violation of any rule issued by the Commission under the Act
constitutes a violation of the Exchange Act. Accordingly, violation of the
proposed rule would subject the violator to all the remedies and sanctions
available under the Exchange Act, including injunctions, cease and desist
orders, and officer and director bars for attorneys who are officers and
directors.
The full text of the detailed release concerning this proposal will be posted
to the SEC Web site as soon as possible. Comments will be collected for 30
days folloWing publication of the proposal in the Federal Register.
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-158.htm
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professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer. These standards
supplement applicable standards of any jurisdiction
where an attorney is admitted or practices and are not
intended to limit the ability of any jurisdiction to
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inconsistent with the application of this part. Where
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conflict with this part, this part shall govern.
«PART 205--STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS APPEARING AND
PRACTICING BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN
THE REPRESENTATION OF AN ISSUER»
<Text ofpart effective Aug. 5, 2003.>
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations,
or Tables>
17C.F.R.§ 205.1
17 CFR § 205.1
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
G - 45
Page 1
17 CFR § 205.2
17 C.F.R. § 205.2
c
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 17--COMMODITY AND SECURITIES
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COMMISSION
PART 20S--STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT FOR ATTORNEYS APPEARING
AND
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Current through March 19, 2003; 68 FR 13614
§ 205.2 Definitions.
For purposes of this part, the following definitions
apply:
(a) Appearing and practicing before the
Connnission:
(1) Means:
(i) Transacting any business with the Connnission,
including communications in any form;
(ii) Representing an issuer in a Connnission
administrative proceeding or in connection with any
Connnission investigation, inquiry, information
request, or subpoena;
(iii) Providing advice in respect of the United States
securities laws or the Connnission's rules or
regulations thereunder regarding any document that
the attorney has notice will be filed with or submitted
to, or incorporated into any document that will be
filed with or submitted to, the Connnission, including
the provision of such advice in the context of
preparing, or participating in the preparation of, any
such document; or
(iv) Advising an issuer as to whether information or
a statement, opinion, or other writing is required
under the United States securities laws or the
Connnission's rules or regulations thereunder to be
filed with or submitted to, or incorporated into any
document that will be filed with or submitted to, the
Connnission; but
(2) Does not include an attorney who:
(i) Conducts the activities in paragraphs (a)(1)(i)
through (a)(l)(iv) of this section other than in the
context of providing legal services to an issuer with
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whom the attorney has an attorney-client
relationship; or
(ii) Is a non-appearing foreign attorney.
(b) Appropriate response means a response to an
attorney regarding reported evidence of a material
violation as a result of which the attorney reasonably
believes:
(1) That no material violation, as defined in
paragraph (i) of this section, has occurred, is ongoing,
or is about to occur;
(2) That the issuer has, as necessary, adopted
appropriate remedial measures, including appropriate
steps or sanctions to stop any material violations that
are ongoing, to prevent any material violation that
has yet to occur, and to remedy or otherwise
appropriately address any material violation that has
already occurred and to minimize the likelihood of its
recurrence; or
(3) That the issuer, with the consent of the issuer's
board of directors, a connnittee thereof to whom a
report could be made pursuant to § 205.3(b)(3), or a
qualified legal compliance connnittee, has retained or
directed an attorney to review the reported evidence
of a material violation and either:
(i) Has substantially implemented any remedial
recommendations made by such attorney after a
reasonable investigation and evaluation of the
reported evidence; or
(ii) Has been advised that such attorney may,
consistent with his or her professional obligations,
assert a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer (or
the issuer's officer, director, employee, or agent, as
the case may be) in any investigation or judicial or
administrative proceeding relating to the reported
evidence of a material violation.
(c) Attorney means any person who is admitted,
licensed, or otherwise qualified to practice law in any
jurisdiction, domestic or foreign, or who holds
himself or herself out as admitted, licensed, or
otherwise qualified to practice law.
(d) Breach of fiduciary duty refers to any breach of
fiduciary or similar duty to the issuer recognized
under an applicable Federal or State statute or at
common law, including but not limited to
misfeasance, nonfeasance, abdication of duty, abuse
of trust, and approval of unlawful transactions.
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AND
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Current through March 19, 2003; 68 FR 13614
§ 205.3 Issuer as client.
(a) Representing an issuer. An attorney appearing
and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer owes his or her
professional and ethical duties to the issuer as an
organization. That the attorney may work with and
advise the issuer's officers, directors, or employees in
the course of representing the issuer does not make
such individuals the attorney's clients.
(b) Duty to report evidence of a material violation.
(1) If an attorney, appearing and practicing before
the Commission in the representation of an issuer,
becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by
the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney shall report such
evidence to the issuer's chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof) or to both the issuer's chief legal
officer and its chief executive officer (or the
equivalents thereof) forthwith. By communicating
such information to the issuer's officers or directors,
an attorney does not reveal client confidences or
secrets or privileged or otherwise protected
information related to the attorney's representation of
an issuer.
(2) The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof)
shall cause such inquiry into the evidence of a
material violation as he or she reasonably believes is
appropriate to determine whether the material
violation described in the report has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur. If the chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof) determines no
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur, he or she shall notify the reporting
attorney and advise the reporting attorney of the basis
for such determination. Unless the chief legal officer
(or the equivalent thereof) reasonably believes that no
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
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about to occur, he or she shall take all reasonable
steps to cause the issuer to adopt an appropriate
response, and shall advise the reporting attorney
thereof. In lieu of causing an inquiry under this
paragraph (b), a chief legal officer (or the equivalent
thereof) may refer a report of evidence of a material
violation to a qualified legal compliance committee
under paragraph (c)(2) of this section if the issuer
has duly established a qualified legal compliance
committee prior to the report of evidence of a
material violation.
(3) Unless an attorney who has made a report under
paragraph (b)(l) of this section reasonably believes
that the chief legal officer or the chief executive
officer of the issuer (or the equivalent thereof) has
provided an appropriate response within a reasonable
time, the attorney shall report the evidence of a
material violation to:
(i) The audit committee of the issuer's board of
directors;
(ii) Another committee of the issuer's board of
directors consisting solely of directors who are not
employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer and are
not, in the case of a registered investment company,
"interested persons" as defined in section 2(a)(19) of
the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.c.
80a-2( a)(l9)) (if the issuer's board of directors has no
audit committee); or
(iii) The issuer's board of directors (if the issuer's
board of directors has no committee consisting solely
of directors who are not employed, directly or
indirectly, by the issuer and are not, in the case of a
registered investment company, "interested persons"
as defined in section 2(a)(19) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(l9))).
(4) If an attorney reasonably believes that it would
be futile to report evidence of a material violation to
the issuer's chief legal officer and chief executive
officer (or the equivalents thereof) under paragraph
(b)(1) of this section, the attorney may report such
evidence as provided under paragraph (b)(3) of this
section.
(5) An attorney retained or directed by an issuer to
investigate evidence of a material violation reported
under paragraph (b)(l), (b)(3), or (b)(4) of this
section shall be deemed to be appearing and
practicing before the Commission. Directing or
retaining an attorney to investigate reported evidence
of a material violation does not relieve an officer or
director of the issuer to whom such evidence has
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been reported under paragraph (b)(1), (b)(3), or (b)(4)
of this section from a duty to respond to the reporting
attorney.
(6) An attorney shall not have any obligation to
report evidence of a material violation under this
paragraph (b) if:
(i) The attorney was retained or directed by the
issuer's chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof)
to investigate such evidence of a material violation
and:
(A) The attorney reports the results of such
investigation to the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof); and
(B) Except where the attorney and the chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof) each reasonably
believes that no material violation has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur, the chief legal officer
(or the equivalent thereof) reports the results of the
investigation to the issuer's board of directors, a
committee thereof to whom a report could be made
pursuant to paragraph (b)(3) of this section, or a
qualified legal compliance committee; or
(ii) The attorney was retained or directed by the
chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof) to
assert, consistent with his or her professional
obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the
issuer (or the issuer's officer, director, employee, or
agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or
judicial or administrative proceeding relating to such
evidence of a material violation, and the chief legal
officer (or the equivalent thereof) provides
reasonable and timely reports on the progress and
outcome of such proceeding to the issuer's board of
directors, a committee thereof to whom a report could
be made pursuant to paragraph (b)(3) ofthis section,
or a qualified legal compliance committee.
(7) An attorney shall not have any obligation to
report evidence of a material violation under this
paragraph (b) if such attorney was retained or
directed by a qualified legal compliance committee:
(i) To investigate such evidence of a material
violation; or
(ii) To assert, consistent with his or her professional
obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the
issuer (or the issuer's officer, director, employee, or
agent, as the case may be) in any investigation or
judicial or administrative proceeding relating to such
evidence of a material violation.
Page 2
(8) An attorney who receives what he or she
reasonably believes is an appropriate and timely
response to a report he or she has made pursuant to
paragraph (b)(I), (b)(3), or (b)(4) of this section need
do nothing more under this section with respect to his
or her report.
(9) An attorney who does not reasonably believe that
the issuer has made an appropriate response within a
reasonable time to the report or reports made
pursuant to paragraph (b)(l), (b)(3), or (b)(4) of this
section shall explain his or her reasons therefor to the
chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof), the
chief executive officer (or the equivalent thereof),
and directors to whom the attorney reported the
evidence of a material violation pursuant to
paragraph (b)(I), (b)(3), or (b)(4) of this section.
(10) An attorney formerly employed or retained by
an issuer who has reported evidence of a material
violation under this part and reasonably believes that
he or she has been discharged for so doing may
notify the issuer's board of directors or any
committee thereof that he or she believes that he or
she has been discharged for reporting evidence of a
material violation under this section.
(c) Alternative reporting procedures for attorneys
retained or employed by an issuer that has established
a qualified legal compliance committee.
(1) If an attorney, appearing and practicing before
the Commission in the representation of an issuer,
becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by
the issuer or by any officer, director, employee, or
agent of the issuer, the attorney may, as an alternative
to the reporting requirements of paragraph (b) of this
section, report such evidence to a qualified legal
compliance committee, if the issuer has previously
formed such a committee. An attorney who reports
evidence of a material violation to such a qualified
legal compliance committee has satisfied his or her
obligation to report such evidence and is not required
to assess the issuer's response to the reported
evidence of a material violation.
(2) A chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof)
may refer a report of evidence of a material violation
to a previously established qualified legal compliance
committee in lieu of causing an inquiry to be
conducted under paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
The chief legal officer (or the equivalent thereof)
shall inform the reporting attorney that the report has
been referred to a qualified legal compliance
committee. Thereafter, pursuant to the requirements
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under § 205.2(k), the qualified legal compliance
committee shall be responsible for responding to the
evidence of a material violation reported to it under
this paragraph (c).
(d) Issuer confidences.
(1 ) Any report under this section (or the
contemporaneous record thereof) or any response
thereto (or the contemporaneous record thereof) may
be used by an attorney in connection with any
investigation, proceeding, or litigation in which the
attorney's compliance with this part is in issue.
(2) An attorney appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer may
reveal to the Commission, without the issuer's
consent, confidential information related to the
representation to the extent the attorney reasonably
believes necessary:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material
violation that is likely to cause substantial injury to
the financial interest or property of the issuer or
investors;
(ii) To prevent the issuer, in a Commission
investigation or administrative proceeding from
committing perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.C. 1621;
suborning perjury, proscribed in 18 U.S.c. 1622; or
committing any act proscribed in 18 U.S.c. 1001 that
is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the Commission;
or
(iii) To rectify the consequences of a material
violation by the issuer that caused, or may cause,
substantial injury to the financial interest or property
of the issuer or investors in the furtherance of which
the attorney's services were used.
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§ 205.4 Responsibilities of snpervisory attorneys.
(a) An attorney supervIsmg or directing another
attorney who is appearing and practicing before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer is a
supervisory attorney. An issuer's chief legal officer
(or the equivalent thereof) is a supervisory attorney
under this section.
(b) A supervisory attorney shall make reasonable
efforts to ensure that a subordinate attorney, as
defined in § 205.5(a), that he or she supervises or
directs conforms to this part. To the extent a
subordinate attorney appears and practices before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer, that
subordinate attorney's supervisory attorneys also
appear and practice before the Commission.
(c) A supervisory attorney is responsible for
complying with the reporting requirements in §
205.3 when a subordinate attorney has reported to the
supervisory attorney evidence of a material violation.
(d) A supervisory attorney who has received a report
of evidence of a material violation from a subordinate
attorney under § 205.3 may report such evidence to
the issuer's qualified legal compliance committee if
the issuer has duly formed such a committee.
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§ 205.5 Responsibilities of a subordinate attorney.
(a) An attorney who appears and practices before the
Commission in the representation of an issuer on a
matter under the supervision or direction of another
attorney (other than under the direct supervision or
direction of the issuer's chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereof)) is a subordinate attorney.
(b) A subordinate attorney shall comply with this
part notwithstanding that the subordinate attorney
acted at the direction of or under the supervision of
another person.
(c) A subordinate attorney complies with § 205.3 if
the subordinate attorney reports to his or her
supervising attorney under § 205.3(b) evidence of a
material violation of which the subordinate attorney
has become aware in appearing and practicing before
the Commission.
(d) A subordinate attorney may take the steps
permitted or required by § 205.3(b) or (c) if the
subordinate attorney reasonably believes that a
supervisory attorney to whom he or she has reported
evidence ofa material violation under § 205.3(b) has
failed to comply with § 205.3.
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§ 205.6 Sanctions and discipline.
(a) A violation of this part by any attorney appearing
and practicing before the Commission in the
representation of an issuer shall subject such attorney
to the civil penalties and remedies for a violation of
the federal securities laws available to the
Commission in an action brought by the Commission
thereunder.
(b) An attorney appearing and practicing before the
Commission who violates any provision of this part
is subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Commission, regardless of whether the attorney may
also be subject to discipline for the same conduct in a
jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or
practices. An administrative disciplinary proceeding
initiated by the Commission for violation of this part
may result in an attorney being censured, or being
temporarily or permanently denied the privilege of
appearing or practicing before the Commission.
(c) An attorney who complies in good faith with the
provisions of this part shall not be subject to
discipline or otherwise liable under inconsistent
standards imposed by any state or other United States
jurisdiction where the attorney is admitted or
practices.
(d) An attorney practicing outside the United States
shall not be required to comply with the requirements
of this part to the extent that such compliance is
prohibited by applicable foreign law.
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(e) Evidence of a material violation means credible
evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is
reasonably likely that a material violation has
occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur.
(t) Foreign government issuer means a foreign issuer
as defmed in 17 CFR 230.405 eligible to register
securities on Schedule B of the Securities Act of
1933 (15 U.S.c. 77a et seq., Schedule B).
(g) In the representation of an issuer means
providing legal services as an attorney for an issuer,
regardless of whether the attorney is employed or
retained by the issuer.
(h) Issuer means an issuer (as defined in section 3 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.
78c)), the securities of which are registered under
section 12 of that Act (15 U.S.c. 781), or that is
required to file reports under section 15(d) of that Act
(15 U.S.c. 78o(d», or that files or has filed a
registration statement that has not yet become
effective under the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.c.
77a et seq.), and that it has not withdrawn, but does
not include a foreign government issuer. For
purposes of paragraphs (a) and (g) of this section, the
term "issuer" includes any person controlled by an
issuer, where an attorney provides legal services to
such person on behalf of, or at the behest, or for the
benefit of the issuer, regardless of whether the
attorney is employed or retained by the issuer.
(i) Material violation means a material violation of
an applicable United States federal or state securities
law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under
United States federal or state law, or a similar
material violation of any United States federal or
state law.
(j) Non-appearing foreign attorney means an
attorney:
(1) Who is admitted to practice law in a jurisdiction
outside the United States;
(2) Who does not hold himself or herself out as
practicing, and does not give legal advice regarding,
United States federal or state securities or other laws
(except as provided in paragraph (j)(3)(ii) of this
section); and
(3) Who:
(i) Conducts activities that would constitute
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appearing and practicing before the Commission only
incidentally to, and in the ordinary course of, the
practice of law in a jurisdiction outside the United
States; or
(ii) Is appearing and practicing before the
Commission only in consultation with counsel, other
than a non-appearing foreign attorney, admitted or
licensed to practice in a state or other United States
jurisdiction.
(k) Qualified legal compliance committee means a
committee of an issuer (which also may be an audit
or other committee of the issuer) that:
(1) Consists of at least one member of the issuer's
audit committee (or, if the issuer has no audit
committee, one member from an equivalent
committee of independent directors) and two or more
members of the issuer's board of directors who are
not employed, directly or indirectly, by the issuer and
who are not, in the case of a registered investment
company, "interested persons" as defined in section
2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15
U.S.c. 80a-2(a)(l9));
(2) Has adopted written procedures for the
confidential receipt, retention, and consideration of
any report of evidence of a material violation under §
205.3;
(3) Has been duly established by the isslter's board of
directors, with the authority and responsibility:
(i) To inform the issuer's chieflegal officer and chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereot) of any
report of evidence of a material violation (except in
the circumstances described in § 205 .3(b)(4));
(ii) To determine whether an investigation is
necessary regarding any report of evidence of a
material violation by the issuer, its officers, directors,
employees or agents and, if it determines an
investigation is necessary or appropriate, to:
(A) Notify the audit committee or the full board of
directors;
(B) Initiate an investigation, which may be
conducted either by the chief legal officer (or the
equivalent thereot) or by outside attorneys; and
(C) Retain such additional expert personnel as the
committee deems necessary; and
(iii) At the conclusion of any such investigation, to:
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
G - 53
17 CFR § 205.2
17 C.F.R. § 205.2
(A) Recommend, by majority vote, that the issuer
implement an appropriate response to evidence of a
material violation; and
(B) Inform the chief legal officer and the chief
executive officer (or the equivalents thereof) and the
board of directors of the results of any such
investigation under this section and the appropriate
remedial measures to be adopted; and
(4) Has the authority and responsibility, acting by
majority vote, to take all other appropriate action,
including the authority to notify the Commission in
the event that the issuer fails in any material respect
to implement an appropriate response that the
qualified legal compliance committee has
recommended the issuer to take.
(1) Reasonable or reasonably denotes, with respect to
the actions of an attorney, conduct that would not be
unreasonable for a prudent and competent attorney.
(m) Reasonably believes means that an attorney
believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is not
unreasonable.
(n) Report means to make known to directly, either
in person, by telephone, bye-mail, electronically, or
in writing.
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December 18,2002
Via E-mail- rule-comments(c{)sec.gov
Securities and Exchange Commission
450 Fifth Street, N. W.
Washington, D.C. 20549
Attention: Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
Re: File No. S7-45-02
Release Nos. 33-8150; 34-46868; IC-25829 _
Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys
Ladies and Gentlemen:
On behalf of the American Bar Association (the "ABA" or the Association"),
I am pleased to submit this letter in response to the request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Commission") for comments on its proposals to implement
Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the "Act") as set forth in Release Nos.
33-8150,34-46868; IC-25829 dated November 21,2002 (the "Release"). The
Commission has proposed to add Part 205 to its rules and regulations which would
require attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission to report evidence of
certain material violations up -the-ladder within an orga nization and, under certain
circumstances, require or permit them to effect a noisy withdrawal and report out. The
Commission has also proposed to apply to lawyers the negligence standards for improper
professional conduct now applicable to accountants under Section 4C of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 added by Section 602 of the Act and Rule 102(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice. As provided in Section 3 of the Act and proposed by
the Commission in Rule 205.6, a violation of Part 205 will be treated in the same manner
as a violation of the Securities Exchange Act subject to the same penalties and remedies.
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The .-\BA. with over 400.000 members throughout the U.S. and abroad. supports strong
ethical standards for all lmvyers, including those who practice in the corporate and securities
area. Indeed, for almost one hundred years, the ABA has provided leadership in the field of legal
ethics by crafting professional standards that have been adopted by the vast majority of the state
and federal courts that oversee the legal profession. The original Canons of Professional Ethics
were adopted by the Association in 1908. The current ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (the "Model Rules"), first adopted in 1983, are a comprehensive and uniform set of
ethical standards for lawyers. In addition, the ABA adopted model mles for enforcement of
lawyer ethical standards by state and federal courts in the 1970s.
In March of this year, my predecessor as President of the ABA, Robert E. Hirshon,
created the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility to examine the systemic issues relating
to corporate responsibility arising out of the corporate failures we have witnessed which have
shaken confidence in the effectiveness of governance and disclosure systems for public
companies in the United States. This Task Force issued its Preliminary Report on July 16, 2002
addressing potential changes in corporate governance mechanisms and lawyer ethical mles
designed to improve corporate responsibility and enhance public trust in corporate integrity. It
has held extensive hearings throughout the country on the issues raised by the Preliminary
Report and is now in the process of evaluating the comments and formulating a final report and
recommendations for submission to the ABA House of Delegates.
In August of this year, Chairman Pitt invited the ABA to participate in a "thoughtful and
constructive dialogue" with the Commission as it seeks to craft the rules required by Section 307
of the Act. Accordingly, in November, the ABA Board of GO\'ernois authorized me to appoint a
task force for the purpose of providing comments to the Commission on this important subject.
The ABA Task Force on Implementation of Section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (the
"Task Force') is comprised of a distinguished group of attorneys and judges with expertise in the
fields of legal ethics, corporate law and securities law; the members, liaisons, and staff of the
Task Force are listed in Attachment 1 to this comment letter. The views expressed in this
comment letter were prepared by the ABA Task Force and then approved for release by the
Executive Committee of the ABA Board of Governors as the position of the Association.
1. Introduction
The ABA joins the Commission in seeking to restore a culture of integrity and confidence
in our financial markets that will warrant the tmst of the American public. We recognize the
important role lawyers play in this mission. We commend the Commission and its Staff for their
efforts in responding to the requirements of Section 307 of the .-\ct and addressing the complex
issues involved in the short time period allowed by Congress. In particular, we commend the
Commission for exercising restraint in not adopting a comprehensive code of professional
standards but rather focusing on the obligations of attorneys to the organization as the client.
While vve believe that some of the Commission's proposals \vill adversely affect issuers' ability
to obtain sound legal advice and suggest revisions accordingly. \ve are appreciative that the
Commission and its Staff hav'e structured the proposals in a way that facilitates identification of
the issues and formulation of comments.
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Our comments address principally:
• Implementation of the up-the-Iadder reporting requirement mandated by Section
307.
• Noisy-withdrawal and reporting out provisions proposed in the Release that were
not manaated by Section 307.
• Revision of the standard for determining improper professional conduct of
attorneys that also was not mandated by Section 307.
For ease of reference, please note that the topics discussed in this letter appear in the
following order: .
Table of Contents
I. Introduction 2
II. Sumlnary 4
III. Limit Rulemaking to Matters Specifically Required by Section 307 6
IV. Basic Concepts 7
V. Up-the-Ladder Reporting 11
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B. Scope of Rule's Application 12
1. "Appearing and Practicing Before the SEC" 12
2. "In the representation of an issuer" 14
3. Definition of issuer 15
C. Triggering Standard 16
1. Use of reasonably believes standard 16
2. Nature of violation 18
D. Process for Reporting 20
1. Prescriptive Process 20
2. Reporting to the Board Level... 21
3. Documentation 22
E. Determining Appropriate Response 22
F. Supervising - Subordinate Attorneys 22
G. Discharged Attorney 24
VI. Noisy Withdrawal and Disaffirmation 24
A. Deferral of Action 24
B. Consideration of the Merits 25
C. Alternatives 27
D. Specific Suggestions 29
E. Problems of Investigative or Defense Counsel 30
VII. Attorney - Client Privi lege and Confidentiality 31
VIII. Sanctions and Liability 33
IX. Special Issues Relating to Counsel for Investment Advisers 34
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II. Summary
The ABA strongly believes that lav,:yers have an important role in assisting clients to
comply with the law and meet high standards of ethical and responsible conduct. We therefore
agree that whe n a lawyer representing an issuer becomes aware of material violations of law that
are likely to substantially injure the organization, the lawyer has a clear duty to take appropriate
remedial action including, in some cases, a duty to bring the matter to the attention of the highest
authority in the organization if the violation has not been remedied. These principles, outlined in
Model Rule 1.13 and embraced by virtually all state and federal courts, are necessary and
appropriate and serve the public interest.
By enacting Section 307 of the Act, Congress has instructed the Commission to adopt a
national rule establishing minimum professional standards for lawyers appearing and practicing
before the Commission, including a rule requiring lawyers to report misconduct up-the-Iadder
within the corporate client. This national up-the-Iadder reporting requirement, which would
override the reporting standard contained in Model Rule 1.13 for lawyers covered by the SEC's
rules, rests on the understanding that the highest authority, typically the board, is capable of
performing and in fact will perform its responsibilities. In this way, corporate governance will
work effectively together with the reporting obligations of attorneys.
The rules that currently govern the professional conduct of lawyers are fashioned from
the ABA's Model Rules and promulgated by state high courts. as the regulators of lawyer
conduct. These rules seek to ensure that clients, including organizations, have access to
independent and effective representation by counsel. An integral part of independent and
effective representation is that lawyers must preserve client confidentiality subject to limited
exceptions when necessary to prevent significant harm.
Our response to the Commission's Section 307 proposals is made with these
considerations in mind, and we stand ready to work with the Commission to fashion final rules
that serve the public interest. We agree that, with changes suggested in this letter, the
up- the-ladder reporting rule required by Section 307 can be effectively implemented by the
January 26, 2003 deadline. We strongly urge, however, that the Commission defer final action
and at the least allow more extended comment for provisions in the proposed rules that are not
specifically required by Section 307.
The following are the major issue~ we address in this letter:
• L'p-/he-Ladder Reporting Reqllirenlents Need Better Defini/ion. The rules relating to up-
the-ladder reporting are ambiguous and need better definition as to the circumstances
under which reporting is required in order for lawyers and issuers to comply effectively
with the rules. Specifically, the scope of persons proposed to be covered as "attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an issuer" is too
broad and would subject to the requirements of the rules persons who do not know that
they are subject to the rules and who are not in a position to comply with them. These
could include non-securities specialists only remotely involved with a securities matter,
persons licensed as attorneys who are not acting in that capacity, and attorneys for third
G .. 60
Securities and Exchange Commission
Attention: Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
December 18. 2002
Page 5
parties who do not even have an attorney - client relationship \vith the issuer. We
suggest instead a functional approach that would subject to the requirements of the rules
only those la\'''~'ers with significant responsibility for the issuer's compliance with U.S.
securities law or with overall responsibility for advising on legal compliance and
corporate governance matters under U.S. law.
It would be preferable if the Commission's concept of "awareness 0 f evidence of material
violation" as the triggering standard for reporting were based on a "kno\vledge" standard,
as currently provided in Model Rule 1.13. If the Commission should proceed with the
proposed objective standard for determining from the information the attorney knows that
a material violation has occurred, is occurring, or is about to occur. this standard would
be more acceptable if it were applied to just the category of attorne ys we propose rather
than to all attorneys that would be covered under the rules as proposed.
The nature of the violations that must be reported should be better defined. They should
be limited to violations related to the attorney's representation in appearing and
practicing before the Commission. Also, the term "material" should be defined as the
Supreme Court has defined the term, with a clear tie to harm to the issuer. In addition,
"violation of securities law" and "breach of fiduciary duty" should be defined in terms
more closely related to the subject matter of SEC regulation and expertise. and "similar
violation" should be defined so that it does not undermine the defining of the other terms.
• The Rules Should Allow For More Flexibility. The rules should be less prescriptive in
requiring specific procedures to be followed and should allow issuers and law firms the
flexibility to establish legal compliance procedures and policies that work for them. The
requisite flexibility includes such matters as identification of a chief legal compliance
officer, timing requirements, internal reporting chains, documentation requirements, and
establishing which independent committees or the board as a whole is to receive and
consider the required reports.
• Defer Action on the Proposed Rules Not Required by Section 307. Because the
Commission's noisy withdrawal and disaffirmation proposals raise complex issues that
would significantly change the traditional attorney-client relationship, and because of
concerns with the substance of these proposals that we identify (including uncertainty as
to the effectiveness of the Commission's attempt to maintain protection of the attorney-
client privilege and conflicts with state client confidentiality obligations), we believe tlnt
the Commission, acting in the public interest, should for the present not adopt these
proposals as part of an up- the-ladder reporting rule or not adopt them at all.
The Commission should instead look to the substantially improved corporate governance
systems that have been developed to address legal compliance matters coupled with
recognition of the requirements of existing state rules of professional conduct, and should
give the Association's efforts underway to review the related Model Rules an OPP011unity
to proceed.
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Similarly. because the Commission's proposal to extend to attorneys the negligence
standard applicable to accountants for determining improper professional conduct is not
required by Section 307, the Commission should, at the least, defer action on this
proposal until there is an opportunity for more considered comment and Commission
deliberation or should not adopt it at all. As the Commission has previously recognized,
imposition of sl!ch a standard can significantly impact an attorney's ability to represent
the client's interests zealously and independently before the Commission.
III. Limit Rulemaking to Matters Specifically Required by Section 307
Before addressing the substance of the Section 307 proposals, we express our concern
over the scope of the rulemaking the Commission has proposed to undertake in the limited time
frame allowed by Congress. The ABA is concerned that adequate time has not been allowed to .
comment upon the proposed rules relating to noisy withdrawal and disaffirmation of documents
and to extending to attorneys a negligence standard for determining improper professional
conduct that are not specifically mandated 9Y Section 307 of the Act. These proposals raise
fundamental and complex policy issues. A more extended comment period would permit a more
careful analysis and response by many constituencies who are or should be vitally interested in
the effect of the nonmandated proposals, including public company officials and other lawyer
organizations. I It would also permit more careful consideration and deliberation by the
Commission. Additionally, a deferral will provide an opportunity for the ABA's review of the
Model Rules now underway to be completed. There are, moreover, many difficult issues in the
proposed Section 307 rules. Our comments relating to the proposals noted below will illustrate
why some of the provisions that are not required to be adopted by January 26. 2003 warrant
broader comment and further analysis if not omitted entirely.
Our concerns regarding the non-mandated proposals relate to serious problems that we
believe would be created not only for attorneys, but also for issuers and their shareholders,
including the following:
• The proposals would have the effect of interfering with the relationship of trust and
confidence between clients and attorneys and thereby undermine the ability of
lawyers to advise clients to comply with legal requirements.
• The uncertain effectiveness of the purported nonwaiver of attorney - client privilege,
which is a critical element of requiring or permitting nOIsy withdrawal or disclosure,
would put both attorneys and clients at risk.
I For example. very few state bar associations are capable of responding comprehensively on the lengthy proposed
rules contained in the Release within so short a time. Even within the AB.-\.. only a few of the sections and other
groups have been able to provide comments to the Task Force. In addition. U.S. and foreign companies. which will
be directly affected by the proposals. need time to become aware of their potential impact and to prepare comments.
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• The inclusion of investigating and defending attomeys vvithin the rcpurting
requirements would interfere with the ability of clients to have effectiw
representation.
• Mandated noisy withdrawal from representation and disaffirmation of documents
filed with th.e Commission would reduce rather than enhance legal compliance and
increase the likelihood of unnecessary disruptions in securities markets.
• The creation of unnecessary, duplicative and. in some instances. contradictory
standards of attorney conduct would impede effective representation of issuers.
• The burdens imposed on supervisory attorneys would create overly broad and
inappropriate requirements.
• The imposition of a negligence standard on attorneys as a basis for denying the right
to practice before the Commission and applying additional sanctions would interfere
with the ability of counsel to effectively represent clients.
For these and the other reasons discussed below, the ABA urges the Commission to defer
action on those proposals that go beyond the reporting up -the-ladder requirements of Section
307.
IV. Basic Concepts
Before addressing the proposed rules in detail, we believe it is useful to identify some
basic concepts that guide our comments and should help assist the Commission' s consideration
of them.
• The ABA concurs in the Commission's overall objectives and concerns. The American
Bar Association concurs with the Commission in recognizing the important role lawyers
play in promoting legal compliance and the obligations that lawyers have to the
organization as the client. The Model Rules incorporate these important policies. Those
rules also recognize the importance of the fundamental policy that require attorneys to
preserve client confidences in order to ensure access to counsel and effective
representation. We therefore share the concerns expressed by the Commission at page 8
of the Release that zealous advocacy not be impaired and that companies not be
discouraged from seeking and obtaining effective and creative legal advice.. It is through
this access to counsel that lmvyers are able on an ongoing basis to counsel their clients to
comply with law and to serve as ethical advisers to their clients.
• Professional independence and preservation ofthe attorney-client privilege and client
confidentiality are important values to be protected. A core principle of our democratic
values is the right of everyone. including organizations, to representation by independent
counsel of their choice to advise and protect against adversarial actions, especially those
of govemmental agencies. To ensure that independence. lawyers need to be able to act in
the best interests of the client \vitl1out self interest or concern over the lawyer's personal
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exposure to civil liability. Also. to have access to efTectiw legal representation and
obtain the best legal advice, clients need to feel free to confide all relevant information to
counsel \vitmut undue concern that counsel will be required to disclose those confidences
to others. particularly governmental agencies. Accordingly, the strong principles of
attorney-client privilege and a lawyer's obligation to preserve client confidentiality,
subject only to limited exceptions. have developed as a bedrock policy of our legal
system. An important collateral benefit of this confidentiality policy is that it enhances
the ability of lawyers to counsel legal compliance.
• Lawyers are regulated by state andfederal courts. Recognizing the important role they
play in our legal system, lawyers operate under a set of rules of professional conduct
established by the highest courts of the states, territories. commonwealths and the District
of Columbia. 2 Thus, although the ABA has developed the Model Rules for use by the
states. the actual professional rules governing lawyers are adopted and administered by or
Ii. under the direction of the highest court in each state and in the federal courts. This
structure for regulation of lawyer professional conduct is imbedded in our federal system
that recognizes the lawyer's primary role as an officer of the judicial branch of
government. It also distinguishes regulation of lawyers from systems of self regulation of
other professions, such as accountants. Far from being self regulated, lawyers are subject
to a detailed system of regulation established by the judicial branch of government, both
state and federal.
• Existing state court rules ofprofessional conduct, patterned on the Model Rules, protect
the public interest. The rules particularly relevant to the Commission's implementation
of Section 307, relating to lawyers' conduct involving organizational clients, include:
• Model Rule 1.13: Organization as Client, is the primary rule concerning the duties
of a lawyer when representing an organization and the lawyer's relationship to the
organization's officers, directors, employees, shareholders and other constituents.
Model Rule 1.13 provides that a lawyer employed or retained by an organization
represents the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents. The Rule
also provides that if a lawyer learns that an officer, employee, or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in. or intends to engage in, a violation of
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be
imputed to the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interests
of the organization. Among the enumerated measures a lawyer may employ is
reporting the matter to the highest authority in the organization that can, under
applicable law, act for the organization. But such reporting is not marrlatory. Rather,
the rule leaves it to the judgment of the lawyer to proceed as reasonably necessary
under the circumstances. Section 96 of the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers (ALI 2000) (the "Restatement") provides standards substantially similar to
Model Rule 1.13.
2 For convenience. \\C refer throughout this letter just to the states.
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• ~lodel Rule 1.2(d) involving the Scope of Representation prohibit~ a lawyer from
assisting a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.
The Rule, however, permits a lawyer to discuss the legal conseqLl~nces of proposed
conduct with a client, and to assist a client to make a good faith etfort to determine
the validity or application of the law. Section 94(2) of the Restatement is generally to
the same effect.
• Model Rule 1.16(a)(1): Declining or Terminating Representation requires a
lawyer to decline or withdraw from representation of a client if the representation will
result in violation of the mles of professional conduct (including Rule 1.2(d) and Rule
4.1), or other law.
• Model Rule 4.1: Transactions With Persons Other Than Client. prohibits a lawyer
from knowingly failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to
avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited
by Rule 1.6.
• Model Rule 1.6: Confidentiality oflnformation, in paragraph (a), prohibits a
lawyer from revealing information relating to the representation of a client except in
specified circumstances. Rule 1.6, however, under paragraph (b)(4). permits a lawyer
to reveal client confidences "to comply with other law or a court order."
Furthermore, versions of Model Rule 1.6 that have been adopted in most states permit
a lawyer to disclose client confidences to prevent, mitigate, or rectify the
consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct that is likely to result in
substantial financial loss. This standard is substantially similar to Section 67 of the
Restatement. The ABA's Task Force on Corporate Responsibility is presently
reviewing Model Rule 1.6 in this regard.
• Consistent state andfederal rules governing lawyer conduct would be beneficial. As an
optimal goal, the Commission should seek to make its mles under Section 307 as
consistent as possible with the prevailing state court rules of professional conduct. lliing
so will help avoid conflicts between SEC requirements and state mandates and will
facilitate compliance by lawyers. Consistent rules will also enhance the ability of state
authorities to enforce compliance.
• The organi::ation, and not its various const ituencies, is the client. Section 307 and the
SEC's proposals to implement it focus on the obligations of lawyers to the organization
as the client. The Commission. in the Release, as distinguished from some earlier
statements, correctly characterizes the organization, and not its shareholders or other
constituencies, as the client. This distinction is important in identifying to whom a
lawyer owes duties - namely the organization and not particular shareholders. whose
interests may differ. The interests of shareholders are, of course, relevant in assessing the
consequences of matters affecting the organization - for example, whether a violation is
material - but not for defining a duty.
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• ...J.uomer responsibilities should be considered in conjunction with enlwnced corporate
governance. As the Commission correctly recognizes in its Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee (QLCC) alternative, the duties of a lawyer to the organization as a client need
to be considered in conjunction with corporate governance measures in place to
effectively address matters reported by the lawyer within the organization. Substantial
improvements h.ave been made to corporate governance over the past year in the wake of
the corporate scandals that have rocked investor confidence, ani these improvements are
ongoing. They are provided for in provisions of the Act. SEC initiatives and stock
exchange listing standards. The public interest will be best served by a system under
which lawyers report matters within the organization to the appropriate body where
action can be effectively taken because enhanced corporate governance standards are in
place. Establishing effective legal compliance systems should be the responsibility of
corporate boards, with lawyer reporting as an important component of those systems.
.• Legal compliance systems need to be flexible. It is also important that the Section 307
rules allow flexibility in the legal compliance systems and procedures to be followed so
that companies can establish those processes that wo rk for them. This flexibility will
promote compliance. Companies should be permitted to identify who within the
organization performs legal compliance functions, the various steps within the
organization to be followed in reporting matters and any partic ular procedural and
documentation requirements. Similarly, flexibility should be allowed for law firms to
establish procedures and to designate responsible attorneys.
• Application ofthe rules to law firms needs to be clarified. The distinction between
requirements applicable to individual attorneys and those applicable to their law firm or
organization should be carefully considered in formulating professional conduct
standards. As a general matter, the Model Rules address individual actions and do not
impute knowledge or responsibility among members of the firm or organization. This
issue becomes particularly acute in the context of withdrawal requirements.
• Increased sanctions require carefitlly tailored rules. The sanctions imposed on attorneys
under Rule 205.6 for violation of the Section 307 rules are quite severe and go well
beyond the past remedy of censure or denial of the right to practice before the
Commission. Consequently, it is especially important that the Section 307 rules be
carefully tailored and limited in their reach to permit ready compliance.
• The corporate and securities areas present issues requiring difficult judgments. There
needs to be recognition that when a material violation is black and white it is easy to
understand an attorrey's professional obligations, but 'vvhen the matter is in the gray area
the issues are more difficult and complex. Most often. the judgments regarding
compliance formulated by lawyers in the corporate and securities area are in the gray
area. The Commission's Section 307 rules need to be tested against that situation.
• J/uny/actors mandate that the Commission exercise restraint in the regulation of
{(myers. as it lraditional!y has in the pasl. Finally. the Commission should exercise
restraint in regulating attomey professional conduct and should limit its rules at this time
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to those the Act requires be adopted by January 26. In addition to the .~hurt time frame
discllssed in Part III above, the reasons for restraint are those considerations that have
prompted the Commission's historic restraint in this area. These considerations include
(1) recognition of principles of federalism, comity and separation of powers under which
lawyers are primarily regulated by the highest courts in jurisdictions in \vhich they are
admitted to practice, (2) preservation of the attorney - client relationship that permits
clients to obtain-quality legal advice and places lawyers in the position to advise on
compliance with law in the interests of the investing public, and (3) avoidance of the
chilling effect on zealous representation that can arise from lawyers being subject to
threat of enforcement by the very regulatory agency before which they must advocate on
behalf of their clients.
It is against the background of these basic concepts that the proposed rules should be
evaluated.
V. Up-the-Ladder Reporting
A. General
Section 307 of the Act requires the Commission to issue rules setting forth minimum
standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and practicing before the Commission,
including a rule requiring the attorney to report evidence of a material violation of securities law
or breach of fiduciary duty or similar violation by the company or any agent thereof to the chief
legal counsel ("CLO") or the chief executive officer ("CEO") of the company. Section 307 also
requires the rule to provide that if the CLO or CEO does not respond by adopting appropriate
remedial measures or sanctions for the violation, the attorney must report the evidence to the
board of directors, to the board's audit committee, or to another board committee comprised
solely of independent directors.
Both the origin of Section 307 and its subsequent legislative history indicate that the
central purpose of the provision was to instruct the Commission to adopt a rule requiring lawyers
to report misconduct "up- the-ladder" within the corporate client. The impetus for this rule
change began with a letter from forty law professors to SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt dated March
7, 2002. In that letter, the professors criticized the discretionary standard contained in Model
Rule 1.13 described above in Part IV and urged the Commission to use its powers under Rule
102(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice to require lawyers appearing or practicing before the
Commission to report violations of the securities laws that senior management refuses to rectify
to the company's board of directors. When the Commission's then General Counsel, David
Becker. responded by letter dated March 28, 2002, that the proposal might more appropriately be
considered through congressional action, Sen. John Edwards (D-NC) decided to introduce
legislation on the issue.
On July 10. 2002. Sen. Edwards. with the support of Sens. Michael Enzi (R- WY) and Jon
Corzine (D-NJ). offered an amendment to the corporate responsibility legislation then pending in
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the Senate. S. 2673. and the Edwards Amendment ultimately became Section 307 of the Act. 3 In
explaining his amendment. Sen. Edwards stated that although the proposal directed the
Commission to establish minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the Commission, the one rule the Commission is required to adopt is the up-
the-ladder reporting requirement specified in Section 307.
B. Scope of Rule's Application
1. "Appearing and Practicing Before the SEC"
The Commission states at page 7 of the Release that "the proposed rule would adopt an
expansive view of who is appearing and practicing before the Commission." While such an
expansive view may be appropriate when addressing whose conduct may be sanctioned by the
Commission generally under its Rules of Practice, we believe it is not the appropriate approach
for imposing SEC-mandated affirmative obligations subject to severe sanctions in the event of
noncompliance. It is fundamental fairness to impose regulatory obligations only on those in a
position to know that they are subject to the obligations and who are in a position to comply. As
now proposed, the definition could subject to the rules attorneys who do not practice securities
law and may have only limited or tangential involvement with particular SEC filings and
documents. For example, it could inappropriately encompass non-securities specialists who do
no more than prepare or review limited portions of a filing, lawyers who respond to auditors
letters or prepare work product in the ordinary course unrelated to securities matters that may be
used for that purpose, and lawyers preparing documents that eventually may be filed as exhibits.
(See the examples below.) We also believe it is inappropriate for the Commission to include
lawyers who simply advise on the availability of exemptions from registration. Consider the
non-securities specialist advising smaller non-public companies or municipal bond lawyers
advising on the availability of the exemption under Section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.
The breadth of coverage of the proposals will have the counterproductive impact of discouraging
broad participation in assuring quality disclosure and provi.ding expert transactional planning.
Additionally, the overbreadth of coverage makes more acute other problems of the proposal
described below, including establishing the proper triggering standard.
We therefore recommend that the Commission provide that the Section 307 rules apply
only to those la\vyers with significant responsibility for the company's compliance with U.S.
securities law, including satisfaction of registration, filing and disclosure obligations, or with
overall responsibility for advising on legal compliance and corporate governance matters under
U.S. law. This functional approach would subject to the rules those lawyers in the best position
to understand their obligations under the rules and to comply with them. Other lawyers who
might be encompassed \vithin the expansive proposed definition \vould not be free ofregulation
because they would still be subject to the professional obligations under Model Rule 1.13, as
well as the other state court rules of professional conduct.
-' SL't: Senate tloor debate regarding .\mendlllent :\0.4187 to S. 267.3. Congressional Record. July 10.2002, pgs.
S655 1-6559 (hereafter referred to by page number).
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If the Commission were nevertheless to retain its expansive definitil'l1. it :;hould give
clearer guidance as to who is covered by the rules. The following are examples of areas of
potential uncertainty:
• Lawyer A, who has a limited non-securities specialty, prepares a draft of a section for
inclusion in a prospectus (e.g., description of a patent, regulatory req uirements or
litigation). .
• Lavvyer A instead reviews a draft of the section prepared by a securities lawyer.
• Lawyer B, a litigator, prepares a summary of pending litigation for general use,
knowing it may be used as a diligence checklist for future securities offerings.
• Lawyer B responds to a routine auditor's request for information on pending litigation
in connection with the auditor giving its COl'Bent for a registration statement.
• La\\iyer C, a real estate specialist, drafts a complex lease that will be filed as an
exhibit to the company's Form lO-K.
The potential overbreadth of these examples, even under the expansive approach to
"appearing and practicing before the Commission," is obvious and should be circumscribed in
the final rules.
In addition, if the Commission decides to follow an expansive approach to coverage
under the rules, it becomes even more important to recognize the functional aspect of the
supervisory - subordinate attorney relationship. Under this approach, a non-securities specialist
should be able to satisfy her obligations by reporting a matter to the responsible securities
attorney and, similarly, a foreign attorney could report to a U.S. attorney responsible for
securities law compliance.
We also note the importance of allowing organizations and law firms to define
procedures and identify responsible persons as discussed in Section 0 of this Part V below.
We address the spec ial problems that application of the Section 307 rules create for
foreign lawyers separately in Part X below. We also discuss the special problems of
litigation/enforcement counsel in Sectiop r:: of Part VI below.
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2. "In the representation ofall issuer"
Acting as an "alforney", The up-the-Iadder reporting required by Section 307 of the Act
is predicated on the professional obligation of attorneys to the organization as the client. 4 That
requirement is designed to ensure that lawyers fulfill their professional obligations to the
organization as a client by reporting evidence of material wrongdoing up-the-Iadder, ultimately,
if necessary, to the proper body within the organization authorized to act. It is grounded in a
la\vyer's professional obligations to the client and is not intended to be a general whistleblower
pro\'lSlOn.
Accordingly, the Section 307 rules should not apply to someone who happens to be a
la'W)'er but is not acting in the capacity, Instead, they should apply only to attorneys who are
rendering legal advice to the organizational client (or those holding themselves out as doing so)
,and therefore have the professional obligations of an attorney. It is not uncommon for persons
;who were attorneys and may still retain their license to move into other non-legal capacities in
the organization. For example, an attorney may become a business development officer or even
i'chief executive officer. Similarly, persons in non-legal positions, such as a human resources
officer, may be admitted to the bar but continue in their non-legal position. Attorneys may also
serve as directors of a company where neither they nor their law firm renders legal services.
These persons should be subject to no greater obligations to the organization than someone who
is not an attorney.
The concept of acting in the capacity as an attorney is sufficiently understood that it need
not be defined separately. It arises from the rendering of legal advice, which creates the duties
and obligations, such as the duty of confidentiality, owed by an attorney to the client as a result
of the attorney-client relationship. We believe the rules are appropriately applied to any attorney
for the issuer acting in that capacity whether or hot that attorney is formally a member of a
company's law department.
Existence ofan attorney-client relationship. In addition, the requirements of the rules
should only apply to a lawyer with an attorney - client relationship with the issuer. The
Commission should revise the concept of "acting on beha If, at the behest, or for the benefit of an
issuer" to make that clear. That concept, unfortunately, can be read broadly to encompass
attorneys who have no attorney - client relationship with the issuer. For example, the
obligations under the rule should not apply to an attorney in the following situations:
• Lawyer V acts as counsel for the underwriters (whether a firm commitment or best
efforts underwriting) or for the placement agent in a securities offering for the
company (whether or not that la\v)'er is designated by the company to serve in that
capacity).
~ .'i<.:e the disclIssion of the amendment proposed by Senator Edwards that became Section 307 of the Act, which in
tllrn was based on the :-'·(arch 7. 2002 letter ti'om forty professors to the Commission, at note 3 supra,
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• Lawyer W. who has no other relationship "vith the company. is clC5i~l1ated by the
company to represent certain officers in connection with an internal investigation
(even if the la'NYer is paid by the company).
• La'NYer X represents the target in an acquisition and in that capacity reviews portions
of the prospectus of the acquiring company relating to the securities tu be issued in
the acquisition.
• Lawyer Y represents the lenders in a going private transaction and is asked to review
the description of the loan arrangements in the tender offer documents.
• La'NYer Z represents the counterparty to a material contra~t that is used as the
collateral and source of payment for a securities offering by the company and renders
a third party closing opinion as to thevalidity of the counterpart;:' sob1igations that is
referred to in the offering documents.
In each of these situations, the lawyer does not have an attorney - client relationship with
the issuer and should not be subject to the obligations to that issuer under the rules. It would be
contrary to the objectives of the Commission to ensure full and accurate disclosure if these
la'NYers were discouraged from reviewing disclosure documents for fear that they would become
enmeshed in the Commission's professional conduct rules with obligations to a company that
was not a client.
Attorney for subsidiaries. We are concerned that the Commission does not adequately
address the position of an attorney for a subsidiary of an issuer. There is not a problem if the
subsidiary is wholly-owned but the attorney can have conflicting interests in the case of a
partially-owned subsidiary. The examples given by the Commission of an attorney for a non-
public subsidiary at page 18 of the Release are fine as far as they go. However. if the non-public
subsidiary is not wholly-owned, the attorney could be in the position of violating a duty to that
subsidiary. Therefore, the Commission should provide an exception from reporting to tie issuer
if the attorney for the subsidiary reasonably believes she would be violating a duty to the
subsidiary. The Commission should also make clear whether or not the obligation to report to
the issuer applies only to attorneys for consolidated subsidiaries or majority-owned subsidiaries.
Finally. the Commission should address whether the obligation to report to the issuer applies to
public subsidiaries.
We discuss separately below in Part IX the special issues relating to attorneys for
investment advisers of investment companies.
3. Definition afissuer
In response to the questions at page 20 of the Release. the ABA believes that Section 307
requires that the Commission use the definition of "issuer" set forth in Section 2(a)(7) of the Act
as it proposes to do in Rule 205.2(g). We do not believe. however, that the Commission should
go beyond "issuers" under the Act to include attorneys for non-public regulated entities, and
certainly not during this limited time frame for consideration. Congress rocused on the
G - 71
Securities :1I1d Exchange Commission
Attention: Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary
Dec('mber 18. 2002
Page 16
obligations of attorneys for public companies as part of the etfot1s to restore investor confidence.
These same considerations do not apply to non-public companies, even if they are regulated
entities. rvloreoveL entities regulated by the Commission can present especially difficult
problems when imposing obligations on attorneys regarding compliance, and the corporate
governance structures that support compliance activities by attorneys may not be present in the
non-public company. ~dditionally, action by the Commission regarding entities it regulates
could result in uneven treatment between entities regulated by the Commission and those
regulated by other agencies.
C. Triggering Standard
1. Use ofreasonably believes standard
The ABA agrees with the Commission's general approach to dealing with ""evidence of
material violation" as comprised of three elements: (i) the attorney's knowledge of information,
(ii) the standard for evaluating the attorney's determination regarding a material violation and
(iii) the standard to be applied to the existence of a material violation. We discuss each of these
elements in turn, and suggest changes we believe necessary.
a. Meaning of "aware." Rule 205.3(b) uses the phrase "aware of
evidence." "Aware" is not defined but we assume that the Commission equates "aware" to
·'knows." We believe it would be preferable to use the term "knows." Its meaning is defined in
Rule l.O(£) of the Model Rules as "actual knowledge of the fact in question," and includes the
concept that "a person's knowledge may.be inferred from circumstances" (or put another way -
an attorney may not ignore the obvious).) We recornmend that this important aspect of the term
"knows" be emphasized by the Commission in the adopting release so that attorneys fully
appreciate the scope of their responsibility.
We believe that it would be helpful if the Commission indicated in the adopting release
that the information of which the attorney is aware must be of a quality sufficient to cause the
requisite conclusion to be reached (e.g., it must be more than a suggestion, shred of evidence or
uncorroborated accusation).
b. Use ofobjective standard ofbelief We believe that the more
difficult issue is the Commission's use of an objective stamard to evaluate an attorney's
determination regarding the existence of a material violation. Model Rule 1.13, which addresses
up- the-ladder reporting, uses a knowledge standard regarding wrongful action. The ABA
believes there are advantages to having SEC rules and state rules of professional conduct as
consistent as possible. and these advantages would weigh in favor of utilizing the Model Rules'
kno\vledge standard in the Section 307 rules. The ABA recognizes, however, that Model Rule
1.13 is currently being reevaluated with regard to the proper standard to be used, and is the
subject of revievi by the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, which may result in
recommendations to the ABA House of Delegates. Accordingly. we address the SEC proposal
separately.
5 Set! note 6 lIIt;D.
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Although the ABA prefers the use of the knowledge standard,6 we belic\\.' that the
suitability of the objective standard proposed by the Commission would depend upon whose
conduct will be governed by the rules. If our suggestion that the requirements of the rules be
imposed only on lawyers with significant responsibility for securities law compliance or overall
responsibility for advising on legal compliance and corporate governance matters. then the
objective standard migh! be a more acceptable measure than it would be if it \\ere applied to all
lawyers that would be covered under the rules as proposed. It may be reasonable to hold lawyers
with such responsibilities to the standards of comparable securities law or corporate specialists.
On the other hand, if the Commission uses the expansive approach it proposed. \\e believe an
objective standard would be difficult to apply, would present problems for compliance, and
would subject the non-securities specialist to inordinate second guessing and exposure. If the
expansive approach is followed, we would urge that the knowledge standard be used.
If an objective standard is used, however, we believe that it needs to be defined with
greater clarity. Section 205.2(1) defines the term "reasonably believes" as meaning that an
attorney, acting reasonably, would believe the matter in question. The term "reasonably," as
defined in Model Rule 1.0(h) and Rule 205.2(k), denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and
competent attorney. The Release states at page 17 that the definition of "reasonably believes" is
based on the term's Model Rule 1.0(i) definition "modified to eliminate any implied subjective
element." But in fact "reasonably believes" under the proposed Section 307 rules establishes a
distinctly different standard than do the same words in the Model Rules. Model Rule I.O(i)
defines the term as denoting that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. Moreover, Rule I.O(a) defines "believes" as
denoting that the person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. However, the
Release states at page 17 that the personal belief of the attorney does not matter.
Importantly, under the proposed Section 307 rules, "reasonably believes" is used as a
standard when a lawyer is obligated, rather than merely permitted, to act in a certain way. But in
the Model Rules, "reasonably believes" is used only in circumstances where a lawyer is
permitted to take action. We believe that a term familiarly associated with permissive lawyer
conduct should not in the Section 307 rules be employed where a lawyer's conduct is mandatory
because it will lead to confusion. Furthermore, its use, as defined by the Commission, is
ul1\\iorkable as a standard for mandated action. For example, if there is a range of reasonable
actions, is the lawyer held to the standard of an attorney who would reasonably believe when
there are others who would not reasonably believe? If the Commission decides to apply an
6 This standard customarily is used in the ivIodel Rules and other lawyer regulatory codes when obligating a lawyer
to act. \Iodel Rule I.OU) defines "knowingly", "known", or "knows" as denoting "actual knowledge of the fact in
question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances". Thus, a lawyer cannot evade knowledge by
closing eyes to the obvious. See Comment [8] under ~Iodel Rule 4.2. See also ABA Formal Ethics Opinion 346R
(1982) (in preparing tax shelter tax opinions: lawyers cannot shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen; a lawyer
should not accept as true that which he should not reasonably believe: recklessly and consciously disregarding
information strongly indicating that the t~lctS expressed are false and misleading involves dishonesty); United States
\ emil. 39 F.3d 1299. 1310 (5[h Cir. 1994) (lawyer cannot close eyes to the obvious). This standard is akin to the
reckkssncss standard used elsewhere by the Commission (see Rule 101 under Regulations FD).
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objectiw standard. it would be better expressed as "the attorney knows information based upon
\',ohich it is unreasonable not to believe that a material violation has occurred, is occurring or will
occur'" Under this standard, a lawyer would not violate the rules unless the lawyer's conduct
were outside the range of reasonableness.
In addition. under an objective standard, whether formulated as proposed by the
Commission or as suggested by us, the lawyer's conduct should be judged, not only by the
standard of what a reasonably prudent and competent attorney" would do, as specified in Rule
205.2(k), but by the standard of what a lawyer with similar training and experience as the lawyer
in question would do. Also, that conduct should be judged at the time and under the
circumstances of the conduct in question. 7 This more precise standard is especially important
because the. rules form the basis for sanctions against attorneys, which could include disbarment
and substantial fines. As the Commission correctly recognized at page 27 of the Release,
referring to ,an attorney's "training, experience, position and seniority," "what the reasonable,
experienced. securities lawyer might regard as a clear violation of the law may appear different-
or not appear at all- to an unseasoned attorney with a different level of expertise."
c. Standardfor material violation. The ABA believes that the
Commission uses the correct standard for determining a material violation by referring to
"evidence that would lead an attorney to ... believe that a material violation has occurred, is
occurring, or is about to occur" [emphasis added]. Any lesser standard would prompt a
proliferation of reports that would both interfere with efficient corporate operations and attorney
- client relationships and would obscure the significant matters that deserve special attention.
2. Nature of violation
a. Relation ofviolation to engagement. The Commission should
make clear that the violation required to be reported is one related to the attorney's
representation of the Company involving appearing and practicing before the Commission.
Otherwise, attorneys will be put in an untenable position of having to report violations unrelated
to their engagement and practice before the Commission and the rule's reach will be further
expanded.
It would be unfair to subject lawyers to sanctions for failure to report material violations
based on an objective standard that would be applied with 20/20 hindsight when those violations
were not related to the lawyer's engagement. Matters unrelated to the lawyer's engagement are
unlikely to be given the same level of attention or to be viewed with the same degree of
kno\',oledge and expertness. Consider the position of an attorney \',ohose only engagement for the
company is handling a nOIHecourse project financing who learns through casual conversation
with a junior officer of the company of an environmental problem unrelated and not material to
the project financing but that might otherwise be material. Although that attorney might choose
These concepts can be retlected by revising the definition ofooreasonable" or "reasonably" to read "denotes the
conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent attorney of simi Jar trai ning and experience, judged as of the time and
unckr the circulllstances ortlle conduct in question,"
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to take action. it would not be appropriate to require reporting in this situation because the
attomey's involvement in the matter is too remote. On the other hand. if the undisclosed
environmental problem was material to the project financing the attorney was handling, the
reporting obligation would apply. The Commission could address this issue by referencing
"material violation related to the representation" in appropriate places, such as. in Rule
~05.3(b)( 1).
b. Definition of "material." The ABA believes that the term
"material" should be defined in a manner consistent with the U.S. Supreme COUl1's decision in
TSC Industries v. iVorthways, 426 U. S. 438 (1976), and applied to Rule 1Ob-.5 under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") in Basic v. Levenson. -1-85 U.S. 224
(1988). The proposed rules, in Section205.2(h), define "material" as referring OOto conduct or
inforn1ation about which a reasonable investor would want to be informed befoi'e making an
investment decision.,,8 The threshold set in this definition is well below the threshold set by the
Supreme Court. In TSC, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's standard for
materiality, which included "all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider important,"
warning of an overly-broad standard which would result in "liability for insigniticant omissions
or misstatements," and which would give rise to issuers trying to avoid exposure from 20/20
hindsight claims by "simply ... bury[ing] shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information."
Instead, the Court announced as the standard for materiality that a fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important and that there
must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would have been viewed by the reasonable
investor as having significantly altered the "total mix" of information made available.
The term "material" should also be clarified to make it clear that it relates to matters (i)
material to investors generally as opposed to particular investors and (ii) material to the business,
financial condition or results of operations of the issuer. The first clarification addresses a
violation that may be material to some investors but not to the company as a whole (e.g., a norr
exempt unregistered offering that creates a right of recission for the particular investors but is not
material to the company). The second clarification avoids concepts such as "ethical materiality"
and other norr financial considerations (such as a director failing to adequately perform his
fiduciary duty of attentiveness but without material consequences to the company).
c. Definition oj\·ivlations. The Commission has attempted to claritY
the types of violations that trigger an obligation under the rules by indicating. as statutory
construction rules would require, that "material" modifies each of the items. We believe,
however. that further clarification is necessary if the requirements of the rules are to work as
intended and to be properly administered by the Commission.
First the nature of the violations should be limited to matters over which the Commission
has regulatory authority and therefore the competence to assess compliance. Therefore.
~ We note the usc of this language by Senator Ed\\ards in his statement on the Senate floor on July 10,2002
(56552). However. we do not believe that this explanation should be determinative of the correct legal standard to
be applied. There is no indication that Congress intended "material" to have a different meaning under Section 307
than cHherwise applicable Linder the Exchange .-\ct.
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violations of securities la\v should be limited to federal securities law and should not include, as
proposed. state securities law. State securities laws are varied and subject to different degrees of
enforcement. and represent a legal specialty of their own. They therefore provide too difficult a
basis upon which to premise a lawyer's reporting obligation. Even more clearly. a lawyer's
obligations under the rules should not be based on violations of foreign securities law, of which
the U.S. lavvyer is likely to have little knowledge. Although the Commission did not include
foreign securities law under "violation of securities law," the vague concept "similar violation"
discussed below might be construed to cover violations of foreign securities laws. and therefore
specific exclusion of such laws may be necessary.
Next, breach of fiduciary duty should be defined in terms of breach of fiduciary duty
under state common law involving financial harm to the organization. that has not been
adequately"disclosed to investors. This definition would focus the breach on matters involving
harm to the organization for which there has not been adequate disclosure in accordance with
SEC requirements. It would avoid a range of breaches that do not result in harm to the
organization or that previously have been disclosed. An expanded definition of "materiality" as
we suggest would help address these issues but we believe a proper definition of breach of
fiduciary duty should also be included.
Also, "similar violation" is so vague as to create serious problems for compliance and
subjects attorneys to serious risk of being judged by hindsight. That term, if undefined, could
also result in undermining any effort by the Commission to define the terms "securities law
violation" and "breach of fiduciary duty." We suggest that the Commission adopt a narrow
detinition of "similar violation." One approach is to define it in terms of "a violation that the
attorney reasonably recognizes as substantially similar to the enumerated violations."
D. Process for Reporting
1. prescriptive Process
The ABA believes that it is a mistake for the Commission to be as prescriptive as it has
been in the proposal in mandating in a regimented way the process required to be followed. This
is an unnecessary intrusion into internal corporate affairs that does not provide the flexibility
needed to allow attorneys to take actions they consider appropriate in the circumstances and to
allow companies to establish procedures that work for them.
We believe that the objectives of Section 307 will be best served if companies are
permitted to define their own legal compliance procedures within parameters established
consistent with Section 307. This will then accommodate the different circumstances that can
arise and the differences within organizations. By allowing companies to establish their own
procedures. the legal compliance function will be enhanced and the requirements of the Section
307 rules will more easily be met.
Specifically. we believe that companies should be able to define their legal compliance
and reporting procedures so long as they require timely reporting of unremediated material
violations to a designated chief legal compliance officer or the chief executive otlicer and
ultimately. if necessary. to one or more designated independent committees of the board or to the
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full board. Companies should be free to designate a chief legal compliance officer. who might
be the general counselor chief legal officer, another in- house lawyer, a non-lawyer compliance
official or outside counsel. Not all companies have a general counsel and e\CI1 -;ume that do look
to others to perform the legal compliance function. Some companies, such as defense
contractors, financial services organizations and other regulated businesses, may have their
compliance functions or parts of them located outside the legal department. Accordingly,
flexibility is needed to lit particular circumstances. We also believe that reporting should be
permitted to either tre legal compliance officer or the CEO to reflect the flexibi lity specifically
provided for in Section 307.
Company legal compliance policies might cover timing requirements for reporting, to
whom reports should be made in the first instance (which might vary based on subject matter),
the appropriate chain of reporting, opportunities for consultation and further inquiry, and similar
topics. The critical point is that companies are more likely to have effective reporting procedures
if they have the flexibil ity to design those that work for the particular company rather than being
subject to a one-size- fits-all procedure mandated by the Commission. An attorney who follows a
qualifying compliance procedure should be protected in complying with the rules. We believe
law firms should similarly be permitted the flexibility to define their procedures. including
designating the lawyer or lawyers with responsibility and those acting in a supervisory capacity .
.
Regardless of the approach adopted with respect to procedures, the Commission should
make clear that an attorney may, depending on the immediacy of the violation, make further
inquiry if the attorney chooses to elicit more information to better inform the attorney's judgment
and to seek to have a matter redressed before a reporting obligation is triggered.
2. Reporting to the Board Level
Similarly, we do not think that the Commission should be prescriptive with respect to
reporting to the board level. We agree that the reporting of material violations that have not been
appropriately addressed should be to the board as a whole or to a committee of the board
consisting solely of independent directors. However, companies vary in their governance
approaches - in some cases the audit committee provides the legal compliance oversight, in
others a different or separate committee may perform that function, and sometimes the
committee to which a matter is referred depends on the subject (e.g., financial matters might be
referred to the audit committee, while violations of company's conflict of interest policies might
be referred to another committee); in still ~ther cases, matters might appropriately be referred to
the full board. With the enhanced corporate governance standards being put in place, such as
requirements for a majority of independent directors and independent committees. we believe the
flexibility we suggest is appropriate. Additionally, we are not concerned about bifurcation of
reporting that could obscure a pattern of violations because board activities are rarely handled in
isolation. Also, an attorney should always have the discretion to report to the full board if the
attorney considers that appropriate.
We also do not believe that reporting by the CLO to the board level of remediated
violations should be mandated. Rather, it should be left to the reasonable judgment of the CLO
ancl the company's o\vn internal reporting procedures. Mandated reporting would place an
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inordinate burden on the CLO by requiring a difficult judgment to be made in numerous cases of
remediated violations as to whether a reporting obligation was triggered.
3. Documentation
The Commission should not prescribe a requirement that attorneys maintain
documentation but rather should leave appropriate documentation to be decided by lawyers as a
matter of good practice. In those cases where the need for documentation is most evident, most
lav-;yers are likely to maintain it. The problem, however, with the Commission's mandating.
specific documentation and retention requirements is that, (i) it will create an impediment to
open discussion and consultation among colleagues for fear that such a discussion will generate a
documentation requirement and (ii) it will increase the vulnerability of clients in litigation
because the mandated documentation could provide a roadmap for ciaimants, particularly given
the uncertainty as to the effectiveness of the Commission's attempt to protect the privilege and
client :confidentiality.
, E. Determining Appropriate Response
The concept of "appropriate response" is critical to the determination whether a matter
needs to be brought to the board level. We believe it is important that the Commission recognize
that a reporting attorney may rely on the considered judgment of the CLO so long as that
judgment is in the range of reasonableness even though the reporting attorney would not
necessarily come out that way. Lawyers advise clients on matters that fall in the gray area,
particularly when dealing with disclosure issues and materiality judgments. We often advise
based on a risk analysis when the conclusion is not clear and leave the judgment to the client
when that judgment is in the permissible range. Sometimes we advise the client that they do not
have a choice because the matter is outside the reasonable judgment range. Lawyers need to be
free to continue to advise on that basis, including in assessing the appropriateness of a response,
and should not be placed in the position of substituting the lawyer's judgment for that of the
client when the client is in the permissible range of reasonable judgment.
F. Supervising - Subordinate Attorneys
Ability to report to supervisory attorney. We believe that the Commission correctly
approaches in Rule 205.5 the treatment of subordinate lawyers who report to a supervisory
la\vyer and in Rule 205.4 (c) the shifting of responsibility for compliance to the supervisory
attorney to which the matter was reported. We recommend that the Commission recognize that a
designated legal compliance officer. even if not a lawyer. can quali(v as playing a supervisory
role.
We also recommend that the Commission extend this approach beyond the structural or
hierarchical relationships that Seem to be contemplated by the rules to a functional relationship.
For example a specialist (to the extent subject to the rules)9 should be able to discharge his or her
'J These might include. for example. employee benefits. environmental. intellectual property. litigation. real estate.
regulatory and tax lawyers.
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responsibility by repolting to the lawyer with general responsibility. Similarly. a lawyer should
be able to rely on the advice of another lmvyer reasonably believed to mve greater expertise or
experience. For example, an in-house attorney should be able to consult with ,m oLltside expert
and rely on that advice; a foreign lawyer, if covered by the rules, should be able to consult with a
U.S. lawyer and so rely.
Obligations impDsed on supervisory attorneys. We believe that the Commission has
unnecessarily and inappropriately proposed in Rule 205.4 to impose entirely nevv and overly-
broad obligations on supervisory attorneys. These proposals are not a necessary part of t~
reporting up-the-ladder provisions required by Section 307 and go well beyond the obligations of
supervisory lawyers under Model Rule 5.1. 10 First, Rule 205.4 expands the definition of lawyers
subject to responsibility as a supervising attorney by including any attorney \vith supervisory
authority over another attorney. This could include all partners in a law firm and even senior
associates, and it appears to be unrelated to the particular matter. Model Rule ~.1 is limited to a
lawyer who has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer. Second, the obligation
imposed on supervisory attorneys, totally without regard to any particular matter, is to "make
reasonable efforts to ensure," not only that a subordinate attorney conforms with the Section 307
rules, but also that the subordinate attorney complies with the federal securities laws. Rule 205.4
then goes on to deem the supervisory attorney to be appearing and practicing before the
Commission to the extent the subordinate attorney appears and practices before the Commission,
without regard to whether the supervision relates to the matter involving appearing and
practicing before the Commission or whether the supervisory attorney is even aware the
subordinate attorney is so practicing. These are extraordinary burdens to place on attorneys and
go well beyond the obligations imposed by Rule 5.1. Under that rule, the supervisory lawyer
(more narrowly defined) is required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the subordinate
lawyer conforms to t~ Model Rules and is responsible for a violation of those rules if he orders
or knowingly ratifies the conduct or knows of the conduct and fails to take reasonable remedial
action.
The ABA urges the Commission to refrain from adopting rules that impose t~se
unprecedented burdens on supervisory lawyers. Instead, the Commission should rely on the
existing Model Rules, referencing them for emphasis in its release. At most, the Commission
should make compliance with Rule 5.1, as it relates to the Section 307 rules, part of its rules
rather than creating a whole new set of supervisory attorney obligations.
10 Model Rule 5.1 imposes an obligation on partners. managers and supervisory lawyers in law firms (including
company legal departments) to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all
lawyers in the firm comply with the rules of professional conduct. It also imposes an obligation on supervisory
lawyers to ensure that lawyers they directly supervise conform to the rules. The Rule also makes partners. managers
and supenising lawyers responsible for violations of the rules committed by other lawyers if they knew about the
\iolations at a time when something could have been done to prevent or mitigate the consequences and took no
action. :-'Iodel Rule 5.2(b) provides that a subordinate lawyer does not violate the rules if the lawyer acts in
accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.
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G. Discharged Attorney
The Commission recognizes the problem of an attorney \\"ho has been discharged for
reporting evidence of a material violation in Rule 205.3(d)(4) but does not adequately address
the responsibilities of that attorney. We believe that the Commission should make clear that, as a
general matter, once an attorney is discharged, her obligations under the rules cease since the
attorney-client relationship is ended. Because the organization, acting through its highest
authority, is the client, we believe that it would be appropriate, if an attorney believes that he or
she has been discharged to prevent the reporting of a material violation tmt has not been
remedied, for that attorney to be entitled, but not required, to report the circumstances of the
dismissal to the board or an appropriate committee of the board.
We would not make the reporting mandatory in recognition of the difficulties a
discharged attorney might face in trying to report. We also would not require reporting out of
the discharge because that would pose the same difficulties as the noisy withdrawal proposal
discussed in Part VI.
VI. Noisy Withdrawal and Disaffirmation
A. Deferral of Action
As discussed in Part III above, the Commission should limit its actions at this time to the
matters specifically required by Section 307. The Commission's noisy withdrawal and
disaffirmation proposals are not required by Section 307. Quite to the contrary, the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress did not intend there to be an external reporting
requirement. II The Commission should not make such a fundamental change in the role of
counsel and the attorney-client relationship that would result from its noisy withdrawal and
disaffirmation proposals in the limited time frame for adoption of the required rules. These are
II During Senate debate on the Edwards arne ndment on July 10, 2002, in addition to the statement of Sen. Enzi
referenced in note 57 to the Release (which the Commission attempts to distinguish), the following colloquy (which
the Release does not cite) took place between Sen. Edwards and the chiefsponsor of the Act, Sen. Paul Sarbanes (0-
MD):
MR. SARBANES. It is my understanding that this amendment, which places responsibility upon the lawyer for the
corporation to report up the ladder, only involves going up within the corporate structure. He doesn't go outside of
the corporate structure. So the lawyer would first go to the chief legal officer, or the chief executive officer, and if
he didn't get an appropriate response. he would go to the board of directors. Is that correct?
\IR. EDWARDS. :VIr. President. my response to the question is the only obligation that this amendment creates is
the obligation to report to the client, which begins with the chief legal officer, and. if that is unsuccessful, then to the
board of the corporation. There is no obligation to report anything outside the client-the corporation.
:'vIR. SARBANES. I think that is an important point. I simply asked the question in order to stress the fact that that
is the \\ay this amendment works. This has been a \cry carefully worked out amendment. ..
Sec' Congressional Record. July 10. 2002. page S6557.
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among the most controversial of ethical proposals because they involve difficult :md competing
public policy considerations. 12 At the least. they deserve the thoughtful analysis. extensive
comment and deliberative Commission consideration that the present schedule does not permit.
B. Consideration of the Merits
We address the merits of the noisy withdrawal/disaffirmance proposals both to illustrate
the difficulties of dealing with them at this time and to provide the Commission with the benefit
of our vie\vs should it nevertheless proceed to consider these proposals. We start \vith the
premise that an objective of the Section 307 rules is to assist attorneys to guide an issuer's
managers and board to make decisions in compliance with law that are in the best interests of the
issuer and its shareholders. We believe the standards in the Model Rules accomplish this
purpose.
It is clear under the Model Rules and under virtually all state court rules of lawyer
conduct that a lawyer must withdraw from representing a client if the lawyer's services will be
used to assist the client to commit a crime or fraud. Model Rule 1. 16(a)(1 ) or its state court rule
counterpart, adopted in virtually all jurisdictions, requires that a lawyer withdraw from the
representation of a client "if. .. the ref!esentation will result in ... violation ofthe rules of
professional conduct or other law." J
Comment [10] to Model Rule 1.2 also makes clear that by reason of Model Rule 1.2(d),14
A lawyer may not continue assisting a client in conduct that the la\"yer originally
supposed was legally proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudLtlent. The
lawyer must, therefore, withdraw from the representation of the client in the
matter. See Rule 1.16(a). In some cases, withdrawal alone might be insufficient.
It may be necessary for the lawyer to give notice of the fact of withdrawal and to
disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or the like. See Rule 4.1. 15
In addition to these provisions, many jurisdictions permit disclosure of client confidences
to the extent necessary to prevent, mitigate or rectify the consequences of a client crime or fraud
12 We note that deferral of action on the noisy withdrawal and disaffirmation proposals would avoid issues
regarding the authority of the Commission to impose such requirements.
13 Rule 1.16(a) also prohibits commencing th~ representation in such circumstances.
14 Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.
15 Emphasis added. :Ylodel Rule 4.1 (b) requires that"a lawyer shall not knowingly ... fail to disclose a material fact
when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6'" See a/so Comment [3J to Model Rule 4.1. Disclosure would not be prohibited by Model
Rule 1.6 "to the extent lawyer reasonably believes necessary: ... to comply with other law or court order... " Model
Rule 1.6(b)(4). See ABA Formal Opinion 92-366 (lawyer must withdraw from representation iflawyer knows
services are being used to perpetrate a fraud and may disaffirm documents being so used). See a/so Hazard &
Hodes. The Law of Lawyering (2000 ed.) § 9.31.9.23. and 9.26-9.27 (disclosure under the circumstances also might
be permitted under :'vlodel Rule 1.6(b)(3) to establish a defense by the lawyer to a charge or claim based on a
cl ient' 5 conduct).
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that is likely to result in substantial financial harm to another. The ABA Task Force on
Corporate Responsibility in its preliminary report has recommended that the Association again
consider the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's proposals to amend the Model Ruks to allow
similar disclosures. 16
We believe that the proposed Section 307 rules that mandate withdrawal from
representation, notice to the SEC and disaffirmance 17 risk destroying the trust and confidence
many issuers have up to now placed in their legal counsel, creating divided loyalties and driving
a wedge into the attorney-client relationship. Providing notice to the SEC that the attorney has
withdrawn "for professional considerations" and disaffirming specific documents will have a
similar effect as a violation of client confidences, and may itself be a violation of the attorney's
duties to the client under state court rules, because it will promptly trigger an enforcement
investigation and potentially civil lawsuits. As a consequence, some issuers might not even
consult qualified attorneys regarding close issues of whether or not to disclose information in a
filing or otherwise because the attorney might engage in a noisy withdrawal even though all that
may have been involved was a matter of business judgment as to the materiality of certain
infonnation.
Moreover, mandating withdrawal and disaffirmance removes the flexibility that lawyers
need in order to have time to counsel their corporate clients effectively. In some instances,
premature witlrlrawal and disaffirmance of documents might seriously and unfairly harm the
issuer and its shareholders or create disruption in the market for issuer's securities, when more
time spent with managers or expert advisers might have avoided the need for the attorney to
employ so extreme a measure. Such consultations also may prove the attorney to be wrong in
believing any material violation will occur. Indeed, one wonders whether noisy withdrawal is
not an undesirable, costly and unnecessary supplement to reporting up-the-Iadder as specifically
required by Section 307 of the Act.
16 The ABA House of Delegates declined to adopt the Ethics 2000 Commission proposal to provide exceptions to
confidentiality:
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes neces sary: ...
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and
in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has
used the lawyer's services:
These exceptions are substantially similar to § 67 of the Restatement.
I? See Rule 205.3(d)(i) respecting ongoing or future material violations likely to result in substantial financial injury
to the issuer or investors. Under Rule 205.3(d)(2)(ii), in -house counsel need not withdraw, but must disaffirm
material the attorney assisted in preparing and reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading. Rule
205.3(d)(2) permits withdrawal and disaffirmance by a retained attome)' and disaffirmance by in-house counsel.
This provision may not often apply because the ongoing effects of many SEC filings are unclear and attorneys
therefore might opt for disclosure to protect themselves.
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The proposed Section 307 rules provide that they preempt the professional conduct rules
of the states. The proposed withdrawal/disclosure standards are. hovvever, sure [\) increase the
attorney's exposure to civil liability if the attorney discloses client confidences or otherwise
violates a duty to the client under the state court's rules in the mistaken belief that noisy
withdrawal is mandated or permitted under the standards of the Section 307 rules. We discuss
the issues regarding attorney-client privilege and confidentiality in more detail in Part VII below.
The noisy withdrawal proposal focuses principally (although not entirely) on the conduct
of individual attorneys. Unclear, however, is how the noisy withdrawal rules would operate
when either the same tlrm handles many matters for the issuer or when a large multinational
corporation is represented on multiple matters by many lawyers in a firm from offices in several
states am foreign jurisdictions. For example, must the firm withdraw from representing the
multinational corporation in all the different matters it is currently handling for the large
multinational corporation when the rtIles call for noisy withdrawal in one matter': Even if the
Section 307 rules do not so require, the applicable rules of professional conduct may require
withdrawal from all matters because the noisy withdrawal and disaffirmance and its
consequences might create such adversity between the law firm and its clients as to result in an
impermissible conflict of interest. The problems law firms may face is discussed in greater detail
in Part XI below.
Under these circumstances, we urge that the Section 307 rules omit any standards for
either mandatory or permissive withdrawal. They should instead on the lawyer conduct rules
adopted by the applicable state courts to govern proper lawyer conduct before the SEC. This is
especially important in view of the broad coverage of the Section 307 rules to govern the conduct
of attorneys wholly unfamiliar with securities law and not providing any securities services, but
who represent issuers in isolated transactions that must be reported or documents which must be
filed with the Commission.
The ABA recommends tmt the Commission at the very least wait until there is clearer
justification than now exists for providing rules that differ in significant respects from those
applicable in the state courts, particularly when Section 307 does not mandate promulgation of
those rules.
C. Alternatives
We believe that there are preferable alternatives for addressing the Commission's
concerns underlying its noisy withdraw/disaffirmance proposals.
Enhanced corporate governance. In providing the QLCC alternative. the Commission
properly acknowledged the importance of corporate governance mechanisms in ensuring proper
legal compliance once material violations are reported to the board level. We believe it is
important to recognize that a sea change has taken place in corporate governance since the
failures that contributed to the corporate scandals and produced the Act and other measures
designed to restore investor confidence. Dramatic corporate governance reforms are being put in
place to address these failures. spurred by the requirements of the Act. SEC actions and stock
exchange responses through enhanced listing standards. These include requirements for a
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maJorIty of independent directors on boards. committees comprised solely of independent
directors under tighter stan::lards of independence. executive sessions of independent directors,
corporate governance guidelines and codes of conduct and ethics. Most importantly, the attitude
of directors and their recognition of their role and responsibilities to provide critical oversight
have changed. We believe these corporate governance reforms and changes in attitude have
made substantial progress in addressing the problems of the past and make it far more likely that
appropriate action will be taken in response to reports of material violations.
We recommend therefore that the Commission embrace the strengthening of corporate
govemance coupled with up- the-ladder reporting to address the problems of past failures of
compliance by putting responsibility for compliance in the right place in the organization. The
Commission should give this new system the time and opportunity t() work before· taking further
significantactions beyond those contemp!<lted by Congress which could have unintended
consequences. Those consequences would include interfering \vith the attorney-client
relationship .\vith the result that lawyers will be left out of the process and therefore less able to
counsel legal compliance, which would undermine the very purpose for which Congress enacted
Section 307. In order to further strengthen corporate governance mechanisms to ensure legal
compliance, we recommend that the Commission encourage the exchanges to require companies,
as part of listing standards, to adopt legal compliance procedures that include an independent
committee of the board (which may be an existing committee, such as the audit committee) with
responsibility for overseeing the company's legal compliance function and addressing any
material violations brought to its attention. Additionally, the exchanges could require the legal
compliance committee to regularly meet in executive session with the chief legal officer and
other counsel and compliance personnel in order to ensure that the committee receives timely
and candid reports. These requirements could be buttressed by disclosure requirements.
We do not believe, however, that an external reporting obligation should be imposed on
members of the committee. Besides the inappropriateness of requiring self reporting of
violations, such a requirement would discourage able people from serving on such a committee.
Moreover, requiring reporting by individual members would be especially disruptive because it
would give a single member of the QLCC or other independent committee the ability to dictate
decisions.
Application ofexisting professional conduct rules. The Commission should also
expressly recognize and emphasize the existing professional conduct rules applicable in most
states discussed above. These include rule: prohibiting an attorney from assisting a client in the
commission of a crime or fraud and requiring withdrawal and disaffirmation under certain
circumstances when the attorney's services are being used and those permitting an attorney in
certain circumstances to disclose client confidences to the extent necessary to prevent a client
crime or fraud.
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D. Specific Suggestions
If the Commission should nevertheless decide that additional obligatiul1s should be
imposed on attorneys when there is a failure at the board level to appropriately respond to a
report of evidence of a material violation, we make the following specific suggestions:
• Withdrawal in all circumstances should not be mandated by the Commission.
Rather it should be left to the attorney to decide what action is appropriate under the
circumstances consistent with applicable state codes. Clearly an attorney may not
permit her services to be used to assist the violation, but an attorney' s continuing to
counsel compliance may serve the public interest and the interests of the company
and its investors. The Commission recognized the value of continued lawyer
representation in its Carter and Johnson decision. 18 One 'can imagine a sitl..lation
where the violation does not involve self- interest and the board is seeking in good
faith to act, perhaps mistakenly, in the company's best interests.
• Even if withdrawal from a particular representation is necessary, this should not
automatically require withdrawal from all matters, even those umelated to the
violation. This withdrawal requirement could be a concern for individual attorneys,
but it would be a major concern if the attorney's law firm had to withdraw from
unrelated matters. Withdrawal in these circumstances could be injurious to the
company and its shareholders and might be inconsistent with state professional codes
and court rules.
• Even if withdrawal is required, for the reasons discussed above, notice to the SEC
and disaffirmation of documents should not be required in all cases. Rather, this
should be addressed by existing requirements of state court rules that require a lawyer
to disaffinn documents when the failure to do so would result in the lawyer's
assisting her client to perpetrate a crime or fraud. This would provide a clearer
standard that attorneys can understand and follow than the Commission's proposal.
• Because of the significant consequences flowing from a noisy withdrawal and
disaffirmation of documents, the attorney's actual knowledge that a material
violation is ongoing or about to occur and is likely to result in substantial financial
injury should be the standard to trigger the obligation. The Commission
acknowledges this at page 40 (' C the Release when it refers to "actually believes," but
Rule 205.3(d) uses the term "reasonably believes," which the Commission has
defined in Rule 205.2(1), contrary to the Model Rules' definition of the same term, as
an objective standard. As discussed above, if the Commission uses the Model Rule
definition of "reasonably believes," it would then be the appropriate term and more
understandable. Ifthe Rule 205.2(1) definition is retained, Rule 205.3(d) should be
revised to include a kno\vledge standard.
IX In [he IIIU[[t'!" ojll"illiulI1 R. Carla. Char/us J .10hIlS0I1. :n S.E.C. Docket 010.292 (Feb. 28. 1981).
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• The time periods established by the Commission in Rule 20S.3(d) for attorneys to act
are unrealistically prescriptive and inflexib Ie. In practice, the circumstances
sun-ounding a withdrawal and the reasons for it are not always clear. Attorneys may
need time to consult in order to evaluate the situation and determine their obligations.
The rule should provide for a "reasonably promptly" standard to allow sufficient
flexibility a~d permit the exercise of reasonable discretion based on the particular
circumstances.
• The rules or accompanying release should make clear that an attorney may initiate
the QLCC alternative at any stage in the process. For example, an attorney could
start the process of reporting to the CLO pursuant to Rule 20S .3(b) and then decide to
take the matter to the QLCC. Similarly, an attorney migqt decide to report to the
QLCC after a matter has been brought to arother committee. Alternatively, the
company or the board or another committee of the board might, on its own motion,
refer a matter to the QLCC. In each case, because the mater has gotten before the
QLCC, the alternative of Rule 20S.3(c) should apply.
• We do not believe that a distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
retained attorney and of a CLO if a matter has been reported to the QLCC. In each
case, the matter has gotten to the appropriate authority within the organization in a
position to address the matter. Accordingly, we urge eliminating the requirement in
Rule 20S.3(b)(3) that the CLO notify the Commission and disaffirm documents if
remedial measures directed by the QLCC are not taken. It is the responsibility of the
QLCC and the board to see that their directives are implemented.
E. Problems of Investigative or Defense Counsel
Rules 20S.2(a)(l), (2) and (3) would broadly include within the definition of appearing
and practicing before the Commission the defense of a party in a Commission administrative
proceeding or investigation. Conducting internal investigations into allegations of impropriety
within public companies also would be included. Apparently, this would include counsel
retained by the QLCC or other board committee to assist in dealing with a matter brought to its
attention.
Literally read, Rule 20S.3(b) and (d) would then require the attorney representing the
issuer to 1sk the client to publicly correct the defective filing that is ~he subject of the
investigation or administrative proceeding. Absent correction. the attorney would then be
required to \vithdraw from the representation and disaffinn the defective filing the attorney is
attempting to investigate or to defend.
It is \vell established that the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, and only the
client can waive it. In practice, to require investigating or detending attorneys to withdraw and
disaffirm \vOLlld change this principle. and thereby threaten to chill the free flow of
communication and candor between attorney aud client that is the cornerstone of our legal
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system. 19 Not only would this impair the ability of organizations to obtain an effective defense,
but. by creating an impediment to the use of and communication with investigati'.e and defense
counsel. the benefits that these counsel bring to the remediation of problems and resolution of
proceedings would be less available.
This is particularly the case insofar as the proposed rules require reporting/noisy
withdrawal with respect to completed, past conduct if such conduct implicates \vhat could be an
on-going violation of law. To recognize the serious issues that are thereby raised for attorney
and client, one need only consider the discussion between them concerning a pre\iously- filed
document which, in the context of the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, may be deemed to give rise
to an on-going violation, as the Commission recognizes. 20
If it is not feasible to exclude such attorneys from the definition in Rule 205.2(a)(1), (2)
or (3). \ve suggest that they be excepted from the responsibilities in Rule 20S.31hl and (d) to the
extent that the operation of those sections would interfere with the judgment of the CLO and
CEO whether to release the results of internal investigations or with the ability of the attorney to
properly defend the client. Rule 20S.2(j)(5) also should be revised to make clear. at the least,
that a QLCC member has no obligation to notify the Commission that a material \iolation has
occurred if the QLCC determines that such action would impair the ability of the issuer zealously
to defend itself in a Commission administrative proceeding or lawsuit or in a lawsuit brought by
a third party.
A similar problem applies to attorneys who advise in specialized areas involving
investigation or defense of claims. For example, environmental investigations performed by
lawyers could be encompassed within the Section 307 rules requirements. Accordingly.
environmental lawyers would be required not only to report up the ladder, but absent correction
by the !ssuer, would be required to withdraw from the representation and to disaffirm.
Although reporting up the ladder in such cases may be appropriate in order to assure that
proper attention is given to the matter by the CLO and CEO, environmental lawyers and other
specialty lawyers in similar circumstances ought not be required to withdraw or disaffirm. Other
lawyers representing the issuer and utilizing the specialists' services would, of course, remain
fully subject to the Section 307 rules with up the ladder reporting responsibilities and be subject
to any withdrawal or disaffirmance requirements in connection with false or misleading filings.
VII. Attorney-Client Privilege and Confidentiality
The proposed rules provide that a noisy withdrmval. including notice to the Commission
that the attorney is withdrawing/or professional considerations, and subsequent disclosure of
1'1 Such ::ll"csult directly contradicts the Commission's expressed intcnt that "the Commission does not want the rule
to impair zealous advocacy, which is essential to the Commission's processes." Release at 8.
~" Sc'" Rl:k,lSI: at 1-1: .. .-\ past instance of misconduct that nevertheless may have an ongoing impact (e. g., a
misstatement contained in a prior Commission tiling that investors may continue to rely upon) will need to be
reCI i tied."
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information by the attorney to the Commission. shall not constitlltl! (f waiver orany Nhenvise
applicahll! pririll!gl! or protection as to other persons. See Rules 205.3(d)( 1)( i). 205 .3(d)(3), and
:205.3(e)(3). The Commission relies heavily on these proposed rules as avoiding the risk of
liability of. or disciplinary action against, attorneys that is inherent in the proposed rules. The
provision, however well- motivated, may not provide the protection that the Commission intends
and may indeed prove to be a trap for the well- intentioned and umvary.
While it is true that Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en bane), and several district courts have ruled that privilege is not waived by disclosure to the
Commission, in other jurisdictions the Diversified approach has been rejected. 21 The
Commission cites the dissent in In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices
Litigation, 293 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2002), in support of its position; b~lt the majority in that case
rejected the: selective waiver approach.
Moreover, under Federal Ruleof~vidence 501, privileges are to be governed by state law or
tederal common law unless there is an Act of Congress or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court
providing otherwise. Thus, while the courts may (and often do) recognize the selective waiver
principle, it is not apparent how the Commission can adopt a rule that will control the courts and
that will determine the nature, scope and applicability of a privilege, absent legislation
specifically granting such authority. It is unclear whether the Act grants such authority. 22
The uncertainty of whether the Commission's proposed rules will preempt state privilege
laws is itself a problem. It would place an attorney who has initiated up-the-Iadder reporting
\vithout receiving an appropriate response in the untenable position of having to decide whether
complying with the Commission's notification provisions will waive the attorney-client
privilege. A wrong decision to withdraw, disaffirm and notify the Commission can cause
substantial injury to the attorney's client, who may now find that a wide range of
communications between the client and the attorney (and possibly the documentation the
attorney is required to prepare and retain under the proposed rules) are no longer protected from
disclosure or discovery in other matters. Once again, there is the threat of a malpractice action
against attorneys acting in good faith.
11 See. e.g.. In If' Subpoena Duces Tecum, 738 F. 2d 1367. 1370 (D.C. Cir. 198'+); Westinghouse Electric Corp. v.
Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991). In yet other jurisdictions, "selective waiver" may be
found in certain circumstances. See generally In re Stein}u;mlt Partners. L.P. ') F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 1993). Case law
also suggests that th~ applicability of any judicially recognized rule as to selective waiver may vary as between
attorney-client privilege and work-product privilege, and may turn on the existence of an appropriate confidentiality
agreement with the governmental agency to which documents are provided, or other circumstances. As the Release
(at '+9) notes, protection through a confidentiality agreement as Rule 205.3(e)(3) contemplates represents the
Commission's position on an unsettled question. The Commission itself concedes that the noisy withdrawal and
disclosure rules exceed the standards explicitly required by Section 307 of the Act. Release at 7.
12 In 198.+. the COlllmission proposed legislation in til is regard, but Congress did not adopt it. See 16 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep at 461 (8;\.-\ :\Iarch 2. 1984) (SEC statement in support of proposed Section 24(d) of the Exchange Act),
r~ferenced in Westinghouse. slipra n. 21. 951 F.2d at 1425.
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It is fundamentally unfair to clients and their attorneys to require the attorneys to make
these t\\O decisions regarding the pre-emptive effect of the Commission's rule:; \\hen the
consequences of a \\Tong decision may be disastrous to the attorney or the client. It creates an
unreasonable conflict between the interests of attorney and client. The uncertainty also will have
a chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship, as companies will be uneasy about retaining
or freely communicating with counsel that mayor may not eventually rely on the Commission's
privilege rules and disdose confidential information to the Commission.
Most troubling, there is no easy way for the Commission to resolve this uncertainty. The
Commission cannot itself establish its authority to preempt state privilege rules. Only Congress
can speak to that. In light of the uncertainty regarding preemption, and the inability for the
Commission to resolve the uncertainty, the Commission should refrain from considering noisy
withdraw'al, disaffirmation, and disclosure provisions unless and until it receives express
Congressional authority to preempt state privilege rules.
VIII. Sanctions and Liability
The rules should state expressly that they may be enforced only by the Commission and
that a violation of the rules does not provide a basis for claims by any third parties. This is
important because exposure to third-party liability could have a chilling effect on a lawyer's
ability to act solely in the interest of and zealously advocate for a client. In addition, the
Commission should provide that actions by an attorney pursuant to the rules do not subject the
attorney to claims by a client for breach of professional dUq', to the client. Such a provision
would be consistent with the legislative intent of Congress. .)
We also believe that it is important that the Commission expressly reaffirm its historic
policy of restraint in bringing actions against attorneys for violation of professional conduct rules
because of the chilling effect such actions would have on the ability of attorneys to effectively
represent clients before the Commission. The Commission should make clear that proceedings
under Part 205 will only be brought when there are clear violations 24 and that the Commission's
policy of not bringing proceedings against attorneys for violation of other state professional
rules, absent a judicial or administrative determination that the attorney has violated the
securities laws. will continue. 25 This would help foster confidence in the bar that lawyers may
l'
-.' Sen Edwards. in his statement on the Senate floor on July 10,2002 (S6552), stated: "Nothing in this bill gives
anybody a right to file a private lawsuit against anybody. The only people who can enforce this amendment are the
people at the SEC." In response to Sen. Sarbanes' question whether the amendment can only be enforced by the
SEC through an administrative proceeding. Sen. Edwards responded (S6557): "The answer is yes. The only way to
enforce this legal requirement is through an administrative process." Sen. Sarbanes responded: "That was an effort,
of course. to deal with the idea that somehow it might bring causes of action from outside, or somewhere else. So it
is limited tothe SEC." Sen. Enzi, a co-sponsor of the amendment. similarly stated (S6555): " ... [T]his amendment
creates a duty of professional conduct and does not create a right of action by third parties."
2.. .-\ "clear and con\'incing" standard of proof generally prevails in disciplinary proceedings for violation of state
professional conduct rules for lawyers.
25 SL'e' hh\ard F. Greene. Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Rel1larl-" tu the :\c\\ York County Lawyers' AssociatiLJIl. (Jan. 18. J982). Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 83.089.
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continue to Yigorously represent their client's interests before the Commission without fear of
retribution unless they have clearly violated the requirements of Part 205.
Furthermore, the Commission should seek to forestall courts from using the requirements
of the Section 307 rules as establishing a standard for attorney performance by expressly
negating their use that way. We suggest inclusion of the following:
Proof of violation of these Rules does not (I) give rise to an implied cause of action for
professional negligence or breach of fiduciary duty, or (2) except for willful or reckless
conduct, establish a standard of care that is relevant to prove professional negligence or
breach of a fiduciary duty. 26
Finally we recommend that the Commission provide a transition period before the
Section 307 rules become effective so that companies and law firms can establish appropriate
procedures for compliance and education of the bar and clients can take place.
IX. Special Issues Relating to Counsel for Investment Advisers
We are concerned that the Commission's views in the Release that would apply the
requirements of the Section 307 rules to attorneys representing privately- held investment
advisers to registered investment companies would fundamentally change the nature of the
attorney-client relationship between those investment advisers and their counsel. We note that
the Commission did not state whether these views extend to publicly-held investment advisers
that are otherwise "issuers" under the Act, nor did the Commission state that its views extend to
investment advisers, either privately-held or publicly held, to investment companies that are not
registered with the Commission, when an issuer may not be involved at all.
Under the proposal, an attorney employed by a privately- held investment adviser who
prepares, or assists in preparing, materials that the attorney has reason to believe will be
submitted to or filed with the Commission by or on behalf of a registered investment company,
or will be incorporated into any document submitted to or filed with the Commission, would be
considered to be "appearing and practicing before the Commission in the representation of an
issuer" and thus subject to the requirements of Rule 205.3(b). By implication, the "issuer" being
represented by counsel to a privately-held investment adviser would be the registered investment
company contracting with the investment adviser.
26 See the Restatement §52 (The Standard of Care). providing:
(1) For purpose of Iiabi Iity under §§ 48 and 49, a lawyer who owes a duty of care must exercise the
competence and diligence normally exercised by lawyers in similar circumstances.
(2) Proof of a violation of a rule or statue regulating the conduct of lawyers:
(a) does not give rise to an implied cause of action for professional negligence or breach offiduciary
duty;
(b) does not preclude other proof concerning the duty of care in Subsection (I) or the fiduciary duty: and
(c) may be considered by a tried offact as an aid in understanding and applying the standard of
Subsection (I) or ~ -+9 to the extent that (i) the rule or statLIte \\ as designed for the protection of
persons in the position of the claimant and (ii) proofofthe content and construction of such a rule or
statute is relevant to the claimant's claim.
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The release states that an attorney for a privately-held im'estment ({(!l'ise l ' \\ho discovers
"e\'idence of a material violation by an oflicer of the investment adviser that is related to the
investment company" must report the evidence to the chief legal officer of the in1'c'.I'lmenl
companJ' client of the investment adviser as required by Rule 205.3(b).
The Commission, applying an agency theory, states that the obligation to report "up the
ladder" to the chief legal officer of the investment company (and which ultimately may lead to a
noisy withdrawal) does "no violence to the attorney-client privilege," because the attorney is
;'providing legal services for the registered investment company." In effect, the Commission is
stating that an attorney retained by a privately- held investment adviser also represents the
registered investment company, regardless of whether that investment company had any role in
the retention of that attorney, and regardless of whether the investment company has otherwise
retained separate counsel (which may also serve as independent legai counsel to the independent
directors) .
The Commission points out that the investment adviser is an agent of the investment
company and owes the investment company a fiduciary duty under common la\\ and under
Section 36 of the Investment Company Act of 1940. We acknowledge that the investment
adviser is a fiduciary of the investment company, but we question the basis for concluding that
this fiduciary duty extends to an attorney retained by the investment advis er.
We believe that obligating an attorney to report client confidences to a third party
fundamentally changes the nature of the traditional attorney-client relationship, which is based
on concepts of trust and confidentiality. We further believe that there is nothing inherent in the
relationship between a privately- held investment adviser and its registered investment company
clients that requires so radical an overhaul in this context.
It goes without saying that investment advisers frequently consult with counsel to discuss
business strategies, disclosure issues and other matters. The possibility that an investment
adviser's counsel may be required to reveal to advisory clients the nature of any consultation
would undermine the essence of the attorney-client privilege and would discourage advisers from
seeking the advice of counsel, perhaps when they could most benefit from it. Moreover, the
nature of these consultations often concern matters of business judgment that could be subject to
second- guessing after the fact should the attorney decide it would not be appropriate to reveal the
confidence.
The sound structure of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Commission's long
history of interpretations under it. recognize that the nature of the relationship between an
investment adviser and its investment company clients is anns-length and can at times be
adverse. The Commission has taken the position that counsel representing an investment adviser
or its affiliates is conflicted from many representations involving an investment company's board
of directors.
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Giwn the conceptual inconsistency between that position and the Section 307 rule
proposals. \\'e suggest that the Commission simply require counsel to report up the ladder within
the investment adviser organization, and not report to the third party investment company.
Absent that. the Commission, in effect, is forcing a model in which counsel to the investment
adviser also represents the investment company, whether or not the independent board members
have retained their own_ independent legal counsel.
X. Application of Section 307 Rules to Foreign Attorneys
The Commission proposes to include foreign attorneys within the scope of the definition
of "attorney" in the proposed rules, and foreign attorneys employed or retained by issuers,
domestic or foreign, who may be deemed to be "appearing and pract~cing" before the
Commission, would be subject to the oblig::ltions imposed on attorneys. While the breadth of the
Commission's proposals create problems for U.S. attorneys, we believe that the adverse impact
will be even stronger on foreign attorneys. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, the ABA
believes that the Commission should, at the very least, defer subjecting foreign attorneys to the
obligations/of attorneys under the rules until the problems created for foreign attorneys can be
adequately addressed. If the Commission chooses to subject them to the rules at this time, the
ABA urges the Commission to do so only in a limited way.
First, the proposed rules would impose extremely burdensome obligations on many
foreign attorneys who are employed or retained by companies that are or may become issuers,
many of whom may prepare or review home country disclosures or documents that later will be
reflected or included in documents filed with or submitted to the Commission. Because a foreign
private issuer must submit to the SEC on Form 6-K whatever information the issuer (i) makes or
is required to make public pursuant to the law of the jurisdic tion of its domicile or in which it is
incorporated or organized, (ii) files or is required to file with a stock exchange on which its
securities are traded and which was made public by that exchange, and (iii) distributes or is
required to distribute to its security holders, a great number of foreign attorneys would be subject
to obligations under the proposed rules, often without knowing it. We believe that, especially in
the case of foreign attorneys, the extraordinary breadth of the term "appearing and practicing" is
likely to lead to confusion as to who is subject to the obligations of the rules, and to its sanctions
in the event of noncompliance.
An attorney subject to the rule is obligated to determine if he or she has evidence of a
material violation of the securities la\vs, matr>rial breach of fiduciary obligations or similar
material violations. While many U.S. attorneys are not familiar with the U.S. securities laws, or
laws relating to fiduciary duty. the information is at least generally accessible. This is not
necessarily the case for foreign attorneys. Except those attorneys with an international practice,
very few foreign attorneys have any knowledge of U.S. securities laws. In addition, because
fiduciary obligations in many non-U.S. jurisdictions are governed by civil law rather than
common law, attorneys practicing in jurisdictions other than in the jurisdiction where the issuer
is organized may not necessarily be familiar \vith the standards applicable to detennining
breaches. Foreign attorneys who provide services for foreign subsidiaries of issuers are also
affected by the proposed rules. insofar as the burden imposed on them under the rule would
appear to require that they be obligated to respond to \iolations at levels above that of the entity
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for \\hol11 they provide services. Many foreign attorneys do not believe they J:',-' :lJequately
positioned to senoe in this capacity.
A number of foreign jurisdictions treat the attorney-client privilege as a "professional
secret." and treat the violation as a matter of criminal law and professional ethics. [examples are
Code Penal art 226-13 in France; Section 203(1) No.3 and Section 356 Strafgesdzbuch in
Germany.] Compliance by an attorney with the obligations imposed by the proposed rules could
possibly result in sanctions against the attorney under the laws of the jurisdiction where the
attorney is admitted to practice. Although the federal system of the United States may provide
an arguable basis for the pre-emption of attorney-client and confidentiality obligations applicable
to U.S. attorneys, it is hard to understand the basis upon which the Commission can claim that
the proposed rules would supervene obligations of attorneys admitted to practice outside the U.S.
Implicit in the proposed rules is the view that an attorney is in a position. ewn if he or
she believes to have evidence of a violation, to determine its materiality. In the event a foreign
attorney were to be performing work for a subsidiary of an issuer, or with respect to a single
document or disclosure by that issuer, it may be unrealistic to expect that the attorney will be in
the position to know whether a perceived violation would be material at the parent level. Too
sensitive a trigger will result in the activation of significant corporate resources to the potential
waste 0 f resources by the issuer and detriment of the reporting attorney. Moreover, most foreign
attorneys are not in a position to assess whether the issuer has adopted an appropriate remedial
response.
We are also concerned that foreign attorneys' fears as to the scope and consequences of
the proposed rules may cause foreign attorneys to advise clients not to list their securities in the
United States or, if possible, to delist in the United States. Additionally, we are concerned that
foreign private issuers, operating under a different governance structure, will not respond
appropriately as mandated by the Commission, thereby precipitating excessive remedial actions
by attorneys that will be disruptive to the markets.
Finally, we are concerned that subjecting foreign attorneys to regulation by the SEC
could result in foreign agencies seeking to regulate the conduct of U.S. attorneys representing
U.S. companies abroad or foreign companies.
If the Commission proceeds to include foreign attorneys under the rules. we believe use
nf the functional approach we suggest abovp for defining "aopearing and practicing before the
Commission" could mitigate somewhat the problems for foreign lawyers. Under that approach,
only those foreign la\vyers with responsibility for compliance with U.S. securities law, and
therefore in a position to know their responsibilities, would be subject to the rule. Because of the
possibility of inconsistent foreign law requirements, however, even those foreign lawyers should
be exempt from taking any action that would be inconsistent with or violative of governing local
law.
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XI. Application of Sectjon 307 Rules to Law Firms
A client often retains a law film to provide legal services rather tha n an individual
attorney. Although the proposed rules appear on the surface to impose obligations only on
individual attorneys, the scope of the definitions and the obligations imposed on attorneys under
the proposed rules create the possibility that in many cases the rules would apply to an entire law
firm, and that sanctions for violation could also effectively be imposed on an entire firm. The
Release does not specifically address these important issues. We have a number of concerns
regarding this iSSll~.
First, it is not clear from the definition of "appearing and practicing" \vhether the term is
limited to individual attorneys at a law firm or could apply to the entire firm. The Commission
should make clear that the term '~appearing and practicing" is intended to relate solely to
individuals, rather than to a firm. To do otherwise would risk subjecting many attorneys at a
firm to obligations they may not have the capacity to undertake.
Related to the above, as discussed elsewhere the proposed rules provide that if a
subordinate attorney appears and practices before the Commission on behalf of an issuer, that
subordinate attorney's supervisory attorneys also appear and practice before the Commission.
This has serious implications for law firms. We believe that only the supervisory attorney or
attorneys to whom a subordinate attorney actually reports evidence of a material violation should
be subject to the requirements of the rules pursuant to Rule 205.4.
We also believe that it should be made clear in the adoption of final rules that information
known to or in the possession of an attorney at a law firm will not be imputed to any other
attorney. For example, knowledge of a potential violation of a fiduciary duty by an attorney'
practicing in the area of employee benefits (and who would not otherwise be deemed to be
"appearing and practicing" before the Commission) should not be attributed to another attorney
at the firm who would be deemed to be "appearing and practicing." If such knowledge were to
be attributed, each attorney at a law firm could be deemed to have an affirmative obligation to
determine the information other attorneys may possess, a burden that would be excessive and
unrealistic. We believe that the rules as adopted should clarify that attorneys in a law firm
should only be held responsible for information actually known by them.
It is unclear to us how an attorney employed by a law firm is required to act under the
proposed rules where a law firm. rather than an individuaL is retained by an issuer. If
withdrawal is required, is it by the individual attorney or by the law tirm, particularly where the
Imv finn \vas engaged? If the entire firm were required to withdraw from all matters, the
consequence could be severe and may well result in significant prejudice not only to the issuer
but also to its shareholders. In some cases, resignation may not be possible, as in the situation of
a litigation matter where resignation will require leave of a court. In other cases, the forced
tem1ination of regulatory attorneys, intellectual property attorneys and others could result in
signiticant disruption to the issuer's ongoing business. and consequential harm and cost to the
issuer and its shareholders.
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We also are concerned that if an entire firm \vere deemed to be subject !\' ~he proposed
rules. a determination that an entire firm had violated the rules could potentiall;. lead to
disastrous consequences for the entire law finn and for its clients. This exposur~ might cause
law firms to decline representation of certain public companies, making it more difticult, for
example. for smaller issuers to obtain quality counsel.
Because of the serious consequences of imposing obligation under the Section 307 rules,
directly or indirectly, on a law firm, the ABA recommends that the Commission clearly limit
their application to individual attorneys and to individual supervisory attorneys.
XII. Revision of Standards for Practice Before the Commission
The Commission proposes to amend the standards for practice by attorneys before the
Commission by subjecting attorneys to the negligence standards applicable to accountants.. This
change in the standards is not required by the Act and should not be dealt vvith b;. the
Commission during this short time period.
When the Commission amended Rule 102(e) in 1998, it specifically did not impose the
negligence standard on attorneys but limited it to accountants. The Commission recognized that
the roles and responsibilities of attorneys and accountants differed significantly. Even imposing
a negligence standard on accountants was not without controversy. 27
The Commission's decision to refrain from including lawyers was consistent with its
historical recognition that, as a regulatory agency with enforcement authority. subjecting lawyers
to discipline by the SEC for negligence would have a chilling effect on the ability of lawyers to
represent their client's interests zealously and independently. Congress, in codifying Rule 102(e)
in Section 602 of the Act, recognized this distinction and limited the negligence standard to
accountants.
There is no justification for the Commission to change the decision it made in 1998 and
that Congress codified in the Act, particularly in the limited time frame for comment and
Commission deliberation imposed by Congress for implementing the up-the-ladder reporting
requirement. Subjecting lawyer conduct across the board to a negligence standard, even one
with ostensibly higher thresholds, puts a powerful and potentially coercive tool in tre hands of
enforcement stafY that could seriously interfere with the independence of counsel and the
freedom of counsel to effectively represent the interests of the client. This is even more
problematic today because of the additional sanctions available for a violation of Section 4C of
the Exchange Act as a result of Section 3 of the Act. The reasons that led the Commission to
decline to impose a negligence standard on attorneys in 1998 remain equally, if not more,
applicable today.
* * *
"27 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner I\orman S, Johnson. Release 1\0. 33 -7593, File No. S7-16-98
(Oct. 19. 19(8). Among other issues raised by Commissioner Jol1'1son \Vas the authority of the Commission to
impose a n<:gligence standard.
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The A.BA appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments, and we are available to
meet \\'ith the Commission or the Staff, to respond to any questions and to assist in the
f0l111ulation of final rules. We also stand ready to work with the Commission. as \ve have with
state and federal courts and other agencies, on an ongoing basis to develop appropriate rules
governing the professional conduct of lawyers that serve the public interest.
Respectfully submitted,
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr.
President, American Bar Association
cc: Hon. Harvey L. Pitt
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SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR SUPERVISORY LAWYER
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
SCR 3.130(5.1) RESPONSIBILITIES OF A PARTNER OR
SUPERVISORY LAWYER
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the other lawyer conforms to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct only if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct
supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: [1] Paragraphs (a) and (b) refer to lawyers who have supervisory authority over the professional work of a
firm or legal department of a government agency. This includes members of a partnership and the shareholders in
a law firm organized as a professional corporation; lawyers having supervisory authority in the law department of
an enterprise or government agency; and lawyers who have intermediate managerial responsibilities in a firm.
[2] The measures required to fulfill the responsibility prescribed in paragraphs (a) and (b) can depend on the firm's
structure and the nature of its practice. In a small firm, informal supervision and occasional admonition ordinarily
might be sufficient. In a large firm, or in practice situations in which intensely difficult ethical problems frequently
arise, more elaborate procedures may be necessary. Some firms, for example, have a procedure whereby junior
lawyers can make confidential referral of ethical problems directly to a designated senior partner or special
committee. See Rule 5.2. Firms, whether large or small, may also rely on continuing legal education in
professional ethics. In any event, the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct of all its members
and a lawyer having authority over the work of another may not assume that the subordinate lawyer will inevitably
conform to the Rules.
[3] Paragraph (c)(1) expresses a general principle of responsibility for acts of another. See also Rule 8.4(a).
[4] Paragraph (c)(2) defines the duty of a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over performance of specific
legal work by another lawyer. Whether a lawyer has such supervisory authority in particular circumstances is a
question of fact. Partners of a private firm have at least indirect responsibility for all work being done by the firm,
while a partner in charge of a particular matter ordinarily has direct authority over other firm lawyers engaged in
the matter. Appropriate remedial action by a partner would depend on the immediacy of the partner's involvement
and the seriousness of the misconduct. The supervisor is required to intervene to prevent avoidable
consequences of misconduct if the supervisor knows that the misconduct occurred. Thus, if a supervising lawyer
knows that a subordinate misrepresented a matter to an opposing party in negotiation, the supervisor as well as
the subordinate has a duty to correct the resulting misapprehension.
[5] Professional misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on the part of
the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of paragraph (c) because there was no direction,
ratification or knowledge of the violation.
[6] Apart from this Rule and Rule 8.4(a), a lawyer does not have disciplinary liability for the conduct of a partner,
associate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer may be liable civilly or criminally for another lawyer's conduct is a
question of law beyond the scope of these Rules.
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SCR 3.130(5.3) RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS
KENTUCKY BAR ASSOCIATION
SCR 3.130(5.3) RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING
NONLAWYER ASSISTANTS
With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer:
(a) A partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; and
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer only if:
(1) The lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) The lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory
authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be
avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
[Adopted by Order 89-1, eff. 1-1-90]
COMMENTARY
Supreme Court
1989: Lawyers generally employ assistants in their practice, including secretaries, investigators, law student
interns, and paraprofessionals. Such assistants, whether employees or independent contractors, act for the
lawyer in rendition of the lawyer's professional services. A lawyer should give such assistants appropriate
instruction and supervision concerning the ethical aspects of their employment, particularly regarding the
obligation not to disclose information relating to representation of the client, and should be responsible for their
work product. The measures employed in supervising nonlawyers should take account of the fact that they do not
have legal training and are not subject to professional discipline.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This outline reviews selected U.S. Supreme Court, Sixth Circuit and Kentucky
bankruptcy decisions during the past year, with a particular emphasis on decisions of interest to
lenders. The decisions demonstrate continued development of issues such as constitutional law,
exemptions, discharge and nondischargeability, lien stripping and mortgage avoidance,
preferential transfers and professional conduct. Selected non-bankruptcy cases which are of
interest to lenders are also included.
II. NEW BANKRUPTCY CASES
A. Preferential Transfers
In re Anderson, 275 B.R. 264 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
In this preference action, the court rejected an earmarking defense based on a pre-petition
balance transfer.
The bankruptcy Trustee filed an adversary proceeding to recover from Napus Federal
Credit Union ("Napus") funds that Napus received within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.
The debtor opened a new credit card account with Fleet Credit Card Services ("Fleet") and
instructed Fleet to pay a credit card debt she owed to Napus. Fleet transferred approximately
$6,000 to Napus, and the debtor filed a bankruptcy proceeding within 90 days. The Trustee
sought to avoid the transfer and recover the money received by Napus as a preferential transfer.
Napus moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that, because the transfer of funds from Fleet to
Napus did not diminish the debtor's estate, no preferential transfer occurred. Instead, one
creditor was simply substituted for another. The court rejected this argument, which centered
upon the "earmarking doctrine," because that doctrine requires the preference defendant to
demonstrate that the debtor had no control over the disposition of the funds in question. Here,
the debtor clearly directed Fleet to pay the funds to Napus, rather than some other creditor, so the
court held that the earmarking doctrine did not apply as a defense. The court further determined
that the transfer of funds to Napus disturbed the Code's equitable distribution principles, because
Many thanks to our associates Lee A. Webb and Brett R. Hensley for their excellent research and drafting
assistance, without which we would not have these materials.
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the debtor's estate was depleted by the payment to Napus instead of distribution of the money
equally among the unsecured creditors. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss.
B. Plan Confirmation/Consummation Issues
Browning v. LevY 283 F.3d. 761 (6th Cir. 2002)
Here the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the failure to reserve them in the confirmed Chapter 11
plan ofone of the plaintiffs.
This case arose out of a 1992 dispute between the Nationwise Automotive, Inc.
Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") and its majority shareholder, Saul Levy, over control
of the corporation. Levy owned the majority of the stock through a subscription agreement on
which he had not yet paid and on which the company had a right to call and demand payment.
A dispute arose between Levy and the ESOP trustees over what steps should be taken to remedy
Nationwise's serious financial difficulties. The Board called the subscription agreement and,
when Levy could not pay, cancelled the agreement, making the ESOP the majority shareholder.
Nationwise then sued Levy in state court alleging fraud in connection with the subscription
agreement. Squire, Sanders & Dempsey ("SSD") represented Levy in a settlement of the dispute
in April of 1992, under which Levy paid Nationwise a reduced amount and remained the
majority shareholder. The settlement was approved in that state court action. In 1995,
Nationwise filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, represented briefly by SSD, until other
counsel took over. The debtor then became known as NW Liquidating, Inc. ("NW"). Shortly
thereafter, some other employees of Nationwise and participants in the ESOP sued Levy alleging
the settlement agreement was procured by fraud. They also accused SSD of breaching its
fiduciary duties under ERISA and NW joined the action and accused SSD of malpractice. They
asked the district court to set aside the settlement and allow the 1992 suit to be re-litigated. The
debtor's plan was confirmed in early 1996. The plan included an omnibus reservation of the
rights to enforce claims under various sections of the Bankruptcy Code, but neither the ESOP nor
the debtor reserved the specific claims asserted against SSD.
SSD then moved for summary judgment on all claims pending against it. The district
court granted SSD's motion with respect to the ESOP and NW, holding that the ESOP's claims
were barred by res judicata and that NW's claims were barred by both res judicata and judicial
estoppel.
NW argued that res judicata and judical estoppel were not applicable because SSD
concealed its actions, preventing NW from knowing about them before confirmation. The court
discussed the fraudulent concealment doctrine but concluded that SSD's actions were either
public record, or certainly known to NW.
The Sixth Circuit then reviewed the requirements for res judicata: "(1) a final decision on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a subsequent action between the same parties
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or their 'privies'; (3) an issue in the subsequent action which was litigated or which should have
been litigated in the prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action."
The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that NW's claims against
SSD were barred by res judicata, as the confirmation order was a final judgment for purposes of
res judicata with respect to the company's claims against SSD. The court ruled that SSD was a
party to the bankruptcy proceeding, because it acted as the debtor's counsel, however briefly.
The court ruled that NW's claims against SSD could and should have been raised or
reserved in the Nationwise bankruptcy proceeding, pursuant tot he bankruptcy c ourt's limited
jurisdiction over non-core proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (including a discussion of
"related-to" jurisdiction). NW's claims were considered "related to" the Nationwise bankruptcy
proceeding because the outcome could conceivably have affected the estate being administered
in bankruptcy. Finally, the court ruled that the district court did not err in concluding that there
was an identity of claims between the claims NW asserted and the Nationwise bankruptcy
proceeding, because they arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions, or out of the
same core of operative facts - i.e., all of the claims arose out of the earlier dispute 0 ver the
control of Nationwise and the resulting litigation and settlement, which contributed to
Nationwise's bankruptcy.
The court held that the district court erred in concluding that NW's claims against SSD
were barred by judicial estoppel when NW failed to include those claims in its disclosure
statement. The court ruled that SSD had failed to show that NW's predecessor took a position
under oath that was contrary to NW's current claims against SSD in the Nationwise bankruptcy
proceeding, and that the omission was more likely inadvertent.
The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that the ESOP's claims
were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The court noted that the first element of res judicata
was satisfied for the same reasons as it was with respect to NW -- that the confirmation order
served as a final judgment for purposes of res judicata. Next, the court ruled that the ESOP was
a party because, for the purposes of res judicata, all shareholders or creditors are considered
participants in a bankruptcy proceeding, and the ESOP should have raised or reserved its claims
in the bankruptcy proceeding. Finally, the court rejected the ESOP's argument that it could not
have brought the claims in the bankruptcy proceeding because of ERISA preemption requiring
adjudication by a federal court, noting that the bankruptcy court is a federal court.
In re Wallace, 46 Fed. Appx. 819 (6th Cir. 2002)(Not Published)
ill this Chapter 13 proceeding, the debtors' confirmed plan provided that a debt to the
debtors' credit union (secured by their 1996 Geo Metro) would be paid outside the plan by the
debtors' daughter. Following confirmation, the vehicle was wrecked. The debtors surrendered
the vehicle, which the credit union sold for $500, leaving a deficiency balance of approximately
$4,400. When the debtors' daughter failed to make payments on the debt, the credit union
moved to dismiss the debtors' Chapter 13 case pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1329, asserting that a de
facto modification of the plan had occurred. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to dismiss
and the district court affirmed. On review, the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the credit
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union was bound by the tenns of the confinned plan, unless the plan was abandoned by the
debtor. The "de facto modification" asserted by the credit union involved the conduct of the
debtors' daughter, not of the debtors themselves. The daughter's breach could not be considered
a plan modification by the debtors, where the credit union freely released them from any further
liability on the debt.
In re Kidd, 315 F. 3d 671 (6th Cir. 2003)
This case addresses the appropriate method of detennining the "market" interest rate to
be paid on a secured claim in a Chapter 13 "cramdown." The court held that the rate may be an
average rate set without consideration ofthe risk related to the particular loan at issue.
Here, the debtors financed their purchase of a used pickup t ruck a tan interest rate 0 f
20.95%. Weeks after they purchased the vehicle, they filed their Chapter 13 petition. The
creditor was undersecured and contested the 8% interest rate proposed by the debtors' plan. The
creditor argued that a market interest rate had to be a rate for which the borrowers actually would
qualify, given pre-bankruptcy risk factors such as credit history and age of collateral. The
creditor contended that this would be similar to or the same as the contract rate which had been
negotiated only weeks before the bankruptcy was filed. The bankruptcy court conducted an
evidentiary hearing, at which a representative of a prime lending institution testified that the
"weighted average" of all vehicle loans made by his bank (i.e. new and used vehicles and
borrowers with good credit and bad) was 9.3%. The bankruptcy court found this to be credible
evidence of the market rate of interest but, because interest rates had recently risen, added an
additional percentage point to arrive at a "market" rate of interest of 10.3%.
The creditor appealed, and the district court affinned. The creditor appealed again, and
the Sixth Circuit affinned. In doing so, the court rejected the creditor's argument that the
language of United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1989), which held that a creditor "is
entitled to receive its current market rate" in a Chapter 13 cramdown meant that the appropriate
interest rate to be applied was the rate at which the particular creditor would loan money to the
particular debtor to finance the purchase of the particular vehicle. The court held that this
language was intended solely to limit consideration to rates relevant to the particular types of
loans at issue (i.e., the court must consider only the rates applicable to the automobile loan
universe and not rates applicable to other collateral). The court concluded that the setting of a
market rate of interest did not entail consideration of the debtor's pre-bankruptcy credit history.
The Sixth Circuit held the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in setting a 10.3% interest
rate as the "market" rate applicable in a Chapter 13 cramdown.
There was a spirited dissent, arguing that this ruling places the Sixth Circuit at odds with
numerous other circuits.
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C. Dischargeability and Discharge
In re Johnson, 281 B.R. 269 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
This case involves the sanction imposed for a debtor's apparently deliberate dissipation
of estate funds.
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on December 11, 2001. On March 6,
2002, the Trustee sent the debtor a letter requesting that she turn over approximately $5,000 of
estate property (cash for various items). The Trustee did not receive the money, and filed a
motion to compel the debtor to turn over these sums. At a hearing, the debtor offered no
plausible explanation for her failure to pay the money over to the Trustee, and testified that she
simply spent the money on living expenses and private school tuition, the majority of it after
being notified by the Trustee of her duty to turn over the funds. The Trustee sought to dismiss
the debtor's case with prejudice and to bar her from filing another bankruptcy petition for six
years. 11 U.S.C. § 521(3) requires all debtors to "cooperate with the Trustee as necessary to
enable the Trustee to perform the Trustee's duties." 11 U.S.c. § 727 provides all debtors with a
discharge, unless the debtor engages inc ertain conduct, including transferring property of the
estate after the filing date. The court found that the debtor clearly violated these provisions. 11
U.S.c. § 109(g) provides that a debtor whose case was dismissed by the court for willful failure
to abide by a court order may not refile for 180 days. Here, however, the court found the
debtor's conduct was "particularly egregious" and that prohibiting her from filing another
petition for 180 days was an insufficient punishment. Accordingly, the court forever barred the
debtor from obtaining a discharge of the debts existing at the time of the entry of its order, and
also barred the debtor from filing any bankruptcy petition for a period of six years from the date
ofthe court's dismissal order.
In re Amos, 283 B.R. 864 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
This case involves the dischargeability of a student loan debt when the creditor fails to
file a proofof claim in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding.
In 1992, the debtor filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 13 which listed a debt in the
amount of approximately $5,000 to the creditor for a student loan. The debtor's plan provided
for payment of 100% of unsecured claims, but did not refer to or provide for the discharge of any
student loan claims. The creditor did not file a proof of claim. The plan was confirmed in 1992.
In 1995, the court entered a decree closing the case and discharging the debtor. Following the
discharge, the creditor filed an action against the debtor seeking to collect the student loan debt.
Debtor did not appear and the creditor obtained a default judgment. In 1999, the debtor filed a
motion to reopen the Chapter 13 case and to hold the creditor in contempt for violating the
discharge. The creditor failed to respond, and the court granted the debtor's motion holding the
creditor in contempt and assessing $5,000 in damages and $3,000 in attorney's fees. When the
debtor attempted to enforce the contempt order, the creditor filed suit against the debtor and his
attorney seeking to void the contempt order. In 2001, the debtor against asked the bankruptcy
court to reopen the Chapter 13 case so that he could pursue a motion for additional sanctions
against the creditor.
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The court concluded that the discharge order was erroneous as a matter of law because it
failed to accurately set forth the discharge and the exceptions to discharge provided by existing
law. At the time the debtor filed his petition, discharge of student loans in Chapter 13 cases
required a debtor to file and prevail against the student loan lender in an adversary proceeding
pursuant to 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(8) (discharge based on "undue hardship"). No such action had
been filed in this case. Therefore, the court found that the creditor had not been discharged as a
matter of law. When a creditor holds a nondischargeable debt, even though it has not filed a
proof of claim, neither the bankruptcy rules nor the proof of claim bar date can prevent the
creditor from collecting that debt outside of bankruptcy. The error in the discharge order was
compounded by the 1999 contempt order. The law in effect at the time the debtor's petition was
filed did not provide for the discharge of the debtor's student loans absent the adversary
proceeding referred to above. The debtor had not taken steps to have the debt discharged. The
creditor was therefore held entitled to collett the student loan debt because it was not discharged
in the Chapter 13 proceeding.
Steier v. Best. 287 B.R. 671 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
Here, a creditor alleged that a debt based on a state court judgment for breach of contract
was non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(6) (debt resulting from willful and malicious
injury) because the debtor had thwarted the creditor's pre-petition collection efforts. The
creditor also alleged the debt to be non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) (debt
resulting from reliance on materially false financial statement). The United States District Court
for the Western District ofKentucky affirmed the bankruptcy court's rejection ofboth claims.
Anthony Steier sued Michael Best and others in Jefferson Circuit Court for breach of a
Stock Purchase Agreement. On September 23, 2000, Steier obtained a judgment against them in
the amount of $300,000 plus interest. In partial satisfaction of the judgment Steier received
some payments from certain of the defendants and attached Best's personal bank account. Steier
claimed Best still owed him nearly $210,000 in principal and interest. Best and his wife filed a
Chapter 7 petition.
Steier filed an adversary proceeding to have the debt declared non-dischargeable pursuant
to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), 523(a)(2)(B), and 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy court ruled against
Steier on all three bases and he appealed the court's decision as it related to 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(6) and 523(a)(2)(B).
Steier premised his claim under 11 U.S.c. 523(a)(6) on the allegation that Best
continually lied to him about the location of his assets and hid money in his home to avoid
repaying Steier. Steier premised his claim under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) on the allegation that
he relied on a materially false financial statement given to him before his investment in the
venture with Best.
11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(6) provides that a debtor will not be discharged from a debt "for
willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity."
Steier contended that Best, by hiding money in his safe and failing to inform Steier of $164,000
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profit he earned from the sale of an office building, in an effort to avoid paying the judgment,
inflicted a second injury on Steier. The court rejected Steier's argument. The court stated that,
under 11 U.S.c. 523(a)(6), a creditor has the burden of proving that it sustained an injury as a
result of a willful and malicious act of the debtor. The court noted that Steier faced two
problems under 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(6). First, he could not demonstrate that the debt he was
seeking to have declared non-dischargeable arose from Best's actions to conceal his assets. To
the contrary, the court stated, the debt in question arose out of the breach of the Stock Purchase
Agreement. Second, Steier could not demonstrate an injury to his legally protected rights. The
court held that the judgment granted by the state court did not assign to Steier any superior rights
(as to other creditors) to any specific assets belonging to Best. The court held that, even if Best
intentionally avoided paying Steier, this did not amount to an 11 U.S.c. 523(a)(6) injury absent
some harm to Steier's legally protected rights.
The court also rejected Steier's arguments regarding 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B). Steier
contended that in making his investment, he relied on a financial statement that failed to disclose
liabilities which would have resulted in liabilities exceeding the venture's assets. The court
affirmed the bankruptcy court's finding that Steier had failed to prove that he reasonably relied
on the written statement. Steier's deposition testimony was that he did not rely on any written
documents, but on the enthusiasm of Best and another participant. Also, while Steier testified at
trial that he did rely on the financial statement, on cross-examination he admitted he did not
understand the financial statement and never asked questions about it.
In re Miller, 282 F.3d 874 (6th Cir. 2002)
In this case the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
judgment of the bankruptcy and district courts that a landlord had violated the discharge
injunction of the Bankruptcy Code and sanctioned the landlord. The landlord sought to recover
post-petition lot rent from the debtor for the continued presence of her mobile home on the
landlord's property after she abandoned the home and filed for bankruptcy protection.
Peggy A. Miller, a former tenant of Chateau Communities, Inc. ("Chateau"), owed rent
for the continued presence of her mobile home on Chateau's property after she abandoned the
home and filed for bankruptcy. She filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection on July
14, 1999. She listed a secured debt to Greentree Financial for a mortgage on her mobile home,
which exceeded the value of the home. She indicated her intent to surrender the mobile home on
her statement of intentions. On October 25, 1999 the bankruptcy court entered an Order of
Discharge. The same day Chateau asked Miller to pay $1,242.80 for rent owed and lot charges
from the date of the bankruptcy petition through the date Greentree Financial foreclosed on the
home. Chateau then moved for and obtained a state court judgment for money damages. Miller
then filed a contempt motion against Chateau in the bankruptcy court arguing that Chateau's
collection request violated the automatic stay and that subsequent acts to collect violated the
discharge injunction. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that
the landlord had violated the discharge injunction of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a), the district court
affirmed, and the landlord appealed.
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The court, in deciding this action, considered two questions: 1) whether the tenancy was
renewed post-petition; and 2) the effect of the automatic rejection provision of 11 U.S.C. § 365.
The debtor argued that any debt related to her tenancy arose pre-petition because she never
entered into any post-petition agreement with the landlord. The landlord responded by arguing
that the debtor's month-to-month tenancy was effectively renewed post-petition because she
failed to remove her trailer home from the property. In the alternative, the landlord argued that
under 11 U.S.c. § 554, the discharge effectively abandoned the property to the debtor, thereby
making her liable for rental payments until the lease was terminated. The court held that Miller's
month-to-month tenancy was not a series of new thirty-day contracts, but was one continuing
tenancy. In addition, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly held that the effect
ofthe automatic rejection under § 365(d)(1) was to create a breach of the lease on the part of the
debtor. I n other words, when the Trustee did not move to assume or reject the lease, it was
deemed rejected. The court further held that pursuant to § 365(g)(1), the rejection is treated as a
breach that took place immediately prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. This created a
pre-petition debt on the part of the plaintiff that was discharged under 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
Finally, the court concluded that the "abandonment" to the debtor arguably resulting from the
discharge did not give rise to post-petition liability.
Miller v. Miller, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22320 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
Here, the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky affirmed the
bankruptcy court's decision that a debtor's live-in girlfriend's income could be considered in
determining his ability to repay his debt.
The debtor owed his former wife over $267,000. A fier hearing evidence and making
factual findings, the bankruptcy court concluded that 75% of the debt was non-dischargeable
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) and was to be paid with interest. The court discharged the
remaining 25% of the obligation. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15)(B) allows the bankruptcy court to
discharge a debt that the debtor has to pay if the debtor proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that a discharge of the debt will result in a benefit to him that outweighs the detrimental
consequences of the discharge to the former spouse. The debtor moved to alter or amend the
judgment or for a new trial, which the bankruptcy court denied.
The debtor raised several challenges in his appeal. First, he challenged the court's
inclusion of the income of his live-in girlfriend in considering his income and ability to repay the
debt. The district court held that the bankruptcy court did not err as a matter of law in
considering the girlfriend's income. It held that the availability of her income improved the
debtor's economic circumstances and that his girlfriend, with whom he had a child, was living
with him in an arrangement of long duration in the home he retained from his prior marriage.
The court also based its decision on his future potential to earn money, as a result of his
partnership in a business with his long-time partner, and his apparent purposeful divestiture of
assets.
The debtor contended that the balancing of the hardships weighed in his favor and
therefore the finding of non-dischargeability was in error. The court considered his former
spouse's lifestyle, the debtor's bad faith and the ex-wife's good faith. The court upheld the
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bankruptcy court's conclusion that the debtor had failed to establish by a preponderance of
evidence that he would suffer greater hardship from the denial of discharge than his former wife
would suffer if discharge was afforded to him.
In re Leet, 274 H.R. 695 (6th HAP 2002)
In this case, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit reversed
the bankruptcy court's decision which permitted appellee creditors to proceed with their
complaint to determine dischargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523 despite the fact that the complaint
was filed two days late.
The sole issue presented in this appeal was whether or not the bankruptcy court erred in
allowing the creditors to file their non-dischargeability complaint two days past the deadline
provided for in Federal Rule Bankruptcy Procedure 4007(c) -- i.e., 60 days after the first date set
for the meeting of creditors under 11 U.S.c. § 341. The creditors' counsel mailed the complaint
to the court for filing several days in advance of the deadline. The bankruptcy court found that
counsel reasonably expected that the filing would be timely and used the court's authority under
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) to extend the deadline two days. The BAP reversed, holding that the time
limit is not subject toe quitable defenses (with a possible exception when t he court itself has
published an erroneous deadline). The BAP noted that this is the majority position.
Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the bankruptcy court should have
enforced Rule 4007(c) according to its letter. Because it did not, the interlocutory order of the
bankruptcy court was reversed and the proceeding was remanded to the bankruptcy court with
instructions to dismiss the creditors' complaint.
In re Sweeney, 276 H.R. 186 (6th Cir. HAP 2002)
Here the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded the decision of the bankruptcy court holding a debt non-dischargeable based on the
preclusive effect of a state court default judgment.
The plaintiffs brought an adversary action against the debtor under 11 U.S.c. §
523(a)(2)(A)(debt incurred by false pretenses, false representations or actual fraud other than a
statement respecting debtor's financial condition). Plaintiffs alleged the non-dischargeability of
a debt owed to them as a result of a default judgment in an Ohio State Court, concerning a
contract for the construction of a home. Service of process was by certified mail at one of the
debtor's business addresses, and the return receipt was signed by an employee of the business,
but the debtor did not answer the plaintiffs' lawsuit and the plaintiffs were granted default
judgment. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment and the debtor appealed.
. The court recognized three issues concerning whether collateral estoppel properly applied
here: 1) did the debtor have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims against him in the
state court action; 2) was the claim of fraud against the debtor actually and directly litigated in
the state court; and 3) does the Rooker-Feldman doctrine apply such that the discharging of the
debt in question would amount to a review and overruling of the state court's decision. The
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court held that the plaintiffs failed to carry their burden on their motion for summary judgment
on the basis of collateral estoppel, because the debtor did not have a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issues raised by the plaintiffs lawsuit. The plaintiff did not distinguish between the
debtor's business and residence service and it ignored the debtor's affidavit denying that he
received service. Based on the Ohio service rules, the court concluded plaintiffs did not prove
there was a fair opportunity to litigate the claims at the state court level. Next, the court ruled
that the issue had not been "actually litigated" at the state court level because it had been decided
on a motion for default judgment, and the trial court did not make findings and conclusions that
could support collateral estoppel. Finally, the court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did
not forbid the bankruptcy court from exercising jurisdiction over questions of dischargeability.
The court reversed the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the case.
D. Lien Avoidance
In re Brinley, 278 B.R. 130 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
In this case, the bankruptcy court addressed the issue of whether to consider the priority
of liens in applying the formula for avoidance of liens under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), which provides
for avoidance ofnon-consensual liens which impair exemptions.
Here, the debtor argued that the simple mathematical formula of 11 U.S.c. § 522(f)(2)(A)
should be applied literally, resulting in impairment of the exemption to the extent that the sum of
all liens on the property exceeds the value of the property in the absence of liens. The debtor's
property was encumbered by a $180,000 first mortgage, an approximately $112,000 judgment
lien and an approximately $80,000 second mortgage (in that priority). According to the debtor's
interpretation of the statute, the value of the property ($280,000) less the first mortgage
($180,000), less the second mortgage ($80,000), left less than $20,000, half of which was the
debtor's interest, and half of which represented the interest of the debtor's spouse. After
deducting the debtor's $6,000 exemption, approximately $4,000 remained in equity for the
judgment creditor's lien to attach. The debtor argued that the remainder of the creditor's
judgment lien would be avoided.
The court rejected this interpretation of § 522(f), as the second mortgage on the debtor's
residence was junior to the creditor's judgment lien. The court determined that, while §
522(f)(2)(A) makes no explicit reference to the priority ofposition of any of the liens included in
the calculation, the nature of the formula implicitly requires a determination of the relative
priorities of judicial liens. The court concluded that to hold otherwise would violate the takings
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The creditor is entitled to have the priority of its lien
considered, and only those encumbrances having priority over its interest are to be used in the
calculations. Thus, the formula must be applied to exclude junior, non-avoidable liens in the
computation ofwhether a creditor's judgment lien impairs the debtor's exemption.
Additionally, the court determined that the equity in the property should not be divided
in half based on the ownership of the property by the debtor in joint survivorship form with his
non-debtor spouse. Dividing t he equity between the debtor and his non-debtor spouse would
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alter the nature of the debtor's entireties interest in the property, afford the debtor a windfall, and
produce an inequitable result. Accordingly, pursuant to the court's calculations, starting with the
$280,000 property value and deducting the $180,000 first mortgage and the $6,000 exemption
left $94,000 in equity to which the judgment lien would attach. The creditor's lien was avoided
in the amount of the remaining approximately $18,000.
In re Radcliffe, 278 B.R. 426 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002), decided on the same day, uses
this same analysis in a case involving the same lien creditor.
In re Kroskie. 315 F.3d 644 (6th eire 2003)
This case involved the proper method of perfecting a security interest when a state's
general property law conflicts with a specific state statute regarding perfection of a security
interest in certain property.
The debtors owned a mobile home affixed to their real property. In 1999, they refinanced
their real estate and mobile home with a loan from R-B Financial Mortgages, Inc. ("R-B
Financial"), secured by a mortgage which R-B Financial recorded in the Register of Deeds of the
appropriate county on January 21, 1999. Simultaneously, the mortgage was assigned to Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corporation ("Chase Manhattan"). Pursuant to Michigan's Mobile Home
Commission Act (MHCA), the method for perfecting a security interest in a mobile home
located in Michigan is to file all certificates oftitle and security interests with Michigan's Mobile
Home Commission. Neither R-B Financial nor Chase Manhattan filed anything with the Mobile
Home Commission. Ten months after refinancing their real estate and mobile home, the debtors
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The Trustee filed a motion for summary judgment
seeking to avoid the Chase Manhattan mortgage as not properly perfected under Michigan law.
The bankruptcy court granted the Trustee's motion for summary judgment. Chase Manhattan
appealed, and the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan reversed the
judgment, holding that Chase Manhattan had perfected its security interest in the affixed mobile
home when it recorded its mortgage with the appropriate county Register of Deeds. The Trustee
appealed.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with
instructions that the bankruptcy court's judgment be affirmed. In so holding, the court
determined that the general rule that a security interest in a fixture can be perfected through a
properly recorded mortgage on real estate does not govern where, as here, there i s a specific
statute dealing with mobile home security interests. The court rejected Chase Manhattan's
argument that parts of Michigan's Article 9 of the UCC dealing with fixtures could be read in
harmony with the MHCA's provisions, because all security interests and fixtures do not have to
be perfected under Article 9 as do all security interests in mobile homes under the MHCA.
Furthermore, this argument was considered to ignore a key provision of Michigan's Article 9
which expressly provided that "a security interest in property subject to the [MHCA] can be
perfected only by compliance therewith." Mich. Compo Laws § 440.9302 (4) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Trustee's interest as a statutory judgment lien creditor was superior to the unperfected
interest of Chase Manhattan, and the Trustee was permitted to avoid Chase Manhattan's interest.
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E. Exemptions
In re Duvall, 281 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
This case involves the question of whether a debtor who is entitled to an Earned Income
Credit ("EIC") may exempt this portion of his or her tax refund under KRS 205.220(3), which
exempts "public assistance" from levy or execution. That statute defines "public assistance" as
money, grants, assistance in kind or services to or for the benefit of needy persons. In several
cases, which were consolidated here, the debtors attempted to exempt the EIC portion of their tax
refunds. The Trustees objected to the claimed exemptions. The court held that the EIC is not
exempt pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Sorenson v. Secretary of
Treasury ofthe US., 475 U.S. 851 (1986), which held that the EIC is not in the nature of public
assistance, but rather is a refunded tax overpayment. Because the court determined the EIC is
not a welfare grant, but rather an incentive to work, the E IC was determined property 0 ft he
estate which debtors may not exempt under KRS 205.220(3).
Note: This case appears to conflict with In re Sharp, 286 B.R. 627 (Bankr. B.D. Ky. 2002),
below, which permitted an exemption for the debtor's EIC.
In re Sharp. 286 B.R. 627 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2002)
Here, the IRS's set-off rights concerning a tax refund were deemed limited by the
debtor's statutory exemptions for public assistance benefits and other funds.
The IRS and the debtor had mutual obligations. The IRS owed the debtor a refund for the
2001 tax year in the amount of $4,715, and the debtor owed the IRS income taxes for 1992 in the
amount of $3,115.93, which was dischargeable. The IRS sought stay relief in order to offset the
refund amount against the tax liability pursuant to 11 U.S.c. § 553. That section permits setoff
where the following three factors are present: (1) a debt is owed by the creditor to the debtor
which arose prior to the commencement of.a bankruptcy case; (2) the creditor has a claim against
the debtor which arose prior to the bankruptcy case; and (3) the debt and claim are mutual
obligations. The bankruptcy court determined that all three factors were present. However, it
also determined that certain portions of the debtor's refund were exempt from setoff. The court
concluded that, pursuant to KRS 205.220(3), public assistance benefits are exempt from levy or
execution and cannot be reached by creditors in bankruptcy. Furthermore, KRS 427.160
provides a $1,000 general exemption. If the IRS does not file an objection to the debtor's
claimed exemption of EIC funds, as it did not here, the tax refund becomes exempt under § 522
(a) so long as none of the exceptions found in § 522(c)(I) through (4) (non-dischargeable debts,
secured debts and debts fraudulently incurred for educational assistance), apply, which they did
not. Accordingly, the court determined the debtor could claim an exemption as to her Earned
Income Credit in the amount of $2,705 and as to her 2001 refund in the amount of $1,000. The
court granted the IRS relief from the automatic stay to offset the remaining amount of the
debtor's 2001 refund against the 1992 tax liability.
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Note that the bankruptcy court here presumes that the EIC is a public assistance benefit,
with little discussion of the issue, perhaps based on the lack of objection to the claimed
exemption. In In re Duvall, above, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Kentucky ruled that EIC is not an exempt form ofpublic assistance.
Schilling v. Tran, 287 B.R. 887 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
Here, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order permitting husband and
wife debtors to combine both their vehicle exemptions to fully exempt one vehicle.
In this Chapter 7 proceeding, the Trustee appealed the bankruptcy court's order
overruling the Trustee's objection to the exemptions claimed by the debtors to a 1995 automobile
valued at $4,500. The debtors claimed the entire value of the vehicle was exempt pursuant to
KRS 427.010(1), which provides that an individual debtor may exempt one motor vehicle not
exceeding $2,500 in value. The debtors each claimed this exemption in the vehicle, thus
exempting the entire claimed value of $4,500. The Trustee objected on the ground that the
vehicle was titled to the debtors in the alternative, and thus, their ownership was not joint
ownership. The bankruptcy court rejected this argument because, pursuant to KRS 186.010(7),
both debtors were "owners" of the vehicle since both were listed as owners on the title. The
court held that it need only conclude that the debtors each own the vehicle to determine that they
are each entitled to a claim of exemption in bankruptcy. The district court further noted that
nothing in KRS 427.010(1) indicates that only one owner may claim an exemption in a vehicle.
Therefore, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order overruling the Trustee's
objection.
F. Jurisdiction
In re Hood, 319 F. 3d 755 (6th eire 2003)
In this case, the Sixth Circuit dealt with the abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the
context of the Bankruptcy Code. The court concluded that the Bankruptcy Clause granted
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity, which power Congress clearly
exercised in 11 U.S.C. § 106(a).
The debtor filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, at which time she owed money on
student loans guaranteed by the Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC). TSAC took
no action in the bankruptcy case, and Hood was granted a discharge. She later filed an adversary
proceeding requesting discharge of her educational loans on the grounds of undue hardship
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). TSAC moved to dismiss, asserting that the adversary
proceeding was barred by sovereign immunity. The bankruptcy court denied the motion to
dismiss, holding that 11 U.S.c. § 106 properly abrogated TSAC's sovereign immunity. The
BAP affirmed, and TSAC appealed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in a lengthy analysis of the
Bankruptcy Clause ofArticle I, Section 8 of the Constitution.
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The court began its analysis by citing the conclusion of Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 V .S. 44, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), that the Indian Commerce
Clause did not grant Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. "[T]he Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional imitations placed u~on federal jurisdiction." The Sixth Circuit
noted that five other circuits (3rd, 4th, 5th, 7th and 9t ) have concluded that, under Seminole Tribe,
Congress could not abrogate state sovereign immunity by relying on its Bankruptcy Clause
powers. The Sixth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion, based on an analysis of the grant by
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the power to establish "uniform" bankruptcy laws and
what the court deemed to be the intent of the framers that a constitutional uniformity requirement
gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction of an issue and authorizes abrogation of state
sovereign immunity. Accordingly, TSAC was held not to be immune from suit under 11 V.S.C. §
523 (a)(8).
Pratt v. Ventas. Inc.• et aL, 273 B.R. 108 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
This case involved the propriety of a creditor's collateral attack on the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court in another circuit. In this putative class action, several plaintiffs alleged
fraudulent use of the federal bankruptcy process. The plaintiffs had previously filed various state
court actions against the debtor, the former Vencor, Inc., and a related company, Ventas, Inc. In
1999, Vencor filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. Vencor's confirmed plan of reorganization
contained an injunction proscribing certain suits directed not only against Vencor, but also
against Ventas. The plan also prohibited the plaintiffs from seeking redress against Vencor,
Ventas, or their officers for any alleged improprieties committed in connection with Vencor's
bankruptcy prior to the date of confirmation.
The plaintiffs brought the instant suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky alleging RICO violations, common law fraud, and tortious interference with
contractual advantage, and alleging Ventas had fraudulently used the bankruptcy process to
evade the plaintiffs' pre-bankruptcy claims. The defendants responded that the plaintiffs were
waging a collateral attack upon the validity of a confirmed plan approved by another federal
court, a challenge that must be pursued via direct appeal. The plaintiffs did not dispute that the
Delaware Bankruptcy Court entered an order ostensibly prohibiting their claims. However, they
asserted that the bankruptcy court exceeded its jurisdictional bounds by enjoining post-
confirmation suits against a non-debtor third-party for its pre-confirmation actions.
The District Court for the Western District of Kentucky noted that plaintiffs could have a
legitimate argument that the Delaware Bankruptcy Court's confirmation of a plan protecting
non-debtor third parties from liability was erroneous. However, the district court, citing Celotex
Corp. v. Edwards, 514 V.S. 300 (1995), held that the plaintiffs were barred from collaterally
attacking the confirmation order issued by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, because the proper
method of attacking that court's judgment was via direct appeal. The district court concluded
that it could not exercise appellate review over the Delaware bankruptcy proceedings, because an
appeal can be taken only by the district court for the judicial district in which the bankruptcy
judge is serving. In so holding, the district court expressly declined to consider whether the
bankruptcy court exceeded its statutory authority in granting injunctive reliefto the defendants.
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G. Attorney Conduct
In re Desilets, 291 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 2002)
Here, the Sixth Circuit held that federal, not state, admission standards control practice in
federal courts. The court reversed the decision of the bankruptcy and district courts that Allen J.
Rittenhouse was not an attorney as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4) because he was not admitted to
the bar of the state where a bankruptcy in which he appeared was pending. The central issue in
this case was whether the "applicable law" authorizing an attorney to practice before the
bankruptcy court consists solely of the federal rules for admission to the federal bar, or also
includes the state rules for admission to the state bar.
Rittenhouse was counsel of record for the debtor, Ernest J. Desilets, in a bankruptcy
proceeding in Michigan. During the bankruptcy proceeding, Delta Home Improvement, Inc.
moved the court to suspend Rittenhouse from practicing before the bankruptcy courts, to require
him to disgorge fees, and to sanction him for the unauthorized practice of law. Rittenhouse was
admitted to the practice oflaw in Texas in 1992. He then moved to Wisconsin. His applications
for admission to the Wisconsin and Michigan bars were denied. However, he was admitted to
the bar of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan, pursuant to a
local ruling permitting admission of an attorney admitted in any state. He has an office in his
home in Wisconsin and also an office in Michigan, and his practice is limited to bankruptcy
matters in federal court.
However, because Rittenhouse had not been authorized by the state bar of Michigan to
practice law in the state of Michigan, the bankruptcy court held that Rittenhouse was not an
"attorney" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 101(4). The bankruptcy
court held that Rittenhouse was a bankruptcy preparer under 11 U.S.C. § 110(a), fined him,
ordered disgorgement of fees, and ultimately suspended him from appearing before that court.
The district court affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's decision. The Sixth Circuit followed
the Ninth Circuit in holding that federal standards govern practice before the federal bar. It also
relied 0 n Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 ( 1963) in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Florida could not apply its licensing requirements to an attorney to prevent him from preparing
patents, since he was registered to practice before the U.S. Patent Office. The Sixth Circuit
rejected the bankruptcy court's attempt to distinguish between the "practice in this court"
permitted by the federal local rule, and the general practice of law, holding that the phrase is
broad enough to encompass more than just court appearances (i.e., it includes counseling
clients).
The court further noted that Rittenhouse met the requirements of the local rule because he
did have a valid state source of authority to practice law: he was properly licensed by Texas.
Finally, the Sixth Circuit found that the bankruptcy court's analysis suffered from a practical
failing -- it did not realistically distinguish between Rittenhouse and those attorneys who have
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their offices across the border, but do all of their work before the Michigan federal courts. The
court noted that if the bankruptcy court's analysis were accepted it would equally extend to other
non-Michigan lawyers who regularly work in Michigan (i.e., lawyers working for large New
York firms and others, using admission pro hac vice).
In re Big Rivers Electric Corp. 284 B.R. 580 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2002)
In this case, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky ordered a
bankruptcy examiner to disgorge all fees and denied his final application for fees. The court did
so after concluding that the examiner had breached his fiduciary duties to the estate by
negotiating for private compensation arrangements with three unsecured creditors, based on
"new value" produced for the estate and the amounts paid on their claims.
The government argued that the examiner was not a "disinterested person" as required
under the bankruptcy law, because of his private negotiations with certain creditors for enhanced
compensation. The examiner countered by arguing that the government lacked standing and that
there was nothing improper in him asking for a percentage-based fee. The court rejected the
examiner's argument and held that there was standing. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that an
examiner must be a "disinterested person" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules. The government argued that even if the examiner was disinterested when initially
selected, he lost his disinterested status when he approached certain unsecured creditors and
solicited them to pay a percentage of his compensation. The examiner argued that he was
disinterested because even though he discussed his compensation with the unsecured creditors,
(1) there was never any agreement; (2) it was clear that any fee agreement would have to be
approved by the bankruptcy court; (3) the examiner received permission from the bankruptcy
court to discuss compensation with these creditors; and (4) when the examiner and one of the
creditors reached an agreement, it was immediately disclosed to the other parties.
The court rejected this argument and held that the examiner was no longer "disinterested"
as required by the Bankruptcy Code after he approached the creditors. The court held that while
there was nothing in the Bankruptcy Code or Rules which prevented the examiner from
requesting an enhanced fee, any such fee would ultimately be determined by the bankruptcy
court. The court held that while the examiner could have properly requested and been entitled to
an enhanced fee, in this case he had pursued it in an improper way which required disgorgement
of fees. The court also held that the examiner had violated his duty to disclose to the court all
compensation proposed to be paid.
H. Miscellaneous
Federal Communications Commission v. Nextwave, 123 S. Ct. 832; 154 L. Ed. 2d 863 (2002)
Here, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the United State Supreme Court held that the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) cancellation of Nextwave's licenses for
broadband personal communication services based upon non-payment was aviolation of § 525(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code as a revocation of a government license solely for non-payment of the
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debtor's dischargeable debts. Further, the Court held that no statutory conflict existed between
the Bankruptcy Code and the Communications Act because the latter did not require cancellation
as a sanction for the debtor's failure to make installment payments.
Pursuant to provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 the FCC awarded spectrum
licenses to small business through competitive bidding and allowed them to pay for the licenses
in installments. The FCC auctioned off certain broadband personal communications services
licenses to respondent Nextwave. Nextwave made a downpayment on the purchase price, signed
promissory notes for the balance, and executed agreements giving the FCC a first lien on, and
security interest in, Nextwave's rights and interests in the licenses. Nextwave eventually filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and suspended payments to all creditors, including the
FCC, pending confirmation of its reorganization plan. However, the FCC took the position that
Nextwave's licenses had been cancelled automatically when Nextwave failed to make the
payment due on those licenses and the FCC announced are-auction.
The bankruptcy court held that the cancellations violated various Bankruptcy Code
provisions. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that exclusive jurisdiction to review the FCC's
regulatory action lies with the courts of appeals and that Nextwave could pursue a regulatory
challenge. Following the FCC's denial of Nextwave's petition for reconsideration of the license
cancellation, the District of Columbia Circuit Court ofAppeals held that the cancellation violated
11 U.S.C. § 525(a), which provides "A governmental unit may not ... revoke ... a license ... to
... a debtor ... solely because such ... debtor ... has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in the
case." The FCC appealed.
The Court noted that federal courts are to overturn agency decisions that are contrary to
law, including 11 U.S.C. § 525(a), and not just the laws the particular agency is charged with
enforcing. However, the FCC argued that it did not revoke Nextwave's licenses "solely
because" of non-payment under § 525(a). Rather, it claimed it had a valid regulatory motive.
The Court rejected this argument and held the fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for
its action was irrelevant. Further, the Court held that § 525 means nothing more or less than that
the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause of the cancellation,
whatever the agency's motive may be. The Court further held that, because Congress made
several express regulatory exceptions to § 525(a), the Court would not interpret the statute as
including implicit exceptions for valid regulatory purposes.
Next, the FCC contended that regulatory conditions such as full and timely payment were
not "debts" under § 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Again, the Court rejected this contention.
The Court held that under the Bankruptcy Code, "debt" means "liability on a claim," and
"claim," has the "broadest available definition" and includes any "right to payment." Finally, the
Court opined that the plain meaning of a "right to payment" was nothing more nor less than an
enforceable obligation, regardless of the FCC's objectives in imposing the obligation. Next, the
FCC argued that Nextwave's obligations were not "dischargeable" under § 525(a) because it was
beyond the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional authority to alter or modify regulatory obligations.
In rejecting this argument the Court held that dischargeability is not tied to the existence of such
authority. The court held that the Bankruptcy Code allows the discharge of any debt that arose
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before the confinnation date and the only debts it excepts are those specifically enumerated in
the Code.
Finally, the Court also rejected the FCC's argument that this Court's interpretation of §
525 created a conflict with the Communications Act by obstructing the functioning of that Act's
auction provisions. The Court held that nothing in t hat act demands that cancellation bet he
sanction for failure to make agreed upon periodic paYments. The Court held that what the FCC
described as a conflict was actually nothing more than a policy preference for (1) selling licenses
on credit and (2) canceling licenses rather than asserting security interests when there is a
default.
There is an extensive dissent by Justice Breyer.
In Fe Majewski, 310 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 2002)
In this case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affinned the judgment of the district and
bankruptcy courts that an employer did not discriminate against the debtor by firing him after he
indicated his intent to file bankruptcy.
The debtor incurred large medical expenses at the hospital where he was employed.
After repaYment negotiations failed, he told the hospital he intended to file for bankruptcy
protection. T he hospital fired him before he did so. T he Trustee in the debtor's bankruptcy
contended that the firing violated the Bankruptcy Code provision barring tennination of an
individual who "is or has been" a bankruptcy debtor "solely because" the individual is or has
been a debtor in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.c. § 525(b). The bankruptcy court held that the statute did
not protect people who had not yet filed a bankruptcy petition. It dismissed the Trustee's claim
against the hospital. The district court affinned.
The trustee contended that the Ninth Circuit should interpret the anti-discrimination
provision of the Bankruptcy Code liberally to apply to debtors before they file a bankruptcy
petition. In support of his position, he compared the Bankruptcy Code to the anti-retaliation
provisions of remedial statutes such as Title VII of the Civil Acts Right of 1964 and the Fair
Labor Standard Act. The court rejected his arguments and held that, while courts encourage the
reporting of statutory violations, they do not wish to encourage persons to file for bankruptcy or
to threaten bankruptcy. The court further stated that the intent is to protect those who actually
have invoked the protection of the bankruptcy laws to obtain a fresh start.
The court noted:
The fonnal act of filing is more significant in bankruptcy than in other contexts ...
Bankruptcy's fresh start comes at the cost of actually filing a bankruptcy petition,
turning one's assets over to the court and repaying debts that can be repaid. One is
not entitled to the law's protections . . . before being bound by its other
consequences.
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There is an extensive dissent, arguing that the majority had adopted an unnaturally rigid
and formalistic construction of the Bankruptcy Code that contravened Congress's clear intent: to
insulate debtors from unfair employment practices directly tied to their attempts to get a "fresh
start."
In re Bard. 49 Fed. Appx. 528 (6th Cir. 2002)(Not Published)
The debtor filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in 1994. Subsequently, she filed a
complaint against her former employer in federal district court under the Americans with
Disabilities Act. While that action was pending, the debtor converted her bankruptcy proceeding
into a Chapter 7 in 1998. Upon the conversion into a Chapter 7 matter, the bankruptcy Trustee
became the real-party-in-interest in the debtor's suit against her employer. In that capacity, the
Trustee reached a settlement agreement with the debtor's employer. The Trustee sought the
bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement agreement, which the court granted over the
debtor's objection. The debtor argued that the Trustee failed to seek expert assistance in
reaching a fair settlement, failed to accurately determine the value of the debtor's employment
claim, and failed to consider the debtor's interest as a residual claimant. The bankruptcy court
disagreed, holding the proposed settlement agreement was fair and equitable to the bankruptcy
estate. The debtor appealed, and the district court affirmed. Upon further appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed, holding the bankruptcy court had meticulously and properly analyzed each of
the relevant factors in approving the compromise request. The bankruptcy court considered and
weighed the uncertainty of the outcome of the employment litigation, the certainty ofpayment in
full to creditors upon approval of the compromise agreement, the uncertainty of the cost to
pursue the litigation, and several other factors, and concluded that the proposed compromise met
a fair and equitable standard. The Sixth Circuit found this analysis was sound, and not clearly
erroneous.
In re Sallee. 286 F.3d 878 (6th Cir. 2002)
Here, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment in favor of
the debtors on a significant portion of their lender liability claim against Fort Knox Bank. The
Sixth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that the bank was a fiduciary to its
customers, and found error in the calculation of damages. The case includes thorough
discussions of fiduciary relationships, fraud by omission and election ofremedies.
The appellant Fort Knox National Bank ("Fort Knox Bank") was a small bank, which had
made numerous business loans to the Bramblett family, which loans were undersecured and
likely to default. In 1988, Worth Sallee purchased Mr. Bramblett's convenience store with
financing from Fort Knox Bank. In 1989 the Sallees bought from the Brambletts a laundromat
located next to the convenience store, which Fort Knox Bank financed in the amount of
$575,000 on a short-term note with subsequent long-term financing anticipated. The loan
officers at Fort Knox Bank provided one appraisal of the laundromat to the Sallees but did not
disclose that they had other wildly inconsistent appraisals of the same property by the same
appraiser, apparently always in amounts necessary to support whatever loan the Brambletts had
requested.
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The bank then stopped all commercial lending. However, the bank got the Sallees to sign
two extension agreements, containing releases, without disclosing that the interim loan would not
be converted to long-term financing.
On October 17, 1990 Fort Knox Bank sued the Sallees seeking to foreclose on the
property securing the $575,000 loan. The Sallees then filed a counterclaim alleging, among
other things, fraud in the inducement relative to the purchase of the laundromat and breach of the
contract for financing the laundromat purchase. The Sallees then filed a petition for bankruptcy
and all actions were moved to the bankruptcy court as an adversary proceeding.
The bankruptcy court awarded the Sallees compensatory damages of over $1.7 million
and punitive damages of $1.2 million against Fort Knox Bank. In their appeal, Fort Knox Bank
and its parent company claimed the bankruptcy and district courts erred by holding that the
release in the extension agreement did not preclude the Sallees' claims, and by concluding that
Fort Knox Bank owed a fiduciary duty to the Sallees. They argued that Fort Knox Bank could
not be liable for fraud because the Sallees could not prove reasonable reliance without a
fiduciary duty. They also argued that the bankruptcy court erred in determining damages and
awarding punitive damages.
The Sixth Circuit ruled that there was no fiduciary relationship between Fort Knox Bank
and the Sallees, citing the rule that there is not typically such a relationship between bank and
customer and noting the lack of a long lasting relationship and the Sallees' relationship with
another bank. The court held that the record did support the bankruptcy court's finding of fraud
based in part on the loan officer's provision of one appraisal but failure to disclose the others.
Next, the court ruled that the releases in the extension agreement were not enforceable as Fort
Knox Bank had procured them by fraud, given that the loan officers knew that the Fort Knox
Bank no longer intended to give the Sallees a long-term loan. The court held further that the
Sallees were precluded from seeking damages flowing from an inducement of the laundromat
purchase, because they had elected to affirm the transaction and to sue for fraudulent
misrepresentation. This court awarded the Sallees damages of $421,000, which was the
difference between the laudromat's final appraisal value and what it was actually worth the day
the Sallees purchased it. Finally, the court agreed that a punitive damages a ward 0 f 75% 0 f
compensatory damages was appropriate.
III. ELECTRONIC CASE FILING UPDATE
A. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of Kentucky2
• The Western District is going to a second version of the Electronic Case Filing program
within two to three months. The biggest change for creditor counsel will be the inability
to see debtors' social security numbers (change mandated by Congress).
2 Information provided by John Brubaker, Chief Deputy Clerk, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Western District of
Kentucky.
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• Credit Card payments for filing fees, etc. will soon be made by the internet, as opposed to
the present card number on file system.
B. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of Kentucky3
• The Eastern District moves to all Electronic Case Filing in all cases, as ofMay 1, 2003.
Paper filing will no longer be accepted.
• Trial orders now require hyper-linking on much briefing. Instructions are at the court's
website.
IV. BANKRUPTCY LEGISLATION
• The House ofRepresentatives passed H.R. 975, "Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention And
Consumer Protection Act of2003," on March 19,2003, by a vote of315-113.
• The bill is largely in the form oflast year's conference report.
• The bill has been placed on the Senate calendar, but Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY)
threatens a filibuster.
3 Information provided by David T. Miller, member of systems staff, Clerk of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern
District of Kentucky.
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COMMERCIAL CODE
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Morgan & Pottinger, P.S.C.
NO STATUTES - THREE CASES - NO ERRORS
The Cecilian Bank v. Sarver, 2003 WL 1249021 (Ky.App. Feb. 7,2003)
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in a not to be published decision, vacated a judgment of
the Hardin Circuit Court which had ruled the bank's action on a note was outside the applicable
statute of limitations. The 1990 revisions to Article 3, effective in Kentucky January 1, 1997,
provide at KRS 355.3-118(1): "[A]n action to enforce the obligation ofa party to a note payable
at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the
note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date."
The note matured January 15, 1994, and the suit to enforce the note was not brought until
August 31, 2000. The trial court found the action untimely and entered judgment for the
defendant. Applying KRS 446.080(3), the Kentucky Court of Appeals found the new statute of
limitations to be prospective in nature and inappropriately applied by the trial court as
retroactive.
Prior to enactment of Revised Article 3, there was no separate statute of limitations for
notes outside of the general law of Kentucky. Now, 3-118 sets out a series of statutes of
limitation for various forms of instruments, notes, and drafts. If the dates of the note and the
lawsuit were each three years later, the result may have been different.
In Re: Kentuckiana Truck & Trailer Repair, Inc., Ralph and McKinley v. Stock Yards Bank
and Trust Co., _BR_, 2002 WL 32065982 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. July 15, 2002).
Owners of an interest in a business sold their interest with the debt secured by a security
interest in all of the business's personal property assets. Plaintiffs perfected their security
interest by filing a financing statement; however, the financing statement was filed more than
three years after the date of the bank's filing on the same assets. They attacked the bank's
priority based the future advances and cross-collateralization clauses in the bank's
documentation.
Plaintiffs argued that loans made by the bank subsequent to the plaintiffs' transaction
with the debtor were not of the same type or class as the bank's previous loans and did not
qualify as future advances for the purpose of the priority of the security interest under
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Kentucky's VCC. The only prior case law on this issue involved a consumer transaction and
could have been interpreted as adverse to the bank's interest. However, Judge Joan Cooper
found that the subsequent "loans were business loans for the purchase of inventory, working
capital, the acquisition of real estate, and are not so unlike the [prior] loans [that they should be]
cast as a different type or class of loan." In view of the prior ruling on a consumer credit fact
situation, this decision is an important and correct decision on the priority of a security interest
securing future advances in a commercial setting.
In Re: Alabama Land and Mineral Corp., National City Bank ofKentucky v. Toffel, Trustee,
292 F.3d 1319 (11 th Cir. 2002).
The Eleventh Circuit found that a Kentucky bank held a valid common law pledge of an
uncertificated certificate of deposit and reversed the Bankruptcy Court and District Court for the
Northern District ofAlabama that awarded the proceeds to a trustee in bankruptcy. National
City held over a million dollars in the account as collateral for the Bank's obligation on a letter
ofcredit that it paid for the benefit of the bankrupt debtor.
The CD was issued in receipt form as opposed to a formal certificate. However, the
lower courts did not distinguish between the forms a CD can take and found National City did
not properly perfect its security interest because it did not take possession of an instrument; an
impossibility since none had been issued. A real Catch 22 for the Bank.
National City argued that the Court should look to Revised Article 9 that recognizes CDs
are not always issued in instrument form and that those which are not are deposit accounts. The
Circuit Court relied on the authority of an Official Comment to Revised 9-102 (noting that
Kentucky has adopted the Official Comments as interpretative of its VCC) as a clarification of
the former law, found that the uncertificated CD should be classified as a deposit account, that
deposit accounts were outside the scope of former Article 9, and that National City's security
interest was properly taken through a common law pledge.
Deposit accounts taken as security in commercial transactions are within the scope of
Revised Article 9. A security interest in a deposit account held by the secured party is
automatically perfected through possession. Perfection in a deposit account held by a third party
is through a control agreement. (See below for discussion of perfection of security interests in
deposit accounts.)
ISSUES UNDER REVISED ARTICLE 9
Security Interests In Deposit Accounts
Deposit accounts, formerly excluded from the law of secured transactions, are now
available as collateral for commercial loans. Not only are deposit accounts within the expanded
scope of Revised Article 9, the drafters also included a set of bank friendly rules on the priority
ofclaims and the perfection of security interests.
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The definition of "deposit account" picks up demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar
accounts maintained with a bank or credit union. The definition is expanded by an Official
Comment to include uncertificated certificates of deposit. (Official Comment 12 to 9-102.)
You obtain a security interest in deposit accounts as you do in any other collateral,
through granting language in an authenticated record. Perfection of a security interest in deposit
accounts is similar to perfection in investment property and is dependent on control of the
account by the secured party.
The secured party is deemed to have control if it is the depository bank that maintains the
account. If the secured party does not maintain the deposit account, it can establish control
through an agreement between the account holder and the depository institution that the
depository will comply with the instructions of the secured party regarding funds in the account.
The secured party may also perfect its security interest if it becomes the depository bank's
customer for the account.
A bank can take a security interest in accounts it maintains through its deposit agreement
with its customer. At least one prominent commentator on Article 9 suggests that new deposit
agreements may not have to be signed if the customer is notified in a monthly statement that the
bank intends to take a security interest in the account and the customer continues to use the
account after receipt of the notice. The notice in the statement is the record, and the customer's
use of the account is authentication ofthe record.
Certificates of deposit that are evidenced by an instrument are excluded from the term
deposit account. However, Revised Article 9's definition of deposit accounts includes
uncertificated certificates of deposit. Uncertificated CDs usually take the form of a receipt for a
deposit that may specify an interest rate and a minimum term. A security interest in this form of
CD can be taken through an authenticated record. If the bank opening the CD is the secured
party, the security interest is automatically perfected through control.
A certificated CD that is nonnegotiable is a deposit account only if it is not an instrument.
The answer turns on whether the nonnegotiable CD is "of a type that in the ordinary course of
business is transferred by delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment." It may be
emblazoned with language indicating that the CD is not transferable, or that it is nonnegotiable,
and still be classified as an instrument under the transfer test.
The best way to avoid litigation over whether a CD is a deposit account, and subject to
your security interest perfected by control, is to not issue paper form CDs. As long as there is no
writing evidencing the bank'sobligation to pay, your customer's CD is clearly a deposit account.
A receipt for a deposit, even one labeled as a CD, remains a deposit account as long as it is not
an obligation ofthe bank.
The first court test under of the new law involved a Kentucky bank. The United States
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit applied Revised Article 9 to a fact situation that arose under
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the fonner law (on the basis that the new law is a clarification of the fonner) to find that an
uncertificated CD for over a million dollars was a deposit account that did not require possession
for perfection. In Re: Alabama Land And Mineral Corp., National City Bank ofKentucky v.
Tolfel, 292 F.3d 1319 (11 th Cir. 2002).
Under fonner Article 9, security interests could reach deposit accounts only through
attachment to the identifiable proceeds of other types of collateral such as inventory or accounts.
The security interest would remain attached upon deposit and the extent of the interest
established through equitable tracing theories such as the lowest intennediate balance rule. That
type of security interest continues under Revised Article 9, however, it is inferior in priority to a
prior perfected security interest in the same account.
A depository bank has control of its deposit accounts as a matter of law and beats a
claimant to proceeds of collateral in the account. The new rule statutorily reverses the case law
established in Kentucky by General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Lincoln National Bank,
18 S.W.3d 337 (Ky. 2000). In that case GMAC recovered the proceeds of its collateral from a
bank that had setoff a dealer's deposits to cover overdraft balances. Now, GMAC would prevail
against the bank only if it had a control agreement with the bank, if GMAC became the bank's
customer for the account, or if GMAC could prove collusion between the bank and its customer.
Moreover, even if a bank has not taken a security interest in its deposit account, and is
instead exercising its common law right of setoff, it still wins under the new priority rules. The
rule at 9-340 is that a bank that maintains the depository account may setoff against a secured
party that holds an interest in the account unless the secured party has established control of the
account through the proper three party control agreement.
Similarly, the payees of checks or other transferees in the ordinary course are protected
from a secured party attempting to recover proceeds of collateral. A transferee takes the money
free of a security interest unless it acts in collusion with the debtor.
The rules protecting depository banks and transferees were negotiated into the new law
by representatives of the Federal Reserve System whose goal was to preserve the integrity of the
payment system. Non-bank asset based lenders, particularly floor plan lenders, are negotiating
with depository banks on protection of their security interest in proceeds of their collateral.
However, Revised Article 9 also specifies that a bank is not required to enter into a control
agreement with a secured party even if the bank's customer so requests or directs.
Practically, banks may have to decide i ft he benefit 0 fk eeping t he account 0 utweighs
giving a third party control of the account and a priority ahead of the bank's security interest.
(One of our clients has attracted additional deposits by agreeing to enter into control agreements
with automobile floor plan lenders.) At a minimum, banks will have to closely monitor accounts
over which another secured party has control and recognize the risk in paying any item drawn on
the account on an overdrawn basis.
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One advantage of taking a security interest in deposit accounts as collateral in a
commercial transaction, as opposed to relying on the right of setoff, is that the bank is better
protected against a creditor that levies a garnishment on the account. Kentucky case law is that a
bank that does not setoff an account until after being served with a garnishment loses tot he
judgment creditor (Ferguson Enterprises v. Main Supply, 818 S.W.2d 98 (Ky.App. 1993)).
Under the new rule, a bank with a security interest in the deposit account wins the priority fight
with the judgment creditor.
One of the elements of the "Consumer Compromise" in the drafting of Revised Article 9
was to exclude deposit accounts from the scope of the law in consumer transactions. Consumer
advocates were concerned that secured parties would use the leverage of their superior position
to take a security interest in deposit accounts in all transactions.
Revised Article 9's definition of a consumer transaction is similar to that found in truth-
in-lending law (an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes) but does not
impose the $25,000 cap. A 11 consumer transactions, regardless 0 famount are excluded from
Article 9. However, a bank continues to retain its common law right of setoff over deposit
accounts maintained by a consumer when the consumer defaults on an obligation to the bank.
A few states, including Illinois, adopted non-uniform versions of former Article 9 that
allowed security interests in deposit accounts as collateral in all transactions including those
involving consumers. Some consultants advised banks to adopt the law of these states in their
security and deposit agreements.
With Revised Article 9, in commercial transactions, there is no need to consider that
option. As to consumer transactions, there is little likelihood that a Kentucky court would
enforce an agreement that selected the law of another state to govern a transaction between a
Kentucky bank and a Kentucky consumer.
Perfecting and Protecting Security Interests In Agricultural Collateral
Agricultural collateral is an important asset of many lenders. Knowing how properly to
perfect your security interest in farm products can save your collateral from the grasp of another
secured party or a trustee in bankruptcy.
Revised Article 9 brought significant changes in the perfection process for ag interests.
Achieving perfection is much easier for crops but involves additional steps for livestock.
Under the former law, lending to a farmer who produces tobacco crops in more than one
county required multiple filings. A financing statement had to be filed in each county clerk's
office in which the land was located, and the financing statement had to provide a description
sufficient to identify the land on which the crop was raised.
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Additionally, under former Article 9, when a financing statement described growing
crops it had to specify the production season. Instead of a five-year perfection period, as for
most collateral, the statute required you to file a new financing statement each year.
Perfecting a security interest in crops now is no different from filing on any other type of
goods. A single financing statement, filed with the Kentucky Secretary of State,perfects your
security interest in a debtor's crops, in all counties, for the full five-year duration of the filing.
And the new statute does not require a description ofthe real estate.
Kentucky's former law on security interests in farm products also contained several non-
uniform provisions that required special notices to the various sellers of farm products. Sellers
of tobacco, grain and soybeans, livestock, and thoroughbred and standardbred horses were each
entitled to a special form of notice. These notice requirements have all been repealed. Now, the
only notice requirement is under the Federal Food Security Act.
Except for including a broad description of equine collateral under the farm products
definition, Kentucky stayed with the model version of Revised Article 9 on all agricultural
collateral issues. (In other states there are sometimes multiple non-uniform provisions relating to
agricultural collateral.)
Ag lenders pay for the new simplicity of crop liens with the more complicated process for
livestock. To achieve purchase money security interest status in livestock requires a lender to
jump through the same hoops as a lender on ordinary inventory.
No longer do you have 20 days from the day your customer receives possession of
livestock to perfect your lien. To achieve PMSI status, you must complete three steps before
your customer takes possession of the livestock: 1) take the security interest, 2) perfect the
security interest through filing with the Secretary of State, and 3) notify any other secured party
that has filed on similar collateral.
A PMSI in livestock covers all identifiable proceeds of the livestock, including accounts
due the farmer customer. Although more difficult to find and reach, the security interest also
covers identifiable products of livestock.
When taking and perfecting security interests in agricultural collateral, don't forget the
various state and federal government programs that result in direct payments to farmers. In
Kentucky there are also payment programs under the National Tobacco Growers Settlement
Trust and the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement.
Properly describing what you want as collateral can be difficult when it involves direct
payment programs. Include accounts, general intangibles, and proceeds of all collateral in your
descriptions for both security agreement and financing statement. Additionally, if you know of a
specific program from which your farmer customer will receive payments, describe the program
and payment that you want covered by your security interest.
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Use of the tenn "farm products" in your collateral description picks up crops, aquatic
goods produced in aquacultural operations, livestock, supplies used in farming operations, and
products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states, but make sure you list proceeds of
your farm product collateral and list the generic categories of accounts and general intangibles.
uee compliance protects you against other lenders and lien creditors, including a trustee
in bankruptcy; however, it does not stop crops and livestock from being sold to an ordinary
course purchaser free and clear of your security interest. Here is where you must decide if you
want to go through the notice requirements ofthe Federal Food Security Act.
Under the FSA you can require that your borrowers disclose where they intend to sell
their crops or livestock. You then send direct notice to the farm product buyer (this includes
direct contract buyers of tobacco), commission merchants, and selling agents (tobacco
warehouse sales). The notice is good for one year and may contain payment requirements such
as dual payee check.
Selling tobacco under contract, rather than through the traditional warehouse auction system,
is a new process on which no law has developed. The conservative approach is to send two FSA
notices. One copy should go to the tobacco company or broker with which your borrower has a
contract, and a second copy should be sent the operator of the buying station who takes the tobacco
from the farmer as the buyer's agent and issues the check.
The federal statute specifies the fonn and contents of the direct notice. Infonnation required
on the notice includes the type of farm products, the names and addresses of the debtor and secured
party, the tax payer identification number of the debtor, a description of the farm product including
amount if applicable, the crop year and a description of the property on which the crop is grown
including the county. Most computer fonns systems have an FSA notice fonn in their library.
These fonns usually include prompts for the required infonnation.
Some ag lenders have found the additional work of the direct notice systems is not worth the
protection it provides. It is an extra layer of protection over, but not in lieu of, the more important
issue of uee perfection (protection against other secured partners, lien creditors, and a trustee in
bankruptcy).
A properly perfected lien under the uee gives the lender a lien on the proceeds of the sale of
farm products. The difference is that under the FSA a buyer of farm products can be directed to
make a proceeds check jointly payable to debtor and secured party and face conversion liability if it
does not.
The FSA requirements remain the same. It is only the requirements to perfect under the
uee that have changed. Change always creates confusion but this change simplifies the process to
perfect most security interests in farm products and puts livestock under the same rules as inventory
financing. The transition should not be difficult because most lenders are accustomed to using the
rules for inventory financing.
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The transition for crop loans is easy because financing statements on all farm products,
including crops, are filed in the same office and in the same manner as financing statements covering
ordinary goods. Instead ofpaper filings in one or several county clerk's offices, a lender can file on
line through the Secretary of State's filing electronic filing system at www.kysos.com. Just go to the
web site and click on "DCC On-Line Filing."
Privacy, Financing Statements, and T.I.N.s
The section for debtor information on the new national form financing statement provides a
space for the debtor's Taxpayer Identification Number. Secured parties complete the form by filling
inserting a federal employer identification number or social security number.
Neither the section of Revised Article 9 on the sufficiency of a financing statement (9-502),
nor the section that lists the reasons a filing officer may reject a filing (9-516), require the debtor's
TIN. Most state filing officers, including the Kentucky Secretary of State, do not include TINs in
searchable databases and redact the numbers from paper records. This raises the question about why
the space for the number appears at section Id ofthe form.
The answer is that under former Article 9 over a dozen states either required or suggested
identification of debtors by TIN. The new form was designed before any state adopted Revised 9.
When the adoption process was complete, only two states, North and South Dakota retained a
requirement to list a debtor's TIN on financing statements. Privacy concerns and identity theft issues
persuaded the other states to drop TINs from public records.
In the 48 states that did not include a requirement for TINs, there is no reason to complete
blank Id. The template for electronic filing on the Kentucky Secretary of State's web site does not
even provide a blank for the debtor's TIN.
The International Association of Commercial Administrators (the group representing
Secretaries of State) voted at its May 2002 meeting to eliminate the TIN block from the model
financing statement. A new version 0 fthe model form without a blank for the debtor's T .LN. is
available on the IACA web site at www.iaca.org/sts. Blank Id refers the user to instructions on the
reverse side that note the requirements in the Dakotas.
Also available on line are the financing statement addendum, a new form for adding
additional parties, the financing statement amendment, and an addendum and multiple additional
party form for the amendment. All IACA forms are in PDF format and are interactive. You can
complete the form on line and print out a financing statement ready to file. The format can also be
downloaded into your computer system. (See forms attached.)
Filing In-Lieu-Of Initial Financing Statements
Secured parties must move all financing statements now on file in county clerks' offices, if
they are to remain effective, to the Secretary of State's filing system before July 1, 2006. The
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continuation and amendment of existing financing statements are accomplished through filing an in-
lieu-of initial financing statement with the Secretary of State.
Many in-lieu-of filings are not effective because they lack all of the information required by
KRS 355.0-706(3). An ILO must contain all ofthe following:
• Satisfy the requirements for an initial financing statement, including a
collateral description.
• Identify the filing office ofthe existing financing statement(s).
• Provide the date(s) and file number(s) of the original financing
statement(s).
• List the date(s) and file number(s), if any, of the most recent continuation
statement(s).
• State that the original financing statement(s) remains effective.
The most frequent error is that the ILO does not describe the collateral to which it relates.
Secured parties are meticulously completing the filing information for the original financing
statement but not describing the collateral.
The ILO is a brand new initial financing statement that stands on its own and must describe
the collateral. The information about the prior filing is only to preserve your priority and original file
date. But without a collateral description the information on the prior filing is meaningless.
In Kentucky, the best way top revent mistakes in t he I LO filing process is to file 0 n 1ine
(www.kysos.com) and complete the template on the Secretary of State's web site. The template has
blanks for all of the information required for an initial financing statement and a section in which
you can complete the information for the prior financing statement and continuation statement. If
you do not complete a required element, the system rejects the filing and informs you ofyour error.
Fixing ILO errors is an issue for which there is no direct answer. If the error is minor (e.g.,
transposition of digits in the final number for the most recent continuation statement), the logical
response is that the minor errors rule of 9-506 covers the problem. However, the information
required to transform an ordinary initial financing statement into an ILO is required by Part 7 and the
minor errors rule, in Part 5, refers to "the requirements of this part...." Steven Weise, the American
Bar Association's advisor to the Article 9 Drafting Committee, has stated that it was the intent of the
drafter that the minor errors rule apply to the 9-706(c) (KRS 355.9-703(3)) requirements and that the
Official Comments to that section may be revised to reflect that intent.
A possible fix for errors in ILOs is to file an amendment pursuant to KRS 355.9-512. This
section allows the secured party to add or delete collateral or to "otherwise amend the information
provided in a financing statement.. .." This solution may help cure the type of minor error noted
above, but what about the financing statement with no collateral description. The text of 9-512
refers to adding collateral, however, the question is whether a financing statement that does not meet
the minimum requirements test of 9-502 is effective and can be amended. The alternative, if the
county level filing remains effective, is to file a new ILO as well as to amend the existing filing.
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An ILO continuation statement may be filed any time during the transition period prior to the
expiration of the local filing, not just during the six months prior to the expiration date. Initially, the
Secretary of State discouraged early filing; however, now that the system is running smoothly there
is no reason to wait to file ILOs in Frankfort.
Be sure to check your reminder system for financing statements that were to expire between
July 1, 2001, and December 31, 2001, and for which continuations were filed during the first six
months of 2001. Unless real estate related, and properly filed in a county clerk's office under
Revised Article 9, these filings must be moved to the Secretary of State's office no later than June
30, 2006. For instance, a filing in Fayette County that would have expired on November 1, 2001,
continued by a filing on June 1,2001, now expires June 30, 2006, NOT November 1,2006.
When the ILO continuation statement is filed, it is a new financing statement, not a
continuation statement for the prior filing that extends the perfection period for five years from the
prior expiration date. Reminder systems must be reset to file a continuation statement within the last
six months of the life of the ILO as measure from its filing date, NOT five years from the expiration
date of the local filing.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
A, NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional)
B, SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)
L
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1, 0 EBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - insertonlYlllIlldebtorname (1 aor1 b) -do notabbreviate orcombine names
1a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 1b.INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
1c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
1d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS I;DD'L INFO RE 11e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 1f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 19. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
2 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME Insert only lllIll debtor name (2a or 2b) - do not abbreviate or combine names
2a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 2b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
2c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
2d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 12e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 21. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 2g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
3 SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or NAMEofTOTALASSIGNEEofASSIGNOR SIP) - insertonlYlllIllsecured partyname (3a or3b)
3a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
3b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
3c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTALCODE COUNTRY
4. ThiS FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral.
FILING OFFICE COPY - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT (FORM UCC1) (REV. 05/22102)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement (Form UCC1)
Please type or laser-print this form. Be sure it is completely legible. Read all Instructions, especially Instruction 1; correct Debtor name is crucial. Follow
Instructions completely.
Fill in form very carefully; mistakes may have important legal consequences. Ifyou have questions, consult yourattorney. Filing office cannot give legal advice.
Do not insert anything in the open space in the upper portion of this form; it is reserved for filing office use.
When properly completed, send Filing Office Copy, with reqUired fee, to filing office. If you want an acknowledgment, complete item Band, iffiling in a filing
office that returns an acknowledgment copy furnished by filer, you may also send Acknowledgment Copy; otherwise detach. If you want to make a search
request, complete item 7 (after reading Instruction 7 below) and send Search Report Copy, otherwise detach. Always detach Debtor and Secured Party
Copies.
If you need to use attachments, you are encouraged to use either Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1AP).
A. To assist filing offices that might wish to communicate with filer, filer may provide information in item A. This item is optional.
B. Complete item B if you want an acknowledgment sent to you. If filing in a filing office that returns an acknowledgment copy furnished by filer, present
simultaneously with this form a carbon or other copy of this form for use as an acknowledgment copy.
1. Debtor name: Enteronly one Debtor name in item 1, an organization's
name (1 a) QJ: an individual's name (1 b). Enter Debtor's exact full legal
~. Don't abbreviate.
1a. Organization Debtor. "Organization" means an entity having a legal
identity separate from its owner. A partnership is an organization; a sole
proprietorship is not an organization, even if it does business under a
trade name. If Debtor is a partnership, enter exact full legal name of
partnership; you need not enter names of partners as additional Debtors.
If Debtor is a registered organization (e.g., corporation, limited partnership,
limited liability company), it is advisable to examine Debtor's current filed
charter documents to determine Debtor's correct name, organization
type, and jurisdiction of organization.
1b. Individual Debtor. "Individual" means a natural person; this includes a
sole proprietorship, whether or not operating under a trade name. Don't
use prefixes (Mr., Mrs., Ms.). Usesuffixboxonlyfortitlesoflineage(Jr.,
Sr., III) and not for other suffixes or titles (e.g., M.D.). Use married
woman's personal name (Mary Smith, not Mrs. John Smith). Enter
individual Debtor's family name (surname) in Last Name box, first given
name in First Name box, and all additional given names in Middle Name
box.
For both organization and individual Debtors: Don't use Debtor's trade
name, DBA, AKA, FKA, Division name, etc. in place of or combined with
Debtor's legal name; you may add such other names as additional
Debtors if you wish (but this is neither required nor recommended).
1c. An address is always required for the Debtor named in 1a or 1b.
1d. Reserved for Financing Statements to be filed in North Dakota or South
Dakota Q!l!y. If this Financing Statement is to be filed in North Dakota
or South Dakota, the Debtor's taxpayer identification number (tax ID#)
- social security number or employer identification number must be
placed in this box.
1e,f,g. "Additional information re organization Debtor" is always required.
Type of organization and jurisdiction of organization as well as
Debtor's exact legal name can be determined from Debtor's current
filed charter document. OrganizationallD #, if any, is assigned by the
agency where the charter document was filed; this is different from
tax ID #; this should be entered preceded by the 2-character U.S.
Postal identification of state of organization if one of the United States
(e.g., CA12345, for a California corporation whose organizationallD
# is 12345); if agency does not assign organizationallD #, check box
in item 1g indicating "none."
Note: If Debtor is atrust or atrustee acting with respectto property held in trust,
enter Debtor's name in item 1 and attach Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) and
check appropriate box in item 17. If Debtor is a decedent's estate, enter name
of deceased individual in item 1b and attach Addendum (Form UCC1 Ad) and
check appropriate box in item 17. If Debtor is a transmitting utility or this
Financing Statement is filed in connection with a Manufactured-Home
Transaction or a Public-Finance Transaction as defined in applicable
Commercial Code, attach Addendum (Form UCC1 Ad) and check appropriate
box in item 18.
2. If an additional Debtor is included, complete item 2, determined and
formatted per Instruction 1. To include further additional Debtors,
attach either Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form
UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1 for determining and formatting
additional names.
3. Enter information for Secured Party or Total Assignee, determined and
formatted per Instruction 1. To include further additional Secured
Parties, attach either Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party
(Form UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1 for determining and formatting
additional names. If there has been a total assignment of the Secured
Party's interest prior to filing this form, you may either (1) enter
Assignor SIP's name and address in item 3 and file an Amendment
(Form UCC3) [see item 5 of that form); or (2) enter Total Assignee's
name and address in item 3 and, if you Wish, also attaching Addendum
(Form UCC1Ad) giving Assignor SIP's name and address in item 12.
4. Use item 4 to indicate the collateral covered bythis Financing Statement.
If space in item 4 is insufficient, put the entire collateral description or
continuation of the collateral description on either Addendum (Form
UCC1Ad) or other attached additional page(s).
5. If filer desires (at filer's option) to use titles of lessee and lessor, or
consignee and consignor, or seller and buyer (in the case of accounts or
chattel paper), or bailee and bailor instead of Debtor and Secured Party,
check the appropriate box in item 5. If this is an agricultural lien (as
defined in applicable Commercial Code) filing or is otherwise not a UCC
security interest filing (e.g., a tax lien, jUdgment lien, etc.), check the
appropriate box in item 5, complete items 1-7as applicable and attach any
other items required under other law.
6. If this Financing Statement is filed as a fixture filing or if the collateral
consists oftimberto be cut or as-extracted collateral, complete items 1-
5, check the box in item 6, and complete the required information (items
13, 14and/or 15) on Addendum (Form UCC1Ad).
7. This item is optional. Check appropriate box in item 7to request Search
Report(s) on all orsome otthe Debtors named in this Financing Statement.
The Report will list all Financing Statements on file against the designated
Debtor on the date of the Report, including this Financing Statement.
There is an additional fee for each Report. If you have checked a box in
item 7, file Search Report Copy together with Filing Officer Copy (and
Acknowledgment Copy). Note: Not all states do searches and not all
stateswill honorasearch request made via this form; some states require
a separate request form.
8. This item is optional and is for filer's use only. For filer's convenience of
reference, filer may enter in item 8 any identifying information (e.g.,
Secured Party's loan number, law firm file number, Debtor's name or
other identification, state in which form is being filed, etc.) that filer may
find useful.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS Ifront and back) CAREFULLY
9. NAME OF FIRST DEBTOR (la or lb) ON RELATED FINANCING STATEMENT
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME rRSTNAME IMIDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
10. MISCELLANEOUS:
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
,
11a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
11 b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
11c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
11d. SEEINSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 111e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 11f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 119. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
12. 1ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S III r1ASSIGNOR SIP'S NAME· insert only llllll name (12a Of 12b)
12a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
12c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
13. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers U timber to be cut or [] as·extracted 16. Additional collateral description:
collateral, or is filed as a Dfixture filing.
14. Description of real estate:
15. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of above·described real estate
(if Debtor does not have a record interest):
17. Check lllI!l! if applicable and check lllI!l! one box.
Debtor is a nTrust ornTrustee acting with respect to property held in trust ornDecedenfs Estate
18. Check lllI!l! if applicable and check lllI!l! one box.BDebtor is a TRANSMITTING UTILITY
Filed in connection with a Manufactured-Home Transaction - effective 30 years
10 Filed in connection with a Public-Finance Transaction - effective 30 years
FILING OFFICE COPY - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM (FORM UCC1Ad) (REV. 05122/02)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement Addendum (Form UCC1Ad)
9. Insert name of first Debtor shown on Financing Statement to which this Addendum relates, exactly as shown in item 1 of Financing Statement.
10. Miscellaneous: Under certain circumstances, additional information not provided on Financing Statement may be required. Also, some states have
non-uniform requirements. Use this space to provide such additional information orto comply with such requirements; otherwise, leave blank.
11. If this Addendum adds an additional Debtor, complete item 11 in accordance with Instruction 1 of Financing Statement. To include further additional
Debtors, attach either an additional Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1 AP) and follow Instruction 1 of Financing Statement
for determining and formatting additional names.
12. If this Addendum adds an additional Secured Party, complete item 12 in accordance with Instruction 3 of Financing Statement. To include further
additional Secured Parties, attach either an additional Addendum (Form UCC1Ad) or Additional Party (Form UCC1AP) and follow Instruction 1
of Financing Statement for determining and formatting additional names. In the case of a total assignment of the Secured Party's interest before
the filing of this Financing Statement, if filer has given the name and address of the Total Assignee in item 3 of Financing Statement, filer may
give the Assignor SIP's name and address in item 12.
13-15. If collateral is timberto be cut or as-extracted collateral, or if this Financing Statement is filed as a fixture filing, check appropriate box in item 13; provide
description of real estate in item 14; and, if Debtor is not a record owner of the described real estate, also provide, in item 15, the name and address
of a record owner. Also provide collateral description in item 40f Financing Statement. Also check box 6 on Financing Statement. Description of real
estate must be sufficient under the applicable law of the jurisdiction where the real estate is located.
16. Use this space to provide continued description of collateral, if you cannot complete description in item 4 of Financing Statement.
17. If Debtor is a trust or a trustee acting with respect to property held in trust or is a decedent's estate, check the appropriate box.
16. If Debtor is atransmitting utility or if the Financing Statement relates to a Manufactured-Home Transaction or a Public-Finance Transaction as defined
inthe applicable Commercial Code, check the appropriate box.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENTADDITIONAL PARTY
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
19. NAME OF FIRST DEBTOR (1a or 1b) ON RELATED FINANCING STATEMENT
19a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
19b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME IFIRSTNAME riDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
20. MISCELLANEOUS:
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
21 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME • insert only Qll§ name (21a or 21 b) • do not abbreviate or combine names
21a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
21b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
21c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE /POSTALCODE COUNTRY
21d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS I:DD'L INFO RE 121e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 211. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 21g. ORGANIZATIONAL 10#, ilany
ORGANIZATION I
I I nNONEDEBTOR
22 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME insert onlYQll§ name (22a or 22b). do not abbreviate Of combine names
22a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
22b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
22c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTALCODE COUNTRY
22d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 122e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 221. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 22g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, ~ any
ORGANIZATION 1
I I nNONEDEBTOR
23 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME insert only Qll§ name (23a or 23b). do not abbreviate or combine names
23a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
23b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
230. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
23d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 123e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 231. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 23g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID #, il any
g~~;6'~TION 1 I I nNONE
24 ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or Name of TOTAL ASSIGNEE) • Insert only Qll§ name (24a or 24b)
24a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
24b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
24c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTALCODE COUNTRY
25 ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or Name of TOTAL ASSIGNEE) • insert only Qll§ name (258 or 25b)
25a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
25b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
250. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE /POSTALCODE COUNTRY
FILING OFFICE COPY - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDITIONAL PARTY (FORM UCC1AP) (REV. OS/22102)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement Additional Party (Form UCC1AP)
Use this form to continue adding additional Debtoror Secured Party names as needed when filing a UCC Financing Statement (Form UCC1).
19. Insert name of first Debtor shown on Financing Statement to which this Additional Party relates, exactly as shown in item 1 of Financing
Statement.
20. Miscellaneous: Undercertain circumstances, additional information not provided on Financing Statement may be required. Also, some states have
non-uniform requirements. Use this space to provide such additional information or to comply with such requirements; otherwise, leave blank.
21-23. If this Additional Party adds additional Debtors, complete items 21 , 22, and 23 in accordance with Instruction 1 of Financing Statement and give
complete information for each additional Debtor. Be sure to complete either the organization's name or individual's name items.
24-25. If this Additional Party adds additional Secured Parties, complete items 24 and 25 in accordance with Instruction 3 of Financing Statement and
give complete information for each additional Secured Party.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER [optional]
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGMENT TO: (Name and Address)
L
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
la.INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE#
1
1b. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is
n
to be filed [for record] (or recorded) in the
REAL ESTATE RECORDS.
2.' ITERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing statement identified above is terminated with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Termination Statement.
3. UCONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement is
continued for the additional period provided by apphcable law.
4. ASSIGNMENT (full or partiaQ: Give name of assignee in item 7a or 7b and address of assignee in item 7c; and also give name of assignor in item 9.
5. AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects Secured Party of record. Check only lIM of these two boxes.
Also check 2.DI of the follOW'ing three boxes iDs:t provide appropriate information in ;terns 6 and/or 7.
CHANGEnameandioraddress: Pleaserefertothedetailedinstructions DELETE name: Give record name
inr ardstochan in thenameladdressofa a to be deleted in item 6a or 6b.
6. CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION;
6a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 6b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
7. CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION:
FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
7a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
7b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
7c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
7d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 17e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 7f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 79. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I
8, AMENDMENT (COLLATERAL CHANGE): check only lIM box.
Describe collateral 0 deleted or 0 added. or give entire0 restated collateral description, or describe collateral 0 assigned.
9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY OF RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name olassignor, ff this is an Assignment). ff this is an Amendment authorized by a Debtor which
adds collateral or adds the authorizing Debtor, or ff this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check here and enter name of DEBTOR authorizing this Amendment.
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
10.0PTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA
FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
FILING OFFICE COpy - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT (FORM UCC3) (REV. 05122/02)
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Instructions for UCC Financing statement Amendment (Form UCC3)
Please type or laser-print this form. Be sure it is completely legible. Read all Instructions, especially Instruction 1a; correct file number of initial financing
statement is crucial. Follow Instructions completely.
Fill in form very carefully; mistakes may have important legal consequences. Ifyou have questions, consult your attorney. Filing office cannot give legal advice.
Do not insert anything in the open space in the upper portion of this form; it is reserved for filing office use.
An Amendment may relate to only one financing statement. Do not enter more than one file number in item 1a.
When properly completed, send Filing Office Copy, with reqUired fee, to filing office. If you want an acknowledgment, complete item B and, if filing in a filing
office that returns an acknowledgment copy furnished by filer, you may also send Acknowledgment Copy, otherwise detach. Always detach Debtorand
Secured Party Copies.
If you need to use attachments, you are encouraged to use either Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad) or Amendment Additional Party (Form UCC3AP).
Always complete items 1a and 9.
A. To assist filing offices that might wish to communicate with filer, filer may prOVide information in item A. This item is optional.
B. Complete item Bifyou want an acknowledgment senttoyou. Iffiling in a filing office that retums an acknowledgment copy furnished by filer, present simUltaneously
with this form a carbon or other copy of this form for use as an acknowledgment copy.
1a. File number: Enter file numberof initial financing statement to which this
Amendment relates. Enter only one file number. In some states, the file
number is not unique; in those states, also enter in item 1a, after the file
number, the date thatthe initial financing statement was filed.
1b. Only ifthisAmendment is to be filed or recorded in the real estate records,
check box 1b and also, in item 13 of Amendment Addendum, enter
Debtor's name, in proper format exactly identical to the format of item 1
of financing statement, and name of record owner if Debtordoes not have
a record interest.
Note: Show purpose of this Amendment by checking box 2,3,4,5 (in item 5
you must check two boxes) or 6; also complete items 6, 7 and/or 6 as
appropriate. Filer may use this Amendment form to simUltaneously accomplish
both data changes (items 4,5, and/or 6) and a Continuation (item 3), although
in some states filer may have to pay a separate fee for each purpose.
2. To termjnatethe effectiveness of the identified financing statement with
respect to security interest(s) of authorizing Secured Party, check box 2.
See Instruction 9 below.
3. To continue the effectiveness of the identified financing statement with
respectto security interest(s) of authorizing Secured Party, check box 3.
See Instruction 9 below.
4. To assign (i) all of assignor's interest under the identified financing
statement, or (ii) a partial interest in the security interest covered by the
identified financing statement, or (iii) assignor's full interest in some (but
not all) of the collateral covered by the identified financing statement:
Check box in item 4 and enter name ofassignee in item 7a if assignee is
an organization, or in item 7b, formatted as indicated, if assignee is an
individual. Complete 7a or 7b, but not both. Also enter assignee's
address in item 7c. Also enter name of assignor in item 9. If partial
Assignment affects only some (but not all) ofthe collateral covered bythe
identified financing statement, filer may check appropriate box in item 6
and indicate affected collateral in item 6.
5,6,7.To change the name of a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate
whether this Amendment amends information relating to a Debtor or
a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is a name
change; also enter name of affected party (current record name) in
item 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter new name (7a or 7b). If the
new name refers to a Debtor complete (7c); also complete 7e-7g if
7a was completed.
5,6,7.To change the address of a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate
whether this Amendment amends information relating to a Debtor or
a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is an
address change; also enter name of affected party (current record
name) in item 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter new address (7c)
in item 7.
5,6,7.To change the name and address of a party: Check box in item 5 to
indicate whether this Amendment amends information relating to a
Debtor or a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this
is a name/address change; also enter name of affected party (current
record name) in items 6a or 6b as appropriate; and enter the new name
(7a or 7b). If the new name refers to a Debtor complete item 7c; also
complete 7e-7g if 7a was completed.
5,6. To delete a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate whether deleting a
Debtor or a Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this
is a deletion of a party; and also enter name (6a or 6b) of deleted party
in item 6.
5,7. To add a party: Check box in item 5 to indicate whether adding a Debtor
or Secured Party; also check box in item 5 to indicate that this is an
addition ofa party and enter the new name (7a or 7b). If the new name
refers to a Debtor complete item 7c; also complete 7e-7g if 7a was
completed. To include further additional Debtors or Secured Parties,
attach Amendment Additional Party (Form UCC3AP), using correct
name format.
Note: The preferred method for filing against a new Debtor (an
individual or organization not preViously of record as a Debtor under
this file number) is to file a new Financing Statement (UCC1) and not
an Amendment (UCC3).
7d. Reserved for Financing Statement Amendments to be filed in North
Dakota or South Dakota Q!l.!y. If this Financing Statement Amendment
is to be filed in North Dakota or South Dakota, the Debtor's taxpayer
identification number (tax ID#) - social security number or employer
identification number must be placed in this box.
6. Collateral change. To change the collateral covered by the identified
financing statement, describe the change in item 6. This may be
accomplished either by describing the collateral to be added or deleted, or
by setting forth in full the collateral description as it is to be effective after
the filing ofthis Amendment, indicating clearly the method chosen (check
the appropriate box). If the space in item 6 is inSUfficient, use item 13 of
Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad). A partial release of collateral is
a deletion. If, due to a full release of all collateral, filer no longer claims a
security interest under the identified financing statement, check box 2
(Termination) and not box 6 (Collateral Change). Ifa partial assignment
consists of the assignment of some (but not all) of the collateral covered
by the identified financing statement, filer may indicate the assigned
collateral in item 6, check the appropriate box in item 6, and also comply
with instruction 4 above.
9. Always enter name of party of record authorizing this Amendment; in most
cases, this will be a Secured Partyof record. If more than one authorizing
Secured Party, give additional name(s), properly formatted, in item 13 of
Amendment Addendum (Form UCC3Ad). If the indicated financing
statement refers to the parties as lessee and lessor, or consignee and
consignor, or seller and buyer, instead of Debtor and Secured Party,
references in this Amendment shall be deemed likewise so to refer to
the parties. If this is an assignment, enter assignor's name. If this is
an Amendment authorized by a Debtor that adds collateral or adds a
Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check the box
in item 9 and enter the name, properly formatted, of the Debtor
authorizing this Amendment, and, if this Amendment or Termination is
to be filed or recorded in the real estate records, also enter, in item 13
of Amendment Addendum, name of Secured Party of record.
10. This item is optional and is for filer's use only. For filer's convenience of
reference, filer may enter in item 10 any identifying information (e.g.,
Secured Party's loan number, law firm file number, Debtor's name orother
identification, state in which form is being filed, etc.) that filer may find
useful.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
11, INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE # (same as item 1a on Amendmentform)
12. NAME OF PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (same as item 9 on Amendment form)
12a, ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 12b, INDIVIDUAL'S lAST NAME rRSTNAME riDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
13, Use this space for additional information
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
FILING OFFICE COpy - NATIONAL UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM (FORM UCC3Ad) (REV. 07/29/98)
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Instructions for National UCC Financing Statement AMENDMENT Addendum (Form UCC3Ad)
11. Enter information exactly as given in item 1a on Amendment form.
12. Enter information exactly as given in item 9 on Amendment form.
13. If space on Amendment form is insufficient oryou must provide additional information, enter additional information in item 13.
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UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDITIONAL PARTY
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
14. INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE # (same as item 1a on Amendment form)
15. NAME OF PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (same as ~em 9 on Amendmenlform)
15a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
15b.INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME rRSTNAME riDDLE NAME,SUFFIX
16. MISCELLANEOUS
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
17 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME - insert only llIl§ name (17a or 17b). do not abbreviate or combine names
17a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
17b.INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
17c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE jPOSTALCODE COUNTRY
17d. SEEINSTRUCTIONS I;DD'L INFO RE 117e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 17f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 179. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
18 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME insert only llIl§ name (18a or 18b) do not abbreviate or combine names
18a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 18b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
1&. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE jPOSTALCODE COUNTRY
18d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS I;DD'L INFO RE j18e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 181. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 18g. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
19 ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME insert only llIl§ name (19a or 19b) • do not abbreviate or combIne names
19a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR 19b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
19c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE rOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
19d. SEE INSTRUCTIONS IADD'L INFO RE 11ge. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION 191. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION 199. ORGANIZATIONAL 10 #, if any
ORGANIZATION
nNONEDEBTOR I I I
20 ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or Name ofTOTAL ASSIGNEE) • insert only llIl§ name (2Oa or 20b)
20•. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
20b.INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
2Oc. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE IPOSTAL CODE COUNTRY
21 ADDITIONAL SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or Name ofTOTAL ASSIGNEE) - insert only llIl§ name (21 a or 21 b)
21a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR
21b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME SUFFIX
21c. MAILING ADDRESS CITY STATE /POSTALCODE COUNTRY
FILING OFFICE COpy - UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDITiONAL PARTY (FORM UCC3AP) (REV. 05122/02)
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Instructions for UCC Financing Statement Amendment Additional Party (Form UCC3AP)
Use this form to continue adding additional Debtor or Secured Party names as needed when filing a UCC Financing Statement Amendment (Form UCC3).
14. Enter file number of Financing Statement as shown on the Amendment to which this Amendment Additional Party relates, exactly as shown
in item 1a of Amendment.
15. Enter information exactly as shown in item 9 of Amendment.
16. Miscellaneous: Under certain circumstances, additional information not provided on Amendment may be required. Also, some states have
non-uniform requirements. Use this space to provide such additional information orto comply with such requirements; otherwise, leave blank.
17-19. If this Amendment Additional Party adds additional Debtors, complete items 17, 18, and 19 in accordance with Instruction 1 of Financing Statement
and give complete information for each additional Debtor. Be sure to complete either the organization's name or individual's name items.
20-21. If this Amendment Additional Party adds additional Secured Parties, complete items 20 and 21 in accordance with Instruction 3 of Financing
Statement and give complete information for each additional Secured Party.
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THE BASICS OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
Can You Risk Proof A Fiduciary?
Tawana Edwards
The Glenview Trust Company
Louisville, Kentucky
Copyright 2003. Tawana Edwards. All rights reserved.
SECTION J

THE BASICS OF FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
Can You Risk Proof A Fiduciary?
Why Are Fiduciaries More Vulnerable To Risk? J-l
How Can Fiduciaries Minimize Risk? J-2
1. Asset fuformation J-3
2. Co-Fiduciary J-4
3. Asset Control J-4
4. Clear Dispositive Scheme J-4
5. Termination Clause J-4
6. Successor Fiduciary Provisions J-4
7. fuvestment Provisions J-4
8. Resignation Provisions J-4
9. Tax Provisions J-5
Appendix:
SR 96-10 (SPE), April 24, 1996: Risk-Focused Fiduciary Examinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. J-7
Successor Fiduciary Provisions J-15
SECTION J

Risk - the chance ofharm or loss.
Today much is written and discussed regarding fiduciary risk, whether the discussion
concerns the activities ofa Board ofDirectors with respect to their company, or an
ERISA trustee concerning plan assets and plan participants, or a financial institution
acting as trustee or investment manager for an individual. Why so much discussion now?
Have the risks involved changed or increased? Are there new risks? What makes
fiduciaries more vulnerable to risks than others? Finally, what can fiduciaries do to
mitigate risks?
The trust and investment business continues to be a very competitive and increasingly
complex business. The competitive environment and rapid growth have enhanced the
opportunity for risk as trustees develop new products, additional services with higher
service standards or operational efficiencies. The traditional risks associated with serving
as a fiduciary probably have not changed significantly in the last decade. Those risks
include transactional type risks associated with potential financial losses, such as lost
securities or misappropriation offunds. Traditional type risks exposing the fiduciary to
loss also include selfdealing, conflicts of interest, errors, omissions, fraud, improper use
of trust assets, improper or unsuitable investment decisions. All potentially exposing the
fiduciary to loss. But, the complexity ofthe business has increased. Fiduciary investing
utilizes more sophisticated investment vehicles. Also, the delivery of fiduciary services
is increasingly dependent on new information systems and technologies.
Several years ago, in response to this changing risk situation, various regulatory agencies
expanded their examination programs to specifically assess risk management practices in
the fiduciary activities ofan institution. For a discussion on that topic see the
Supervisory Letter issued by the Federal Reserve Board in 1996, attached as Appendix A.
Why are fiduciaries more vulnerable to risk?
I think one ofthe key reasons that trustees are more vulnerable to risk is simply "time".
Many trusts continue in existence for a very long period oftime. Generally, a corporate
'fiduciary thinks this is a good thing. You collect fees longer, a long-term revenue stream.
But in his article "Risk Management: Facing The Consequences" (Trusts & Estates,
November 2000) Peter Bernstein reminds us there is a relationship between risk and time.
He says, "As the time horizon expands, uncertainty increases because the range of
possible outcomes widens as we look further and further into the future." His comments
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related specifically to investment decisions and time but I think it applies equally to all
discretionary decisions made by a fiduciary. With many jurisdictions repealing the rule
against perpetuities you may see more ofthese situations
Probably the most common reason for fiduciary vulnerability is the fact that
beneficiaries often have diverse interests yet a trustee must serve all beneficiaries'
interest. It is the age-old conundrum for a fiduciary. It is very difficult to keep everyone
happy. The competing interest ofbeneficiaries in a split interest trust will continue to
create the potential for disagreements and possibly litigation. .
Finally, last but not least, a fiduciary generally is required to be properly capitalized to
serve as a fiduciary. This capitalization creates the relatively deep pocket that can be very
attractive to an eager litigant.
Certain types ofdecisions carry greater risk. Obviously discretionary decisions by the
fiduciary carry greater risk. This is the very reason why so many corporate fiduciaries do
not want to serve ifthey are required to exercise any discretion other than investment
discretion. But, eliminating fiduciary discretion is not the answer to minimizing risk. In
fact eliminating discretion may reduce the effectiveness and therefore eventually the use
of trusts.
How can fiduciaries minimize risk?
This may sound exceedingly elementary but the first step to minimizing risk is to read
and understand the governing document (i.e. the will or trust). In so many instances I
have found the answer just be reviewing the document. Generally ifthe fiduciary is
acting in accordance with the document the risk is minimized. But clearly it is not that. .
simple. Unfortunately the documents cannot possibly anticipate every interpretive
situation that might arise during the continuance ofthe fiduciary relationship. But still,
every effort should be made to determine that you are within the scope ofauthority
granted to the fiduciary in the governing document.
A fiduciary can also minimize risk by developing and following written policies and
procedures. Any time you have two or more individuals working to deliver fiduciary
services having written policies and procedures that are consistently followed, will
minimize risk. This is true because there is some protection in consistency, even if the
action was not perfect.
The policies and procedures should be thorough and cover every action ofthe fiduciary
from marketing the products to the termination ofan account. Obviously, the policies
should be based on applicable laws and regulations to provide accurate guidance. There
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are many good publications with sample fiduciary policy and procedure manuals. I have
used Trust Department Administration and Operations (Matthew Bender) and Trust
Department Policies and Procedures Manual Sheshunofflnformation Services, Inc.
2002. I found both to be very useful
The written operational procedures should be specific and include directions and
guidelines for completing all transactions. The procedure should require complete
records of the administration ofeach account and provide which documentation should
be retained and in what file. While it is important that the activities of the fiduciary be
documented, it is also important to keep the files clean and businesslike. You should
assume that every piece ofpaper could potentially be printed in the newspaper or appear
as evidence in litigation. Once the policies and procedures are in place and have been
disseminated and explained you should also implement a schedule for updating and
reviewing the policies and procedures.
Once the policies and procedures are developed they should be followed. Kentucky law
provides that it is negligent ifperformance fails to follow the written policy. In fact,
these policies may actually be used against you to substantiate your liability. An example
is found in the Kentucky case ofThomas v. Turner, Ky. App. 736 S.W. 2d 343. In
Thomas v. Turner, the Court ofAppeals was reviewing a decision ofthe Circuit Court
that had authorized the bank as trustee to transfer real estate (an asset of the trust) to a
company that was owned by a director ofthe bank. The appellate court in ultimately
deciding against the bank indicated ''the bank's own trust policies prohibit selling trust
real estate when the potential for appreciation is high even though the current income
production is low." (p.344). Then again, at page 345 ofthe opinion, ''the bank's own
trust policies rail against self-serving practices and conflicts of interest." Several
different attorneys have suggested it would be better to have NO policies than to have out
ofdate (dust covered) policies that no one knows or follows. However, all regulatory
agencies that supervise trust activities for financial institutions will require written
policies and procedures.
One ofthe most obvious ways for a fiduciary to manage risk is to control the type of
business that is accepted. The initial step in a risk management process is the review of
prospective business. Whether an individual or a committee performs the review, the
function ofreviewing potential business is a vital step in managing risks. In today's
competitive market there is a tendency to close the sale, then ask questions. But, this can
be very dangerous since liability attaches upon acceptance. Conversely, in an attempt to
control risk some corporate fiduciaries have determined certain accounts will never be
accepted. Both are extremes and adequate review process that is consistently utilized is a
better solution for the fiduciary and the client. Some ofthe major points to be considered
in this initial review include the following:
1. Asset Information. Current financial statements should accompany the
discussion drafts ofthe documents to permit a risk investment review before the
account is accepted. Obviously, in this step the fiduciary should look for "risky"
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assets such as property environmentally at risk, assets or liabilities that may
create conflicts of interest with the fiduciary (example loans with the
commercial side of the bank).
2. Co- Fiduciary. If it is a co fiduciary situation determine whether the duties of
each are delineated. Does the document specify which fiduciary controls in the
event there is a disagreement? Is a dissenting fiduciary exonerated?
3. Asset Control. Ifthe fiduciary will be responsible for assets in the control of
another does the document protect the fiduciary accordingly? .Ifnot, can
adequate protections be arranged or control changed.
4. Clear Dispositive Scheme. Determine whether all the beneficiaries are identified
clearly and unambiguously in the document. Try to avoid from the beginning
any potential involvement in litigation to "interpret" dispositive provisions.
5. Termination Clause. Is the language clear? Will the fiduciary understand at
what point in time their responsibility ends?
6. Successor Fiduciary Provisions. When considering a successor fiduciary
appointment ask yourself"ifthe current fiduciary can not handle this trust
properly, will I be able to do so, what will I need to do differently and can I do
that?" Ifthe decision is made to accept this appointment as successor, the
document should have language relieving the successor fiduciary ofthe
obligation to review and correct the actions of the prior fiduciary and to protect
the successor from liability for the actions ofthe prior fiduciary. Sample
language is included in Appendix B.
7. Investment Provisions. Are the investment powers clear? The document should
not only include standards by which the fiduciary's actions will be measured but
also include additional provisions that are necessary to adequately address any
special circumstances such as stock restrictions or an ongoing business, etc. with
which the fiduciary feels comfortable and clearly understands. Are the
authorized investments broad enough to cover the type ofassets you will likely
purchase for the trust. Ifnot, does the governing law give the needed authority?
8. Resignation Provisions.. Can you bailout ifneed be? The greater the specificity
as to all matters pertaining to resignation, the better. Is the language clear on
how the successor trustee will be appointed in the event the present trustee
resigns? Without appropriate authority or reason, the act ofresigning can
expose the fiduciary to liability for breach of fiduciary duty.
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9. Tax Provisions. To discuss all the appropriate tax provisions necessary in
fiduciary documents is beyond the scope of this outline. However, documents
should specifically exonerate the fiduciary from liability for making tax
decisions that may (or will definitely) adversely affect one or more classes of
beneficiaries in favor ofanother class ofbeneficiaries.
Once the initial acceptance review is completed and you have decided it is safe, in fact
good business, to accept the trust is there a need for any further review? It is sound
fiduciary practice to establish some form ofperiodic review. . This review would
include periodically check to determine whether policies and procedures are being
followed, and whether duties are being performed within the guidelines or standards
established in the policies. In this manner you are self-auditing and can locate and
correct errors or omissions before others find them. At the risk ofstating the obvious, it
is far less expensive to find and correct your own mistakes than to have those mistakes
discovered by a disgruntled beneficiary.
Another key component ofmanaging risk is product analysis. Review the fiduciary
services being provided to clients. Include an evaluation ofthe risks involved in
delivering those services. Re-examine what is involved in delivering the service (ie. the
number ofpeople involved, the costs associated with the service, the expertise required,
any losses or charge offs sustained on the service). Is this service being delivered
profitably? Before you decide to deliver an additional product or service go through the
same analysis.
Client communication is another key to minimizing risk. Obviously if you are able to
keep all your clients happy you have a reduced risk of litigation. Generally, satisfied
clients do not sue you for breach of fiduciary duty, etc. Ofcourse that does not mean a
fiduciary can or should always to whatever a beneficiary desires in order to keep the
beneficiary happy. There are times when the beneficiary's request is beyond the trustee's
authority in the document. However, even in those instances face to face communication
with all the beneficiaries on a regular basis to keep them informed ofdevelopments and
decisions will often avoid most ofthe potential controversies that typically arise. This is
especially true of investment actions. Whether or not a fiduciary has full discretion,
communication of investment decisions and actions, before implementing them will often
avoid future controversy. I am not suggesting the fiduciary request beneficiary approval
(unless it is required by the document or the particular circumstance). However, a
beneficiary/client who might otherwise resent the entire trust being invested in a fumily
ofmutual funds may fully appreciate the wisdom ofthe decision if it is effectively
communicated in advance. When communicating with the client avoid "institutional
arrogance". Remember to whom the $$$$$$$ belongs.
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In addition to frequency ofcommunication, also consider the method ofcommunication
and let your client drive that choice. Does the client understand the statements? Are
charts and graphs a better choice for a particular client and words for another?
In conclusion, you may not be able to "risk proof' the fiduciary but you can minimize
risk. Do so by utilizing written policies and procedures, performing initial reviews prior
to accepting the fiduciary appointment, understanding whether the service can be
delivered effectively and profitably through product analysis and increase communication
with your clientlbeneficiaries.Taking these steps will not only help to minimize risk, but you will
likely have better satisfied clients.
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EXHIBIT A
BOARD OF GOVERNORS
OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20551
DlVISION OF BANKING
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION
SR 96-10 (SPE)
April 24, 1996
TO THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF SUPERVISION
AT EACH FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
SUBJECT: Risk-Focused Fiduciary Examinations
Recent changes in the nature and complexity of fiduciary activities, both in
the United States and abroad, have underscored the need to revise the focus and emphasis of
fiduciary examinations in order to assess better a banking organization's ability to manage
effectively the risks associated with fiduciary activities and ensure the prudent conduct of
those activities. The changes include rapid growth in fee-based products and service
globalization, the increasing dependence on new information systems and communications
technologies, whether developed in-house or outsourced, and the heightened demand in the
fiduciary area for more sophisticated investment products. These changes have, to some
extent, diminished the line separating commercial banking and fiduciary activities.
The Federal Reserve's fiduciary examinations have traditionally focused on
risks associated with compliance, fmancial management and operations, and the fiduciary's
duty of undivided loyalty to the trust beneficiaries. Much of the examination was oriented to
specific transactions and their compliance with statutory or regulatory requirements where
noncompliance could result in defined penalties such as those authorized by ERISA and the
Internal Revenue Code. The financial management and operations review focused on
activities associated with possible fmanciallosses that occur due to error, omission, fraud or
accident that result from lost securities, misappropriation of funds, and mispostings, for
example. Some fiduciary risk arises from the potential that a fiduciary could violate its duty
of loyalty to the trust's principals or beneficiaries resulting in possible losses to the fiduciary
from settlements and litigation. For example, the improper use of trust assets, possibly for
personal gain, and improper or unsuitable investment decisions can expose the fiduciary to
material loss or litigation.
Given the changes in the industry noted above, the Federal Reserve's fiduciary
examination current focus is being expanded to look more intensively at risk managewent
practices and related aspects ofa banking organization's trust activities." This will result in,
among other things, (1) greater use ofa more diversified examiner population including those
with capital markets, information systems, and safety and soundness experieneel, (2) a
stronger emphasis on an assessment of the individual organization's unique risk profile, and
(3) a thorough review of risk identification, measurement, monitoring and control. This
enhanced focus is consistent with the guidance provided to examiners and distributed to state
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member banks and bank holding companies in SR 95-51, issued November 14, 1995, "Rating
the Adequacy of Risk Management Processes and Internal Controls at State Member Banks
and Bank Holding Companies." The letter calls for the rating of a bank's risk management
practices taking into consideration credit, market, liquidity, operational, legal and
reputational risks, all ofwhich are pertinent to fiduciary activities as well. The attachment to
that letter indicates that a bank's II •••risk management systems should also encompass the
organization's trust and fiduciary activities... ,,2.
Based on the need to enhance the examination process in order to adapt to
these changes, a System Task Force on Reengineering Trust Supervision has developed a
fiduciary examination approach that is more intensively focused on evaluating risk, assessing
management's internal controls to limit risk, and integrating both the pre-planning,
assessment stage and the on-site fmdings into the overall safety and soundness evaluation of
a banking organization. In designing this approach, particular attention was directed to
ensuring that examiners continue to emphasize the unique nature of the risks inherent in
fiduciary activities as they relate to the fiduciary's "duty ofundivided loyalty" to the trust
customer which requires placing the interests of the customer above those of the institution.
Risk Profile of Fiduciary Activities
The risk-focused fiduciary examination and supervision process centers
around the preparation and upkeep of individualized risk profiles by the Reserve Bank for
organizations that engage in a significant volume of fiduciary activities1. The appropriate
scope of the fiduciary examination, particularly for the largest banking organizations, would
be influenced by an assessment of the information contained in the risk profiles:'!:. Where
appropriate, coordinated interdistrict examiner pooling arrangements or other System
initiatives would be used to provide the most effective resources to address the particular
fiduciary risks and safety and soundness risks within the banking organization. Examinations
would focus resources on the activities that pose the most substantive risk as detailed in each
institution's profile and would be influenced by prior examination findings as welL In this
way, it is expected that a more thorough understanding of each institution's unique risks and
risk controls will develop.
The banking organization's efforts to identify, measure, monitor and control
risk through implementation of specific policies, procedures, internal controls and
management information systems will then be assessed and tested during the examination.
Conclusions should be discussed with bank management, and, in the case of the more
complex institutions at a minimum, should be incorporated into the safety and soundness
report ofexamination.
As indicated in SR 95-51, and consistent with the greater emphasis given to
risk management in Federal Reserve examination and supervisory policy statements, System
examiners have been asked to assign a rating for risk management practices and assign that
rating significant weight when evaluating the banking organization's"management. Similarly,
effective with the commencement of new examinations, trust examiners are instructed to
assign a formal supervisory rating to an institution's risk management processes including its
internal controls pertaining to fiduciary activities2. The specific rating of risk management
and internal controls should be given significant weight when evaluating the "Supervision
and Organization" component as part of the overall trust rating§..
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Risk Focus
With the adoption ofthe System's risk-focused examination approach for
fiduciary activities, it is anticipated that in a complex institution, fiduciary examiners will
direct more of their attention to assessing the organization's functions and its ability to
identify, measure, monitor and control fiduciary, market, credit and operational risks. In
particular, examiners should assess risks that result from the fiduciary's investment
management, investment advisory, mutual funds, global custody, and securities lending and
processing activities, and any other activities that are subject to adverse movements in market
rates or prices, or to operating problems associated with processing a large volume of
securities. These fiduciary activities could result in material losses to trust customers and, in
turn, expose the institution to financial losses and litigation if not conducted in a manner
consistent with the fiduciary's duty of loyalty and the investor's stated objectives. Recently,
some of these fiduciary activities conducted at several large banking organizations have led
to actual or potential customer losses and, rather than risking litigation or potentially
exposing the organization to business reputation impairment, these banking organizations
elected to absorb the losses directly.
A review of internal controls and policies and procedures will continue to be
an integral part of the examination program. Greater attention to management competence
and accountability, to management's review of risks associated with the introduction ofnew
products and services and to its overall risk awareness will constitute other significant facets
of the examination.
This emphasis on risk assessment and control parallels the guidelines and
procedures pertaining to state member bank examinations and bank holding company
inspections that are contained in SR 95-51, and recognizes the efforts ofmany progressive
institutions in establishing fiduciary risk assessment and control initiatives of their own.
Along these lines, when rating the quality of risk management of fiduciary activities,
examiners should place primary consideration on findings relating to the following elements
ofa sound risk management system: (l) active board and senior management oversight, (2)
adequate policies, procedures, and limits, (3) adequate risk measurement, monitoring and
management information systems, and (4) comprehensive internal controls. Each of these
elements is described further below, along with a list ofconsiderations relevant to assessing
the adequacy of each element.
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Active Board and Management Oversight
Given that boards ofdirectors have ultimate responsibility for all of the
activities of their institutions, they should approve overall fiduciary business strategies and
policies including those related to identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling
fiduciary risks. The boards ofdirectors must qnderstand the nature ofthe risks significant to
their organization and ensure that management is taking the steps necessary to manage these
risks.
Senior management has the responsibility for implementing approved
strategies in a way that will limit fiduciary risks and ensure compliance with laws and
regulations. Senior management should, therefore, be fully involved in the fiduciary activities
J-g
oftheir institution and have sufficient knowledge ofall fiduciary business lines to ensure that
necessary policies, controls and risk monitoring systems are in place and that accountability
and lines ofauthority are clearly set forth.
In assessing the quality of fiduciary oversight by boards ofdirectors and
senior management, examiners should consider whether these conditions exist:
The board and senior management have a clear understanding and working
knowledge of the types of fiduciary activities performed by the institution and
the risks inherent in them. They have approved appropriate policies, procedures,
recordkeeping systems and reporting systems to support the fiduciary activities
and to help measure and monitor risks. They have established procedures to keep
them informed about changes in fiduciary activities and the associated risks.
Management at all levels provides adequate supervision of the daily activities of
officers and employees to ensure that its lines of fiduciary business are managed
and staffed by persons with knowledge, experience, and expertise consistent
with the nature and scope of the organization's fiduciary activities.
Before offering new services or introducing new products, management
identifies the fiduciary risks associated with them and ensures that internal
controls are in place to manage the service or product and the accompanying
risk.
Adequate Policies, Procedures and Limits
An institution's directors and senior management should establish fiduciary
and fiduciary risk management policies and procedures commensurate with the types of
activities the institution conducts. The policies and procedures should provide enough
detailed guidance to ensure that all material areas of fiduciary activity and risk are addressed.
They should also be modified when necessary to respond to changes in the organization's
activities. A smaller, less complex institution that has effective management which is heavily
involved in daily operations generally would be expected to have more basic policies
addressing the significant areas of its activities and setting forth a limited but appropriate set
of requirements and procedures. In a larger institution, where senior management must rely
on a widely-dispersed staff to implement strategies in a wide range ofcomplex situations, far
more detailed policies and related procedures would be expected.
In assessing the adequacy of an institution's fiduciary and fiduciary risk
management policies and procedures, examiners should consider whether these conditions
exist:
The institution's ~licies and procedures adequately address the fiduciary
activities performed and are consistent with management's experience level and
the institution's stated goals and objectives.
The institution's policies and procedures provide for adequate identification,
measurement, monitoring and control of the risks posed by its fiduciary
activities.
J - 10
Policies clearly establish accountability and set forth lines ofauthority.
Policies provide for review of new fiduciary services and activities to ensure that
they are suitable and consistent with fiduciary customer objectives, and that the
systems necessary to identify, measure, monitor and control risks associated with
new services and activities are in place before the activity is initiated.
Adequate Risk Monitoring and Management Information Systems
Risk monitoring requires institutions to identify and measure all areas of
material fiduciary risk on a continuous basis. To do so effectively, risk monitoring activities
must be supported by information systems that provide senior management with timely
reports on fmancial condition, operating performance, marketing efforts, new products and
services, pending or threatened litigation and risk exposure arising from fiduciary activities.
They also must provide regular and more detailed reports for managers engaged in the daily
management of the institution's activities.
The sophistication of risk monitoring and control information systems should
be commensurate with the complexity of the institution's fiduciary operations. Less complex
institutions may require only a limited number ofmanagement reports to support risk
monitoring activities. Larger, more complex institutions, however, would be expected to
have much more comprehensive reporting and monitoring systems. These systems would
allow for more frequent reporting and closer monitoring ofcomplex activities.
In assessing the adequacy of an institution's measurement and monitoring of
fiduciary risk, examiners should consider whether these conditions exist:
The institution's fiduciary risk monitoring practices and reports encompass all of
its business lines and activities, and are structured to monitor exposures
consistent with established goals, limits and objectives.
Key assumptions, data sources, and procedures used in identifying, measuring
and monitoring fiduciary risk are appropriate for the activities performed by the
institution and are adequately documented and tested for reliability on a
continuous basis.
Reports to management are accurate and timely and contain sufficient
information for policy and decision makers to identity any adverse trends and
any potential or real problems. The reports must be adequate for them to
evaluate the level of fiduciary risk faced by the institution.
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Adequate Intenial Controls
A comprehensive internal control structure is critical to the safe and sound
functioning of an institution and its fiduciary risk management system. Establishing and
maintaining a system of internal controls that sets forth official lines ofauthority and
appropriate segregation ofduties is one ofmanagement's most important responsibilities.
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A well structured system of internal controls promotes effective fiduciary
operations and reliable reporting. safeguards assets. and helps to ensure compliance with
laws. regulations, and institutional policies. Controls should be periodically tested by an
independent party (preferably the auditor, or at least an individual not involved in the process
being reviewed) who reports directly to either the institution's board of directors or one of its
designated committees. Given the importance ofappropriate internal controls to
organizations of all sizes and risk profiles. the results of these reviews should be adequately
documented, as should management's responses to them.
In evaluating the adequacy ofan institution's internal controls as they relate to
fiduciary activities, examiners should consider whether these conditions exist:
The system of internal controls is appropriate to the type and level of fiduciary
activities.
The institution's organizational structure establishes clear lines ofauthority and
responsibility.
Reporting lines provide sufficient independence of the control areas from the
business lines and adequate separation ofduties throughout the institution.
Financial, operational, and regulatory reports are reliable, accurate, and timely.
Adequate procedures exist for ensuring compliance with laws and regulations.
Internal audit or other control review practices provide for independence and
objectivity.
Internal controls and information systems are adequately tested and reviewed
with findings documented and weaknesses given appropriate and timely
attention.
The board ofdirectors and/or the audit committee reviews the effectiveness of
internal audits and other control review activities on a regular basis.
The fiduciary risk assessment and control categories and tools listed above are
not meant to be all inclusive but are guidelines for use by the fiduciary examiner and the
fiduciary activities management in their risk assessment and control efforts. It is expected
that adjustments to the list will be made as the risk-oriented examination approach continues
to develop and be utilized. It is also expected that the examination ofeach individual
institution may require some modification depending upon its organization and the
complexity of the products and services offered.
Other Initiatives
The Task Force is also reviewing fiduciary examination frequency guidelines
to see if they need to be modified. In addition, the trust examination handbook will be
changed as necessary to reflect the risk-focused examination approach.
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Should you have any comments or questions regarding this letter, please
contact Howard Amer (ext. 2958) or Don Vinnedge (ext. 2717) at the Board.
James I. Garner
Deputy Associate Director
Cross reference:
SR 95-51, Rating the Adequacy ofRisk Management
SR 95-22, Supervising Foreign Banking Organizations
SR 95-17, Evaluating Risk Management in Nontrading Activities
SR 94-53, Investment Adviser Activities
SR 93-69, Evaluating Risk Management in Trading Activities
SR 82-28, Trust Rating System
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Footnotes
1. Consistent with the intent of SR 94-31, which provides state member banks the
opportunity to have their fiduciary activities examined on a coordinated basis with the safety
and soundness examination of the bank, the proposed increased use ofa variety ofexaminers
with various specializations during complex fiduciary examinations is meant to enhance the
overall examination process. Return to text
2. This initiative is also consistent with guidance previously provided to examiners that was
contained in SR 93-69 (Examining Risk Management and Internal Controls for Trading
Activities of Banking Organizations), SR 94-53 (Investment Adviser Activities), SR 95-17
(Evaluating the Risk Management and Internal Controls of Securities and Derivatives
Contracts Used in Nontrading Activities) and SR 95-22 dealing with ratings for U.S. offices
of foreign banks. Return to text
3. Significant volume can be measured in relation to the bank's overall size or in relation to
the volume of business conducted by the largest banking organizations. Return to text
4. The Task Force is also developing comparable guidance for use in supervising small
banking organizations with noncomplex fiduciary activities. Return to text
5. Consistent with SR 95-51, the assignment ofa specific risk management rating offrom 1
to 5 should be included on the Examiner's Comments page of the confidential section when
using the trust examination report. Comments, conclusions and criticisms relating to risk
management should be brought to the attention ofmanagement and should be presented in
the open section on the "Supervision and Organization" page and, ifwarranted, on the open
section Examiner's Comments page.
In those cases where the findings pertaining to fiduciary activities are integrated into a
safety and soundness examination or inspection report ofa state member bank, bank holding
company or U.S. branch or agency ofa foreign bank, the risk management comments and
rating for fiduciary activities should be included on the respective open and closed section
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pages that pertain to fiduciary activities and should also be considered and referenced when
presenting the comparable subject matter for the overall organization. Return to text
6. The Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System (UITRS) is contained in SR 82-28 along
with the Federal Reserve's Implementing Guidelines. In assigning risk management rating,
no new component will be added to UITRS. Return to text
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APPENDIXB
SUCCESSOR FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
A successor trustee shall not be obligated to examine the accounts, records and acts ofthe
previous trustee or trustees or any allocation oftrust assets made by the previous trustee.
Any successor trustee shall not be responsible for any act or omission to act on the part of
any previous trustee or trustee.
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Real Estate Issues for Bank Counsel
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)
Developments
HMDA Developments
I. Background
Federal Regulation C implements the requirements of the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) (12 CFR part 203). Covered
institutions must collect and report, on a Loan Application
Register (LAR), data for each HMDA-applicable application. The
LAR includes:
• application date; the action taken and the date of the action;
the loan amount; the loan type and purpose; and if the loan is
sold, the type of purchaser;
• the applicants' ethnicity, race, sex, and income; and
• the location and occupancy status of the property.
Covered Depository Institutions-Depository institutions that have
a home office or branch in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)
and exceed $32 million in assets, must collect and report HMDA
data for year 2003. Federal law requires the Federal Reserve
Board to adjust annually the coverage asset threshold based on
changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners
and Clerical Workers.
2002 Revisions-Final revisions to Regulation C were issued on
February 15,2002, and June 27, 2002. Generally, these revisions
expand the current data fields to include information regarding
the APR on certain originated applications, whether a loan is
subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA), the lien status of applications and originations, and
identifying applications for manufactured homes. Additionally,
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the definitions of application, home improvement loan, and
refinancing have been revised.
Adjustment to Effective Date-Originally, the 2002 revisions were
scheduled to become effective on January 1, 2003. In May 2002,
the revisions were delayed until January 1, 2004, except for the
two issues discussed in section II below.
II. Regulation C (HMDA) Revisions Effective January 1, 2003
The following two 2002 HMDA revisions were effective on
January 1, 2003. Financial institutions subject to Regulation C
must insure that procedures addressing these requirements are in
place.
A. Use of 2000 Census Data
1. 2000 census tract and demographic data for year 2003
reporting
B. Telephone Applications
1. Government monitoring information must be
requested
a) National origin or race and sex
b) Telephone applicants cannot be required to
provide the information
2. "Explanatory information" must be stated orally
before telephone request
a) "The following information is requested by the
Federal Government for certain types of loans
related to a dwelling, in order to monitor the
Lender's compliance with equal credit
opportunity, fair housing and home mortgage
disclosure laws. You are not required to
furnish this information, but are encouraged to
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do so. The law provides that a Lender may
neither discriminate on the basis of this
information, or on whether you choose to
furnish it."
3. Race or national origin categories
a) During 2003, use the current categories
• American Indian, Alaskan Native
• Asian, Pacific Islander
• Black
• Hispanic
• White
• Other
4. Manner application received notation
a) Loan officer/interviewers should notate
"telephone application"
• Provides explanation for missing
government monitoring information
III. Regulation C (HMDA) Revisions Effective January 1,2004
The following 2002 HMDA revisions become effective on January
1, 2004. Financial institutions subject to Regulation C must
insure that procedures addressing these requirements are in place
by the effective date.
A. Preapprovals
1. Home purchase applications only
a) A new Preapproval Section IS added to
theHMDALAR
• "I" preapproval was requested
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1. Metropolitan Area
B. Adjustments to Definitions
a) Two new fields are added to Action
Taken Section
• "2" preapproval was not requested
• "3" not applicable
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HMDA and RESPA Developments
b) Withdrawn or Incomplete preapprovals
are not reported
• "7" preapproval request denied by
financial institution
• "8" preapproval request approved but
not excepted by the applicant (optional
reporting)
a) Limited set of conditions may apply (e.g.,
identification of a property, post
preapproval verification of the
applicant's financial situation, results of
home or termite inspection)
a) Prequalifications involving less rigorous
underwriting with no binding
commitment are not covered
4. Approved and denied preapprovals must be
reported
3. Covers preapproval programs where written
commitment letters are issued
2. Covers applications that undergo full credit
evaluation
Real Estate Issues for Bank Counsel
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D. Applicant Information-Ethnicity and Race
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• One-to-four family (other than
manufactured housing)
• Manufactured housing
• Multifamily
• Applications for loans where both the
existing and new loan are secured by a lien
on a dwelling
b) Manufactured home is defil\ed by HUD
regulations (24 CFR 3280.2)
a) Property type options include:
a) Reportable refinancings
a) System classification'test is eliminated for
dwelling-secured loans--retained for unsecured
loans
• Follows Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) 2000 Census standards
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a) The new term replaces "metropolitan statistical
area"
1. Mirrors Office of Management and Budget 2000
Census data classifications
Manufactured Housing Identifier
1. Applications involving manufactured housing must be
identified in the Property Type Section
3. Refinancing
2. Home Improvement Loan
C.
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a) Ethnicity
2.
• "1" Hispanic or Latino
• "2" not Hispanic or Latino
• "3" information not provided by applicant in
mail, Internet, or telephone application
• "4" not applicable
• "5" no co-applicant
b) Race
• "I" American Indian or Alaska Native
• "2" Asian
• "3" Black or African American
• "4" Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander
• "5" White
• "6" Information not provided by applicant
in mail, Internet, or telephone application
• "7" not applicable
• "8" no co-applicant
c) Applicants may stipulate one or more race
designations
• The collection form explanatory information
is modified to add this sentence: "'You may
select one or more designations for "Race. "
Telephone Applications
a) Government monitoring information must be
requested
b) National orlgm or Race using expanded
designations
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Real Estate Issues for Bank Counsel HMDA and RESPA Developments
c) Government monitoring information cannot be
required
d) Explanatory information must be stated orally
prior to requesting the ethnicity/race
information and include the reference to
multiple designations of race
"The following information is requested by the
Federal Government for certain types of loans
related to a dwelling, in order to monitor the
Lender's compliance with equal credit
opportunity, fair housing and home mortgage
disclosure laws. You are not required to
furnish this information, but are encouraged to
do so. You may select one or more designations
for "Race." The law provides that a Lender
may neither discriminate on the basis of this
information, or on whether you choose to
furnish it."
E. Pricing Disclosure
1. Coverage
a) Originated home purchase loans
b) Secured home improvement loans
c) Refinancings
2. Rate Spread
a) Bank must identify date the final rate (APR) is
set
b) Final rate (APR) must be compared to U.S.
Treasury yields for comparable maturities
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• FRB will publish Treasury yields on
FFIEC's Internet web site
• FRB's Statistical Release H-15 or the
Treasury auction result~ may not be used
c) Treasury yields are as of the 15th day of the
month prior to date the final rate (APR) is set
• If final rate (APR) is set on September 7,
2004, then the August 15, 2004 FRB table
will apply
• If the final rate (APR) is set on September
19,2004, then the September 15,2004 table
will apply
d) Rate spreads in excess of 3% for first-lien loans
or 5% for subordinate-lien loans must be
reported
F. Home Ownership / Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) Status
1. Originated or purchased loans subject to HOEPA
(i.e., Section 32 Mortgage) must be identified
a) A new HOEPA Section is created in the HMDA
LAR
• Code "I" identifies a HOEPA loan
• Code "2" (not a HOEPA loan)
G. Lien Status
1. Reported on applications and originations
a) Purchased loans are exempt
2. Determined by:
a) Title searches on home purchase loans
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c) "3" not secured by a lien
b) Other readily available information
b) "2" secured by a subordinate lien
a) "1" secured by a first lien
HMDA and RESPA Developments
a) Loans purchased in this manner are HMDA
reportable
• The purchase need not involve the branch's
physical facilities
b) Loans purchased through branch acquisition
are not HMDA reportable
• Applicant's credit report or statement on
application
a) Purchase of all the assets and .liabilities of a
branch
2. Branch acquisition
1. Branch "asset sale" (excluding branch's liabilities)
3. A new Lien Status Section is created in the HMDA
LAR
The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has
proposed a major rewrite of the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA). HUD's proposal, which was published
F. Purchased Loans-Branch"Asset Sale" vs. Acquisitions
I. Background
RESPA Developments
Real Estate Issues for Bank Counsel
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
8
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
-
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in the Federal Register on July 29, 2002, is designed to "simplify
and improve the process of obtaining mortgages and to reduce
settlement costs to consumer."
HUD desires to 1) clarify the compensation and role ofmortgage
brokers and loan originators, 2) completely redesign the Good
Faith Estimate Disclosure Form and 3) allow the packaging of
settlement services that would be exempt from the RESPA "kick
back" penalties. The proposed changes would cover first and
second lien mortgage loans, purchase money and refinancings,
and possibly home equity and reverse mortgages.
What is noteworthy is the fact that in spite of strong opposition
from the mortgage broker segment of the industry, HUD
Secretary Mel Martinez is very committed to getting this proposal
finalized this year. A brief overview of the proposal, together
with an explanation of one significant change that is now effective
follows.
II. Expanded and Redesigned Good Faith Estimate (GFE)
A. Expanded Information
1. Mortgage broker and loan originator services
a) The GFE will require a uniform description of
the services provided by these entities
b) Comparison shopping must be suggested since
best rates and terms are not guaranteed
2. Describe options for paying settlement costs
3. Disclose total origination charges to mortgage broker
and bank
4. Yield spread premiums and broker payments
disclosed as "lender payments to the borrower"
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2. Settlement costs tolerances
3. Loan information
d) Monthly payment
a) Loan amount
HMDA and RESPA Developments
b) Interest rate with APR
b) 10% for shoppable lender required third party
services, borrower selected title services, title
insurance and escrows
• Government charges
• Escrows
• Per diem interest
• Hazard insurance
• Owner's title insurance
c) Mortgage insurance, if applicable
a) 0% for loan originator, lender required and
selected "third party services and government
charges
b) Title services/insurance
c) Shoppable lender required third party services
d) Other charges
a) Loan originator, lender required and selected
third party services
1. Four categories of settlement costs
B. Redesigned GFE
Real Estate Issues for Bank Counsel
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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-
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II
II
•
•
•
III
•• K(a) - 11
Real Estate Issues for nank Counsel
4. Other items
HMDA and RESPA Developments
a) Definition of application is revised
b) GFE would be valid for 30 days
C. Guaranteed Mortgage Package (GMP)
1. Services covered will be stipulated by regulation
2. Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement (GMPA)
required
III. Significant Change--Mortgage Servicing Disclosure Form
A. Disclosure requirement is eliminated
1. Authorization is contained in the proposal
B. GFE must contain servicing statement
1. '~Servicing of this loan may be assigned, sold, or
transferred while the loan is outstanding"
C. Transfer of Servicing
1. Rules relate to notice of transfer, misdirected
payments and borrower inquiries still apply
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[Federal Register: February 15,2002 (Volume 67, Number 32)]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 203
[Regulation C; Docket No. R-lOO I]
Home Mortgage Disclosure
AGENCY: Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final rule; staff interpretation.
SUMMARY: The Board is amending Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure) and the commentary interpreting the
regulation. The Board's amendments to Regulation C expand the coverage of nondepository lenders by adding a $25 million
dollar volume test to the existing percentage-based coverage test. The amendments require lenders to report data items related
to loan pricing; for loan originations in which the annual percentage rate (APR) exceeds the yield for comparable Treasury
securities by a specified amount or threshold, the lender will report the spread or difference between the APR and the Treasury
yield. The Board has tentatively set the thresholds at 3 percentage points for first lien loans, and 5 percentage points for second
lien loans, but is seeking comment on these thresholds in a separate proposed rule published in today's Federal Register.
Lenders also must report whether a loan is covered by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). The final
rule also requires lenders to report whether an application or loan involves a manufactured home.
The Board is revising certain definitions in the regulation. The definition of an application is revised to include a request for
preapproval as defmed in the regulation, for purposes of reporting denials of such requests. To promote consistency in the
reported data, the definition of a refinancing, and the definition of a home improvement loan are revised. In addition, the
amendments conform the collection of data on race and ethnicity to standards established by the U.S. Office ofManagement
and Budget in 1997. The Board also has reorganized the regulation and made other technical changes.
DATES: This rule is effective on January 1,2003. Compliance is mandatory for collection of data that begins on January I,
2003, which is to be submitted to supervisory agencies no later than March 1,2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John C. Wood, Counsel, Kathleen C. Ryan, Senior Attorney, or Dan S.
Sokolov, Attorney, Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, DC 2055 I, at (202) 452-3667 or (202) 452-2412. For users of Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD)
only, contact (202) 263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background on HMDA and Regulation C
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA; 12 U.S.c. 2801-10) has three purposes. One is to provide the public and
government officials with data that will help show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of the neighborhoods and
communities in which they are located. A second purpose is to help public officials target public investment to promote private
investment where it is needed. A third purpose is to provide data that assist in identifYing possible discriminatory lending
patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
HMDA accordingly requires certain depository and for-profit nondepository lenders to collect, report, and disclose data
about originations, purchases, and refmancings of home purchase and home improvement loans. Lenders must also report data
about applications (including certain preapproval requests) that did not result in originations.
The Board's Regulation C implements HMDA. Regulation C generally requires that lenders report data about:
Each application or loan, including the application date; the action taken and the date of that action; the loan amount; the
loan type and purpose; and, if the loan is sold, the type ofpurchaser;
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Each applicant or borrower, including ethnicity, race, sex, and income; and
Each property, including location and occupancy status.
Lenders report this information to their supervisory agencies on an application-by-application basis using a loan application
register format (HMDAlLAR). Lenders must make their HMDAlLARs--with certain fields redacted to preserve applicants'
privacy--available to the public. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), acting on behalfof the
supervisory agencies, compiles the reported information and prepares an individual disclosure statement for each institution,
aggregate reports for alI covered lenders in each metropolitan area, and other reports. These disclosure statements and reports
are available to the public.
The Board began the current review of Regulation C in March 1998 by publishing an Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (Advance Notice; 63 FR 12329 (March 12, 1998». The Advance Notice solicited comment on several specific
issues, as well as generally on potential revisions to Regulation C. The specific issues related to the reporting of preapprovals;
revising the defmitions of reportable refinancings and home improvement loans; coverage of purchased loans, construction
loans, and manufactured home loans; and reporting the reasons for a credit denial. The Board received approximately 100
comment letters. Most commenters addressed only the issues identified in the Advance Notice; others raised additional issues.
Subsequently, the Board received further suggestions for revising Regulation C, many reflecting increased public and
agency concern about predatory lending. For example, the Department ofHousing and Urban Development and the Department
of the Treasury held hearings on predatory lending and in June 2000 issued a report, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage
Lending, that included recommended changes. The Board received other suggestions at public hearings that the Board held on
possible changes to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) during the summer of2000.
In December 2000, the Board published for public comment a proposal to amend Regulation C. 65 FR 78656 (Dec. 15,
2000). The proposed amendments: (1) Extended coverage ofHMDA to more nondepository lenders; (2) simplified the
definitions of reportable refmancing and home improvement loans; (3) required reporting of requests for preapprovals as
defined in the regulation; (4) required reporting of home-equity lines ofcredit; and (5) required reporting on additional items of
data, including the annual percentage rate (APR), whether a loan is subject to HOEPA, and whether a loan or application
involves a manufactured home.
The Board received almost 300 comments. Most of the commenters--including lenders and related trade associations,
community and civil rights groups, and law enforcement agencies--supported expanding the coverage of nondepository lenders.
They believed that coverage of these lenders would provide more complete information about the mortgage market and would
also result in a more level playing field for depository lenders.
Commenters were divided on all other aspects of the proposal. Many lenders and other industry commenters supported
simplification of existing loan categories. Many ofthese commenters, however, did not want to report additional loans and
applications because ofconcerns about burden. Most lenders were opposed to reporting pricing and other new data items
because ofconcerns about burden and about the potential public misinterpretation of the resulting data. Community groups,
civil rights groups, and law enforcement agencies generally supported the revised definitions of reportable loans and
applications and the new data items, to assist in enforcement of fair lending laws and to provide better and more consistent
information about the mortgage market.
II. Summary of the Final Rule
Based on the comments and its own further analysis, the Board is amending Regulation C as set forth below. For each of the
amendments to the regulation, the Board weighed the potential benefit and burden that would result. The Board also considered
each proposed change in light of the aggregate benefit and burden of all of the proposed changes. The final rule is substantially
similar to the proposal, with some revisions to reduce burden and improve the quality of the data.
Coverage of nondepository lenders is expanded by adding a dollar volume threshold of$25 million to the current
loan-percentage test, to ensure that nondepository lenders in the business of mortgage lending are covered as required by the
statute.
The definitions of reportable loans have been revised to ensure better and more useful data. The fmal rule revises the
definition of a reportable refmancing to cover transactions in which a new obligation satisfies and replaces an existing
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obligation, where both the existing and the new loan are secured by a lien on a dwelling. The final rule amends the definition of
a home improvement loan to cover dwelling-secured loans that are made in whole or in part for home improvement purposes.
For home improvement loans not secured by a dwelling, the rule is unchanged: these loans are reported only if they are for
home improvement purposes and the lender classifies them as home improvement loans. The current rule also remains
unchanged for home-equity lines ofcredit: lenders report HELOCs at their option, and report only the amount of the line
intended for home improvement or home purchase purposes.
The fmal rule adopts the proposal to revise the term "application" to include preapprovals in which a lender issues a written
commitment to lend to creditworthy borrowers up to a specific amount and for a specific time, subject to limited conditions
such as locating a suitable property. Lenders are required to report denials of preapprovals as defined in the final rule, as well
as preapprovals that result in a loan origination (these are already reported but are not currently distinguished from other
applications). A lender may but is not required to report preapproval requests that are approved but not accepted by the
applicant.
Additional data items are required under the final revisions to Regulation C to improve understanding of the mortgage
market, including the subprime market, and assist in enforcing fair lending laws. The additional items are:
For originated loans where the APR exceeds the yield on Treasury securities with comparable maturity periods by a
specified amount, the rate spread or difference between the APR on the loan and the Treasury yield;
Whether a loan is subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act; and
Whether a loan or application involves a manufactured home.
The Board is adopting the proposed changes to the rules for collecting and reporting information on ethnicity and race of
applicants, to conform to guidance issued in 1997 by the Office of Management and Budget ( "OMB" ). The Board is
separately soliciting comment on whether to revise the rule on collecting information about the applicant's ethnicity, race, and
sex for applications taken entirely by telephone; under the proposal published in today's Federal Register, a lender would be
required to ask for the monitoring information in telephone applications, consistent with the existing rule for mail and Internet
applications.
In the December 2000 proposal, the Board solicited comment on an alternative system for categorizing loans, under which
the categories reported would be (I) home purchase loans (subdivided into first and junior liens), (2) other mortgage loans
(similarly subdivided), (3) home-equity lines of credit, and (4) unsecured home improvement loans.
Some commenters supported the alternative system. Many commenters, including financial institutions and community
groups, were opposed. Industry commenters argued that the burden of reprogramming and retraining staff would be very large,
and that historical trend analyses of HMDA data would be adversely affected because new data would be inconsistent with data
from earlier years. Some commenters believed that the alternative system would reduce the utility of the data, since data on
secured home improvement loans and refinancings would be indistinguishable from other loans. A number ofcommenters
advocated other alternatives in which categories of loans would be further broken down into various subcategories.
Based on the comments and its own analysis, the Board has decided not to adopt the proposed alternative system.
III. Section-by-Section Analysis of Final Rule
The following discussion generally tracks the regulation (including appendices) as amended by the Board. Revisions to the
staff commentary are addressed under the sections of the regulation that they interpret. Rules or interpretations that the Board
has not revised are also discussed under the pertinent sections. Conforming and non-substantive changes to the regulation and
commentary generally are not discussed.
Section 203.2 Defmitions
2(b) Application
Requests for preapproval. The Board proposed to cover certain requests for preapprovals ofhome purchase loans. The
defmition proposed covered those preapproval programs in which a creditor issues a creditworthy applicant a written
commitment to extend credit that specifies the maximum amount ofcredit that it commits to extend and the period of time
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during which the commitment remains valid. The commitment letter may state limited conditions, such as identification ofa
property or verification ofno material change in the borrower's creditworthiness. This definition does not cover
prequalification programs, in which the underwriting is less rigorous and the lender makes no binding written commitment.
Commenters were divided on whether lenders should be required to report preapproval requests. Many commenters,
including community and civil rights groups, federal law enforcement agencies, and a few lenders, urged the Board to adopt the
proposed rule. Collecting data on preapproval requests, they stated, would better reflect market activity in the home purchase
market, consistent with HMDA's purposes. Preapproval data would also facilitate enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
Many other commenters, primarily financial institutions and their trade associations, were opposed to covering preapproval
requests under Regulation C. These commenters generally believe hat the burden of collecting preapproval data would
outweigh the utility of the data. Commenters stated, for example, that the number of transactions reported would greatly
increase, staff would have to be trained, and software and collection procedures would have to be changed. Commenters also
stated that the data would not serve the purposes ofHMDA-to provide information on whether lenders were meeting the
housing needs of their communities--as property location would be available only for those preapproval requests that later
resulted in originations.
The statute requires lenders to report action taken on applications, and the Board believes that requests for preapproval as
defined in the proposal and final rule represent credit applications. 1 The final rule provides that lenders must report
preapproval requests that are denied under defined programs, and that lenders may, at their option, report preapproval requests
that are approved but not accepted by the applicant. Under the final rule, lenders will continue to report preapprovals that are
approved and that result in loan originations; lenders will distinguish such loan originations from other loans by the use of
separate codes.
1 Preapprovals and prequalifications emerged in the mortgage market in the ear(v 199005. In 1995, the Board revised the
stallcommentary to Regulation C to provide that prequalifications are not applications under Regulation C. 60 FR 63393
(Dec. I I, 1995j. The Board deferred action on preapprovals, however. and instructed lenders not to report them under
Regulation C because there was no common industry d~finition ofa preapproval as distinct.frol11 a prequalif/catiofl. The
Board stated, however, that it might consider amending Regulatioll C at a later time to address whether lenders should report
preapprovals.
The preapproval programs covered by the final rule involve decisions based on a comprehensive credit underwriting in
which a lender collects and reviews the information it typically collects and reviews in making a credit decision on a traditional
application. For a preapproval program to be covered, the lender must issue a binding written commitment for approved
applicants or deny the request and issue an adverse action notice under Regulation B, based on the lender's review of the
applicant's credit record.
The final rule also provides that a covered preapproval may be subject only to a limited set of conditions. These are
identification ofa property; verification that the applicant's financial situation has not changed since the request was approved;
and other conditions unrelated to creditworthiness that are typically included in traditional loan commitments (such as
satisfactory completion of a home inspection or proofof a termite inspection). A staff comment provides guidance on these
limited conditions.
Data on denials ofpreapproval requests will provide more complete data on the availability of home financing, and will be
useful in fair lending enforcement. As with traditional applications, these preapproval data will allow comparisons of minority
and non-minority populations that will serve as useful screening devices to help identitY underwriting processes and practices
that may warrant scrutiny. While geographic information will not be available for preapprovals that do not lead to originations,
the data will nevertheless be useful for fair lending analyses; preapproval programs are, by definition, not about geographic
issues but about the fmancial strength and creditworthiness of the applicants.
The fmal rule requires lenders to report denials of preapproval requests, and to designate those loan originations (which are
already reported) that were initiated under a covered preapproval program. Lenders may also, however, wish to report
preapproval requests that are approved but not accepted by the applicant, in order to put into context the preapproval requests
that are denied. Accordingly, the revised rule permits, but does not require, lenders to report preapproval requests that fall into
this category.
Under the final rule, lenders will not report preapproval requests that are withdrawn or incomplete. The Board believes that
the proportion of preapproval requests that are withdrawn or closed for incompleteness is likely to be relatively small; for
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traditional mortgage applications, the HMDA data show that in 2000 approximately 7 percent were withdrawn by the applicant
and 2 percent were closed by the institution for incompleteness. Thus, the Board believes that any benefit from these data does
not warrant the burden of reporting the information.
The Board asked for comment on the relative benefit of a code to identitY preapprovals. Nearly all commenters, including
those opposed to coverage of preapprovals, stated that the data on preapprovals would be of little use unless lenders
differentiate requests for preapproval from other applications. Commenters believed that without a code for preapprovals,
denial rates would be artificially inflated. Commenters mistakenly believed that lenders would have to report as denials all of
the preapproval requests the lender approved that do not lead to loans with the lender. (Such requests would not be reported as
denials under the final rule.) Still other commenters were concerned that without a separate code, double counting would occur
where a lender approves a preapproval request and subsequently originates the loan. Based on comments and on further
analysis, the final rule requires lenders to distinguish preapproval requests from other applications in their data reporting.
Other matters. The definition of an application has been revised to refer to "procedures used by a financial institution." This
focuses the definition on what institutions actually do, rather than what their procedures state.
2(d) Dwelling
The staff commentary has been revised to indicate that the term "dwelling" does not apply to transitory residences such as
college dormitories. This responds to requests that the Board claritY the meaning of the term "dwelling."
2(e) Financial Institution
HMDA covers nondepository lenders that are "engaged for profit in the business of mortgage lending." 12 U.S.c. 2802.
Regulation C provides that a nondepository mortgage lender is covered if in the preceding year its home purchase loan
originations, including refinancings of home purchase loans, equaled or exceeded 10 percent of all its loan originations (by
dollar volume).2 Some nondepository lenders originate significant numbers of reportable loans, but because these lenders are
also heavily engaged in other types of lending (credit card lending and other consumer lending, for instance) they are not
currently covered by HMDA. Coverage of these lenders' mortgage activity could provide more complete information on the
mortgage market.
2 In addition, a nondepository lender is exempt Ji'om Regulation C ifits total assets, combined with those ofany parent
cO/poration, were S I () million or less on the preceding December 31, and ifthe institution originatedfewer than 100 home
purchase loans (again. including refinancings (?f home purchase loansj in the preceding calendar year. There is also a
location test, under which a nondepository lender is exempt ifon the preceding December 31 it had no o/fice in a metropolitan
area, and received applications for, originated, or purchasedfewer Than five home purchase or home improvement loans in a
metropolitan area in the preceding calendar Jiear.
The Board proposed to address the coverage issue by preserving the existing percentage-based test and adding a
dollar-volume test. A nondepository lender would be covered by Regulation C if its prior-year home purchase loan
originations, including refinancings of home purchase loans, equaled or exceeded $50 million even if they did not equal or
exceed 10 percent oftotal originations. The Board estimated that a $50 million threshold would result in coverage of a
nondepository institution making approximately 400 to 500 mortgage loans annually (based on a national average of$125,000
for home purchase loans). Comment was solicited on whether $50 million was an appropriate threshold.
Commenters, including industry, community groups, and law enforcement agencies, supported expanding coverage of
nondepository lenders. Many depository lenders asserted that greater coverage of nondepository lenders would create a more
level playing field for all lenders. Commenters also stated that expanded coverage ofnondepositories could provide the
agencies and the public with more information about the subprirne market.
Different views were expressed, however, on the best approach for expanding coverage of nondepository lenders. Many
commenters supported a dollar-volume threshold, but argued that the proposed $50 million threshold was too high. Some
industry commenters suggested lowering the dollar-volume threshold to as low as $5 million. Other commenters urged the
Board to drop the proposed dollar-volume threshold and to adopt instead a number-of-Ioans test to address markets where the
average loan amount is smaller than the national average. Some commenters pointed out that in some regions of the country,
the average home purchase loan amount is less than the national average of$125,000. For example, HMDA data and data
provided by the National Association of Realtors indicate that the average home purchase loan amount in the South is
approximately $93,000.
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Still other commenters, including some community groups and federal agencies, suggested eliminating the 10 percent test.
These commenters asserted that a lender's impact on a local or broader horne mortgage market is a better measure ofwhether
the lender is in the business of mortgage lending than the relationship between the lender's home mortgage lending and its total
loan originations.
The Board is adopting a dollar-volume threshold of $25 million. Based on the national average home purchase loan amount,
adollar-volume threshold of $25 million would result in coverage of a nondepository institution that originates approximately
200 home purchase loans annually. HMDA data show that, on average, a lender with 200 loan originations per year receives
approximately 400 applications annually. The Board believes that a lender receiving this volume ofhome purchase loan
applications per year is engaged "in the business of mortgage lending."
Other matters. As part of the reorganization of the regulation, coverage criteria that used to appear in section 203.3--
"Exempt Institutions" are consolidated under the definition of "financial institution" in section 203.2(e). Correspondingly,
several comments have been moved from section 203.3 to section 203.2(e) of the staff commentary.
2(t) Home-Equity Line of Credit
The current regulation permits, but does not require, reporting of home-equity lines ofcredit (HELOCs), as home
improvement or home purchase loans, depending on the purpose of the credit line. If a lender opts to report HELOCs, it reports
only the amount of the line intended for home improvement or home purchase purposes at the time of the application.
The Board proposed to require lenders to report all HELOCs, regardless of the purpose of the credit line. The proposal was
based on research showing that about 70 percent of all HELOCs are used at least in part for home improvement purposes. The
Board proposed creating a separate category for HELOCs to facilitate comparisons between the markets for home-secured lines
of credit and closed-end home improvement loans, which have distinct demographic characteristics. To simplifY reporting of
HELOCs, the Board proposed to require lenders to report the full amount of the credit line, rather than the amount intended to
be used for home improvement (or home purchase) purposes.
A number ofcommenters, including some lenders, supported the proposal to mandate the reporting of HELOCs as a
separate loan category. Many others were opposed, however, contending that the change would result in a very large increase in
the volume ofloans reported under HMDA. In response to the proposal's request that commenters rank the proposed changes
in order of burden and benefit, some industry commenters ranked reporting all HELOCs as one of the most costly and least
beneficial changes. Many commenters also stated that most HELOCs are not used for home improvement, but for purposes
(such as college tuition and debt consolidation) that are unrelated to HMDA's purposes.
The Board has retained the current rule regarding HELOCs. Reporting ofHELOCs remains optional. See section
203.4(c)(3). Collecting data on all HELOCs for home improvement and home purchase purposes would give a more complete
picture of the home mortgage market, but it would result in increased burden. The Board believes that the benefit ofcollecting
information on all HELOCs, when ranked with other changes presented in the final rule, such as the pricing information, does
not support the increased reporting burden.
Lenders that report HELOCs will continue to report only that part of the line that is intended for home purchase or home
improvement purposes. Some commenters--including those who opposed the proposal to require reporting of
HELOCs--supported reporting the entire amount of the line because it would reduce burden. Other commenters noted that
many HELOCs are never drawn upon. The Board believes that reporting the entire amount of the line could overstate the
amount of home improvement and home purchase lending.
Other matters. The Board is adopting the proposal to clarifY the term "home-equity line of credit" as an open-end credit plan
secured by a dwelling as defmed in Regulation Z (12 CFR part 226).
2(g) Home Improvement Loan
The current rule defmes a home improvement loan as a loan made in whole or in part for home improvement purposes, and
classified by the lender as a home improvement loan. Thus, a lender may avoid reporting loans made for home improvement
purposes by not classifYing them as home improvement loans. Although the classification test for home improvement loans has
reduced burden on the industry, the resulting data have been of limited usefulness. A loan is reported as a home improvement
loan only if a lender classifies it as such. Lenders' classification schemes can vary greatly. The same type of loan might be
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classified as a home improvement loan by one lender but not by another.
To address these issues, the Board proposed to change the treatment of home improvement loans by dropping the
classification test. Under the proposal, any loan made in whole or in part for home improvement purposes would be reported as
a home improvement loan, regardless of how the institution classified the loan.
The Board is adopting the proposal with modifications. The final rule differentiates between secured and unsecured home
improvement loans as follows: (1) The classification test is eliminated for dwelling-secured loans, but (2) the classification test
is retained for home improvement loans not secured by a dwelling.
Dwelling-Secured Home Improvement Loans. Commenters expressed concern about the burden that would be imposed on
lenders if they have to ascertain the purpose of every credit product they offer, including credit cards. The Board believes that,
for dwelling-secured loans, it should not be unduly burdensome for lenders to ascertain the intended purpose of the loan
proceeds because of the level of documentation and of interaction between lender and applicant in such loan applications.
In determining whether loan proceeds are intended for home improvement purposes, lenders may rely on applicants'
statements, and are not required to take other steps to determine loan purpose. One method suggested in the proposal for
lenders to determine whether a loan is intended for home improvement purposes was a check-box on a loan application form.
Some commenters were concerned that if application forms contain check-boxes with a number ofchoices including home
improvement, applicants may tend to check home improvement even if they are not sure they will use the loan for that purpose.
The final rule does not require a lender to use a check box; instead, for example, an application form might contain a blank in
which the applicant could enter the purpose of the loan, without any prompting or limiting of choices.
Non-Dwelling-Secured Home Improvement Loans. The final rule retains the classification test for home improvement loans
not secured by a dwelling, so that reporting of such loans and applications will continue to hinge on lenders' own classification
systems. Retention of the classification test will mitigate substantially the burden that commenters were concerned about.
Lenders would not have to report an unsecured loan as a home improvement loan for HMDA purposes if the institution
classifies it otherwise.
Other matters. The Board believes the data on home improvement lending will be more useful by the reporting oflien status,
as the revised defmition of a home improvement loan turns on whether the loan is dwelling-secured. Thus the Board is
separately seeking additional public comment on whether lenders should be required to report lien status, in a notice published
in this issue of the Federal Register. 2(h) Home Purchase Loan
The Board proposed to claritY, in an addition to the staff commentary, that if an institution making a first mortgage loan also
makes a second mortgage loan that finances part or all of the borrower's downpayment, the institution reports each loan
separately as a home purchase loan. A few comments were received on this issue. One financial trade association asserted that
the two loans should be reported as one to reduce burden on institutions; another commenter supported the proposal but
believed the number of home purchase loans would be overstated unless the Board required institutions to differentiate these
second mortgages from others. The final rule is identical to the proposal. The Board believes that reporting these two loans
separately more accurately reflects a lender's home purchase lending, as both loans are made for the purpose ofhome purchase.
2(i) Manufactured Home
The Board is adopting the proposed definition of "manufactured home." See the discussion under section 203.4(a)(5)
regarding property type.
20) Metropolitan Area
The Board amends the regulation, as proposed, to replace the term "metropolitan statistical area" with "metropolitan area,"
the term now used by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). "Metropolitan area" will have the same meaning as
"metropolitan statistical area" does currently. In December 2000, OMB adopted revised standards for defining metropolitan
and micropolitan statistical areas; the new standards replace the 1990 standards for defming metropolitan areas. (65 FR 82228
(December 27,2000)). OMB has stated that it plans to announce defmitions of areas based on the new standards and Census
2000 data in 2003.
2(k) Refinancing
Regulation C requires a lender to report refinancings of home purchase and home improvement loans. A refinancing is
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defmed as a transaction in which a new obligation satisfies and replaces an existing obligation by the same borrower. Currently,
the regulation allows lenders to select from among four scenarios in deciding which refinancings to report:
(1) The existing obligation was a home purchase or home improvement loan, as determined by the lender (for example, by
reference to available documents);
(2) The applicant states that the existing obligation was a home purchase or home improvement loan;
(3) The existing obligation was secured by a lien on a dwelling; or
(4) The new obligation will be secured by a lien on a dwelling.
This rule was adopted to ease compliance burden by providing flexibility, but it generates inconsistent data among HMDA
reporters to the extent that different lenders choose different scenarios to determine which refinancings to report. Consequently,
it is impossible for the data user to know what the data represent.
To remove this inconsistency, the Board proposed to define a refinancing as a transaction in which a new obligation satisfies
and replaces an existing obligation by the same borrower, where both the existing and the new obligation are secured by a lien
on a dwelling. The proposed definition would reduce the inconsistency of refmancing data, because all lenders would report
using a single two-pronged test.
The Board also solicited comment on an alternative definition. Under the alternative, a refinancing would be defined as a
transaction in which a new obligation satisfies and replaces an existing obligation by the same borrower and the new obligation
is secured by a lien on a dwelling. This definition would capture not only refinancings where the old obligation was
dwelling-secured, but, in addition, refinancings of unsecured debt in which the new obligation is dwelling-secured. Under this
formulation, for example, a lender that pays off a consumer's existing unsecured loan by extending a new, dwelling-secured
loan to that consumer would report the new loan.
Some commenters opposed any revision in the definition of refinancing, on the grounds that it would reduce flexibility for
the industry. Other commenters argued that the proposed definition would impose burden on industry, in that a lender may not
know the lien status of the existing obligation, particularly at the time of application. These commenters favored the alternative
definition. More commenters supported the proposed definition (both the existing and new loan secured by a lien on a
dwelling), acknowledging that the flexibility in the current definition results in inconsistent data.
The Board is revising the definition of refmancing as proposed; under the fmal rule, reportable refmancings are those in
which both the existing and the new loan are secured by a lien on a dwelling. (Lenders may rely on a borrower's statement
about whether the loan being refinanced is dwelling-secured.) This definition will avoid covering refinancings of unsecured
debt, which could result in a substantial increase in the volume of loans reported, and thus in the reporting burden. It also will
reduce the inconsistency of the data.
MECAs. The Board did not propose any change regarding the status of modification, extension, and consolidation
agreements (MECAs). MECAs are not reported because they do not meet the definition of a refinancing (satisfaction and
replacement of an existing mortgage loan). A few commenters asserted, however, that MECAs should be reported because they
substitute for traditional refinancings in some states, such as New York and Texas, to avoid mortgage recording fees and taxes.
The final rule does not include MECAs as reportable under HMDA. The existing defmition ofa refmancing establishes a
bright-line test for reportable transactions. The Board believes that MECA data may be useful in certain instances, but that,
under the existing loan classification scheme, the advantages ofa bright-line test for determining whether a transaction should
be reported--especially in reducing compliance burden--outweigh the benefits ofadditional data on these transactions.
Therefore, the Board has not revised the defmition of refmancing to include MECAs.
Section 203.4--Compilation of Loan Data
4(a) Data Format and Itemization
The Board had proposed to revise the introductory material in section 203.4(a) to refer to home-equity lines ofcredit as a
distinct category. The final rule does not include this revision because, as discussed below, the Board did not adopt the
proposal to require reporting of home-equity lines of credit.
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4(a)(1) Application Date
The Board is not adopting proposed comment 4(a)(1)-5, which was intended to clarifY when an application is received. The
proposed comment provided that the date an institution receives an application is the date on which the institution or its agent
first takes possession of a completed copy of the application. Several financial institutions expressed concern, however, that the
comment could create confusion. They believed that the·comment suggested that "completed application" has a different
meaning under Regulation C than under Regulation B. Commenters also opposed the reference to the creditor's "agent," noting
that the law of agency varies from state to state and thus the data could be inconsistent.
4(a)(3) Purpose
The Board has reorganized the loan application register to clarifY the data categories, by separating the purpose of the loan
from the type of property involved.
4(a)(4) Preapprovals
The loan application register has been revised to provide for the reporting of certain preapproval requests. See the
discussion under section 203.2(b) "application."
4(a)(5) Property Type--Manufactured Housing Status
The Board proposed to require lenders to identifY loans involving manufactured housing, which are underwritten differently
from other types of housing loans and tend to have higher denial rates. Commenters were divided on this issue. Many
commenters--including community and civil rights groups and the federal agencies charged with enforcing the fair lending
laws--favored distinguishing loans and applications for manufactured homes from other transactions. They believed that doing
so would improve the public's ability to understand the home mortgage market and would make HMDA data more useful for
fair lending purposes.
Many other commenters, including most lenders and their trade associations, were opposed to identifYing manufactured
home loans. These commenters said that the additional data would be of limited value because there have been no reports of
abusive behavior in the manufactured home loan market. They believe that requiring lenders to identifY manufactured home
loans would not be worth the burden the requirement would entail.
Some commenters stated that lenders do not always know whether an application is for a loan to be secured by manufactured
housing. It was suggested that if the Board adopts the proposal, the loan application register must allow a reporter to indicate
when it does not know whether the application involves a manufactured home. Commenters also asserted that lenders are not
familiar with the proposed definition of manufactured housing found in HUD regulations. Some commenters believed that loan
officers would have to review loan applications and files to determine if the property involved met the specifications in the
HUD definition.
The Board believes that identifYing applications and loans involving manufactured housing will improve the utility of
HMDA data. As in the proposal, the final rule provides that manufactured home loans will be identified using the definition
that appears in the HUD regulation that establishes construction and safety standards for manufactured homes. Although some
commenters suggested reproducing the text of the HUD definition in Regulation C, the Board has opted to incorporate the
definition by reference, so that ifHUD revises the text of its regulation in the future, changes to Regulation C will not be
necessary. The HUD definition is accepted by the manufactured home industry and establishes a clear definition for HMDA
reporters. If a lender does not know at the time of application--and cannot determine through reasonable means--whether a loan
is for a manufactured home, the lender reports the property type as a one-to four-family dwelling. 4(a)(8) Type of Action Taken
and Date
Counteroffers. A new comment is adopted to clarifY that an institution must report a denial on the original terms requested
by the applicant when the institution makes a counteroffer--such as an offer of a different amount ofcredit from the amount
requested--and the applicant does not accept the counteroffer or fails to respond. See comment 4(a)(8)-I.
Underwriting conditions. The staff commentary provides that if an institution issues a loan approval subject to the
applicant's meeting underwriting conditions, other than customary conditions, and the applicant does not meet them, the
institution must report the action taken as a denial. The Board proposed to delete the exclusion for "customary conditions" from
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this comment, because institutions expressed confusion about the scope of this tenn, and the Board believed that it was
impractical to make the tenn precise and comprehensive.
Commenters--primarily financial institutions--opposed the deletion of the exclusion for customary conditions. They stated
that without the exclusion, a lender would be viewed as having denied an application when the loan was not originated due to
circumstances outside the lender's control, such as title difficulties. One commenter argued that customary conditions could be
defined as verification ofemployment, amount of compensation, appraised·value, and insurability. Another commenter
suggested that loans within the exclusion should be reported as approved but not accepted. Based on the comments and on its
own analysis, the Board has retained the exclusion for customary conditions. The Board continues to believe, however, that
defining customary conditions is not practicable, given the wide variety of practices among lenders. Thus the comment
continues to provide illustrative examples of customary conditions. See comment 4(a)(8)-4.
Other matters. As part of the reorganization of the regulation, the Board has moved some material regarding the date action
is taken from Appendix A to the staff commentary. See comment 4(a)(8)-7. 4(a)(l0) Ethnicity, Race, Sex and Income
See Appendix A, paragraph I.D.3. and 4, and Appendix B, below, regarding changes to the appendices to confonn
collection ofethnicity and race data under Regulation C to OMB guidance. For ethnicity, the standards provide for data on
whether individuals are Hispanic or Latino, or do not fall within this category. The revised standards prescribe five racial
designations: American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander;
and White. The standards eliminate the option ofdesignating "Other." The standards also require that respondents be offered
the option of selecting one or more designations. 62 FR 58782, 58786 (October 30, 1997).
To achieve complete confonnity with these guidelines, the Board is modifying the appendices. As proposed, the appendices
combined the questions ofrace and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity. OMB recommends that the question of Hispanic ethnicity be
posed separately from the question of race in all cases of self-identification. Therefore, Appendices A and B as adopted
separate the questions ofethnicity and race and, as OMB recommends, pose the ethnicity question first.
Many industry commenters objected to the proposal. Some cited the cost ofconverting their data collection systems. The
Board believes, however, the compliance burden is outweighed by the importance ofunifonn adoption of the standards
throughout the federal government. The Board also notes that these objections were considered by the OMB before it
promulgated the new standards. See 62 FR at 58784 (summarizing comments opposing multiple-race reporting on grounds of
increased costs).
Some commenters were concerned that the new system would confuse applicants as well as employees of lenders who have
to designate the race and ethnicity of applicants by visual observation. The Board believes that any confusion among lenders'
employees can be mitigated by appropriate and timely training. Although some industry commenters requested guidance on
designating race under a regime that pennits multiple designations, the Board is not revising existing guidance, which provides
that designations be made to the extent possible.
Some commenters contended that data collected under the revised standards would not enable proper fair lending
assessments. For instance, some commenters expressed concern that pennitting multiple designations ofrace would make it
difficult to interpret the data for fair lending purposes. OMB has published guidance on how to aggregate and allocate
multiple-race responses. See OMB Bulletin No. 00-02, Guidance on Aggregation and Allocation of Data on Race for Use in
Civil Rights Monitoring and Enforcement (March 9, 2000) at http://www.whitehouse.2:ov/omb/bulletinsibOO-02.html). Some
commenters also expressed concern that data collected under the new standards would not be comparable to data collected
under the old standards. OMB has addressed this issue as well. See Provisional Guidance on the Implementation of the 1997
Standards for Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (December 15,2000), Appendix C, The Bridge Report: Tabulation Options
for Trend Analysis (available at http:www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforegir&e_app-c&tables.pdf).
Applications Taken by Telephone. The Board proposed to revise Appendix B to codify a longstanding interpretation that, if
an application is made entirely by telephone, the reporting institution is pennitted, but not required, to request data on race or
ethnicity and sex. Many commenters expressed concern that this interpretation may have contributed to declining response rates
to these questions. HMDA data show that from 1993 to 2000, the proportion of home loan applications of all types with
missing race or ethnicity data increased from about 8 percent to about 28 percent. Missing data about the applicant's sex has
increased at about the same rate.
It is not clear what proportion of this missing infonnation is attributable to telephone applications. Applicants by mail and
Internet may have declined to provide the infonnation, even though asked, as required, by the lender. The Board believes,
K(a) - 24
FED-REG-NOTICE, BANK-COMPLIANCE 67 FR 7221, FR 12CFR 02/15/02 Final 67 FR 7221 - Home Mortgage
Disclosure
COPYRIGHT 2003, CCH Incorporated
however, that at least part of the substantial decline in response rates regarding race and ethnicity may be explained by the
apparent increase in lenders' use of the telephone to take applications. Thus the Board has published a separate notice in
today's Federal Register, proposing to conform the current rule for telephone applications to the rule applicable to mail and
Internet applications. For a discussion of the issue and information about how to submit comments, please refer to the Board's
notice published elsewhere in today's Federal Register. 4(a)(l2) and (13) Additional Data Items Related to Loan Pricing
The statutory fmdings and purposes section of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act refers to lenders' responsibilities "to
provide adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable tenns and conditions," and to the goal of providing the
enforcement agencies and the public "with sufficient information to enable them to detennine whether [lenders] are filling their
obligations to serve the housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located * * *." 3 In addition,
the 1989 amendments to the act, requiring reporting of racial characteristics, sex, and income, made clear that another goal of
the statute is strengthening enforcement of fair lending lawsA The Congress provided that the Board "shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary" to carry out these purposes.S
3 HMDA Sec. 302(a) and (b), 12 USc. 2801(a) and (b).
4 "A primary purpose ofsllch reporting [under HMDA] is to assist regulatory agencies in ident[fi.'ing possible
discriminatory lending patterns that warrant closer scrutiny" H. Con! Rep. 101-222, p. 459 (Aug. 4, 1989) (i'eport
accompanying legislation adding racial characteristics, sex, and income). "The conferees placed highest priority on the
collection o/analyticall)' usejitl data by means o.fwhich to ident[fj, and eliminate discriminator)' lending practices. " 1d
5 HMDA Sec. 305(a}, 12 U.Sc. 2804(a).
Obtaining loan pricing data is critical to address fair lending concerns related to loan pricing and to better understand the
mortgage market, including the subprime market. The mortgage marketplace has changed significantly since HMDA was
enacted and continues to evolve. Along with a substantial growth in the subprime market has come increased variation in loan
pricing, generally related to an assessment ofcredit risk. In light of these changes, the Board believes that the collection of loan
pricing infonnation is necessary to fulfill the statutory purposes ofHMDA and to ensure the continued utility of the HMDA
data. The Board is revising the regulation to require lenders to report data regarding loan pricing (the rate spread and HOEPA
status, as described below). The Board also believes infonnation on lien status would make pricing data more useful, and is
separately seeking comment in today's
Federal Register on whether it should amend Regulation C to require lenders to indicate lien status for applications and
loans.
Annual Percentage Rate. HMDA data currently include no infonnation on loan pricing. The Board proposed to require that
lenders report the annual percentage rate (APR) charged on a loan. This information would facilitate identification ofsubprime
loans, which have different characteristics, such as higher denial rates, from other mortgage loans. Pricing information could
also help identifY practices that raise potential fair lending concerns warranting further investigation.
The Board proposed to require reporting of the APR only for home purchase and home improvement loans that are covered
by the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) for which the lender is required to disclose the APR to the consumer. Thus, APR reporting
would not be required, for example, on an application withdrawn before the lender is required to disclose the APR, or on a loan
made to a corporate borrower and therefore not covered by TILA, which applies only to credit extended for consumer
purposes.
Lenders and their trade associations generally opposed the collection of the APR based on a belief that the data obtained
would not be useful enough to justifY the burden imposed in gathering it. They argued that APR data, viewed in isolation from
other tenns and conditions of the loan and from underwriting information, have little value and are subject to misinterpretation
by the public. Lenders appeared concerned about unfounded allegations of unlawful credit discrimination should the data reveal
disparities among different classes of borrowers, even though the disparities may be based on legitimate risk-based pricing and
creditworthiness standards. Lenders also argued that there is no need to require that the APR be reported under HMDA because
examiners already have access to APR data in depository lenders' files.
The Board proposed to mitigate burden by requiring reporting of APRs only for HMDA loans subject to TILA, for which
the APR is already computed by the lender. Some lenders contended, however, that reporting under HMDA would still impose
a substantial cost burden, because their systems for TILA disclosure and HMDA reporting are separate and do not necessarily
interface readily. About half of the comments from lenders and their trade associations stated that reporting ofpricing data in
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particular would be burdensome, although only about halfof these offered specific reasons for their claim of burden. Perhaps
the most common sources of burden cited were the initial costs of reprogramming software, changing procedures, and training
employees, as well as the ongoing costs of data entry and monitoring.
Some commenters suggested that if the Board decided to require reporting of the APR, the requirement should be limited to
originated loans, to reduce the burden imposed. For example, they believed that denied or withdrawn loan applications and
purchased loans should not be subject to the requirement.
Other commenters, including community groups and law enforcement and regulatory agencies, supported collection of the
APR. They believe that APR data would be useful as an initial screen in fair lending analysis. They noted that the burden would
involve primarily a one-time expense to reprogram systems and the ongoing costs to input data, which would be mitigated by
the fact that lenders already calculate and disclose the APR under TILA. Many commenters who supported reporting the APR
advocated collecting other data about loan terms and underwriting information such as interest rate, fees, subprime status, lien
status, whether the loan is fixed-rate or variable-rate, the term of the loan, loan-to-value ratio, credit score, and debt-to-income
ratio.
Alternative Pricing Disclosure. The proposal would have required lenders to report and disclose the APR for all loan
applications and originations. The Board has instead adopted a modified approach regarding the rate disclosure and coverage
of the rule. Under the final rule, lenders will report the rate spread between the APR on a loan and the yield on Treasury
securities with comparable maturity periods, for loan originations in which the APR exceeds the applicable Treasury yield by a
percentage or threshold specified by the Board. The staff commentary clarifies how a lender determines which Treasury
security has a maturity period that is comparable to a particular loan. See comment 4(a)(12)-1.
The Board is adopting this approach to loan pricing information because it will adjust pricing data for changes in market
conditions over time, focus on higher cost loans, and limit reporting burden because fewer loans would be subject to the
reporting requirement. The Board has limited the reporting requirement to originations of home purchase loans, secured home
improvement loans, and refinancings, to minimize burden. The final rule excludes from the reporting requirement: (1)
Applications that are incomplete, withdrawn, denied, or approved but not accepted; (2) purchased loans; and (3) unsecured
home improvement loans.
The Board believes that lenders should report the spread for loans that equal or exceed a threshold of3 percentage points for
first lien loans, and 5 percentage points for subordinate lien loans (which generally have a higher APR). These thresholds are
tentative--in the text of the fmal regulation, brackets have been inserted around the thresholds--because selecting the
appropriate thresholds for price disclosure is not straightforward. The thresholds are intended to ensure, to the extent possible,
that pricing data for higher cost loans are collected and disclosed, and at the same time to exclude prime loans from the
requirement. There is limited public information on the range of prices (particularly APRs) of closed loans in the mortgage
market, and there is no absolute demarcation between subprime and prime mortgage markets. Therefore, the Board is seeking
public comment on whether the tentative thresholds are appropriate in a separate notice in this issue of the Federal Register.
The Board will finalize the thresholds for reporting pricing information by mid-year 2002. For a discussion of the issue and
information about how to submit comments, please refer to the Board's notice published elsewhere in this Federal Register.
HOEPA Status. The Board proposed to require that in addition to the APR on a loan, lenders report whether the loan is
covered by the provisions of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) as implemented in Regulation Z.
Obtaining information on the volume and pattern of lending covered under HOEPA would be useful for better understanding
the mortgage market, particularly the subprime market.
Lenders and their trade associations generally opposed the proposal. They contended that HOEPA loans carry reputational
risk, and that the requirement to disclose HOEPA status would therefore act as a disincentive to lenders to make such loans. As
with APR reporting, commenters suggested that there was no need to require HOEPA status reporting under HMDA, because
the same information could be obtained by the banking agencies through the examination process.
Community groups and regulatory and enforcement agencies supported the proposal. They asserted that data on the HOEPA
status ofloans is critical to the Board's separate rulemaking under HOEPA; that HOEPA status could be considered a proxy for
subprime status, and would allow regulators to focus fair lending examinations on that part of the market; and that any burden
associated with collecting HOEPA status would be primarily the one-time cost of reprogramming software.
The Board is amending Regulation C, as proposed, to require that the HOEPA status of a loan be reported and disclosed.
While HOEPA status can be obtained through bank examinations, nondepository lenders are not subject to regular
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examinations. Nondepository lenders made about 57 percent of the dollar volume ofloan originations reported under HMDA
for the year 2000. Moreover, although depository lenders are examined on a regular basis, collecting HOEPA status on the
HMDA/LAR is a more efficient way to obtain the data.
Some commenters believed that, if the APR data were to be collected, requiring the reporting of HOEPA status would be
duplicative. But a loan's HOEPA status cannot be determined from the loan's APR alone. HOEPA coverage is based not only
on the APR, but also on points and fees; some loans are covered because of the fees charged. Information from industry that
was submitted to the Board during the HOEPA rulemaking suggests that roughly 30 percent of the first-lien loans and 23
percent of the subordinate-lien loans that will be covered by HOEPA (as revised in December 2001) will be covered only
because of the points and fees on the loans.
Lien Status. The Board solicited comment in its December 2000 proposal on all aspects of the proposed changes and on any
other issues that might warrant further review. Some commenters recommended that the Board require lenders to report the lien
status and type of interest rate on a loan, along with other items of data. Other commenters, including a federal agency, said that
information on lien status would be useful in interpreting other loan information such as the APR.
The Board believes that lien status would be useful in interpreting information on loan pricing. Interest rates, and therefore
APRs, vary according to lien status; rates on first-lien loans are generally lower than rates on junior-lien or unsecured loans.
Information on lien status would also be useful in interpreting home improvement loan data, as the revised defmition of a home
improvement loan turns on whether the loan is dwelling-secured. In view of the fact that the Board is soliciting comment in a
separate notice on the appropriate thresholds for collecting rate spread information, the Board believes it is appropriate to
provide the public with an additional opportunity to comment on the collection oflien status information. For a discussion of
these issues and information about how to submit comments, please refer to the Board's notice published separately in this
issue of the Federal Register.
Other matters. The Board requested comment on whether the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), or the appraised value of the
property that secures a loan should be reported, based on concerns that appraisals may be used to discriminate against certain
home mortgage applicants.
Several commenters supported a requirement to report LTV or appraised value. Some believed that these data would be very
useful in rooting out predatory lending, particularly in combination with the APR and points and fees on a loan. The majority of
commenters who addressed the issue--including almost all the fmancial institutions--opposed a requirement to report either
appraised value or LTV ratio. Some argued that appraisals are too subjective to generate useful data. Others pointed out that
complete data could not be gathered, because appraisals are not required for all properties. Similarly, commenters pointed out
that these data may be available only for loans originated, because an application may be denied or withdrawn before an
appraisal is ordered or an LTV is calculated. Based on the comments and its own analysis, the Board is not revising the
regulation to require lenders to report LTV or appraised value.
4(b) Collection ofData on Ethnicity, Race, Sex, and Income 4(b)(2) Optional Collection
The Board has deleted the provision that depository institutions with assets on the preceding year-end of $30 million or less
may, but need not, collect the data on applicants' race, ethnicity, sex, and income. This exemption has become superfluous.
Regulation C entirely exempts from coverage a depository institution with total assets on the preceding year-end at or below the
threshold set annually by the Board based on changes in the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical
Workers. In 2001, the Board set this threshold at $32 million for data collection in 2002.
4(c) Optional Data
4(c)(1) Reasons for Denial
The statute permits, but does not require, a fmancial institution to report the reasons why a loan application was denied.
Regulation C similarly gives institutions the option to report this information. The Board solicited comment on whether the
regulation should be revised to require lenders to report reasons for denial. Based on the comments and its own analysis, the
Board has retained the current rule on reporting of denial reasons.
Most commenters who addressed this issue--including several financial institutions, one banking trade association,
regulatory agencies, and civil rights and community groups--supported requiring all institutions covered by HMDA to report
reasons for denial. They contended that reporting denial reasons would not be burdensome, because lenders currently must
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provide the reasons to applicants under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B (or at least inform them of their
right to know the reasons). These commenters argued that requiring such reporting would facilitate the identification of
potential discrimination, and that all lending institutions should be subject to the same rules. They pointed out that reporting
denial reasons in all cases would allow better comparison ofdata from different lenders.
Some commenters--primarily financial institutions--opposed mandatory reporting. These commenters maintained that denial
reasons are not a reliable fair lending indicator because they may oversimplifY the reasons for a credit decis~on.
Some commenters also opposed mandatory reporting on the basis of cost and burden. The Board believes that although
information on denial reasons could be useful, the burden such a requirement would impose on lenders is not justified.
4(c)(2) Preapproval Requests
The regulation has been revised to require lenders to report preapproval requests that are denied and to identifY preapproval
requests that result in a loan origination. See discussion under 203.2(b) "Application." The Board has also revised the
regulation to permit, but not require, lenders to report preapproval requests that are approved by the institution but not accepted
by the borrower, using the code provided. See Appendix A., Paragraphs LA.8. and LB.I. 4(d) Excluded Data
4(d)(3) Temporary Financing
Regulation C generally does not permit lenders to report temporary fmancing. The Board has not amended these rules. The
Board believes that, although in some cases the data would not be duplicative--such as where a lender originates construction
loans but does not offer permanent financing--these instances appear to be relatively few.
Time Period. The Board requested comment on whether the regulation should define "temporary loans" in terms of a time
period. A few financial institutions requested a definition that includes a specific time period. Upon further analysis, however,
the Board believes that in the absence of any generally accepted time frame for "temporary financing," it is impracticable to
provide a "bright-line" test. Instead, the regulation will continue to offer examples, such as construction financing.
4(d)(6) Purchased Loans
Branch Acquisition. The Board proposed to exclude from HMDA reporting loans that are purchased as part ofa branch
acquisition. Limited comment was received. A community group asserted that data on all purchased loans are needed to
discourage institutions from purchasing predatory loans. Industry commenters, on the other hand, supported the proposal. They
believe that the decision to acquire a branch is an investment decision rather than a credit decision.
Based on the comments and on its own analysis, the Board is adopting the proposal. A "branch acquisition" entails the
purchase of all (he assets and liabilities ofa branch ofa depository institution; it need not involve the purchase of the branch's
physical facilities. Loans purchased as part of a branch asset sale (not including sale of the branch's liabilities) would continue
to be reported.
Section 203.5--Disclosure and Reporting
5(b) Public Disclosure of Statement
The regulation requires that a financial institution make its disclosure statement available to the public, under certain
circumstances, within a specified number of"business days." The Board has revised the staff commentary to clarifY that for this
purpose a "business day" is any calendar day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal public holiday. (See comment 5(b)-1.)
5(t) Loan Aggregation and Central Depositories
As part of the reorganization of the regulation, material on loan aggregation and central depositories that now appears in
section 203.1" Authority, purpose, and scope" has been moved to section 203.5, as paragraph (t).
Section 203.6--Enforcement
As part of the reorganization of the regulation, some material from the staff commentary (see comments 4(a)-1 and 6(b)-1)
has been moved to this section of the regulation. The material clarifies that certain actions do not violate the act or regulation.
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IV. Appendix A
The Board's reorganization of the regulation entails non-substantive revisions of Appendix A, such as redesignating several
provisions. The Board also makes certain substantive changes that conform Appendix A to revisions discussed above.
I. Instructions for Completion ofLoan/Application Register
A. Application or Loan Information
4. Property Type
A new field is added to identify the type of property to which the application or loan relates (one-to four-family dwelling,
manufactured housing, or multifamily dwelling). See the discussion of"Manufactured housing status" under section 4(a)(5),
above.
5. Purpose
This field, which used to combine loan purpose and property type, is revised to include only the purpose of the application
or loan (i.e., home purchase, home improvement). Information on property type is moved to its own field, as discussed in
paragraph 4 above. B. Action Taken
New codes are added for action taken on preapproval requests. An institution is required to report preapproval requests that
are denied, using the action code provided. An institution may report, at its option, preapproval requests that are approved but
not accepted by the applicant, using the code provided.
C. Property Location
Coordination with the CRA. Appendix A provides guidance to lenders that report data under the CRA regarding the
reporting of property-location information for loans located outside the metropolitan areas where those lenders have offices. In
response to inquiries from lenders, the Board is clarifying this guidance, without changing it substantively.
Lenders that report data under the CRA must report the metropolitan area, state, and county where the property is located. In
general, they must also report the census tract. However, if the property is located in a county with a population of30,000 or
less, a lender may report either "NA" or the census tract number.
Block Numbering Areas. Under the current rule, lenders may report the Block Numbering Area (BNA) for untracted areas.
The Census Bureau has assigned census tract numbers to all areas. Accordingly, the Board has revised Appendix A to reflect
this change.
Requests for Preapproval. The final rule requires institutions to identify requests for preapproval that result in loan
originations and to report denials of preapproval requests. See discussion under section 2(b), above. Because preapproval
requests denied will not include data on property location, the Board is clarifying that lenders should report "NA" in the
property location fields associated with requests for preapproval that are denied. Lenders that opt to report preapprovals falling
in the category of"approved but not accepted" also should report "NA" in the property location fields.
D. Applicant Information--Ethnicity, Race, Sex, and Income
3. and 4. Ethnicity and Race ofBorrower or Applicant
The Board has conformed the racial classifications to the standards set by OMB. See the discussion under section
203.4(a)(l0) "collection of ethnicity, race, sex, and income of applicants." Consistent with OMB's guidelines, an applicant is
allowed to designate all racial groups that are applicable, and information regarding Hispanic or Latino ethnicity is collected
separately from information on race. As noted previously, the Board is separately requesting comment on a proposal to make
mandatory the collection of monitoring information in applications taken by telephone.
Minor revisions have been made to the codes to provide more clarity. A code 5 for ethnicity and a code 8 for race have been
added for cases in which there is no co-applicant or co-borrower. In addition, the instructions make clear that the code "not
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applicable" is to be used only in loans involving a corporate borrower or a partnership, or for loans purchased by the
institution.
E. Type of Purchaser
The final rule includes changes to the codes for identifying the type of purchaser of an originated loan. The Board believes
these changes will increase the utility ofthe information about the secondary market available to users ofHMDA data. Under
the current codes, the categories of "life insurance company," "commercial bank," and "savings bank or association," account
for a very small portion of loans sold. About one-third of home loans sold are attributed to the code 9, "other type of
purchaser." The final rule addresses these matters by expanding certain existing categories, combining others, and adding a new
category for private securitization.
G. Other Data
The Board is adding fields for the price of the loan (rate spread) and HOEPA status. See the discussion under section
4(a)(l2) and (13) "additional items related to loan pricing."
II. Federal Supervisory Agencies
The Board has removed the list of types of lenders and their supervisory agencies from the Appendix. This information is
provided in section 305(b) of the act (l2 U.S.C. 2804(b)).
Form ofTransmittal Sheet
Based on the comments and its own analysis, the Board is revising the HMDAfLAR transmittal sheet to require reporting of
the identity ofa parent company, if any. The requirement was eliminated a few years ago to reduce burden, because parent
information is generally available through the National Information Center ("NIC" ) database. 63 FR 52140 (September 30,
1998). Data users have asserted, however, that it is important to have the information in the HMDA data rather than in a
separate database such as NIC. Moreover, the NIC database does not include parent company information for all HMDA
reporters. Generally, commenters supported requiring institutions to report parent company information. Some commenters,
including financial institutions, noted that such a requirement would impose minimal burden on lenders.
The transmittal sheet also has been revised to call for the institution's e-mail address, if any exists, in addition to the existing
requirements for the telephone and facsimile numbers of the reporting institution's contact person.
V. Appendix B
Appendix B is revised to reflect the revised OMB guidance discussed under section 203.4(a)(l0).
VI. Reorganization of the Regulation
The Board proposed to reorganize Regulation C to make it easier to use and to make reporting less burdensome for
institutions. In the past, formal guidance for compliance with HMDA was contained in Regulation C, in the instructions for
completing the loan/application register (Appendix A to the regulation), in the instructions for the collection of certain
applicant data (Appendix B), and in the staff commentary. Informal guidance was provided in the FFIEC's "A Guide to HMDA
Reporting: Getting It Right!" Compliance officers and other commenters expressed concern about having to consult several
sources to locate a requirement or interpretation dealing with a particular issue.
The Board solicited comment on the benefits of incorporating all of the interpretive materials into the commentary, reducing
the instructions in Appendix A to code descriptions, and reorganizing the material within the regulation. These changes were
supported by most of the commenters that addressed them--including both data reporters and data users. They believed that a
reorganization would make the regulation easier to understand and decrease possible misinterpretations by reporters and others.
For these commenters, the benefits of simplification outweighed the burden of learning a new system of organization. Based on
the comments and its own analysis, the Board has reorganized the regulation and commentary, eliminated redundant provisions,
revised the instructions to facilitate reporting, and made other changes--such as rewording some provisions--so that the
regulation is easier to use.
The cross-references to Appendix A in the staff commentary are deleted; they are unnecessary in view of the simplification
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and reorganization of Appendix A. "A Guide to HMDA Reporting: Getting It Right!" will continue to be published, in a format
reflecting the reorganized regulation.
Provisions of the regulation, appendices, and commentary are redesignated as indicated in the tables below. The fIrst six
tables identify redesignated provisions in the fIrst fIve sections of the regulation and in the corresponding paragraphs of the
staff commentary; the seventh and eighth tables identify redesignated provisions in Appendices A and B. While the tables
present a substantially complete summary of the reorganization, they should not be used as a substitute for a detailed
comparison of the revised regulation with the old regulation.
Table l.--Section 203.1--Authority, Purpose, and Scope
Current New
commentary 203.1(c)-2, 3, 4 Regulation 203.2(k)
Commentary 203.1 (e) -5 Commentary 203.1 (el-2
Commentary 203.1(c)-6 Commentary 203.1(c)-3
Commentary 203.1(c)-7 Commentary 203.1(cl-4
Commentary 203.1(c)-8 Commentary 203.1(cl-S
commentary 203.1(c)-9 Commentary 203.1(c)-6
Commentary 203.1(cl-lO Commentary 203.1{c)-7
Commentary 203.1 tel -11 Commentary 203.1 (el-8
Commentary 203.1Ic)-12 Commentary 203.1(c)-9
Regulation 203.1 (d) Regulation 203.5 (f)
Table 2.--Section 203.2--Definitions
Current New
Regulation 203.2(f) Regulation 203.2(g)
Regulation 203.2Ig) Regulation 203.2Ih)
Regulation 203.2(h) Regulation 203.2(i)
Commentary 203.2(e)-1 Commentary 203.2(e)-5
Commentary 203.2(e)-2 Commentary 203.2(e)-6
Commentary 203.2 (f) -1 Deleted
Commentary 203.2 (f) -2 Commentary 203-41Ia) (3)-1
Commentary 203.2(f)-3 Commentary 203.4Ia) (7)-3
Commentary 203.2 (f) -4 Commentary 203.2Ig)-1
Commentary 203.2(f)-5 Commentary 203.2(g)-2
Commentary 203.2(f)-6 Commentary 203.2Ig}-3
Commentary 203.2(f)-1 Commentary 203.2Ig1-5
Commentary 203.2If)-8 Commentary 203.2Ig)-4
Commentary 203.2Ig}-6 Commentary 203.2(g)-8
Table 3.--Section 203.3--Exempt Institutions
current New
Regulation 203.3Ia) (I) Regulation 203.2Ie) (1)
Regulation 203.3(a) 12) Regulation 203.2Ie) (2)
Regulation 203.3{bJ Regulation 203.3(al
Regulation 203.3Ic) (1) Commentary 203.2Ie)-1
Regulation 203.3 (c) (2) Regulation 203. 31b)
Commentary 203.3(a)-1 Commentary 203.2(e)-l
Commentary 203.3{al-2 Commentary 203.2(e)-3
Commentary 203.3(a)-3 Commentary 203.4{dl-l
Table 4.--Section 203.4--Compilation of Loan Data
Current New
Commentary 203.4(a)-1 Regulation 203.6(b) (3)
Commentary 203.4(a) (21-1 Commentary 41a) (3)-2, 2Ig)-6, 2Ih)-1
Commentary 203.4 (a) (3) -1 Deleted
Commentary 203.4Ia) 13)-2 Commentary 203.4(a) (6)-1
Commentary 203.4(a) 14)-3 Commentary 203.4Ia) (7)-3 & 203.4(a) (3)-1
Commentary 203.4(a) 14)-4 Commentary 203.4Ia) (7)-3
Commentary 203.4Ia) 15) Commentary 203.4Ia) (8)
Commentary 203.4 (aI16)-1 through -4 commentary 203.41al 191
Commentary 203.4 (a) (6) -5 Deleted
Commentary 203.4(a) 11) Commentary 203.4(a) (10)
Commentary 203.4 (a) (8) Commentary 203.4 (a) (11)
Commentary 203.4 (c)-l Deleted
Commentary 203.4(d)-1 Regulation 203.4(d) 14)
Table 5.--Section 203.5--Disclosure and Reporting
Current New
Regulation 203.5(a) Regulation 203.5(a) (1)
Regulation 203.5(b) (1) Regulation 203.5Ib) (2)
Regulation 203.5(bl (2) Regulation 203.51bl (31
Commentary 203.5 (a) -1 Commentary 203.5 (a)-5
Commentary 203.5(al-2 Commentary 203.5(a)-6
Table 6. --Section 203. 6--Enforcement
Current New
Commentary 203_6(b,-1 Commentary 203.6(b)-1
Current New
Regulation 203_ 6 fb) (2)
Table 7.--Appendix A
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LA Regulation 203.21el (1)
I.B Regulation 203.21el (1)
I.C Regulation 203.2(e) (21
I. D Deleted
I.E Regulation 203.51al (21
LF Regulation 203.3(al 131
II.A Commentary 203.5(a)-1 and -2
ILB Conunentary 203.5(a}-3
II.C Commentary 203.5(a)-4
11.0 Commentary 203.5(a)-4
I I. E Deleted
lILA Regulation 203.5(al III
IlI.B Conunentary 203.5(al-6 & 4Ial-l(vil
IILC Conunentary 203.5(a)-8 & 4lal-llviil
III.D.l Regulation 203.5(bl (1) and 121, Conunentary 203.5Ibl-l
IILD.2 Conunentary 203.5(b)-2
III.E.l Regulation 203.5Ic)
IILE.2 Commentary 203.5(c)-1
III.E.3 Regulation 203.5(cl
IILF.l Commentary 203.5(e)-1
III.F.2 Commentary 203.5Iel-2
IV.A.l Commentary 203.4 la) -1 (I}
IV.A.2 Commentary 203.4 la)-1(;;)
IV.A.3 Commentary 2Q3.4{a)-1(iii)
IV.A.4 Commentary 203.4(a)-1(iv)
IV.A.5 Commentary 203.4Ia)-1Ivl
IV.B Deleted
V.A.l Commentary 203.4(a) (1)-4 & App. A.LA.I.
V.A.2 App. 11..1.11..2.
V.A.3 App. 11..1.11..3.
V.11..4 App. A. LA. 4 &
V.A.5 App. A.LA.4 &
V.A.6 App. 11..1.11..6
V.A.? App. 11..1.11..6
V.A.8 App. A.LA.7.
V.B.l App. A.I.B.I.
V.B.2 App. A.LB.I.
V.B.3 App. A.I.B.2
V.C App. A.I.C. & Conunentary 203.4Ia) (9)-2
V.C.l App. A.Le.l
v.C.2 App. A.I.C.2
V.C.3 App. A.I.C.3
V.C.4 App. A.I.C.4
V.C.5 App. A.I.C.5
V.C.6 Deleted
V.C.? App. A.I.C.6
V.D App. 11..1.0.
V.D.l App. 11..1.0.1
V.D.2 App. 11..1.0.2; App.B.II.A.
V.D.3 App. A.LD.3 & 4
V.D.4 App. A.I.D.5.
V.D.S App. 11..1.0.6
V.E App. A.I.E. & Commentary 203.41al (11)-2
V.F App. A.I.F
VI App. A. rr.
Table B.--Appendix B
Current New
B.I.A I.
B.I.B.III.A.
I.B.2 II.D.
I.B.3 II.B.
LB.4 ILE.
I.B. 5 Deleted
VII. Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.c. 3506; 5 CFR 1320 Appendix A.I), the Board reviewed
the final rule under the authority delegated to the Board by the Office of Management and Budget. The Federal Reserve may
not conduct or sponsor and an organization is not required to respond to, this information collection unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number. The OMB control number is 7100-0247 for the Federal Reserve's information collection
under Regulation C.
The mandatory collection of information that is revised by this rulemaking is found in 12 CFR part 203, which implements
12 U.s.C. 2801-2810. Public officials use this information to determine whether financial institutions are serving the housing
needs of their communities; to help target public investment to promote private investment where it is needed; and to identitY
possible discriminatory lending patterns for enforcement of anti-discrimination statutes.
The respondents are all types of financial institutions that meet the tests fo~ coverage under the regulation. Depository
institutions with offices in metropolitan areas whose assets are below an asset size threshold that adjusts yearly (currently $32
million) are not required to comply. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act the Federal Reserve accounts for the burden of the
paperwork associated with the regulation only for state member banks, their subsidiaries, subsidiaries of bank holding
companies, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than federal branches, federal agencies, and insured state
branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and organizations operating
under section 25 or 25A ofthe Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.c. 60 1-604a; 611-631). Other federal agencies account forthe
paperwork burden for the institutions they supervise. Respondents must maintain their HMDNLARs and modified
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HMDAILARs for three years and their disclosure statements for five years.
The final rule amends Regulation C to improve the quality, consistency, and utility ofdata reported under HMDA. The
revisions expand coverage of nondepository lenders, revise defmitions ofcovered loans and applications, and require reporting
of additional items of information.
In conjunction with its proposal, the Federal Reserve sought comment on the burden estimates for the proposed changes.
The Board received nearly 300 public comment letters, most ofwhich addressed the issue of respondents' burden. These
comments were addressed at length earlier in this notice. In general, industry commenters expressed concern that the proposed
changes, taken as a whole, would impose significant burdens. The Federal Reserve has revised certain aspects of the proposal
to address some of the burden concerns. Those revisions are discussed earlier in this notice.
The estimated annual burden for this information collection varies from 12 to 12,000 hours, depending on individual
circumstances, with estimated averages of242 hours for state member banks and 192 hours for mortgage banking subsidiaries
and other respondents. To most accurately estimate the annual burden for this information collection the staff used the number
of Federal Reserve supervised respondents that were required to report CY 2000 data in March 200 I. The Federal Reserve
estimates the annual burden to be roughly 146,000 hours, a 20 percent increase from the last estimate ofthe annual burden
under the current regulation.
Respondents also face a one-time cost burden to reprogram systems to add codes for new data items, update systems with
the new definitions for current data items, and create an interface between current HMDA and Truth in Lending systems to
enable reporting of pricing data. Institutions that use vendor-provided software systems (the bulk of reporting institutions) will
face costs averaging around $2,000 to $5,000. Institutions that purchase and adapt off-the-shelf applications will face costs
averaging between $20,000 and $50,000. Institutions that use mainframe systems and employ systems programmers (the largest
institutions) will face costs averaging between $120,000 and $270,000. Using the maximum cost for each of the three ranges to
calculate a weighted average, the Federal Reserve estimates that the average covered financial institution will incur a one-time
cost ofapproximately $17,400.
The Board's Legal Division has determined that HMDA data collection and reporting are required by law; completion of the
loan/application register, submission to the Federal Reserve, and disclosure to the public upon request are mandatory. After the
data are redacted as required by the statute and regulation, they are made publicly available and are not considered confidential.
Data that the regulation requires be redacted (loan number, date application received, and date action taken) is given
confidential treatment under exemption 6 of the Freedom ofInformation Act (5 U.S.c. 552(b)(6».
The Board has a continuing interest in the public's opinion of the Federal Reserve's collection of information. At any time,
comments regarding the burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for
reducing the burden, may be sent to: Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets, NW.,
Washington, DC 20551; and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (7100-0247),
Washington, DC 20503.
VIII. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
In accordance with section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 USC 604(a», the Board has prepared a final regulatory
flexibility analysis of these revisions. A copy of the analysis may be obtained from Publications Services, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, at (202) 452-3245. A summary of the analysis follows.
The fmal rule is a consequence of Board policy to review its regulations periodically and a desire to update the regulation to
reflect mortgage markets more clearly, enhance consumer protection, and conform its regulation with new guidance from the
Office of Management and Budget concerning collection of data on ethnicity and race by federal agencies.
The Board received no comments specifically responding to the initial regulatory flexibility analysis published in
conjunction with the proposed rule. As discussed in the Supplementary Information, however, many comments the Board
received discussed the burdens arising from particular proposals. Such comments are summarized throughout the
Supplementary Information, as are the Board's responses. The Supplementary Information also contains discussions of
alternative measures the Board considered adopting, and in some cases adopted, to reduce burden.
The major changes in the fmal rule bring more institutions and transactions under requirements for data collection and
reporting and requiring more data on each covered transaction. Among the proposed revisions, those increasing the transactions
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covered and the data that are required to be reported for each transaction are the most significant in terms of potential benefits
and in increasing regulatory burden. The fmal rule would affect all institutions currently within the scope of the regulation,
including covered small institutions.
The number of institutions that would be brought under the regulation for the first time is likely quite limited. No newly
covered institution would be a small mortgage lender. The new criterion for coverage'which is added to the existing criteria--is
that institutions must have originated at least $25 million home purchase loans (including refinancings of such loans) in the
prior calendar year. Board staff projects that any newly covered institutions would be more active in the mortgage business than
most of the institutions currently required to report.
It is difficult to quantify the benefits and costs associated with the final rule. The new information will provide data to help
identify possible discriminatory lending patterns and assist regulators in conducting examinations under the Community
Reinvestment Act and other laws. Additional data on covered transactions will allow for more precise differentiation among
loan products and reduce the potential bias that results when dissimilar loan products are jointly classified. The data will also
help inform the public about developments in the mortgage market by revealing pricing information on higher-cost home loans
and by ensuring that more complete and consistent information is available about mortgage refinancings and home
improvement lending.
Although the fmal rule will offer a number of benefits it also will require covered lenders, including small institutions, to
change their current procedures and systems for collecting and reporting required data, and potentially to report new
transactions. The regulatory agencies will take steps to mitigate these costs, but for at least some covered lenders they are likely
to be significant.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 203
Banks, Banking, Federal Reserve System, Mortgages, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board revises 12 CFR part 203 to read as follows:
PART 203--HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE (REGULATION C)
Sec.
203.1 Authority, purpose. and scope.
203.2 Definitions.
203.3 Exempt insti tutions.
203.4 Compilation of loan data.
203.5 Disclosure and reporting.
203.6 Enforcement.
Appendix A To Part 203--Form And Instructions for Completion of HMDA
Loan/Application Register
Appendix B To Part 203--Form And Instructions for Data Collection on
Ethnicity, Race, And Sex
Supplement I To Part 203--Staff Commentary
Authority: 12 U.S.c. 2801-2810.
Sec. 203.1 Authority, purpose, and scope.
(a) Authority. This regulation is issued by the Board ofGovemors of the Federal Reserve System ("Board" ) pursuant to the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA") (12 USc. 2801 et seq.), as amended. The information-collection requirements
have been approved by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") under 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. and have been
assigned OMB numbers for institutions reporting data to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (1557-0159), the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (3064-0046), the Office ofThrift Supervision (1550-0021), the Federal Reserve System
(7100-0247), and the Department of Housing and Urban Development ( "HUD" ) (2502-0529). A number for the National
Credit Union Administration is pending.
(b) Purpose. (1) This regulation implements the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which is intended to provide the public
with loan data that can be used: .
(i) To help determine whether fmancial institutions are serving the housing needs of their communities;
(ii) To assist public officials in distributing public-sector investment so as to attract private investment to areas where it is
needed; and
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(iii) To assist in identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
(2) Neither the act nor this regulation is intended to encourage unsound lending practices or the allocation ofcredit.
(c) Scope. This regulation applies to certain financial institutions, including banks, savings associations, credit unions, and
other mortgage lending institutions, as defined in Sec. 203.2(e). The regulation requires an institution to report data to its
supervisory agency about home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancings that it originates or purchases, or
for which it receives applications; and to disclose certain data to the public.
Sec. 203.2 Definitions.
In this regulation:
(a) Act means the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA" ) (12 U.S.C. 2801 et seq.), as amended.
(b) Application. (1) In general. Application means an oral or written request for a home purchase loan, a home improvement
loan, or a refinancing that is made in accordance with procedures used by a financial institution for the type ofcredit requested.
(2) Preapproval programs. A request for preapproval for a home purchase loan is an application under paragraph (b)(l) of
this section if the request is reviewed under a program in which the fmancial institution, after a comprehensive analysis of the
creditworthiness of the applicant, issues a written commitment to the applicant valid for a designated period of time to extend a
home purchase loan up to a specified amount. The written commitment may not be subject to conditions other than:
(i) Conditions that require the identification of a suitable property;
(ii) Conditions that require that no material change has occurred in the applicant's financial condition or creditworthiness
prior to closing; and
(iii) Limited conditions that are not related to the financial condition or creditworthiness of the applicant that the lender
ordinarily attaches to a traditional home mortgage application (such as certification of a clear termite inspection).
(c) Branch office means:
(1) Any office ofa bank, savings association, or credit union that is approved as a branch by a federal or state supervisory
agency, but excludes free-standing electronic terminals such as automated teller machines; and
(2) Any office ofa for-profit mortgage-lending institution (other than a bank, savings association, or credit union) that takes
applications from the public for home purchase loans, home improvement loans, or refinancings. A for-profit mortgage-lending
institution is also deemed to have a branch office in a metropolitan area if, in the preceding calendar year, it received
applications for, originated, or purchased five or more home purchase loans, home improvement loans, or refinancings related
to property located in that metropolitan area.
(d) Dwelling means a residential structure (whether or not attached to real property) located in a state of the United States of
America, the District ofColumbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The term includes an individual condominium unit,
cooperative unit, or mobile or manufactured home.
(e) Financial institution means:
(I) A bank, savings association, or credit union that:
(i) On the preceding December 31 had assets in excess of the asset threshold established and published annually by the
Board for coverage by the act, based on the year-to-year change in the average of the Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage
Earners and Clerical Workers, not seasonally adjusted, for each twelve month period ending in November, with rounding to the
nearest million;
(ii) On the preceding December 31, had a home or branch office in a metropolitan area;
(iii) In the preceding calendar year, originated at least one home purchase loan (excluding temporary fmancing such as a
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construction loan) or refinancing ofa home purchase loan, secured by a first lien on a one-to four-family dwelling; and
(iv) Meets one or more of the following three criteria:
(A) The institution is federally insured or regulated;
(B) The mortgage loan referred to in paragraph (e)(l)(iii) of this section was insured, guaranteed, or supplemented by a
federal agency; or
(C) The mortgage loan referred to in paragraph (e)(l)(iii) of this section was intended by the institution for sale to Fannie
Mae or Freddie Mac; and
(2) A for-profit mortgage-lending institution (other than a bank, savings association, or credit union) that:
(i) In the preceding calendar year, either:
(A) Originated home purchase loans, including refmancings of home purchase loans, that equaled at least 10 percent of its
loan-origination volume, measured in dollars; or
(B) Originated home purchase loans, including refinancings of home purchase loans, that equaled at least $25 million; and
(ii) On the preceding Decembe~ 31, had a home or branch office in a metropolitan area; and
(iii) Either:
(A) On the preceding December 31, had total assets of more than $10 million, counting the assets of any parent corporation;
or
(B) In the preceding calendar year, originated at least 100 home purchase loans, including refinancings of home purchase
loans.
(f) Home-equity line of credit means an open-end credit plan secured by a dwelling as defined in Regulation Z (Truth in
Lending), 12 CFR part 226.
(g) Home improvement loan means:
(1) A loan secured by a lien on a dwelling that is for the purpose, in whole or in part, of repairing, rehabilitating, remodeling,
or improving a dwelling or the real property on which it is located; and
(2) A non-dwelling secured loan that is for the purpose, in whole or in part, of repairing, rehabilitating, remodeling, or
improving a dwelling or the real property on which it is located, and that is classified by the fmancial institution as a home
improvement loan.
(h) Home purchase loan means a loan secured by and made for the purpose of purchasing a dwelling.
(i) Manufactured home means any residential structure as defined under regulations of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development establishing manufactured home construction and safety standards (24 CFR 3280.2).
(j) Metropolitan area means a metropolitan area as defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(k) Refinancing means a new obligation that satisfies and replaces an existing obligation by the same borrower, in which:
(l) For coverage purposes, the existing obligation is a home purchase loan (as determined by the lender, for example, by
reference to available documents; or as stated by the applicant), and both the existing obligation and the new obligation are
secured by first liens on dwellings; and
(2) For reporting purposes, both the existing obligation and the new obligation are secured by liens on dwellings.
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Sec. 203.3 Exempt institutions.
(a) Exemption based on state law. (1) A state-chartered or state-licensed financial institution is exempt from the
requirements of this regulation if the Board determines that the institution is subject to a state disclosure law that contains
requirements substantially similar to those imposed by this regulation and that contains adequate provisions for enforcement.
(2) Any state, state-chartered or state-licensed financial institution, or association of such institutions, may apply to the
Board for an exemption under paragraph (a) of this section.
(3) An institution that is exempt under paragraph (a) of this section shall use the disclosure form required by its state law and
shall submit the data required by that law to its state supervisory agency for purposes ofaggregation.
(b) Loss of exemption. An institution losing a state-law exemption under paragraph (a) of this section shall comply with this
regulation beginning with the calendar year following the year for which it last reported loan data under the state disclosure
law.
Sec. 203.4 Compilation ofloan data.
(a) Data format and itemization. A financial institution shall collect data regarding applications for, and originations and
purchases of, home purchase loans, home improvement loans, and refinancings for each calendar year. An institution is
required to collect data regarding requests under a preapproval program (as defined in Sec. 203.2(b)) only if the preapproval
request is denied or results in the origination ofa home purchase loan. AU reportable transactions shall be recorded, within
thirty calendar days after the end of the calendar quarter in which final action is taken (such as origination or purchase of a
loan, or denial or withdrawal of an application), on a register in the format prescribed in Appendix A of this part. The data
recorded shall include the following items:
(1) An identifying number for the loan or loan application, and the date the application was received.
(2) The type ofloan or application.
(3) The purpose of the loan or application.
(4) Whether the application is a request for preapproval and whether it resulted in a denial or in an origination.
(5) The property type to which the loan or application relates.
(6) The owner-occupancy status of the property to which the loan or application relates.
(7) The amount of the loan or the amount applied for.
(8) The type of action taken, and the date.
(9) The location of the property to which the loan or application relates, by metropolitan area, state, county, and census tract,
if the institution has a home or branch office in that metropolitan area.
(10) The ethnicity, race, and sex of the applicant or borrower, and the gross annual income relied on in processing the
application.
(11) The type of entity purchasing a loan that the institution originates or purchases and then sells within the same calendar
year (this information need not be included in quarterly updates).
(12) For originated loans subject to Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226, in which the loan's annual percentage rate (APR)
exceeds the yield on a Treasury security with a comparable period of maturity (as of the 15th day of the month immediately
preceding the month in which the application for the loan was received by the financial institution) by 3 percentage points for a
loan secured by a first lien and by 5 percentage points for a loan secured by a junior lien, the difference between the APR and
the yield on the comparable Treasury security.
(13) Whether the loan is subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994.
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(b) Collection of data on ethnicity, race, sex, and income. (I) A financial institution shall collect data about the ethnicity,
race, and sex of the applicant or borrower as prescribed in Appendix B of this part.
(2) Ethnicity, race, sex, and income data may but need not be collected for loans purchased by the fmancial institution.
(c) Optional data. A financial institution may report:
(I) The reasons it denied a loan application;
(2) Requests for preapproval that are approved by the institution but not accepted by the applicant; and
(3) Home-equity lines of credit made in whole or in part for the purpose of home improvement or home purchase.
(d) Excluded data. A financial institution shall not report:
(I) Loans originated or purchased by the financial institution acting in a fiduciary capacity (such as trustee);
(2) Loans on unimproved land;
(3) Temporary fmancing (such as bridge or construction loans);
(4) The purchase of an interest in a pool ofloans (such as mortgage-participation certificates, mortgage-backed securities, or
real estate mortgage investment conduits);
(5) The purchase solely of the right to service loans; or
(6) Loans acquired as part ofa merger or acquisition, or as part ofthe acquisition of all of the assets and liabilities ofa
branch office as defmed in Sec. 203.2(c)(I).
(e) Data reporting for banks and savings associations that are required to report data on small business, small farm, and
community development lending under CRA. Banks and savings associations that are required to report data on small business,
small farm, and community development lending under regulations that implement the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
(12 U.S.c. 2901 et seq.) shall also collect the location of property located outside metropolitan areas in which the institution
has a home or branch office, or outside any metropolitan areas.
Sec. 203.5 Disclosure and reporting.
(a) Reporting to agency. (I) By March I following the calendar year for which the loan data are compiled, a financial
institution shall send its complete loan/application register to the agency office specified in Appendix A ofthis part. The
institution shall retain a copy for its records for at least three years.
(2) A subsidiary ofa bank or savings association shall complete a separate loan/application register. The subsidiary shall
submit the register, directly or through its parent, to the agency that supervises its parent.
(b) Public disclosure of statement. (I) The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC") will prepare a
disclosure statement from the data each fmancial institution submits.
(2) An institution shall make its disclosure statement (prepared by the FFIEC) available to the public at its home office no
later than three business days after receiving it from the FFIEC.
(3) In addition, an institution shall either:
(i) Make its disclosure statement available to the public, within ten business days of receiving it, in at least one branch office
in each other metropolitan area where the institution has offices (the disclosure statement need only contain data relating to the
metropolitan area where the branch is located); or
(ii) Post the address for sending written requests in the lobby of each branch office in other metropolitan areas where the
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institution has offices; and mail or deliver a copy of the disclosure statement within fifteen calendar days of receiving a written
request (the disclosure statement need only contain data relating to the metropolitan area for which the request is made).
Including the address in the general notice required under paragraph (e) of this section satisfies this requirement.
(c) Public disclosure of modified loan/application register. A fmancial institution shall make its loan/application register
available to the public after removing the following information regarding each entry: the application or loan number, the date
that the application was received, and the date action was taken. An institution shall make its modified register available
following the calendar year for which the data are compiled, by March 31 for a request received on or before March 1, and
within thirty calendar days for a request received after March 1. The modified register need only contain data relating to the
metropolitan area for which the request is made.
(d) Availability of data. A fmancial institution shall make its modified register available to the public for a period of three
years and its disclosure statement available for a period of five years. An institution shall make the data available for inspection
and copying during the hours the office is normally open to the public for business. It may impose a reasonable fee for any cost
incurred in providing or reproducing the data.
(e) Notice of availability. A financial institution shall post a general notice about the availability of its HMDA data in the
lobby of its home office and of each branch office located in a metropolitan area. An institution shall provide promptly upon
request the location of the institution's offices where the statement is available for inspection and copying, or it may include the
location in the lobby notice.
(t) Loan aggregation and central data depositories. Using the loan data submitted by financial institutions, the FFIEC will
produce reports for individual institutions and reports of aggregate data for each metropolitan area, showing lending patterns by
property location, age ofhousing stock, and income level, sex, ethnicity, and race. These reports will be available to the public
at central data depositories located in each metropolitan area. A listing of central data depositories can be obtained from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Washington, D.C. 20006.
Sec. 203.6 Enforcement.
(a) Administrative enforcement. A violation of the Act or this regulation is subject to administrative sanctions as provided in
section 305 ofthe Act, including the imposition of civil money penalties, where applicable. Compliance is enforced by the
agencies listed in section 305(b) of the Act (12 U.S.C. 2804(b).
(b) Bona fide errors. (I) An error in compiling or recording loan data is not a violation of the act or this regulation if the
error was unintentional and occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.
(2) An incorrect entry for a census tract number is deemed a bona fide error, and is not a violation of the act or this
regulation, provided that the institution maintains procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such errors.
(3) If an institution makes a good-faith effort to record all data concerning covered transactions fully and accurately within
thirty calendar days after the end of each calendar quarter, and some data are nevertheless inaccurate or incomplete, the error or
omission is not a violation of the act or this regulation provided that the institution corrects or completes the information prior
to submitting the loan/application register to its regulatory agency.
Appendix A to Part 203-Form and Instructions for Completion ofHMDA Loan/Application Register
Paperwork Reduction Act Notice
This report is required by law (12 U.S.C. 2801-2810 and 12 CFR 203). An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and an
organization is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless it displays a valid Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Control Number. See 12 CFR 203.I(a) for the valid OMB Control Numbers, applicable to this information
collection. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including
suggestions for reducing the burden, to the respective agencies and to OMB, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Paperwork Reduction Project, Washington, DC 20503. Be sure to reference the applicable agency and the OMB Control
Number, as found in 12 CFR 203.I(a), when submitting comments to OMB.
I. Instructions for Completion of Loan/Application Regsiter
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A. Application or Loan Information
1. Application or Loan Number
a. Enter an identifYing loan number that can be used later to retrieve the loan or application file. It can be any number of
your institution's choosing (not exceeding 25 characters). You may use letters, numerals, or a combination of both.
2. Date Application Received
a. Enter the date the loan application was received by your institution by month, day, and year. If your institution normally
records the date shown on the application form you may use that date instead. Enter "NA" for loans purchased by your
institution. For paper submissions only, use numerals in the form MM/DD/CCYY (for example, OllI5/2003). For submissions
in electronic form, the proper format is CCYYMMDD.
3. Type of Loan or Application
Indicate the type of loan or application by entering the applicable code from the following:
Code I--Conventional (any loan other than FHA, VA, FSA, or RHS loans)
Code 2--FHA-insured (Federal Housing Administration)
Code 3--VA-guaranteed (Veterans Administration)
Code 4--FSA/RHS-guaranteed (Farm Service Agency or Rural Housing Service)
4. Property Type
Indicate the property type by entering the applicable code from the following:
Code l--One-to four-family dwelling (other than manufactured housing)
Code 2--Manufactured housing
Code 3--Multifamily dwelling
a. Use Code 1, not Code 3, for loans on individual condominium or cooperative units.
b. Ifyou cannot determine (despite reasonable efforts to find out) whether the loan or application relates to a manufactured
home, use Code 1.
5. Purpose of Loan or Application
Indicate the purpose of the loan or application by entering the applicable code from the following:
Code I--Home purchase
Code 2--Home improvement
Code 3--Refmancing
a. Do not report a refinancing if, under the loan agreement, you were unconditionally obligated to reflllance the obligation,
or you were obligated to refmance the obligation subject to conditions within the borrower's control.
6. Owner Occupancy
Indicate whether the property to which the loan or loan application relates is to be owner-occupied as a principal residence
by entering the applicable code from the following:
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Code l--Owner-occupied as a principal dwelling
Code 2--Not owner-occupied as a principal dwelling
Code 3--Not applicable
a. For purchased loans, use Code 1 unless the loan documents or application indicate that the property will not be
owner-occupied as a principal residence.
b. Use Code 2 for second homes or vacation homes, as well as for rental properties.
c. Use Code 3 if the property to which the loan relates is a multifamily dwelling; is not located in a metropolitan area; or is
located in a metropolitan area in which your institution has neither a home nor a branch office. Alternatively, at your
institution's option, you may report the actual occupancy status, using Code 1 or 2 as applicable.
7. Loan Amount
Enter the amount of the loan or application. Do not report loans below $500. Show the amount in thousands, rounding to the
nearest thousand (round $500 up to the next $1,000). For example, a loan for $167,300 should be entered as 167 and one for
$15,500 as 16.
a. For a home purchase loan that you originated, enter the principal amount of the loan.
b. For a home purchase loan that you purchased, enter the unpaid principal balance of the loan at the time of purchase.
c. For a home improvement loan, enter the entire amount of the 10an--including unpaid fmance charges if that is how such
loans are recorded on your books--even ifonly a part of the proceeds is intended for home improvement.
d. Ifyou opt to report home-equity lines ofcredit, report only the portion of the line intended for home improvement or
home purchase.
e. For refmancings, indicate the total amount of the refinancing, including both the amount outstanding on the original loan
and any amount of"new money."
f. For a loan application that was denied or withdrawn, enter the amount applied for.
8. Request for Preapproval
Indicate whether the application is a request for a preapproval by entering the applicable code from the following:
Code I--Preapproval requested
Code 2--Preapproval not requested
Code 3--Not applicable
a. Enter code 3 for applications or loans for home improvement or refinancing, and for purchased loans.
B. Action Taken
1. Type of Action
Indicate the type ofaction taken on the application or loan by using one of the following codes.
Code l--Loan originated
Code 2--Application approved but not accepted
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Code 3--Application denied
Code 4--Application withdrawn
Code 5--File closed for incompleteness
Code 6--Loan purchased by your institution
Code 7--Preapproval request denied
Code 8--Preapproval request approved but not accepted (optional reporting)
a. Use Code 1 for a loan that is originated, including one resulting from a request for preapproval.
b. For a counteroffer (your offer to the applicant to make the loan on different terms or in a different amount from the terms
or amount applied for), use Code I if the applicant accepts. Use Code 3 if the applicant turns down the counteroffer or does not
respond.
c. Use Code 2 when the application is approved but the applicant (or the loan broker or correspondent) fails to respond to
your notification of approval or your commitment letter within the specified time. Do not use this code for a preapproval
request.
d. Use Code 4 only when the application is expressly withdrawn by the applicant before a credit decision is made. Do not
use code 4 if a request for preapproval is withdrawn; preapproval requests that are withdrawn are not reported under HMDA.
e. Use Code 5 if you sent a written notice of incompleteness under Sec. 202.9(c)(2) of Regulation B (Equal Credit
Opportunity) and the applicant did not respond to your request for additional information within the period of time specified in
your notice. Do not use this code for requests for preapproval that are incomplete; these preapproval requests are not reported
underHMDA.
2. Date of Action
For paper submissions only, enter the date by month, day, and year, using numerals in the form MMIDD/CCYY (for
example, 02/2212003). For submissions in electronic form, the proper format is CCYYMMDD.
a. For loans originated, enter the settlement or closing date.
b. For loans purchased, enter the date of purchase by your institution.
c. For applications and preapprovals denied, applications and preapprovals approved but not accepted by the applicant, and
files closed for incompleteness, enter the date that the action was taken by your institution or the date the notice was sent to the
applicant.
d. For applications withdrawn, enter the date you received the applicant's express withdrawal, or enter the date shown on the
notification from the applicant, in the case of a written withdrawal.
e. For preapprovals that lead to a loan origination, enter the date of the origination.
C. Property Location
Except as otherwise provided, enter in these columns the applicable codes for the metropolitan area, state, county, and
census tract to indicate the location of the property to which a loan relates.
1. Metropolitan area. For each loan or loan application, enter the metropolitan area number. Metropolitan area boundaries
are defined by OMB; use the boundaries that were in effect on January 1 of the calendar year for which you are reporting. A
listing of metropolitan areas is available from your supervisory agency or the FFIEC.
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2. State and County
Use the Federal Infonnation Processing Standard (FIPS) two-digit numerical code for the state and the three-digit numerical
code for the county. These codes are available from your supervisory agency or the FFIEC.
3. Census Tract
Indicate the census tract where the property is located. Notwithstanding paragraph 6, if the property is located in a county
with a population of30,000 or less in the 2000 census (as detennined by the Census Bureau's 2000 CPH-2 population series),
enter "NA" (even if the population has increased above 30,000 since 2000), or enter the census tract number.
4. Census Tract Number
For the census tract number, consult the U.S. Census Bureau's Census Tract/Street Index for 2000; for addresses not listed
in the index, consult the Census Bureau's census tract outline maps. Use the maps from the Census Bureau's 2000 CPH-3
series, or equivalent 2000 census data from the Census Bureau (such as the Census TIGER/Line file) or from a private
publisher.
5. Property Located Outside Metropolitan Area
For loans on property located outside the metropolitan areas in which an institution has a home or branch office, or for
property located outside of any metropolitan area, the institution may choose one of the following two options. Under option
one, the institution may enter the metropolitan area, state and county codes and the census tract number; and if the property is
not located in any metropolitan area, it may enter "NA" in the metropolitan area column. (Codes exist for all states and counties
and numbers exist for all census tracts.) Under this first option, the codes and census tract number must accurately identify the
property location. Under the second option, which is not available if paragraph 6 applies, an institution may enter "NA" in all
four columns, whether or not the codes or numbers exist for the property location.
6. Data Reporting for Banks and Savings Associations Required To Report Data on Small Business, Small Fann, and
Community Development Lending Under the CRA Regulations
Ifyour institution is a bank or savings association that is required to report data under the regulations that implement the
CRA, you must enter the property location on your HMDA/LAR even if the property is outside metropolitan areas in which you
have a home or branch office, or is not located in any metropolitan area.
7. Requests for Preapproval
Notwithstanding paragraphs I through 6, if the application is a request for preapproval that is denied or that is approved but
not accepted by the applicant, you may enter "NA" in all four columns.
D. Applicant Infonnation--Ethnicity, Race, Sex, and Income
Appendix B contains instructions for the collection of data on ethnicity, race, and sex, and also contains a sample fonn for
data collection.
1. Applicability
Report this infonnation for loans that you originate as well as for applications that do not result in an origination.
a. You need not collect or report this infonnation for loans purchased. Ifyou choose not to, use the Codes for "not
applicable."
b. If the borrower or applicant is not a natural person (a corporation or partnership, for example), use the Codes for "not
applicable."
2. Mail, Internet, or Telephone Applications
Any loan applications mailed to applicants or made available to applicants via the Internet must contain a collection form
K(a) - 43
FED-REG-NOTICE, BANK-COMPLIANCE 67 FR 7221, FR 12CFR 02/15/02 Final 67 FR 7221 - Home Mortgage
Disclosure
COPYRIGHT 2003, CCH Incorporated
similar to that shown in Appendix B regarding ethnicity, race, and sex. For applications taken entirely by telephone, you may,
but are not required to, request the data on ethnicity, race, and sex. If the applicant does not provide these data in an application
taken by mail, Internet, or telephone, enter the code for "information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone
application" specified in paragraphs LD.3., 4., and 5. (See Appendix B for complete information on the collection of these data
in mail, Internet, or telephone applications.)
3. Ethnicity of Borrower or Applicant
Use the following codes to indicate the ethnicity of the applicant or borrower under column "A" and of any co-applicant or
co-borrower under column "CA."
Code I--Hispanic or Latino
Code 2--Not Hispanic or Latino
Code 3--Information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone application
Code 4--Not applicable
Code 5--No co-applicant
4. Race of Borrower or Applicant
Use the following Codes to indicate the race of the applicant or borrower under column "A" and of any co-applicant or
co-borrower under column "CA."
Code I--American Indian or Alaska Native
Code 2--Asian
Code 3--Black or African American
Code 4--Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
Code 5--White
Code 6--Information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone application
Code 7--Not applicable
Code 8--No co-applicant
a. Ifan applicant select more than one racial designation, enter all Codes corresponding to the applicant's selections.
b. Use code 4 (for ethnicity) and code 7 (for race) for "not applicable" only when the applicant or co-applicant is not a
natural person or when applicant or co-applicant information is unavailable because the loan has been purchased by your
institution.
c. Ifthere is more than one co-applicant, provide the required information only for the first co-applicant listed on the
application form. If there are no co-applicants or co-borrowers, use Code 5 (for ethnicity) and Code 8 (for race) for "no
co-applicant" in the co-applicant column.
5. Sex of Borrower or Applicant
Use the following Codes to indicate the sex of the applicant or borrower under column "A" and of any co-applicant or
co-borrower under column "CA."
Code I--Male
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Code 2--Female
Code 3--Infonnation not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone application
Code 4--Not applicable
Code 5--No co-applicant or co-borrower
a. Use code 4 for "not applicable" only when the applicant or co-applicant is not a natural person or when applicant or
co-applicant infonnation is unavailable because the loan has been purchased by your institution.
b. If there is more than one co-applicant, provide the required infonnation only for the fust co-applicant listed on the
application fonn. If there are no co-applicants or co-borrowers, use Code 5 for "no co-applicant" in the co-applicant column.
6. Income
Enter the gross annual income that your institution relied on in making the credit decision.
a. Round all dollar amounts to the nearest thousand (round $500 up to the next $1,000), and show in thousands. For
example, report $35,500 as 36.
b. For loans on multifamily dwellings, enter "NA."
c. Ifno income infonnation is asked for or relied on in the credit decision, enter "NA."
d. If the applicant or co-applicant is not a natural person or the applicant or co-applicant infonnation is unavailable because
the loan has been purchased by your institution, enter "NA."
E. Type of Purchaser
Enter the applicable code to indicate whether a loan that your institution originated or purchased was then sold to a
secondary market entity within the same calendar year:
Code O--Loan was not originated or was not sold in calendar year covered by register
Code I--Fannie Mae
Code 2--Ginnie Mae
Code 3--Freddie Mac
Code 4--Fanner Mac
Code 5--Private securitization
Code 6--Commercial bank, savings bank or savings association
Code 7--Life insurance company, credit union, mortgage bank, or fmance company
Code 8--Affiliate institution
Code 9--0ther type of purchaser
a. Use Code 0 for applications that were denied, withdrawn, or approved but not accepted by the applicant; and for files
closed for incompleteness.
b. Use Code 0 if you originated or purchased a loan and did not sell it during that same calendar year. If you sell the loan in
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a succeeding year, you need not report the sale.
c. Use Code 2 if you conditionally assign a loan to Ginnie Mae in connection with a mortgage-backed security transaction.
d. Use Code 8 for loans sold to an institution affiliated with you, such as your subsidiary or a subsidiary of your parent
corporation.
F. Reasons for Denial
1. You may report the reason for denial, and you may indicate up to three reasons, using the following codes. Leave this
column blank if the "action taken" on the application is not a denial. For example, do not complete this column if the
application was withdrawn or the file was closed for incompleteness.
Code I-Debt-to-income ratio
Code 2--Employment history
Code 3--Credit history
Code 4--Collateral
Code 5--Insufficient cash (downpayment, closing costs)
Code 6--Unverifiable information
Code 7--Credit application incomplete
Code 8--Mortgage insurance denied
Code 9--0ther
2. If your institution uses the model form for adverse action contained in the Appendix to Regulation B (Form Col in
Appendix C, Sample Notification Form), use the foregoing codes as follows:
a. Code 1 for: Income insufficient for amount ofcredit requested, and Excessive obligations in relation to income.
b. Code 2 for: Temporary or irregular employment, and Length of employment.
c. Code 3 for: Insufficient number of credit references provided; Unacceptable type of credit references provided; No credit
file; Limited credit experience; Poor credit performance with us; Delinquent past or present credit obligations with others;
Garnishment, attachment, foreclosure, repossession, collection action, or judgment; and Bankruptcy.
d. Code 4 for: Value or type of collateral not sufficient.
e. Code 6 for: Unable to verify credit references; Unable to verify employment; Unable to verify income; and Unable to
verify residence.
f. Code 7 for: Credit application incomplete.
g. Code 9 for: Length of residence; Temporary residence; and Other reasons specified on notice.
G. Pricing-Related Data
1. Rate Spread
a. For a home purchase loan, a refinancing, or a dwelling-secured home improvement loan that you originated, report the
rate spread if the difference between the APR and the applicable Treasury yield is equal to or greater than 3 percentage points
for first-lien loans or 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. To determine whether the rate spread meets this threshold,
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use the Treasury yield for a comparable period of maturity as of the 15th day of the month preceding the month in which the
application for the loan was received by the financial institution, and the annual percentage rate (APR) for the loan, as
calculated and disclosed under Sec. 226.6 or 226.18 of Regulation Z (12 CFR part 226).
b. If the loan is not subject to Regulation Z, or involves a home improvement loan that is not dwelling-secured, or involves a
loan that you purchased, enter "NA."
c. Enter "NA" in the case of an application that does not result in a loan origination.
d. If the difference between the APR and the Treasury yield is less than 3 percentage points for first-lien loans and 5
percentage points for subordinate-lien loans, enter "NA."
e. Enter the rate spread to two decimal places, and use a leading zero. For example, enter 03.29. If the difference between
the APR and the Treasury yield is a figure with more than two decimal places, round the figure or truncate the digits beyond
two decimal places.
2. HOEPA Status
a. For a loan that you originated or purchased that is subject to the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994
(HOEPA), as implemented in Regulation Z (12 CFR 226.32), because the APR or the points and fees on the loan exceed the
HOEPA triggers, enter Code 1.
b. Enter code 2 in all other cases. For example, enter code 2 for a loan that you originated or purchasedthat is not subject to
the requirements of HOEPA for any reason; also enter code 2 in the case of an application that does not result in a loan
origination.
II. Federal Supervisory Agencies
A. You are strongly encouraged to submit your loan/application register via Internet e-maiL Ifyou elect to use this method
of transmission and your institution is regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the National Credit Union Administration, or the Office of Thrift Supervision, then you should submit
your institution's files to the Internet e-mail address dedicated to that purpose by the Federal Reserve Board, which can be
found on the Web site of the FFIEC. If your institution is regulated by one of the foregoing agencies and you elect to submit
your data by regular mail, then use the following address: HMDA, Federal Reserve Board, Attention: HMDA
Processing,(insert name of your institution's regulatory agency), 20th & Constitution Ave, NW., MS N502, Washington, DC
20551-0001.
B. If your institution is regulated by the Federal Reserve System, you should use the Internet e-mail or regular mail address
ofyour district bank indicated on the Web site of the FFIEC. If your institution is regulated by the Department of Housing and
Urban Development, then you should use the Internet e-mail or regular mail address indicated on the Web site of the FFIEC.
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
BILLING CODE 6210-0 l-C
graphics omitted
Appendix B to Part 203--Form and Instructions for Data Collection on Ethnicity, Race, and Sex
1. Instructions on Collection of Data on Ethnicity, Race, and Sex
You may list questions regarding the ethnicity, race, and sex of the applicant on your loan application form, or on a separate
form that refers to the application. (See the sample form below for model language.)
II. Procedures
A. Vou must ask the applicant for this information (but you cannot require the applicant to provide it) whether the
application is taken in person, by mail or on the Internet. When an application is taken entirely by telephone, you may, but are
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not required to, ask for this infonnation.
B. Infonn the applicant that the federal government requests this infonnation in order to monitor compliance with federal
statutes that prohibit lenders from discriminating against applicants on these bases. Infonn the applicant that if the infonnation
is not provided where the application is taken in person, you are required to note the data on the basis of visual observation or
surname.
C. You must offer the applicant the option ofselecting one or more racial designations.
D. If the applicant chooses not to provide the infonnation for an application taken in person, note this fact on the fonn and
then note the applicant's ethnicity, race, and sex on the basis of visual observation and surname, to the extent possible.
E. If the applicant declines to answer these questions or fails to provide the infonnation on an application taken by mail or
telephone or on the Internet, the data need not be provided. In such a case, indicate that the application was received by mail,
telephone, or Internet, if it is not otherwise evident on the face of the application.
BILLING CODE 6210-01-P
BILLING CODE 62 10-0 l-C
Supplement I to Part 203--StaffCommentary
Introduction
1. Status. The commentary in this supplement is the vehicle by which the Division ofConsumer and Community Affairs of
the Federal Reserve Board issues fonnal staff interpretations of Regulation C (12 CFR part 203).
Section 203.1--Authority, Purpose, and Scope
1(c) Scope. 1. General. The comments in this section address issues affecting coverage of institutions and exemptions from
coverage.
2. The broker rule and the meaning of"broker" and "investor." For the purposes of the guidance given in this commentary,
an institution that takes and processes a loan application and arranges for another institution to acquire the loan at or after
closing is acting as a "broker," and an institution that acquires a loan from a broker at or after closing is acting as an "investor."
(The tenns used in this commentary may have different meanings in certain parts of the mortgage lending industry, and other
tenns may be used in place of these tenns, for example in the Federal Housing Administration mortgage insurance programs.)
Depending on the facts, a broker mayor may not make a credit decision on an application (and thus it mayor may not have
reporting responsibilities). If the broker makes a credit decision, it reports that decision; ifit does not make a credit decision, it
does not report. If an investor reviews an application and makes a credit decision prior to closing, the investor reports that
decision. If the investor does not review the application prior to closing, it reports only the loans that it purchases; it does not
report the loans it does not purchase. An institution that makes a credit decision on an application prior to closing reports that
decision regardless of whose name the loan closes in.
3. Illustrations of the broker rule. Assume that, prior to closing, four investors receive the same application from a broker;
two deny it, one approves it, and one approves it and acquires the loan. In these circumstances, the first two report denials, the
third reports the transaction as approved but not accepted, and the fourth reports an origination (whether the loan closes in the
name of the broker or the investor). Alternatively, assume that the broker denies a loan before sending it to an investor; in this
situation, the broker reports a denial.
4. Broker's use of investor's underwriting criteria. If a broker makes a credit decision based on underwriting criteria set by
an investor, but without the investor's review prior to closing, the broker has made the credit decision. The broker reports as an
origination a loan that it approves and closes, and reports as a denial an application that it turns down (either because the
application does not meet the investor's underwriting guidelines or for some other reason). The investor reports as purchases
only those loans it purchases.
5. Insurance and other criteria. If an institution evaluates an application based on the criteria or actions of a third party other
than an investor (such as a government or private insurer or guarantor), the institution must report the action taken on the
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application (loan originated, approved but not accepted, or denied, for example).
6. Credit decision of agent is decision of principal. If an institution approves loans through the actions of an agent, the
institution must report the action taken on the application (loan originated, approved but not accepted, or denied, for example).
State law determines whether one party is the agent of another.
7. Affiliate bank underwriting (250.250 review). If an institution makes an independent evaluation of the creditworthiness of
an applicant (for example, as part ofa preclosing review by an affiliate bank under 12 CFR 250.250, which interprets section
23A of the Federal Reserve Act), the institution is making a credit decision. If the institution then acquires the loan, it reports
the loan as an origination whether the loan closes in the name of the institution or its affiliate. An institution that does not
acquire the loan but takes some other action reports that action.
8. Participation loan. An institution that originates a loan and then sells partial interests to other institutions reports the loan
as an origination. An institution that acquires only a partial interest in such a loan does not report the transaction even if it has
participated in the underwriting and origination of the loan.
9. Assumptions. An assumption occurs when an institution enters into a written agreement accepting a new borrower as the
obligor on an existing obligation. An institution reports as a home purchase loan an assumption (or an application for an
assumption) in the amount of the outstanding principal. If a transaction does not involve a written agreement between a new
borrower and the institution, it is not an assumption for HMDA purposes and is not reported.
Section 203.2--Definitions
2(b) Application. 1. Consistency with Regulation B. Board interpretations that appear in the official staff commentary to
Regulation B (Equal Credit Opportunity, 12 CFR part 202, Supplement 1) are generally applicable to the definition ofan
application under Regulation C. However, under Regulation C the definition of an application does not include prequalification
requests.
2. Prequa1ification. A prequalification request is a request by a prospective loan applicant (other than a request for
preapproval) for a preliminary determination on whether the prospective applicant would likely qualify for credit under an
institution's standards, or for a determination on the amount of credit for which the prospective applicant would likely qualify.
Some institutions evaluate prequalification requests through a procedure that is separate from the institution's normal loan
application process; others use the same process. In either case, Regulation C does not require an institution to report
prequalification requests on the HMDA/LAR, even though these requests may constitute applications under Regulation B for
purposes of adverse action notices.
3. Requests for preapproval. To be a covered preapproval program, the written commitment issued under the program must
result from a full review of the creditworthiness of the applicant, including such verification of income, resources and other
matters as is typically done by the institution as part of its normal credit evaluation program. In addition to conditions involving
the identification ofa suitable property and verification that no material change has occurred in the applicant's fmancial
condition or creditworthiness, the written commitment may be subject only to other conditions (unrelated to the financial
condition or creditworthiness of the applicant) that the lender ordinarily attaches to a traditional home mortgage application
approval. These conditions are limited to conditions such as requiring an acceptable title insurance binder or a certificate
indicating clear termite inspection, and, in the case where the applicant plans to use the proceeds from the sale of the
applicant's present home to purchase a new home, a settlement statement showing adequate proceeds from the sale of the
present home.
2(c) Branch office. I. Credit union. For purposes of Regulation C, a "branch" of a credit union is any office where member
accounts are established or loans are made, whether or not the office has been approved as a branch by a federal or state
agency. (See 12 U.S.C. 1752.)
2. Depository institution. A branch of a depository institution does not include a loan production office, the office ofan
affiliate, or the office of a third party such as a loan broker. (But see Appendix A, Paragraph LC.6, which requires certain
depository institutions to report property location even for properties located outside those metropolitan areas in which the
institution has a home or branch office.)
3. Nondepository institution. For a nondepository institution, "branch office" does not include the office of an affiliate or
other third party such as a loan broker. (But note that certain nondepository institutions must report property location even in
K(a) - 49
FED-REG-NOTICE, BANK-COMPLIANCE 67 FR 7221, FR 12CFR 02/15/02 Final 67 FR 7221 - Home Mortgage
Disclosure
COPYRIGHT 2003, CCH Incorporated
metropolitan areas where they do not have a physical location.)
2(d) Dwelling. 1. Coverage. The definition of "dwelling" is not limited to the principal or other residence of the applicant or
borrower, and thus includes vacation or second homes and rental properties. A dwelling also includes a multifamily structure
such as an apartment building.
2. Exclusions. Recreational vehicles such as boats or campers are not dwellings for purposes of HMDA. Also excluded are
transitory residences such as hotels, hospitals, and college dormitories--whose occupants have principal residences elsewhere.
2(e) Financial institution. 1. General. An institution that met the test for coverage under HMDA in year I, and then ceases to
meet the test (for example, because its assets fall below the threshold on December 31 of year 2) stops collecting HMDA data
beginning with year 3. Similarly, an institution that did not meet the coverage test for a given year, and then meets the test in
the succeeding year, begins collecting HMDA data in the calendar year following the year in which it meets the test for
coverage. For example, a for-profit mortgage lending institution (other than a bank, savings association, or credit union) that, in
year I, falls below the thresholds specified in Sec. 203.2(e)(2)(ii)(A) and (B), but meets one of them in year 2, need not collect
data in year 2, but begins collecting data in year 3.
2. Adjustment of exemption threshold for depository institutions. Depository institutions with assets at or below $32 million
are exempt from collecting data for 2002.
3. Coverage after a merger. Several scenarios of data-collection responsibilities for the calendar year of a merger are
described below. Under all the scenarios, if the merger results in a covered institution, that institution must begin data
collection January I of the following calendar year.
i. Two institutions are not covered by Regulation C because ofasset size. The institutions merge. No data collection is
required for the year of the merger (even if the merger results in a covered institution).
ii. A covered institution and an exempt institution merge. The covered institution is the surviving institution. For the year of
the merger, data collection is required for the covered institution's transactions. Data collection is optional for transactions
handled in offices of the previously exempt institution.
iii. A covered institution and an exempt institution merge. The exempt institution is the surviving institution, or a new
institution is formed. Data collection is required for transactions of the covered institution that take place prior to the merger.
Data collection is optional for transactions taking place after the merger date.
iv. Two covered institutions merge. Data collection is required for the entire year. The surviving or resulting institution files
either a consolidated submission or separate submissions for that year.
4. Originations. HMDA coverage depends in part on whether an institution has originated home purchase loans. To
determine whether activities with respect to a particular loan constitute an origination, institutions should consult, among other
parts of the staff commentary, the discussion of the broker rule under Secs. 203.I(c) and 203.4(a).
5. Branches offoreign banks--treated as banks. A federal branch or a state-licensed insured branch ofa foreign bank is a
"bank" under section 3(a)(I) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12 U.S.c. 1813(a)), and is covered by HMDA ifit meets
the tests for a depository institution found in Sec. 203.2(e)(1) of Regulation C.
6. Branches and offices of foreign banks--treated as for-profit mortgage lending institutions. Federal agencies, state-licensed
<agencies, state-licensed uninsured branches of foreign banks, commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign
banks, and entities operating under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. 601 and 611 (Edge Act and
agreement corporations) are not "banks" under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. These entities are nonetheless covered by
HMDA if they meet the tests for a for-profit nondepository mortgage lending institution found in Sec. 203.2(e)(2) of
Regulation C.
2(g) Home improvement loan. I. Classification requirement for loans not secured by a lien on a dwelling. An institution has
"classified" a loan that is not secured by a lien on a dwelling as a home improvement loan if it has entered the loan on its books
as a home improvement loan, or has otherwise coded or identified the loan as a home improvement loan. For example, an
institution that has booked a loan or reported it on a "call report" as a home improvement loan has classified it as a home
improvement loan. An institution may also classify loans as home improvement loans in other ways (for example, by
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color-coding loan files).
2. Improvements to real property. Home improvements include improvements both to a dwelling and to the real property on
which the dwelling is located (for example, installation ofa swimming pool, construction of a garage, or landscaping).
3. Commercial and other loans. A home improvement loan may include a loan originated outside an institution's residential
mortgage lending division (such as a loan to improve an apartment building made through the commercial loan department).
4. Mixed-use property. A loan to improve property used for residential and commercial purposes (for example, a building
containing apartment units and retail space) is a home improvement loan if the loan proceeds are used primarily to improve the
residential portion of the property. If the loan proceeds are used to improve the entire property (for example, to replace the
heating system), the loan is a home improvement loan if the property itself is primarily residential. An institution may use any
reasonable standard to determine the primary use of the property, such as by square footage or by the income generated. An
institution may select the standard to apply on a case-by-case basis. If the loan is unsecured, to report the loan as a home
improvement loan the institution must also have classified it as such.
5. Multiple-category loans. If a loan is a home improvement loan as well as a refinancing, an institution reports the loan as a
home improvement loan.
2(h) Home purchase loan. 1. Multiple properties. A home purchase loan includes a loan secured by one dwelling and used to
purchase another dwelling.
2. Mixed-use property. A dwelling-secured loan to purchase property used primarily for residential purposes (for example,
an apartment building containing a convenience store) is a home purchase loan. An institution may use any reasonable standard
to determine the primary use of the property, such as by square footage or by the income generated. An institution may select
the standard to apply on a case-by-case basis.
3. Farm loan. A loan to purchase property used primarily for agricultural purposes is not a home purchase loan even if the
property includes a dwelling. An institution may use any reasonable standard to determine the primary use of the property, such
as by reference to the exemption from Regulation X (Real Estate Settlement Procedures, 24 CFR 3500.5(b)(l)) for a loan on
property of25 acres or more. An institution may select the standard to apply on a case-by-case basis.
4. Commercial and other loans. A home purchase loan may include a loan originated outside an institution's residential
mortgage lending division (such as a loan for the purchase of an apartment building made through the commercial loan
department).
5. Construction and permanent financing. A home purchase loan includes both a combined construction/permanent loan and
the permanent financing that replaces a construction-only loan. It does not include a construction-only loan, which is
considered "temporary financing" under Regulation C and is not reported.
6. Second mortgages that frnance the downpayments on first mortgages. If an institution making a first mortgage loan to a
home purchaser also makes a second mortgage loan to the same purchaser to finance part or all the home purchaser's
downpayment, the institution reports each loan separately as a home purchase loan.
7. Multiple-category loans. If a loan is a home purchase loan as well as a home improvement loan, or a refinancing, an
institution reports the loan as a home purchase loan.
Section 203 A--Compilation of Loan Data
4(a) Data Format and Itemization. I. Reporting requirements.
i. An institution reports data on loans that it originated and loans that it purchased during the calendar year described in the
report. An institution reports these data even if the loans were subsequently sold by the institution.
ii. An institution reports the data for loan applications that did not result in originations--for example, applications that the
institution denied or that the applicant withdrew during the calendar year covered by the report.
iii. In the case of brokered loan applications or applications forwarded through a correspondent, the institution reports as
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originations the loans that it approved and subsequently acquired per a pre-closing arrangement (whether or not they closed in
the institution's name). Additionally, the institution reports the data for all applications that did not result in originations--for
example, applications that the institution denied or that the applicant withdrew during the calendar year covered by the report
(whether or not they would have closed in the institution's name). For all of these loans and applications, the institution reports
the required data regarding the borrower's or applicant's ethnicity, race, sex, and income.
iv. Loan originations are to be reported only once. If the institution is the loan broker or correspondent, it does not report as
originations the loans that it forwarded to another lender for approval prior to closing, and that were approved and subsequently
acquired by that lender (whether or not they closed in the institution's name).
v. An institution reports applications that were received in the previous calendar year but were acted upon during the
calendar year covered by the current register.
vi. A financial institution submits all required data to its supervisory agency in one package, with the prescribed transmittal
sheet. An officer of the institution certifies to the accuracy of the data.
vii. The transmittal sheet states the total number of line entries contained in the accompanying data transmission.
2. Updating--agency requirements. Certain state or federal regulations, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
regulations, may require an institution to update its data more frequently than is required under Regulation C.
3. Form ofquarterly updating. An institution may maintain the quarterly updates of the HMDA/LAR in electronic or any
other format, provided the institution can make the information available to its regulatory agency in a timely manner upon
request.
4(a)(1) Application number and application date. 1. Application date--consistency. In reporting the date of application, an
institution reports the date the application was received or the date shown on the application. Although an institution need not
choose the same approach for its entire HMDA submission, it should be generally consistent (such as by routinely using one
approach within a particular division of the institution or for a category of loans).
2. Application date--application forwarded by a broker. For an application forwarded by a broker, an institution reports the
date the application was received by the broker, the date the application was received by the institution, or the date shown on
the application. Although an institution need not choose the same approach for its entire HMDA submission, it should be
generally consistent (such as by routinely using one approach within a particular division of the institution or for a category of
loans).
3. Application date--reinstated application. If, within the same calendar year, an applicant asks an institution to reinstate a
counteroffer that the applicant previously did not accept (or asks the institution to reconsider an application that was denied,
withdrawn, or closed for incompleteness), the institution may treat that request as the continuation of the earlier transaction or
as a new transaction. If the institution treats the request for reinstatement or reconsideration as a new transaction, it reports the
date of the request as the application date.
4. Application or loan number. An institution must ensure that each identifYing number is unique within the institution. If an
institution's register contains data for branch offices, for example, the institution could use a letter or a numerical code to
identifY the loans or applications ofdifferent branches, or could assign a certain series of numbers to particular branches to
avoid duplicate numbers. Institutions are strongly encouraged not to use the applicant's or borrower's name or social security
number, for privacy reasons.
5. Application--year action taken. An institution must report an application in the calendar year in which the institution takes
fmal action on the application.
Paragraph 4(a)(3) Purpose.
1. Purpose--statement of applicant. An institution may rely on the oral or written statement of an applicant regarding the
proposed use of loan proceeds. For example, a lender could use a check-box, or a purpose line, on a loan application to
determine whether or not the applicant intends to use loan proceeds for home improvement purposes.
2. Purpose--multiple-purpose loan. If a loan is a home purchase loan as well as a home improvement loan, or a refmancing,
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an institution reports the loan as a home purchase loan. Ifa loan is a home improvement loan as well as a refinancing, an
institution reports the loan as a home improvement loan.
Paragraph 4(a)(6) Occupancy.
1. Occupancy--multiple properties. If a loan relates to multiple properties, the institution reports the owner occupancy status
of the property for which property location is being reported. (See the comments to paragraph 4(a)(9), Property location.)
Paragraph 4(a)(7) Loan amount.
1. Loan amount--counteroffer. If an applicant accepts a counteroffer for an amount different from the amount initially
requested, the institution reports the loan amount granted. If an applicant does not accept a counteroffer or fails to respond, the
institution reports the loan amount initially requested.
2. Loan amount--multiple-purpose loan. Except in the case of a home-equity line ofcredit, an institution reports the entire
amount of the loan, even if only a part of the proceeds is intended for home purchase or home improvement.
3. Loan amount--home-equity line. An institution that has chosen to report home-equity lines of credit reports only the part
that is intended for home-improvement or home-purchase purposes.
4. Loan amount--assumption. An institution that enters into a written agreement accepting a new party as the obligor on a
loan reports the amount of the outstanding principal on the assumption as the loan amount.
Paragraph 4(a)(8) Type ofaction taken and date.
1. Action taken--counteroffers. If an institution makes a counteroffer to lend on terms different from the applicant's initial
request (for example, for a shorter loan maturity or in a different amount) and the applicant does not accept the counteroffer or
fails to respond, the institution reports the action taken as a denial on the original terms requested by the applicant.
2. Action taken--rescinded transactions. If a borrower rescinds a transaction after closing, the institution may report the
transaction either as an origination or as an application that was approved but not accepted.
3. Action taken--purchased loans. An institution reports the loans that it purchased during the calendar year, and does not
report the loans that it declined to purchase.
4. Action taken--conditional approvals. If an institution issues a loan approval subject to the applicant's meeting
underwriting conditions (other than customary loan commitment or loan-closing conditions, such as a clear-title requirement or
an acceptable property survey) and the applicant does not meet them, the institution reports the action taken as a denial.
5. Action taken date--approved but not accepted. For a loan approved by an institution but not accepted by the applicant, the
institution reports any reasonable date, such as the approval date, the deadline for accepting the offer, or the date the file was
closed. Although an institution need not choose the same approach for its entire HMDA submission, it should be generally
consistent (such as by routinely using one approach within a particular division of the institution or for a category ofloans).
6. Action taken date-originations. For loan originations, an institution generally reports the settlement or closing date. For
loan originations that an institution acquires through a broker, the institution reports either the settlement or closing date, or the
date the institution acquired the loan from the broker. If the disbursement of funds takes place on a date later than the
settlement or closing date, the institution may use the date ofdisbursement. For a construction/permanent loan, the institution
reports either the settlement or closing date, or the date the loan converts to the permanent fmancing. Although an institution
need not choose the same approach for its entire HMDA submission, it should be generally consistent (such as by routinely
using one approach within a particular division of the institution or for a category ofloans). Notwithstanding this flexibility
regarding the use of the closing date in connection with reporting the date action was taken, the year in which an origination
goes to closing is the year in which the institution must report the origination.
7. Action taken--pending applications. An institution does not report any loan application still pending at the end of the
calendar year; it reports that application on its register for the year in which fmal action is taken.
Paragraph 4(a)(9) Property location.
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l. Property location--multiple properties (home improvement/refinance of home improvement). For a home improvement
loan, an institution reports the property being improved. If more than one property is being improved, the institution reports the
location of one of the properties or reports the loan using multiple entries on its HMDA/LAR (with unique identifiers) and
allocating the loan amount among the properties.
2. Property location--multiple properties (home purchase/refinance of home purchase). For a home purchase loan, an
institution reports the property taken as security. If an institution takes more than one property as security, the institution reports
the location of the property being purchased if there is just one. If the loan is to purchase multiple properties and is secured by
multiple properties, the institution reports the location of one of the properties or reports the loan using multiple entries on its
HMDA/LAR (with unique identifiers) and allocating the loan amount among the properties.
3. Property location--Ioans purchased from another institution. The requirement to report the property location by census
tract in a metropolitan area where the institution has a home or branch office applies not only to loan applications and
originations but also to loans purchased from another institution. This includes loans purchased from an institution that did not
have a home or branch office in that metropolitan area and did not collect the property-location information.
4. Property location--mobile or manufactured home. If information about the potential site ofa mobile or manufactured
home is not available, an institution reports using the code for "not applicable."
Paragraph 4(a)(lO) Applicant and income data.
I. Applicant data--completion by applicant. An institution reports the monitoring information as provided by the applicant.
For example, if an applicant checks the "Asian" box the institution reports using the "Asian" code.
2. Applicant data--completion by lender. If an applicant fails to provide the requested information for an application taken in
person, the institution reports the data on the basis of visual observation or surname.
3. Applicant data--application completed in person. When an applicant meets in person with a lender to complete an
application that was begun by mail, Internet, or telephone, the institution must request the monitoring information. If the
meeting occurs after the application process is complete, for example, at closing, the institution is not required to obtain
monitoring information.
4. Applicant data--joint applicant. A joint applicant may enter the government monitoring information on behalf of an absent
joint applicant. If the information is not provided, the institution reports using the code for "information not provided by
applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone application."
5. Applicant data--video and other electronic-application processes. An institution that accepts applications through
electronic media with a video component treats the applications as taken in person and collects the information about the
ethnicity, race, and sex of applicants. An institution that accepts applications through electronic media without a video
component (for example, the Internet or facsimile) treats the applications as accepted by mail.
6. Income data--income relied on. An institution reports the gross annual income relied on in evaluating the creditworthiness
ofapplicants. For example, if an institution relies on an applicant's salary to compute a debt-to-income ratio but also relies on
the applicant's annual bonus to evaluate creditworthiness, the institution reports the salary and the bonus to the extent relied
upon. Similarly, if an institution relies on the income of a cosigner to evaluate creditworthiness, the institution includes this
income to the extent relied upon. But an institution does not include the income of a guarantor who is only secondarily liable.
7. Income data--co-applicant. If two persons jointly apply for a loan and both list income on the application, but the
institution relies only on the income ofone applicant in computing ratios and in evaluating creditworthiness, the institution
reports only the income relied on.
8. Income data--Ioan to employee. An institution may report "NA" in the income field for loans to its employees to protect
their privacy, even though the institution relied on their income in making its credit decisions.
Paragraph 4(a)(lI) Purchaser.
1. Type ofpurchaser--Ioan-participation interests sold to more than one entity. An institution that originates a loan, and then
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sells it to more than one entity, reports the "type of purchaser" based on the entity purchasing the greatest interest, if any. If an
institution retains a majority interest, it does not report the sale.
2. Type of purchaser--swapped loans. Loans "swapped" for mortgage-backed securities are to be treated as sales; the
purchaser is the type ofentity receiving the loans that are swapped.
Paragraph 4(a)(12) Rate spread information.
1. Treasul)' securities. To determine the yield on a Treasul)' security for the pricing information, lenders may use the
Board's "Selected Interest Rates" (statistical release H-15) or the actual auction results. TreasUI)' auctions are held at different
intervals for the different types ofsecurities. These figures are published by major fmancial and metropolitan newspapers and
are also available from Federal Reserve Banks. Lenders must use the yield on the security that has the nearest maturity at
issuance to the loan's maturity. 'For example, if a lender must compare the annual percentage rate to Treasul)' securities with
either 7-year or 1O-year maturities, the annual percentage rate for a 9-year loan is compared with securities that have a 1O-year
maturity. Ifthe loan maturity is exactly halfway between, the annual percentage rate is compared with the Treasury security that
has the lower yield. For example, if the loan has a maturity of20 years and comparable securities have maturities of 10 years
with a yield of6.501 percent and 30 years with a yield of 6.906 percent, the annual percentage rate is compared with the yield
of6.501 percent, the lower of the two yields.
Paragraph 4(c)(3) Optional data--home-equity lines of credit.
1. An institution that opts to report home-equity lines reports the disposition of all applications, not just originations.
Paragraph 4(d) Excluded data.
1. Mergers, purchases in bulk, and branch acquisitions. If a covered institution acquires loans in bulk from another
institution (for example, from the receiver for a failed institution) but no merger or acquisition of the institution, or acquisition
of a branch, is involved, the institution reports the loans as purchased loans.
Section 203.5(a)--Disclosure and Reporting
Paragraph 5(a) Reporting to agency.
1. Submission of data. Institutions submit data to their supervisol)' agencies in an automated, machine-readable form. The
format must conform to that of the HMDAILAR. An institution should contact its federal supervisol)' agency for information
regarding procedures and technical specifications for automated data submission; in some cases, agencies also make software
available for automated data submission. The data are edited before submission, using the edits included in the agency-supplied
software or equivalent edits in software available from vendors or developed in-house.
2. Submission in paper form. Institutions that report twenty-five or fewer entries on their HMDAILAR may collect and
report the data in paper form. An institution that submits its register in nonautomated form sends two copies that are typed or
computer printed and must use the format of the HMDA/LAR (but need not use the form itself). Each page must be numbered
along with the total number of pages (for example, "Page 1 of3").
3. Procedures for entering data. The required data are entered in the register for each loan origination, each application acted
on, and each loan purchased during the calendar year. The institution should decide on the procedure it wants to follow--for
example, whether to begin entering the required data, when an application is received, or to wait until final action is taken (such
as when a loan goes to closing or an application is denied).
4. Options for collection. An institution may collect data on separate registers at different branches, or on separate registers
for different loan types (such as for home purchase or home improvement loans, or for loans on multifamily dwellings). Entries
need not be grouped on the register by metropolitan area, or chronologically, or by census tract numbers, or in any other
particular order.
5. Change in supervisory agency. If the supervisol)' agency for a covered institution changes (as a consequence of a merger
or a change in the institution's charter, for example), the institution must report data to its new supervisol)' agency beginning
with the year of the change.
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6. Subsidiaries. An institution is a subsidiary ofa bank or savings association (for purposes of reporting HMDA data to the
parent's supervisory agency) if the bank or savings association holds or controls an ownership interest that is greater than 50
percent of the institution.
7. Transmittal sheet--additional data submissions. Ifan additional data submission becomes necessary (for example, because
the institution discovers that data were omitted from the initial submission, or because revisions are called for, that submission
must be accompanied by a transmittal sheet.
8. Transmittal sheet--revisions or deletions. Ifa data submission involves revisions or deletions of previously submitted data,
it must state the total of all line entries contained in that submission, including both those representing revisions or deletions of
previously submitted entries, and those that are being resubmitted unchanged or are being submitted for the first time.
Depository institutions must provide a list of the metropolitan areas in which they have home or branch offices.
Paragraph 5(b) Public disclosure ofstatement.
1. Business day. For purposes of Sec. 203.5, a business day is any calendar day other than a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
public holiday.
2. Format. An institution may make the disclosure statement available in paper form or, if the person requesting the data
agrees, in automated form (such as by PC diskette or CD Rom).
Paragraph 5(c) Publie disclosure of modified loan/application register.
1. Format. An institution may make the modified register available in paper or automated form (such as by PC diskette or
computer tape). Although institutions are not required to make the modified register available in census tract order, they are
strongly encouraged to do so in order to enhance its utility to users.
Paragraph 5(e) Notice of availability.
1. Poster--suggested text. An institution may use any text that meets the requirements of the regulation. Some of the federal
financial regulatory agencies and HUD provide HMDA posters that an institution can use to inform the public of the
availability of its HMDA data, or the institution may create its own posters. If an institution prints its own, the following
language is suggested but is not required:
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Notice
The HMDA data about our residential mortgage lending are available for review. The data show geographic distribution of
loans and applications; ethnicity, race, sex, and income of applicants and borrowers; and information about loan approvals and
denials. Inquire at this office regarding the locations where HMDA data may be inspected.
2. Additional language for institutions making the disclosure statement available on request. An institution that posts a notice
informing the public of the address to which a request should be sent could include the following sentence, for example, in its
general notice: "To receive a copy of these data send a written request to [address]."
Section 203.6--Enforcement
Paragraph 6(b) Bona fide errors.
1. Bona fide error--information from third parties. An institution that obtains the property-location information for
applications and loans from third parties (such as appraisers or vendors of"geocoding" services) is responsible for ensuring
that the information reported on its HMDAILAR is correct.
By order of the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System, February 5,2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary of the Board.
[FRDoc. 02-3323 Filed 2-14-02; 8:45 am]
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FR 12CFR 06/27/02 Final 67 FR 43218 - Home Mortgage Disclosure
[Federal Register: June 27, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 124)]
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 203
[Regulation C; Docket No. R-1120]
Home Mortgage Disclosure
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final rule; staff interpretation.
SUMMARY: The Board is publishing amendments to Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure). The amendments
establish the thresholds for determining the loans for which financial institutions must report loan pricing data (the spread
between the annual percentage rate on a loan and the yield on comparable Treasury securities) as required under a final rule
approved in January 2002; the thresholds are a spread of 3 percentage points for frrst-lien loans and 5 percentage points for
subordinate-lien loans. The amendments require lenders to report the lien status of a loan or application. The amendments also
require that lenders ask applicants their ethnicity, race, and sex in applications taken by telephone; this monitoring requirement
is made applicable as of January 1,2003, through a rule published elsewhere in today's Federal Register.
DATES: The amendments are effective January 1,2004.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John C. Wood, Counsel, Kathleen C. Ryan, Senior Attorney, or Dan S.
Sokolov, Attorney, Division ofConsumer and Community Affairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, DC 20551, at (202) 452-3667 or (202) 452-2412. For users of Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD)
only, contact (202) 263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) (12 U.S.C. 2801-2810) has three purposes. One is to provide the public and
government officials with data that will help show whether lenders are serving the housing needs of the neighborhoods and
communities in which they are located. A second purpose is to help public officials target public investment to promote private
investment where it is needed. A third purpose is to provide data that assist in identifying possible discriminatory lending
patterns and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
HMDA accordingly requires certain depository and for-profit nondepository lenders to collect, report, and publicly disclose
data about originations and purchases of loans secured by residential real property and of home improvement loans. Lenders
must also report data about applications that did not result in originations.
The Board's Regulation C implements HMDA. Regulation C generally requires that lenders report data about:
Each application or loan, including the application date; the action taken and the date of that action; the loan amount; the
loan type and purpose; and, if the loan is sold, the type of purchaser;
Each applicant or borrower, including ethnicity, race, sex, and income; and
Each property, including location and occupancy status.
Lenders report this information to their supervisory agencies on an application-by-application basis using a loan application
register format (HMDAlLAR). Lenders must make their HMDAILARs--with certain fields redacted to preserve applicants'
privacy--available to the public. The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), acting on behalfof the
supervisory agencies, compiles the reported information and prepares an individual disclosure statement for each institution.
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The FFIEC also aggregates data and prepares reports for all lenders in each metropolitan area and for the nation. These
disclosure statements and reports are available to the public.
On January 23,2002, the Board approved amendments to Regulation C after a comprehensive review ofthe regulation. 67
FR 7222, February 15,2002. Among other things, the final rule requires lenders to report the spread between the APR on loans
and the yield on Treasury securities with comparable maturity periods, if the spread meets or exceeds certain thresholds
specified by the Board.
At the same time that the fmal rule was published, the Board issued a proposed rule for comment on whether thresholds of3
percentage points above the yield on comparable Treasury securities for fIrst-lien loans and 5 percentage points for
subordinate-lien loans (which generally have a higher APR) are appropriate thresholds for identifying the loans for which
financial institutions must report loan pricing data. 67 FR 7252, February 15,2002. The Board also proposed to require lenders
(1) to report the lien status on loans and applications and (2) to ask telephone applicants their ethnicity, race, and sex.
The Board received approximately 250 comments on the proposed rule; commenters were generally divided on the issues.
Industry commenters provided differing views on the appropriate thresholds for reporting pricing data and on the burden
associated with reporting lien status. They were generally opposed to the proposed collection of applicants' ethnicity, race, and
sex in telephone applications.
Commenters representing community groups, researchers, and state, local and tribal officials generally urged the Board to
require lenders to report pricing information on all loans. These commenters supported the reporting of lien status for
originations and applications, and argued for extending the requirement to purchased loans. They believed that lenders should
be required to ask for applicants' ethnicity, race, and sex in telephone applications.
Many industry commenters, in addition to commenting on the proposed rule, also requested a delay in the effective date of
the final rule published on February 15,2002. On May 2,2002, the Board delayed the effective date of the final rule to January
1,2004. Lenders must, however, use the census tract numbers and corresponding geographic areas from the 2000 Census for all
applications and loans recorded on their 2003 HMDA/LAR and reported to the supervisory agencies by March I, 2004. 67 FR
30771, May 8, 2002.
Industry commenters also requested guidance on how to collect and report data when an application is received before--and
final action is taken after--January 1,2004, the effective date of the revised rule. In some instances, several months may elapse
between application and final action, and applications taken in 2003 may not be acted upon until 2004.
Lenders generally must comply with the revised rules for all applications upon which final action is taken on and after
January 1,2004. The Board plans to issue guidance later this year to alleviate the burden on lenders to "look back" at all
applications taken in 2003 but acted on in 2004. For example, the Board could establish that for applications taken before a
certain date--such as November I, 2003--a lender would not be required to use the revised rules.
II. Section-by-Section Analysis of the Final Rule
The following discussion generally tracks the regulation (including appendices) as amended by the Board. Revisions to the
staff commentary are addressed under the sections of the regulation that they interpret.
Section 203.2--Definitions
2(i) Manufactured Home
Commenters asked whether the definition of a manufactured home in Sec. 203.2(i) includes modular, panelized, and pre-cut
homes. The defmition in Sec. 203.2 refers to the federal building code for factory-built housing established by the Department
ofHousing and Urban Development (HUD). The HUD code requires generally that housing be essentially ready for occupancy
upon leaving the factory and being transported to a building site. Modular homes that meet all of the HUD code standards are
included in the defmition because they are ready for occupancy upon leaving the factory. Other factory-built homes, such as
panelized and pre-cut homes, generally do not meet the HUD code because they require a significant amount of construction on
site before they are ready for occupancy. Loans and applications relating to manufactured homes that do not meet the HUD
code should not be identified as manufactured housing under HMDA. Comment 203.2(i)-1 contains this guidance.
Section 203.4--Compilation of Loan Data
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4(a)(12) Rate Spread Information
The Board proposed a reporting threshold of3 percentage points above the yield on Treasury securities ofcomparable
maturity for first-lien loans and 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans (which generally have a higher APR). The
thresholds are intended to ensure, to the extent possible, that pricing data for higher-cost loans are collected and disclosed. The
data available to the Board when it proposed the thresholds indicated that these thresholds would exclude the vast majority of
prime loans and include the vast majority of other loans. The Board solicited comment on the appropriate thresholds before
finalizing them. Information on the following specific issues and questions was also solicited:
Whether the rule for determining coverage under the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) should be used
to determine whether rate spread information must be reported under HMDA-specifIcally, whether the 15th day of the month
preceding the month in which the application for the loan was received should be used for determining the APR spread.
The proportion ofloan originations (by number ofloans) reported under HMDA that would fall above and below various
thresholds, segregated by risk class (for example, A, A-minus, and B) and lien status.
Circumstances or special credit products that might be particularly subject to misclassiflcation, as loans associated with a
higher credit risk than prime loans, should the proposed thresholds be implemented. For example, are there product lines in
which loans with very little credit risk nonetheless have high APRs? Alternatively, are there product lines in which loans with
relatively high credit risk nonetheless have low APRs?
Is the 2-percentage point difference between the proposed thresholds for fIrst- and subordinate-lien loans appropriate?
Some industry commenters supported the thresholds of3 and 5 percentage points, although they objected to reporting any
pricing data. These commenters stated that, based on their experience, the tentative thresholds would exclude nearly all prime
loans from the pricing-data reporting. Nearly all industry commenters--whether or not they supported thresholds of 3 and 5
percentage points--indicated that a 2-percentage point difference between thresholds is appropriate.
Many industry commenters argued that the proposed thresholds were too low, based on a beliefthat the thresholds would
capture a significant number of prime loans. Some commenters stated that the proposed thresholds would include loans that
they believe are not higher-priced loans, for example, short-term loans with balloon payments, loans involving manufactured
homes, and FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans. These commenters did not, however, provide data to support their views.
Industry commenters also expressed concern that stigma would attach to loans that meet the pricing thresholds and that
responsible subprime lending would consequently be curtailed.
Some commenters urged the Board to adopt the thresholds for HOEPA coverage (8 percentage points for first-lien loans and
10 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans) for reporting pricing information under Regulation C. Others suggested
thresholds of 5 percentage points and 7 percentage points for fIrst- and subordinate-lien loans, respectively, so as to capture
only what they believe to be higher-priced loans.
In addition to commenting on the proposed thresholds, many industry commenters urged the Board to reverse its decision to
require lenders to report pricing information under HMDA. Some of these commenters stated that, in the alternative, the Board
should allow lenders the option of reporting the APR on a loan and having the Board calculate the spread. They said that
reporting the spread would be more burdensome than reporting the APR, because lenders do not track the yield on Treasury
securities and may have difficulty obtaining the correct information to use in calculating the spread. Commenters were
concerned that lenders could make inadvertent errors in calculating the spread and, if the errors were pervasive, could incur the
costs of resubmission of HMDA data or civil money penalties.
A few industry commenters urged the Board not to use the yield on Treasury securities for calculating the spread. They
suggested that lenders be permitted to use other indices for calculating the spread, such as the LIBOR (London Inter-Bank
Offered Rate) index, that they said playa more direct role in their pricing.
Still others--community groups, researchers, and state, local, and tribal officials--urged the Board to require pricing
information on all loans reported under HMDA, and not just those that meet or exceed certain thresholds. These commenters
believed that requiring pricing information only on higher-priced loans would allow discrimination and other abusive lending
practices to go undetected in the prime market. Some of these commenters also argued that the APR, and not the spread, should
be reported to facilitate fair lending enforcement. Some community groups, while preferring pricing information on all loans,
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stated that the thresholds of 3 and 5 percentage points were appropriate.
The Board is adopting the proposed thresholds of 3 and 5 percentage points for fIrst- and subordinate-lien loans,
respectively. In January 2002, the Board adopted the requirement to report the spread only for loans over specific thresholds in
order to adjust pricing data for changes in market conditions over time, focus on higher-cost loans, and limit reporting burden
(because fewer loans would be subject to the reporting requirement). The data supplied by commenters tended to confirm the
data available to the Board indicating that the proposed thresholds would avoid capturing the vast majority of prime loans while
capturing the vast majority ofother loans.
The Board believes that the thresholds will not result in misciassifIcation of the products mentioned by some
commenters--for example, FHA-insured loans, VA-guaranteed loans and manufactured home loans. While the spread on many
manufactured home loans may exceed the thresholds, these loans tend to have elevated credit risk and are generally not
considered prime loans. The thresholds should exclude most FHA-insured loans and VA-guaranteed loans. Moreover,
Regulation C requires lenders to distinguish FHA and VA loans from other loan types on their HMDAILARs; and under the
final rules, lenders will also be required to distinguish loans for manufactured homes from loans for site-built homes. Thus,
even if these loans are misciassifIed as higher-priced loans, data users can treat these loans as distinct product lines in their
analyses.
The Board will take steps to minimize any difficulties lenders may have in calculating the spread and also to minimize the
risk oferrors. These steps include publishing the applicable Treasury yields for common maturity periods on the FFIEC's
Internet web site, in addition to making the information available by fax upon request. Lenders will be required to use only the
rates published by the Board--and not the H-15 or the Treasury auction results, which lenders may use for HOEPA purposes--to
ensure consistent and accurate calculations for HMDA data collection and reporting. An interactive tool could also be available
on the FFIEC Web site to calculate the rate spread for a loan, based on information input by the lender.
The final regulation approved in January set an "application date" rule for determining whether the rate spread must be
reported. That is, lenders would compare the APR on a loan at consummation with the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity as of the 15th day of the month preceding the month in which the loan application was received. This is
the rule used to determine HOEPA coverage. The Board solicited comment on whether HOEPA's application date rule is
appropriate in calculating the spread for HMDA purposes.
Many industry commenters, including the banking trade associations, supported use of the application date for identifying
the applicable Treasury security yield. They noted that adopting the HOEPA rule would ease compliance burden, as lenders
whose loans are covered by HOEPA are already familiar with this rule. Other industry commenters suggested that the "lock
date," or date that the lender sets the interest rate for the loan, would result in a more accurate determination of whether a loan
was a prime loan or a higher-priced loan. A small number of industry commenters suggested using the date oforigination or
consummation.
The Board is adopting the date the final interest rate is set as the date for determining the yield on comparable Treasury
securities. The rule provides that lenders use the 15th-of-the-month prior to the date the final rate is set. For example, if the
lender sets the interest rate for the final time before the loan closing on September 3, 2004, the relevant date for use of the
Board's table is August 15,2004; if the lender sets the rate for the fmal time before closing on September 17,2004, the
relevant date is September 15,2004. If the rate is set on September 15,2004, the relevant date is September 15,2004. These
instructions have been incorporated into Appendix A, Paragraphs LG.l. and 2.
The date the fmal rate is set more accurately reflects the lender's pricing decision than a date related to the date of
application or to the date of consummation. A date related to the date ofapplication or consummation might reflect a different
rate environment than existed when the fmal interest rate was established, and could result in inaccurate and misleading data for
periods when interest rates are volatile.
Using the date the fmal rate is set may impose additional burden on some lenders, as many lenders do not systematically
track the date the interest rate is set or locked. In contrast, using the HOEPA rule (a date measured from the application date)
may impose less burden on lenders that currently make HOEPA loans or routinely monitor their loans for HOEPA coverage
(although it does not pose that advantage for lenders that do not make HOEPA loans); and the dates ofapplication and
consummation also may be less burdensome because these dates are already collected and reported under HMDA. On balance,
however, the Board believes that the benefits of increasing the accuracy of pricing information by selecting the date the fmal
interest rate is set outweigh the compliance burden associated with the requirement.
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Section 4(a)(12) is also modified to clarifY that lenders must report the rate spread on a loan if the spread equals or exceeds
the thresholds. This change conforms the regulation to the instructions for reporting rate-spread information in Appendix A,
Paragraph I.G.I.
4(a)(14) Lien Status
The Board proposed to require lenders to report whether a loan is or would be (1) secured by a first lien on a dwelling; (2)
secured by a subordinate lien on a dwelling; or (3) not secured by a lien on a dwelling. The Board solicited comment on these
reporting categories (and also on whether reporting of lien status should be required for purchased loans). Data on lien status
may help explain some pricing disparities, because interest rates, and therefore APRs, vary according to lien status. Rates on
first-lien loans are generally lower than rates on subordinate-lien or unsecured loans. In addition, lien status would enable data
users to better analyze information on secured and unsecured home improvement loans.
Most industry commenters--although opposed generally to reporting more data under HMDA--stated that lien status was
closely linked to pricing and that it would not be unduly burdensome for them to report this information for originations on
their HMDA/LAR. Most industry commenters, however, opposed a requirement to collect and report these data for purchased
loans, because they believe the additional burden is not warranted. Some commenters stated that lien status should not be
required for applications that do not result in loans; they suggested that an application might be denied before the lender knows
what the lien status of the loan would have been.
Other industry commenters opposed the requirement to report lien status even for originations as unduly burdensome. These
commenters stated that while they know when a loan they make is secured, they often do not know their lien position with
certainty. They were concerned that a final rule would require title searches for all reportable loans. Some commenters stated
that they generally assume they will have a first lien for all home purchase applications and loans; but for other home
mortgages, often they do not know their lien position even if the loan is originated, and base their pricing decisions on the
assumption that they will have a subordinate lien. A few commenters suggested that the Board should allow lenders to report
lien status based on these assumptions.
Community groups, researchers, and state, local, and tribal officials stated that lien status was critical to interpreting pricing
data and distinguishing secured from unsecured home improvement loans, and many argued that lien status should be reported
for purchased loans as well. Some of these commenters suggested that the data collection might serve to deter lenders from
persuading consumers to consolidate a small first mortgage and unsecured debt into a new first mortgage (when a second
mortgage or an unsecured loan might be more in the consumer's interest). Some also stated that data on lien status for
purchased loans would facilitate monitoring of the activities of subprime lenders that purchase loans which may be unfairly
priced, and for which little data are available.
The final rule requires lenders to report lien status on applications and originations, but not on purchased loans. Conforming
changes have been made to the HMDA/LAR and the HMDA/LAR Code Sheet in Appendix A. Lien status on loan originations
will help the public and the agencies interpret the pricing information. Collecting lien status on loan originations will enable
data users to differentiate between secured and unsecured home improvement loans, and will facilitate fair lending data
analysis.
Lien status for applications that do not result in originations is also important information in the analysis of acceptance and
denial ratios for borrowers ofdifferent races. Disparities by race or ethnicity in acceptance and denial ratios that initially
suggest unlawful discrimination are often explained by differences in the lien status of the loan for which application was made,
but only after significant effort is expended to retrieve information on lien status from individual loan files.
Lenders are required to report the lien status according to the best information readily available to them at the time final
action is taken on an application. A comment has been added to the staff commentary, clarifYing that Regulation C does not
require lenders to conduct title searches solely for HMDA reporting purposes. Lenders may rely on the title search they
routinely require for home purchase loans; lenders may also rely on other information readily available to them and that they
reasonably believe to be accurate, such as the applicant's credit report or the applicant's statement on the application. For
example, a lender would report a loan origination as secured by a subordinate lien if the application states that there is a
mortgage on the property (and the mortgage will not be paid off as part of the transaction). If the same application did not result
in an origination--for example, because the application is denied or withdrawn--the lender would report the application as an
application for a subordinate-lien loan.
The fmal rule does not require lenders to collect and report lien status for loans that they purchase. Pricing information is not
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required for purchased loans, nor is information on ethnicity, race, and sex. Thus, the utility of lien-status data on purchased
loans would be limited and would not justifY the additional reporting burden. Appendix A to Part 203--Form and Instructions
for Completion ofHMDA Loan/Application Register
In the fmal rules, the instructions for completing the HMDAILAR provide three codes for indicating whether a loan or
application relates to a preapproval request as defmed in Sec. 203.2(b). Codes 1 and 2 indicate whether a preapproval for a
home purchase loan was requested. Because only preapprovals for home purchase loans are covered under the fmal rule,
lenders use code 3, "not applicable," for refinancings and home improvement loans and applications and for purchased loans of
any type. Commenters asked what code should be used for home purchase applications and loans if a lender does not have a
preapproval program as defined in Sec. 203.2(b). Appendix A has been changed to clarifY that code 3 should be used for home
purchase loans and applications if the lender does not offer covered preapprovals.
Instructions for calculating the rate spread and for reporting lien status have been added to Appendix A, as discussed above
under Sees. 203.4(a)(l2) and (14). The HMDAILAR and the HMDA/LAR Code Sheet have been modified to reflect the
requirement in Sec. 203.4(a)(l4) to report lien status. Appendix A has also been modified to reflect the revised rules regarding
collection ofethnicity, race, and sex in applications taken by telephone, discussed under Appendix B below. Appendix B to
Part 203--Form and Instructions for Data Collection on Ethnicity, Race, and Sex
The Board proposed to conform the telephone application rule regarding ethnicity, race, and sex to the rule applicable to
mail and Internet applications. There has been a substantial decline in response rates regarding race and ethnicity. From 1993 to
2000, the proportion of home mortgage loan applications of all types with missing race or ethnicity data increased from about 8
percent to about 28 percent. (Missing data about the applicant's sex have increased in a similar fashion.) At least part of this
decline may be explained by an apparent increase in lenders' use of the telephone to take applications. The Board solicited
comment on the benefits and burdens of this proposal.
Commenters were divided on whether lenders should be required to ask for ethnicity, race, and sex in telephone
applications. Community groups, researchers, and state, local, and tribal officials urged the Board to require lenders to ask for
such information on telephone applications. Many of these commenters pointed out that without the information, fair lending
analyses based on HMDA data are less effective. These commenters also believe that the number of applications taken by
telephone will continue to grow and, thus, that the rate of applications and loans missing information about ethnicity, race, and
sex will increase as well. Some industry commenters supported the proposal, stating that it was simpler to have one rule on
collection of ethnicity, race, and sex that applies regardless of the manner in which an application is taken.
On the other hand, many other industry commenters opposed the proposal because they believe that applicants will resent
the intrusion into an area they regard as confidential or sensitive. Some commenters believe that applicants will fear
discrimination, and will not pursue an application, will refuse to supply the information, or will supply incorrect information.
Still others said that requiring lenders to ask for information about ethnicity, race, and sex would raise the cost of taking
telephone applications. A few commenters asked the Board to provide a script for requesting the information in telephone
applications.
The final rule requires lenders to ask for applicants' ethnicity, race, and sex in telephone applications. This amendment will
serve the fair lending enforcement purpose ofHMDA by improving the data obtained on ethnicity, race, and sex; the Board
believes this benefit outweighs the costs of compliance.
The Board is making the amended rule applicable as of January 1,2003, through a rule published elsewhere in today's
Federal Register. Although for at least some lenders the cost of implementing the telephone rule in 2003 may be somewhat
greater than the cost of implementing it in 2004, the Board believes that the cost difference is justified by the need to try to
stem the increasing rate of missing data.
The fmal rule conforms the procedures for requesting applicant information in telephone applications to those for
applications taken by mail or on the Internet. Generally, loan applicants must be advised that requesting information about
ethnicity, race, and sex is mandated by the federal government to assist in the enforcement of fair lending laws. In addition,
applicants must be advised that the lenders are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of the information provided, or on
the basis of the applicant's choosing to provide or not provide the information.
For applications taken beginning January 1,2003, lenders are required to ask telephone applicants for monitoring
information using the national origin or race categories in the current Appendices A and B, as set forth in a notice published
elsewhere in today's Federal Register. For applications taken by telephone on or after January 1,2004, lenders are required to
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ask for monitoring information using the ethnicity and race categories in revised Appendices A and B.
III. Paperwork Reduction Act
In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3506; 5 CFR 1320 Appendix A.I), the Board reviewed
the rule under the authority delegated to the Board by the Office of Management and Budget. The Federal Reserve may not
conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to respond to, this information collection unless it displays a currently
valid OMB control number. The OMB control number is 7100-0247 for the Federal Reserve's information collection under
Regulation C.
The mandatory collection of information that is revised by this rulemaking is found in 12 CFR part 203, which implements
12 U.S.c. 2801-2810. Public officials use this information to determine whether financial institutions are serving the housing
needs of their communities; to help target public investment to promote private investment where it is needed; and to identifY
possible discriminatory lending patterns for enforcement ofantidiscrimination statutes.
The respondents are all financial institutions, depositories and non-depositories, that meet the tests for coverage under the
regulation. Depository institutions with offices in metropolitan areas whose assets are below an asset size threshold (currently
$32 million) that adjusts yearly are not required to comply. Under the Paperwork Reduction Act the Federal Reserve accounts
for the burden of the paperwork associated with the regulation only for state member banks, their subsidiaries, subsidiaries of
bank holding companies, U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks (other than federal branches, federal agencies, and
insured state branches of foreign banks), commercial lending companies owned or controlled by foreign banks, and
organizations operating under section 25 or 25A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 601-604a; 611-631). Other federal
agencies account for the paperwork burden for the institutions they supervise. Respondents must maintain their HMDAILARs
and modified HMDA/LARs for three years, and their disclosure statements for five years.
The final rule has three principal elements. In January 2002, the Board approved several amendments to Regulation C,
including one that requires lenders to report the spread between the APR on a loan and the yield on Treasury securities of
comparable maturity when the spread exceeds a certain threshold. The final rule sets the reporting threshold (which depends on
lien status) at the level proposed by the Board in January 2002. The final rule also adds a field to the HMDAILAR for lien
status, which must be reported for loans and applications, but not for purchased loans. Finally, the final rule requires lenders to
ask telephone applicants their ethnicity, race, and sex. The public comments on these issues are summarized above in the
Supplementary Information.
When the Board adopted the January 2002 amendments, it estimated the annual burden for the information collection as
varying from 12 to 12,000 hours, averaging 242 hours for state member banks and 192 hours for mortgage banking subsidiaries
and other respondents. (These estimates were based on the number of HMDA data submissions by Federal Reserve supervised
respondents that were required to report calendar year 2000 data in March 2001.) Two items in the present amendments will
increase the annual burden: The requirement to report lien status and the requirement to ask telephone applicants their ethnicity,
race, and sex. The Board estimates that the addition of these two items will increase the burden by 7 percent. Accordingly, the
Board estimates that the annual burden for the information collection varies from 13 to 12,840 hours per institution, averaging
260 hours for state member banks and 200 hours for mortgage banking subsidiaries and other respondents. Therefore, the
annual burden of the information collection under Regulation C is estimated to be approximately 155,000 total annual hours for
Federal Reserve supervised respondents.
The present rule changes will also cause respondents to incur a modest programming cost in addition to the programming
cost associated with the January 2002 amendments. In particular, institutions will have to program their systems to add a new
field to the HMDAILAR for lien status; and institutions that do not now collect ethnicity, race, and sex on telephone
applications may have to reprogram their systems to enable such collection. The Board believes that these additional costs will
fit within the broad cost ranges the Board estimated applied to the January 2002 amendments. For convenience, those ranges
are reproduced here: Institutions that use vendor-provided software systems (the bulk of reporting institutions) will face costs
averaging around $2,000-$5,000; institutions that purchase and adapt off-the-shelf applications will face costs averaging
between $20,000-$50,000; and institutions that use mainframe systems (the largest institutions) will faGe costs averaging
between $120,000-$270,000. Using the maximum cost for each of the three ranges to calculate a weighted average, it is
estimated that the average covered financial institution will incur a total cost from the January 2002 amendments and the
present amendments of approximately $17,500.
The Board's Legal Division has determined that HMDA data collection and reporting are required by law; completion of the
loan/application register, submission to the Federal Reserve, and disclosure to the public upon request are mandatory. After the
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data are redacted as required by the statute and regulation, they are made publicly available and are not considered confidentiaL
Data that the statute and regulation require be redacted (loan number, date the application is received, and the date the action is
taken) are given confidential treatment under exemption 6 of the Freedom ofInformation Act (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)).
The Board has a continuing interest in the public's opinions of its collections of information. At any time, comments
regarding the burden estimate, or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the
burden, may be sent to: Secretary, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C Streets, NW., Washington,
DC 20551; and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (7100-0247), Washington, DC 20503.
IV. Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
In accordance with section 3(a) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.c. 604(a)), the Board has prepared a final
regulatory analysis of these revisions. A copy of the analysis may be obtained from Publications Services, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551, at (202) 452-3245. A summary of the analysis follows.
The fmal rule is a consequence of Board policy to review its regulations periodically and a desire to update the regulation to
reflect mortgage markets more clearly and enhance consumer protection.
The Board received no comments specifically responding to the initial regulatory analysis published in conjunction with the
proposed rule. As discussed in Sections I and II, however, some comments the Board received discussed the burden arising
from particular aspects of the proposed rule. Such comments are summarized throughout Sections I and II, as are the Board's
responses. Section II also discusses alternative measures the Board considered.
The changes under the fmal rule require more data on certain covered transactions. Some of the changes will affect all
institutions currently within the scope of the regulation, including covered small institutions; others will affect only certain
institutions, depending upon the interest rates and fees they charge and on whether they take applications by telephone.
It is difficult to quantify the benefits and costs associated with the final rule. The new information will provide data to help
identify possible discriminatory lending patterns and assist regulators in conducting examinations under the Community
Reinvestment Act and other laws. Additional data on covered transactions will allow for more precise differentiation among
loan products and reduce the potential bias that results when dissimilar loan products are jointly classified. The data will also
help inform the public about developments in the mortgage market by revealing pricing information on higher-cost home loans,
and improve local governments' ability to use HMDA data to help guide local investments. More complete data about applicant
characteristics in telephone applications will improve fair lending analysis.
Although the final rule offers a number of benefits, it also will require covered lenders, including small institutions, to
change their current procedures and systems for collecting and reporting required data. The Board believes the benefits
outweigh these added costs.
List of Subjects in 12 CFR Part 203
Banks, Banking, Mortgages, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board amends 12 CFR part 203 as follows:
PART 203--HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE (REGULATION C)
1. The authority citation for part 203 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.s.C. 2801-2810.
2. Section 203.4 is amended by:
a. Revising paragraph (a)(l2); and
b. Adding a new paragraph (a)(l4).
Sec. 203.4 Compilation ofloan data.
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(a) Data fonnat and itemization. * * *
(12) For originated loans subject to Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226, the difference between the loan's annual percentage rate
(APR) and the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity, if that difference is equal to or greater than
3 percentage points for loans secured by a first lien on a dwelling, or equal to or greater than 5 percentage points for loans
secured by a subordinate lien on a dwelling. The lender shall use the yield on Treasury securities as of the 15th day of the
preceding month if the rate is set between the 1st and the 14th day of the month and as of the 15th day of the current month if
the rate is set on or after the 15th day, as prescribed in appendix A to this part.
* * * * *
(14) The lien status of the loan or application (first lien, subordinate lien, or not secured by a lien on a dwelling).
*****
3. Appendix A is amended by:
a. Revising paragraph LA.8.;
b. Revising paragraph LD.2.;
c. Revising paragraph LG.I.;
d. Redesignating paragraph LG.2. as paragraph LG.3. and adding a new paragraph 1.G.2.;
e. Adding a new paragraph LH.;
f Revising the Loan!Application Register; and
g. Revising the Loan!Application Register Code Sheet.
Appendix A to Part 203--Fonn and Instructions for Completion of HMDA Loan!Application Register
* * * * *
1. Instructions for Completion of Loan!Application Register
* * * * *
A. Application or Loan Infonnation
* * * * *
8. Request for Preapproval ofa Home Purchase Loan
Indicate whether the application or loan involved a request for preapproval ofa home purchase loan by entering the
applicable code from the following:
Code I--Preapproval requested
Code 2--Preapproval not requested
Code 3--Not applicable
a. Enter code 2 if your institution has a covered preapproval program but the applicant does not request a preapprovaI.
b. Enter code 3 if your institution does not have a preapproval program as defmed in Sec. 203.2(b).
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c. Enter code 3 for applications or loans for home improvement or refmancing, and for purchased loans.
* * * * *
D. Applicant Information--Ethnicity, Race, Sex, and Income
* * * * *
2. Mail, Internet, or Telephone Applications. All loan applications, including applications taken by mail, Internet, or
telephone must use a collection form similar to that shown in appendix B regarding ethnicity, race, and sex. For applications
taken by telephone, the information in the collection form must be stated orally by the lender, except for information that
pertains uniquely to applications taken in writing. If the applicant does not provide these data in an application taken by mail or
telephone or on the Internet, enter the code for "information not provided by applicant in mail, Internet, or telephone
application" specified in paragraphs 1.0.3.,4., and 5. of this appendix. (See appendix B for complete information on the
collection of these data in mail, Internet, or telephone applications.)
*****
G. Pricing-Related Data
1. Rate Spread
a. For a home purchase loan, a refinancing, or a dwelling-secured home improvement loan that you originated, report the
spread between the annual percentage rate (APR) and the applicable Treasury yield if the spread is equal to or greater than 3
percentage points for first-lien loans or 5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. To determine whether the rate spread
meets this threshold, use the Treasury yield for securities of a comparable period ofmaturity as of the 15th day ofa given
month, depending on when the interest rate was set, and use the APR for the loan, as calculated and disclosed to the consumer
under Sees. 226.6 or 226.18 of Regulation Z (12 CFR part 226). Use the 15th day of a given month for any loan on which the
interest rate was set on or after that 15th day through the 14th day of the next month. (For example, if the rate is set on
September 17,2004, use the Treasury yield as of September 15,2004; if the interest rate is set on September 3, 2004, use the
Treasury yield as of August 15,2004). To determine the applicable Treasury security yield, the financial institution must use
the table published on the FFIEC's Web site (http://w,vw.ffiec.gov/hmda) entitled "Treasury Securities of Comparable Maturity
under Regulation c."
b. If the loan is not subject to Regulation Z, or is a home improvement loan that is not dwelling-secured, or is a loan that you
purchased, enter "NA."
c. Enter "NA" in the case of an application that does not result in a loan origination.
d. Enter the rate spread to two decimal places, and use a leading zero. For example, enter 03.29. If the difference between
the APR and the Treasury yield is a figure with more than two decimal places, round the figure or truncate the digits beyond
two decimal places.
e. If the difference between the APR and the Treasury yield is less than 3 percentage points for a first-lien loan and less than
5 percentage points for a subordinate-lien loan, enter "NA."
2. Date the interest rate was set. The relevant date to use to determine the Treasury yield is the date on which the loan's
interest rate was set by the financial institution for the fmal time before closing. If an interest rate is set pursuant to a "lock-in"
agreement between the lender and the borrower, then the date on which the agreement fixes the interest rate is the date the rate
was set. Ifa rate is re-set after a lock-in agreement is executed (for example, because the borrower exercises a float-down
option or the agreement expires), then the relevant date is the date the rate is re-set for the fmal time before closing. Ifno
lock-in agreement is executed, then the relevant date is the date on which the institution sets the rate for the fmal time before
closing.
* * * * *
H. Lien Status
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Use the following codes for loans that you originate and for applications that do not result in an origination:
Code I--Secured by a first lien.
Code 2--Secured by a subordinate lien.
Code 3--Not secured by a lien.
Code 4--Not applicable (purchased loan).
a. Use Codes 1 through 3 for loans that you originate, as well as for applications that do not result in an origination
(applications that are approved but not accepted, denied, withdrawn, or closed for incompleteness).
b. Use Code 4 for loans that you purchase.
* * * * *
BILLING CODE 6210-0 I-P
l.OANIM'PlICAllON REGISTER P__01_ -_...."-l__"_f_"'_" ",
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LOAN/APPLICATION REGISTER
CODE SHEET
Use the following codes 10 complete the Loan/Application Register. The instructions to the HMOA-LAA explain the proper use of each code.
Application or Loan Information
loan Type;
l-Convention81 (any loan othet than FHA,
VA.. FSA. 0' RHS loans)
2-FHA·insured {Federal Housing
Administration)
3--VA~uafanteed(Velerans Administration)
4-FSA/RHS (Farm Service Agency or Aural
Housing Service)
Property Type;
1-One to lour-lamily (other than manufactured
l1ousmg)
2-Manufactured hoUsing
3--Multifamily
Purpose of Loan:
l-Home purchase
2-Home improvement
3-Aefinancing
OwnlM"-Qccupancy:
l-Owner-occupied as a principal dwelling
2-Nol ownltr~C\Jpled
3-Notapplicable
Preapproval (home purcnase loans onlyl·
l-Preapproval was requested
2- Preapproval was not r-8QUested
3-Not applicable
Action Taken:
1-Loan originated
2-Applicalioll approved blJt oot accepte<;l
3--Appllcation denied by linanclalinstitulion
4--~icationwithdrawn by appHcanl
5-- File closed for incompleteness
6-loan purchased by financial institution
BILLING CODE 6210-01-C
7-Preapproyal request denied by tinancicU
institution
8-Preapproval request apprQlled but not
accepted (optional reportmgl
Applicant Informallon
Elhnicily:
1-HiSpaniC ot Latino
2- Not Hispanic or Lalino
3--lo1ormation not provided by applicant in mail.
Intemet Of telephone application
4-Not applicable (see App. A, !.D.)
5- No co-applicant
Race:
l-Amertcan lodian Of Alaska Native
2-A,sian
3-Black or Alrican American
4- Native Hawiliian or Other Pacific Islander
5-White
6-lnfonnation not provided by applicant
in tN.iI, Internet, or telephone appncation
7-Not applicable (see App. A. 1.0_1
8-Noco-appIica.nl
5eK:
1-Male
2-FemaJe
3-1nfocmalioo not provided by applicant
in mail, Internet, Of lelephone application
4- Not applicable- (see App.. A, to.)
S-No co-applicant
Type of PurchaS8f'
D-Loan was not originated or was nOI
sold in calenaar year covered by register
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l-Fannie Mae
2-GinnieMae
3-Freddie Mac
4-Farmet"Mac
5- Privale securitization
6-Commercial bank. sayings bank at savings
association
7-Ufe insurance company. credit unioft,
motIgage bank. 0( finance company
8-- Affiliate Institution
g-Other type at purchaser
Reasons for Denial (optional reporting)
1-0ebt·to-incorTMIralio
2-EmP'Oyment history
3-Credithistory
4-Collateral
5-lnsuffident cash (dOwnpayment, closing costs)
6-Unverifiable infofmation
7-Credit application incomplete
8-Martgage insurance denied
9-01"'"
Other Data
HOEPA Status (only tor loans ariginaled. or
pun::hUedl:
1-HOEPAJoan
2-Not a HOEPA loan
Uen Status (only for appli<:ations and originations);
1-SeaJred by a flr.d lien
2-Secured by a subordinate nen
3-Not secured by a lien
4-Not applicable (purcnaSed loans)
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4. Appendix B is amended by revising Paragraph ILA to read as follows:
Appendix B to Part 203--Form and Instructions for Data Collection on Ethnicity, Race, and Sex
* * * * *
n. Procedures
A. You must ask the applicant for this information (but you cannot require the applicant to provide it) whether the
application is taken in person, by mail or telephone, or on the Internet. For applications taken by telephone, the information in
the collection form must be stated orally by the lender, except for that information which pertains uniquely to applications taken
in writing.
* * * * *
5. In Supplement I to Part 203:
a. Under Section 203.2--Definitions, a new heading 2(i) Manufactured Home and a new paragraph 1 are added.
b. Under Section 203A--Compilation of Loan Data, under Paragraph 4(a)(12), paragraph 1 is revised; and a new heading
Paragraph 4(a)(14) and a new paragraph 1 are added.
Supplement I to Part 203--StaffCommentary
* * * * *
Section 203.2--Definitions
*****
2(i) Manufactured home.
1. Definition of a manufactured home. The definition in Sec. 203.2(i) refers to the federal building code for factory-built
housing established by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The HUD code requires generally that
housing be essentially ready for occupancy upon leaving the factory and being transported to a building site. Modular homes
that meet all of the HUD code standards are included in the definition because they are ready for occupancy upon leaving the
factory. Other factory-built homes, such as panelized and pre-cut homes, generally do not meet the HUD code because they
require a significant amount of construction on site before they are ready for occupancy. Loans and applications relating to
manufactured homes that do not meet the HUD code should not be identified as manufactured housing under HMDA.
* * * * *
Section 203 A--Compilation of Loan Data
4(a) Data Format and Itemization. * * *
Paragraph 4(a)(12) Rate spread information.
I. Treasury securities of comparable maturity. To determine the yield on a Treasury security, lenders must use the table
entitled "Treasury Securities of Comparable Maturity under Regulation C," which will be published on the FFIEC's Web site
(hup://\v\vw.ffiec.govihmda) and made available in paper form upon request. This table will provide, for the 15th day of each
month, Treasury security yields for every available loan maturity. The applicable Treasury yield date will depend on the date
on which the fmancial institution set the interest rate on the loan for the fmal time before closing. See Appendix A, Paragraphs
LG.l. and 2.
* * * * *
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Paragraph 4(a)(l4) Lien status.
1. Determining lien status for applications and loans originated. i. Lenders are required to report lien status for loans they
originate and applications that do not result in originations. Lien status is determined by reference to the best information
readily available to the lender at the time final action is taken and to the lender's own procedures. Thus, lenders may rely on the
title search they routinely perform as part of their underwriting procedures--for example, for home purchase loans. Regulation
C does not require lenders to perform title searches solely to comply with HMDA reporting requirements. Lenders may rely on
other information that is readily available to them at the time fmal action is taken and that they reasonably believe is accurate,
such as the applicant's statement on the application or the applicant's credit report. For example, where the applicant indicates
on the application that there is a mortgage on the property or where the applicant's credit report shows that the applicant has a
mortgage--and that mortgage is not going to be paid off as part of the transaction--the lender may assume that the loan it
originates is secured by a subordinate lien. If the same application did not result in an origination--for example, because the
application is denied or withdrawn--the lender would report the application as an application for a subordinate-lien loan.
ii. Lenders may also consider their established procedures when determining lien status for applications that do not result in
originations. For example, a consumer applies to a lender to refinance a $100,000 first mortgage; the consumer also has a home
equity line ofcredit for $20,000. If the lender's practice in such a case is to ensure that it will have first-lien
captionposition--through a subordination agreement with the holder of the mortgage on the home equity line--then the lender
should report the application as an application for a first-lien loan.
* * * * *
By order of the Board of Govemors of the Federal Reserve System, June 21, 2002.
Jennifer J. Johnson,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 02-16191 Filed 6-26-02; 8:45 am]
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K(a) . 73
K(a) - 74
--FRB: Press Release -- Postponement of recent amendments to Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure A,
Federal Reserve Release
Press Release
Release Date: May 2, 2002
For immediate release
The Federal Reserve Board on Thursday approved a final rule that postpones the effective
date of the recent amendments to Regulation C (Home Mortgage Disclosure Act) from
January 1,2003, to January 1,2004.
On February 15, 2002, the Board published in the Federal Register amendments to
Regulation C effective for data collected beginning January 1,2003, and solicited comment
on several related issues with a comment period that closed on April 12. Financial
institutions and their trade associations requested a postponement of the effective date until
January 1, 2004, on the grounds that a 2003 deadline does not afford institutions adequate
time to take the steps necessary to ensure full compliance with the new rules. Consumer and
community organizations generally opposed postponement of the effective date.
The Board has weighed the financial institutions' claims and underlying assumptions against
public policy benefits of collecting the new data as soon as possible. The Board believes that
some Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) reporters, especially the largest ones, will
not be able to fully implement the new rules by January 1,2003, without jeopardizing the
quality and usefulness of the data and incurring substantial additional implementation costs
that could be avoided by a postponement.
The Board is, however, adopting an interim amendment to Regulation C, effective January
1,2003, mandating the use of2000 census data in HMDA reporting. Given the many
changes that have occurred since the 1990 census, use of 2000 census tracts and
demographics will produce more accurate and useful data in the HMDA disclosure
statements and aggregate reports.
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/boardacts/2002/20020502/default.htm
K(a).- .75
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
12 CFR Part 203
[Regulation C; Docket No. R-1120]
HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE
AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
ACTION: Final rule; technical amendment.
SUMMARY: The Board is publishing amendments to Regulation C (Home Mortgage
Disclosure). The amendments require lenders to ask applicants their race or national
origin and sex in applications taken by telephone, conforming the telephone application
rule to the rule applicable to mail and Internet applications.
DATES: The amendments are effective January 1,2003.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John C. Wood, Counsel, Kathleen C.
Ryan, Senior Attorney, or Dan S. Sokolov, Attorney, Division of Consumer and
Community Mfairs, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington,
D.C. 20551, at (202) 452-3667 or (202) 452-2412. For users of Telecommunications
Device for the Deaf (TDD) only, contact (202) 263-4869.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
.
The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) requires certain depository and
for-profit nondepository institutions to collect, report, and publicly disclose data about
originations and purchases of home mortgage and home improvement loans. Institutions
must also report data about applications that do not result in originations. The Board's
Regulation C implements HMDA.
On January 23, 2002, the Board approved a final rule amending Regulation C,
effective January 1,2003. 67 FR 7222, February 15,2002. The Board subsequently
delayed the effective date of the amendments from January 1,2003, until January 1,
2004. 67 FR 30771, May 8, 2002.
At the same time that the final rule was published, the Board issued a proposed
rule for comment on three items related to the final rule: (1) the appropriate thresholds for
purposes of reporting pricing data on loan originations; (2) whether lenders should report
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lien status; and (3) whether lenders should be required to ask applicants for monitoring
information on ethnicity, race, and sex in applications taken entirely by telephone.
67 FR 7252, February 15, 2002.
The Board has issued a final rule, adopting the three proposed items, in a notice
published elsewhere in today's Federal Register. For reasons discussed in that notice, the
revised rule regarding the collection of monitoring information about ethnicity, race, and
sex is effective as of January 1,2003. Because the final rule published today amends the
revised regulation-which does not take effect until January 1, 2004-the Board is
publishing a rule with respect to monitoring information, set forth in this notice, to cover
the period from January 1,2003, to December 31,2003. The rule amends the portions of
the current Appendices A and B to Regulation C that set forth instructions for collecting
monitoring information in telephone applications.
Thus, for applications taken beginning January 1,2003, lenders must ask
telephone applicants for monitoring information under Appendix A, Paragraph VD.2,
and Appendix B, Paragraph LB.4., as revised by the Board in this notice. For these
applications, lenders must use the race or national origin categories in current Appendix
A, Paragraph V.D.3., and in the sample data collection form in current Appendix B. For
applications taken on or after January 1,2004, lenders are required to ask telephone
applicants for monitoring information under Appendix A, Paragraph LD.2., and
Appendix B, Paragraph IT.A., as revised in the notice published elsewhere in today's
Federal Register, using the revised ethnicity and race categories in Appendix A,
Paragraphs LD.3. and 4., and the sample data collection form in Appendix B approved by
the Board on January 23,2002.
List of Subjects
Banks, Banking, Mortgages, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Board amends 12 CFR Part 203 as
follows:
PART 203--HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE (REGULATION C)
1. The authority citation for part 203 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 US.c. §§ 2801-2810
2. Appendix A is amended by revising Paragraph VD.2.
APPENDIX A TO PART 203--FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR
COMPLETION OF HMDA LOAN/APPLICATION REGISTER
*****
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V. Instructions for Completion of Loan/Application Register.
*****
D. Applicant Information-Race or National Origin, Sex, and Income.
*****
2. Mail, Internet, or Telephone Applications. All loan applications, including
applications taken by mail, Internet, or telephone, must use a collection form similar to
that shown in Appendix B regarding race or national origin and sex. For applications
taken by telephone, the information in the collection form must be stated orally by the
lender, except for information that pertains uniquely to applications taken in writing. If
the applicant does not provide these data in an application taken by mail, Internet or
telephone, enter the code for "information not provided by applicant in mail or telephone
application" specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 below. (See Appendix B for complete
information on the collection of these data in mail, Internet, or telephone applications.)
* * * * *
3. Appendix B is amended by revising Paragraph I.BA.
APPENDIX B TO PART 203-FORM AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR DATA
COLLECTION ON RACE OR NATIONAL ORIGIN AND SEX
*****
I. Instructions on collection of data on race or national origin and sex.
* * * * *
B. Procedures.
*****
4. You must ask the applicant for this information (but you cannot require the
applicant to provide it) whether the application is taken in person, by mail or telephone,
or on the Internet. For applications taken by telephone, the information in the collection
form must be stated orally by the lender, except for that information which pertains
uniquely to applications taken in writing. You need not provide the data when you take
an application by mail or telephone or on the Internet, if the applicant fails to
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answer. You should indicate whether an application was received by mail, telephone, or
the Internet, ifit is not otherwise evident on the face of the application.
*****
By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, acting
through the Secretary of the B0ru-d under delegated authority, June 21,2002.
(signed) Jennifer J. Johnson
Jennifer 1. Johnson
Secretary of the Board
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AGENCY: Office of the Assistant
Secretary for Housing-Federal Housing
Commissioner, HUD.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
SUMMARY: The Department of Housing
and Urban Development is issuing this
proposed rule under the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), to
simplify and improve the process of
obtaining home mortgages and reduce
settlement costs for consumers. The
current disclosure requirements under
RESPA have not been substantially
revised in decades. The current
disclosures were comprehensively
reviewed as recently as 1998 by HUD
and the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, but the
problems identified then remain.
Nevertheless, since 1998, there have
been continuing changes in the
marketplace, new products, and greater
accessibility of mortgage information via
the Internet, all of which are reducing
settlement costs and, if properly
addressed by Government, could result
in greater price reductions for
consumers. First, to simplify and
improve the mortgage loan process, this
proposal would address the issue of
loan originator compensation,
specifically the problem of lender
payments to mortgage brokers, by
fundamentally changing the way in
which these payments in brokered
mortgage transactions are recorded and
reported to consumers. Second, it would
significantly improve HOD's Good Faith
Estimate (GFE) settlement cost
disclosure and HUD's related RESPA
regulations to make the GFE firmer and
more usable, to facilitate shopping for
mortgages, to make mortgage
transactions more transparent, and to
prevent unexpected charges to
consumers at settlement. Finally, the
rule would promote competition by
removing regulatory barriers to allow
guaranteed packages of settlement
services and mortgages to be made
available to consumers, to simplify
shopping by consumers and further
reduce settlement costs. The proposed
rule also includes proposed, revised
forms and solicits comments on
additional changes including changes to
HUD's settlement disclosure form and
disclosure requirements.
DATES: Comment Due Date: Deadline for
comments on this proposed rule,
including comments on the proposed
information collection requirements:
October 28, 2002.
ADDRESSES: Interested persons are
invited to submit comments regarding
this proposed rule to the Rules Docket
Clerk, Office of General Counsel, Room
10276, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, 451 Seventh Street,
SW., Washington, DC 20410-0500.
Communications should refer to the
above docket number and title.
Facsimile (FAX) comments are not
acceptable. A copy of each
communication submitted will be
available for public inspection and
copying between 7:30 a.m. and 5:30
p.m. weekdays at the above address.
HUD also invites interested persons to
submit comments on the proposed
information collection requirements of
this proposed rule. Comments should
refer to the above docket number and
title, and should be sent to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget,
Attention: Desk Officer for HUD,
Washington, DC 20503.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ivy
Jackson, Acting Director, Interstate Land
Sales and RESPA Division, Room 9146,
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 451 Seventh Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20410; telephone (202)
708-0502 (this is not a toll-free number)
or for legal questions Kenneth A.
Markison, Assistant General Counsel for
GSE/RESPA, or Steven J. Sacks or
Teresa L. Baker (Senior RESPA
Attorneys); Room 9262, telephone (202)
708-3137. Persons with hearing or
speech impairments may access this
number via TTY by calling the toll-free
Federal Information Relay Service at
(800) 877-8339. The address for the
above listed persons is: Department of
Housing and Urban Development, 451
Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC
20410.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
1. Introduction
The American mortgage finance
system is justifiably the envy of the
world. It has offered unparalleled
financing opportunities under virtually
all economic conditions to a very wide
range of borrowers that, in no small
part, have led to the highest
homeownership rate in the Nation's
history. At the same time, however, the
process of financing or refinancing a
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home, which is regulated under RESPA,
12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq., remains too
complicated, too costly, and too opaque
for many borrowers. The monies needed
to close on a home are a significant
impediment to homeownership, and
settlement costs are a significant
component of these costs. In light of the
Administration's commitment to reach
even higher levels of homeownership,
the RESPA regulatory scheme deserves
particular scrutiny and necessary
reform.
The current disclosure requirements
under RESPA have not been
substantively revised in decades.
Although the RESPA disclosures were
comprehensively reviewed as recently
as 1998 by both HUD and the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, the problems identified in that
review remain largely unaddressed.
Recent judicial developments
regarding lender 1 payments to mortgage
brokers 2 (yield spread premiums and
other named payments based on
borrowers' transactions) have
heightened the importance of increasing
borrower awareness regarding how
mortgage brokers are paid and how
borrowers can benefit from payments
made by lenders based on mortgages
exceeding par interest rate. 3 Some
borrowers 4 understand, agree to, and
properly use higher interest rates to
lower up front settlement costs. Others
report, however, that they paid
substantial origination costs in up front
fees for mortgages and then learned that
they were charged interest rates higher
than those they qualified for merely to
support an additional payment to their
mortgage broker.
Under the current rules, many
borrowers are provided estimated
settlement cost information on a GFE
only after paying a significant fee
required by a loan originator,5 which
prevents the borrower from shopping
among additional originators using the
1 The term "lender" is used throughout this
document to mean any person who is the "real
source of funds" for a federally related mortgage
loan.
2 Except as specifically described in footnote 17,
the term "mortgage broker" is used throughout the
document to mean a person (not an employee of a
lender) who table funds or acts an intermediary in
a federally related mortgage loan. Mortgage brokers
that are the "real source of funds" for a federally
related loan are not regarded as brokers in such
transactions.
J The term "par interest rate" is used throughout
this document to mean the interest rate at which
there is not payment made by the lender to the
borrower or from the borrower to the lender.
• The tenns "consumer" and "borrower" are used
interchangeably throughout the document.
5 The term "loan originator" is used throughout
this document to refer to lenders and mortgage
brokers.
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GFE. Also, when borrowers receive
estimated settlement cost information
after applying for a mortgage, the
estimates are often unreliable and prove
too low. Final charges at settlement
often include additional surprise "junk
fees,"6 which increase the original
estimates. HtJI)'s current rules provide
little guidance on the standards that
originators should be held to in
providing good faith settlement cost
estimates.
By requiring a long listing on the GFE
of each estimated settlement charge, the
current disclosure fails to highlight the
major costs and seems to lead only to a
proliferation of charges without any
actual increase in the work performed or
enhanced borrower understanding to
assist in shopping for services and guard
against unnecessary charges. The
current requirements allow an
individual such as a loan originator, to
charge several fees for origination,
document preparation, and document
review. It is difficult for borrowers to
distinguish or understand the precise
purpose of these various itemized
services provided by the same
originator. Excessive itemization thus
enables originators to charge more than
if the borrower could review and shop
the total origination charges. The same
holds true for title and other third party
services. The types of fees charged by
loan originators, title agents and other
service providers have multiplied in
recent years making it steadily more
difficult for borrowers to compare
settlement costs.
Industry advocacy groups have
indicated that they support better
disclosure of mortgage broker
compensation specifically and loan
origination charges in general.
Consumer groups have called for
protections against yield spread
premiums that were not bargained for,
more shoppable settlement cost
disclosures, and much firmer interest
rates and settlement service costs.
Settlement cost disclosures need to be
improved so that the information they
provide is simpler, clearer, more
reliable, and reasonably available to
facilitate shopping, increase
competition, and lower settlement costs.
Although HUD has called for better
disclosures in policy statements and
opinions, its regulations need to be
updated to establish requirements that
are'more useful to consumers.
While technology and market forces
have played a significant role in
• "funk fee" is a term used throughout this
document to mean any fee charged for a service to
a borrower that has little or no value in relation to
the charge. andlor may be duplicative, to increase
a loan originator's profits,
lowering costs in the settlement process,
it is not clear that under existing rules
these benefits are passed on to the
borrower in the form of lower settlement
prices. HUD's rules implementing
Section 8 of RESPA require originators
to pass through third party costs
without "mark-ups" or "upcharges,"
and generally prohibits volume discount
arrangements. Many industry and
consumer advocates assert, however,
that these regulatory restrictions prevent
activities and innovations which would
lower prices to borrowers. Many
mortgage industry providers also report
that while they follow the rules, they are
competitively disadvantaged by those
who do not because of the lack of
adequate enforcement by HUD.
Specifically, some assert that HUD's
RESPA rules impede arrangements for
the packaging of settlement services,
which would allow packagers to draw
on their knowledge of the market and
familiarity with the products offered by
providers of specific services to develop
lower settlement cost packages for
borrowers. They assert that such
packages would increase competition
and enhance borrower shopping,
lowering costs more effectively than
restrictions against referral fees or
unearned fees. In the joint HUD and the
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, Joint Report to the
Congress Concerning Reform of the
Truth in Lending Act and the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, (July
1998), (hereafter HUD-Federal Reserve
Report) both agencies agreed that an
exemption should be established to
facilitate the provision of settlement
services and to improve consumers'
ability to shop effectively for a mortgage
loan and thereby allow competitive
forces to reduce the cost of financing a
home. HUD-Federal Reserve Report at
33. At that time, some settlement service
providers claimed that such an
exemption would legalize kickbacks and
referral fees. HUD has examined this
concern and concluded that guaranteed
packaging arrangements should be
permitted in a carefully circumscribed
safe harbor. Deregulation, transparency
and a free market will wring out
kickbacks, referral fees, and other
excesses more effectively than the
current restrictions and, for this reason,
the establishment of a safe harbor is
warranted. Under this proposal,
settlement service providers may choose
either to operate using an improved GFE
disclosure, or to participate in packages
qualifying for the safe harbor.
Accordingly, this dual approach will
provide industry and borrowers alike
with an opportunity to test both
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methods where they should be tested, in
the marketplace, to determine which is
more effective in lowering settlement
costs.
Late last year, in Statement of Policy
2001-1, Clarification of Statement of
Policy 1999-1 Regarding Lender
Payments to Mortgage Brokers, and
Guidance Concerning Unearned Fees
Under Section 8(b), 66 FR 53052
(October 18, 2001), the Secretary
announced his intention to make full
use of his regulatory authority to
provide clear requirements and
guidance regarding the disclosure of
mortgage broker fees, and more broadly,
to improve the mortgage settlement
process to better serve borrowers. The
Secretary has established the following
principles to guide HUD's RESPA
reform and enforcement efforts:
1. Borrowers should receive
settlement cost information early
enough in the process to allow them to
shop for the mortgage product and
settlement services that best meet their
needs;
2. Disclosures should be as firm as
possible to avoid surprise costs at
settlement;
3. Regulatory amendments should be
utilized to remove unintended barriers
to marketing new products,
competition, and technological
innovations that could lower settlement
costs;
4. Many of the current system's
problems derive from the complexity of
the process; with simplification of
disclosures and better borrower
education, the loan origination process
can be improved; and
5. RESPA should be vigorously
enforced to protect borrowers and
ensure that honest industry providers
have a level, competitive playing field.
In accordance with these principles,
this proposed rule would first
fundamentally change the way in which
mortgage broker compensation is
reported by requiring, in all loans
originated by mortgage brokers, that any
payments from a lender based on a
borrower's transaction, other than the
payment for the par value 7 of the loan,
including payments based upon an
above par interest rate on the loan
(payments commonly denominated
"yield spread premiums"), be reported
on the Good Faith Estimate (and the
HUD-l/IA Settlement Statement) as a
lender payment to the borrower.
Additionally, in brokered loans, any
borrower payments to reduce the
interest rate ("discount points") must
7 The term" par value" of the loan is used
throughout this document to mean the principal
amount of the loan,
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equal the discount in the price of the
loan paid by the lender, and be reported
on the GFE (and HUD-l/1A) as
borrower payments to the lender. These
changes would require mortgage brokers
to disclose, at the outset, the maximum
amount of compensation they could
receive from a transaction, and include
the amount in the "origination fees"
block ofthe GFE and separately on the
GFE Attachment A-1. They would then
disclose the amount of the lender
payment to the borrower that would be
received at the interest rate quoted, if
any. Mortgage brokers would be unable
to increase their compensation without
the borrower's knowledge, either by
placing the borrower in an above par
loan, and receiving a payment from the
lender (yield spread premiums), or by
retaining any part of any borrower
payment intended to reduce the loan
rate (discount points).
Through these changes in reporting
requirements, HUD believes that
virtually all disputes regarding broker
compensation in table funded
transactions and intermediary
transactions involving yield spread
premiums would be resolved. Maximum
broker compensation would be clear
and brokers would have no incentive to
seek out lenders paying the largest yield
spread. They would instead be
motivated to find the best loan product
they can for the borrower. At the same
time, HUD believes that since these new
disclosure requirements will allow
borrowers to focus on the total
origination costs for shopping purposes,
they will not disadvantage brokers in
competition with lenders.
Second, the proposed rule would
improve the existing RESPA disclosure
scheme by establishing a new required
format for the Good Faith Estimate
providing greater accuracy and
usefulness for borrowers, which would:
(1) Inform the borrower that mortgage
brokers and other loan originators do
not offer loans from all funding sources
and cannot guarantee the lowest price or
best terms available in the market; (2)
explain to the borrower the option of
paying his or her settlement costs
through the use of lender payments
based on higher interest rates, or
reducing the interest rate by paying the
lender additional amounts at settlement;
(3) disclose the loan originators' fees,
including the mortgage broker's and
lender's total charges to borrowers; and
(4) require, in transactions originated by
mortgage brokers, that all payments
from a lender other than for the par
value for the loan (including "yield
spread premiums," servicing release
premiums, and all other payments from
lenders), be reported on the GFE and the
HUD-l Settlement Statement as a
lender payment to the borrower and any
discount points charged to the borrower
must equal the discount in the price of
the loan paid by the lender and be
reported on the GFE and the HUD-l
Settlement Statement as borrower
payments to the lender. These changes
will ensure that borrowers receive the
full benefit of any payments from or to
lenders in brokered transactions, either
by reducing their up front settlement
costs in exchange for accepting a loan
with a higher rate, or by reducing their
interest rate and monthly payments by
paying additional amounts to the lender
at settlement.
The new GFE would also better
inform borrowers of the costs of
obtaining a mortgage loan from a
mortgage broker, as well as from
mortgage bankers, lenders or other loan
originators, and would better protect
borrowers from unnecessary surprise
charges at settlement. It would:
(1) Include an interest rate quote in
the form of the mortgage loan's note rate
and APR, and notification of any
prepayment penalties, to assist the
borrower in shopping among mortgages;
(2) Disclose subtotals of major
categories of settlement costs (including,
for example, loan origination costs and
title services) to borrowers to eliminate
the proliferation of fees by individual
settlement service providers, and to
allow borrowers to focus on and
comrare major fees; and
(3 Provide additional shopping
information for borrowers that would
provide a breakdown of lender and
broker origination charges, title
insurance and title agent charges, and
inform the borrower of lender required
and selected services and those third
party services that can be shopped for
by the borrower.
The proposed rule would further
improve the existing disclosure scheme,
by amending Regulation X to establish
new rules for the provision of the GFE
which would: (1) Clarify the basic
information needed in an "application"
to obtain a GFE; (2) limit fees paid by
borrowers for the GFE, if any, to the
amounts necessary to provide the GFE
itself and exclude amounts used to
defray later appraisal or underwriting
charges, in order to facilitate shopping
with GFEs; (3) require that loan
originators not exceed the amounts
reported on the GFE regarding their total
compensation, lender required and
selected third party services, and
government charges through settlement
(absent unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances); (4) require that loan
originators comply with upper limits or
"tolerances" for specified major
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settlement charge categories so they do
not exceed those stated on the GFE by
more than 10%; and (5) clarify that loan
originators can make arrangements with
third party settlement service providers
to lower prices for their customers,
provided that these prices and any
charges are reflected accurately on the
GFE and are not "marked up" or "up
charged."
Third, the proposed rule would
remove regulatory barriers to allow
packages of settlement services and
mortgage loans to be made available to
borrowers. These transactions would be
even simpler and more transparent for
borrowers, and would allow market
forces, borrower shopping, and
competition to further reduce the costs
of settlement services to better achieve
the purposes of the statute.
To accomplish this objective, HUD
would establish a carefully
circumscribed safe harbor under RESPA
for "Guaranteed Mortgage Package"
(GMP) transactions. Any entity (a
lender, broker, other settlement service
provider, or other entity), hereinafter a
"packager," may qualify for the safe
harbor as long as it offers a GMP. The
packager must offer the GMP to a
borrower following his or her
submission of application information,
but before the borrower's payment of
any fee to the packager. The GMP must
include: (1) A guaranteed package price
for a comprehensive package of loan
origination and virtually all other
settlement services required by the
lender to close the mortgage (including
without limitation, all application,
origination and underwriting services,
the appraisal, pest inspection, flood
review, title services and insurance, and
any other lender required services
except hazard insurance, per diem
interest, and escrow deposits); (2) a
mortgage loan with an interest rate
guarantee, whether when the
"Guaranteed Mortgage Package
Agreement" (GMPA) is given or subject
to change (prior to borrower lock-in)
only pursuant to market changes
evident from an observable and
verifiable index or other appropriate
data or means; and (3) a contract offer
in the form of a GMPA to guarantee the
price for settlement services and the
mortgage interest rate through
settlement, if the offer is accepted by the
borrower. Additionally, in order to
ensure that the borrower receives the
settlement package of services and the
mortgage loan, the proposed rule would
require that the packager sign the GMPA
agreeing to provide the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package at the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package price and that non-
lender packagers have a lender sign the
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GMFA after borrower acceptance
agreeing to provide the loan included in
the Guaranteed Mortgage Package.
The GMFA would describe the
package as "including all services
required by the lender to close the
mortgage" but would not itemize the
specific services to be provided. The
packager would, however, be required
to inform the borrower if certain items
of interest to the borrower are
anticipated to be excluded from the
package, specifically lender's title
insurance, pest inspections, and a
property appraisal. Additionally, where
the packager anticipates obtaining a pest
inspection, appraisal, or credit report,
the packager must disclose that
information on Attachment A-I and
make such documents available at the
borrower's request. The HUD-l would
list the services ultimately provided, but
not the charges for specific services.
HUD is requesting comments on
whether this approach satisfies, or
whether alternative approaches should
be developed, to ensure that consumers'
rights under TILA and HOEPA are
protected while facilitating packaging.
The Secretary is exercising the
exemption authority under Section
8(c)(5) and Section 19 ofRESPA to
establish this Guaranteed Mortgage
Packaging safe harbor for those
Guaranteed Mortgage Package
transactions that meet the requirements
set forth in this rule. The Secretary has
determined that the establishment of
this carefully circumscribed safe harbor
is necessary to allow this class of
transactions to be available to
consumers and to achieve the purposes
of the Act. The Secretary has concluded
that the availability of these packages to
consumers at single guaranteed prices
with an interest rate guarantee will
simplify consumers' shopping for
mortgages and allow them to gain the
benefit of an active competitive
marketplace in which market forces
produce lower settlement costs. For the
same reasons, the Secretary has
determined that payments among
packagers and participating settlement
service providers and the earnings of
packager in Guaranteed Mortgage
Packages, as set forth in this rule, shall
not be construed as prohibited under
Section 8 of RESPA as long as the
requirements in this rule are satisfied.
Pursuant to Section 8(c)(5) the Secretary
has undertaken the necessary
consultation with other agency heads as
required prior to promulgating this
exemption.
The safe harbor from Section 8 will
permit the packager to charge for
services within the package and will
permit payments to, or exchanges of
other things of value between entities
participating in the package. Section 8
would, however, continue to prohibit
any payments for the referral of
business, kickbacks, splits of fees and
unearned fees between the packager and
any of the entities participating in the
package on the one hand and entities
outside of the package on the other.
Under the safe harbor, packagers would
prOVide the GMFA in lieu of a GFE.
HUD regards such provision of a GMFA
as fully, indeed more than, satisfying
the requirements of Section 5 of RESPA
that borrowers receive a Good Faith
Estimate of the amount of charges for
settlement services the borrower is
likely to incur. HUD believes that the
GMPA, by providing a Guaranteed
Mortgage Package price encompassing
virtually all settlement charges, along
with a limited number of itemized
charges, including owner's title
insurance, also more than satisfies the
requirements of Section 4 of RESPA.
Nevertheless, as long as the
requirements of the safe harbor are
satisfied, HUD is also prepared to
exercise the exemption authority under
Section 19 to create a safe harbor for
packagers from the requirements of
Sections 4 and 5 of RESPA, if it deems
such an exemption necessary.
The safe harbor is proposed to be
available only where the transaction
does not result in a high cost loan as
that term is defined in the Home
Ownership Equity Protection Act, 15
U.S.C.160l(SupP II 1996). The safe
harbor also may not be available to
mortgages that exceed other limits, or
include other features identified
through this rulemaking, resulting in
unreasonable settlement charges or loan
terms inimical to the purposes of
RESPA.
The proposed rule's new regulatory
requirements will apply to first and
second lien transactions, purchase
money loans, and refinances. Home
equity transactions are addressed in
§ 3500.7(f), under current RESPA
regulation. At Question 26 the
Department invites comments on this
issue.
The Department also is inviting
comments specifically on whether, and
to what extent modification of the
existing HUD-l/lA Settlement
Statement and Instructions, found at 24
CFR part 3500, Appendix A, is
necessary to make it comparable to the
new GFE. HUD also announces that it
plans to revise the Special Information
Booklet concerning settlement costs
consistent with the final rule, and to
develop new booklets for refinance and
junior lien transactions.
K(a) . 87
In this proposed rule at Appendix C
and F, the Department is publishing for
comment new proposed required
formats for the Good Faith Estimate
(GFE) and new GMFA. HUD believes
that the content of the material in these
proposed forms gives the consumer the
information needed to shop for loan
products and to assist them during the
settlement process. HUD recognizes that
in order for these forms to be useful
shopping tools, they must be consumer
friendly. The Department seeks public
comment on these proposed forms In
addition, the Department will arrange
focus groups during the comment
period to elicit comments on how to
make the material in the new proposed
forms as consumer friendly as possible
including considering, among other
things, how the new proposed forms are
best compared by consumers to the
HUD-l and what revisions, if any, to
the HUD-l would be most helpful.
In addition, the Department will
facilitate the provision of web based
information to consumers on settlement
costs and pursue other efforts to ensure
that RESPA regulation encourages
technological advances to facilitate
competition, and lower costs and prices
to consumers. Beyond this rulemaking,
the Department is examining possible
changes to its rules to facilitate
electronic mortgage transactions
consistent with the Electronic
Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act. Public Law 106-229.
The Department will also undertake
efforts with Federal and State regulators
and others to better address
technological changes to lower costs.
Additionally, the Department plans to
finalize the 1997 Section 6 transfer of
servicing proposed rule; however, in the
meantime the Section 6 language in the
statute may be provided in conjunction
with the GFE. Separate from this
rulemaking, the Secretary is increasing
the resources dedicated to enforcing and
regulating RESPA.
Following the background materials,
this proposal includes a description of
today's proposed rule, specific
questions for public comment, and
proposed rule language. Public
comment on this proposal will be
important to formulating a final rule
that is consistent with RESPA's
purpose, workable in the marketplace,
and best serves the financing needs of
America's families.
II. General Background
A. Legal Authority
The Department is proposing this rule
in accordance with 5 U.S.c. 552,
Sections 19 and 8(c)(5) of the Real Estate
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Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (12
U.S.c. 2617).
RESPA Overview
In 1974, Congress enacted the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Pub.
L. 93-533,88 Stat. 1724, 12 U.S.C. 2601
et seq.) after finding that "significant
reforms in the real estate settlement
process are needed to ensure that
borrowers throughout the Nation are
provided with greater and more timely
information on the nature and costs of
the settlement process and are protected
from the unnecessarily high settlement
charges that have developed in some
areas of the country." [d. RESPA's stated
purpose is to "effect certain changes in
the settlement process for residential
real estate that will result:
(1) In more effective advance
disclosure to home buyers and sellers of
settlement costs;
(2) In the elimination of kickbacks or
referral fees that tend to increase
unnecessarily the costs of certain
settlement services;
(3) In a reduction in the amounts
home buyers are required to place in
escrow accounts established to ensure
the payment of real estate taxes and
insurance; and
(4) In significant reform and
modernization of the local record
keeping of land title information." Id.
RESPA's requirements apply to
transactions involving "settlement
services" for "federally related mortgage
loans." Under the statute the term
"settlement services" includes any
service provided in connection with a
real estate settlement.8 The term
"federally related mortgage loan" is
broadly defined to encompass virtually
all purchase money and refinance
mortgages.9 Section 4(a) ofRESPA
8 These services include, but are not limited to,
"title searches, title examinations, the provision of
title certificates. title insurance. services rendered
by an attorney, the preparation of documents,
property surveys. the rendering of credit reports or
appraisals, pest and fungus inspections. services
rendered by a real estate agent or broker. the
origination of a federally related mortgage loan
(including. but not limited to, the taking of loan
applications. loan processing. and the underwriting
and funding of loans), and the handling of the
processing, and closing of settlement." 12 U.S.c.
2602(3).
9 Specifically, the term covers mortgages "secured
by a first or subordinate lien on residential real
property (including individual units of
condominium and cooperatives) designed
principally for the occupancy of one to four
families"; mortgages made "in whole or in part by
any lender the deposits or accounts of which are
insured by the Federal Government or is made in
whole or in part by any lender which is regulated
by any agency of the Federal Government" or
"insured, guaranteed, supplemented or assisted in
any way by HUD or any officer or agency of the
Federal Government." intended to be sold to Fannie
Mae. Ginnie Mae. Freddie Mac or an institution
requires the Secretary to develop and
prescribe"a standard form for the
statement of settlement costs which
shall be used * * * as the standard real
estate settlement form in all transactions
in the United States which involve
federally related mortgage loans." The
rule further requires that the form
"conspicuously and clearly itemize all
charges imposed upon the borrower and
all charges imposed upon the seller in
connection with the settlement. * * *"
Section 5 requires the Secretary to
prescribe a Special Information Booklet
for borrowers. Section 5(c) requires that
a Good Faith Estimate (GFE) be
provided at or within 3 days of loan
application, authorizes the Secretary to
prescribe the contents of the GFE, and
requires that the GFE state "the amount
or range of charges for specific
settlement services the borrower is
likely to incur in connection with the
settlement as prescribed by the
Secretary." Notice of transfer of
servicing language was added to RESPA
at Section 6 in 1990 and amended most
recently in 1996, and requires
notification to borrowers at the time of
application for the mortgage, and during
the life of the loan, of whether the
servicing of the loan may be or has been
assigned, sold, or transferred.
Section 8(a) prohibits any person from
giving and any person from accepting
"any fee, kickback, or thing of value
pursuant to any agreement or
understanding, oral or otherwise," that
real estate settlement service business
shall be referred to any person. 12
U.S.c. 2607(a). Section 8(b) prohibits
anyone from giving or accepting "any
portion, split, or percentage of any
charge made or received" for the
rendering of a real estate settlement
service "other than for services actually
performed." 12 U.S.C. 2607(b). Section
B(c) ofRESPA provides, in part, that
"[n]othing in [Section 8] shall be
construed as prohibiting * * * (2) the
payment to any person of a bona fide
salary or compensation or other
payment for goods or facilities actually
furnished or for services actually
performed." * * * or "(5) such other
payments or classes of payments or
other transfers as are specified in
regulations prescribed by the Secretary,
after consultation with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, the Federal Home Loan Bank
from which it will be purchased by Freddie Mac,
or is made in whole or in part by any loan
originator, among other things, "who makes or
invests in residential real estate loans aggregating
more than $1,000.000.00 per year." 12 V.S.c.
2602(3).
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Board,lO the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System and the
Secretary of Agriculture." 12 U.S.c.
2607(c)(2).
Section 9 forbids any seller of
property from requiring buyers to
purchase title insurance covering the
property from any particular title
company as a condition of sale. Section
10 limits the amounts that lenders or
servicers may require borrowers to
deposit in escrow accounts, and
requires that borrowers be provided
with both initial and annual escrow
account statements. Section 12 prohibits
lenders and loan servicers from
imposing any fee or charge on any other
person for the preparation and
submission of the Settlement Statement,
the escrow account statements required
under Section W(c), or any disclosures
required by the Truth in Lending Act.
Section 19 ofRESPA specifically
authorizes the Secretary "to prescribe
such rules and regulations, * * * and to
grant such reasonable exemptions for
classes of transactions * * *, as may be
necessary to achieve the purposes of
[RESPA]."
B. Background
HUD's RESPA Rules
In 1975, HUD promulgated its first set
of RESPA rules including limited
disclosure requirements. Real Estate
Settlement Procedures and Cost, 40 F.R.
22448 (1975). These rules included a
requirement that the HUD-1 form be
given to borrowers within seven days of
a loan commitment, with the provision
that estimates were permitted for those
items the lender could not accurately
provide cost information for at the time
of loan commitment. Congress amended
the RESPA statute in 1976 and included
a requirement that borrowers be
provided with a Good Faith Estimate
along with the special information
booklet at, or within 3 days of a loan
application. Following these
amendments, HUD promulgated rules in
1977 that included a suggested format
for the GFE and requirements for its
provision to borrowers at or within 3
days of application, as well as a
Uniform Settlement Statement,
designated as the HUD-1, to itemize
settlement charges to borrowers in every
settlement involving a federally related
mortgage loan where there is a borrower
laThe Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)
was abolished Effective October 8, 1989, by the
Financial Institutions Reform. Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989, (Pub. L. 101-73). Its
successor agency, the Office of Thrift Supervision,
Department of the Treasury, assumed the FHLBB's
regulatory functions,
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and a seller, along with instructions and
requirements for its use.
On November 2,1992, HUD amended
its rules to implement the 1984
amendments to RESPA establishing a
"controlled business exemption" (now
known as an "affiliated business
exemption"), a controlled (now known
as an "affiliated") business disclosure to
be provided at the time of a referral, and
a disclosure of required providers to
accompany the GFE. 57 FR 49600. The
1992 amendments also made other
significant additions and changes,
including defining the term mortgage
broker,l1 and applying disclosure
requirements to mortgage brokers, as
more fully discussed below. In 1994, at
59 FR 6506, HUD amended its rules to
conform with the 1992 amendments to
the law covering refinancings and junior
lien transactions. At that time, HUD
promulgated a new disclosure form, the
HUD-IA, for use in refinancing and
subordinate loan transactions where
there is no seller. While the 1992 and
1994 amendments necessitated
additional disclosures, the formats of
the GFE and HUD-l, and the disclosure
requirements, have remained
substantially unchanged since they were
originally established in 1977.
Contents of Good Faith Estimate and the
HUD-l
HUD's RESPA rules require that
lenders and mortgage brokers who are
not exclusive agents of lenders provide
a GFE to all applicants for federally
related mortgage loans, and contain a
suggested format in Appendix C to 24
CFR part 3500. The suggested GFE
format lists twenty common settlement
services and prOVides spaces for the
charges for such services. The
instructions indicate that any other
possible services and charges should
also be listed.12 The GFE provides a
place for the "amount of or range" of
each charge that the borrower is likely
to incur in connection with the
settlement. Between the name and
amount of each charge is a reference to
11 HUD's RESPA rules, found at 24 CFR part 3500
(Regulation Xl. currently define a "mortgage
broker" to be "a person (not an employee or
exclusive agent of a lender) who brings a borrower
and lender together to obtain a federally-related
mortgage loan, and who renders services" as
described in the rule (24 CFR 3500.2(b)).
12 Specifically, the GFE format lists the loan
origination fee, loan discount fee, appraisal fee,
credit report, inspection fee, mortgage broker fee,
CLO access fee, tax related service fee, interest at
"dollars" per day, mortgage insurance premium,
hazard insurance premium, reserves, settlement fee,
abstract or title search, document preparation fees,
attorney's fee, title insurance, recording fees, city/
county tax stamps. state tax. survey, pest inspection
and the form provides space for additional fees that
may be added.
where the same charge will be disclosed
on the HUll-lor HUD l-A at
settlement. If the lender requires the use
of particular settlement service
provider(s) and requires the borrower to
pay for any portion of such provider's
services, the rules require that the GFE
state: that the use of the provider is
required and that the estimate is based
on the selected provider's price; the
provider's name, address and telephone,
and the nature of any relationship
between the provider and the lender.13
The current GFE does not identify the
particular items that the borrower may
shop for after he has selected a lender
or broker, such as a title or settlement
agent, title insurance, and a pest
inspector.
The HUD-l, described in detail in
Appendix A of HUD's RESPA rules,
discloses the charges at settlement in
major groupings or series. The left hand
column on the front of the HUD-l
summarizes the borrower's transaction,
listing the cash due at settlement from
the borrower, as a result ofthe gross
amounts due less any amounts paid by
or on behalf of the borrower prior to
settlement. This part of the HUll-l lists
credits to the borrower as well as the
total settlement charges due from line
1400 on the back of the form. The right
hand column on the front of the HUD-
1 summarizes the seller's transaction,
listing the total amount due to the seller
as the gross amount due to the seller
adjusted for items such as settlement
charges to the seller and the payoff(s) of
any mortgages, and any other items due
from seller (such as taxes), to arrive at
a total amount due seller.
The 700 series of the HUD-1 lists real
estate broker commissions; the 800
series lists origination fees and certain
third party settlement services payable
in connection with the loan; the 900
series lists items required by the lender
to be paid in advance; the 1000 series
lists reserves deposited with lender; the
1100 series lists all title related charges;
the 1200 series lists government
charges; the 1300 series lists any
additional settlement charges; and line
1400 discloses the total settlement
charges.
The current GFE and HUD-l/IA
forms require a listing of the settlement
charge for each service, which appears
to have led to an increasing proliferation
of enumerated services by individual
settlement service providers (e.g., loan
originators, title agents, etc.) and an
13 24 CFR 3500.7(eJ(3). Except for a provider that
is the lender's chosen attorney, credit reporting
agency, or appraiser, if the lender is in an affiliated
business relationship with the provider (see
§ 3500.15), the lender may not require the use of
that provider.
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artificial separation and inflation of the
total charges of certain settlement
service providers resulting in higher
total costs to borrowers than a more
consolidated list would provide. For
example, the current requirements
encourage loan originators to charge for
several separate "services"-
origination, document preparation,
document review. Similarly, title
service providers are required to
separate their charges into "abstract,"
"document preparation," "attorney's
fees," and other charges. Moreover,
neither the GFE nor the HUD-l specify
the total amount of fees that each major
recipient receives and retains, including
the lender, the broker, and the title
agent. It is reported that some
originators charge "junk" fees for
"services" to increase profits by filling
in as many blank lines on the form as
possible. It also has been reported that
some originators compete on rate and
points when giving quotes and then
charge a variety of additional fees to
increase their profits.
Provision of the Good Faith Estimate
The RESPA rules require that the loan
originator must provide the GFE either
by delivering it or placing it in the mail
to the borrower not later than three
business days after a loan application 14
is received or prepared. In practice, loan
originators frequently insist on the
borrower's completion of a full
application form and payment of a
significant fee to cover the costs of an
appraisal and credit check before a GFE
is provided. Therefore, by the time that
the borrower receives a GFE he or she
has typically already selected a
particular loan originator, and paid
substantial fees, and is highly unlikely
to shop further for another loan
originator. In addition, because the GFE
is not generally provided until the
borrower applies for a loan, the form
does not provide borrowers with
sufficient opportunity to focus on and
compare the full costs of the originator
and other major recipients of fees, nor
does it indicate clearly other individual
settlement services including title
services that the borrower may shop for.
Borrowers must shop on their own
without the aid of a GFE.
Current Definition of "Good Faith"
HUD's RESPA rules currently require
that a GFE must be made in good faith,
bear a "reasonable relationship" to the
charge the borrower is likely to be
14 The rules define an "application" as the
submission of a borrower's financial information in
anticipation of a credit decision involving a
federally related loan on a specific property. 24 CFR
3500.2(b).
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required to pay at settlement, and "be
based upon experience in the locality of
the mortgaged property." 24 CFR
3500.7(c)(2). The rules, however, do not
establish any bright lines or tolerances
to assure that there is, in fact, a
reasonable relationship between these
estimates and final costs at settlement.
Although the rules do require additional
disclosure where the lender requires the
use of a particular provider, stating that
the lender must "make its estimate
based upon the lender's knowledge of
the amounts charged by the provider,"
the rules do not establish any bright
lines for the loan originator with respect
to their estimates of these or other third
party charges, or even with respect to
their own charges. Id.ts Under HUD's
rules, charges on the Good Faith
Estimate are to be disclosed as "a dollar
amount or range of each charge" which
will be listed in section L of the HUD-
lor HUD-IA. Frequently, borrowers
report to HUD that brokers' or lenders'
own charges at settlement include one
or more additional fees that were not
disclosed on the GFE, or that the
charges for particular services rendered
by or for the loan originator
substantially exceed the estimated
amounts. RESPA contains no sanctions
for inaccurate or incomplete GFEs, or
even for outright failure to provide a
GFE. Bank and other regulators do
enforce these requirements with respect
to regulated institutions, although other
originators are not subject to such
enforcement.
Use and Provision of the HUD-l,
HUD-IA
Settlement agents are required to use
the HUD-l in every settlement
transaction involving a federally related
mortgage loan in which there is a
borrower and a seller.t6 The settlement
agent is required to complete the HUD-
1 in accordance with the instructions at
Appendix A to HUD's RESPA rules and
to deliver a completed HUD-l (or HUD-
1A where applicable) at or before the
settlement to the borrower, the seller (if
applicable), and the lender (if the lender
is not the settlement agent) or their
agents. 24 CFR 3500.8(a). RESPA and
15 While the current rules need improvement.
they are not entirely without standards. They do
require estimates to be in good faith and tell the
borrower what charges he or she is likely to incur
at settlement based on the originator's experience.
For example, on July 5. 2002. HUD issued a letter
to the State of Washington that indicated that a
range of charges of 0-$15,000 on a GFE for points
did not meet these requirements.
16 16 Under current rules, where there is a
borrower and no seller, such as in a refinance or
a subordinate lien loan. the HUD-l may be utilized
using the borrower's side of the HUD-l statement,
or the HUD-IA may be used as an alternative.
HUD's RESPA rules permit the borrower
to inspect, a day before settlement, the
HUD-1 or HUD-1A containing those
items that are known to the settlement
agent at the time of the inspection. 24
CFR 3500.10.
Mortgage Brokers 17
At the time RESPA was enacted,
single-family mortgages were mainly
originated and held by savings and
loans, commercial banks, and mortgage
bankers. During the 1980's and 1990's,
the rise of secondary mortgage market
financing resulted in the emergence of
new retail entities, notably mortgage
brokers, to compete with traditional
mortgage originators, lending
institutions, and mortgage bankers.
Today, mortgage brokers are estimated
to originate more than 60% of the
nation's mortgages.
Mortgage brokers essentially provide
retail lending services, including
counseling borrowers on loan products,
collecting application information,
ordering required reports and
documents, and otherwise gathering
data required to complete the loan
package and mortgage transaction. As
retailers, brokers also provide the
borrower and lender with goods and
facilities such as reports, equipment,
and office space to carry out retail
functions. Ie The amount of work
mortgage brokers provide in particular
transactions depends, in part, on the
level of difficulty involved in qualifying
applicants for particular loan programs.
Differences in credit ratings,
employment status, levels of debt,
assets, and experience frequently
translate into varying degrees of effort
required to originate a loan. Also,
mortgage brokers may be required to
perform different components of
origination services (I.e., underwriting)
17 In the discussion of mortgage brokers in the
background section of this preamble, the term is
being used in a broader sense than the proposed
amended HUD definition, and the way the term is
used throughout the rest of the proposed rule. In
this section when referring to mortgage brokers the
term also includes those individuals who are the
real source of funds through a warehouse line of
credit or otherwise.
18HUD Statement ofPolicy-1999-1 Regarding
Lender Payments to Mortgage Brokers proVided a
list of compensable loan origination services
originally developed by HUD in a response to an
inquiry from the Independent Bankers Association
of America (IBAA), which HUD considers relevant
in evaluating mortgage broker services. In analyzing
each transaction to determine if services are
performed by mortgage brokers, HUD stated that it
believes the 1999 Statement of Policy should be
used as a guide. As stated there. the iBAA list is
not exhaustive, and while technology is changing
the process of performing settlement services. HUD
believes that the list is stil! a general!y accurate
description of settlement services.
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pursuant to specific agreements with
individual wholesale lenders.19
Mortgage brokers have various means
of obtaining funding for the loans they
originate. Some mortgage brokers close
mortgage loans in their own name but,
at the time of settlement, transfer the
loan to a lender that simultaneously
advances funds for the loan.
Immediately after the loan is
consummated, the mortgage broker
delivers the loan package to that lender,
including the promissory note,
mortgage, evidence of insurance, and all
rights in the loan that the mortgage
broker held. This type of transaction is
known in the lending industry, and
defined in HUD's regulations, as "table
funding."
Some mortgage brokers function
purely as intermediaries between
borrowers and lending sources. They
originate loans by providing loan
processing and arranging for the
provision of funds by lenders. Loans
which they originate are closed in the
names of the funding lenders.
Other mortgage brokers originate
loans that are closed in the mortgage
brokers' names, fund the loans
temporarily using their own funds or a
warehouse line of credit, and sell the
loans after settlement. These
transactions by mortgage brokers are
treated similarly to loans made by
mortgage bankers, and other lenders,
and hence any compensation received
by the mortgage broker, as a result of the
bona fide transfer of a loan obligation in
the secondary market, is not subject to
Section 8 of RESPA due to the
"secondary market transaction"
exemption. 24 CFR 3500.5(b)(7).
Mortgage Broker Functions and
Compensation
Since the advent of mortgage brokers
in the mid-1980s, there has been
confusion among borrowers concerning
the mortgage broker's functions and
fees,-Le., whether brokers do or do not
shop on the borrower's behalf, as well
as how they are paid and how much
they are paid, and by whom.
Some mortgage brokers indicate to
borrowers that they will, in essence, act
as their agent to shop for the best
mortgage loan for them. 20 Other brokers
state that they work with a number of
funding sources to provide loans, and
19 The terms "wholesale lender" or "funding
lender" are used throughout the document to mean
a lender who does not originate the mortgage loan
but provides funds for the loan and may purchase
the loan.
20 In some states, for example North Carolina.
nlortgage brokers may be held to have an agency
relationship or a legal responsibility to the
borrower.
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will arrange a favorable loan with one
of them for their borrower. Whether
brokers serve as the borrower's agent as
a strict legal matter, the fact is that many
brokers are perceived by borrowers as
shopping on their behalf for the best
loan to meet the borrower's needs. This
perception frequently deters borrowers
from shopping themselves for the loan
originator and mortgage product that
best meets their needs.
Mortgage brokers receive
compensation for their services by
various methods. A broker may be paid
directly by the borrower, indirectly by
the lender or wholesale lender who
purchases the mortgage loan, or through
a combination of both. Brokers may
charge borrowers directly at or before
settlement for loan origination as well as
for other services including the
application, document preparation and
document review. In some cases, broker
origination charges may be denominated
as an origination fee and sometimes as
an "origination point" (one point equals
1% of the loan amount), while other
fees for named services (e.g., application
fees, document preparation fees,
processing fee, etc.) are charged as
separate cost items on the GFE.21 Some
brokers receive both percentage based
fees and fees for named services.
Where brokers receive a payment for
compensation from someone other than
the borrower, most commonly the
lender, it is called indirect
compensation. Such indirect
compensation from lenders is ordinarily
based upon an above market interest
rate on the loan entered into by the
broker with the borrower. This type of
compensation is often referred to as a
"yield spread premium," (YSP) though
it sometimes shows up under a different
label, e.g. servicing release premium.
The use of a YSP can reduce up front
settlement costs to a borrower by
building these costs into the borrower's
interest rate and monthly payments over
the life ofthe borrower's loan. In issuing
RESPA Policy Statement 2001-1,
discussed in greater detail below, HUD
stated that borrowers should continue to
have the choice of paying their total
settlement costs up-front or using the
yield spread premium payment as a
credit to pay all or part of these costs.
Consumer advocates assert, however,
that all too frequently brokers place the
borrower in an above par rate loan
without the borrower's knowledge,
provide the borrower with little or no
21 Mortgage broker fees are not always described
in the same terms. Sometimes mortgage brokers fees
are expressed in straight dollar amounts and
sometimes as "points." "Points" are charges based
on a percentage of the borrower's loan. Points
therefore have a dollar equivalent to the borrower.
benefit in the form of reduced up front
costs, and use the YSP payment solely
or primarily as a means of increasing
their total compensation.
Current Broker Disclosure Requirements
Under HUD's current rules, where
mortgage brokers originate and table
fund loans or act as intermediaries, they
are required to disclose their direct
charges and any indirect payments to be
made to them on the GFE, and deliver
or mail it to the borrower no later than
3 days after loan application. 24 CFR
3500.7(a)-(c). Such disclosure must also
be provided to borrowers, as a final
figure, at settlement on the HUD-l and
HUD-IA settlement statement. 24 CFR
3500.8. In table funded and
intermediary transactions, direct broker
fees are treated like the fees of other
settlement service providers, such as
title agents, attorneys, appraisers, etc,
whose fees are disbursed at or before
settlement. However, HUD's current
rules require that on the GFE and HUD-
1, lender-paid (indirect) mortgage broker
fees are to be shown as "Paid Outside
of Closing" (P.O.c.), listed outside the
columns, and excluded from the
computation of borrower's total
settlement costs. 24 CFR 3500.7(a)(2).
This approach does not assure that YSPs
are understood and credited to the
borrower to reduce up front settlement
costs.
Disclosure of Fees by Lenders
Lenders are also compensated by
borrowers through various methods.
When lenders originate mortgage loans,
they may charge borrowers directly at or
before settlement for loan origination as
well as for other services including the
application, document preparation and
document review. In some cases, lender
origination charges may be denominated
as an origination fee and sometimes as
an "origination point" (one point equals
1% of the loan amount), while other
fees for named services (e.g., application
fees, document preparation fees,
processing fee, etc.) are'charged as
separate cost items on the GFE.22
Lenders may also require "discount
points" from the borrower for the stated
purpose of lowering the interest rate of
the loan. It is unclear to what extent
discount points represent the present
22 Lenders' fees are not always described in the
same terms. Sometimes lenders' fees are expressed
in straight dollar amounts and sometimes as
"points." "Points" may be used to describe
"origination fees" or "discount points" and both
types of points may be charged in the same
transaction. "Points" are just percentage amounts of
the borrowers loans. and these "points," just like
any other terms used to describe fees to loan
originators, have a dollar equivalent to the
borrower.
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value of the difference between the par
mortgage interest rate and the rate on
the loan on one hand, or provide
additional compensation to lenders on
the other.
The functional equivalent of a yield
spread premium may also be present in
loans originated by lenders. Lenders
routinely offer loans with low or no up
front costs required at settlement. They
can do so just like brokers do by
charging higher interest rates for these
loans and then recouping the costs by
selling the loans into the secondary
market for a premium representing the
difference between the interest rate on
the loan and the par, or wholesale
market interest rate. Alternatively, the
lender can hold the loan and earn the
above market return in exchange for any
lender paid settlement costs.
HUD's current rules require lenders to
disclose only direct fees paid to them by
borrowers including origination fees or
"origination points" as well as other
direct fees for named services and
discount points. However, neither the
current GFE, nor the HUD-1, provides
totals of all charges paid to the lender.
The rules also do not require lenders to
disclose indirect fees earned in
secondary market transactions from the
sale of borrowers' loans. This is because
the compensation earned from the bona
fide transfer of the loan obligation in the
secondary market is exempt from HUD's
RESPA rules. HUD's RESPA rules
provide "[i]n determining what
constitutes a bona fide transfer HUD
will consider the real source of funding
and the real interest of the funding
lender." 24 CFR 3500.5(bj(7). HUD's
rules explicitly provide, however, that
table-funded mortgage broker
transactions are not secondary market
transactions. Lender sales into the
secondary market are considered
secondary market transactions.
Legality of Mortgage Broker Fees
Over the last decade, there has been
persistent litigation concerning the
legality of indirect fees to mortgage
brokers. More than 150 lawsuits have
been brought since the mid-1990s
seeking class action certification, based
in whole or in part on the theory that
the indirect fees paid by lenders to
mortgage brokers are fees for the referral
of business in violation of section 8 of
RESPA.23
23 See e.g., Mentecki v. Saxon Mortgage. No. 96-
1629-A, slip op. (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 1997). The court
held initially that indirect fees to mortgage brokers
in the form of "yield spread premiums" violated
section 8(a) ofRESPA as referral fees. However.
subsequently. in an order and opinion dated July
11,1997, the Court refused to certify the class.
Continued
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HUD's RESPA rules, amended in 1992
to require disclosure of indirect fees to
mortgage brokers, did not explicitly take
a position on whether yield spread
premiums or any other named class of
back-funded or indirect fees paid by
lenders to brokers are per se legal or
illegal. See Illustrations of Requirements
ofRESPA, Fact Situations 5 and 12 in
Appendix B to 24 CFR part 3500. The
rule specifically listed "servicing release
premiums" and "yield spread
premiums" as fees required to be
itemized on the HUD-l/IA Settlement
Statement. Accordingly, while the rule
specifically acknowledged the existence
of such fees and provided illustrations
of how they are to be reflected on HOD
disclosure forms, HUD took the position
that the rule does not create a
presumption of per se legality or
illegality.
Between 1992 and 1999, HUD
provided various interpretations and
other issuances under its RESPA rules
stating the Department's position that
the legality of a payment to a mortgage
broker does not depend on the name of
the particular fee. Rather, HUD has
consistently advised that the issue
under RESPA is whether the total
compensation to a mortgage broker is
reasonably related to the total value of
the goods or facilities actually furnished
or services actually performed. If the
compensation, or a portion thereof, is
not reasonably related to the goods or
facilities actually furnished or the
services actually performed, there is a
compensated referral or an unearned fee
in violation of Section 8(a) or 8(b) of
RESPA, whether the compensation
results from a direct or indirect payment
or a combination thereof.
In 1995, as a result of concerns that
the requirement that mortgage brokers
disclose indirect fees placed mortgage
brokers on an unequal footing with
other mortgage loan providers, and that
information on indirect fees was
confusing to borrowers, HUD issued a
proposed rule to obtain the public's
views on the disclosure and legality of
broker fees. 60 FR 47650 (September 13,
1995). At that time, plaintiff borrowers
began initiating class action lawsuits
Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage Corp., 953 F.Supp.
367 (N.D. Ala. 1997). The court held that a payment
for a loan above market was permissible under
section a(c) of RESPA as payment for a "good."
Barbosa v. Target Mortgage, No. 94-1938, U.S.D.C.,
Southern District of Florida; Martinez v.
Weyerhauser Mortgage, No. 94-160, U.S.D.C.•
Southern District of Florida; Monoz v. Crossland
Mortgage Company, Civil Action No. 96-12260,
U.S.D.C. for the District of Massachusetts. These
last two Federal district courts concluded that yield
spread premiums (or differentials) were not per se
violations of RESPA and therefore refused to certify
class actions on this issue.
claiming that payments to mortgage
brokers by lenders were per se illegal.
Shortly afterwards, HUD embarked on a
negotiated rulemaking on these subjects.
See notices published on October 25,
1995 (60 FR 54794) and December 8,
1995 (60 FR 63008).
The 1995-1996 negotiated rulemaking
on mortgage broker fees did not result
in a final rule. It did, however, result in
a clear consensus by rulemaking
participants that borrowers were
confused about the functions of
mortgage brokers and the amounts and
sources of their fees. See Report on
Negotiated Rulemaking on Mortgage
Broker Disclosure--Final Report, A.L.J.
Alan W. Heifetz, (July 19, 1996). This
confusion may translate into borrowers
failing to compare services and fees,
thereby paying unnecessarily high
settlement costs. Most of the rulemaking
participants, except for the
representative of the mortgage brokerage
industry and one consumer advocate,
agreed on a regulatory framework that
would create a pre-application
agreement between a borrower and a
broker fully disclosing the broker's
function and compensation, in return
for a limited "safe harbor" for
transactions where these contracts were
entered into. In 1997, HUD issued a
proposed rule on mortgage broker fees
that would have established a safe
harbor for brokers who contractually
commit to borrowers regarding their
total compensation, along the lines
agreed to by the majority in the
negotiated rulemaking. The proposed
rule also provided that during the
rulemaking process, a ceiling on the
amount of fees eligible for the safe
harbor would be established to protect
against predatory lending. The rule was
strongly opposed by the mortgage
brokerage industry and other segments
of the mortgage industry. HUD did not
finalize the 1997 rule and efforts to do
so were soon eclipsed by HUD's effort
to clarify its position on the legality of
mortgage broker fees under existing law.
1999 Statement of Policy on Lender
Payments to Mortgage Brokers
In 1998, in the Conference Report on
HUD's 1999 Appropriations Act,
Congress directed HUD to clarify its
position on the legality of mortgage
broker fees and to work with industry,
Federal agencies, consumer groups, and
other interested parties on a statement
of policy on the subject. The Report also
stated that Congress never intended
payments by lenders for goods or
facilities actually furnished or for
services actually performed to violate
Section 8(a) or (b) of RESPA.
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On March 1,1999, in response to
Congress's directive, HUD issued
RESPA Statement of Policy 1999-1
Regarding Lender Payments to Mortgage
Brokers, following extensive discussions
with industry, consumer groups, and
essential agreement among them on the
interpretation embodied in the
Statement. The Statement said that, in
applying Section 8 and HUD's
regulations to lender payments to
mortgage brokers, HUD did not consider
such payments to be legal or illegal per
se. The Statement said that the "fees in
cases and classes of transactions are
illegal if they violate the prohibitions of
Section 8 of RESPA." 64 FR 10084.
The Statement established a two-part
test to determine the legality of lender
payments to mortgage brokers under
RESPA which requires that: (1) Goods or
facilities must actually be furnished or
services actually performed for the
compensation paid; and (2) payments
must be reasonably related to the value
of the goods or facilities that were
actually furnished or services that were
actually performed. In applying this
test, HUD stated that total compensation
should be scrutinized to assure that it is
reasonably related to goods, facilities, or
services furnished or performed to
determine whether it is legal under
RESPA.24
As a Statement of Policy, the 1999
Statement interpreted HUD's existing
rules. Nonetheless, beyond these rules,
the Statement emphasized the
importance of disclosing brokerage fees,
including yield spread premiums, to
borrowers as early as possible in the
borrower's process of shopping for a
mortgage. See 64 FR at 10087.
The 1999 Statement said:
There is no requirement under
existing law that consumers be fully
informed of the broker's services and
compensation prior to the GFE.
Nevertheless, HUD believes that the
broker should provide the consumer
with information about the broker's
services and compensation, and
agreement by the consumer to the
arrangement should occur as early as
possible in the process. Mortgage
brokers and lenders can improve their
ability to demonstrate the
reasonableness of their fees if the broker
discloses the nature of the broker's
services and the various methods of
compensation at the time the consumer
24 The 1999 Statement of Policy also said, "[tlhe
Department considers that higher interest rates
alone cannot justify higher total fees to mortgage
brokers. All fees will be scrutinized as part of total
compensation to determine that total compensation
is reasonably related to the goods or facilities
actually furnished or services actually performed."
64 FR 10084.
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first discusses the possibility of a loan
with the broker. 64 FR at 10087.
Post 1999-1 Statement of Policy Circuit
Court Decision
After HUD issued its 1999 Statement
of Policy, most Federal District courts
held that yield spread premium
payments from lenders to mortgage
brokers are legal provided that such
payments meet the test for legality
articulated in the 1999 Statement of
Policy and otherwise comport with
RESPA. However, in Culpepperv. Irwin
Mortgage Corp., 253 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir.
2001), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld class
certification in a case alleging that yield
spread premiums violated Section 8 of
RESPA where the defendant lender,
pursuant to a prior understanding with
mortgage brokers, paid yield spread
premiums to brokers based on the
lender's use of a rate sheet and the
brokers' delivery of above par interest
rate loans, without the lender knowing
whether, or to what extent, the brokers
had performed services. The court
concluded that a jury could find that
yield spread premiums were illegal
kickbacks or referral fees under RESPA
where the lender's payments were based
exclusively on interest rate differentials
reflected on rate sheets, and the lender
had no knowledge of what services, if
any, the brokers had performed. The
court also said that HUD's 1999
Statement of Policy was ambiguous.
Following Culpepper,25
representatives of the mortgage industry
urged HUD to issue a clarification to the
1999 Statement of Policy to make clear
that the lenders could make payments to
brokers through rate sheets and that, to
properly apply the 1999 test, all
payments must be examined, not simply
the payment from the lender, to
determine ifthe broker's total
compensation is reasonable. These
representatives said that if the
Culpepper interpretation prevailed,
without further guidance from HUD, the
industry could no longer offer yield
spread premiums as an option to
borrowers to lower their up front
settlement costs.
Representatives of the mortgage
industry, including representatives of
the Mortgage Bankers Association and
the National Association of Mortgage
Brokers, assured the Department that
following a clarification by HUD, they
'5 In this proposed rule Culpepper refers to
Culpepper v. Irwin Mortgage Corp.. 253 F.3d 1324
(11th Cir. 2001). There were earlier reported
decisions in this same litigation.
also would support a HUD rule
requiring improved fee disclosure. 26
Statement of Policy 2001-1
On October 17, 2001, the Department
issued Statement of Policy 2001-1,
Clarification of Statement of Policy
1999-1 Regarding Lender Payments to
Mortgage Brokers, and Guidance
Concerning Unearned Fees Under
Section 8(b). The 2001 Policy Statement
reiterated and clarified the test
articulated in the 1999 Statement of
Policy that where compensable services
are performed, application of both parts
of the HUD test is required before a
determination can be made regarding
the legality of a lender payment to a
mortgage broker. 66 FR 53052,53054-
55. The 2001 Statement also said:
[n]either Section 8(a) of RESPA nor the 1999
Statement of Policy supports the conclusion
that a yield spread premium can be
presumed to be a referral fee based solely
upon the fact that the lender pays the broker
a yield spread premium that is based upon
a rate sheet, or because the lender does not
have specific knowledge of what services the
broker has performed. 66 FR 53052, 53055.
The 2001 Statement of Policy also
interpreted HUD's existing rules then
further detailed what HUD regards as
meaningful disclosure of mortgage
broker fees to borrowers:
In HUD's view. meaningful disclosure
includes many types of information: What
services a mortgage broker will perform, the
amount of the broker's total compensation for
performing those services (including any
yield spread premium paid by the lender),
and whether or not the broker has an agency
or fiduciary relationship with the borrower.
The disclosure should also make the
borrower aware that he or she may pay
higher up front costs for a mortgage with a
lower interest rate, or conversely pay a higher
interest rate in return for lower up front
costs, and should identify the specific trade-
off between the amount of the increase in the
borrower's monthly payment (and also the
increase in the interest rate) and the amount
by which up front costs are reduced. HUD
believes that disclosure of this information,
and written acknowledgment by the borrower
that he or she has received the information,
should be provided early in the transaction..
Such disclosure facilitates comparison
shopping by the borrower, to choose the best
combination of up front costs and mortgage
terms from his or her individual standpoint.
HUD regards full disclosure and written
acknowledgment by the borrower, at the
earliest possible time, as a best practice. 66
FR 53056.
26 Letter to Secretary Martinez. Submitted by
America's Community Bankers, American Banking
Association. Consumer Mortgage Coalition, and
Mortgage Bankers Association of America
(December 27.2001): National Association of
Mortgage Brokers. Position Paper: Prospective HOD
Rulemaking Concerning Mortgage Originator
Disclosure, Correspondence to the Department
(December 4th. 2001).
K(a) - 93
The 2001 Policy Statement also
specifically acknowledged the utility to
borrowers of treating and reporting all
interest rate based lender payments as
monies belonging to the borrower. The
Policy Statement endorsed this
approach, stating:
[I]t has been suggested to the Department that
the yield spread premium should be reported
as a credit to the borrower in the "200"
series, among the "Amounts Paid by or in
Behalf of Borrowers." The homebuyer or
homeowner could then see that the yield
spread premium is reducing closing costs,
and also see the extent of the reduction.
HUD believes that improved early
disclosure regarding mortgage broker
compensation and the entry of yield spread
premiums as credits to borrowers on the GFE
and the HUD-l settlement statement are both
useful and complementary forms of
disclosure. The Department believes that
used together these methods of disclosure
offer greater assurance that lender payments
to mortgage brokers serve borrowers' best
interests. 66 FR 53056.
C. HUD's Commitment to Mortgage
Reform
The HUD-Federal Reserve Report
Since the mid-1990s, HUD has been
examining ways to improve the
mortgage process for borrowers to lower
settlement costS.27 In June of 1998. in
response to a Congressional directive in
Section 2101 of the Economic Growth
and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction
Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009), HUD and the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve ("the Board")
issued a joint report on reforming
RESPA. The HUD-Federal Reserve
Report. The Report called for legislative
changes to reform both laws. The Report
did not attempt to differentiate where
changes could be made under existing
law pursuant to the Board's and HUD's
existing regulatory authorities from
areas where new legislation was
required. Subsequently, the Board has
exercised its regulatory authority under
TILA to effectuate certain of the Report's
recommendations. See 66 FR 65604,
December 20, 2001.
Major Findings of the Report
The HUD-Federal Reserve Report
posed and addressed several questions
involving the disclosure scheme under
both RESPA and TILA, and both HUD
27 HOD and others have considered proposals to
permit lenders to package settlement services
almost from the time the law was enacted_ Senator
Proxmire introduced S. 2775 which would have
required lenders to bear certain settlement costs
with the view that the lenders have the
sophistication and bargaining power to keep costs
down.
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and the Board recommended in part 28
that:
• Loan originators be required to
provide firmer quotes for settlement
costs disclosed under RESPA; and
• The timing ofRESPA and TILA
disclosures to borrowers be advanced,
so that borrowers receive them earlier
and use them to shop.
In order to achieve firmer cost
information, both agencies also
recommended that lenders and other
providers be given the choice of:
• Offering a "packaging" or a
guaranteed cost approach; or
• Providing a GFE where estimated
costs would be subject to tolerances, to
improve the current disclosure scheme
by reducing the instances in which
consumers may incur additional costs at
closing.
Both agencies recommended an
exemption from Section 8 to facilitate
packaging. HUD also said that to receive
the exemption, both the settlement costs
and the interest rate on a mortgage
should be guaranteed.
Timing of Disclosures
The Report observed that in home
secured transactions, the borrower
currently receives TILA or RESPA
disclosures at several different times.
Borrowers receive generic information
such as HUD's Special Information
Booklet at the time of application.
Additionally, for residential mortgage
transactions, lenders and brokers
provide through mailing or delivery
within 3 days after application, specific
information including the GFE and the
initial TILA disclosure disclosing the
finance charge and the "APR" or
"annual percentage rate" for the
mortgage. TILA § 128(b)(2); Reg. Z
§ 226.19(a). TILA may require additional
new disclosures for home-purchase
loans if early disclosures have become
inaccurate. See TILA 128(b) and Reg. Z
§ 226.17(b). A settlement agent gives
final disclosures on the HUD-l at
settlement based on information
provided by the lender.
Both agencies recommended that the
disclosure process could be improved
for industry if the timing requirements
for disclosures were made more
consistent between RESPA and TILA 2 9
and it would be improved for borrowers
if disclosures were given when they
would be most useful. In the Report,
2. The Report also concluded that the APR and
finance charge disclosures under TILA should be
retained and improved to include all costs required
by the creditor to get the credit and that additionl1l
substantive protections should be added to TILA.
'9 Under current TILA rules. Regulation Z. the
TILA disclosure may be given simultaneously along
with the GFE, TILA § 128 (b); Reg. Z § 226.17(b).
HUD recommended that generic
information, e.g., HUD's Special
Information Booklet, be given when the
borrower first contacts settlement
service providers, including loan
originators and real estate agents. Both
HUD and the Board also recommended
that borrowers be given initial
disclosures, including firm information
about settlement costs, interest rates and
points as early in the shopping process
as possible so that they can shop and
make informed choices. The HUD-
Federal Reserve Report at 41. Although
HUD and the Board differed somewhat
in their approaches, both indicated that
advances in technology and market
competition promised to provide
borrowers better information at or near
the time of application. HUD said that
it supported requiring that estimated
costs disclosures be provided earlier
than three days after application-
ideally at first contact with lenders.
HUD indicated, however, that while it
seeks early disclosures, it recognizes
that sometimes there will be a trade-off
between having an early disclosure and
ensuring that a disclosure is firm and
complete enough to allow borrowers to
shop and protect against increases in
costs. In such cases, HUD recommended
that timing requirements be flexible to
allow enough time to provide
guaranteed information.
Moreover, in the interest of promoting
shopping, HUD recommended that
borrowers not be required to pay a
significant fee to the loan originator
prior to receiving initial cost
information. Id. at 42.
Providing Firmer Cost Disclosures
In arriving at the recommendation
that cost disclosures must be firmer, the
Report observed that borrowers reported
many instances in which the costs
disclosed on the GFE were significantly
lower than those actually charged at
settlement or that costs were completely
left out of the GFE. The HUD-Federal
Reserve Report at 20. The Report noted
that more reliable settlement cost
information could promote shopping.
Id. at 32. In recommending that the
choice of providing "guaranteed cost
packages" or a more reliable GFE
subject to tolerances be offered, the
agencies stated that a dual system
would create an opportunity for the
market to test whether guaranteed cost
arrangements offer more economical
and efficient means for consumers to
obtain mortgage loans.
Packages/Guaranteed Costs
Under the packaging or guaranteed
cost approach envisioned in the Report,
the lender or other packager would set
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a lump-sum price for settlement costs
and would be held to that figure from
the time the package is agreed to
through settlement. Most charges for
services that the borrower currently
pays at settlement for origination, title
work and insurance, credit report,
appraisal, document review, inspection,
up front mortgage insurance, pest
inspection and flood review, etc., would
be included in the package. 30
Government charges associated with
filing a mortgage or release that can be
determined easily also would be
included. The Report suggested that any
costs excluded from the guaranteed
settlement costs would be disclosed as
either "other required costs" or as
"optional costs." "Other required costs"
would include charges such as per diem
interest, which fit the definition of those
costs that the borrower will have to pay
at settlement, but the amount of which
the packager cannot be readily
determined at the time the package is
provided to the borrower. 31 The Report
suggested, however, that there are
means for per diem interest to be
included in the package; lenders could
be required to state a maximum amount
30 In developing the Report, the agencies
considered whether services should be itemized
within the package. Some entities claim that for
there to be true competition, borrowers must be able
to know what is included in each package to
compare. These entities point out that borrowers
generally like to know what services are included
in packages and that without itemization lenders
may choose to forego many services for their
packages while insisting that nonIenders have more
expansive packages, making borrower information
and competition impossible. On the other hand, it
was observed that a requirement for full itemization
of services might lead some packagers to create
longer lists, ultimately confusing borrowers and
hindering their evaluation of different loans. Also,
lenders pointed out that services are performed in
large measure to protect their security and when the
initial disclosure is provided they may not know
what is needed in each case. The Board and HUD
concluded that in packages, lenders could disclose
the guaranteed amount for settlement costs without
any elaboration on the early disclosure, and
subsequently provide a list of services actually
performed on the fmal settlement disclosure.
Alternatively, lenders could provide a list of
services that might be performed on the early
disclosure with an explanation, if appropriate. that
all items may not be performed, and then indicate
on the settlement statement the services actually
performed. The Report also observed that disclosing
the cost of each service also could present
problems, particularly where lenders or other
packagers enter into volume-based contracts. The
HUD-Federal Reserve Report at 25-26.
31 Charges for per diem or "odd days" interest,
which floats along with the interest rate, cover the
time between the date of settlement and the date
regular monthly interest starts accruing. As an
illustration, if a loan closes on January 15 and the
first monthly payment (due on March 1) begins to
accrue interest on February 1, interest for the days
between January 15 and February 1 is generally
required to be paid at settlement as per diem
interest. Some lenders do not collect per diem
interest at settlement but add the amount to the first
monthly payment.
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based on thirty days (a full month) or to
disclose the daily interest to allow
borrowers to calculate the actual
amount as the date of settlement
becomes certain. The Report also
suggested that mortgage insurance
should be included in the package price
even though it is difficult to calculate
until final underwriting.
According to the Report "optional
costs" would include charges that
depend on whether the borrower
chooses to purchase the service, and on
the level of service chosen. The HUD-
Federal Reserve Report at 27-28.
Examples include owner's title
insurance and optional hazard
insurance chosen by the borrower.
The Report observed that packagers
would arrive at their package prices
based on their experience or, more
likely, enter into volume-based
contracts with affiliated and other
settlement service providers for those
goods and services required by lenders
to close a loan. Id. at 23.
Support for Packaging
Many of the nation's largest mortgage
lenders and their representatives
expressed support for a "packaging"
approach. They said that borrowers
rarely shop for individual settlement
services, and also that borrowers are
more interested in the overall price of
their mortgage loan than the prices of
individual settlement services, and that
borrowers would shop for mortgages if
all they needed to compare was a single
guaranteed price for all the settlement
services needed to close the loan.
Advocates of packaging said that by
packaging services, discounts that
would be secured by lenders under
these arrangements will be passed on to
borrowers. Through this dynamic and
by making it easier for borrowers to
shop, costs would be lowered. 32
In the development of the Report,
entities other than lenders, including
real estate firms and affinity groups, also
expressed some interest in packaging.
These entities asserted that if packaging
was restricted only to lenders,
competition would be unnecessarily
restricted and borrowers could be
deprived of lower prices. Some industry
representatives voiced the fear that large
32 For example, a packager could contract to have
XYZ Appraisal Company complete all its appraisals
for a given period for $300 each rather than the
$350 the company normally charges for a standard
appraisal. The packager could rely on that
discounted contract price in pricing the package of
guaranteed costs to the borrower. With their own
costs negotiated in advance. packagers could
disclose the cost for the entire package early in the
borrower's mortgage shopping process with
certainty. and the borrower then could compare
different vendors' packages.
lenders will make it difficult for non-
lenders to develop any packages other
than those the lenders themselves retail,
by refusing to participate in other
entities' packages. 33 On the other hand,
lenders asserted that since settlement
services are largely required to protect
the lender's security, lenders should not
have to accept unconditionally any
other settlement service providers'
settlement packages. In the HUD-
Federal Reserve Report HUD
recommended that any entity should be
permitted to package as long as it can
provide a Guaranteed Mortgage Package
and a mortgage loan at a guaranteed
interest rate.
Consumer advocates also supported
packaging, but asserted that any
packages must include a loan with an
interest rate guarantee to be useful to
borrowers. Although consumer
advocacy groups believed that
guaranteeing settlement costs has value,
they noted that these costs are a small
portion of the overall cost of a mortgage
loan. Advocates said that unless
borrowers also receive a firm
commitment on the interest rate and any
applicable points they cannot truly
comparison shop. Without such a firm
commitment, consumer advocates said
some lenders may provide the borrower
with a guaranteed settlement cost quote
and then increase the interest rate to
offset any savings offered to the
borrower on the settlement costs. These
lenders would then realize additional
profits based on the mortgage's pricing.
These advocates expressed the fear that
unwary borrowers will be lured into
particular loan products by inexpensive
or below-market settlement cost
packages and then find themselves in
higher rate loans that more than offset
any purported cost savings. The HUD-
Federal Reserve Report at 22.
Lender representatives expressed
varying views on guaranteeing rates as
part of a specific package. Some lenders
stated that underwriting is costly and
time-intensive and that mortgage
brokers and other retail originators
cannot provide guaranteed rates that
bind lenders early in the mortgage loan
process. Other industry representatives
asserted, however, that requiring
lenders to provide guaranteed rates
along with guaranteed settlement costs
is viable. Many of today's mortgage
originators provide firm rate
information to shoppers early in the
process based on nearly instantly
available credit information, without
any assurance that the borrower will go
33 Nonlenders also suggested that to provide a
level playing field, the services in the package
should be itemized.
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forward with the transaction and the
originator will receive compensation.
Section 8 Exemption for Packaging
Lenders' representatives asserted at
the time of the Report that an exemption
from RESPA's Section 8 prohibitions is
necessary for packaging to work. These
representatives pointed out that Section
8 prohibits volume-based discounts
between settlement service providers,
since they fear such arrangements
would be viewed as compensated
referral arrangements in violation of the
statute. Also, while Section 8 prohibits
kickbacks, compensated referrals, and
unearned fees, the statute provides no
bright line on how to determine when
a payment has been earned for goods or
services (which is permissible under
RESPA) or is compensation for a
referral, or is an unearned fee (which are
illegal and subject to criminal sanctions
and civil action under Section 8).
Moreover, RESPA prohibits requiring
the use of an affiliated settlement
service provider except in limited
circumstances,34 which can be an
additional impediment to packaging
services. Proponents of packaging
further asserted that because of Section
8's prohibitions and questions about
how they apply, lenders and others do
not currently package. These
proponents said that were an exemption
granted and packaging of services
prevalent, borrowers would benefit
more from the resulting lower costs than
they do from RESPA's current Section 8
prohibitions. The HUD-Federal Reserve
Report at 30. Consumer groups generally
also supported an exemption for
packaging, as long as packagers are
required to guarantee both settlement
costs and interest rates.
Members of the settlement services
industry other than large lenders,
however, including small lenders and
title companies, expressed strong
concern about and, in some cases,
outright opposition to an exemption
from Section 8 to encourage packaging.
They said that only lenders would offer
packages and that the lenders would
squeeze out savings from small
providers and then retain these savings
in the form of higher profits, without
passing them on to borrowers. Small
settlement service providers also said
that the only way they could remain
competitive would be by offering
packages themselves, and they
expressed serious concern about their
ability to do so. They further asserted
34 Generally. under Section 8(c)(4] of RESPA an
entity may refer business to an affiliate as long as
tbe affiliate arrangement is disclosed. there is no
required use. and the only return to the entity
making the referral is a return on capital.
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that borrowers do in fact already shop
for settlement services, that prices for
these services are currently competitive,
and that lifting Section 8 restrictions
will harm rather than help borrowers
because any savings from packaging will
not be passed on to borrowers and fewer
providers will be available to compete.
Id. at 22.
During the development of the HUD-
Federal Reserve Report the agencies
noted that technology is enabling the
provision of earlier, furner, settlement
cost information. Id. at 39. Moreover,
during the development of the Report,
HUD became aware of promising
proposals that were advanced by
consumer advocates and some industry
representatives where lenders, after
obtaining credit reports, would provide
borrowers guaranteed rate and point
information.35 This guarantee would be
subject to appropriate conditions such
as market changes in the cost of money
(where the rate and points are not
locked), and verification of the value of
the collateral and the borrower's
creditworthiness. HUD supported these
and similar efforts because it regards the
full costs of obtaining a loan-including
settlement costs, interest rate, and
points-as the information that is
essential to assist borrowers in shopping
for a mortgage loan.
HUD concluded that an exemption
should be provided for packaging to
facilitate earlier comparison shopping
by borrowers, greater competition
among mortgage lenders and others, and
guaranteed prices to borrowers from the
time the borrower applies for a mortgage
through settlement. The Board
recommended an exemption to improve
the consumer's ability to shop
effectively and to allow competition to
reduce the cost of financing a home. To
encourage packaging, HUD
recommended that a Section 8
exemption should be made available to
loan originators and others who: (1)
Offer borrowers a comprehensive
package of settlement services needed to
close a loan; (2) provide borrowers with
a simple prescribed disclosure that gives
the guaranteed maximum price for the
package of services through settlement;
and (3) disclose the rate offered to the
borrower for the loan, with a guarantee
that the rate will not increase, subject to
prescribed conditions.
The Report suggested that fees paid
and arrangements within packages
would be exempt from Section 8. Fees
35 At the time of the Report some consumer and
industry groups discussed the possihility that
borrowers could pay credit repositories the costs of
and arrange the provision of credit information to
lenders to expedite the process and to avoid
significant fees.
for referrals to or from the packager of
settlement services to or from those
outside the package would continue to
be subject to Section 8. For example a
real estate agent could not receive a fee
for referring a borrower to a packager.
Entities that do not meet the
requirements of the exemption would be
subject to Section 8. The HUD-Federal
Reserve Report at 33.
A More Reliable GFE
As an alternative to packaging, both
the Board and HUD also recommended
making disclosures firmer under the
current practice, by requiring a more
reliable GFE, subject to tolerances. The
HUD-Federal Reserve Report at 31.
The Report suggested that tolerances
could be based on a percentage of the
total estimated costs; if the actual costs
at settlement exceeded the sum of the
estimated costs and the amount of the
tolerance, the loan originator would
generally be held liable. Alternatively,
the tolerance could apply only to certain
categories of costs such as those within
the loan originator's control. The Report
said that charges imposed directly by
the loan originator would have to be
accurate. On the other hand, an increase
in costs resulting from a borrower's
choice would not count against the loan
originator in determining whether the
total costs exceeded the tolerance. The
HUD-Federal Reserve Report at 31.
The HUD-Treasury Report
Early in 2000, HUD, in cooperation
with the Department of the Treasury,
reviewed the problem of predatory
mortgage lending. Following five
hearings in New York, Chicago, Atlanta,
Los Angeles and Baltimore, in June,
HUD and the Treasury issued a major
report on the subject of predatory
mortgage lending. The Report, entitled
"Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage
Lending" (HUD-Treasury Report),
detailed predatory or abusive lending
practices in connection with higher cost
loans in the mortgage market. In
addition, among numerous
recommendations to address predatory
lending, the Report reiterated support
for RESPA/TILA reform along the lines
recommended in the HUD-Federal
Reserve Report.
The HUD-Treasury Report stated:
"that borrowers need firm information
early in the loan process so that they
can compare the products of one
settlement service provider with
another. If borrowers receive firm
information but it comes too late in the
loan process, they will not have the
opportunity to shop. Moreover, if the
information is available but the
borrower must pay a significant fee to
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obtain it, borrowers may be disinclined
to seek comparable information from
multiple sources. See HUD-Treasury
Report, 2000 at 66.
The HUD-Treasury Report pointed out
that unscrupulous mortgage brokers
"may receive compensation as a result
of inflated upfront charges paid by
borrowers and indirect fees paid by
lenders * * *. Brokers and lenders may
also structure charges so that they are
less transparent to the borrower,
through the use of mechanisms such as
yield spread premiums, which may
disguise the true cost of credit." HUD-
Treasury Report, 2000, at 80.
III. This Proposed Rule
With the above background in mind,
today's rule proposes a new framework
for borrower disclosures under RESPA
that would:
1. Address the issue of mortgage
broker compensation, specifically the
problem of lender payments to mortgage
brokers, by fundamentally changing the
way in which such lender payments in
brokered mortgage transactions are
recorded and reported to borrowers;
2. Significantly improve HUD's Good
Faith Estimate (GFE) settlement cost
disclosure, and amend HUD's related
RESPA regulations, to make the GFE
firmer and more usable, to facilitate
shopping for mortgages, and to avoid
unexpected charges to borrowers at
settlement; and
3. Remove regulatory barriers to allow
guaranteed packages of settlement
services and mortgages to be made
available to borrowers, to make
borrower shopping for mortgages easier
and further reduce settlement costs. A
description of each of these aspects of
the rule follows.
A. Addressing Mortgage Broker
Compensation and Lender Payments to
Brokers
The proposed rule would
fundamentally change the way in which
information on the mortgage broker's
functions and charges are reported in
the Good Faith Estimate as described
below.
1. Describing the Loan Originator's
Function
Under this proposed rule, the new
GFE at Section r would require that
mortgage brokers and all other loan
originators describe their services. The
proposed form does not ask that only
brokers provide this description because
the description of other originators'
services is equally useful to borrowers.
The GFE would advise that the loan
originator performs origination services
by arranging funding from one or more
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sources for the borrower. It also advises
that the originator does not shop for nor
offer loans from all mortgage funding
sources and the originator cannot
guarantee the lowest price or best terms
available in the market. The GFE makes
clear that the borrower should compare
the prices on the form and shop for the
loan originator, mortgage product, and
settlement services that best meet the
borrower's needs.
The rule would require that this
information be provided on the GFE to
effectuate the GFE's purpose of
providing borrowers with settlement
cost information and avoiding confusion
particularly with respect to the role of
mortgage brokers. This language seeks to
disabuse borrowers of the notion that
brokers or other loan originators are
their agents, and therefore are
automatically shopping for them, a
notion that can prevent their own
shopping. This new provision will be
coupled with increased education
through the Settlement Cost Booklet and
other means to help borrowers.
2. Explaining to the Borrower the
Option of Paying Settlement Costs
through the Use of Lender Payments
Based on Higher Interest Rate
The new GFE, at Section IV, would
clearly show borrowers the effect of
alternative interest rates and their effect
on monthly payments and cash needed
for settlement. The GFE would inform
borrowers that they have the options to
pay settlement costs: (l) Through cash
payments at settlement, (2) by
borrowing additional funds to pay
settlement costs, (3) by paying
settlement costs through a higher
interest rate and higher monthly
payment, or (4) by lowering the interest
rate and monthly payment by paying
discount points. These options are
available in loans from originators other
than brokers. The Department in both
the 1999 and 2001 Policy Statements on
Mortgage Broker Fees especially called
for the provision of this information to
borrowers by brokers in brokered loans.
The provision of this information on
the form will help borrowers
understand their options for paying
settlement costs and decide whether to
use any lender payments to the
borrower, discussed in (4) below, to
help defray some costs or all of their
settlement costs, including but not
limited to the mortgage broker's charges.
3. Disclosing the Loan Originators'
Charges-Including the Mortgage
Broker's and Lender's Total Charges to
Borrowers
HUD's current rules require that the
broker's direct charges be disclosed on
the GFE while all indirect payments
including yield spread premiums are
disclosed separately as "Paid Outside of
Closing" (P.O.G).36 The existing
disclosure requirements and
instructions do not make clear to the
borrower the broker's total charges so
that the borrower can focus on them,
shop among brokers, or negotiate these
total costs with the broker. Instead,
because of the way indirect broker
compensation is currently disclosed,
many borrowers conclude incorrectly
that such indirect payments have no
effect on their loan costS.37
Section III A of the GFE, as proposed,
would disclose to the borrower as a
consolidated figure the total origination
charges of the mortgage broker and the
lender. (The zero tolerance applies to
the total origination charges of the
mortgage broker and the lender rather
than any split between them.)
Additionally, on Attachment A-l there
would be a breakdown of the origination
charges into the total charges,
respectively, of the broker and of the
lender. This approach of providing total
origination charges initially is taken to
assist borrowers in comparing total
origination charges of brokered loans to
loans originated by lenders. At the same
time, it ensures that the borrower knows
the broker's and lender's charges. For
mortgage brokers, these charges shall
include all charges from the borrower
that are paid to the mortgage broker for
the transaction. For lenders, these
charges shall include all or any portion
of direct charges from the borrower that
the lender receives for the transaction,
other than discount points reported in
line III B (2). Under the secondary
market exemption, any additional fees
realized by a lender from a bona fide
3. HUU's existing RESPA regulations do not
provide explicit guidance on where to place a yield
spread premium on the GFE, nor is there any
express reference to such indirect payments on the
GFE format. The regulations do suggest generally,
however, that Appendix A Instructions for the
HUD-l should be followed in completing the GFE.
See 24 CFR 3500.7(c)(l). As described above, these
Instructions state that a mortgage broker's fee is to
be disclosed on one of the blank lines in the 800
series. A corresponding line appears on HUU's
current suggested GFE format (Appendix C to
Regulation Xl for listing such fees. HUO's
instructions, however, do not require that the
amount to be reported in the 800 series for mortgage
broker fees must include yield spread premiums. To
the contrary, HUU's Appendix A Instructions
advise that yield spread premiums and other lender
payments to mortgage brokers should be disclosed
on the HUD-I as payments by the lender to the
broker that are "paid outside of closing" ("p.a.c."),
and expressly state that such amounts should not
be shown in the borrower's column. 24 CFR part
3500, Appendix A.
37 HUU's Settlement Cost Booklet is also not
helpful. It suggests. incorrectly, that yield spread
premiums are not costs to the borrower. It will be
revised.
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transfer of a loan is not required to be
disclosed under HUD's RESPA
regulations. See 24 CFR 3500.5 (b)(7),
4, Requiring That in Brokered
Transactions Lender Payments to the
Borrower and Borrower Payments to the
Lender Be More Appropriately Reported
A major provision of this rule is the
requirement that in all loans originated
by mortgage brokers, any payments from
a lender based on a borrower's
transaction, other than a payment to the
broker for the par value of the loan,
including payments based upon an
above par interest rate on the loan
(including payments formerly
denominated as yield spread premium),
be reported on the GFE (and the HUD-
lilA Settlement Statement) as a lender
payment to the borrower. Additionally,
the rule would require that any
borrower payments to reduce the
interest rate (discount points) in
brokered loans must equal the discount
points paid to the lender, and be
reported as such on the GFE (and HUD-
lilA) as a borrower payment to the
lender. These changes would require
mortgage brokers to disclose the
maximum amount of compensation they
could receive from a transaction, by
including the amount in the
"origination charges" block of the GFE,
and indicating the amount of the lender
payment to borrower that would be
received at the interest rate quoted, if
any. Mortgage brokers would be unable
to increase their compensation without
the borrower's knowledge, by placing
the borrower in an above par loan and
receiving a payment from the lender
(yield spread premiums), or by retaining
any part of any borrower payment
intended to reduce the loan rate
(discount points).
Through these changes in reporting
requirements, HUD believes that
virtually all disputes regarding broker
compensation in table-funded
transactions and intermediary
transactions involving yield spread
premiums will be resolved. All
mortgage broker compensation will be
reported as direct compensation in the
origination block of the GFE, maximum
broker compensation will be clear and
brokers will have no incentive to seek
out lenders paying the largest yield
spread. They will, instead, be motivated
to find the best loan product they can .
for the borrower.
In requiring this methodology for
reporting lender payments and discount
points, it is important to note what the
Department has not done. HUD has not
taken away from borrowers the ability to
select a higher rate loan in order to pay
settlement costs (including, where the
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borrower so chooses, broker
compensation), or to pay additional
sums at settlement in order to lower
their interest rate and monthly
payments. HUD has long recognized
that these financing tools provide
flexibility and have value to borrowers
in specific circumstances. The
Department emphasized this point most
recently in Statement of Policy 2001-l.
HUD's proposed rule, therefore,
preserves these options, but seeks to the
maximum extent possible within the
Department's statutory and regulatory
framework, to eliminate the possibility
of abuse in the application of these
financing tools, by ensuring that the full
value of selecting either option is
known and redounds to the borrower.
The Department acknowledges that
the proposed rule results in different
treatment of compensation in loans
originated by lenders and those
originated by mortgage brokers. This is
not because the Department believes
that the latter are necessarily more
suspect or susceptible of abuse than the
former. It results simply from the fact
that the reporting of total lender
compensation cannot be meaningfully
regulated under RESPA, while total
broker compensation can be regulated.
This is so for both legal and practical
reasons; first, as indicated above,
lenders enjoy a secondary market
exemption from RESPA Section 8
scrutiny, meaning that under HUD's
regulations any compensation derived
from the sale of a loan in the secondary
market by a lender is outside RESPA's
purview. Second, were there no such
exemption, measuring indirect lender
compensation (compensation derived
from the loan rate) would be very
difficult. A lender may retain the loan
in its portfolio for the life of the loan,
or sell it long after the settlement.
Payments from lenders to borrowers in
brokered loans, however, based on the
lenders' rate sheets or otherwise, as well
as discount points paid to lenders, are
capable of quantification down to the
last penny.
Currently, as indicated in the
background, the GFE requires disclosure
of the lender payment to the borrower
(formerly the "yield spread premium")
as a charge that is "POC" or "paid
outside of closing," which has been a
cause of confusion for borrowers. The
form as proposed would now require
that the lender payment be disclosed
Immediately after the origination
charges. HUD believes that this new
location for the disclosure of the lender
payment will cure any confusion and
clearly tell borrowers how much their
mortgage broker is earning from the
transaction. Furthermore in order to
avoid borrower confusion about the
mortgage brokers' charges as compared
to other loan originators' charges and
the impact of a lender payment, the
proposed rule would require that
immediately following disclosure of the
lender payment the form will show the
net loan origination charge due from the
borrower. It is this number that HUD
intends the borrower to focus on and
HUD seeks to achieve this by
highlighting that total on the form, so
that the borrower understands that the
payment is applied as a credit to reduce
the borrower's total origination charges.
HUD believes that this approach ensures
clearer disclosure of all relevant broker
fees and lender payments while
avoiding disadvantaging brokers. With
the understanding provided by the form
the borrower can compare his or her net
origination charges loan-to-loan,
originator-to-originator.
B. Significantly Improved Good Faith
Estimate (GFE)
As described in the Background,
under RESPA and its implementing
regulations, loan originators must
provide the GFE either by delivering the
GFE or by placing it in the mail to the
loan applicant, not later than 3 business
days after an application is received or
prepared.38 Frequently, a GFE is
provided only after the borrower pays a
significant fee or fees. The current
suggested GFE calls for a listing of
charges that may itself lead to a
proliferation of charges. Moreover, there
are few standards for loan originators to
follow in calculating estimated costs,
which allows the GFE to be unreliable.39
For these reasons, the GFE is generally
not a useful shopping tool to compare
the charges of loan originators, other
settlement service providers, or loan
products. The GFE, and its attendant
rules, also do not effectively prevent
surprise costs at settlement.
Today's rule would make the GFE
firmer and more usable, to facilitate
borrower shopping for mortgages by
making the mortgage transaction more
transparent, and to prevent unexpected
charges to the borrower at settlement. In
order to improve the GFE HUD has
concluded that establishment of a new
required GFE format is necessary.
The rule therefore would establish a
new, more informative, required GFE
format to be provided to borrowers by
loan originators in all RESPA covered
transactions and new requirements for
its provision. HUD believes that the
,. The rule indicates that the GFE must be given
within 3 days of the time an application is received
or prepared to accommodate those instances where
originators prepare applications for borrowers.
39 See note 13. infra,
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content of the material in these
proposed forms gives the consumer the
information needed to shop for loan
products and to assist them during the
settlement process. HUD recognizes that
in order for these forms to be useful
shopping tools, they must be consumer
friendly. The Department seeks public
comment on thes'e forms. In addition,
the Department will arrange focus
groups during the comment period to
elicit comments on how to make the
material in the new proposed forms as
consumer friendly as possible, .
including considering how the new
proposed forms are best compared by
consumers to the HUD-1 and what
revisions, if any, to the HUD-1 would
be most helpful.
1. The New GFE
The proposed format for the new GFE
and Instructions for completing it
appear as Appendix C to this rule. The
proposed form is intended for use in all
federally related mortgage transactions.
In addition to the changes to the GFE
described in A above, the new required
GFE format would:
a. Provide the Interest Rate and Costs for
the Loan the Borrower Seeks
The current requirements for the GFE
do not require the inclusion of an
interest rate. Nonetheless, borrowers
shop for mortgages based on the interest
rate as well as settlement costs, and the
inclusion of this information would be
useful to borrowers. Accordingly, the
new GFE, in Section II, would list the
note rate, Annual Percentage Rate
(APR), and loan amount for the loan that
the GFE is based on. Any mortgage
insurance premium included in the APR
would be separately disclosed in
Section II. Section V would contain
information on interest rates and
adjustments to adjustable rate mortgages
and applicable prepayment penalties
and balloon payments. In Section III, the
GFE would include a disclaimer
indicating that unless the borrower
locks at this time, the interest rate may
change.
b. Simplify and Consolidate Major
Categories on the GFE
As detailed in the Background
section, under current RESPA rules, the
GFE simply lists estimated charges or
ranges of charges for settlement services.
There is no requirement for grouping or
subtotaling charges to the same
recipients. The costs listed on the GFE
include loan originator/lender-retained
charges, such as loan origination and
underwriting charges; charges by third
parties for lender required services,
such as appraisal, title and title
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insurance fees; state and local charges
imposed at settlement, such as
recording fees or city/county stamps;
and amounts the borrower is required to
put into an escrow account, or reserves,
for items such as property taxes or
hazard insurance. At settlement,
borrowers receive a second RESPA
disclosure-the Uniform Settlement
Statement (the HUD-1/1A)-that
enumerates the final costs associated
with both the loan and, if applicable,
the purchase transaction.
As proposed, the revised GFE, in
Section III, would group and
consolidate all fees and charges into
major settlement cost categories, with a
single total amount estimated for each
category. This approach would reduce
any incentive for loan originators and
others to establish a myriad of "junk
fees" and provide them in a long list, in
order to increase their profits. Loan
originators would be required to include
all fees they receive in their total,
including all points and origination
charges. The interest rate dependent
payment would include all fees
formerly to the mortgage broker from the
lender as well as any such fees in the
future.
In addition to the loan originator
charges and the interest rate dependent
payment, the major cost categories on
the revised GFE would be: (1) Lender
required and selected third party
services; (2) title charges and title
insurance premiums; (3) shoppable
lender required third party services; (4)
state and local government charges; (5)
escrow/reserves (for taxes and
insurance); (6) hazard insurance; (7) per
diem interest; and (8) optional owner's
title insurance. The proposed form then
would include a final total of all
settlement charges so the borrower can
focus on the total costs to properly
compare offers.
c. Identifies Shoppable and Required
Services
The GFE in Section III E, would aid
shopping after application by requiring
loan originators to separately identify
those third party settlement services
that are loan originator selected and
required and those that the borrower
may shop for independently.40 This
provision will enable borrowers to shop
for major services to the extent possible,
even after the borrower has selected a
loan originator. As described above,
HUD's current rules at 24 CFR 3500.7(e)
requires lenders to list on the GFE the
.0 Lender required. lender selected third party
services are to include items such as flood
certification services and mortgage insurance, to the
extent an upfront premium is charged.
particular providers of settlement
services that they require their
customers to use.41 Attachment A-1 to
the proposed form will list those
"Required Use" providers while also
identifying the services that are
required, but which borrowers can shop
for providers on their own.
Additionally, the rule proposes to ease
the "Required Use" disclosure
requirement, by only requiring the loan
originator to state the service, the name
of the provider, and the cost estimate.
The Department proposes to forego the
requirement that this listing also
include the lender's relationship to the
required provider.
Attachment A-1 will, as noted, also
include the breakdown of the
origination charges into lender and
broker charges so that borrowers can
better understand the respective lender
and broker charges, and where possible
even negotiate lower costs. In a similar
vein, Attachment A-1 also breaks out
title agent services and title insurance
into separate subtotals for the actual
title insurance versus compensation to
the title agent. Title agents routinely
receive direct payments from borrowers
for their services as well as commissions
from the insurance premium for the sale
of insurance. The title agent subtotal
will add up these costs so that the
borrower can compare, and possibly
negotiate, these charges.
2. New GFE Requirements
To improve the existing disclosure
scheme, this proposed rule would
amend Regulation X to establish new
rules for the GFE including the
following:
a. Clarifying the Application
Requirements
Under the proposed rule, the GFE
would be delivered or mailed at or
within 3 days of application. The
proposed rule, however, would only
require a borrower to provide basic
credit information and a property
address in verbal, written or
computerized form, but before the
payment of any significant fee to the
loan originator in order to receive a
GFE. The GFE would be conditioned on
the borrower's credit approval following
final undenniting and appraisal of the
property to be secured by the mortgage.
To carry out this approach, the rule
proposes to first clarify the definition of
the term application, in HUD's RESPA
., HUD's RESPA regulations contain certain
restrictions on Affiliated Business Arrangements.
See 24 CFR 3500.15. Section 9 of RESPA also
prohibits sellers of property from requiring. directlv
or indirectly. the buyer to purchase title insurance
from any particular title company.
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rules at 24 CFR 3500.2(b). The new
definition of application would make
clear, in accordance with informal HUD
advice, that an application is deemed to
exist whenever a prospective borrower
provides a loan originator sufficient
information (typically a social security
number, a property address, basic
employment information, the borrower's
information on the house price or a best
estimate on the value ofthe property,
and the mortgage loan needed), whether
verbally, in writing or computer
generated, to enable the loan originator
to make a preliminary credit decision
concerning the borrower so that the
originator can provide a GFE. See HUD
Old Informal Opinion (March 27, 1980)
and HUD Old Informal Opinion
(October 15, 1982). HUD proposes this
new definition to facilitate the provision
of GFEs in response to virtually any
type of request for a GFE, in order to
give the borrower the necessary
information for shopping. Under current
rules, an application is the "submission
of a borrower's financial information, in
anticipation of a credit decision whether
written or computer generated relating
to a federally related loan" identifying
a specific property. The proposed rule
would explicitly broaden the definition
to cover verbal and other requests as
long as these requests contain sufficient
information for the originator to provide
a GFE. HUD also will consider
comments on whether it should provide
a brief form for the application.
Under RESPA, a "Good Faith
Estimate" is to be provided with a
settlement cost booklet by a lender to
each person "from whom it receives or
for whom it prepares a written
application." 12 U.S.c. 2604(d). Because
an originator begins the process of
preparing an application on behalf of
the borrower when the borrower
submits application information, the
borrower's information itself need not
be provided in writing.
RESPA's time limits for delivery of
the GFE would run from the point that
an originator receives "an application."
While the statute allows the loan
originator to mail or deliver the GFE 3
days after application, it is likely that
the originator will provide the GFE as
quickly after the borrower's request as
possible.42 HUD recognizes that the
proposed rule's change of the definition
of application, and the requirement that
42 As indicated in the background section. supra.
during the development of the HUD/Fed Report.
HUD became aware of proposals where borrowers
would arrange and pay for credit reports to loan
originators of their selection. HUD supports these
efforts as a way to lessen tbe burden on the
originator's customers of paying the costs of those
who are shopping.
49150 Federal Register / Vol. 67, No. 145/ Monday, July 29, 2002/ Proposed Rules
GFE be provided to prospective
borrowers early in the shopping process,
frequently before they select a loan
originator, may have implications for
the content and delivery of required
disclosures under the Truth in Lending
Act (TILA). Question 28 specifically
seeks comments on how HUD's
proposed GFE changes impact other
federal disclosure requirements, and
invites suggestions on ways to
consolidate or coordinate existing
statutory disclosure requirements.
The rule proposes that GFE estimates
would be valid for a minimum of 30
days from when the document is
delivered or mailed to the borrower.
This is proposed in light of the
tolerances to avoid committing
originators indefinitely. Within the 30
days the borrower must agree to go
forward and pay any additional money
required to complete the underwriting
process. If the borrower fails to accept
the offer within 30 days, the borrower
would need to return to the loan
originator to request the originator to
provide a new GFE or ratify the
previous one. Commenters are asked in
Question 5 below whether this is an
appropriate time period for the GFE.
b. Facilitating Shopping With the GFE
As stated above, to achieve the
purposes of the Act, the proposed rule
would limit fees paid by the borrower
for the GFE, if any, to the amounts
necessary for the originator to provide
the GFE itself. The fee could not include
amounts to defray later appraisal or
underwriting costs. This approach
would both facilitate shopping and
reduce the possibility that fees for the
GFE are unearned, in violation of
RESPA's proscription against such fees.
While HUD recognizes that there may be
costs attendant to obtaining credit
information from third parties and
evaluating that information manually
and/or electronically, the provision of
the GFE does not today, and would not
in the future, necessitate full
underwriting and appraisal. These steps
come afterwards, and under the
approach in this proposal, GFEs
explicitly would be given subject to
underwriting and appraisal. Therefore,
any charge at the time of application
should be limited only to those costs
that result directly from providing the
GFE. This is not to say that all loan
originators would be expected to charge
for GFEs. HUD would prefer that
originators not impose any charge for a
GFE, since providing a GFE before the
payment of any fee will further facilitate
shopping. HUD believes it would be
reasonable for loan originators to treat
shoppers for mortgages in much the
same way other retailers treat shoppers,
where the price of the product includes
marketing expenses and purchasers pay
the costs incurred to serve shoppers
who do not purchase the goods or
services. Such an approach would better
serve the purposes of the statute.
c. Providing an Accurate GFE
As described in the background
section, Regulation X currently defines
"Good faith estimate" as "an estimate,
prepared in accordance with Section 5
of RESPA, of charges that a borrower is
likely to incur in connection with a
settlement." Pursuant to 24 CFR
3500.7(c) of Regulation X, loan
originators are required to state on the
GFE the dollar amount or range of
charges that the borrower will normally
pay at or before settlement based upon
common practice in the locality of the
mortgaged property. While the rules
require that the estimate be made in
"good faith" and "bear a reasonable
relationship" to the charges the
borrower is likely to incur at settlement,
there is no further explication of what
a "Good Faith Estimate" demands,
either with respect to the loan
originator's own charges/compensation,
or with regard to lender required third
party charges and other settlement costs.
Three decades of experience has
shown that too often the estimates
appearing on GFEs are significantly
lower than the amount ultimately
charged at settlement, are not made in
good faith (e.g., a range of $0-$10,000),
and do not provide meaningful
guidance on the costs borrowers
ultimately will face at settlement. The
Department recognizes that,
occasionally, unforeseeable
circumstances can and do drive up costs
in particular transactions. HUD believes,
however, that in most cases loan
originators have the ability to estimate
final settlement costs with great
accuracy. The loan originator's own feel
compensation, which is entirely within
the originator's control, can be stated
with certainty, absent unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances. Moreover,
most third party costs such as appraisal
charges, pest inspection fees, and taxi
flood reviews, are fixed, and others,
such as upfront mortgage insurance
premiums, and title services and
insurance, typically only vary
depending on the value of the property
or the loan amount. State and local
recording charges, stamps, taxes are also
generally well known to loan originators
or, where necessary, can readily be
calculated based on the loan amount or
estimated precisely, on a pro rata basis,
based on a projected settlement date.
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HUD also believes that recent
advances in technology and
telecommunications in loan processing
make the routine provision of accurate
estimates of third party costs both easier
and cheaper.
Notwithstanding, the GFE has too
often failed to represent an accurate
estimate of final settlement costs for a
number of reasons. The absence of more
precise regulatory standards for
measuring accuracy has not helped
ensure greater accuracy and reliability.
Beyond that, some originators appear to
purposely underestimate settlement
costs as a means of inducing prospective
borrowers to use their services, or as a
way to obfuscate the amounts they plan
to receive later in the final mortgage
transaction. In too many cases, charges
that never appeared on the GFE
materialize at settlement. Such "junk
fees" typically result in additional
compensation for the originator and/or
third party settlement service providers.
In light of these considerations, HUD
believes that in order for the GFE to
serve its intended purpose, which is to
apprise prospective borrowers of the
charges they are likely to incur at
settlement, new standards must be
established under existing law to better
define "good faith" and the standards
applicable to the GFE.43 Accordingly,
the proposed rule would make a number
of specific changes to GFE requirements.
First, the rule would prohibit loan
originators from exceeding the charges
stated on the GFE for their own services,
lender required and lender selected
third party services, and government
charges at settlement absent
"unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances" beyond the loan
originator's control such as acts of God,
war, disaster, or any other emergency,
making it impossible or impractical to
perform.
Second, the rule would establish an
upper limit, or 10% "tolerance," so that
actual charges at settlement for
shoppable lender required third party
services, borrower selected title services
and insurance, and reserves/escrow,
cannot vary by more than 10% of the
estimates of those fees and charges
43 Differing editions of Black's Law Dictionary
have defined "good faith" as "a state of mind
consisting in * • • honesty in belief or purpose
• * • [and faithfulness to one's duty or obligation,"
and "freedom from knowledge of circumstances
which ought to put the holder upon inquiry" as
well as "absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render [a transaction
unconscientious." Inherent in these definitions is
the concept that where a party makes an estimate
in good faith they will take into account all relevant
information available to them. and will exercise
reasonable care in ascertaining and evaluating such
information before providing such an estimate.
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stated on the GFE absent unforeseeable
and extraordinary circumstances. The
10% tolerance applies to all lender
selected third party services, and to
third party services from providers who
have been suggested to the borrower by
the loan originator. It does not apply to
third party services from providers
selected by the borrower independently
of the originator's recommendation.
The inclusion ofthese tolerances will
assure that borrowers can either find
prices within the estimates in the
marketplace or return to the lender who
will identify sources that will honor
those prices. However, if the borrower
chooses to purchase a more expensive
service than is available or than the
lender can provide, the lender will not
be held to have exceeded the tolerance.
The 10% level for tolerances has been
selected to inject discipline into
estimates while providing a margin for
legitimate error based on market
changes. Commenters are asked to
provide their views on whether this is
or is not the appropriate tolerance level,
tolerance, and why.
Third, the rule would include
redisclosure requirements triggered by
changed circumstances. Specifically, if,
after full underwriting, a loan originator
selected by a borrower to obtain a
mortgage loan determines that the
prospective borrower does not qualify
for the loan product identified in a
previously provided GFE, the loan
originator shall inform the borrower that
the loan originator does not offer loan
products meeting the borrower's needs
or credit status. Alternatively if the loan
originator does offer other products
meeting the borrower's circumstances,
the loan originator must so inform the
borrower and the borrower may request
a new GFE. Furthermore, when, after
receiving a GFE, a borrower selects a
loan originator to obtain a mortgage loan
and qualifies for the loan product
identified, but elects not to lock-in the
interest rate and the interest rate
dependent payment quoted on the GFE,
the loan originator shall provide the
borrower with an amended GFE at such
time as the borrower does lock the rate
and the interest rate dependent payment
if either has changed from that quoted
on the original GFE. The amended GFE
shall identify those cost categories that
have changed as a result ofthe change
in the interest rate. In no case mayan
amended GFE include increases in cost
categories which are not dependent on
the interest rate (Section III. B.).
By limiting the extent to which final
settlement charges can exceed GFE
estimates, the Department intends to
render the GFE a much firmer, more
reliable, and meaningful disclosure for
borrowers. If the cost at settlement
exceeds the amount reported on the
Good Faith Estimate, absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, the borrower may
withdraw the application and receive a
full refund of all loan-related fees. Such
circumstances would have to be
documented in writing by the loan
originator and such documentation
retained by the loan originator. These
circumstances may be further defined in
HUD's final regulations, and comments
are requested in response to Question 2
below on both the definition of
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, and borrower rights
where there is noncompliance with GFE
requirements. Concurrent with
finalization of this rule, HUD also will
establish procedures for closely
scrutinizing loan originators that fail to
meet these new GFE requirements for
possible Section 8 violations.
d. Negotiating Discounts From Third
Party Settlement Service Providers
The establishment of tolerances under
the proposal will require that loan
originators actively follow the market
prices for settlement services in their
communities. HUD recognizes that the
new GFE's tighter requirements on
estimated third party charges may cause
many loan originators not already doing
so to seek to establish pricing
arrangements with specific third party
settlement service providers in advance,
in order both to ensure they are able to
meet the tolerances and to ensure lower
prices for their customers. As part of
negotiations for such arrangements,
many originators, particularly those
with a substantial volume of business,
may seek prices from third party
providers that are lower than those
providers offer on a retail basis.
However, because Section 8 ofRESPA
broadly prohibits providing a "thing of
value," which is specifically defined to
include discounts, in exchange for the
referral of business, many loan
originators have been reluctant to
openly seek such pricing benefits, even
where any such discount in the price is
passed on to the borrower. HUD
believes that the fundamental purpose
of RESPA is to lower settlement costs to
borrowers, and it is therefore contrary to
the law's objectives to interpret the anti-
referral fee provisions of Section 8 to
prohibit one settlement service provider
from using its market power to negotiate
discounted prices, as long as the entire
discounted price negotiated by the
originator is charged to the borrower
and reported as part of the total charge
within Sections III(C) through (J) as
appropriate. The proposed rule amends
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Regulation X to make this clear. HUD
also solicits comments on this issue in
Question 4 below.
e. Revising the HUD-l/IA and
Appendix A Instructions
Consistent with the proposed rule's
new approach to the reporting of lender
payments to borrowers, the proposal
would require that on the HUD-l all
such payments be reflected in the
borrower's column, in the applicable
series (e.g., 800 series for payments to
mortgage brokers; 1300 series for
payments to other third party settlement
service providers). However, inasmuch
as there is no place for identifying and
reporting credits on the HUD-l A, in
any transaction where there is such
payment, the rule requires that the
HUD-l must be used. The proposed
rule's revisions to the Appendix A
instructions for the HUD-l appear
immediately following the proposed
amendments to Regulation X.
Also, the proposed new GFE, while
reducing the number of cost items
reported on the face page, and
consolidating the presentation to the
borrower of important cost information,
is not readily comparable to either the
HUD-l or HUD-IA form, which the
borrower will receive at settlement. This
is because certain cost items on the GFE
are currently reported in numbered
sections of the HUDI/IA forms not
corresponding to their GFE
counterparts. Thus, for example, while
the proposed GFE clearly distinguishes
between those settlement costs
attributable to the loan originator(s)
(section A. on the new GFE) and other
lender required third party settlement
services (sections C. and E. on the new
GFEJ, the HUD-l/IA forms combine
loan originator costs and some third
party costs under the same heading
("Items Payable in Connection with the
Loan") and numbered section (800). The
HUDI/I-A forms include credit report
fees, appraisal fees, mortgage insurance
application fees, and inspection fees in
this category. Other third party services,
such as pest inspection fees, permit fee,
and surveys are separately reported on
the HUD-I/IA (1300). In addition, the
new GFE identifies as separate major
cost categories some items reported, in
whole or in part, under the same
heading on the HUD-I/IA. For
example, the new GFE lists hazard
insurance and per cHern interest as
separate categories. However, on the
HUD-I/IA, where hazard insurance
premiums are paid in advance they are
reported, along with other items such as
per diem interest and pre-paid mortgage
insurance premiums, in section 900,
"Items Required by Lender to be Paid in
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Advance." Moreover, where a portion of
the hazard insurance premium is
required to be escrowed, that amount is
reported on the HUD-l/1A in section
1000, along with other escrow items, as
"Reserves Deposited With Lender."
As proposed, the new GFE would
consolidate certain charges into lump
sum categories (e.g. lender required
third party services). The Department
has made only minor changes to the
HUD-l instructions, to assist the
borrower in comparing the new GFE to
the HUD-I. The Department took this
approach because the HUD-l is well
accepted as a listing of settlement
service charges by industry and
consumers alike and HUD is reluctant to
change the form unnecessarily.
However, there is a risk that if the forms
are not clearly comparable, lenders
could deviate from the prices given in
the GFE or GMPA and the borrower
would not realize the deviations.
Modifications could be made to the
HUD-l so that the fee categories on the
new GFE would correspond to similar
groupings on the HUD-1 and the two
documents could be more easily
compared. HUD invites comments in
Question 9 below on whether or not the
HUD-l should be modified. HUD plans
to use focus groups to ensure that the
proposed forms are consumer friendly
including considering, among other
things, how the new proposed forms are
best compared by consumers to the
HUD-1 and what revisions, if any, to
the HUD-l would be most helpfuL
For purposes of TILA, the packager
must list the finance charges needed to
calculate the APR on an addendum to
the HUD-l or HUD-IA and HUD
invites comments in Question 20 on this
issue. The proposed rule seeks comment
on whether there should be further
modifications to the HUD-l/1A forms
so that they more accurately correspond
to the new GFE. However, the
Department believes that, in the absence
of further changes to the HUD-l/1A
forms, borrowers can be assisted in
comparing the two disclosures, and, to
that end, the new GFE identifies, next
to each GFE category, where on the
current HUD-l/IA the corresponding
cost information is to be found. As the
preceding discussion makes clear, this
necessitates identifying more than one
HUD-1/1A section number next to some
GFE categories.44
.. Specifically. the new GFE contains the
following cross-references to the HUD-1/1A for
each GFE category: A. Origination Fees. 800; C.
Lender Required/SelectedThird Party Services, 800.
900, 1000, 1300; D. Title Services/Insurance, 1100;
E. Lender Required/Shoppable Third Party
Services. 800, 900, 1000, 1300; F. Government
Charges-Taxes. 1000. 1200; G. Reserves/Escrow,
3. Section 6 Transfer of Servicing
Language
In 1990, Congress amended RESPA to
include a disclosure, which informs
borrowers that their loan or the
servicing of their loan, may be sold. 12
U.S.C. 2605, Public Law 93-533 section
6 (November 28, 1990). In 1997, HUD
proposed a rule to implement the
amended statute. Many comments were
received and the rule was never
finalized. 62 FR 25740. The Department
plans to finalize the 1997 proposed rule
shortly. However, in the meantime, the
Section 6 language in the statute may be
provided in conjunction with the GFE
instead of the language currently
indicated in § 3500.21 and Appendix
MS-1.
C. Remove Regulatory Barriers To Allow
Guaranteed Packages ofSettlement
Services and Mortgages To Be Made
Available to Borrowers
1. A New Safe Harbor for Guaranteed
Mortgage Packages (GMP) Created
Through HUD's Exemption Authority
Consistent with its earlier
recommendations in the HUD-Federal
Reserve Report, described in the
background section of this rule, the
Department believes that the most
effective means of simplifying the
process of obtaining a mortgage,
promoting competition to lower costs
and facilitating shopping is to offer
borrowers Guaranteed Mortgage
Packages containing a lump sum price
for all loan originator and governmental
required settlement costs associated
with obtaining a mortgage combined
with an interest rate guarantee for the
loan. The Department believes that such
packages offer borrowers the possibility
of lower prices through innovation by
packagers, the pricing discipline
involved in arranging packages, and
competition among packagers.
Under a Guaranteed Mortgage Package
approach packagers would offer a lump-
sum price for settlement costs, and an
interest rate guarantee at no cost to the
borrower until the borrower selects the
package. The packager would be held to
those figures from the time the package
is agreed to through settlement. This
approach would allow the borrower to
rely on the quoted price and rate and to
compare fewer numbers in shopping for
the best loan to meet his or her needs.
Even with improvements to the current
disclosure scheme, including more
reliable quotes for major settlement
costs under the new GFE (see B(2)(c),
1000; H. Per Diem Interest. 900; I. Hazard
Insurance. 900. 1000; J. Optional Owner's Title,
1100.
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above), it will not be as easy for
borrowers to shop and compare as it
would be if they could simply
comparison shop for mortgages based on
a few prices as under this proposal.
The Secretary has determined,
therefore, that effective packaging of
settlement services will depend on
packagers negotiating lower costs with
third party settlement service providers,
and then providing borrowers with an
alternative disclosure, the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package Agreement (GMPA).
This proposal will increase the
opportunities for borrowers to shop
among packages fostering competition
to lower costs further. Under Section
8(c)(5) of the Act, the Secretary is
authorized to issue regulations that
remove certain payments or classes of
payments or other transfers from the
Section 8 prohibitions on kickbacks and
unearned fees after consultation with
designated regulatory agencies. Also,
under Section 19 (a) of the Act, the
Secretary is authorized to grant
reasonable exemptions for classes of
transactions as may be necessary to
achieve the purposes of the Act.
Accordingly, under these authorities,
HUD is proposing to establish a
carefully circumscribed safe harbor from
RESPA's provisions at Section 8 to
facilitate the development and
marketing of Guaranteed Mortgage
Packages.
2. Who May Package
The purpose of the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package safe harbor is to
stimulate competition and improve the
borrower's ability to shop. Under this
proposal, entities other than lenders
may qualify as packagers for a safe
harbor, as long as their packages include
a mortgage and otherwise satisfy the
requirements of the safe harbor. In this
connection, in order to ensure that the
borrower receives the settlement
package of services and the mortgage
loan, the proposed rule would require
that the packager sign the GMPA
agreeing to provide the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package at the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package price and that non-
lender packagers have a lender sign the
GMPA after borrower acceptance
agreeing to provide the loan included in
the Guaranteed Mortgage Package.
3. Requirements for the Safe Harbor
Packagers that provide the GMP and
abide by its terms and the other
requirements of this rule, along with
any settlement service providers
participating in such a package, would
receive a safe harbor from scrutiny
under Section 8 of RESPA as described
below. Specifically, to qualify for the
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safe harbor, packagers, within 3 days of
borrower's application, would have to
offer, without an upfront fee: (1) A
guaranteed price for the loan origination
and virtually all other lender required
settlement services needed to close the
mortgage, including without limitation,
all application, origination,
underwriting, appraisal, pest inspection,
flood and tax review, title services and
insurance, and any other lender
required services, and governmental
charges; (2) a mortgage loan with an
interest rate guarantee, subject to change
(prior to borrower lock-in) resulting
only from a change in an observable and
verifiable index or based on other
appropriate data or means to ensure the
guarantee; 45 and (3) a Guaranteed
Mortgage Package Agreement (GMPA) as
a prospective contract with the borrower
that is binding through settlement
containing the maximum settlement
costs. The GMP offer would remain
open as an offer for a minimum of 30
days from when the document is
delivered or mailed to the borrower. The
GMPA becomes a binding contractual
commitment immediately upon
borrower acceptance of the package and
payment of a minimal engagement fee,
subject only to acceptable final
underwriting and property appraisal.
The guaranteed package also would
include up-front costs of mortgage
insurance. The cost of mortgage
insurance is based on the ratio of the
loan amount to the value of the property
and is not finally determined with
certainty until the lender knows the
property value. In the GMP price, the
packager shall include any maximum
upfront mortgage insurance premium
based upon the borrower's estimate of
the property value and the amount that
needs to be borrowed. The GMPA will
inform the borrower that the upfront
mortgage insurance premium, if any,
may decrease or become unnecessary
depending on the final appraised value
of the property. The "Other Required
Settlement Costs", discussed
immediately below, would include any
required reserves for mortgage insurance
premiums. Because full underwriting
information will not be available to the
packager at the time the GMPA is
provided, implementation issues are
presented. Commenters are invited in
Question 21 below to provide their
views on how mortgage insurance
45 Through this requirement. discussed infra,
HUD seeks to ensure that the rate of the loan does
not vary after the borrower commits to a packager
for reasons other than an increase in the cost of
funds. There may be a variety of ways to solve this
problem and HUD is seeking comments, in
particular, on how to implement an interest rate
guarantee.
should be addressed in Guaranteed
Mortgage Package Agreements.
Under the proposal, reserves that are
escrowed would be disclosed on the
GMPA as "Other Required Costs" and
subject to a 10% tolerance. The only
costs that could be excluded from the
guarantee and not subject to any
tolerance would be those that fluctuate
depending upon the borrower's choice,
such as hazard insurance, per diem
interest, and optional owner's title
insurance. However, the Questions
below ask commenters whether these
items should also be included in the
package at the required minimum
amounts with a notation that "optional
costs" are the responsibility ofthe
borrower.
The proposal does not require
packagers to itemize the services
included in the GMPA. HUD believes
however, that there are certain
settlement services that are of specific
interest and value to the borrower such
as pest inspection, appraisal and the
purchase of lender's title insurance
(which may affect the cost of owner's
title insurance). Some lenders may
choose to forego some or all of these
services. Therefore, HUD proposes that
if any of these particular services are not
anticipated to be included in the GMP,
this fact must be disclosed on the
GMPA.
Packagers may in GMP transactions
provide a GMPA in lieu of the GFE. The
revised instructions for the HUD-l/IA
require that in Guaranteed Mortgage
Packages, the HUD-l/IA must itemize
the services provided, but not the
specific charges for those services.
However, because the amounts of
certain individual charges needed to
compute the finance charge and the
APR under TILA and HOEPA, the
packager must list the finance charges
needed to calculate the APR on an
addendum to the HUD-l or HUD-IA.
At Question 20, commenters are asked
to provide their views on whether this
approach adequately protects and
preserves consumers' rights under TILA
and HOEPA while facilitating
packaging, and to suggest alternatives, if
needed. Entities that do not choose to
seek this safe harbor will continue to
provide the GFE and HUD-l/IA
disclosure scheme, as amended by this
rule.
4. Contents of the Guaranteed Mortgage'
Package Agreement
The premise underpinning packaging
is that firm, simple, guaranteed price
quotes will enable borrowers to shop for
mortgage loans with much greater
confidence and certainty. The GMPA
starts with a brief description of the
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function of the packager-what the
packager is providing-and a statement
that the interest rate on the proposed
form, and the settlement costs quotation
(if any), represent an offer to the
borrower which is open and guaranteed
for 30 days from when the document is
delivered or mailed to the borrower, and
which will immediately become a
binding contractual agreement upon
borrower acceptance and payment of a
minimal engagement fee, subject only to
acceptable final underwriting and
property appraisal. The opening
description also makes clear that any
required settlement costs not separately
itemized and estimated in Section III of
the GMPA are the responsibility of the
packager.
Section I of the GMPA provides the
interest rate guarantee and APR along
with an explanation that the interest
rate is guaranteed through settlement if
the borrower agrees now to the GMPA
and locks-in this rate by a specified
date/time. Any mortgage insurance
premium included in the APR would be
separately disclosed in Section 1. It
provides that if the borrower does not
choose to commit immediately, it is
guaranteed that the quoted interest rate
will not change except in relation to
changes in a specified index rate (or
other such appropriate data or means as
HUD may determine to assure that
changes in the rate are reflective of the
cost of funds and not simply to increase
the packager's compensation).
Section II of the GMPA states that this
package price covers all services,
besides those listed in Section III, that
are necessary to close the loan. The
packager would, however, be required
to inform the borrower if certain
designated items are not anticipated to
be included as part of the package
including lender's title insurance, the
pest inspection, and appraisal. Under
the GMPA, any pest inspection report,
credit report, and appraisal would be
provided to the borrower upon the
borrower's request. (On the HUD-l,
borrowers will receive a listing of the
specific services provided, but not the
specific prices for each service. The
total settlement costs will be provided.)
Section III of the GMPA provides a
description of "Other Required
Settlement Costs" which are outside the
package and informs the borrower that
reserves/escrow are subject to a 10%
upper limit, or tolerance, at settlement
absent unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances. However, the 10%
tolerance does not apply to hazard
insurance and per diem interest in this
category. The GMPA also makes clear
that any required settlement cost not
specifically identified on the GMPA as
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outside a package, and itemized on the
GMPA, is included in the guaranteed
price quote and is the responsibility of
the packager.
Section IV of the GMPA provides the
borrower the cost of owner's title
insurance, if available. For any package
where the packager offers the borrower
the option of paying all or part of the
stated guaranteed and/or estimated
settlement costs through a higher
interest rate, that option will be
explained in accordance with Section V
ofthe GMPA. Similarly, where a
packager offers the borrower the option
of lowering the stated guaranteed
interest rate by paying additional
amounts at settlement, commonly
referred to as discount points, that
option will also be explained in
accordance with Section V of the
GMPA.
Section VI provides interest rates and
adjustment terms related to adjustable
rate mortgages, applicable prepayment
penalties, and balloon payments.
Section VII of the GMPA must be signed
by an authorized agent of the packager
and the borrower to become a binding
contract for the Guaranteed Mortgage
Package at the Guaranteed Mortgage
Package price. After acceptance by the
borrower, non-lender packagers must
ensure that the lender sign the GMPA
agreeing to provide the loan included in
the Guaranteed Mortgage Package. HUD
solicits comments on the issue of lender
signatures on the GMPA in Question 18
below. Notwithstanding the basic
objective of packaging, which is to
dramatically improve the borrower's
capacity to comparison shop, different
entities may offer two types of packages.
Some packagers may offer GMPs in
which all settlement costs are included
in the interest rate guarantee (in which
case no guaranteed settlement cost
quote will be provided), while other
packagers may quote a guaranteed price
for all settlement costs along with a
(presumably lower) interest rate
guarantee. The Special Information
Booklet and other consumer education
materials will alert borrowers to
compare the combined impact of both
settlement cost and interest rate
guarantees when shopping among
packagers, and will suggest that a
borrower might wish to compare the
APRs of the two products as well as
consider how long the borrower plans to
stay in the property; a longer mortgage
term may mitigate in favor of a borrower
choosing to pay settlement costs
through a higher rate.
5. Interest Rate Guarantee
In the rule, HUD is requiring that
Guaranteed Mortgage Packages include
an interest rate guarantee. HUD's
rationale for this requirement is that
both the settlement costs and the
interest rate need to be firm for
borrowers to compare loan products.
HUD recognizes, however, that after a
borrower requests a GMPA but before
locking in a rate, the interest rate on a
loan may change based on market
forces. Similarly, some borrowers
choose to float even after they have
committed to an originator, in the hopes
that market interest rates will fall. In
such instances, HUD believes that in the
context of GMPs, it is necessary to
assure that when the borrower is ready
to lock, the interest rate will only be
changed based on observable market
changes, or based on other data or
appropriate means to ensure the
guarantee. One possibility is to have the
rate move with an observable and
verifiable index. Another is to have a
rate publicly available. Whatever the
ultimate methodology, it must be easily
useable and verifiable by the borrower
and the industry. Commenters are asked
to address Question 13 concerning the
use of an index or a substitute therefore
to address this problem.
6. Scope of the Safe Harbor
The Secretary is exercising exemption
authority under Section 8(c)(5) and
Section 19 of RESPA to establish this
carefully circumscribed guaranteed
mortgage packaging safe harbor. The
Secretary is establishing this safe harbor
only for those Guaranteed Mortgage
Package transactions that meet the
requirements set forth in this rule. The
Secretary has determined that the
establishment of this safe harbor is
necessary to allow this class of
transactions- guaranteed packages of
settlement services with the protections
required under this rule- to be
available to consumers to achieve the
purposes of the Act. The Secretary has
concluded that the availability of these
packages to consumers will simplify
their shopping for settlement services
and allow them to gain the benefit of an
active competitive marketplace where
market forces lower settlement costs.
For the same reasons, the Secretary has
determined that payments and pricing
arrangements between packagers and
participating settlement service
providers for Guaranteed Mortgage
Packages as set forth in this rl,lle shall
not be construed as prohibited under
Section 8 of RESPA as long as the
requirements in this rule are satisfied.
Pursuant to Section 8(c) (5) the
Secretary has undertaken the necessary
consultation with other agency heads as
required prior to promulgating this
exemption.
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This safe harbor will allow packagers
to inject pricing discipline to negotiate
firm overall prices for essentially all
settlement services and mortgage
interest rates with participating
settlement service providers. Some
GMPs may require the use of affiliated
entities, a practice prohibited by Section
8 except in limited circumstances. Other
GMPs may involve arrangements
between independent providers based
on the projected volume of business to
be referred. The safe harbor will apply
in both of these arrangements. Without
this safe harbor, Section 8(al's
prohibition on referral fees may bar
such arrangements and Section 8 (bl's
prohibitions may deter packagers from
retaining profits that result from
packaging, which could be regarded as
unearned. Outside the safe harbor,
where loan originators arrange
discounted prices that are charged to
consumers, HUD is proposing in this
rulemaking to clarify that Section 8 is
not violated (see above). Because HUD
believes that the benefits to borrowers of
packaging outweigh any protections
offered by Section 8's provisions, the
Secretary has concluded that such a
carefully circumscribed safe harbor is
appropriate, subject to the eligibility
conditions set forth in this rule.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 19,
the Secretary has determined that the
safe harbor is necessary for these
prescribed transactions to achieve the
purposes of the Act. Where the
requirements are met, the safe harbor
from Section 8 will permit payments or
other things of value exchanged
between a packager and entities
participating in the package, and will
insulate packager earnings from Section
8 scrutiny. Section 8 would, however,
continue to prohibit any payments for
the referral of business, kickbacks, splits
of fees and unearned fees between the
packager and any of the entities
participating in the package on the one
hand, and entities outside ofthe
package on the other.46 As long as the
requirements of the safe harbor are
satisfied, the exemption authority under
Section 19 will create a safe harbor for
packagers from the Section 8
requirements.
Under the safe harbor, as noted above,
packagers would provide the GMPA in
lieu of a GFE. HUD regards the
provision of a GMPA as fully, indeed,
more than satisfying the requirements of
Section 5 of RESPA that borrowers
receive a Good Faith Estimate ofthe
46 Thus. for example. a real estate agent. outside
of the package. would continue to be subject to
Section 8 for accepting a payment from a packager
for referring a customer to a package.
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amount of charges for settlement
services the borrower is likely to incur.
Additionally, HUD believes that the
GMPA, by itemizing a Guaranteed
Mortgage Package price encompassing
virtually all settlement charges, along
with a limited number of itemized
charges, including owner's title
insurance, also more than satisfies the
requirements of Section 4 of RESPA.
Nevertheless, HUD is prepared to
exercise the exemption authority under
Section 19 to create a safe harbor for
packagers from the disclosure
requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of
RESPA, if it deems such an exemption
necessary.
The safe harbor is proposed to be
available only where the transaction
does not result in a high cost loan as
that term is defined in the Home
Ownership Equity Protection Act. See
15 U.S.C. 1601 (Supp II 1996). The safe
harbor also may not be available for
mortgages that exceed other limits or
include other features identified by the
Department during the course of this
rulemaking as resulting in unreasonable
settlement charges or other loan terms
inimical to the purposes of RESPA.
In this rulemaking, in Question 12
below, HUD is soliciting comments on
the scope of the safe harbor and in
particular, how the safe harbor should
apply to affiliated business
arrangements.
D. Scope ofthe Proposed Rule
The proposed rule's new regulatory
requirements will apply to first and
second lien transactions, purchase
money loans, and refinances. Home
equity transactions are addressed in
§ 3500.7(1'), under current RESPA
regulations. At Question 26 the
Department invites comments on this
issue.
E. Contractual Remedies and
Enforcement Priorities
For the safe harbor, the proposed rule
intends that borrowers, individually or,
where appropriate, as a class, may sue
for specific performance or for damages
pursuant to applicable State contract
law provisions in the event a packager
breaches a contract entered into
pursuant to C., above.
Beyond any contractual remedies
available to borrowers under state laws,
HUD will regard noncompliance with a
GMPA as an enforcement priority, and
any entity found in violation of such a
contract will not be able to claim a safe
harbor under Section 8. As a result,
those found in violation of a GMPA will
be subject to Section 8 scrutiny and
possible penalties as well as individual
or class relief.
F. Preemption
Pursuant to Section 18 of RESPA, 12
U.S.C. 2616, the Secretary is authorized
to determine whether any provisions of
State law are inconsistent with any
provision of RESPA. Where such a
determination is made, after
consultation with other appropriate
Federal agencies, the Secretary may
exempt any person subject to RESPA
from compliance with said State law to
the extent such compliance is
inconsistent with RESPA. Question 22
below seeks comments on how this
provision of RESPA should be applied
in light of the provisions in the
proposed rule.
IV. Questions for Commenters
Commenters are asked to address the
following questions in their comments
to the extent that they have views on
these subjects.
The New Good Faith Estimate (GFE)
Requirements
1. As proposed in Section III.A.(l), the
proposed GFE form would briefly
explain the originator's functions and
that the borrower, not the originator, is
responsible for shopping for his or her
best loan. Does the language proposed
adequately convey this message? If the
commenter thinks otherwise, it should
provide alternative language for the
form that better explains the loan
originator's function to the borrower.
Should the form also address agency
requirements under state laws and how?
2. In Section IILB.(2) c., the proposed
rule requires that the amounts estimated
on the GFE for mortgage broker and
lender origination charges may not vary
at settlement absent unforeseeable
circumstances. Should the rule provide
for this "unforeseeable circumstances"
exception? Are the particular
circumstances specified in HUD's
formulation in this proposal sufficiently
encompassing? What evidence should a
broker or lender be required to retain to
prove the existence of such
circumstances and justify any increase
in charges at settlement?
3. In Section III.B.(2) c., the proposed
rule establishes a 10% limit, or
"tolerance," for categories of settlement
services and costs including third party
services that the borrower shops for and
escrowlreserves by which such costs
cannot exceed the GFE estimates by
10% at settlement absent unforeseeable
and extraordinary circumstances. It also
establishes zero tolerances for
origination charges and lender required
lender selected third party costs and
government charges that cannot vary
from the estimate through settlement
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absent unforeseen circumstances. Are
these appropriate tolerances and
tolerance levels or should other
tolerances/tolerance levels be
established for these categories? Also,
should a tolerance be established for
borrower's title insurance? What
alternative or additional means might be
employed to ensure that loan originators
take the care necessary to complete the
GFE to ensure that it represents a Good
Faith Estimate of final settlement costs?
4. In Section IILB.(2) d., the proposed
rule would amend Regulation X to make
clear that loan originators may enter
into volume arrangements where such
discounted prices are charged to their
customers. Commenters are invited to
provide their views on the
ramifications, if any, of this
clarification.
5. In Section III.B.(2) c., the proposed
rule requires that the tolerances will
apply to the GFE from the time the form
is given by the loan originator through
settlement. Also, in case it takes a
substantial time for the borrower to
decide to use the loan originator from
the date the form is given, the rule and
the form provide that the GFE need only
be open for borrower acceptance for a
minimum of 30 days from when the
document is delivered or mailed to the
borrower. After that time, the GFE could
be ratified or superseded by the
originator at the borrower's request. Is
this expiration date appropriate to
protect against unnecessary costs
flowing from an indeterminate liability
or for other reasons? Is 30 days too long
or too short? Another possibility that
commenters may consider is whether
the numbers on the GFE should apply
only from the time the borrower enters
into an agreement with the loan
originator. HUD also invites
commenters' views on whether HUD
now should require a borrower's
signature on the GFE to memorialize
acceptance and begin the period during
which the estimates are binding.
6. In Section lILB.(l) b., the proposed
rule simplifies the GFE by placing all
loan origination costs in a small number
of primary categories. This is intended
to facilitate borrower understanding and
shopping of major loan costs and
minimize the proliferation of "junk
fees" and duplicative charges. How
could the GFE be made even simpler to
facilitate borrower shopping? If the
commenter believes greater itemization
is desirable, what should be itemized
and why?
7. In Section III.A.(3), the proposed
rule requires that on the front of the
proposed form mortgage brokers
disclose the lender credit right below
the total origination charges to: (a) Make
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the borrower aware of the effect that the
credit has to reduce total origination
costs; (b) avoid confusion among
borrowers; and (c) avoid giving any
competitive disadvantage to either a
broker or lender for the same loan.
What, if any, other approach to address
these concerns is better and why?
Should the new GFE form disclose this
credit at the bottom of the proposed
form because the credit can be applied
to all settlement costs?
8. As proposed in Section III. A. (3),
as another step to avoid borrower
confusion and any competitive
disadvantage among lenders and
brokers, the proposed rule breaks out on
Attachment A-I, rather than on the
front of the proposed form, the "Loan
Origination Charges" into "Lender
Charge" and "Broker Charge." How, if at
all, does this approach advantage or
disadvantage either lenders or brokers
or confuse borrowers in comparison
shopping? Would the industry and
borrowers be better served if there is a
breakout of "Lender charges" and
"Broker charges" on the front of the
form and why?
9. As proposed in Section III. B. (2) e,
the new GFE will consolidate certain
charges into lump sum categories (e.g.
lender required third party services). To
permit the borrower to compare the new
GFE to the HUD-l, it will be necessary
for HUD to establish additional
instructions to guide the reader so that
the new GFE could be compared to the
HUD-1. Would it be better to change the
HUD-l so the fee categories correspond
to the groupings on the GFE and the two
documents can be more easily
compared? If commenters support
changes to the HUD-l to make it more
comparable to and compatible with the
new GFE, how extensive should these
changes be and in what areas? Should
the HUD-l continue to list all charges
for services or should it also be
shortened and simplified as well to
cover only categories of services?
10. Should a safe harbor from Section
8 scrutiny be established for
transactions where the mortgage broker
signs and contractually commits to its
charges on the GFE? The purpose of
proposing this safe harbor would be to
encourage a firm contractual
commitment to borrowers, before they
pay a fee and commit to a particular
mortgage broker, so that the borrower
can shop among mortgage brokers.
Considering the proposed changes to the
GFE, the proposed packaging safe
harbor and HUD's current guidance on
mortgage broker fees, is this safe harbor
necessary for industry or borrowers and
why? In light of the proposed rule's
other provisions is any other additional
disclosure for mortgage brokers
warranted, such as an additional
statement of what the broker's fees are
and how they function?
Guaranteed Mortgage Package
Agreements
11. Is a safe harbor along the lines
proposed in Section III. C. (1) of this
rule necessary to allow lump sum
packages of settlement services to
become available to borrowers? Would
the proposed clarification by HUD that
discounts may be arranged, if passed on
to borrowers and not marked up, suffice
to make packages available to
borrowers? Would a rule change to
approve volume discounts and/or mark-
ups when a package is involved suffice?
Would it suffice to trim the disclosure
requirements for packaging and offer the
option of providing a streamlined GFE
to those who packaged?
12. As proposed in Section III. C. (6)
is the scope of the safe harbor
appropriately bounded in applying to
all packagers and participants in
packages? The safe harbor also currently
does not apply to referrals to the
package. Should there also be a bar
against part time employees of other
providers working for the package to
steer business? How should the safe
harbor apply to affiliated business
arrangements to protect borrowers from
steering?
13. As proposed in Section III. C (5),
to qualify for the safe harbor, the
packager must include an interest rate
guarantee with a means of assuring that
when the rate floats, it reflects changes
in the cost of funds not an increase in
originator compensation. For this
purpose, the rule suggests tying the rate
to an observable index or other
appropriate means. What other means
could assure borrowers that the rate of
a lender was not simply being increased
to increase origination profits? For
example, would a lender's commitment
to constantly make rates public on a
web site be a useful control? If an index
is the best approach, how should it be
set? If an index approach is approved,
should each lender be allowed to pick
its own observable index?
14. As discussed in the preamble to
the rule in Section III. C (5), if an
observable index or other appropriate
means of protecting borrowers from
increases in lender compensation when
the borrower floats in a guaranteed
packaging approach is not practical,
should HUD provide a packaging safe
harbor only for mortgage brokers? Such
a mortgage broker safe harbor would
require disclosing the lender credit to
the borrower in broker guaranteed
packages. The theory for the safe harbor
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would be that any amounts in indirect
fees could be credited to borrowers
taking away any incentive for an
increase in rates to increase
compensation. Should this be offered in
any event?
15. As proposed in Section III. C (6),
under the rule, mortgages with total fees
or a rate covered by the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(HOEPA) would be subject to the new
GFE disclosure requirements; however,
HOEPA loans would not qualify for the
guaranteed package safe harbor. Is this
exclusion appropriate considering, on
the one hand, that packaging promises
borrowers a simpler way to shop and
make transactions more transparent? On
the other hand, the safe harbor could be
provided for a loan that has very high
rate and/or fees and may be predatory.
The proposal also says that during the
rulemaking other limitations may be
established to exclude high cost and/or
loans with predatory features from the
packaging provisions. HUD invites
comments on whether HOEPA loans,
any other loans, or features of loans
should be included or excluded from
the safe harbor and why.
16. As proposed in Section III.C (3),
the GMPA provides that the offer must
be open to the borrower for at least 30
days from when the document is
delivered or mailed to the borrower. Is
this an appropriate minimum time
period to ensure that the borrower has
an adequate opportunity to shop?
17. As proposed in Section III. C (4),
the rule currently provides that the
Guaranteed Mortgage Package
agreement must indicate that certain
reports such as the appraisal, credit
report, and pest inspection are available
to the borrower upon the borrower's
request. Also, packagers may decide to
forego such reports or services (Le.
lender's title insurance) and must
inform the borrower that such reports or
services are not anticipated to be
included in the package price. Are these
adequate protections for the borrower?
HUD is aware that other laws such as
Regulation B (ECOA) provide certain
rights to borrowers with respect to
obtaining some of these reports. In order
to qualify for the safe harbor HUD has
created additional reporting
requirements. Are these additional
reporting requirements appropriate?
18. Should additional consumer
protections be established for
packaging? For example, should
additional qualifications be established
for "packagers" to ensure that borrowers
are protected against non-performance
including the unavailability of a
mortgage that could result in a borrower
"losing" a house? For example, should
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there be a requirement that a packager
must have sufficient financial resources
to credibly back the guarantee? Is it
necessary to require a lender signature
on the GMPA to ensure that the
borrower receives the loan at the time of
settlement? How can the borrower's
interests be protected without unduly
burdening the process or unduly
limiting the universe of packagers?
19. Consistent with the HUD-Fed
Report, the rule proposes that certain
charges, such as hazard insurance and
reserves, are outside the package as
other or optional costs. Is this the right
approach or should these charges be
disclosed as the minimum amounts
required by the lender and required to
be inside the package? Would the latter
better serve the objective of establishing
a single figure for the borrower to shop
with?
20. The rule proposes in Section III.
C (3), that under Guaranteed Mortgage
Packaging, the HUD-l will list the
settlement services in the package but
not the specific charges for each service.
Certain third party charges are excluded
from the calculation of the finance
charge and the APR under TILA and
HOEPA. Commenters are invited to
express their views on whether the
approach in the rule satisfies or whether
alternative approaches to cost
disclosures should be established to
ensure consumers' rights under TILA
and HOEPA are protected while
facilitating packaging. More broadly,
commenters are invited to provide their
views on means of better coordinating
RESPA and TILA disclosures.
21. Commenters are asked to provide
their views on how the rules should
treat mortgage insurance? The rule
proposes in Section III. C (3), that the
guaranteed package would include any
mortgage insurance premiums in the
APR and up-front costs of mortgage
insurance in the guaranteed package.
"Other Required Costs" would include
reserves for mortgage insurance
premiums. However, because the
packager will not have an appraisal at
the time the GMPA is provided, the
packager may not have firm information
to provide a definite figure. Another
possibility is to exclude mortgage
insurance from the package but notify
the borrower that mortgage insurance
may be an "Other Required Costs" and
present the borrower an estimate subject
to a tolerance, if mortgage insurance is
necessary. This approach would
exclude a major charge from the
package. HUD recognizes that there are
state laws that prohibit rebates or any
splitting of commissions for mortgage
insurance. How. if at all. should this
impact the decision to include mortgage
insurance in packages of settlement
services?
22. To what extent, if any, do
inconsistencies currently exist, or
would they exist upon promulgation of
the proposed rule between State laws
and RESPA? Specifically. what types of
State laws result in such inconsistencies
and merit preemption? What, if any.
provisions of the proposal should be
revised to facilitate any necessary
preemption?
23. The rule proposes that the GFE
and the GMPA be given subject to
appraisal and underwriting. How
should the final rule address the matter
of loan rejection or threatened rejection
as a means of allowing the originator to
change the GFE or GMPA to simply earn
a higher profit?
24. To what extent, if any, should
direct loan programs such as those
provided by the Rural Housing Service
of the Department of Agriculture be
treated differently under the new
regulatory requirements proposed by
this rule?
25. As proposed, the GFE and GMPA
currently contain sections for loan
originators and packagers to indicate the
specific loan terms for adjustable rate
mortgages, prepayment penalties, and
balloon payments. Are these appropriate
loan terms to include on these forms,
and what, if any, other mortgage terms
or conditions should be listed on the
forms?
26. What are the arguments for or
against limiting the proposed rule to
purchase money, first and second lien,
and refinancing loans as opposed to
offering it to home equity, reverse
mortgage and other transactions?
Should there be any additional
requirements for so-called B, C, and D
loans?
27. As proposed, the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package includes one fee for
settlement services required to complete
a mortgage loan. The fee for the package
will include loan origination fees,
typically referred to as "points." As
points are generally deductible under
IRS rules, comments are invited as to
how to determine which portion of the
package prices should be deemed to
constitute points.
28. To what extent do the proposed
changes to the definition of application
in Section III. B (2) a., and requirements
for delivery of.the GFE impact other
federal disclosure requirements, such as
those mandated by the Truth in Lending
Act? How can the disclosure objectives
of the proposed rule be harmonized
with such other disclosure
requirements?
29. The proposed rule in Section III.
8 (2) c., would require a loan originator
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capable of offering an alternative loan
product to provide a prospective
borrower, upon the borrower's request,
with a new GFE if, after full
underwriting, the borrower does not
qualify for the loan identified on the
original GFE. Is this approach
appropriate? What other options should
be considered where borrowers do not
qualify for the loan product initially
sought?
30. The proposed rule in Section III.
B (2) c., would require loan originators
to provide qualified borrowers with an
amended GFE, identifying any changes
in costs associated with changes in the
interest rate, where the borrower elects
not to lock-in the interest rate quoted on
the original GFE at the time it is
provided. Is this an appropriate
requirement? What alternatives, if any,
should HUD consider?
V. Findings and Certifications
The Paperwork Reduction Act
The information requirements
contained in this proposed rule have
been submitted to the Office of
Management and Budget for review in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35). The Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act of 1974 requires
settlement providers to disclose to
homebuyers certain information at or
before settlement and pursuant to the
servicing of the loan and escrow
account. This includes a Special
Information Booklet, a Good Faith
Estimate, an Initial Servicing Disclosure,
a Settlement Statement (the Form HUD-
1 or Form HUD I-A), and when
applicable an Initial Escrow Account
Statement, an Annual Escrow Account
Statement, an Escrow Account
Disbursement Disclosure, an Affiliated
Business Arrangement Disclosure, and a
Servicing Transfer/Disclosure. This
information requirement under OMS
control number 2502-0265 consolidates
information previously collected under
OMS control numbers 2502-0458,
2502-o491,2502-o501,2502-o516,and
2502-0517.
Estimate of the total reporting and
recordkeeping burden that will result
from this information requirement is as
follows:
Respondents: Individuals or
households, business or other for-profit
entities.
Frequency ofsubmission: On occasion
and annually.
Reporting burden: Number of
respondents: 20,000, Annual responses:
105,300,000, Hours per response: 0.04.
Total estimated burden hours:
6.500.000.
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Good faith estimate means an estimate
of settlement costs on the required
format prescribed at Appendix C to this
part prepared in accordance with
§ 3500.7.
(b) * * *
Application means the submission of
credit information (Social Security
number, property address, basic income
information, the borrower's information
on the house price or a best estImate on
the value of the property, and the
mortgage loan needed) by a borrower in
anticipation of a credit decision,
whether oral, written or electronic,
relating to a federally related mortgage
loan. If the submission does not state or
identify a specific property, the
submission is an application for a pre-
qualification and not an application for
a federally related mortgage loan under
this part. The subsequent addition of an
identified property to the submission
converts the submission to an
application for a federally related
mortgage loan.
Congressional Review ofFinal Rules
This rule constitutes a "major rule" as
defined in the Congressional Review
Act (5 U.S.c. Chapter 8). At the final
rule stage, this rule will have a 60-day
delayed effective date and be submitted
to the Congress in accordance with the
requirements of the Congressional
Review Act.
VI. Rule Language
List of Subjects in 24 CFR part 3500
Consumer protection, Condominiums,
Housing, Mortgagees, Mortgage
servicing, Reporting, and recordkeeping
requirements.
Accordingly, for the reasons set out in
the preamble, part 3500 of title 24 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is proposed
to be amended as follows:
1. The authority citation shall
continue to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.c. 2601 et. seq.; 42
U.S.c. 3535(d).
2. In § 3500.2, paragraph (b) is
amended by revising the definitions of
Application, Good faith estimate, and
Mortgage broker and adding the
following definitions of Guaranteed
mortgage package, Loan originator,
Mortgage broker loan, No tolerance,
Packager, Packaged services,
Participating settlement service
provider, Par value, Tolerance,
Unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, and Zero tolerance:
§ 3500.2 Definitions.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Executive Order 12866, Regulatory
Planning and Review
The Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) reviewed this proposed rule
under Executive Order 12866 (entitled
"Regulatory Planning and Review"),
which the President issued on
September 30, 1993. This rule was
determined economically significant
under E.O. 12866. Any changes made to
the proposed rule subsequent to its
submission to OMB are identified in the
docket file, which is available for public
inspection in the office of the Rules
Docket Clerk, Room 10276, U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 451 Seventh Street, SW,
Washington, DC, 20410--0500. The
Initial Economic Analysis prepared for
this rule is also available for public
inspection in the Office of the Rules
Docket Clerk.
Federalism Impact
This proposed rule does not have
federalism implications and does not
impose substantial direct compliance
costs on State and local governments or
preempt State law within the meaning
of Executive Order 13132 (entitled
"Federalism").
Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Secretary, in accordance with the
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.c.
605(b)), has reviewed and approved this
proposed rule and has determined that
the rule would have a significant
economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities within the
meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility
Act.
In accordance with section 603 of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, an Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA)
has been prepared and has been made
part of the Economic Analysis prepared
under Executive Order 12866. The IRFA
portion, however, ofthe combined
analysis is published as an appendix to
this proposed rule. The IRFA was also
submitted to the Chief Counsel for
Advocacy of the Small Business
Administration for review and comment
on its impact on business.
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.c. 1531-
1538) (UMRA) requires Federal agencies
to assess the effects of their regulatory
actions on State, local, and tribal
governments and on the private sector.
This proposed rule does not, within the
meaning of the UMRA, impose any
Federal mandates on any State, local, or
tribal governments nor on the private
sector.
The status of this information
collection is that it is a reinstatement,
with changes, of a previously approved
collection. In accordance with 5 CFR
1320.8(d)(1J, HUD is soliciting
comments from members of the public
and affected agencies concerning this
collection of information to:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency's estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond; including through the
use of appropriate automated collection
techniques or other forms of information
technology, e.g., permitting electronic
submission of responses.
Interested persons are invited to
submit comments regarding the
information collection requirements in
this proposal. Comments must be
received within sixty (60) days from the
date of this proposal. Comments must
refer to the proposal by name and
docket number (FR-4668) and must be
sent to:
Lauren Wittenberg, HUD Desk Officer,
Office of Management and Budget,
New Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC 20503,
lauren_wittenberg@opm.eop.gov, Fax:
(202) 395-6974
and;
Gloria Diggs, Reports Liaison Officer,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for
Housing-Federal Housing
Commissioner, Department of
Housing & Urban Development, 451
Seventh Street, SW, Room 9116,
Washington, DC 20410.
Environmental Impact
A Finding of No Significant Impact
with respect to the environment has
been made in accordance with HUD
regulations at 24 CFR part 50, which
implement section 102(2)(C) of the
National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (42 U.S.C. 4223). The Finding of
No Significant Impact is available for
public inspection between the hours of
7:30 a.m. and 5:30 p.m. weekdays in the
Office of General Counsel, Regulations
Division, Room 10276, U.S. Department
of Housing and Urban Development,
451 Seventh Street, SW, Washington,
DC 20410--0500.
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Mortgage broker means a person or
entity that renders origination services
in a table funding or intermediary
transaction. Where a mortgage broker is
the source of the funds for a transaction,
the mortgage broker is a "lender" for
purposes of this part.
3. In § 3500.7, paragraph (a)
introductory text and (aJ(2) through (e)
are revised, paragraph (f) is redesignated
as paragraph (g); and a new paragraph
(f) is added to read as follows:
§ 3500.7 Good faith estimate
(a) Lender to provide. Except as
provided in paragraphs (aJ, (b) or (f) of
Guaranteed mortgage package means a
guaranteed package of mortgage related
settlement services and an interest rate
guarantee for a federally related
mortgage loan that is offered to a
consumer under a Guaranteed Mortgage
Package Agreement (GMPA) in
accordance with § 3500.16.
Loan originator means a lender or
mortgage broker.
Tolerance means a variation above an
estimate of a category of settlement
costs. Tolerance is expressed as a
percentage of the estimate.
Unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances means acts of God, war,
disaster, or any other emergency,
making it impossible or impractical to
perform.
Zero tolerance means the amount
listed may not vary at closing, except in
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances.
an adjustable rate mortgage, contains a
prepayment penalty clause or has a
balloon payment, the functions of the
originator, and the total amount of
charges for each category of services:
loan origination, interest rate dependent
payment, lender required and selected
third party services, title services and
title insurance, shoppable lender
required third party services,
government services, amounts for
escrow/reserves, per diem interest,
hazard insurance and optional owner's
title insurance. Attachment A-1 of the
good faith estimate must indicate the
subtotals of the origination charges to
the lender and to the mortgage broker,
and the subtotals of all the charges and
fees for title and for settlement agent
services.
(d) Accuracy of good faith estimate.
(1) The amounts of the categories ofloan
origination charges, lender required and
selected third party settlement service
provider charges, lender selected title
services and title insurance, and
governmental fees and charges reported
on the good faith estimate shall not vary
from the time the good faith estimate is
given to the borrower and may not be
exceeded at settlement absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances. The estimates in the
good faith estimate shall be open to the
borrower for a minimum of 30 days
from when the document is delivered or
mailed to the borrower. Within the 30
days the borrower must agree to go
forward and pay the additional money
to complete the underwriting process. If
the offer expires, the borrower may ask
the loan originator to ratify such
estimate or request a new one. If the cost
at settlement exceeds the estimate
reported on the good faith estimate,
absent unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, the borrower may
withdraw the application and receive a
full refund of all loan-related fees and
charges. The loan originator must
document any such circumstances and
retain the document in accordance with
§ 3500.10(e).
(2) The amounts for lender required
third party services must include an
estimate of the maximum mortgage
insurance premium to be charged
upfront to the borrower based upon the
borrower's assertion of the value of the
property and loan amount needed and
indicate that the mortgage insurance
premium may decrease or be removed
after fun underwriting;
(3) The amounts of the categories of
borrower selected title services and title
insurance, shoppable lender required
third party services, and reserves/
escrow deposits charged to a borrower
may not vary at settlement by greater
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
(b) Mortgage broker to provide. In the
event an application is received by a
mortgage broker who is not an exclusive
agent of the lender, the mortgage broker
must provide a good faith estimate by
delivering the good faith estimate or by
placing it in the mail to the loan
applicant, not later than three business
days after an application is received or
prepared. As long as the mortgage
broker has provided the good faith
estimate, the funding lender is not
required to provide an additional good
faith estimate, but the funding lender is
responsible for ascertaining that the
good faith estimate has been delivered.
If the application is denied before the
end of the three-business-day period,
the mortgage broker need not provide
the denied borrower with a good faith
estimate. A mortgage broker shall not
collect any fee in connection with the
application or the good faith estimate
beyond that which necessary to provide
the good faith estimate.
(c) Content of good faith estimate. As
prescribed in and completed in
accordance with the instructions in
Appendix C to this part, the good faith
estimate must state the property
address, loan amount, interest rate used
to calculate the estimated amounts, the
Annual Percentage Rate (APR) for the
loan including mortgage insurance, and
the monthly payment for principal and
interest and mortgage insurance. The
form must also state whether the loan is
this section, or where a guaranteed
mortgage package agreement is provided
in accordance with § 3500.16 of this
part, the lender shall provide an
applicants for a federally related
mortgage loan with a good faith
estimate. The lender shall provide the
good faith estimate either by delivering
the good faith estimate or by placing it
in the mail to the loan applicant, not
later than three business days after an
application is received or prepared. If
the application is denied before the end
of the three-business-day period, the
lender need not provide the denied
borrower with a good faith estimate. A
lender shaH not collect any fee in
connection with the application or the
good faith estimate beyond that which
is necessary to provide the good faith
estimate.
(2) For all mortgage loans, third party
settlement services, governmental fees
and charges, any other loan related
expenses that are not paid to and
retained by the originator must be
reported in their entirety in the
appropriate categories on the good faith
estimate.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Mortgage broker loan is a federally
related mortgage loan that is originated
by a mortgage broker.
No tolerance means that the charges
may vary without being subject to any
tolerance.
Packager means a person or other
entity that offers and provides
guaranteed mortgage packages to
borrowers in accordance with § 3500.16.
Packaged services are settlement
services that the lender requires for
settlement and includes all services
except per diem interest, hazard
insurance, escrow/reserves, and
optional settlement services.
Participating settlement service
provider means a settlement service
provider that provides settlement
services in a guaranteed mortgage
package and whose charges are included
in the guaranteed mortgage package
price.
Par value means the principal amount
of the loan.
L
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5. In § 3500.10, a new sentence is
added to paragraph (e) to immediately
follow the second sentence to read as
follows:
6. In § 3500.14, a new paragraph
(g)(I)(viii) is added to read as follows:
§3500.14 Prohibition against kickbacks
and unearned fees.
§3500.16 [Redesignated as §3500.20]
7. In § 3500.16 is redesignated as
§ 3500.20 and a new § 3500.16 is added
to read as follows:
§ 3500.16 Guaranteed Mortgage Package-
Safe Harbor.
(a) General. A guaranteed mortgage
package is defined in § 3500.2.
(g)(l)(viii) Any discounts negotiated
among settlement service providers,
packagers, or any other entities for
settlement services provided that the
entire discounted price is charged to the
borrower and reported as part of the
total charge within Sections m(C)
through (J) of the good faith estimate as
appropriate. .
(b) Violation and safe harbor. A
guaranteed mortgage package. including
payments. discounts, pricing
arrangements or any other exchanges of
things of value by and between persons
or entities offering their services and
compensated through guaranteed
mortgage packages (hereinafter
"packagers") and participating
settlement service providers as part of
such a transaction, shall not violate
section 8 of RESPA or § 3500.14 and
satisfies sections 4 and 5 of RESPA if
the conditions set forth in this section
are met.
(c) Criteria for guaranteed mortgage
package. In order to qualify for the safe
harbor stated in paragraph (b) of this
section. packagers must deliver a
guaranteed mortgage package offer
within 3 days of application or such
time as may be reasonable in special
cases but prior to the borrower paying
any fee, that includes:
(1) A package of designated lender
required settlement services at a
guaranteed price from the time the
guaranteed mortgage package is offered
by the packager to the borrower through
settlement provided that the borrower
accepts the guaranteed mortgage
package agreement within 30 days, or
such greater period offered by the
packager, from when the document is
delivered or mailed to the borrower;
(2) A mortgage loan with an interest
rate guarantee and an Annual
Percentage Rate (APR) that is guaranteed
through settlement provided that the
borrower accepts the guaranteed
mortgage package agreement within 30
days. or such greater period offered by
the packager, and the interest rate is
adjusted only to reflect changes in
market interest rates based on
movement in a observable and verifiable
index or other appropriate measure; and
(3) A guaranteed mortgage package
agreement as prescribed in and
completed in conformity with Appendix
F to this part which:
(il Explains that the guaranteed
mortgage package includes necessary
settlement services required by the
lender and guarantees a package price
for these services through settlement
provided that the borrower accepts the
GMPA within 30 days, or such greater
period offered by the packager, from
when the document is delivered or
mailed to the borrower;
(iil Commits the packager to provide
all settlement services and includes all
charges required to complete your
mortgage except those specified as other
required settlement costs and advises
the borrower if the packager anticipates
whether a pest inspection, lender's title
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
(3) If the lender maintains a
controlled list of required providers
(five or more for each discrete service)
or relies on a list maintained by others,
and at the time of application the lender
has not yet decided which provider will
be selected from that list, then the
lender may satisfy the requirements of
this section if the lender provides the
borrower, on the good faith estimate,
with the names of the required
providers, and the estimated charge for
the particular settlement service.
4. In § 3500.8, the third sentence of
paragraph (a) is revised to read as
follows:
§ 3500.8 Use of HUD-1 or HUD-1A
settlement statements.
(a) * * * Alternatively, the form
HUD-IA may be used for these
transactions, but not for transactions in
which there is a lender credit to the
borrower. * * *
§3500.10 One-day advance inspection of
HUD-1 or HUD-1A settlement statement;
delivery; recordkeeping.
(e) * * * Loan originators shall retain
documentation of unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances related to
good faith estimates provided to
borrowers and packagers shall retain
documentation of such circumstances
related to guaranteed mortgage package
agreements provided to borrowers for
five years after settlement. * * *
than a tolerance of 10% from the
amounts for such categories reported on
the good faith estimate, except when a
borrower chooses to purchase a more
expensive service, absent unforeseeable
and extraordinary circumstances.
(4) The amounts of the categories of
per diem interest, hazard insurance and
optional owner's title insurance
reported on the good faith estimate shall
be carefully prepared based upon the
originator's knowledge of relevant
prices, but are not subject to tolerances,
which means that charges may vary
without being subject to any tolerance.
(5) In mortgage broker loans, the
borrower payment to the lender for a
lower interest rate must be paid in full
to the lender and the lender payment to
the borrower for a higher rate must
include any lender payments for the
transaction other than for the par value
of the loan.
(6) Loan originators must include all
charges correctly within their prescribed
category on the good faith estimate and
not include any "mark ups" or "up
charges" in their estimates of charges for
categories m(C) through (J) of the good
faith estimate. The Loan originator shall
include all of its charges in the
origination charges and interest rate
dependent categories.
(7) No loan originator shall be held
responsible for charges imposed on the
borrower at settlement for shoppable
lender required third party services
unless the borrower asked where the
services could be obtained within the
tolerance, used a settlement service
provider identified by the originator,
and was charged an amount in excess of
the tolerance.
(e) Form of good faith estimate. A
good faith estimate required format is
set forth in Appendix C to this part. The
good faith estimate may be provided
together with disclosures required by
the Truth in Lending Act, 15 V.S.c.
1601 et seq., so long as all required
material for the good faith estimate is
grouped together.
(f) Particular providers required by
lender. (1) If the lender requires the use
(see § 3500.2, "required use") of a
particular provider of a settlement
service, other than the lender's own
employees, and also requires the
borrower to pay any portion of the cost
of such service, the good faith estimate
must identify the required settlement
service provider. .
(2) Except for a provider that is the
lender's chosen attorney, credit
reporting agency, or appraiser, if the
lender is in an affiliated business
relationship (see § 3500.15) with a
provider. the lender may not require the
use of that provider.
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General Instructions
Except with respect to a loan resulting
from a Guaranteed Mortgage package, the
settlement agent shall complete the HUD-l
to itemize all charges imposed upon the
Borrower and the Seller by the loan
originator and all sales commissions,
whether to be paid at settlement or outside
of settlement, and any other charges which
either the Borrower or the Seller will pay for
at settlement. Charges to be paid outside of
settlement. including cases where a non-
settlement agent (i.e.. attorneys, title
companies. escrow agents, real estate agents
or brokers) holds the Borrower's deposit
against the sales price (earnest money) and
applies the entire deposit towards the charge
for the settlement service it is rendering,
shall be included on the HUD-l but marked
"P.O.c." for "Paid Outside of Closing"
(settlement) and shall not be included in
computing totals. P.O.c. items should not be
placed in the Borrower or Seller columns, but
rather on the appropriate line next to the
columns. In the case of loans where
settlement services are paid through the
interest rate. any charges to be paid by the
APR on an addendum to the HUD-l or
HUD-IA.
(e) Exclusions from safe harbor.
(1) Notwithstanding the existence of a
guaranteed mortgage package, section 8
of RESPA remains applicable to
payments by and between packagers or
participating settlement service
providers and parties outside the
guaranteed mortgage package.
(2) The Affiliated Business
Arrangement (AffiA) exemption
requirements, set forth in § 3500.15,
remain in effect when a borrower is
referred to a packager by a person or
entity not otherwise participating in the
guaranteed mortgage package who is an
affiliate of the packager or any
participating settlement service
provider.
(3) The guaranteed mortgage package
safe harbor shall not be available where
the rate or points and fees of a Federally
related mortgage loan make the loan
subject to the Home Ownership Equity
Protection Act (HOEPA).
§3500.19 [Amendedl
8. In § 3500.19(c) the cross references
to "§ 3500.16" and to "section 3500.16"
are both revised to read "§ 3500.20"
9. Appendix A to part 3500-
Instructions for Completing HUD-l and
HUD-IA Settlement Statements is
amended as follows:
Appendix A to Part 3500-Instructions
for Completing HlID-1 and HUD 1-A
Settlement Statements; Sample HlID-1
and HUD 1A Statements
a. The second paragraph of the
General Instructions is revised to read as
follows:
b. The Line Item Instructions for the
HUD-1 paragraph describing line 204-
209 are revised to read as follows:
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
Section L. Settlement charges. For all items
except for those paid to and retained by the
Loan Originator, the name of the person or
firm ultimately receiving the payment should
be shown. In the case of loans where
settlement services are paid through the
interest rate, any charges to be paid by the
lender should be shown in the appropriate
column used in computing totals.
Lines 204-209 are used for other items
paid by or on behalf of the Borrower.
Examples include cases in which the Seller
has taken a trade-in or other property from
the Borrower in part payment for the
property being sold. They may also be used
in cases in which a Seller (typically a
builder) is making an "allowance" to the
Borrower for carpets or drapes which the
Borrower is to purchase separately. Lines
204-209 can also be used to indicate any
Seller financing arrangements or other new
loan not listed in Line 202. For example, if
the Seller takes a note from the Borrower for
part of the sales price, insert the principal
amount of the note with a brief explanation
on Lines 204-209. Additionally, a blank line
in this series shall be used to record the total
of all payments from the Lender to the
Borrower based on the transaction, including
payments based on a higher interest rate.
* * * * *
c. Following the instructions for
HUD-1 Line 603, Section L. Settlement
Charges is revised to read as follows:
d. The paragraph immediately
following "Line Item Instructions for
Completing HUD--IA" is revised to
read as follows:
lender should not be marked as P.O.c. but
should be shown in the appropriate column
and used in computing totals. In loans
originated through guaranteed mortgage
package agreements, the HUD-l/l-A shall
indicate through checkmarks in the
appropriate column which third party
settlement services were performed for the
guaranteed mortgage package price. The
guaranteed mortgage package price shall be
shown on line 801. Additionally, the finance
charges needed to calculate the APR will be
disclosed in an addendum on the HUD-l.
Note: HUD-1A is an optional form that
may be used for refinancing and subordinate
lien federally related mortgage loans, as well
as for any other one-party transaction that
does not involve the transfer of title to
residential real property or does not involve
any lender payments to the borrower based
on the transaction, including any payments
based on a higher interest rate. The HUD-l
form may also be used for such transactions.
by utilizing the borrower's side of the HUD-
1 and following the relevant parts of the Line
Item Instructions. The use of the HUD-l or
HUD-A is not mandatory for open-end lines
****
, insurance, credit report, and/or
appraisal will be anticipated;
(iii) Identifies and provides estimates
for other required settlement costs, such
as per diem interest, reserves/escrow,
and hazard insurance, and optional
owner's title insurance and explains
that any required settlement costs not
separately itemized and estimated are
the responsibility of the packager;
(iv) Identifies and explains any
borrower option to utilize payments to
or from the lender as a result of the
interest rate to pay settlement costs or
adjust the interest rate and mortgage
payments;
(v) Identifies any reports such as the
pest inspection, lender's title insurance,
appraisal or credit report for the loan
transaction that are available to the
borrower at the borrower's request;
(vi) Specifies that the packager will
ensure that a mortgage loan is provided
as part of the package and that, after
acceptance by the borrower and the
lender, the lender participating in the
package shall provide a loan with the
same terms as set forth in the
guaranteed mortgage package
agreement;
(vii) Advises the borrower of whether
the loan is an adjustable rate mortgage
and the terms of the mortgage, whether
there is a prepayment penalty and that
the borrower can request its terms,
whether there is a balloon payment,
whether the guaranteed mortgage
package price includes an upfront
maximum mortgage insurance premium
based upon the borrowers assertion of
the value of the property and loan
amount needed and that the mortgage
insurance premium may decrease or be
removed after full underwriting; and
(viii) Commits the packager to the
terms of the guaranteed mortgage
package agreement upon borrower
acceptance and payment of any fee,
subject only to acceptable final
underwriting and property appraisaL
(d) Impact on Good faith estimate and
HUD-l/IA. Where a packager satisfies
the criteria in paragraph (c) ofthis
section, the packager shall provide the
borrower the guaranteed mortgage
package agreement in lieu of the good
faith estimate. In loans originated
through guaranteed mortgage package
agreements, the HUD-l/I-A shall be
completed at settlement by itemizing all
the included services (but not the
charges) of third party settlement
service providers that were performed
for, the guaranteed mortgage package
price. The guaranteed mortgage package
price shall be shown as the origination
fee on line 801 ofthe HUD-l/HUD-IA.
Additionally, the packager must list the
finance charges needed to calculate the
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of credit (home-equity plans), as long as the
provisions of Regulation Z are followed.
e. For HUD 1-A, the second
paragraph following "General
Instructions" is revised to read as
follows:
The settlement agent shall complete the
HUD-IA to itemize all charges imposed
upon the borrower by the lender, whether to
be paid at settlement or outside of settlement,
and any other charges that the borrower will
pay for at settlement. For all items except for
those paid to and retained by the lender, the
name of the person or firm ultimately
receiving the payment should be shown
together with the total amount paid to such
person in connection with the transaction. In
loans originated through guaranteed
mortgage package agreements, the HUD-IA
shall be completed at the time of settlement
by indicated through checkmarks in the
appropriate column which settlement
services were performed for the guaranteed
mortgage package price. The guaranteed
mortgage package price shall be shown on
line 801. Additionally, the finance charges
needed to calculate the APR will be disclosed
in an addendum on the HUD-IA.
10. Appendix C to part 3500 is revised
in its entirety, including the heading, to
read as follows:
Appendix C to Part 3500-Instrudions
for Completing Good Faith Estimate;
Sample Good Faith Estimate
Instructions for completing the Good Faith
Estimate
The following are instructions for
completing the Good Faith Estimate required
under section 5 of RESPA and Regulation X
of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (24 CFR 3500.7). This form is
to be used as a statement of estimated
settlement charges. The instructions for
completion of the Good Faith Estimate are
primarily for the benefit of the loan originator
who prepares the form and need not be
transmitted to the borrower(s) as an integral
part of the Good Faith Estimate.
General Instructions
The loan originator preparing the Good
Faith Estimate may fill in information and
amounts on the form by typewriter, hand
printing, computer printing, or any other
method producing clear and legible results.
Under these instructions the "form" refers to
the Good Faith Estimate form.
All fees and charges shall be disclosed in
dollar amounts. Percentages may be added,
when applicable.
Specific Instructions
I. Our Services. Loan originators shall
include a paragraph substantially the same as
the paragraph set forth on the form in this
Appendix. This paragraph explains the
services provided by the loan originator and
emphasizes that the borrower should shop
and compare different loans and originators
to find the best loan for his or her individual
situation.
borrower chooses to purchase a more
expensive service.
IILE. Shoppable Lender Required Third
Party Services. Loan originators shall subtotal
all charges for loan originator/lender required
third party services in this section. If services
are shoppable by the borrower, and the
borrower ultimately elects to obtain some or
all of these services through the loan
originator, the final amount at settlement
may not exceed the loan originator's estimate
by more than 10% (10% tolerance) absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, except when a borrower
chooses to purchase a more expensive
service.
IILF. Government Charges-Taxes (State
and Local). Loan originators shall subtotal all
state and local fees, charges, and taxes that
will be required at settlement in this section.
This estimate shall be based on an assumed
settlement date that the loan originator will
specify on the form. The estimate shall not
vary from actual costs at the time of
settlement (0% tolerance) for the assumed
settlement date, absent unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances.
III.G. Reserves/Escrow. Loan originators
shall subtotal reserves/escrow amounts that
will be required by the lender at settlement.
This section shall include only required
escrow items such as taxes, hazard insurance,
and mortgage insurance. The estimate shall
not vary from the actual costs required for
reserves/escrow at the time of settlement by
more than 10% (10% tolerance) absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances, except when a borrower
chooses to purchase a more expensive
service.
IILH. Per Diem Interest. Loan originators
shall disclose the estimated cost of the
minimum amount of per diem interest that
the lender will charge in this section.
Although loan originators are expected to
provide reliable figures in this section based
on their experience, no tolerance applies to
this section, which means that charges may
vary without being subject to any tolerance.
IILL Hazard Insurance. Loan originators
shall disclose the estimated cost of the
minimum amount of hazard insurance that
the lender will require in this section.
Although loan originators are expected to
provide reliable figures in this section based
on their experience, no tolerance applies to
this section, which means that charges may
vary without being subject to any tolerance.
IILJ. Optional Owner's Title Insurance.
Loan originators shall disclose the estimated
subtotal of optional homeowner's title
insurance that the borrower may choose to
purchase. Although loan originators are
expected to provide reliable figures in this
section based on their experience, no
tolerance applies to this section. which
means that charges may vary without being
subject to any tolerance.
IV. Options to Pay Settlement Costs and
Lower Your Interest Rate. Loan originators
shall explain the borrower's options for
paying settlement costs in this section of the
form by using material that is essentially the
same as that contained in paragraphs A, B,
C and D of this section at Appendix C along
with discussing these issues with the
II. Loan Terms. Loan originators shall fill
in the mortgage amount, indicate whether the
loan is a fixed or variable loan, specify the
interest rate and Annual Percentage Rate
(APR) and fill in the length of the loan (i.e.
number of years/months) and the monthly
payment. including any mortgage insurance.
III. Settlement Costs. This section covers
the settlement costs associated with the
mortgage loan and warns the borrower that
the costs may change if a different mortgage
product is chosen or the interest rate
changes.
IILA. Origination Charges. Loan originators
shall total all origination charges to the
lender and the broker in this category on the
form. For mortgage brokers, these charges
shall include all charges from the borrower
that are paid to the mortgage broker for the
transaction. For lenders, these charges shall
include all direct charges from the borrower
for the transaction, other than discount
points reported in line III B (2). The
estimated total origination charges shall not
vary from the actual costs at the time of
settlement (0% tolerance), absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances.
III.B. Interest Rate Dependent Payment.
(1) In loans originated by mortgage brokers,
mortgage brokers shall subtotal any lender
payments to the borrower for a higher
interest rate as well as any other lender
payments for the transaction other than for
the par value of the loan in this category on
the form.
(2) In loans originated by mortgage brokers,
mortgage brokers shall subtotal any borrower
payments to the lender for a lower interest
rate.
The mortgage broker shall include the
payments in (1) and (2) when computing the
net loan origination charge due from
borrower (Sum of A and B). Lenders may
complete this section at their option.
IILe. Lender Required and Selected Third
Party Services. Loan originators shall subtotal
all charges for lender required and lender
selected third party services in this section
on the form. This subtotal shall cover all
such services except for title related services
and title insurance in connection with the
borrower's loan and shall not vary from
actual costs at the time of settlement (0%
tolerance), absent unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances.
III.D. Title Services and Title Insurance.
Loan originators shall subtotal all fees or
charges for title and settlement agent services
and title insurance in this category of the
form. On the form. the loan originator also
must indicate whether the services and
insurance are loan originator selected or
borrower selected. If title services and
insurance are loan originator/lender selected.
the estimate shall not vary from actual costs
at the time of settlement (0% tolerance),
absent unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances. If title services and/or
insurance are shoppable by the borrower, and
the borrower ultimately elects to use a
provider identified by the loan originator/
lender, the final amount at settlement may
not exceed the estimate by more than 10%
(10% tolerance) absent unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances, except when a
*
**
*
*
*
*
*
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borrower, as needed. The loan originator
must fill in the chart to demonstrate to the
borrower how the borrower's chosen interest
rate, monthly payments, and settlement costs
compare to a loan of the same size with a
lower and a higher interest rate. The
completed chart serves as an example for the
loan originator of how to fill out the
categories. Loan originators shall use figures
relevant to the borrower's transaction.
V. Additional Loan Terms. Loan
originators shall indicate whether the
mortgage loan is subject to a prepayment
penalty and whether the loan has a balloon
payment due at the conclusion of the loan
term. If there is a prepayment penalty, the
K(a) - 113
loan originator shall advise the borrower that
he or she is entitled to a copy of the
prepayment penalty terms upon request.
For Adjustable Rate Mortgage Loans, loan
originators must indicate the interest rates
and adjustment terms of the adjustable rate
mortgage loan.
BILLING CODE 4210-27-P
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Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Costs (GFE)
This form provides a reliable eSlimate of the funds that will be required from you, ,lhe
borrower(s) to obtain a mongage using our company as your Joan originator. This OFE coyers both our charges, lhe charges of other
senlemcnl service providers who perform services that are required by the lender to close your mongage loan, and applicable State
and local government charges and taxes due a[ settlement.
The following estimale is valid for __ days (30 days oiheater! from the date this form is delivercd or mailed to you, if
you qualifi for this mangage based on your credi, raring. the:~pp[al~al, and other appropriate criteria.
'1i,
THE PROPERTY: You seek (O [purcfuseJ(refirunC(:) a residenci.11 Jkrty at
(Add-us)
I. OUR SERVICES:
As a loan originator. we perform the services necessary to olii~in"l!Jd process your mortgage Joan with our own funds or one or marc
funding sources. We do not offer loans Crom all funding s~~, e;i:hnd we cannot guarantee the lowest price or best terms
available in the market. You should com are the riceJf below and sho for the loan 0 • 'nator mo a e
roduct and settlement services that best meet our fina'il
II. LOAN TERMS:
For a mortgage amount of$__~ at a [fixed] inter'il1.tr3tew _%. your APR wiil be __%.. which includes __% for
mortgage insurancc. Your loan tcrm will be [ I years~ith I 1Ji\,onthly payments. Your [initial) monthly payment for principal
and interest and morlgage insurance on this loan will lie $ "'~. See Section v, for /nan terms related to adjustable rate
mangages. applicable prepayment penalties and ballo73h.paym",i#rts.
III. SETTLEMENT COSTS:
Ifyou choose a different mortgage product or you do not Jock your interest rale, some of the estimates listed below may change. The
following costs will have to be paid at or before loan c1osing:,.~,
~r .:~t.
A. Origination Charges(HUD-1800 Series)* ',:";' $ _
See Attachment A-I listing origination charge suhtof$,.!s for the lender and the broker.
B. Interest Rate Dependent Payment (200, 900)***
Until you lock in your interest rate these payments may change.
(1) (+) Borrowcr Paymenl [() Lender for Lower [nterest Rate: $ _
(2) (-) Lender Payme~ft(; Bo'iTawer for Higher Interesl Rate: $ _
NET LOAN oRIGINAnON CHARGE DUE~RONitORROWER(Sum of A and B): Ib$:;;;;:;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;d
D. Title Services and Title Insurance (1100)
C. Lender Required and Selected Third Party Services (800, 1300)*
These arc third pany services that are required and selec~ed bX the lender, these services
must be disclosed to you. See Attachment A-I itemiziniJ-IJ.ese'services.
·-i~'l
-.', ~
"!':'~~
(I) __ lender selected*
(2) borrower selected **
E. Shoppable Lender Required Third Party Se~i-c~'~800,1300)**
These are third party services that are required by the le6a;;'1'ii1 you may shop for (olher than
title services and title insurance). See AI/achmenl A.Iif1kt!.~i1J}r-rheseservices:
F. Government Charges -Taxes, State and Local (1200)*
Government charges due at the time of settlement on
G. Reserves/Escrow, (if required) (1000)**
H. Per Diem Interest (900) ***
Per Diem Daily Rate $ at __ days with an estimated selllement date of .
I. Hazard Insurance(9OO)***
J. Optional Owner's Title Insurance (1l00)***
TOTAL SETTLEMENT COSTS DUE FROM BORROWER (Sum of A-J):
$--
$--
$--
$--
$--
$--
$--
$--
~ I$
*The charges listed in A. C, D (if selected by the lender), F. and H (daily rate) will not vary except in unforeseeable and
extraordinary circumstances as prescribed by federal regulation_
"The charges listed in D (if selected by the borrower), E, and G must nol be exceeded at settlement by more than 10% absent
unforeseeable and extrnordinary circumstances. except when a borrower chooses to purchase a more expensiye service.
*"The charges listed in B, H, r. and J are nol subject to a lolerance, therefore these charges may vary.
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IV. OPTIONS TO PAY SETfLEMENT COSTS AND LOWER YOUR INTEREST RATE
A. Cash Payment at Settlement: You may pay all or part of your required settlement costs at
settlement using your available funds. .,
B. Borrowing Additional Funds to Pay S;~ttl~mentCosts: You may be able to pay all or part
of your settlement costs by borrowing the n'6eded funds as part of your mortgage loan principal.
If you chose this option. your monthly payments will increase.
C. Pay Settlement Costs Through a Highednterest Rate:
You may be able to lower your settlement ~bsl;;:'.tn ex.change for paying a higher interest rate on
your mortgage loan. This higher interest r~,~;',VI increase your monthly payments.
"",,~~~._. . '" ~'~,.
D. You May Lower Your Interest Rate:
You may be able to lower the interest rate on your loan by paying additional funds at closing,
commonly referred to as "discount points.':"Thereduced interest rate will lower your monthly
payments. ..' ;',
The following table will show you how hikhecai& lower interest rates affect your loan and loan
payments.
RLRH' h IY SidGFET, erms ou e ecte .' IPI er nterest ate ower nterest ate
New Loan Balance $100,000
~,);',
:,'$100,000 $100,000f~
l~···;,··,,-/i;
Interest Rate 7.00% },;. 7.25% 6.75%
Monthly Principal & $700.30 $717.18 $683.60
Interest & PMI
if :':;-",
Credit $100
)i,<.. f.:~J,J00
N.A.
Discount Points N.A. N.A. $900
Change in Cash to $1,000 less $1,000 more
Close From GFE
'<Terms You Selected
·i,.. ",:--
Change in Monthly $16.88 more $16.70 less
P&I from GFE
Terms You Selected ...,,'..;¥•••.•• L-
V. ADDITIONAL LOAN TERMS
o This mortgage lli subject to Prepayment Penalty.
o This mortgage lli NOT subject to'P~epay~:~ntPenalty.
o This mortgage HAS a balloon payrii~ntof iL--, which wiD be due at the conclusion of the loan
term. t~ :;~r
o This mortgage DOES NOT HAVE~'.I!i!l16J~payment.
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Loans
This is an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Loan. The initial interest rate for this
ARM loan is __. The first adjustment will occur after __months/years and every
__months/years thereafter for a period of months/years. The interest rate is based on
the __index and may increase by a margin of __ percent over this index. with each
adjustment. The maximum rate increase adjustment per period is and the maximum
interest rate that can ever apply to this loan is __.
K(a) - 115
49166 Federal Register/Vol. 67, No. 145/Monday, July 29, 2002/Proposed Rules
Attachment A-I instructions
Attachment A-I. "Required Use" and Shoppable Third Party Providers.
A. The loan originator must itemize on this form any services that may be independently obtained by the borrower and the
estimated cost (based on local market averages for the area where the property is located). The loan originator must also indicate
(by checking the appropriate box) any lender-required, lender selected services, along with the estimated charge (based on local market
averages for the area where the property is located), and name of the provider.
B. In reporting subtotals for mortgage broker/lender and title agent/title insurance, the loan originator must indicate the names
of the service providers and the subtotals of all their charges and fees.
Attachment A-I
A. "Required Use" and Shoppable Third Party Providers
Federal regulation 3500.7(f) requires that if a lender requires the usc of a particular provider of a settlement service, other
than tile lender's own employees, and also requires the borrower to pay any portion of the cost of such service, then the good faith
estimale must: (I) state that the particular provider is required;.(21.state the providers name; and (3) state the estimated charge. These
services are marked as "requireduse...· :.::
The services marked as shoppahle On this list that ar~'~.Iso:·r~quired by us to close your loan. however, unlike the "required
use" services. we do not require that you use a particular prov~i:ler. You nUlY want to shop for these services on your own to find the
best price and service to meet your needs. However, if you cllose to use a company that is more expensive then our selection, then the
excess over our estimate below is excluded from the 10% limit on the closing cost estimate given by us. The following lists the
services and companies used by us and price estimates for those services.
ReQ. Use Shoppable Service P;~i:idcr Estimate
"';~::"
···h..
. '.
!~ ';;1-
."c:., .•...•..• At
B. Loan Origination and Title Services Subtotals
Federal regulation 3500.7(e) requires that this Attachment indicate the subtolals of the lender and mortgage broker
origination charges; the subtQtals of all the charges for title ang·settlement agent services, including any commissions for title
insurance; and the subtotal for the title insurance premium.:~:i't
:~:'., -,' ;' .'
f-:SubtotalService ,
Mortgage Broker Charges
mUD I line 800)
Lender Charges (800)
,;:~ "';~
Title Agent Charges(llOl) ~·~c,," "p,¥f'.
Tille Insurance Premium (1108)
BILLING CODE 4210-27-C
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11. A New Appendix F to part 3500
is added to read as follows:
Appendix F to Part 350o-Instructions
for Completing Guaranteed Mortgage
Package Agreement; Sample
Guaranteed Mortgage Package
Agreement
Instructions for Completing the Guaranteed
Mortgage Package Agreement
The following are instructions for
completing the guaranteed mortgage package
agreement under Regulation X of the
Department of Housing and Urban
Development (24 CFR 3500.16(gJ(1)(ix)). This
form is to be used as a statement of
guaranteed settlement charges. interest rate,
and costs. The instructions for completion of
the guaranteed mortgage package agreement
are primarily for the benefit of the packager
who prepares the form and need not be
transmitted to the borrower(s) as an integral
part of the guaranteed mortgage package
agreement.
General Instructions
The loan packager preparing the
guaranteed mortgage package agreement may
fill in information and amounts on the form
by typewriter, hand printing, computer
printing, or any other method producing
clear and legible results. Under these
instructions the "form" refers to the
guaranteed mortgage package agreement
form.
The guarantee includes all services
provided in connection with the mortgage
package, except for per diem interest,
reserves/escrow, hazard insurance, and
optional owner's title insurance.
Specific Instructions
Packagers shall include a paragraph
substantially the same as the introductory
paragraph set forth in Appendix F that
explains the nature of the package and that
the guaranteed mortgage package agreement
remains open for a minimum of 30 days, or
such greater period offered by the packager,
from when the document is delivered or
mailed to the borrower. Within that time
period the borrower must accept the
agreement and pay a minimal fee to make it
binding. The packager shall fill out the
property address and indicate whether the
transaction is a purchase or refinance.
I. Interest Rate Guarantee. The packager
shall specify an interest rate guarantee and
Annual Percentage Rate (APR), as well as the
amount of any mortgage insurance that is the
APR, in this section of the form, which the
borrower may accept and lock at application.
While the guaranteed mortgage package
agreement offer is open, if the borrower does
not accept or lock, the interest rate shall be
tied to an observable and verifiable index, or
other appropriate data or means, and may not
change except in relation to said index or
measure during the time the offer is pending.
If the borrower does not apply for a loan
within 30 days, or such greater period offered
by the packager, the offer will expire.
II. Guaranteed Mortgage Package. The
packager shall specify a lump sum package
price for covered settlement services in this
section of the form. At a minimum, this
amount must include all origination services,
title services and title insurance, other
packager or lender required third party
services, all government charges, and an
upfront maximum mortgage insurance
premium, if applicable.
III. Other Required Settlement Costs. The
packager shall itemize any other required
settlement charges in this section of the form
as permitted under § 3500.16. Any settlement
costs not separately itemized in this section
are presumed to be included in the Section
II guarantee.
lILA. Per Diem Interest. The packager shall
disclose the estimated cost of the minimum
amount of per diem interest that the lender
will require in this section. Although loan
originators are expected to provide reliable
figures in this section based on their
experience, no tolerance applies to this
section, which means that charges may vary
without being subject to any tolerance.
III.B. Reserves/Escrow. The packager shall
accurately indicate the estimated subtotal for
reserves/escrow in this section on the form.
This estimate shall cover all reserves/escrow
deposits required by the lender for such
items as taxes, hazard insurance, and
mortgage insurance. The final amount
required to be placed in reserves/escrow at
settlement may not exceed the estimate by
more than 10% (10% tolerance), absent
unforeseeable and extraordinary
circumstances. The packager must document
any such circumstances and retain the
document in accordance with § 3500.10(e) of
this part.
III.C. Hazard Insurance. The packager shall
estimate the cost of the minimum amount of
hazard insurance that the lender will require
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in this section on the form. Although loan
originators are expected to provide reliable
figures in this section based on their
experience, no tolerance applies to this
section, which means that charges may vary
without being subject to any tolerance.
IV. Optional Owner's Title Insurance. The
packager shall estimate the cost of optional
owner's title insurance that the borrower may
choose to purchase. Although packagers are
expected to provide reliable figures in this
category, no tolerance applies to this section,
which means that charges may vary without
being subject to any tolerance.
V. Options to Pay Settlement Costs and
Lower Your Interest Rate. Packagers shall
explain the borrower's options for paying
settlement costs in this section by using
material that is essentially the same as that
contained in paragraphs A, B, C and D of this
section at Appendix F, along with discussing
these issues with the borrower, as needed.
The packager must fill in the chart to
demonstrate to the borrower how the
borrower's chosen interest rate, monthly
payments, and settlement costs compare to a
loan of the same size with lower and higher
interest rates. The completed chart serves as
an example for the packager of how to fill out
the categories. Packagers shall use figures
relevant to the borrower's transaction.
VI. Additional Loan Terms. Packagers shall
indicate whether the mortgage loan is subject
to a prepayment penalty and whether the
loan has a balloon payment due at the
conclusion of the loan term. If there is a
prepayment penalty, the packager shall
advise the borrower that he or she is entitled
to a copy of the prepayment penalty terms
upon request For Adjustable Rate Mortgage
Loans, packagers must indicate the interest
rates and adjustment terms of the adjustable
rate mortgage loan.
VII. Guaranteed Mortgage Package
Agreement. This section must be signed by
an authorized agent of the packager and the
borrower to become a binding contract for the
guaranteed mortgage package at the
guaranteed mortgage package price. After
acceptance by the borrower, non-lender
packagers must ensure that the lender signs
the GMPA agreeing to provide the loan
included in the guaranteed mortgage
package.
BILLING CODE 4210-27-P
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Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement
This GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE AGREEMENT commits us. , the PACKAGER, to
provide you. , the BORROWER(S), upon your acccptance and payment of a $__ fee within __days (30
days or greater)) of the date this form is delivered or mailed to you: (1) a mOrlgage loan on lhe property described below at a
GUARANTEED INTEREST RATE; (2) a GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE PRICE for selliement services required
by the lender; (3) a firm estimate (within 10%) of the amount of OTHER REQUIRED SETILEMENT COSTS you will pay at or
before seulement; and (4) a sum of the TOTAL ESTIMATED SBTfLEMENT COSTS that you will be required to pay at or before
selliement to obtain your mortgage.U·it'
This Agreement is subject to verification of your cr~)nating, final property appraisal, and other appropriate underwriting
criteria. Other providers offer similar packages, or altem!ftive approaches to mortgage origination. You should shop to find
the best packager or originator and mortgage product til'ineet your needs.
THE PROPERTY: You seek to (purchasellrefinance) a residential property at
(Addrcss) -•. ;
I. INTEREST RATE GUARANTEE
We guarantee to provide you an (initial] interest rate of__on a, [fix.ed rate] (adjustable] mortgage of $ for ( ] years with (
monthly payments. Your [initial] monthly payment for pri~iP;;1 ali~ interest and monthly mortgage insurance on this loan will be $
___' Your APR will be __0/0. which includes __~,.for mortgage insurance, .
This interest rate is guaranteed through selliemen(\¥.f you a~ept and sign this agreement now, and lock-in this rate by !insert
date/timel. If you choose not to accept by this time, we gua'ta!l!'",c;d'i1it the interest rate will not exceed __% (over] (under] the
(prime] (indexl rate for __days (30 days or greater]. Jfyou do not accept within this period, this offer will expire. If you accept this
agreement, but elect not to lock-in the rate at the time of acceptance, we further guarantee that your interest rate will not exceed _ %
(over](underj the [prime](index] rate or other standard measuremcnt in lieu of an index when you do lock-in.
II. GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE r-·
We will provide you a GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PAdhGE for all selliement services and charges required to complete your
mortgage, exceptlhose specifically set forth in Section IV below, at a GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE PRICE. You
will pay this GUARANTEED PRICE in addition to the OTHER REQUIRED SETTLEMENT COSTS itemized in Section ru.
The precise services for each transaction may vary. See Allachment A-I for an indication of whether we anticipate pest inspection,
lender's title insurance and property appraisal services beingitnciud~d in your guaranteed mortgage package. -
This guaranteed mortgage package price may include ~ifnaxim~~mortgage insurance premium based upon your assertion of
the value of the property and loan amount needed. l1ui']nortgage in.<urance premium may decrease or be removed after full
underwriting. "'<." fd
GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE PRICE:
·luJ'"
III. OTHER REQUIRED SETILEMENT COSTS: ';;
In addition to thc GUARANTEED MORTGAGE PACKAGE PRICE, you are or may be required to pay advanced mortgage and
hazard insurance premiums, and to establish escrow reserves at settlement. Some of these costs may vary depending on when your
loan closes and how much insurance you are required to obll\!n.No ,cost may be imposed on you at settlement that is not
specifically itemized and estimated in this Section other tf\an the Guaranteed Mortgage Package Price.
;"'1'; •...".. ,. -,
'!;.!1;
~y.
A. Per Diem Interest (HUD.l 900 Series) "tc. .. ,
Per Diem at $ @ __ dayswithanestimatedsettlementdateof .
$---
B. Reserves! Escrow, (if required) (1000)*
C. Hazard Insurance (900)
$---
$---
IV. OPTIONAL OWNER'S TITLE INSURANCE (1100)
TQTALESTIMATED SETILEMENT COSTS (SUM OF SEC. III, IV, AND V):
$---
* Generally, pursuant to federal regulations, the amount stated in line B may not be exceeded at settlement by more than 10%
absent unforeseeable and extraordinary circumstances
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V. OPTIONS TO PAY SETTLEMENT COST& LOWER YOUR INTEREST RATE
A. Cash Payment at Settlement: You may pay all Or part of your required settlemem costs at settlement using
your available funds.
B. Borrowing Additional Funds to Pay SettlemehtCo~ts: You may be able to pay all or part of your settlemem
costs by borrowing lhe needed funds as part of your~!i>ongageloan principal. If you chose this oplion, your monthly
paymems will increase.,":",
C. Pay Settlement Cos!.s Through a Higher Tnterest Rate:
You may bc able to lower your settlement costs in l;!\(;!l~nge for paying a higher interest rate on your mortgage loan.
This higher interest rate will increase your monthli'~aym~ts.
~i:'~, _. ,A<-; ,:,"
D. Lower Your Interest Rate: ','f
You may be able to lower the interest rate on yourJ6an bytpaying additional funds at closing, commonly referred to
as "discount points," The reduced interest rate will lower your monthly payments. The following table will show
you how higher and lower imerest rates affect your loan and loan payments.
49169
GMPA Terms You Stleetea" Higher Interest Rate
:~~'/
Lower Tnterest Rate
"...~. 1';"~
New Loan Balance $100,000 ,rt ij$100,000 $100,000~;
':-_;;.:>:,.<,.,-
Interest Rate 7.00% 7.25% 6.75%
Monthly Principal & $700.30
,~~.
-,$717.18 $683.60
Interest & PMI
GMPA Price $2,600 ,::", $1,600 $3,600
Change in Cash to $1,000 less $1,000 more
Close From GMPA
~,r'Terms You Selected '"tr
Change in Monthly ''':.~",. $16.88 more $16.70 less
P,I, & PMI from
GMPA Terms You
Selected ~.~'
""", .
o This mortgage lli subject to Prepayment Penalty ~
o This mortgage lli NOT subject to Prepayment Penalty.
o This mortgage HAS a balloon pay;';~"Fi"~'tL-,which will be due on _
o This mortgage DOES NOT HA VE 3;:/:IaU<!On payment.
Adjustable Rate' Mortgage (ARM) Loans' ~
This is an Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) Loan. The initial interest rate for this ARM
loan is __. The first adjustment will ~l.lfaft,F __months/years and every
__months/years thereafter for a period~9f "t: months/years. The interest rate is based on
the __index and may increase by a mar(n of if' percent over this index with each
adjustment. The maximum rate increase adjustttlent per period is and the maximum
interest rate that can ever apply to this loan is .
VII. Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement:
We are providing this GMPA to you at no cosr. If you agree to seek a mortgage loan using OUf services within 30 days. by
signing. dating. and returning this GMPA to us on or before __. along with a$_ applicalion fee, we will be contractually
bound to the terms oflhis GMPA provided that you qualify for this mortgage based on your credit rating, the appraisal.
and other appropriate criteria.
Signl1ture of Authorized Agent
Signature(s) of BOlTower(s)
Dale Sign:llure: of under" Dale
Date
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Attachment A-l instructions
Attachment A-I. The packager shall indicate in the chart (either yes or no) whether specific services are anticipated to be included
in the guaranteed mortgage package price, such as the pest inspection, lender's title insurance, appraisal, and credit report.
Attachment A-I
This list indicates whether we anticipate specific services being included in your guaranteed mortgage
package. Upon request, you are entitled to receive a copy of the reports generated by any of the services listed
below that are included in your package.
Service :/ Anticipated (YIN)
Pest Inspection (HUD-I line 1302) ...:
Lender's Title Insurance (HUD-l{line 1109)
Property Appraisal (HUD-l line 803)
Credit Report
BILLING CODe 421D-27-C
Dated: July 5, 2002.
John C. Weicher,
Assistant Secretary for Housing-Federal
Housing Commissioner.
Appendix to FR-4727 Proposed Rule
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Note: This appendix will not appear in the
Code of Federal Regulations.
The following Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis is Chapter 5 of the rule's Economic
Impact Analysis, which is available for
public inspection.
Summary ofthe Rule's Benefits and Impacts
on Small Businesses
The proposed RESPA rule offers a dual
approach to problems in the settlement
market: A new, simplified GFE combined
with tolerances on final settlement costs and
a new method for reporting wholesale lender
payments in broker transactions; and a
guaranteed cost approach based on packaging
of settlement services. This chapter provides
a summary of benefits, costs, transfers,
efficiencies, and market impacts of these two
approaches, highlighting the effects on small
businesses. Section I discusses the new GFE
approach while Section II discusses the
guaranteed cost approach, or packaging. The
chapter also summarizes alternative
approaches that HUD considered that
potentially impacted small businesses. The
format in this chapter is to list the major
findings; additional details about the new
GFE approach and packaging are available in
Chapters 3 and 4, respectively.
l. New GFE Approach
The main benefits, costs. transfers, and
market impacts of the new GFE approach are
outlined below, along with the specific
impacts on small businesses. Since most
brokers and settlement service providers are
small businesses, the main impacts of the
new GFE approach on these entities are
highlighted below in subsections I.C, I.D and
I.F.
A. Shopping Benefits
The new GFE approach will improve
consumer shopping for mortgages, which
will result in better mortgage products at
lower prices for consumers.
• The new GFE format in the proposed
rule simplifies the process of originating
mortgages by consolidating costs into a few
major cost categories. This is a substantial
improvement over today's GFE, which
contains a long list of individual charges that
encourages fee proliferation and junk fees,
and can often overwhelm and confuse
consumers.
• The new GFE contains a statement that
clarifies the role that the originator plays in
the loan process. It states, for example, that
the originator does not distribute the loan
products of all funding sources, that the
originator does not guarantee the best loan
terms, and that the consumer should shop.
This will put all borrowers on notice that
they should protect their interests by
shopping.
• The new GFE also makes cost estimates
more certain, by requiring that loan
originators adhere to amounts reported on
the GFE for major cost categories (such as
origination fees), and on additional cost
categories give estimates subject to a 10%
upper limit, or tolerance. This will reduce
the all too frequent problem of borrowers
being surprised by additional costs at
settlement.
• The new GFE will better inform
consumers about their financing choices by
requiring that lenders explain the different
interest rate and closing cost options
available to consumers. For example,
consumers will fully understand the trade-
offs between reducing their closing costs and
increasing the interest rate on the mortgage.
• Altogether, the simplicity and certainty
offered by the new GFE should improve
comparison shopping for mortgage loans,
reduce interest rates and settlement prices for
borrowers, and eliminate surprises at
settlement. There will be less of the sub-
optimal consumer shopping that often
characterizes today's mortgage market. In
addition, originators will be less able to take
advantage of uninformed shoppers.
B. Summary of Estimated Benefits, Costs,
Transfers, and Efficiencies
Chapter 3 provided estimates of the
magnitude of the benefits, costs, transfers,
and efficiencies. Transfers totaled $6.3
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billion to borrowers, with $4.5 billion coming
from originators and $1.8 billion from third
party settlement service providers. In
addition to these transfers, there are
efficiency gains: Borrowers realize $826
million in efficiency gains from less time
spent shopping; and loan originators and
third party settlement service providers
experience $1.630 billion in efficiency gains,
some or all of which have the potential to be
passed through to borrowers through
competition. Costs to originators rise by
approximately $250-$275 million. These
estimates are explained further below. While
they are based on specific assumptions (see
Chapter 3), they provide a sense of the
overall effects of the new GFE approach.
• Under one set of assumptions, Chapter 3
estimates that $7.5 billion of the $15 billion
in total yield premium payments (YSPs) is
not passed through to borrowers to reduce
closing costs. If the proposed rule results in
half of this $7.5 billion being recaptured by
borrowers, then the annual impact would be
$3.75 billion. While this figure will vary
depending on specific assumptions, it
provides a sense of how large the effects of
the proposed rule could be on the return of
YSPs to borrowers as reduced closing costs.
• Direct origination fees are estimated to
be $15 billion (which when added to the $15
billion in YSPs results in total originator
compensation of $30 billion). In addition to
the $3.75 billion in YSPs recaptured by
borrowers, it is also assumed that improved
shopping enables borrowers to capture five
percent (or $0.75 billion) of originators'
direct origination fees of $15 billion.
• Chapter 3 estimates that $18 billion in
third-party fees would be subject to increased
price pressure as a result of the imposition
of tolerances and expanded shopping by
originators. While it is difficult to estimate
how much tolerances and expanded
originator shopping will reduce the $18
billion, this figure provides a base on which
this effect will be felt. The estimates reported
below assume that third-party fees would fall
by 10 percent, or $1.8 billion.
• It was estimated that borrowers would
save $6.3 billion in annual settlement
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charges.! This $6.3 billion represents
transfers to borrowers from higher priced
producers, with $4.5 billion coming from
originators 2 and $1.8 billion from third party
settlement service providers. While these
figures will vary depending on specific
assumptions, it provides a sense of how large
the effects of the proposed rule could be on
settlement charges to borrowers.
• In addition to the transfers. there are
several efficiencies associated with the GFE.
Borrowers realize $826 million savings in
time spent shopping for loans and third party
services. Loan originators save $1.280 billion
in time spent with shoppers, in efforts spent
seeking out vulnerable borrowers, and from
the substitution of more efficient for less
efficient originators. Third party settlement
service providers save $350 million in time
spent with shoppers and from the
substitution of more efficient for less efficient
third party settlement service providers.
Some or all of the $1.280 billion and $350
million in efficiency gains have the potential
to be passed through to borrowers through
competition.
• Costs to originators rise by $226 million
if it takes 10 extra minutes to handle the
forms and by $26 to $52 million to make
third party arrangements in response to
tolerances. (See "Costs and other Impacts"
below.)
• As discussed throughout this chapter.
the benefit, cost, transfer. and efficiency
estimates are based on specific assumptions.
The estimates provide a sense of the overall
net benefits of the proposed new GFE
approach to consumers. The rest of this
summary highlights the main impacts of the
new GFE approach.
C. New Treatment of Wholesale Lender
Payments and Impacts on Brokers
An important feature of the new GFE
approach is that it addresses the problem of
lender payments to mortgage brokers.
• The proposed rule ensures that in
brokered transactions, borrowers receive the
full benefit of the higher price paid by
wholesale lenders for a loan with an above-
par interest rate, that is. yield spread
premiums will go dfrectly to the borrower.
On both the GFE and HOD-1, the portion of
any wholesale lender payments that arise
because a loan has an above-par interest rate
is passed through directly to borrowers as a
credit against other costs. Thus. there is
assurance that borrowers who take on an
above-par loan receive funds to offset their
settlement costs.
• Similarly, the proposed rule ensures that
in brokered transactions, consumers who
1 As explained in Section IV.C of Chapter 3. the
$6.3 billion represents about 13 percent of the
baseline settlement costs, which include origination
fees and selected third party costs (appraisal. credit
report, tax service and flood certificate and title
insurance and settlement agent charges). Survey.
pest inspection, and mortgage insurance are not
included. as they are not required on all loans.
Thus. the $6.3 billion may be a conservative figure.
This assumes, of course, that all the other
assumptions underlying this scenario are correc!.
2 The $3.75 billion in YSPs recaptured by
borrowers plus the $0.75 billion in reduced direct
origination fees give $4.5 billion in transfers to
borrowers from originators.
choose to pay discount points receive the full
market benefit in terms of lower mortgage
interest rates.
• Under these new rules, brokers must
report the total origination fees they receive
on the GFE and the HUD-1-rather than their
origination fees net of any yield spread
premium they receive. Thus. the new GFE
clarifies what brokers are receiving for loan
origination.
• Most brokers are small businesses. The
above changes in the method for reporting
wholesale lender payments on the GFE and
HUD-1 will reduce the incomes of those
brokers who have been overcharging
consumers by receiving a combination of
origination fees and yield spread premium
payments that is greater than that suggested
by competitive markets. The new GFE will
clearly indicate both (a) the broker's total
origination fee received and (b) the net
upfront origination fee to the borrower, after
reduction for any yield spread premium that
the wholesale lender pays the borrower.
Consumers will have full information about
broker fees, which will allow them to
comparison shop and pay lower fees,
compared with the situation they face in
today's market.
• As explained in the proposed rule, it is
not practical to implement such a system for
lenders, which means that lenders can
continue to report their origination fees on a
net basis if they so choose. 3 However, HUD
has designed the new GFE form so that it
reduces any anti-competitive effects between
brokers and lenders. For purposes of
comparing lender and broker offers, the new
GFE focuses the borrower's attention on the
right number, which is the subtotal after
reducing total origination fees by any lender
payment to the borrower (Le. yield spread
premium). This should reduce any anti-
competitive impacts of the proposed rule on
small businesses.
• Furthermore, it is anticipated that market
competition will increase the likelihood that
yield spread premium payments will be
passed through to borrowers throughout the
market, in lender (Le., non-broker) as well as
broker transactions. The information that
consumers gain from broker transactions
concerning the money back on premium
loans should make consumers act
competitively with respect to premiums on
similar loans from non-brokers.
• Brokers as a group will remain highly
competitive actors in the mortgage market.
Chapter II discusses the factors that will
continue to keep brokers competitive with
other lenders. As noted above, HUD has also
designed the GFE to lessen any anti-
competitive effects from the different
reporting requirements of lenders and
brokers on the new GFE. Therefore, there is
no evidence to suggest that there would be
any major anti-competitive impact on the
broker industry as a whole from the new GFE
provisions in the proposed rule.
• Rather, the main impact on brokers (both
small and large) of the proposed new
treatment of payments by wholesale lenders
would be on those brokers (as well as other
3 This also includes those brokers who have
wholesale lines of credit.
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originators) who have been overcharging
uninformed consumers, through the
combination of high origination fees and
yield spread premiums. As noted above, it is
anticipated that market competition, under
this new GFE approach, will have a similar
impact on those lenders (non-brokers) who
have been overcharging consumers through a
combination of high yield spread premiums
and origination costs.
• As noted above, according to some
estimates $7.5 billion in YSPs is not passed
through to borrowers to reduce closing costs.
While this figure will vary depending on
specific assumptions, it provides a sense of
how large the effects of the proposed rule
could be on the return ofYSPs to borrowers
as reduced closing costs.
D. Lower Settlement Service Prices
In addition to reducing originator fees, the
tighter tolerances of the new GFE approach
would result in lower prices for third party
settlement services. Settlement service
providers who are small businesses would be
impacted by any reduction in settlement
service prices arising from the tighter
tolerances on settlement fees.
• The imposition of tolerances on fees will
encourage originators to seek discounts and
cut settlement service prices. The proposed
rule clarifies that loan originators can make
arrangements with their third party
settlement service providers (appraisers,
settlement service agents, etc.) to lower
prices for their customers (Le., borrowers),
provided these prices or any fees on the GFE
are not "marked up" or "up charged."
• Section V of Chapter 3 examines the
magnitude of third-party fees that would be
subject to increased price pressure as a result
of the imposition of tolerances and expanded
shopping by the originator. As noted above,
$18 billion in third party fees would fall into
this category. While it is difficult to estimate
how much tolerances and expanded
originator shopping will reduce the $18
billion. this figure provides a base on which
this effect will be felt. The estimates reported
above under "Summary of Estimated
Impacts" assumed that third-party revenues
would fall by $1.8 billion, or 10 percent.
• It is estimated that small settlement
service providers would account for $1.3
billion of the $1.8 billion decline in third
party revenues. But as discussed in Chapter
3, this estimate is subject to variation.
E. Costs and Other Impacts
Chapter 3 identifies several factors might
impact the costs of handling the new GFE
form. As noted below, many of these factors
tend to offset each other with end result
being that annual additional costs appear to
be small.
• There are some direct costs to originators
from complying with the GFE portion of the
proposed rule. These do not appear to be
very large. While the new GFE format
requires less itemization than today's GFE,
the HUD-1, with its detailed itemization,
remains essentially the same. Originators and
closing agents will have to expend some
minimal effort in explaining to consumers
the cross walk between the new streamlined
GFE and the more detailed HOD-1. There is
a new page of the GFE showing interest rate
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alternatives, which should not impose much
additional costs, given that most originators
do that in some form today. Annual costs to
originators rise by $226 million if it takes 10
extra minutes to handle the new GFE form.
Chapter 3 also estimates that first-year
startup costs could range from $55-$95
million.
• There will be some costs to originators
from the need for additional preliminary
underwriting in order to generate new GFEs.
While this underwriting is already occurring
for full applications today, it is expected that
some borrowers under the new GFE will get
multiple applications and use them to shop.
However, it is difficult to estimate how many
additional GFEs and preliminary
underwritings will result under the new GFE
scheme. In addition, as discussed in Chapter
3, the number of applicants going to full
underwriting could decline under the
proposed rule.
• The imposition of zero and 10 percent
tolerances on fees will require lenders to take
some actions that will increase their costs.
For example, arrangements will have to be
made with third party settlement service
providers, in order for the originator to come
up with estimates that can be delivered
within the 10 percent tolerance. As noted
above, these are estimated to range from $26
to $52 million.
F. Small Business Impacts-A Summary and
Alternatives Considered
Chapter 3 estimates that $3.5 billion of the
$6.3 billion in transfers would corne from
small businesses. The above summary bullets
highlight the mechanisms in which this will
happen. Improved consumer shopping
among originators and more aggressive
competition by originators for settlement
services will lead to price reductions.
Originators (both small and large) and
settlement service providers (both small and
large) that have been charging high prices
will experience reductions in their revenues.
Of the $3.5 billion impact on small
businesses, it is estimated the $2.2 billion
will come from small originators and $1.3
billion, from small settlement service
providers.
Market impacts on different types of
businesses are discussed throughout Chapter
3, as well as in the summary bullets under
C and D above. Chapter 3 also discussed
alternative policies that HUD considered
when developing the rule. Examples of
alternatives that would impact small
businesses include:
• One alternative considered was to place
the interest rate dependent payment at the
bottom of the form rather than directly after
the origination charge. This was rejected
since an unsophisticated borrower might
misinterpret the broker's higher origination
charge (relative to a lender who can net the
yield spread premium out of the origination
charge rather than list it separately as a
lender payment to the borrower) as
indicating that the broker's loan is more
costly.
• The Department considered placing the
division of the origination charge into broker
and lender portions on the front page of the
GFE but rejected that idea since the
information was not useful in bottom line
comparison shopping. Loans with identical
origination charges will now have the same
numbers presented in the origination charge
whether originated by a broker or lender.
• The Department considered having zero
tolerance on both the lender and broker
components of the origination charge instead
of zero tolerance on the total. Zero tolerance
on the components would have given brokers
less flexibility in switching lenders, even if
the total of the lender and broker fees would
remain the same. The method selected makes
it easier for brokers to switch lenders, so long
as the total origination charge does not rise.
• The Department considered having
different statements of the services of the
originator. The purpose of this section of the
GFE is to alert borrowers to shop in order to
protect their interests. Different statements
could favor brokers over lenders. or vice
versa. The Department adopted the idea that
every originator would have to deliver the
same message, so that every borrower gets the
same warning and no originator is at a
disadvantage in delivering the message.
II. Guaranteed Cost Packaging or Packaging
The main benefits, costs, transfers, and
market impacts of the guaranteed cost or
packaging are outlined below, along with the
specific impacts on small businesses. Since
most brokers and settlement service
providers are small businesses, the main
impacts of packaging on these entities are
highlighted below in subsection II.F.
A. Overview of Packaging Benefits
First, guaranteed packaging will improve
and increase borrower shopping for
mortgages. Basically, guaranteed packaging
reduces the loan offer to:a settlement package
price, an interest rate, an APR, and a PMI
premium rate. The package price and the PMI
premium has zero tolerance, and the interest
rate is guaranteed if locked (otherwise the
rate varies with a market index). In addition,
the offer is free and, if agreed upon by the
borrower, the offer becomes a contract that is
enforceable. These are all advantages over
today's process of shopping for mortgages.
Economic efficiencies result from easier and
less time consuming shopping under
packaging. Borrowers are better informed,
shop better, and reach better deals.
Second, the guaranteed packing approach
would remove regulatory barriers that are
today preventing market competition from
reducing settlement prices. Under current
law, a providers' efforts to enter into volume
arrangements with settlement service firms
may be regarded as illegal and restrictions
against mark-ups of third party costs may
impede the packaging of services. Under
HUD's proposed rule, packagers will be able
to enter into cost-reducing, volume-discount
arrangements, and competition among
packagers will pass these lower costs through
to borrowers at mortgage settlement.
B. Summary of Estimated Benefits, Costs,
Transfers, and Efficiencies
Chapter 4 presents estimates of the
magnitude of the benefits, costs, transfers,
and efficiencies associated with packaging.
Transfers total $10.3 billion to borrowers,
with $6.7 billion coming from originators and
$3.6 billion from third party settlement
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service providers. In addition to these
transfers, there are efficiency gains:
borrowers realize $1.652 billion in
efficiencies from less time spent shopping
and loan originators and third party
settlement service providers realize $3.410 in
efficiency gains, some or all of which have
the potential to be passed through to
borrowers through competition. These
estimates are explained further below. While
they are based on specific assumptions (see
Chapter 4), they provide a sense of the
overall effects of packaging.
While these benefits of packaging are
basically similar to the benefits of the new
Good Faith Estimate approach discussed in
Section I, it is anticipated that packaging will
improve shopping and lower settlement costs
to an even greater extent than the GFE
approach. Above, it was estimated that
borrowers could save $6.3 billion in annual
settlement costs under the new GFE
approach. It is anticipated that a system
based on packaging alone would lead to even
greater savings for borrowers, as transfers
from firms to borrowers will rise by $4
billion for a total of $10.3 billion. Originators
contribute $6.7 billion of this and third party
settlement service providers, $3.6 billion.
This benefit to consumers comes from further
reductions in overcharges that competition
passes on to borrowers. Under this scenario,
the final savings to the borrower would
depend on how the market settles down
between the two methods of loan
origination-the new GFE approach and
packaging. If it is half and half, borrower
gains are slightly over $8 billion.
In addition to the transfers, there are
several efficiencies associated with packaging
(see the summary in Section VII in Chapter
4). Borrowers realize $1.652 billion savings
in time spent shopping for loans and third
party services. Loan originators save $2.710
billion in time spent with shoppers, in efforts
spent seeking out vulnerable borrowers, and
from the substitution of more efficient for
less efficient originators. Third party
settlement service providers save $700
million in time spent with shoppers and from
the substitution of more efficient for less
efficient third party settlement service
providers. Some or all of the $2.710 billion
and $700 million in efficiency gains have the
potential to be passed through to borrowers
through competition.
The simplification and other advantages of
the new GMPA will lead to lower costs than
under the new GFE. It is assumed that costs
under the GMPA will be the same as today's
GFE. As discussed in Chapter 4, one area of
uncertainty about packaging and the new
GMPA concerns the index that is used to
ensure that changes in the interest (note) rate
reflect changes in the market. Until the exact
mechanism is selected, it is difficult to
determine the effect of the index on
packaging.
Concerns have been expressed about the
impacts of the packaging approach on small
lenders and small service providers. Chapter
4 estimated that small businesses (Le., small
originators and small service providers)
would account for $5.9 billion of the $10.3
billion in transfers. The effects on small
businesses are discussed below in II.F.
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C. Shopping Benefits
· Packaging offers numerous shopping
advantages for consumers. compared to
today's process of shopping for mortgages.
Under packaging, borrowers are better
informed and better able to comparison shop.
• Guaranteed packaging will improve and
increase borrower shopping for mortgages.
Basically, guaranteed packaging reduces the
loan offer to two numbers (a settlement
package price and an interest rate), has zero
tolerance on the package price, and
guarantees the interest rate if locked
(otherwise the rate varies with a market
index). In addition, the offer is free and, if
agreed upon by the borrower, the offer
becomes a contract that is enforceable. These
are all advantages over today's process of
shopping for mortgages, as well as over the
Good Faith Estimate approach outlined in
Chapter 3.
• The simplified loan offer under
packaging does away with the proliferation of
fees, including junk fees that often
characterizes today's mortgage offers.
• The packaging agreement eliminates the
separate reporting of the premium or
discount associated with brokered loans.
This is done to facilitate competition and
comparison shopping.
• Economic efficiencies result from easier
and less time consuming shopping under
packaging. Borrowers are better informed,
shop better, and reach better deals.
• In this case, the main transfers will be
from originators who are charging above
market prices to borrowers who are more
informed and better able to comparison shop
(see the $6.7 billion estimate reported above).
D. Lower Settlement Service Prices
The packaging approach will result in even
lower prices for third party settlement
services than estimated above for the new
GFE approach.
• The Section 8 safe harbor will allow
greatest protection to entities within the
package from charges of illegal referral fees,
kickbacks, and unearned fees. This will free
up packagers to pursue lower prices for third
party services in their package without
concern that the technique used could be a
Section 8 violation. Competition is
substituted for regulation.
• Thus, packaging will result in lower
prices paid for settlement services, as
packagers aggressively seek discounts in
third-party service prices. A better shopper
(the packager) is substituted for the borrower
as the searcher for third party settlement
services.
• In addition, there are several efficiencies
associated with packaging that could lead to
lower costs. Under packaging, originators
may deal with one packager, rather than a
whole array of third party providers and the
packager, who specializes in this activity,
may be more efficient than the originator.
• Given the likelihood that there will be
competition among a number of packagers,
the lower third party service prices will be
passed through to borrowers as lower costs
for closing a loan. In this case, the main
transfers will be from settlement service
providers to borrowers (see the $3.6 billion
estimate reported above).
E. Impact on Business Operations and Market
Structure
The proposed RESPA rule offers a dual
approach to settlement market problems-(l)
a new, simplified GFE combining tolerances
on final settlement costs and a new method
for reporting wholesale lender payments; and
(2) a guaranteed cost approach based on
packaging. Consumers and originators can
use either approaph, which has the advantage
of allowing the qiarket determine the best
approach under(? given set of circumstances.
While there are reasons to expect originators
to move toward the packaging approach, it is
difficult to estimate the share of the market
that will ultimately fall under packaging, as
well as the timing of the move toward
packaging.
• An uncertainty with respect to the
implementation of packaging concerns the
interest rate index that determines changes in
mortgage rates for borrowers who are
shopping (before they sign the guaranteed
packaging offer) and for borrowers who
choose to "float" rather than "lock-in" their
interest rate (at the time they sign the offer).
Packaging depends on lenders finding an
acceptable interest rate index, or some other
mechanism for ensuring that any changes in
the interest rate reflect overall market
changes. As noted below, there will likely be
some costs associated with lenders'
guaranteeing that interest rates move only
with market conditions, depending on the
indexing technique chosen.
• As explained in this chapter, packaging
could take several forms-for example,
originators could develop their own packages
or specialized firms could develop packages,
or components of packages, which they
would then sell them to originators. The
section on small business below highlights
several additional market impacts of
packaging.
F. Compliance and Other Costs
The simplification and other advantages of
the new Guaranteed Mortgage Packaging
Agreement (GMPA) will lead to lower costs
than under the new GFE.
• The GMPA and HUD-1 with packaging
will have substantially fewer numbers and
less detail than the current GFE and HUD--
1. Only six numbers are required on the first
page of the Guaranteed Mortgage Packaging
Agreement. This will lead to a more efficient
origination process since less time will be
spent by the originator and the borrower in
deciphering the proliferation of fees that now
characterizes the GFE and HUD--I.
• Packaging eliminates the reporting of
individual fees within the package and in so
doing permits, in effect, average cost pricing.
This reduces costs because firms do not have
to keep up with an itemized, customized cost
for each borrower.
• As mentioned above, there could be
some additional costs associated with lenders
having to use an as yet undetermined index
in order to guarantee market interest rates (a)
during the time that the consumer is
shopping (after the packager has made the
offer) and (b) during the time between the
offer being accepted and final closing for
those borrowers who choose to "float" rather
than "lock-in" their interest rate. The
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proposed rule asks for comments on how the
interest rate index could be determined.
• Originators make a free offer that is also
guaranteed. This will require additional
information gathering and preliminary
underwriting to the extent that borrowers
seek multiple offers, beyond what they do in
today's market. There could also develop
some degree of uncertainty and costs
associated with originator's making
guaranteed offers based on preliminary
underwriting, particularly for those
borrowers who typically require extensive
underwriting. As explained in Chapter 4,
however, this would simply result in the
originator making a new loan offer or sending
their customer elsewhere.
• There will be some costs associated with
the arrangements that packagers have to
make with third party settlement service
providers, in order for the packager to ensure
tlIat there would be no change in the pre-
arranged third party prices. But as discussed
in Chapter 4, other efficiencies resulting from
packagers dealing with third party providers
are expected to offset these costs.
G. Summary of Small Business Impacts and
Alternatives Considered
As noted above. concern has been
expressed about the market impacts of
packaging, particularly as they relate to small
businesses. The main findings regarding the
effects of packaging on small businesses are
as follows:
• The nature of locally-provided, third
party services (such as appraisal, survey, pest
inspection. closing agents) could remain the
same under packaging-the main change will
involve who purchases these services.
Packagers will be the new purchasers of these
services, and third party service prices will
be lower.
• Under packaging, those third party
service providers (both large and small) who
are currently charging high prices for their
settlement services would experience
reductions in the prices of their services. To
the extent that third party settlement service
providers happen to be small businesses.
they would, of course, experience a reduction
in their revenues. Of the $3.6 billion in price
reductions for third party services. the small
business share is $2.5 billion.
• It is estimated that small businesses (Le.,
small originators and small service providers)
would account for $5.9 billion of the $10.3
billion in transfers to consumers noted
above--$3.4 billion of this would come from
small originators and $2.5 billion would
come from small settlement service
providers. As in the case with the new GFE
approach, firms suffering losers under
packaging are originators and third party
providers who are currently charging high
prices for their services.
• Still, there is no strong reason to expect
that locally-based small businesses could not
continue providing third party settlement
services under packaging, albeit at possibly
lower prices and revenues, as noted above.
Services that are local in nature (such as
appraisals) will continue to be demanded
under the packaging approach. Services that
are national in nature and characterized by
economies of scale (such as credit reporting)
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are already being conducted by larger firms
on a national scale.
• There has also been a concern that small
lenders would be placed at a disadvantage
under packaging because of the "bulk"
buying power oflarge lenders. While this
may be the case, it does not have to be. First,
there is no evidence of this effect today
where large lenders can purchase services
such as appraisals on a "bulk" basis. Second,
if specialized packaging firms develop, it
seems reasonable to expect them to offer their
packages to small lenders as well as large
lenders. It is difficult to reach firm
conclusions about the magnitude of the
impact on small lenders.
• Brokers, most of whom are small
businesses, could pursue a number of
avenues under packaging. They could
develop their own package, purchase one
from specialized firms, or use the package
offered by the wholesale lender they are
dealing with. Under packaging, brokers will
continue their main function of reaching the
consumer, just as they do today. This
customer outreach function is not going to go
away with packaging.
• Furthermore, Chapter 2 of this Economic
Analysis reports that technology
improvements and other recent changes in
the mortgage market have probably increased
the competitive position of brokers relative to
other originators. These underlying strengths
of brokers are also not going to disappear
with packaging.
Chapter 4 discusses alternative policies
that were considered with respect to
packaging. The Department considered
writing this proposed rule as if only lenders
could package. This idea was rejected in
favor of allowing anyone to package so long
as the package contains a loan. This further
affords smaller firms the opportunity to offer
their services and benefit from a packaging
environment.
Under packaging, there is no separate
treatment of yield spread premiums or
discounts and no special rules for brokers.
Thus, all originators present their loans the
same way and all the market's competitive
forces are applied to everything in the
package regardless of the type of originator.
No broker, or any other kind of originator for
that matter, is at a competitive disadvantage.
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SECTION K(b)
Claims arise over all kinds of issues. The most predominant type of
claim received by Stewart Title Guaranty Co. is the one that closing agents
can do the most to prevent: missed encumbrances. Typically, the
encumbrance that is missed is a judgment lien or a state recoupment lien of
some sort. There is usually no defense to these types of claims if it can be
established that the owner/mortgagor or a predecessor in title is indeed the
person named in the judgment lien or other encumbrance. Care must be
taken to do a good search of the records and to document the "facts" as told
by borrower to avoid this type of problem.
There are a number of other areas where a significant number of
claims arise. This paper identifies a few of those most common areas of
property law in which claims develop with an eye towards claim prevention
as opposed to claims handling.
1. Manufactured Homes ("trailers")
Frequently you will have a loan transaction where a
"manufactured home, ff or trailer, is being offered as security along with the
land upon which it is located. Care needs to be taken to make sure that
perfection of the lender's security interest in a manufactured housing unit is
done properly. If not ffperfected, ff a trustee in bankruptcy can set aside the
security interest and have the lender's debt declared unsecured. Such action
will result in a claim loss. Knowing the proper steps to take to perfect a
security interest in a manufactured home is vital.
It is important at the beginning to identify the type of housing unit at
issue. The Kentucky Revised Statutes ("KRS ff ) define "manufactured home. ff
KRS 186.650(3).1 This definition was used in a previous version of the
statute to define "trailer. ff Essentially the statute covers housing units that
are transported to the real property location by being towed on wheels. This
type of housing unit is not a "modular home. ff The terms are often confused.
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A modular home, one that is manufactured off-site, but delivered to the
residential site as cargo, is not subject to the requirements discussed.
"Modular homes" are handled like traditional "stick-built" homes.
If a housing unit meets the statutory definition of a "manufactured
home," a real estate mortgage is not effective to perfect a security interest in
that unit. Such units are commonly known as "trailers" or "double wides." In
essence, any such unit that had wheels attached for delivery must be "titled"
in the same manner as an automobile and perfection of the security interest
in the property accomplished by notation on the title document. KRS
186A.195; Hiers v. Bank One, Ky. App., 946 S.W.2d 196 (1997). 2 Attached
as Exhibit A is a copy of a bulletin issued by Stewart Title that outlines one
of the procedures that can be used when taking manufactured homes as
security and an ALTA 7 endorsement is requested. 3
Altern~tively, a procedure in place since July 2000 provides that the
title certificate can be surrendered and canceled upon presentation of and the
filing of an "Affidavit of Conversion to Real Property" by the owner. KRS
186A.297. However, just like filing a title lien statement, an Affidavit of
Conversion can only be used where there is an extant title document.
Additionally, when the Affidavit of Conversion is used, any lien already noted
on the title document must be released and written evidence of that release
presented with the Affidavit. Attached as Exhibit 8 is a copy of a memo
circulated by the Kentucky County Clerks Association regarding the affidavit
and a sample affidavit.
2. Equity line or revolving credit mortgages.
Equity line or revolving credit mortgages are provided for by statute.
KRS 382.385. The priority date for these mortgages is the date of initial
filing, no matter when the actual disbursements are made. A maximum
1 Copies of all statutes cited are attached.
2 Copies of all cases cited are attached.
3 The ALTA 7 policy endorsement amends the definition of "land" in the policy to include
any manufactured housing unit located on the property.
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amount of indebtedness must be stated in the mortgage. Unless the account
on which the mortgage is based is closed by a specific request of the
borrower, either pursuant to the terms of the account itself or through the
statutory means provided, the mortgage is not released and continues to
secure any advance made in the future. Paying the balance owed to zero
alone will not result in a release of this type of mortgage.
These mortgages can present a real problem in a refinance where the
borrower pays the line to zero at closing, but then incurs additional debt
under the line. It is even more of a problem when a seller incurs additional
debt now secured by property the seller no longer owns. It is imperative that
all such revolving credit accounts be terminated pursuant to statute and the
terms of the account agreement. If not, the equity line mortgage must be
subordinated to the insured mortgage.
3. Contracts for deed
Also known as a land installment contract, a contract for deed is a
relatively common method of real property conveyance in this state. Such
conveyances have been interpreted by the Kentucky courts as the equivalent
of a sale with a retained mortgage or vendor's lien. Sebastian v. Floyd, 585
S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979). Therefore, a purchaser under such a contract for
deed acquires an increasing' equitable interest in the subject property as
payments are made. In order to eliminate an interest based on a contract for
deed, the contract purchaser must quitclaim back his interest to the seller or
the new buyer or that interest must be foreclosed by appropriate litigation.
These types of conveyances present claim issues primarily because
liens against either the equitable or legal title holder can arise prior to the
execution of the actual deed and the merger of the legal and equitable title.
Care needs to be taken. It is not recommend that anyone convey property in
this manner unless it cannot be avoided.
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4. Marital Interests
Dealing with title issues where divorce is involved can be tricky. One
fundamental matter needs to recognized: a divorce decree/judgment does not
convey an interest in real property. By statute, an interest in real property
can only be conveyed by will or deed. KRS 382.010. A divorce decree may
order a party to convey his/her interest in property, but until a deed from that
person is executed, the person ordered to convey still retains an interest in
the property.
Kentucky law has created one area of concern in particular when
dealing with property held by both a husband and wife. Unlike under
common law, a conveyance to a husband and wife does not automatically
provide for the fee simple interest to vest in the survivor of the couple upon
the death of one of them. By statute, any survivorship interest must be
stated specifically in the document. KRS 381.050.
Many practitioners have thus reasoned that there is no longer an
interest in property known as a tenancy by the entireties in this state. Under
common law, such an entity was created when property was conveyed to a
husband and wife even without reference to the survivorship element in the
deed. Recent Kentucky case law has confirmed, however, that such an
estate in land continues in this state. Sanderson v. Saxson, Ky., 834 S.W.2d
696 (1992). A conveyance to spouses with reference to survivorship creates
a tenancy by the entireties.
Here is the kicker. Once a divorce occurs, the survivorship element of
a deed that created a tenancy by the entireties goes away. Nelson v.
Mahurin, Ky.App., 994 S.W.2d 10(1992). So what? Look at this
hypothetical.
Hand W acquire property while married. Such deeds typically include
survivorship language. That type of deed would create a tenancy by the
entireties since the parties are spouses, not a joint tenancy with the right of
survivorship. Hand W then divorce and become ex-H and ex-W. Ex-H dies.
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Ex-W, her children, and other interested parties may then conclude she holds
fee simple title in full by virtue of the survivorship language in the deed. No
she doesn't. According to Mahurin, the survivorship element of that deed
was destroyed by the divorce so that the parties hold the property as
tenants-in-common after the divorce. This is important because the individual
Y2 interests in the property become part of the decedent's estate upon the
death of one of the tenants-in-common. The individual property interest does
not by-pass probate by virtue of the survivorship language in the deed.
Another area of claims concerns in the marital area is dower/curtesy
interests. Kentucky still recognizes dower/curtesy interests when a person
dies intestate (without a written will). KRS Chapter 392. A spouse of either
sex has the same interest under the Kentucky statutes and all references in
the statute and here are to the term "dower" only. KRS 392.010. A
surviving spouse has an Ifestate in fee of one-half( 1/2) of the surplus real
estate" owned by the decedent in fee simple at the time of death and a life
estate in 1/3- of any real estate owned during the marriage, but not at the
time of death. KRS 392.030.
A dower interest is not extinguished by sale of the property while both
spouses are alive. That dower interest must be addressed upon any
conveyance or mortgage. Commonly, this is done by having the non-title
holding spouse simply join in any conveyance as a grantor and in a mortgage
as mortgagor. Alternatively, dower can be waived by the execution and
recording of a document with all the formalities of a deed that specifically
waives dower in a particular piece of real property.
5. Probate Matters
The law in Kentucky is that "upon the death of a landowner, title
passed directly to the heirs or devisees." Hardy v. Lucas, unpublished
decision, 43 K.L.S. 3, p.5 (1996). This interest is subject to the debts of and
claims against the decedent's estate. As a result, involuntary liens (e.g.,
judgment liens and tax liens) against any of the heirs or devisees attach to
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the real property interest acquired by an heir or devisee immediately upon the
death of the decedent. Therefore, the names of all devisees/heirs should be
run for involuntary liens before insuring property acquired by will or intestate
descent. The exception is when the property is being sold by the personal
representative of the decedent's estate for purposes of paying debts of the
estate or administering the estate.
Sales of real property by a decedent's estate are" authorized only when
the will gives a specific power of sale to the executor or a court authorizes
such a sale. Any sale by an intestate estate will require court approval. Any
sale by a testate estate where there is no power of sale in the will or a
power of sale cannot be clearly implied from the testator's direction in the
will is also subject to court approval. That approval must be obtained under
KRS 389A.01 O.
Sales by a personal representative have been brought into issue by an
appellate court's decision in Lucas v. Mannering. 745 S.W.2d 654 (Ky. App.
1988), That case held that any power of sale in a will is a qualified one,
subject to the direction of the heirs or devisees. For this reason, it is better
practice to include heirs and devisees as grantors in any sale from an estate
not authorized by court order or to obtain written approval of the sale from
them. This practice is recommended even in light of the statement in Hardy
v. LLicas, supra, that ff • •• a personal representative authorized to sell real
property may convey good and merchantable title thereto. In absence of
fraud or other misdealing, the purchaser's title cannot be defeated. ff
In Kentucky, no deed from the estate of the decedent to heirs or
devisees who acquire the property is necessary. They acquire property
pursuant to the terms of the will or by operation of law. In a sale of property
acquired by descent or devise after the close of the estate, the source of
title for property acquired by a will is the will itself. It is filed of record in the
County Clerk's Office upon its admission to probate and operates to confer
title on the designated devisees.
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When property is acquired from an intestate ancestor, an Affidavit of
Descent is required prior to the conveyance of the property by the heirs. KRS
382.110. Note, however, that such an affidavit, even when filed of record,
does not work to extinguish the interests of any heirs not named and does
not operate as a warranty of title. Sirls v. Jordan, 625 S.W.2d 106 (Ky.App.
1982).
6. Minors and Persons Under a Disability
All fiducial sales are governed by KRS 389A.010. A copy of that
statute is attached. It should be followed strictly when such sales are to be
made. Strict compliance is especially important for the 30 day period
provided by the statute before any mortgage or conveyance can be made. A
violation of this waiting period means the transaction is void ab initio.
Stewart Title will not issue title insurance related to a transaction where this
waiting period has not been followed.
7. Other Tax Liens
Liens for other unpaid taxes, e.g. income taxes, are also provided by
statute. KRS 134.420(3). The current statute of limitations (SOL) for the
enforcement of those liens is 10 years. CAUTION! The statute was amended
in 1998 to impose the 10 year SOL. Prior to that amendment, these liens
were good until satisfied: no SOL. The Kentucky Revenue Cabinet has
interpreted the amendment to apply only prospectively and that previously
filed (pre-1998) liens are not subject to the 10 year limitation. Do not pass
on these liens at any time as being past the statute of limitations.
8. Powers of Attorney
Real property can be conveyed or mortgaged by an "attorney in fact"
authorized by a properly executed power of attorney (POA) if the attorney in
fact is specifically authorized by the POA to do so. A catch all phrasel such
as "empowered generally to do and perform all acts that I might do/I is not
sufficient. Robertson v. Vaughn l unpublished decision l 36 K.L.S. 7 1 p. 4
(Ky.App.1989). A POA used to convey a real property interest should be a
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"durable" POA, i.e. it must survive the disability of the grantor. KRS
386.093. However, if the grantor is judicially determined to be incompetent
and a guardian is appointed, the POA is terminated. Rice v. Floyd, 768
S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1989).
Any transfer by the attorney in fact of the property of the grantor as a
gift, either to himself or others, must be specifically authorized by the POA.
KRS 386.093(6). This appears to have been the law before its inclusion in
the statute, but the statute was recently amended to clarify that fact. This
often occurs when an elderly parent wishes to convey property to a child or
other person. For such a transaction to be valid (and insurable), the POA
upon which the conveyance is based must be specific as to the fact that the
attorney in fact is granted the power to convey property by gift and that
such conveyances can be made to the attorney in fact herself.
An original POA must be recorded to give notice to third parties. KRS
382.370. Stewart Title underwriting guidelines provide that the POA must be
relatively contemporaneous (6 months to a year at the oldest) unless
previously recorded.
9. Abstractor/Closing Attorney Non-Contract liability
Kentucky is generally categorized in the literature regarding abstractor
liability as having no non-contractual liability for examiners/abstractors.
Stewart commitments issued in the state contain the following disclaimer:
NOTE: This commitment is not an abstract, examination, report,
or representation of fact or title and does not create and shall
not be the basis of any claim for negligence, negligent
misrepresentation or other tort claim or action. The sole liability
of company and its title insurance agent shall arise under and be
governed by the conditions of the commitment.
That having been said, attached is a copy of Siegle v. Jasper, 867
S.W.2d 476 (Ky.App.1993) which finds an attorney/examiner/closer
responsible to the buyer (not his client) for failing to report an easement.
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Document - Stewart Title Virtual Underwriter
EXHIBIT A
BULLETIN
Stewart Title Guaranty Company
P. O. Box 2029 Houston, Texas 77252-2029 (800) 729-1902
11KY00000411
Date:
From:
To:
RE:
November 13, 1998
Kentucky District Office
All Kentucky District Agents
Manufactured Homes
Dear Associates:
There has been an increase in underwriting questions regarding the issuance of title insurance
where a trailer or manufactured home is located on the subject property. In order to address
those problems, you should follow the procedures outlined in this Bulletin in addition to all
regular standards applicable to the closing of a real estate transaction.
The language used to describe various structures manufactured off-site and placed on real
property causes some confusion in this area. The underwriting problem discussed in this Bulletin
is associated with structures that fall within the definitions of "trailer," "semitrailer," or
"manufactured home" found at KRS 186.650. The structures that meet those definitions,
primarily those in which a structured chassis supports the floors, walls, and roofs and in which the
chassis rests on wheels, axles, and brakes for the purpose of transportation to a site, are titled in
the same manner as motor vehicles. Security interests in those structures are also perfected in the
same manner as motor vehicles. This Bulletin is directed to insuring transactions involving those
structures.
The procedures outlined in this Bulletin are necessitated by the fact that the Kentucky courts have
ruled that the procedure outlined in KRS Chapter 186A for the perfection of a security interest in
a structure having a motor vehicle title is the sole and exclusive method for the protection of
priority in such liens. Liens or mortgages recorded in the real estate records of the county clerk's
office regarding structures with motor vehicle titles would not perfect the security interest for
priority purposes.
There are several scenarios that could arise when you are requested to insure a transaction
involving a building that was constructed, at least in part, offsite. The three major scenarios are
addressed below.
I. UNIT HAS MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE, NOT AFFIXED TO REAL ESTATE
When you become aware of the existence of a trailer or manufactured home on property to be
insured, you should assume that the trailer or manufactured home is not affixed to the land and is
classified as personal property for tax purposes. Thus, the trailer or manufactured home is not
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insurable. The following exception should appear in Schedule B of the policy:
The land described in Schedule A hereof shall not be deemed to include any house trailer, trailer,
or manufactured home located on the premises.
II. UNIT HAS MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE, AFFIXED TO REAL ESTATE
When a unit has allegedly been affIXed to the real property where it is located, but there is a motor
vehicle title for the unit, you may be requested to insure the property including the value of the
trailer or manufactured home by the issuance of the Manufactured Housing Unit endorsement
(ALTA Form 7) which provides for inclusion within the coverage under the policy of any
manufactured unit located on the land at the date of the policy.
When you are requested to delete the trailer or manufactured home exception or issue the ALT A
Form 7, the following actions must be taken:
Examine any restrictive covenants for prohibitions against trailers or manufactured homes.
Determine that the trailer or manufactured home has become permanently affixed by inspection
or by written confirmation from the surveyor or appraiser. Factors which must be present for the
unit to be considered permanently affixed to the land include the removal of the wheels, tongue,
and axles from the unit, the unit is set on a permanent foundation, and the unit has permanent
utility connections.
Perform a search of the motor vehicle title records required to be maintained by KRS Chapter
186A to determine the existence of any prior liens. They are located in the county clerk's office in
the county where the unit is located. Also search the UCC records to check for liens in favor of
out-of-state vendors who might be unaware of the Kentucky requirements.
The lien of your lender must be noted on the motor vehicle title document, any prior noted liens
(including those found in the UCC records) paid and satisfied, and a lien statement filed as
required by KRS Chapter 186A. Additionally, the lender should take physical possession of the
title document before a policy is issued.
The trailer or manufactured home should be taxed as real property. You should check with the
local tax office as to their requirements before closing a transaction where an ALTA 7
endorsement is required.
III. NO MOTOR VEHICLE TITLE ISSUED FOR UNIT
If the transaction at issue involves a modular home or prefabricated home (structures not subject
to motor vehicle titling requirements) the analysis is different. An ALTA 7 endorsement can be
issued for a modular home (a prefabricated structure that arrives onsite in units preassembled at
a factory) or a prefabricated home (a structure consisting of two or more three dimensional
components that are joined together at the site) by verifying they are permanently affixed to the
real property.
For further information, please see Section 12.24 of the Underwriting Manual.
References
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EXHIBITB
AFFIDAVIT OF CONVERSION 1'0 UAL ESTA~E
COUNTY CLERK'S PROtlliDURES
County C1ctk eJIWIIinc:s Tide document for lim notations, inquires~.into AVIS to JIssurc
tbat it is the most C1U'RDl Title and that DO liens arc present lftben~ Docuinent
has uarcleascd liens on ifJe face. or in AVIS, the Affidavit ofCdnveniion cannOt be
aa::cpted for fiiing ualea it i&~ by a lien termination lllak:ment or that AVIS
shows the lien hal been IeIJRiIJakd in another county. .
Mae tWo Photocopies of the: subject ~rreotTitle document.
Make photocopy ofAffidav.i1ofConvenion
File Original AfJidiMt togetherwi. one of the.photocopies ofKeUtucky
Ccrtificaec oCTIUe in MiscellaneoWi &ok (diaauxl by the subjdct
statute).
Sum:ndcr titJe in AVIS using the code. CCR
Fwuisb c;uscoma- with~ Receipt $bowing $1.00 tte
.::~~~~=Il=ti=~~~:·.
Send photocopy orAmfIavit- Q( Coaversioo plus oac: of tbc pbotocoPics
of""'~~__.. hlcoIl'VA. .
After flling 8JJd. n:tun1 original Affidavit of Conversion to
filer as we do all land n:cords.
i
EXISTING MOBILE HOME FOil WUICII A TITLE HAS NOT BEEN 18&UID.
County Clet'kuses~... procedure fo.. ~urina aTItle to a
mobile home fOf w a title ba5 DCVer been issued. .
Owner cxccutes .. "onfar tide '
Owner executes aft) t attaiting to hllCCe of ownetShip, length atownersbip. cu::. and
....1ad1es any otIIFro~P doct.uncntt euc:b .. II n\u :rSale, Tax Bill, et~_ .
wbid wiD accompany applicatioR for TIde..
\
When tide is iuued by~tion. follow tile new procedure for filing
the Affidavit ofConYenUon to Real E5tI1tc 5Cf. out above. .
NEW M!P OUT OJ "AD MQJI!LI HOMIIS
Owner., SU.broils aWl' for a .K.~.lltuc..ky ce.. rtificate ofTide andsum:ndcn the . Ie ofOrigin or tt1e out-of-state ide Document.
When Tille is isaueclby ransport;dioo. follow procedure for
:.::~:::'tQW-:A:lJtdiivit:QjiMnio.llto.Real ~setOUt~
" -.- . .
1m
Filing Aifidavit ofConJersion
Sum:odaing Tide
Noouy Pee (per 1JIIJDe)
$9.00
1.00
2~OO
JNPD:.ING PROCIDUM§
Requites a Mi&lCC~1Book . . • ~ . .
Docs DOt~ a If:8al .ptioo 85 in a deed, Deed Book and Page Number n:t'erencc is sufficient
Does not requuc 1I 5 statemeIll .. . . .
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INDEXING l"ROCEDVRES CONTINUED
Named to be inde:(~ is the natnc of Qwncr(s) of ttlanufact~hoUse (mobile honte) as Gr.uuor
Description should read "Affidavit ofCQQVersiOl1, Deed Book~ Page xxxx
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AFFIDAVIT OF CONVERSION~TO REAL-ESTATE
The Undersigned-swear (or affirm) that they are the:owner(s) o~:
the manufactured home (mobile home) known as:
Make ......,....., -', Model _
Serial Number ~_ _'. Kentucky Certificate of
Title number -..). has been or wilt be permariently affi~ed to
real estat~ il! __,.."_..".., _,.,,..,-.-,-~ County. KeRtueJ.ty as described in Deed
" ".'
Bti9k number- - --. Page number __---.J. in aid County. Pursuant to
Chapter 186A, t~e aforementioned Kentucky Certificate ofTitlc-is hereby
surrendered.
Owner
Owner
Street Address
City. State and Zip Code
~ubscribed~d sworn to before ~e this __day of_.....;.;....;......;l..:ZO_.
NOTARY PUBLIC
My colJl.Ilrission expires .....)1 20__.
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STATUTES
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186.650 Definitions for KRS 186.650 to 186.700.
As used in KRS 186.650 to 186.700:
(1) A "trailer" means any vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and
being drawn by a motor vehicle being so constructed that no part of its weight
rests upon the towing vehicle.
(2) "Semitrailer" means any vehicle designed for carrying persons or property and
for being drawn by a motor vehicle and is so constructed that some part of its
weight and some part of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle,
except that:
(a) "Semitrailer" shall not include any vehicle designed for carrying persons or
property and being drawn by a motor vehicle registered according to the
provisions ofKRS 186.050(4)(a) and used by a farmer only for transporting
persons,' food, provender, feed, machinery, livestock, material and supplies
necessary for his farming operation, and the products grown on his farm.
(3) "Manufactured horne" means a structure, transportable in one (1) or more
sections, which:
(a) Is eight (8) body feet or more in width and forty (40) body feet or more in
length when in the traveling mode;
(b) Has three hundred twenty (320) or more square feet when erected on site;
(c) Is built on a permanent chassis;
(d) Is designed to be used as a dwelling, with or without a permanent
foundation, when connected to the required utilities;
(e) Includes plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems; and
(f) May be used as a place of residence, business, profession, or trade by the
owner, lessee or their assigns, and may consist of one (1) or more units that
can be attached or joined together to comprise an integral unit or
condominium structure.
(4) "Recreational vehicle" means a vehicular type unit primarily designed as
temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use, which either
has its own motive power or is mounted on or drawn by another vehicle. The
basic entities are: travel trailer, camping trailer, truck camper, and motor horne;
(a) A travel trailer is a vehicular unit, mounted on wheels, designed to provide
temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use. It shall be
a size and weight which shall not require special highway movement
permits when drawn by a motorized vehicle. It shall have a living area of
less than two hundred twenty (220) square feet, excluding built-in
equipment (such as wardrobes, closets, cabinets, kitchen units, or fixtures)
and bath and toilet rooms. The exterior area of a travel trailer shall be less
than three hundred twenty (320) square feet.
(b) A camping trailer is a vehicular portable unit mounted on wheels and
constructed with collapsible partial side walls which fold for towing by
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another vehicle and unfold at the camp site to provide temporary living
quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use.
(c) A truck camper is a portable unit constructed to provide temporary living
quarters for recreational, travel, or camping use, consisting of a roof, floor,
and sides, designed to be loaded onto and unloaded from the bed of a pick-
up truck.
(d) A motor home is a vehicular unit designed to provide temporary living
quarters for recreational, camping, or travel use built on or permanently
attached to, a self-propelled motor vehicle chassis or on a chassis cab or
van which is an integral part of the completed vehicle.
(5) "Cabinet" means the Transportation Cabinet.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 42, sec. I, effective July 15, 1994.
History through 1968: Amended 1966 Ky. Acts ch. 255, sec. 172. -- Amended
1966 Ky. Acts ch. 139, sec. 14. -- Amended 1962 Ky. Acts ch.62, sec. 18. --
Created 1956 (2nd Extra. Sess.) Ky. Acts ch. 6, sec. l.
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186A.195 Title lien statement defined - System to receive financing information -
Perfection of security interest.
(I) As used in this chapter, a title lien statement is a document to be submitted by the
secured party to the county clerk. Upon submission of the title lien statement, the
county clerk shall use the information contained therein to note the security interest
on the certificate of title. The county clerk may make title lien statements available
to the general public. However, public availability of such statements is not
necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property required to be
registered or titled in accordance with this chapter.
(2) If a title lien statement and the required fees accompany the application for first title
of any property in the name of an owner, the county clerk shall enter the
information required by KRS 186A.190(6) into the automated system so as to
produce a certificate of title in Frankfort bearing in addition to any other required
information, the information designated by KRS 186A.190(6). The clerk shall
thereby produce, in accordance with design of the automated system, a certificate of
registration, if required.
(3) If a title lien statement and the required fees are not received at the time of
application for first title of any property in the name of the owner due to owner's
residency in another county, or if the form prescribed by KRS 186A.060 indicates a
pending lien but the title lien statement does not accompany the application for title,
the county clerk shall enter into the Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS)
the name and address of the lienholder and the county where the lien is to be noted
or that a lien is pending. The clerk shall indicate a title is not to be issued until the
lien has been noted and fees, according to KRS 186A.190, paid in the county of the
owner's residence or in thirty (30) days. The county clerk shall then issue the
registration. The county clerk in the county of the owner's residence shall, after
receiving the title lien statement and fees contained in KRS 186A.190, enter into the
Automated Vehicle Information System (AVIS) the date of lien notation and the
notation number, thus enabling the system to produce the title in Frankfort.
(4) Should a certificate of title be issued after the thirty (30) day period has expired
without the notation of a security interest thereon, or should there be no provision
made for a lien to be noted in the county of residence of the debtor within thirty (30)
days and the title issued within that time, the secured party shall request from the
debtor, and the debtor shall submit to the secured party, the certificate of title. The
secured party shall submit the certificate of title along with the title lien statement to
the county clerk of the county of the debtor's residence. The county clerk shall then
enter the information required by KRS 186A.190(6) into the Automated Vehicle
Information System (AVIS) and note on the certificate of title in the appropriate
section the information described in that section. Following the notation of the
appropriate information on the certificate of title, the county clerk shall return the
title to the debtor.
(5) The security interest noted on the certificate of title shall be deemed perfected at the
time the security interest attaches (KRS 355.9-203) if the secured party tenders the
required fees and submits a properly completed title lien statement and application
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for first title or, in the case of property previously titled in the name of its debtor,
the certificate of title to the appropriate county clerk within twenty (20) days of
attachment. Otherwise, the security interest shall be deemed perfected at the time
that such fees are tendered and such documents are submitted to the appropriate
county clerk.
Effective: July 1,2001
History: Amended 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408, sec. 181, effective July 1,2001. -- Amended
1996 Ky. Acts ch. 297, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1988 Ky. Acts
ch. 132, sec. 4, effective March 31, 1988. -- Amended 1986 Ky. Acts ch. Il8,
sec. 98, effective July I, 1987. -- Created 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 164, sec. 36, effective
July 15, 1982.
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186A.297 Filing of affidavit of conversion to real estate when manufactured home is
permanently affIXed to land -- Surrender of certificate of title.
(1) When a manufactured home is or is to be permanently affixed to real estate, the owner
may execute and file an affidavit of conversion to real estate with the county clerk: of the
county in which the real estate is located. The affidavit shall attest to the fact that the home
has been or will be permanently affixed to the real estate and be accompanied by a
surrender of the Kentucky certificate of title. The county clerk: shall file the affidavit of
conversion to real estate in the miscellaneous record book.
(2) A county clerk shall not accept a surrender of a Kentucky certificate of title which
displays an unreleased lien unless it is accompanied by a release of the lien. When the
county clerk files the affidavit of conversion to real estate, the county clerk shall furnish a
copy to the property valuation administrator for inclusion in the real property tax rolls of
the county. A filing of an affidavit of conversion to real estate and a surrender of a
Kentucky certificate of title shall be deemed a conversion of the property as an
improvement to the real estate upon which it is located.
Effective: July 14,2000
History: Created 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 166, sec. 1, effective July 14,2000.
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382.385 Mortgage on real estate to secure payment of sums due under line of credit
or revolving credit plan - Priority of liens - Mortgage amendment - Release of
lien.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Line of credit" means a note, commitment, instrument, or agreement in writing
between a lender and a debtor pursuant to which:
1. The lender may extend loans, advances, or other extensions of credit to, or
for the benefit of, the debtor; and
2. The total amount of loans, advances, or extensions of credit outstanding may
increase or decrease from time to time.
(b) "Revolving credit plan" means an arrangement between a lender and a debtor
pursuant to which:
1. The lender may extend credit to the debtor by permitting the debtor to make
purchases of goods, services, and anything else of value or obtain loans, from
time to time, directly from the lender or indirectly by use of a credit card,
check, or other device, as the plan may provide;
2. The unpaid balances of purchases made, the principal of loans obtained, and
finance and other appropriate charges are debited to the debtor's account;
3. A finance charge, if made, is not precomputed, but is computed on the
outstanding unpaid balances of the debtor's account from time to time; and
4. The lender renders bills or statements to the debtor at regular intervals, which
need not be a calendar month (the "billing cycle"), the amount of which bills or
statements is payable by and due from the debtor on a specified date stated in
the bill or statement or, at the debtor's option, may be paid in instaUments.
(2) (a) Any mortgage of real property may secure payment of any or all sums due and
payable by the debtor under a line of credit or under a revolving credit plan if the
mortgage:
1. States, in substance or effect, that the parties intend that the mortgage secures
the line ofcredit or revolving credit plan;
2. Specifies the maximum principal amount of credit which may be extended
under the line of credit or the maximum credit limit of the revolving credit plan
which, in each case, may be outstanding at any time or times under the line of
credit or plan, and which is to be secured by the mortgage.
(b) The mortgage shall remain in full force and effect until released of record as
provided in subsection (5) of this section and the validity, continued effectiveness,
and priority of the mortgage shall not be affected or impaired by the fact that no
loan, advance, or extension of credit is made at the time of the execution or
recordation of the mortgage, or that the outstanding balance due under the line of
credit or revolving credit plan secured by the mortgage is zero at any time or times.
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(3) Except as provided in paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) of this subsection or in any written
subordination or other written agreement entered into by the lender relating to the priority
of the mortgage referred to in subsection (2) of this section, the lien of the mortgage
referred to in subsection (2) of this section shall be superior to any liens or encumbrances
of any kind created or arising after recordation of the mortgage, even to the extent of
sums advanced by the lender with actual or constructive notice of a subsequently created
lien, but the lien ofthe mortgage shall be inferior to:
(a) Real estate tax liens and liens for public improvement assessments explicitly stated
by statute to be superior to other nontax liens;
(b) Any construction funds advanced under, or any additional indebtedness incurred
within the meaning of KRS 382.520 and secured by, the lien of any mortgage
recorded prior to the mortgage referred to in subsection (2) of this section;
(c) Any sums specifically authorized to be advanced under any mortgage recorded
prior to the mortgage referred to in subsection (2) of this section for, or paid on
account of, taxes, charges, fmes, and assessments against covering the property
described in the mortgage or to effect insurance thereon; or
(d) Valid mechanics' or materialmen's liens, with respect to which all filing and other
requirements of KRS Chapter 376 have been satisfied, for the performance of
labor or furnishing of materials for those purposes set forth in KRS 376.010(1) with
respect to an owner-occupied, single or double-family dwelling, but only to the
extent of sums advanced by the lender after the filing of the statement required
under the applicable section of KRS Chapter 376.
(4) (a) The debtor or his agent may, at any time or times, request the lender to amend the
mortgage to reduce the maximum amount of credit specified in the mortgage
referred to in subsection (2) of this section which may be extended under the line of
credit or revolving credit plan by sending by certified mail, return receipt requested,
or physically delivering to the lender at the address and to the person or
department, if any, specified in the agreement establishing the line of credit or
revolving credit plan, a written request signed and acknowledged by all debtors
obligated under the line ofcredit or revolving credit plan. The request shall:
I. Specifically, and not by implication, describe the line of credit or revolving
credit plan by account or other identifYing number and request that the line of
credit or plan be amended by reducing the maximum amount of credit which
may be extended under the line of credit or the amount of the credit limit of
the revolving credit plan which, in either case, may be outstanding from time
to time under the line of credit or revolving credit plan, to an amount specified
in the notice. The amount may not, however, be less than the balance owing
under the line of credit or revolving credit plan at the time the request referred
to in this paragraph is received;
2. IdentifY the real property covered by the mortgage referred to in subsection
(2) of this section to which the request relates and give the date, volume, and
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fIrst page of the records of the county clerk where the mortgage is recorded,
which information shall be provided to the debtor within sixty (60) days of
recording by the lender; and
3. Be accompanied by funds sufficient to pay the fIling fee for recording the
amendment referred to in paragraph (b) of this subsection.
(b) Within ten (lO) business days after actual receipt of the request referred to in
paragraph (a) of this subsection and of the funds sufficient to pay the fIling fee, the
lender shall record in the office of the county clerk in which the mortgage referred to
in subsection (2) of this section is recorded an amendment to the mortgage
reflecting the reduction in the maximum amount of credit at any time or times
outstanding which may be extended under the line of credit or revolving credit plan
secured by the mortgage.
(c) If within the ten (lO) day period the lender fails to record the amendment to the
mortgage referred to in paragraph (b) of this subsection, the debtor may record a
copy of the written request referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection upon
payment of the same fIling fee as provided for in an amendment to a mortgage. If
the request complies with all the requirements of this section, the recording of the
request shall constitute and be deemed to be an amendment to the line of credit or
revolving credit plan and the mortgage to the extent described in the request.
(5) The lender shall be obligated to release the lien of the mortgage referred to in subsection
(2) ofthis section:
(a) If the line of credit or revolving credit plan is closed or terminated in accordance
with its terms and all amounts owed by the debtor thereunder are paid in full; or
(b) Upon the written request to release the mortgage signed by all debtors or their
agents obligated under the line of credit or revolving credit plan, which notice shall
be sent by certifIed mail, return receipt requested, or physically delivered to the
lender. The lender shall fIle a properly executed satisfaction of the mortgage upon
payment of the balance owing under the line of credit or revolving credit plan at the
time the request is received. From and after the request, the debtor shall have no
right to request or demand that the lender extend credit under the line of credit or
revolving credit plan, and the lender shall be released from all obligations and
commitments to extend credit thereunder.
(6) The provisions of KRS 382.330,382.365,382.430, and 382.520 shall not be applicable
to the mortgage referred to in subsection (2) of this section.
(7) This section is not exclusive and shall not prohibit the use of other types of mortgages or
other instruments given for the purpose of creating a lien on real property permitted by
law.
Effective: July 14, 1992
History: Created 1992 Ky. Acts ch.49, sec. 1, effective July 14, 1992.
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382.010 Estate - Owner may convey - When deed or will necessary.
The owner may convey any interest in real property not in the adverse possession of
another; but no estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of more than one (I) year,
in real property shall be conveyed, except by deed or wilL
Effective: October 1, 1942
History: Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky.
Stat. sec. 490.
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381.050 Estate created by conveyance to husband and wife - Will not to defeat right
to the entirety by survivorship.
(1) Ifreal estate is conveyed or devised to husband and wife, unless a right by survivorship is
expressly provided for, there shall be no mutual right to the entirety by survivorship
between them, but they shall take as tenants in common, and the respective moieties shall
be subject to the respective rights of the husband or wife as fIxed in KRS Chapter 392,
with all other incidents to such tenancy.
(2) Where a conveyance or devise expressly creates a mutual right to the entirety by
survivorship in real estate between a husband and wife, no provision of the will of the
husband or wife shall be construed to defeat such right to the entirety by survivorship of
the surviving spouse.
Effective: July 15,1980
History: Amended 1980 Ky. Acts ch. 2, sec. 1, effective July 15, 1980. - Recodified 1942
Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 2143.
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392.010 Husband's interest in wife's realty same as wife's interest in his.
All the sections of this chapter, except KRS 392.100, that relate to the wife's dower or interest
in the deceased husband's estate, shall apply in all cases, so far as may be, to the husband's
interest in the wife's estate.
Effective: July I, 1956
History: Amended 1956 Ky. Acts ch.117, sec. I, effective July 1,1956. -- Recodified
1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. I, effective October 1,1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 2148.
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392.030 Actual possession by deceased spouse not necessary for dower.
If the deceased spouse, during the coverture, was seized in law of the fee simple of any real
estate, then the surviving spouse may have dower or curtesy in that real estate, although the
deceased spouse never had actual possession.
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382.110 Recording of deeds and mortgages - Place of recording - Contents of deed.
(1) All deeds, mortgages and other instruments required by law to be recorded to be effectual
against purchasers without notice, or creditors, shall be recorded in the county clerk's
office of the county in which the property conveyed, or the greater part thereof, is located.
(2) No county clerk or deputy county clerk shall admit to record any deed of conveyance of
any interest in real property equal to or greater than a life estate, unless the deed plainly
specifies and refers to the next immediate source from which the grantor derived title to
the property or the interest conveyed therein.
(3) If the source of title is a deed or other recorded writing, the deed offered for record shall
refer to the former deed or writing, and give the office, book and page where recorded,
and the date thereof. If the property or interest therein is obtained by inheritance or in any
other way than by recorded instrument of writing, the deed offered for record shall state
clearly and accurately how and from whom the title thereto was obtained by the grantor.
(4) If the title to the property or interest conveyed is obtained from two (2) or more sources,
the deed offered for record shall plainly specify and refer to each of the sources in the
manner provided in subsections (2) and (3), and shall show which part of the property, or
interest therein, was obtained from each of the sources.
(5) No grantor shall lodge for record, and no county clerk or deputy shall receive and pennit
to be lodged for record, any deed that does not comply with the provisions of this section.
(6) No clerk or deputy clerk shall be liable to the fine imposed by subsection (1) of KRS
382.990 because of any erroneous or false references in any such deed, nor because of
the omission of a reference required by law where it does not appear on the face of such
deed that the title to the property or interest conveyed was obtained from more than one
(1) source.
(7) This section does not apply to deeds made by any court commissioner, sheriff or by any
officer of court in pursuance of his duty as such officer, nor to any deed or instrument
made and acknowledged before March 20, 1928. No deed shall be invalid because it is
lodged contrary to the provisions of this section.
Effective: October 1, 1942
History: Recodified 1942 Ky_ Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky.
Stat. sec. 495.
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389A.OIO Jurisdiction of District Court - Adversary proceedings to be in Circuit
Court.
(1) Notwithstanding any other statutory limitation of the jurisdiction ofthe District Court:
(a) Any trustee, guardian, conservator, or personal representative (hereinafter
"fiduciary"), not otherwise possessing a power of sale, may move the District Court
of the county in which the fiduciary has qualified for an order granting the fiduciary
the power to sell or mortgage any real estate or any interest therein possessed by
his ward, decedent, or trust; and
(b) The District Court may enter an order granting the fiduciary the power to sell or
mortgage any real estate or any interest therein possessed by the ward, decedent or
trust.
(2) The motion shall include an adequate description of the property, a summary of the
grounds for the motion, and a request that the bond of the fiduciary be increased in an
adequate amount in accordance with KRS 395.130.
(3) Unless waived in writing, written notice of the hearing with a copy of the motion shall be
served in a manner authorized by the Ru1es of Civil Procedure for the initiation of a civil
action upon all persons who have a vested or contingent interest in the property interest
sought to be sold. Where the property interest sought to be sold belongs to a person
under legal disability, service of notice and defense shall be governed by Civil Ru1es
4.04(3) and 17.03.
(a) In the case where the subject of the action is the property interest of a person under
legal disability, unless waived in writing, written notice by certified mail, return
receipt requested shall be given to all known adult next ofkin of:
1. The nature and pendency of the action; and
2. Not less than thirty (30) days' notice of the time, date, and location of the
hearing on the motion. At or before the hearing, the fiduciary or his attorney
shall file an affidavit on personal knowledge showing compliance with this
paragraph and attaching a copy of the notice given and the original of all
receipts returned.
(b) All such persons shall have standing to present evidence and to be heard at the
hearing.
(4) An aggrieved party may no later than thirty (30) days from the date of the order, institute
an adversary proceeding in Circuit Court pursuant to KRS 24A.l20(l)(b) in respect to
any order affecting the right ofthe fiduciary to sell or mortgage. Pending the entry ofa final
order and expiration of the time for an appeal therefrom, neither the fiduciary nor the
owner of any vested interest shall make any conveyance or mortgage of the real estate
and any attempt to do so shall be null and void.
(5) No proceedings under this section shall be conducted by or before a commissioner of the
District Court.
Effective: September 1, 1998
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134.420 Lien for taxes.
(1) The state and each county, city, or other taxing district shall have a lien on the property
assessed for taxes due them respectively for ten (10) years following the date when the
taxes become delinquent, and also on any real property owned by a delinquent taxpayer
at the date when the sheriffoffers the tax claims for sale as provided in KRS 134.430 and
134.440. This lien shall not be defeated by gift, devise, sale, alienation, or any means
except by sale to a bona fide purchaser, but no purchase of property made before final
settlement for taxes for a particular assessment date has been made by the sheriff shall
preclude the lien covering the taxes. The lien shall include all interest, penalties, fees,
commissions, charges, and other expenses incurred by reason of delinquency in payment
of the tax bill or in the process of collecting it, and shall have priority over any other
obligation or liability for which the property is liable. The lien of any city, county, or other
taxing district shall be of equal rank with that of the state. When any proceeding is
instituted to enforce the lien provided in this subsection, it shall continue in force until the
matter is judicially terminated. Every city of the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth class shall file
notice of the delinquent tax liens with the county clerk of any county or counties in which
the taxpayer's business or residence is located, or in any county in which the taxpayer has
an interest in property. The notice shall be recorded in the same manner as notices of lis
pendens are filed, and the file shall be designated miscellaneous state and city delinquent
and unpaid tax liens.
(2) If any person liable to pay any tax administered by the Revenue Cabinet, other than a tax
subject to the provisions of subsection (1) of this section, neglects or refuses to pay the
tax after demand, the tax due together with all penalties, interest, and other costs
applicable provided by law shall be a lien in favor of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
The lien shall attach to all property and rights to property owned or subsequently acquired
by the person neglecting or refusing to pay the tax.
(3) The lien imposed by subsection (2) of this section shall remain in force for ten (10) years
from the date the notice of tax lien has been filed by the secretary of the Revenue Cabinet,
or his delegate with the county clerk of any county or counties in which the taxpayer's
business or residence is located, or any county in which the taxpayer has an interest in
property.
(4) The tax lien imposed by subsection (2) of this section shall not be valid as against any
purchaser, judgment lien creditor, or holder of a security interest or mechanic's lien until
notice of the tax lien has been filed by the secretary of the Revenue Cabinet or his
delegate with the county clerk of any county or counties in which the taxpayer's business
or residence is located, or in any county in which the taxpayer has an interest in property.
The recording of the tax lien shall constitute notice of both the original assessment and all
subsequent assessments of liability against the same taxpayer. Upon request, the Revenue
Cabinet shall disclose the specific amount of liability at a given date to any interested party
legally entitled to the information.
(5) Even though notice of a tax lien has been filed as provided by subsection (4) of this
section, and notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 382.520, the tax lien imposed by
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subsection (2) of this section shall not be valid with respect to a security interest which
came into existence after tax lien filing by reason of disbursements made within forty-five
(45) days after the date of tax lien filing or the date the person making the disbursements
had actual notice or knowledge of tax lien filing, whichever is earlier, provided the security
interest:
(a) Is in property which:
1. At the time of tax lien filing is subject to the tax lien imposed by subsection (2)
of this section; and
2. Is covered by the terms of a written agreement entered into before tax lien
filing; and
(b) Is protected under local law against a judgment lien arising, as of the time of tax lien
filing, out ofan unsecured obligation.
Effective: March 30, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 209, sec. 9, effective March 30, 1998. -- Amended
1996 Ky. Acts ch. 344, sec. 9, effective July 15, 1996. -- Amended 1990 Ky. Acts
ch. 164, sec. 2, effective July 13, 1990; and repealed and reenacted ch.476, Pt V,
sec. 349, effective July 13, 1990. -- Amended 1982 Ky. Acts ch. 238, sec. 6, effective
July 15, 1982. -- Amended 1978 Ky. Acts ch. 84, sec. 3, effective June 17, 1978. --
Amended 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 319, sec. 1. -- Amended 1962 Ky. Acts ch. 210, sec. 22. --
Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October I, 1942, from Ky. Stat.
secs. 4021, 4257a-7.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/13/90). The Act amending this section
prevails over the repeal and reenactment in House Bill 940, Acts ch. 476, pursuant to
Section 653(1) of Acts ch. 476.
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386.093 Effect of disability, incapacity, or death on power of attorney, durable or
otherwise.
(1) As used in this section, "durable power of attorney" means a power of attorney by which
a principal designates another as the principal's attorney in fact in writing and the writing
contains the words, "This power of attorney shall not be affected by subsequent disability
or incapacity of the principa~ or lapse of time", or "This power of attorney shall become
effective upon the disability or incapacity of the principal", or similar words showing the
intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity, and, unless it states a time of termination,
notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution ofthe instrument.
(2) All acts done by an attorney in fact under a durable power of attorney during any period
of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effect and inure to the benefit of
and bind the principal and the principal's successors in interest as if the principal were
competent and not disabled. Unless the instrument states a time of termination, the power
is exercisable notwithstanding the lapse of time since the execution of the instrument
(3) The death of a principal who has executed a written power of attorney, durable or
otherwise, does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the attorney in fact or other
person, who, without actual knowledge of the death of the principal, acts in good faith
under the power. Any action so taken, unless otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds
successors in interest of the principal.
(4) The disability or incapacity of the principal who has previously executed a written power
of attorney that is not a durable power does not revoke or terminate the agency as to the
attorney in fact or other person, who, without actual knowledge of the disability or
incapacity of the principal, acts in good faith under the power. Any action so taken, unless
otherwise invalid or unenforceable, binds the principal and the principal's successors in
interest.
(5) If the power of attorney is to become effective upon the disability or incapacity of the
principal, the principal may specifY the conditions under which the power is to become
effective and may designate the person, persons, or institution responsible for making the
determination of disability or incapacity. If the principal fails to so specifY, the power shall
become effective upon a written determination by two (2) physicians that the principal is
unable, by reason of physical or mental disability, to prudently manage or care for the
principal's person or property, which written determination shall be conclusive proof of
the attorney in fact's power to act pursuant to the power of attorney. The two (2)
physicians making the determination shall be licensed to practice medicine.
(6) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a durable power of attorney may
authorize an attorney in fact to make a gift of the principal's real or personal property to
the attorney in fact or to others if the intent of the principal to do so is unambiguously
stated on the face of the instrument
Effective: July 14,2000
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such, then Sahieta may be asked if he told
her of the statement attributed to appel-
lant. If Sabieta denies that Franklin told
her of the statement, the inquiry must
stop. Sahieta, having no personal knowl-
edge of what appellant is alleged to have
told Franklin, cannot be impeached on this
point.
The real mischief in admitting Sahieta's
tape recorded statement is that a connec-
tion between appeUant and the statement
attributed to him was never shown. In the
manner of its introduction the statement is
inherently unreliable. If under the guise
of Jett evidence such as this is admitted,
the hearsay rule would pass into non-exist-
ence.
For the foregoing reason, the judgment
is reversed and remanded to the trial court.
All concur except VANCE, J., who
concurs in result only.
PenY A. RICE, Appellant,
v.
Mayme B. FLOYD. William A. Floyd and
Guy Duerson. Jr.. Attomey-in-Fact for
Mayme B. Floyd. Appellees.
No. 88-SC-477-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
April 6, 1989.
Daughter of alleged incompetent
brought suit seeking establishment of
guardianship. The Circuit Court, Madison
County, dismissed because attorney-in-fact
was already appointed. The Court of Ap-
peals denied discretionary review. On fur-
ther application for discretionary review,
. the Supreme Court, Wintersheimer. J., held
that: (1) upon determination that principal
was incompetent, requiring appointment of
guardian, powers of principal's attorney-in-
fact were terminated, and (2) durable pow-
er of attorney is not substitute for appoint- .
ment of guardian and cannot prevent insti-
gation of guardianship proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
Lieb80D, J., concurred in part and dis-
sented in part with opinion in which Gant
and Vance, JJ., joined.
1. Principal and Arent *"42
Terms "incapacity" and "disability" as
used in attorney-in-faet-appointment stat-
ute do not mean adjudication of disability
pursuant to guardian chapter, and should
be given their ordinary meanings. KRS
386.010 et seq., 886.093.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Guardian and Ward ....13(1)
Statutes related to appointment of
guardians are mandatory and must be
strictly construed. KRS 387.500(4), 387.-
570, 387.605.
3. Principal and Agent *"42
Upon determination that principal is
incompetent, requiring appointment of a
guardian, powers of principal's attorney-in-
fact are terminated. KRS 386.093, 387.-
58O(3)(a), 387.590, 387.590(5).
4. Mental Health *"101
Durable power of attorney is not sub-
stitute for appointment of guardian and
cannot prevent instigation of guardianship
proceedings. KRS 386.093, 387.580(3)(a),
387.590, 387.590(5).
Glenn E. Acree, McBrayer, McGinnis,
Leslie & Kirkland, Lexington, Charles R.
Coy, Coy, Coy & Gilbert, Richmond, for
appellant.
James Dean Liebman, Liebman & lieb-
man, Frankfort, Guy K. Duerson, Duerson
& Duerson, Berea, Robert C. Moody, Rich-
mond, for appellees.
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice.
This appeal involves a Petition pursuant
to K.R.S. 387.500 which was dismissed by
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the district court on the ground that an
attorney-in-fact fulfilled all the purposes
for which a guardian was sought by the
petition. The circuit court affirmed the
action of the district court and the Court of
Appeals denied discretionary review. This
Court granted review.
The question presented is whether a trial
judge is required to conduct a hearing pur-
suant to K.R.S. 387.580 when a durable
power of attorney is challenged by a peti-
tion for a guardianship.
Mayme Floyd is the mother of Peggy
Rice. Mrs. Floyd has not been declared
mentally incompetent but is wholly unable
to care for herself. Prior to her disability,
she executed on April 28, 1983 a Power of
Attorney appointing Guy K. nuerson, a
lawyer, as her attorney-in-fact. The ap-
pointment is comprehensive providing that
Duerson has the power to make contracts,
lease, sell or convey any of Mrs. Floyd's
property, whether real or personal, to re-
ceive moneys due her, to execute all
checks, leases, deeds, to invest her assets,
etc. The document granting the power of
attorney concludes that it shall not be af-
fected by disability and the powers con-
ferred herein shall be exercised notwith-
standing disability. In May, 1986, Mrs.
Floyd became disabled and Duerson, with
the consent of her husband who is now
deceased, had Mrs. Floyd admitted to the
Berea Hospital.
Subsequently, Mrs. Rice filed two peti-
tions to have herself appointed as her
mother's guardian under the provisions of
K.R.S. Chapter 387. The fll'St petition was
dismissed and no appeal was taken, and a
second petition was also dismissed with the
district judge stating that the needs of the
mother as to the management of her per-
sonal and financial affairs are provided for
in the Power of Attorney executed April
28, 1983, pursuant to K.R.S. 386.093. It is
this order that provides the basis of the
conflict in this case.
When the petition in the original proceed-
ings was filed, an order for the examina-
tion of Mrs. Floyd was issued and a report
of the interdisciplinary evaluation team de-
termined that she was incompetent and un-
able to care for herself. Full guardianship
and conse"atorship was recommended for
the duration of her life. The evaluation
team did not believe there were any appro-
priate alternatives to guardianship. Al-
though a hearing was scheduled to deter-
mine her disability, no jury was impaneled
and the hearing was not conducted. The
district judge dismissed the case because
he believed that the power of attorney pro-
vided that the appointment survive her dis-
ability and there was no need for a guardi-
an. In our view, the durable power of
attorney provided by K.R.S. 386.093 does
not make the ap~intment of a guardian
automatically unnecessary. It was not in-
tended to supplant the provisions of K.R.S.
387.500, the guardianship statute.
The Kentucky statute regarding durable
power of attorney is derived from section
6-501 of the Uniform Probate Code (1969).
The Kentucky Jaw modified the common
law principle that the acts of an attorney-
in-fact taken after the principal's loss of
power to contract were void. The general
purpose of the Uniform Act is to change
the common Jaw rules that voided powers
upon the principal's incompetency. Uni-
form Laws Annotated, Uniform Durable
Power ofAttorney Act, Prefatory Note p.
ZT7 (1981). It is our interpretation that the
Kentucky statute had the same purpose.
K.R.S. 386.093 and K.R.S. 387.500 et seq.
can be harmonized if this purpose is given
to K.R.S. 386.093. The statutes in question
provide a pattern for the systematic and
rational resolution of the problems of in-
competency and the time immediately prior
thereto.
K.R.S. 386.093 is designed to validate the
acts of the attorney-in-fact during a period
of actual disability prior to a finding of
legal disability. This law provides an an·
swer to the timeless problem which existed
under common law of determining when a
principal became disabled and at what time
the power of attorney terminated and the
acts thereafter were void. See 2A C.J.s.,
Agency § 141.
(1] The terms "incapacity" and "disabil-
ity" as used in K.R.S. 386.093 do not mean
an adjudication of disability pursuant to
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Chapter 387. The terms are not defined in
Chapter 386 and should be given their com-
mon and ordinary usage. Dept. of Reve-
nue 11. Greyhound Corp., Ky., 321 S.W.2d
60 (1969). The period of incapacity or dis-
ability referred to in K.R.S. 886.093 means
that time prior to an adjudication of disabil-
ity during which the principal's competency
is legally uncertain but is capable of being
determined by the courts. K.R.S. 386.093
relates to the effect of a Power of Attorney
during later uncertainty as to whether the
principal is "alive or dead." There is a
parallel in the statute between a missing
penon not proven or presumed to be dead
and a person considered as disabled but not
legally adjudicated as such. We believe it
assists in giving proper interpretation to
the terms "incapacity and disability."
Frequently, it is very uncertain as to
when disability begins and K.R.S. 386.093
is very useful in eliminating questions
about the legality of the acts of an attor-
ney-in-fact during that period.
Proceeding with a guardianship petition
does not infringe upon any civil or constitu-
tional right of the principal Rather it aids
the principal in the proper judicial consider-
ation of the rights of the parties. The
durable power of attorney is not compre-
hensive enough to replace the provisions of
Chapter 387 in regard to the administration
of the estates of incompetents. The pur-
pose of K.R.s. 387.500 is to appoint a per-
son to take care of the day-to-day personal
business of an incompetenl The scope of
authority, duties and accountability of a
guardian is much broader than that of a
traditional power of attorney, even one in-
tended to survive disability. The crucial
phrase of K.R.S. 386.093 is found in the
last sentence which states that, "[I]f a fidu-
ciary is thereafter appointed by the court
for the principal, the power of the attorney
in fact shall thereupon terminate and he
shall account to the court's appointed fidu-
ciary."
It was not the purpose of K.R.S. 386.093
to permit an attorney-in-fact to undertake
all the obligations of a legally appointed
guardian. A "durable power of attorney is
not limitless." Matter of Wilhelm, New
York Surr.eL, 134 Misc.2d 448, 611 N.Y.S.
2d 510, 511 (1981),
The process of appointing a guardian or
conservator is the legal means by which
the court applies due process to avoid the
possible invasion of civil or legal rights in
regard to a partial disability. K.R.S.387.-
500(2). The courts have always had the
inherent duty to protect the rights and
interests of incompetents. Metcalf 11. Met-
calf, 301 Ky. 817, 193 S.W.2d 446 (1946).
The position enunciated by the distriet
court that a durable power of attorney can
be substituted for a guardianship does not
properly recognize the distinctions between
the two statutory positions.
This Court notes that the guardian is
answerable to a court and must file ac-
countings at least annually. The attorney-
in-fact is answerable and accountable only
to the principal who may be mentally dis-
abled. It is obvious that there must be
adequate safeguards and control on the
person who manages an incompetent's es-
tate and that a great disparity exists be-
tween the durable power of attorney and a
guardian.
A guardian must comply with K.R.S.
389A.010 et seq. whenever the sale of real
property is involved. The attorney-in-fact
may sell real estate as if it were his own.
The guardian must also file biennial ac-
counts with the district court. K.R.S.387.-
670 and K.R.S. 387.710. An attorney-in-
fact is not a fidiuciary as defined in K.R.S.
395.001, nor is he a fiduciary subjected to
the reporting requirements of K.R.s. 387.-
500 et seq. The attorney-in-fact is account-
able only to his principal, who in this case
appears to be incompetenl
The guardianship provides for broad
powers and duties such as the power to
select the place of living and the restric-
tions of personal freedom of the disabled.
K.R.S. 387.660. Such powers have never
been encompassed in the traditional power
of attorney even the durable power of at-
torney. The attorney-in-fact is not restrict-
ed.
An incompetent cannot be sued and an
attorney-in-fact cannot defend an action on
behalf of an incompetenl Civil Rule 17.03.
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Defense must be completed by a legally
appointed guardian or committee.
The legal and personal requirements of a
disabled person are not well satisfied by an
attorney-in-fact as they might be by a
guardian. We do not believe they accom-
plish the same goals as those expressed in
the .guardianship statutes.
In Kentucky, the durable power of attor-
ney statute states that if a fiduciary is
thereafter appointed for the principal, the
attorney-in-fact is terminated and he must
account to the court-appointed fiduciary.
The appointment of a guardian was con-
templated by the legislature as part of the
durable power of attorney.
(2) The statutes relating to the appoint-
ment of guardians are mandatory and must
be strictly construed. Downing v. Sid-
dens, 247 Ky. 311, 57 S.W.2d 1 (1933).
K.R.S. 387.58O(1)(c) & (d) require the jury
to determine whether the respondent is dis-
abled, partially disabled, or has no disabili-
ty in the management of his personal and
financial affairs. Upon the jury determin-
ing the respondent disabled, the court
skall, without the jury, determine the type
of guardian or conservator to be appointed.
K.R.s. 387.580(3). The trial court is grant-
ed authority to determine the individual or
entity to be appointed, and the court may
appoint the attorney-in-fact if suitable to
the task. An accounting at trial of his acts
as attorney-in-fact would be relevant evi-
dence as to his suitability. In appointing a
guardian or conservator, the court must
give preference to those individuals pos-
sessing qualifications enumerated in K.R.S.
387.605. The four qualifications are not
listed in order of priority, but all four: quali-
fications must be considered together in
order to determine the person or entity
most qualified to serve.
K.R.S. 387.500(4) merely advises the trial
court of the legislative intent to impose the
least restrictive measures under the indi-
vidual's circumstances. The trial judge is
not granted authority by this section to
forego a hearing as set forth in K.R.S.
387.570, because he is of the opinion that
the respondent is being adequately taken
care of by other· means.
(3) The Uniform Probate Code (U.P.C.)
was developed with the intention that the
durable power of attorney would provide
an alternative to court-oriented, protective
procedures. The drafters of the Code real-
ized that the existence of a power of attor-
ney could not prevent the appointment of a
court-appointed fiduciary. The Code was
written 80 that the appointment of a fiduci-
ary would not automatically terminate the
power of attorney, but would leave it up to
the fiduciary to determine if the agency
was appropriate. Uniform Probate Code
(U.L.A.) Prefatory Note (1983). The U.P.C.
and the Uniform Durable Power of Attor-
ney Act (U.D.P.A.) provide for the coexist-
ence of durable powers and guardians or
conservators, and the attorney-in-fact is ac-
countable to the fiduciary and the principal.
These acts also allow the principal to nomi-
nate the conservator or guardian in the
event court proceedings are initiated. Uni-
form Probate Code (U.L.A.) Section 5-503
(1983); Uniform Durable Power ofAttor-
ney Act (U.L.A.) Section 3 (1983). The
U.P.C. and U.D.P.A. allow the attorney-in-
fact to continue to manage the principal's
financial affairs, while the eourt-appointed
fiduciary would take the place of the princi-
pal in overseeing the actions of the attor-
ney-in-fact.
However, K.R.S. 386.093 does not follow
the U.P.C. or the U.D.P.A. in the dual
management of the incompetent's estate,
but requires the termination for the power
of attorney-in-fact upon the appointment of
a fiduciary of the principal. If Floyd is
determined by the jury to be disabled, the
power of attorney will cease and a fiduci-
ary as provided for in K.R.S. 387.590 will
be appointed by the trial judge. K.R.S.
386.093; K.R.S. 387.58O(3)(a). Should
Floyd be found disabled in managing both
her personal affairs and financial re-
sources, the court shall appoint a guardian,
"unless the court considers it in the best
interest of the ward to appoint both a limit-
ed guardian and a conservator." K.R.S.
387.590(5).
[4] It is the holding of this court that
the durable power of attorney is not a
K(b) - 40
RICE v. FWYD
ate ... Ky~ 768 S.W.u 57
Ky. 61
substitute for the appointment of a guanli-
an. The existence of a durable power of
attorney cannot prevent the institution of
guardianship proceedings. The disabled
person is entitled to have the district court
exercise control and supervision of her es-
tate by the impaneling of a jury to deter-
mine whether she is disabled pursuant to
Chapter 387 of the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes and if 80 to appoint a guardian in
accordance with that chapter, and if a fidu-
ciary is appointed then the power of attor-
ney-in-fact shall terminate and an account
must be given to the court-appointed fiduci-
ary.
The decisions of the circuit court and the
district court are reversed and this matter
is remanded to the district court for an
appropriate hearing and proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
STEPHENS, C.J., and COMBS and
LAMBERT, JJ., concur.
LEIBSON, J.,concurs in part and
dissents in part by a separate opinion.
GANT and VANCE, JJ., join in
LEIBSON's, J., opinion.
LEIBSON, Justice, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
Respectfully, I dissent. I confess to a
great deal of confusion as to the holding in
the Majority Opinion. I agree that there
should have been a competency hearing
and a hearing on the need for a guardian-
ship. But if the Majority Opinion means
that a jury's determination of disability au-
tomaticaU,l tenninates a durable power of
attorney and mandates the appointment of
a guardian, I disagree. This interpretation
of the impact of KRS 386.093 on the guard-
ianship procedure frustrates the statutory
intent, and serves no legitimate purpose.
By creating the durable power of attor-
ney the General Assembly intended to per-
mit an individual, while competent, to ar-
range for the handling of his affairs should
he become incompetent. This includes the
power to designate an attorney in fact to
manage his affairs. Such a person is a
fiduciary who may be questioned as to mis-
management of the principal's affairs to
768 S.W.2d-3
the same effect, if not by the same statu-
tory procedure, as is true with a guardian
appointed pursuant to KRS 387.500 et seq.
The guardianship statutes, as presently
revised, specify that the procedure for
"guardianship and conserVatorship for dis-
abled persons shall be utilized only as is
necessary to promote their well-being."
KRS 387.500. KRS 387.53O(d) specifies
that the petition for appointment of a
guardian must specify the "facts and rea-
sons supporting the need for guardian-
ship."
In these circumstances a fair interpreta-
tion of the impact of KRS 386.093, the
durable power of attorney statute, on the
guardianship procedure is:
1) Under KRS 387.570, when the petition
is filed for appointment of a guardian "the
respondent shall have a jury trial" to de-
cide incompetency.
2) Under KRS 387.580, if Mayme Floyd
is found to be incompetent, the "court
shall, at the same hearing, without a jury,
determine" whether a guardian needs to be
appointed or whether the durable power of
attorney process in place is sufficient con-
servator of the incompetent's affairs.
On remand, our decision should provide
that the trial court has discretion, after a
hearing, to decide if a guardian is unneces-
sary even though Mayme Floyd is found to
be incompetent. If the effect of our deci-
sion is to force a guardianship on Mayme
Floyd even though the trial court, after a
hearing, has determined that such is both
contrary to the instrument she prepared
while she was competent and unnecessary,
we have limited the effect of the durable
power of attorney statute unduly and irra-
tionally.
Medical science has extended the limita-
tions on human existence to the point
where many of us will now linger long in a
twilight zone of incompetency and disabili-
ty. Statutes such as KRS 386.093 were
enacted to permit those of us who want it
some measure of control over what will
happen in our lives when we can no longer
manage our own affairs. If the legislature
pennits us such self-detennination, as it
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baa done at least in part by the durable
power of attorney statute, there is no rea-
son for us to foree our courts into the ''big
brother" role by mandating guardianship
for the disabled. First, the person seeking
guardianship status should have to prove
that such is necessary. KRS 387.605 gives
preference to the daughter, Peggy Rice, as
the person to be appointed if we force a
guardianship on Mayme Floyd when such
is unnecessary. It is quite possible that
J4a. Floyd's purpose in executing the dura-
ble power of attorney was to prevent just
such eventuality.
U a jury finds Mayme Floyd incompe-
tent, as both sides agree that she is, still
there is no reason to require the trial court
to appoint a guardian until first the trial
court baa determined, after a hearing, that
such "is necessary to promote [her] well-be-
ing." KRS 387.500(3). The trial court
should be left to decide, after a hearing, if
management of the estate under the dura-
ble power of attorney suffices to protect
Ms. Floyd's interest. She thought so, and
said so, while she was competent.
GANT and VANCE, JJ., join.
COMMONWEALTH of
Kentucky, Appellant,
v.
Brldgette GILBERT and WIlliam Lee
Jackson, Appellees.
No. 88-CA....I6-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Apnl 21, 1989.
Rehearing Denied July 7, 1989.
The Jefferson Circuit Court, Laurence
E. Higgins, J., dismissed indictment charg-
ing defendants with receiving stolen prop-
erty valued over $100, and with complicity
thereto, and Commonwealth appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Lester, J., held that: (1)
trial court could not rule that stolen money
orders with face value of $398.77 had value
of less than $100 as matter of law, and (2)
Commonwealth's appeal was not violative
of double jeopardy.
Vacated and remanded.
1. Receiving Stolen GoocU p2
Money orders were "property" within
meaning of statute defining "property" as
anything of value, including documents,
Ch08es in action, and other interests in or
claims to wealth, and thus defendants who
possessed money orders could be charged
with receiving stolen property. KRS 514.-
010(6).
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Receiving Stolen Good. p9(l)
Trial court could not rule that stolen
money orders, with face value of $393.77,
had value of less than $100 as matter of
law, and thus that defendants could not be
charged with receiving stolen property val-
ued over $100, even though loss may bave
been recoverable by the owner after they
were stolen.
3. Rec:eivin« Stolen Goods p2
Defendants who possessed stolen mon-
ey orders could be charged with receiving
stolen property valued over $100, even
though money orders were nonnegotiable,
as fact that something further would have
to be done to them to negotiate them and
obtain their face value did not render them
valueless. KRS 355.3-104(1)(8).
4. Criminal Law ~1024(2)
Commonwealth's appeal from order
dismissing indictment did not violate double
jeopardy, as jeopardy had not attached
when judge entered his order of dismissal.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5.
Frederic J. Cowan, Atty. Gen., Thomas
W. Dyke, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Louisville,
for appellant.
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Jerry K. SIRLS and wife, Brenda
Sirls, Appellants,
v.
Sandra Darlene JORDAN, Appellee.
No. 81-CA-504-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Oct. 23, 198!.
Discretionary Review Denied Jan. 6, 1982.
Previously undisclosed heir at law of
decedent brought action for partition or
sale of decedent's former property against
purchasers of property. The Marshall Cir-
cuit Court, James M. Lassiter, J., entered
summary judgment for heir, and pu~chasers
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Mc-
Donald, J., held that purchasers, who pur-
chased property from some of heirs of dece-
dent pursuant to a warranty deed and an
affidavit of descent purportedly listing all
heirs at law, took subject to the interest of
previously undisclosed heir.
Affirmed.
Hogge, J., concurred by separate opin-
ion.
1. Vendor and Purchaser <8=231(13)
Bona fide purchasers of real property
from some of heirs of deceased former own-
er pursuant to a warranty deed and an
affidavit of descent purportedly listing all
heirs at law took subject to interest of
undisclosed heir, and were not entitled to
protection of recording statute with respect
to interest of undisclosed heir. KRS 882.-
080,382.120.
2. Descent and Distribution <8=74
A decedent's estate in intestacy vests in
the heirs at law immediately upon his
death.
3. Deeds <8=8
What passes under a deed is that title
that grantor had.
Robert L. Prince, Prince & Owen, Benton.
for appellants.
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Paul Shapiro, Lovett, Johnson & Shapiro,
Benton, for appellee.
Before HOGGE, HOWARD and Mc-
DONALD, JJ.
McDONALD, Judge:
This appeal presents the question of
whether a bona fide purchaser of real prop-
erty from some of the heirs of the former
owner takes subject to the interest of an
undisclosed heir. The trial court granted a
summary judgment for the heir and held
that her interest had not been defeated.
When heirs to intestate real property
want to convey it, K.R.S. 382.120 requires
that they file an affidavit of descent before
recording their deed. I n this case, Eukley
McNeely died intestate on November 28,
1977, owning 50 acres of real property in
Marshall County. On April 17, 1978, his
brother, sister, niece and nephew executed
an affidavit of descent listing themselves as
the only surviving heirs at law having an
estate of inheritance in his land. They filed
the affidavit for record and conveyed the
entire tract by general warranty deed to
Mr. and Mrs. Sirls, the appellants, for $37,-
101.00.
Two years later, Sandra Darlene Jordan,
the appellee, filed an action for partition or
sale of the land. The petition named as
defendants Mr. and Mrs. Sirls; also named
were David and Cindy Ganger, other heirs
at law of the decedent omitted by the affi-
davit of descent. The appellee claimed YI!
interest in the property as grandniece of
the decedent. She stated that the Gangers
each inherited lfM interest in the property at
Eukley McNeely's death. (The Gangers
were never located during the lower court
proceedings despite the efforts of a warn-
ing order attorney. They are not parties to
this appeal.)
The appellants denied that the appellee
had any interest in the 5O-acre tract. Both
sides moved for a summary judgment. The
appellee's position was that although the
other heirs had purported to convey the
SIRLS v. JORDAN
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whole tract, they only owned an undivided
fractional share. They could not convey
more than they owned and they could not
deprive her of her vested interest by a
conveyance which she had not joined. The
appellants countered with the argument
that because they are unquestioned bona
fide purchasers of the property, their title
should be protected from the appellee's
claims.
[1] The court granted the appellee's mo-
tion, overruled the appellants', and entered
the following order:
IT IS, THEREFORE, THE ORDER
AND JUDGMENT of this Court that the
relief sought by petitioner be granted to
the extent that it is now determined that
the petitioner was not, as a matter of
law, divested of her interest in the real
estate identified in the Complaint (Peti-
tion); and that she continues to be the
owner of said interest pending her con-
veyance of the same on a voluntary basis
or upon a petition for division.
The appellants appealed this order. For the
reasons discussed below, we affirm.
The parties agree that the affidavit of
descent omitted three heirs at law of the
decedent. There are no issues of fraud,
notice, or laches raised. Surprisingly, the
question of priority under these circum-
stances has not been squarely addressed in
this jurisdiction. This appears to be a ease
between two innocent parties, for the heirs
who executed the affidavit and received the
consideration for the land have not been
joined in the action.
The appellee cites two early cases for the
proposition that the rights of heirs who
have not joined in a conveyance are en-
forceable against a subsequent purchaser.
New York & T. Land Company v. Hyland, 8
Tex.Civ.App. 601, 28 S.W. 206 (1894); Car-
ter v. Thompson, Ark., 267 S.W. 790 (1925).
In the Texas case, the purchaser's belief
that he was purchasing from all the heirs
was held to be not sufficient to deprive the
omitted heir of his interest. In the Arkan-
sas case, the other heirs had supplied an ex
parte affidavit at the request of the title
examiner. The court held that the recitals
in the deeds, even when backed up by the
affidavit, were incompetent to prove that
they were the only heirs.
The appellants cite eases which protect
those who rely on the public records of
conveyances. The cases focus on the ques-
tion whether the purchaser had notice of
inconsistent interests, but notice was not an
issue here. In Bashara v. Glasscock, Tex.
Civ.App., 289 S.W. 128 (1926), the court held
that any gap in the chain of title by failure
of a conveyance by the decedent's personal
representative was cured by properly filed
and recorded affidavits of descent. A later
Texas ease, Moran v. Adler, Tex., 570
S.W.2d 883 (1978), advocates the protection
of apparent legal titles over hidden titles.
In that case the hidden heirs were children
who alleged they had been equitably adopt-
ed by their stepmother and were therefore
entitled to an interest in property owned by
her. The court held in favor of the good
faith purchaser because there was no way
that a search of the records would reveal an
interest of children who were equitably
adopted.
The problem with adopting a rule in fa-
vor o( the good faith purchaser (or value
over the omitted heir in this jurisdiction is
that it runs counter to our statutes and to
established principles of property law. We
are not convinced that the appellants are
entitled to the protection of our recording
statute, K.R.S. 382.080. It is a notice stat-
ute, and provides in part as (ollows:
No deed conveying any title to or interest
in real property, or lease of oil, gas, coal
or mineral right and privilege, for a long-
er time than five (5) years, nor any agree-
ment in consideration of marriage, shall
be good against a purchaser (or a valua-
ble consideration without notice thereof,
or any creditor, unless the deed is ac-
knowledged by the party who executes it,
or is proved and lodged for record in the
proper office, as prescribed by law.
Although there is no dispute over the appel-
lants' giving of value and their lack of
notice, we point out that the statute does
not protect good faith purchasers against
all adverse claims. The statute seeks to
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redress the evils of prior unrecorded deeds,
mortgages and leases by making them inef-
fectual as against subsequent bona fide pur-
chasers. In this way. the statute upholds
the recording system and the interests of
those who comply with it. But it does not
void other interests which are not required
to be recorded. Until the appellee chose to
convey her interest, she would have no obli-
gation to record; therefore, her interest
falls outside the statute.
Nor does K.R.S. 382.120, which requires
the affidavit of descent, invest that docu-
ment with the effect of a warranty of title.
The statute merely sets out the steps an
intestate heir must take to enable him to
file a deed and convey his interest. The
contents of the affidavit. as called for in the
statute, provide the potential purchaser
with notice of the source of title claimed by
the grantor. However, the statute does not
raise the affidavit to the level of conclusive
proof of heirship, and we decline to do so by
decision. We note that any of several peo-
ple can file the affidavit: the grantor, any
heir or next of kin of his ancestor, or any
two Kentucky residents with knowledge of
the facts. K.R.S. 382.120. The legislature
anticipated the risk of fraud inherent in
such instruments because it supplied a stat-
utory cause of action for an injured party
against a person who knowingly makes a
false statement in an affidavit of descent.
K.R.S. 382.990(2).
[2,3] Finally, we are confronted by the
principle that the decedent's estate in intes-
tacy vests in the heirs at law immediately
upon his death. Ryburn v. First National
Bank of Mayfield, Ky., 399 S.W.2d 313
(1965). It is undisputed that the appellee is
an heir at law of the decedent and that title
vested in her and the other heirs at Eukley
McNeely's death. We add to this the fun-
damental rule that what passes under a
deed is that title that the grantor had.
Vanhoose v. Fairchild, 145 Ky. 700, 141
S.W. 75 (1911). See also, K.R.S. 381.150
which states:
A deed in warranty of land purporting
to pass or assure a greater right or estate
than the person can lawfully pass or as-
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sure, shall operate to convey on warrant
so much of the right and estate as such
person can lawfully convey.
The inescapable conclusion is that the four
heirs could warrant and convey only the
interests which they inherited from the de-
cedent.
The court in Vanhoose, supra, stated at
141 S.W. 76:
Where no title, legal or equitable, passed
by a conveyance to the purchaser, for the
reason that the title was in another per-
son than the vendor, the fact that the
purchaser paid value and had no notice is
immaterial. [Citations omitted.]
Although our decision penalizes the inno-
cent purchasers, they have not been left
without a remedy. First, there is an action
against the heirs on the warranty. Second,
K.R.S. 382.990(2) provides a penalty and a
right of action for the willful and fraudu-
lent making of an affidavit of descent.
We affirm the judgment of the trial
court that there were no issues of material
ract and that appellee was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law.
HOWARD, Judge, concurs.
HOGGE. Judge, concurs by separate opin-
ion.
HOGGE, Judge, concurring:
The question involved in this case is an-
other of the vagaries in our law that ap-
pears to prescribe a treatment that does not
cure the defect. K.R.S. 382.120 provides for
the affidavit of descent and the necessary
safeguards of its accuracy are by both civil
and criminal liabilities for fraud as set forth
in K.R.S. 382.990. However, this enactment
doesn't appear to elevate the dignity of the
affidavit to the level that would protect the
innocent purchaser, relying on that affida-
vit, as against omitted heirs. Until the
legislature sees fit to make the affidavit
conclusive proof of ownership, the innocent
purchaser must continue to suffer a possible
cloud on his title. The act should enable
the innocent purchaser to rely on this
source of title. else why should it be a
William E. Sloan, Wylie & Sloan, Lexing-
ton, for appellant.
Bill Shelton and Anthea M. Boarman,
Lexington, for appellee.
Before GUDGEL, HOGGE and LESTER,
JJ.
LESTER, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment deter-
mining that it was not an unwarranted
invasion of privacy to permit appellee to
inspect certain personnel records in posses-
sion of appellant within the meaning of
KRS 61.878(I)(a), a provision of the Ken-
tucky Open Records Act.
One Jennifer Massotti, a security officer
in the employment of the Fayette County
v.
Dec. 4, 1981.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Reversed and remanded.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSION, Appellee.
No. 81-eA-997-MR.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FAYETTE
COUNTY, Kentucky, Appellant,
BD. OF ED. v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN CTY. Ky. 109
Oteas, Ky.App., I255.W.2d I"
prerequisite to recording the deed, or are-I. Rec:orde 41=:>64
quirement at all. In determining whether disclosure of
information from public personnel record
would involve an unwarranted invasion of
privacy, court is not to tilt toward disclo-
sure, but, rather, is to apply the test of
balancing interests of the parties as well as
those of the public measured by the stan-
dard of a reasonable man. KRS 6L-
878(I)(a), (3); U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.
2. Rec:orde 41=:>66
In action wherein urban county human
rights commission sought to compel board
of education to disclose county school sys-
tem's personnel files for purpose of permit;..
ting investigation of system's security offi-
cer's claim that her failure to receive pr0-
motion involved sex discrimination, public
interest would not be served by complete
disclosure of information including informa-
tion relating to sex offenses committed on
member of an employee's family and mate-
rial relating to criminal investigations in-
volving law enforcement agencies possibly
employing confidential techniques, Commis-
sion would be permitted to specify the in-
formation it sought and, thereafter, board
would be permitted to "sanitize" records of
material not germane to sex discrimination
claim. KRS 61.878(I)(a), (3, 4), 61.882(3);
U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 4.
Urban county human rights commis-
sion brought action to compel board of edu-
cation to disclose county school system's
personnel files for purpose of permitting
investigation of system's security officer's
claim that her failure to receive a promo-
tion involved sex discrimination. The Fa-
yette Circuit Court, L. T. Grant, J., entered
judgment determining that it was not an
unwarranted invasion of privacy to permit
inspection of the personnel records, and
board appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Lester, J., held that public interest would
not te served by a complete disclosure of
information, including information relating
to sex offenses committed on member of an
employee's family and material relating to
criminal investigations involving law en-
forcement agencies possibly making use of
confidential techniques, and commission
would be permitted to specify the informa-
tion sought and, thereafter, board would be
authorized to "sanitize" records of material
not germane to sex discrimination claim.
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Mary C. LUCAS. Ex~utrix of the Estate
of Mary T. Mannering, Appellant.
v.
Danny Ray MANNERING. William Lan-
den and Robert Lee Landen,
Appellees.
Danny Ray MANNERING and William
Landen, Crou-Appellants,
v.
ESTATE OF Mary T. MANNERING by
Mary C. LUCAS, Executrix.
Crou-Appellees.
Nos. 86-CA~I659-MR.
86-CA-OOI686-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Dee. 23, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1988.
Executrix brought action for determi-
nation of authority to sell real property in
lieu of conveying property to residuary
beneficiaries. The Circuit Court, Jefferson
County, Martin E. Johnstone, J., ordered
executrix to convey property to benefi-
ciaries, awarded attorey fees to executrix'
attorney, and permitted executrix to collect
rent until fmal settlemenl Appeal and
cross appeal were taken. The Court of
Appeals, Clayton, J., held that: (1) execu-
trix was not vested with unqualified au-
thority to sell residual real estate, but owed
duty to convey it to residuary beneficiaries;
(2) conclusions that executrix' duty to ad-
minister estate included defense of appoint-
ment as executrix and that executrix was
entitled to attorney fees were not clearly
erroneous; and (3) executrix' duty to col-
lect and manage estate permitted executrix
to collect rent from property that passed to
residuary beneficiaries under terms of will
until final settlement was approved.
Affirmed.
McDonald, J., concurred in result and
filed opinion.
1. Executon and Admlnktratou
*""138(7)
Will giving executrix continuing, abso-
lute, discretionary power to sell any assets
of estate did not give executrix unquatifi~
authority to sell residual real estate that
was to be divided among residuary benefi-
ciaries, but executrix owed duty as fiduci-
ary to testator and beneflciaries to transfer
property to them. KRS 395.001.
2. Executon and Administraton *""75
Executrix is trustee, and funds of es-
tate in her hands are trust funds. KRS
395.001.
3. Executon and Administnton $0>74. 75
Executrix represents testatrix and to
very great extent, heirs, legatees, or dis-
tributees. KRS 395.001.
4. Executon and Administraton *""81
Executrix has right to defend in court
authority to act
5. Executon and Adminlstraton
$0>111(1)
Conclusions that executrix' duty to ad-
minister estate included defense of appoint-
ment as executrix and that executrix wu
entitled to attorney fees were not clearly
erroneous. KRS 395.195(18).
6. Executon and Administnton $0>131
Executrix' duty to collect and manage
estate permitted executrix to collect rent
froin property that passed to residuary
beneficiaries under terms of will until fmal
settlement was approved.
Michael L. Allen, Allen &; Saunders,
P.S.C., Louisville, for appe1laDtlcross-appel-
lee.
Ben B. Hardy, Durward W. Maynard,
Donald M. Heavrin, Louisville, for appel-
lees/cross-appellantB.
Robert Lee Landers, pro se.
Before CLAYTON, McDONALD and
MIILER, JJ.
CLAYTON, Judge.
Mary C. Lucas, executrix of the estate of
Mary T. Mannering, appeals from a judg.
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ment entered in a declaratory judgment vey any of the &Bsets of my estate which
action brought by her in the Jefferson Cir- I now possess or may acquire or beeome
euit Court to determine her authority to entitled to after the execution of this
selleertain parcels of real property remain- Will.
ingin the Mannering estate in lieu of con- It appears that the will was drafted by an
veying the property to the residuary bene- attorney who was also appointed as execu-
fieiaries of the estate. The circuit court tor but who was later replaced by Mary
held that Lucas' power to selJ the realty Lucas via the codicl1 dated March 9, 1980.
was discretionary and there bei~g no rea- Mary Lucas promptly sold one parcel of
son presented for the sale whIch would land to the individuals who had been leas-
have benefited the estate, Ol~ered her to ing it from Mrs. Mannering and had bul1t
co~v~y the property to .the resld~ bene- their home thereon. The remaining real
fi~s. We agree WIth the trial court's estate consists of approximately 7.45 acres
deCISIon and affll'D1. and it was appraised in February of 1983 at
The appellees, Danny Ray Mannering, approximately $137,000. A number of indi-
William Landers and Robert Lee Landers, viduals leased portions of this property
are the sons of Mary T. Mannering and the from Mrs. Mannering and bunt homes
residuary beneficiaries of her estate. They thereon. A dispute arose when Mary Lu-
cross-appeal from the portion of the judg- cas expressed her desire to sell this real
ment granting Donald Heavrin's motion for estate to the leaseholders despite the
an attorney's fee of $2,000 to be paid from wishes of the residuary beneficiaries to
the estate and the portions ordering Mrs. take fee simple title in the property.
Lucas .to coll~ the rents .from the real In order to resolve this dispute, Mary
es~te m question and ordenn~ h~ to sub- Lucas filed an action for declaratory judg-
mit a fmal settlement to the dIStrict court. ment in the Jefferson Circuit Court on June
The facts are not substantially in dis- 24, 1983. An answer and counterclaim was
pute. Mrs. Mary T. Mannering died on filed by the defendaDtlappellees alleging
April 25, 1982. Mrs. Lucas, named execu- certain improprieties in Mary Lucas' admin-
trix in a codicil dated March 9, 1980, to the istration of the estate and seeking her re-
1978 will of Mrs. Mannering, qualified as moval together with damages.
executrix on May 14, 1982. On January 14, 1984, an order was en-
Under the terms of the will, appellees, tered by Judge Shobe which removed Mary
Danny Ray Mannering and Robert Lee Lucas as executrix. However, this order
Landers, each received the laDd on which was not based on an evidentiary hearing.
they resided. The remainder of the estate, On September 9, 1985, the case was reas-
which consisted of some personal property signed to Judge Johnstone, who, after a
and two noncontiguous tracts of land, was hearing, found that the appellees failed to
to be divided equally between the three meet their burden for removing Mary Lu-
sons. All debts and administration costs cas as executrix aDd accordingly Judge
were paid first out of the estate, thus no Shobe's order was set aside. The remain-
outstanding creditor claims exist. ing issue, whether Mary Lucas had the
The problem in this case stems from a au.thority to sell th~ residual property:~
discretionary power of sale for realty and bnefed by the parties and the fmal OPIDIOn,
personalty of the estate granted to the order and judgment was entered on June
executrix in paragraph IV of the will. It 20, 1986.
reads as follows: On appeal, Mrs. Lucas argues that para-
I hereby grant to my Executor the con- graph IV of the will clearly empowers her
tinning, absolute, discretionary power to with the unrestricted authority to seU the
deal with any property, real or personal, residual property of the estate and divide
held in my estate as freely as I might in the proceeds among the residual benefi-
the handling of my own affairs. Such ciaries. Apparently, her reason for want-
power includes the right to sell and eon- ing to sell the property is that the lease-
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holders are her long-time friends and she is
con<:erned that their leases would not be
renewed. Mrs. Lucas stated to the lower
court that Mrs. Mannering orally indicated
her desire to accommodate the leases.
Mrs. Lucas further expressed to the trial
court her willingness to convey the realty
to the 8OD8 if measures were taken to
preserve the leaseholds.
[1-3] We cannot agree that Mrs. Lucas
is vested with the unqualified authority to
sell the residual real estate. An executrix
is a fiduciary. KRS 395.001. More accu-
rately, an executrix is a trustee, and funds
of the estate in her hands are trust funds.
Carpenter v. Planck, 304 Ky. 644, 201
S.W.2d 908 (1947); 31 Am.Jur.2d Exuutors
and Administrators Section 2 (1967). The
executrix represents the testatrix and to a
very great extent, the heirs, legatees or
distributees, for whose benefit probate pro-
ceedings are had. 33 C.J.S. Executors and
Administrators Section 142 (1942). See
Carpenter, supra.
In its eight-page opinion, order and judg-
ment, the trial court noted that if Mrs.
Mannering had intended the leaseholders to
have the land, she could have easily grant·
ed them a purchase option. The record
reveals no compelling evidence that it was
Mrs. Mannering's intent to have the prop-
erty sold and the proceeds divided among
her SODS. The record, however, certainly
does reflect the beneficiaries' desire to take
the property in-kind rather than the pro-
ceeds from a sale of it. Thus, we conclude
that it is Mrs. Lucas' duty as fiduciary to
the testatrix and the beneficiaries, to trans-
fer the property to the appellees.
[4,6] Turning to the cross-appeal of the
appellees/eross-appellants. They first as-
sert that the trial court committed reversi-
ble error by granting Donald Heavrin an
attorney's fee of $2,000 to be paid from the
estate. Under KRS 395.195(18), a personal
representative of an estate is authorized to
employ an attorney to assist her in per-
forming her administrative duties. Mr.
Heavrin provided assistance to the estate
by representing Mrs. Lucas at the hearing
on January 7, 1986, which resulted in the
order setting aside Judge Shobe's order
removing Mrs. Lucas as executrix of.Mrs..
Mannering's estate. An executrix haS 'the
right to defend in court her authority to
act. 33 C.J.8. Eucutors and Administ~
tors Section 141 (1942). We cannot say
that it is clearly erroneous to conclude that
Mrs. Lucas' duty to administer the estate
includes defending her appointment as ex-
ecutrix made by the testatrix. The trial
court allowed a $2,000 fee, to be paid out of
the estate, for Mr. Heavrin's services to the
estate. We do not believe this finding is
clearly erroneous; thus, we will not disturb
it on appeal. We note that Mr. Heavrin
also represented Mrs. Lucas' original attor-
ney during certain procedures below and
the trial court properly refused to award
any fees for these services.
(6) Next, the cross-appellants assert
that the trial court committed reversible
error by ordering Mrs. Lucas to continue
collecting rental receipts owed to the estate
until a final seWement is approved by the
district court. The cross-appellants argue
that upon the death of the testatrix, the
real property of the estate immediately
passes to them as heirs or devisees, subject
only to the power of the executrix to sell
such property. They contend that since
Mrs. Lucas had no legitimate reason to sell
the property, it passes immediately to
them. The trial court determined that it
was in the best interest of the estate for
Mrs. Lucas to collect all rents and "make a
fun and complete accounting of all rental
collection activity to be tendered to the
District Court upon submission of the final
settlement" We cannot say that this is an
improper order in light of the executor's
duty to collect and manage the estate.
Lastly, the cross-appellants claim that the
trial court failed to consider the issue stat-
ed in their answer and counterclaim eon-
cerning the removal of the executrix and
damages caused by ber breach of fiduciary
duty. This issue was disposed of by the
order dated January 7, 1986, wherein
Judge Johnstone set aside the prior order
removing Mrs. Lucas as executrix, after
finding that the eroaa-appellees failed to
meet their burden of proof. Thus, the trial
court was correct in sending the ease back
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to the district court for final settlement.
The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court'is affirmed on both the direct appeal
and the eross-appeaI.
MILLER, J., concurs.
McDONALD, J., concurs by separate
opinion.
McDONALD, Judge, concurring:
I concur with the result reached in the
majority opinion. However, there are two
points which I believe deserve special atten-
tion, so I WIll elaborate. The f"llSt point
concerns the description given the execu-
tors. KRS 396.001 specifically includes ex-
ecutors within the definition of "fiduciary"
under Kentucky law. Herein, a fiduciary
duty being placed upon Mrs. Lucas as exec-
utrix of the estate is beyond dispute. How-
ever, the majority goes further and asserts
that "an executrix is a trustee, and funds
of the estate in her hands are trust funds."
Carpenter v. Planck,' 304 Ky. 644, 201
S.W.2d 908 (1947), and 31 Aril.Jur.2d Ezec-
utor. and Administrator. § 2 at 28, are
cited as authority for the principle. Both
authorities couch their respective proposi-
tions in terms such as "analogous" (Car-
penter), and "in other words" (Am.Jur.2d).
Likewise, it is the omission of such provi-
sional language in the majority opinion
with which I take exception. Such an un-
qualified, dogmatic assertion seems unnec-
essary for the result reached and appears
contrary to the lhstatement (Second) of
TruBtB § 6 (1969), which distinguishes the
two entities despite their similarities. To
analogize executors and trustees is one
thing; to hold them equal to each other is
quite different.
The secondpoint concerns the effect our
opinion may have upon the leaseholders
herein. The tract of land is currently
leased to as many as fifteen separate indi-
viduals, some of whom have built cabins
and homes On their plots. The leases were
entered into between the decedent, Mrs.
Mannering, and her friends and neighbors.
The record indicates that some of the lease
agreements are oral agreements.
The appellant argues that the testatrix
intended these lease agreements be hon-
ored in the event of her death and that the
discretionary power of sale given the exec-
utrix would protect the lessees through her
last WIll and testament. Unfortunately for
the leaseholders, Mrs. Mannering's will did
not adequately express that intent. The
trial court reasoned that the testatrix could
have devised the plots to the leaseholders
or could have granted them an option to
purchase if she had so desired. It is the
contrast between the alleged intent of the
testatrix and the effect of our opinion
which concerns me. It is obvious that the
beneficiaries of the WIll have no desire to
accommodate the leases and, to the con-
trary, it seems that their motives are oppo-
site those claimed by the executrix.
While the facts of this ease support the
findings of the trial court, the likelihood of
further lawsuits and the danger that our
opinion may in some fashion be construed
as favoring the desires of beneficiaries of a
will over the intent of the testator are too
great to ignore.
Donald H. GRAY, Appellant,
v.
Marlia B. GRAY, AppeUee.
No. 86-CA-2367-8.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Jan. 15, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1988.
Former wife, who former husband was
to provide with automobile of specific type
pursuant to first divorce decree, obtained
judgment for damages against former hus-
band in the Floyd Circuit Court, Hollie Coo-
ley, J., after spouses remarried, second di-
vorce decree was entered, husband discon-
tinued paying on automobile, and it was
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Jonathan W. mERS; and Loretta
F. Hiers, Appellants/Cross-
Appellees.
v.
BANK ONE, WEST VIRGINIA,
WILLIAMSON, NA, Appel-
leeiCross-Appella.p.t.
Nos. 95-CA-124S-MR, 95-CA-1378-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Oct. 18, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1997.
Discretionary Review Denied by
Supreme Court June 11, 1997.
Action was brought to resolve priority
dispute between lessors, who asserted inter-
est in mobile home pursuant to language in
lease, and bank with security interest there-
in. The Circuit Court, Pike County, Charles
E. LoWe, Jr., J., entered order adjudging
that bank was entitled to possession, but
declined to award any damages for lessors'
alleged conversion. Both sides appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Gudgel, J., held that:
(1) exclusive means of perfeeting security
interest, even in "affixed" mobile home, was
by submitting certificate of title and title lien
statement to proper county clerk, but (2)
circumstances surrounding dispute between
lessors and bank did not justify a finding that
any such conversion occurred.
Affinned.
1. Automobiles eo>20
Secured Transactions eo>87
Mere fact that mobile home had been
affixed to realty did not affect its status as
mobile home, under statutes requiring resi-
dent owners of such mobile homes to obtain
certificates of title and providing for perfec-
tion of security interests by notation on cer-
tificate of title; thus, exclusive means of per-
fecting security interest, even in such an
"affixed" mobile home, was by submitting
certificate of title and title lien statement to
I. Bank One and its predecessor bank are herein-
proper county clerk in accordance with stat-
utes. KRS 186.650, 186A070, 186A.19O(1).
2. Secured Transactions eo>170
Lessors claiming interest in mobile
home affixed to leased property, pursuant to
language in lease indicating that lessors
would become owners of any personal prop-
erty attached to leased premises following
lessees' death, were not liable in conversion
for failing to relinquish mobile home to bank
with perfected security interest therein; cir-
cumstances surrounding dispute between les-
sors and bank did not justify a finding that
any such conversion occurred, though court
ultimately determined priority of bank's in-
terest.
Michael de Bourbon, Pikeville, for Appel-
IanWCross-Appellees.
James B. Ratliff, Pikeville, for Appel-
lee/Cross-Appellant.
Before WILHOIT, C.J., and EMBERTON
and GUDGEL, JJ.
OPINION
GUDGEL, Judge:
This is an· appeal and cross appeal from a
judgment entered by the Pike Circuit Court
adjudging that appelleelcross-appellant Bank
One, West VJrginia, Williamson, NA 1 was
entitled· to possession of a mobile home be-
cause it possessed a perfected and superior
security interest therein. Appellants/cross-
appellees Jonathan W. Hiers and Loretta F.
Hiers contend that the trial court erred (1)
by finding that a security interest in a mobile
home, as such, can be perfected only through
submission of a certificate of title and title
lien statement to the proper county clerk,
and (2) by failing to find that certain provi-
sionsof a lease agreement granted them an
interest in the mobile home which was supe-
rior to that of Bank One. On cross appeal,
Bank One contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to award it
damages for the Hiers' alleged wrongful re-
tention of the mobile home. For the reasons
after both referred to as "Bank One."
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stated hereafter, we affirm the trial court's
judgment in all respects.
The record shows that in November 1988
Susan Alcazar Tackett (Susan) and her hus-
band at the time, Fermin Alcazar (Fermin),
leased certain real property from the Hiers.
The lease agreement, which was recorded in
the Pike County Clerk's office in November
1983, stated that it w~uld terminate upon the
death of both lessees, at which time the
Hiers would become the owners of any per-
sonal property of the lessees which had. be-
come attached as improvements to· the real
estate. Susan and Fermin subsequently pur-
chased a mobile home which they installed on
the leased premises for use as their resi-
dence.
Susan and Fermin later divorced, and Fer-
min transferred his interest in .the mobile
home to Susan. In April 1992 Susan and her
nevi' husband executed a promissory note and
security agreement in favor of Bank One in
the amount of $51,208.20, and Susan execut-
ed a motor vehicle lien statement which
granted Bank One a security interest in the
mobile home. An earlier lien on the mobile
home was paid and released, and Bank One's
security. interest therein was noted on the
new certificate of title which' was 'recorded in
the Pike County Clerk's office in July 1992.
After Susan died in 1993, there was a
default in making payments on the promisso-
ry note. Bank One declared the remaining
balance immediately due and payable, and in
a pending probate proceeding it filed a claim
seeking possession of the mobile home.
'However, the Hiers claimed that they were
erititled to possession .of the mobile home
pursuant to the terms of the recorded lease
agreement,2 and Jonathan Hiers took p0sses-
sion of it. This action followed. During the
pendency of the action, the Hiers agreed to
put a portion of the monthly rent received on
the mobile home into an escrow account.
The trial court adjudged that the mobile
home met the statutory definition of such a
2. In May 1993. Fennin signed a document
whereby he released any interest which he pOs-
sessed in the leased premises.
3. This case was tried in April 1994 but a judg-
ment was not entered until April 1995. Mean-
while, effective July IS. 1994. KRS 186.650 was
amended to substitute the tenn "manufactured
stnlcture, that it was permanently affixed to
the leased property, that the promissory
note was in default, that the lease agreement
did not constitute a valid financing- statement
because the mobile home was not described
therein, and that Bank One held a perfected
first and prior security interest ir, the mobile
home which it acquired in July 1992.
Hence, the court concluded that Bank One
was entitled to possession of the mobile
home and to the recovery of $26,-396.52 from
Susan's estate. Moreover; the eourt found
that although Bank One was entitled to the
escrowed rental funds, the Hiers were not li-
able to Bank One for damages for conver-
sion. This appeal and cross appEal. followed.
[1] First, the Hiers contend that the trial
court erred by adjudging both i:.Mt a security
interest in the mobile home at issue could
only be perfected by submitting a certificate
of title and title lien statement to the proper
county clerk, and that because Bank One
complied with these'requirements it was enti-
tled to the mobile home's possE!SSion. We
disagree.
On the date the instant action was filed, a
"mobile home" was defined in KitS 186.650 3
as
a structure, transportable in one (1) or
more sections, which when erected on site
measures eight (8) body feet or more in
width and thirty-two (32) bedy feet or
more in length, and which is built on a
permanent chassis and designed to be used
as a dwelling, with or without ~, permanent
foundation, when connected to the re-
quired utilities, and includes the plumbing,
heating, air-conditioning, and electrical
systems contained therein. It tnay be
used as a place of residenc<~ business,
profession, or trade by the owner, lessee or
their assigns and tnay consist (If one (1) or
more units- that can be attached or joined
together to comprise an intel~ unit or
CQlldominium structure.
home" for the tem{"mobile home," and tliisnew
tenn was accordingly subStitutedfor~'mobile
home" elsewhere in KRS Chapters 186 and
186A. However, as this new tenn and the related
statutes were not amended in any substantive
way relevant to the issues herein. we will refer to
any such property as a "mobile hOOle."
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KRS 186A.070 states that any "state resident
owner" of a mobile home must obtain a cer-
tificate of title thereto. Moreover, KRS
186A.19O(1) expressly provides that "(t]he
perfection and discharge of a security inter-
est in any property for which has been issued
a Kentucky certificate of title shall be by
notation on the certificate of title" in accor-
dance with the requirements of KRS Chapter
18M, and that any such notation shall "re-
main effective until discharged under this
chapter and KRS Chapter 186,"
Here, there is no dispute that Bank One
complied with the requirements of KRS
Chapter 186A for perf¢ing a security inter-
est in the disputed mobile home. Neverthe-
less, the Hiers contend that the decision in
Vanover v. Bank ofAlexandria, KyApp.,644
S.W.2d 948 (1983), compels us to conclude
that once the trial court found that the mO'-
bile home was permanently affixed to their
land, the property ceased" to be mobile and
therefore was no longer governed by the
certificate 'of title requirements set forth in
KRS Chapter 186A. We disagree.
Va1W'VeT turned on an interpretation of
statutory provisions which were enacted pri-
or to the enactment of KRS Chapter 186A.
Moreover, contrary to appellants' contention,
we are not persuaded that Va1W'VeT governs
the issue of whether the disputed mobile
home lost its mobility once it was permanent-
ly affixed to the real estate. Indeed, KRS
Chapter 186A contains nothing to suggest
that the chapter's provisions or the certifi-
cate of title requirements cease to apply to a
mobile home if it is permanently affixed to
real estate.
Moreover, we reject appellants' contention
that KRS Chapter 355.9 authorizes alterna-
tive methods to be utilized to perfect a secu-
rity interest in a mobile home which is per-
manently affiXed to real estate. Indeed, just
the opposite is true as KRS 186AI9O(2) spe-
cifically states in pertinent part as follows:
Nof:tuiJ,h,gtanding the "existence ofany filed
financing statement under the prcrvisWns
of KRS Chapter 955 relating to any prop-
erty registered or titled in Kentucky, the
sole means ofperfecting and discharging a
security interest in property for whick a
certificate of title is required by this chap-
ter is by notation on such property's certif-
icaie oftitle. In other respects the securi-
ty interest is governed by the provisions of
KRS chapter 355. (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, consistent with this statute, KRS
355.9-202(3) specifically states that "(t]he fil-
ing of a financing statement otherwise re-
quired by this Article is not necessary or
effective to perfect a security interest in
property subject to" the provisions of KRS
Chapter 186A. (Emphasis added.)
KRS 186A.19O(2) and KRS 355.9-202(3)
clearly and unambiguously provide that, as to
any property for which a certificate of title is
required by KRS Chapter 186A, a security
interest iri that property may be perfected or
disCharged only by a notation in that vein on
the certificate of title. It follows, regardless
of whether the disputed mobile home in the
instant action was permanently affixed to the
real estate, that there is no merit in appel-
lants' contention that the notation on that
mobile home's certificate of title did not
serve as the exclusive method for perfecting
Bank One's security interest therein. We
hold, therefore, that the court did not err by
finding that by virtue of its perfected securi-
ty interest as reflected on the applicable
certificate of title, Bank One was entitled to
possess the disputed mobile home upon a
default. See KRS 355.9-503. Moreover, in
light of this conclusion there is no merit in
appellants' remaining contention regarding
their claim as to the priority of their interest
in the mobile home.
[2] Finally, Bank One contends on cross
appeal that the trial court abused its discre-
tion by failing to award it damages stemming
from the Hiers' alleged wrongful conversion
of the mobile home during the pendency of
thisaction. However, we agree with the trial
court that the circumstances herein simply
do not justify a finding that any such conver-
sion occurred. See Nolin Production Credit
Association v. Canmer Deposit Bank, Ky.
App., 726 S.W.2d 693 (1986); Ranier v. Gil-
ford, KyApp.,688 S.W.2d 753 (1985).
The court's judgment is affirmed.
All concur.
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In my judgment, Young v. J.B. Hunt
Transportation, Inc., Ky., 781 S.W.2d 503
(1989) and Commonwealth v. Remer, Ky.,
734 S.W.2d 794 (1987) cited in the majority
opinion are distinguishable. Both eases
hold the jury may be instructed as to the
legal effect of clearly admissible evidence.
Before us now is the issue whether to
instruct the jury to consider otherwise in-
admissible evidence.
The jury instruction mandated can be
based only upon pure speculation that the
jury in the Ill'St trial did not follow the
Court's instruction on the methodology to
reach its damages verdict. I think this lack
of respect for the jury is ill-founded. More
likely is the main hypothesis urged by Ap-
pellant that the jury discredited the testi-
mony upon this one issue leading to its
unsustainable verdict.
The majority opinion follows the pattern
in the recent case Hall v. Commonwealth,
Ky., 817 S.W.2d 228 (1991) so as to coun-
tenance presentation to the jury of other-
wise inadmissible evidence in order to pro-
vide "background information." This
Court should not introduce a medicine
which will cause a sickness worse than any
cure it purports to effect. Instructing a
jury to take into consideration irrelevant,
inadmissible evidence advances a precedent
which we will sorely rue.
COMBS and LEIBSON, JJ., join in
dissent.
Wilbur Ray SANDERSON, Appellant,
v.
Marie SAXON and Maurice
Redden, Appellees.
No. 91-8C-000164-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
June 25, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 1992.
Deceased joint tenant's grantees
brought action against surviving joint ten-
ant for declaration of rights. The Circuit
Court, Graves County, determined that
deed to grantees did not affect surviving
joint tenant's survivorship interest. Ap-
peal was taken. The Court of Appeals
reversed. Review was granted. The Su-
preme Court, H. Jefferson Herbert, Jr., J.,
held that deceased joint tenanfs deed con-
veyed only joint life estate and survivorship
interest and did not affect surviving joint
tenant's survivorship interest.
Decision of Court of Appeals reversed,
and judgment of trial court reinstated.
Leibson, J., dissented and filed opinion
joined by Lambert and Wintersheimer, JJ.
1. Tenancy in Common <8=>1, 10
"Tenaney in common" is estate in
whieh two or more persons hold title to
land in sueh fashion as to give eaeh of
them undivided possession; rights of no
tenant are enlarged by virtue of death of
another, and only unity is possession of
entire property to which each tenant is
equally entitled.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
2. Husband and Wife eal4.2(l)
"Tenaney by the entirety" is estate
shared by husband and wife whereby, at
death of either, survivor is entitled to full
fee simple ownership.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
3. Joint Tenancy eal
"Joint tenancy" is estate held by two
or more people who are not husband and
wife; eaeh is jointly entitled to enjoyment
of estate so long as all live, but interest of
joint tenant at death passes to survivor.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
4. Joint Tenancy ea3
Deed conveying property "with surviv-
orship" "jointly and to the survivor" ere-
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Sam B. Neely, Sr., Neely & Brien, May-
field, for appellant.
Benjamin J. Lookofsky, Mayfield, for ap-
pellee.
SANDERSON v. SAXON
ate... K:y~ 134 S.W.2d 676
ated joint tenancy, even though habendum same property to Marie Saxon and Maurice
clause did not contain language of surviv- Redden, the granting clause of which pro-
orship. vided:
I, Willie Mae Redden ... have sold and
5. Joint Tenancy *"8 do hereby sell and convey with covenant
Deed creating joint tenancy "with sur- of GENERAL WARRANTY, to MARIE
vivorship" "jointly and to the survivor" SAXON one-half (%) of my one-half (112)
manifestly expressed intent that interest of interest and to MAURICE REDDEN
one first dying should belong to survivor, one-half (%) of my one-half (%) interest,
and, thus, joint tenant's d~d con~e>:ed only jointly, as life tenants with the remainder
her life estate and surVIvorship mterest in fee simple to the survivor of them in
and could not prevent surviving joint ten- and to ....
ant from acquiring entire fee simple estate. Willie Mae Redden died on December 14,
KRS 381.120, 381.130. 1988. The Redden to Saxon and Redden
Deed was recorded on February 21, 1989.
A Petition for Declaration of Rights was
filed in the Graves Circuit Court by Appel-
lants Saxon and Redden against Appellee
Sanderson, seeking a declaration that the
effect of the Redden to Saxon and Redden
H. JEFFERSON HERBERT, Jr., Special deed effectively severed the joint tenancy
Justice. which had existed between Appellee Wilbur
Ray Sanderson, and Willie Mae Redden,
At issue in this ease is whether one of . converting the status of title to the subject
two joint tenants may unilaterally destroy real estate to one in which Appellee Sand-
the right of the other to receive the full erson. was a tenant in common as to·a one-
real property interest upon the death of the half (%) undivided interest, and Appellants
first. The trial court held that neither joint owned the remaining one-half (112) interest.
tenant had such power. The Court of Ap- The language of the Redden to Saxon and
peals reversed. We granted discretionary Redden deed appears to convey a one-half
review. (112) interest in the subject real estate to
On June 19, 1985, Carrie"Davis conveyed appellees as joint tenants, which pre-sup-
a house and lot in Mayfield, Kentucky, to poses the right of survivorship between
Willie Mae Redden and Wilbur Ray Sander- those two individuals. However, that issue
son, in survivorship. The granting clause is not before us, and we do not so decide.
of that General Warranty Deed read as Appellant of course responded to the De-
follows: claratory Judgment Petition with the argu-
I, Carrie Davis, single, have sold and ment that neither Willie Mae Redden nor
hereby convey with survivorship to Willie Wilbur Ray. Sanderson could destroy the
Mae Redden ... and Wilbur Ray Sander- survivorship rights which existed between
son ... jointly and to the survivor, the the two. Therefore, upon the death of
following desen"bed real estate lying in Willie Mae Redden the full fee simple es-
Graves County, Kentucky.... tate became vested in Appellant Wilbur
The habendum clause of the Carrie Davis Ray Sanderson.
deed reads: The trial court interpreted KRS 381.120
To have and to hold the said real estate (formerly Ky.Stat. Sec. 2348) as abolishing
and appurtenances thereunto belonging the right of survivorship in estates held in
unto the said Grantees, their heirs and joint tenancy, with the exception of those
assigns forever. circumstances described in KRS 381.130
On November 9, 1988, WIllie Mae Red- (formerly Ky.Stat. Sec. 2349). It found
den, one of the joint tenants created by the that the deed from Carrie Davis to Willie
Carrie Davis deed, executed a deed of the Mae Redden and Wilbur Ray Sanderson did
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fall within the exceptions provided by KRS
381.130, and that the later deed from Red-
den to Saxon and Redden did not, there-
fore, affect the survivorship interest of Ap-
pellant Sanderson.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court, holding that there had been no statu-
tory or judicial change to the common law
rule allowing one joint tenant to destroy
the survivorship right of another, by con-
veyance to a third party.
The need to establish, with certainty,
rights of parties to a commonly used-estate
in real property convinced us to grant dis-
cretionary review.
There are essentially three estates in real
property involving more than one owner:
tenancy in common, joint tenancy, and ten-
ancy by the entirety. An understanding of
all three is essential to the resolution of the
issue presented by this ease.
[1] A tenancy in common is an estate
in which two or more persons hold title to
land in such fashion as to give each of
them undivided possession. The rights of
no tenant are enlarged by virtue of the
death of another, that is, no tenant accedes
to full, or even increased, ownership by
virtue of the death of another tenant. The
only "unity" involved in a tenancy in com-
mon is the possession of the entire proper-
ty, to which each tenant is equally entitled.
McLeod 11. AndrelO8, 303 Ky. 46, 196
S.W.2d 473 (Ky.1946); 20 Am.Jur.2d, C0-
tenancy and Joint Ownership, Section 22.
[2] A tenancy by the entirety is an
estate in land shared by husband and wife,
whereby at the death of either the survivor
is entitled to full fee simple ownership.
Under the common law, five unities were
essential to the creation and existence of a
tenancy by the entirety: interest, time, ti-
tle, possession and marriage. Kentucky
still recognizes the estate known in com-
mon law as tenancy by the entirety. AL-
ford v. Rogers, Ky., 262 S.W.2d 676 (1953);
Cowan 11. Pleasant, Ky., 263 S.W.2d 494
(1954); Hoffmann v. Newel~ Ky., 60
S.W.2d 607, 249 Ky. 270 (1933). A distin-
guishing feature of a tenancy by the entire-
ty is that the survivor takes the entire
estate at the death of the deceased co-
tenant not by virtue of that death, but
because, in law, each was viewed to own
the entire estate from the time of its cre-
ation.
(3] A joint tenancy, as distinguished
from the tenancy by the entirety, is an
estate held by two or more people who (in
the ease where the estate is held by only
two) are not husband and wife. Each is
jointly entitled to the enjoyment of the
estate so long as all live; however, the
interest of a joint tenant, at his or her
death, passes to the survivor. McLeod,
supra; Stambaugh 11. Stambaugh, 288 Ky.
491, 156 S.W.2d 827 (1941).
[4] The threshold question to be an-
swered in resolving the issues presented in
this case is, what was the nature of the
estate created by the initial deed, from
Carrie Davis to Willie Mae Redden and
Wilbur Ray Sanderson? If a tenancy in
common was created, then it is unneces-
sary to consider the effect of the second
deed upon the interest owned by appellant.
Likewise, if a tenancy in common was cre-
ated, then Willie Mae Redden could do with
her interest as she pleased, without in any
way affecting the rights of appellant-re-
gardless of the initial intent of the parties,
or the relative consideration paid by Red-
den and Sanderson.
The granting clause of the fl1'St deed
recites a conveyance "with survivorship,
. .. jointly and to the sumvor. ... " [em-
phasis added] Clearly the language of the
granting clause expresses an intent to con-
vey a real property interest dependent in
some fashion upon the death of one of the
grantees. We note that the habendum
clause of the Carrie Davis deed does not
contain the language of survivorship.
While at common law the habendum was
relevant if its language was repugnant to
or in conflict with the granting clause, the
latter is controlling in the event of a con-
flict. See Stambaugh v. Stambaugh, 288
Ky. 491, 156 S.W.2d 827 (1941). In this
case, the two clauses are not in conflict;
the habendum simply makes no reference
to the creation of a survivorship estate.
We conclude that the estate created by the
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first deed, from Davis to Redden and Sand- compelled to make partition, and when a
erson, was a joint tenancy. joint tenant dies, his part. of the joint
[5] Appellant contends that KRS 381.- e~tate~ real or personal, ~hall descend t:o
150 I precludes the conveyance of a larger his helrs, or pass by. deVISe,.or go to hlS
estate than that owned by the grantor. personal representa~ve, sU~Ject to debts,
Thus, Willie Mae Redden, by virtue of the curtesy, dower or distnbution.
Davis deed, owned the right to enjoy the It seems to follow logically that a legisla-
subject property during her lifetime and tively expressed intent to allow one joint
that of Wilbur Ray Sanderson; her proper- tenant to judicially compel a physical divi-
ty rights beyond those are extinguished sion of property held in joint tenancy is
unless she survived Sanderson. Continu- certainly not inconsistent with the then ex-
ing with that rationale, Appellant concludes isting common law, which allowed one joint
that those rights, just desenbed, are the tenant to unilaterally convert the estate to
only rights which Willie Mae Redden could a tenancy in common.
have bestowed upon her grantees, Marie However, the General Assembly in KRS
Saxon and Maurice Redden. However, this 381.130 (formerly Ky.Stats. Section 2349)
argument of Appellant begs the point. The carved out an exception to KRS 381.120,
fundamental issue is the nciture of the which redefines the nature of· a joint tenan-
rights actually owned by Willie Mae Red- cy:
den by virtue of the Carrie Davis deed. If 381.130. Exceptions to KRS 381.120.-
the common law or the legislature defmes KRS 381.120 shall not apply to any es-
the nature of those ownership interests as tate which joint tenants hold as execu-
including the right to alter the survivor- tors or trustees, nor to an estate con-
ship aspects created in the original deed, veyed or devised to persons in their own
then the second deed does not constitute an right, when it manifestly appears,· from
attempt to convey a larger ownership inter- the tenor of the instrument, that it was
est than Willie Mae redden owned. Thus it intended that the part of the one dying
is necessary to analyze the precise nature should belong to the others,.neither.shall
of that interest. it affect the mode of proceeding on any
At the common law, it seems uncontro- joint contract or judgment.
verted that one joint tenant could destroy Thus rather than interpreting the facts
the right of survivorship of the other joint of the case at hand in the light of the
teJJa.nt, by way of a conveyance to a third common law, the effect of KRS 381.130
party. Osborne v. Hughes, 219 Ky. 116, must be considered.
292 S.W. 748 (1927); Elliott v. NickoltU!, 67 It seems that the General Assembly has
Ky. (4 Bush) 502 (1868); Rogers v. Grider, redefined the nature of a joint tenancy.
t Dana 242 (1~). If the common law has The elear intent of KRS 381.130 is to pre-
not been modifIed by the General Assem- serve the survivorship aspect of joint ten-
bly, the? clearly Appellant's argum~n~ ancies, where "it manifestly appears, from
must fad, because the deed from Wdlie the tenor of the instrument, that it was
Mae Redden to Saxon and Redden would intended that the part of the one dying
have operated to destroy the joint tenancy. should belong to the others ...." The deed
Indeed, the General Assembly has ad- by which Appellant claims title, from Davis
dressed the issues presented on this appeal. to Redden and Sanderson, recites that the
KRS 381.120 (formerly Ky.Stat. Section conveyance is "with survivorship" to the
2348) provides: two grantees "jointly and to the survivor."
381.120. Joint tenants-Partition- Inour judgment, the deed in question man-
Death of one.-Joint tenants· may· be ifestly expresses the intent that the mter-
1. KRS 318.150. Conveyance of greater eatate
than lraator owu--Effect.- A deed and war·
ranty of land purportin8 to pass or assure a
greater right or estate than the person can law·
fully pass or assure, shaIl operate to conveyor
warrant so much of the right and estate as such
person can lawfully convey. If such convey-
ance is made by a tenant for life it sball not
work a forfeiture of his estate.
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est of the one first dying should belong to
the other. There can be no other reason
for the use of the words "survivorship"
and "survivor." Accordingly, the deed
from Redden to Saxon and Redden con-
veyed only the joint life estate and surviv-
orship interest of Willie Mae Redden. The
nature of the estates taken by the grantees
of that deed was still measured by the
relative lifetimes of the initial grantees,
Willie Mae Redden and Wilbur Ray Sander-
son. Willie Mae Redden having died first,
the entire fee simple estate vested in Wil-
bur Ray Sanderson.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and the judgment of the trial
court is ordered reinstated.
STEPHENS, C.J., and COMBS and
SPAIN, JJ., coneur.
LEIBSON, J., dissents in a separate
dissenting opinion in whieh LAMBERT and
WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join.
LEIBSON, Justice, dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
Common law presumed a conveyance to
two or more persons created a joint tenan-
cy without requiring any specific words to
that effect. Recently, however, because
many jurisdictions do not favor joint tenan-
cy, they have enacted legislation to discard
or reverse the presumption. See, 20 Am-
Jur2d, § 11, p. 102. In Kentueky, the Gen-
eral Assembly enacted KRS 381.120 which
presumes a conveyance to two or more
persons creates a tenancy-in-eommon, an
estate without the right of survivorship.
Stambaugh 11. Stambaugh, 288 Ky. 491,
156 S.W.2d 827 (1941). Then, KRS 381.130
goes on to say "KRS 381.120 shall not
apply ... when it manifestly appears, from
the tenor of the instrument, that. it was
intended that the part of the one dying
should belong to the other .... " In other
words, KRS 381.120 abolishes the right of
survivorship recognized in joint estates at
common law unless (under KRS 381.130)
sueh right manifestly appears on the in-
strument. Osborne v. Hughes, 219 Ky.
116,292 S.W. 748 (1927) and Stambaugh v.
Stambaugh, 1fUpra.
These statutes place the burden on the
grantor to expT68811l create an estate with
a right of survivorship, a joint tenancy, by
requiring specifie language in the convey-
ance. They explain how one can create a
joint tenancy, but they do not, however,
change the nature of a joint tenancy as
contended by the Majority Opinion. Thus
the Majority Opinion has misconstrued the
purpose and the effeet of KRS 381.120 and
.130.
At common law the nature of a joint
tenancy ineluded the right of a joint tenant
to convey his interest, inter vi1J08, to a
third party, and, if he did so the estate was
ehanged to a tenaney-in-eommon because
he destroyed his right of survivorship. See
Rogers fl. Grider, 31 Ky. (1 Dana) 242
(1833), cited in the Majority Opinion. See
also 20 AmJur 2d, § 22, 48A C.J.s. §§ 16
and 17. This has not changed. The joint
tenant continues to have the ability to
destroy the right of survivorship, just as he
could do at common law. The Majority
Opinion recognizes that at common law in a
joint tenancy "one joint tenant could de-
stroy the right of survivorship of the other
joint tenant, by way of a conveyance to a
third party."
The Majority errs in result because it
mistakenly assumes the statutes have
changed the nature of a joint tenancy as
well as the presumption with regard to the
existence of one.
This is not to say a grantor could not, in
his conveyance, restriet the grantees'
rights to convey during their lifetime, but
more is needed to do so than survivorship
language which has the effeet of ereating a
joint tenancy. That more which is needed
is specific language in the conveyance cre-
ating the joint tenancy spelling out that no
joint tenant shall convey his interest dur-
ing his lifetime-an express restriction on
the rights the joint tenant would otherwise
possess. There is no such express restric-
tion here. .
Therefore, I dissent.
LAMBERT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ.,
join this dissent.
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suit. The test from Zapata would apply
to charges ten through twelve only since
demand had been made on the others.
The court here did seem to apply the con-
siderations set out in Zapala and conclud-
ed the committees and the boards had
acted correctly and that the corporations,
not Mattingly, should maintain the suit.
The circuit court properly acted within its
discretion in reaching that decision.
Next, Mattingly alleges that the circuit
court erred by not making the requisite
rmding that the members of the special
litigation committees were disinterested.
We have reviewed the court's opinion, and
the language clearly shows that the court
found that the committees' members were
disinterested. The circuit court's rmding
once again was not clearly erroneous. An
effort was made by the corporations'
boards to keep the directors from serving
on the committees investigating entities
such as Modern Concrete with which they
had a direct interest. Mattingly has
raised general concerns about Schneider
and Dahlem, but he has not proven that
they were not disinterested.
[13] We next consider Mattingly's ar-
gument that the circuit court improperly
held that he was not a suitable representa-
tive to prosecute this action pursuant to
KRS 271B.7-400(1). Once again, the
court's conclusion was supported by evi-
dence in the record. Mattingly stated dur-
ing his deposition that he would have the
auditor review every financial record from
the very beginning of the corporation that
was available. He said that he would not
place any cost controls or budgets on the
investigation of the litigation. Based upon
such evidence, it was not clearly erroneous
for the court to conclude that Mattingly
was not a suitable representative.
[14] Finally, Mattingly argues that the
circuit court prematurE.lly dismissed the
claims against the individual directors.
He had maintained in his complaint that
they were individually liable in breach of
their fiduciary duty for their refusal to
seek recovery on the claims he set forth.
He contended that the directors' failure to
seek such recovery constituted aiding and
abetting and made them jointly and sever-
ally liable for damages to the corporation.
He also argues that the directors have
made no effort to prosecute the claims.
First, the circuit court found that the
investigation by the special litigation com-
mittees had been conducted properly and
that the directors and boards had upheld
their duties even though some of Matting-
ly's claims were at first refused. The
court found that they had satisfied the
business judgment rule. Thus, the circuit
court correctly dismissed the claims
against them for this reason. Second, the
claim by Mattingly that no action had yet
been fIled is premature. This Court is
currently being asked to address the ques-
tion of whether the circuit court erred by
deciding that the corporations, rather than
Mattingly, were the proper parties to
bring the suit. Further, under KRS
271B.7-400(3), a proceeding commenced
pursuant to the statute may not be discon-
tinued or settled without the court's ap-
proval. If the corporations fail to bring
the suit in a timely manner, Mattingly may
later have a claim.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of
the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
Melody Ann NELSON, Appellant,
v.
Beth MAHURIN, Appellee.
No. 1996-CA--{)02875-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Dec. 18, 1998.
In a quiet title action concerning
rights of former wife and fonner husband's
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post-dissolution creditor, the Circuit Court,
Henderson County, Stephen Hayden, J.,
summarily quieted title in former wife.
Creditor appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Johnson, J., held that: (1) decree of disso-
lution, by operation of law, terminated ten-
ancy by the entirety and concomitant right
of survivorship to entire estate, and (2)
property settlement agreement allowing
former wife to retain her legal title to
residence until former husband had her
name removed from mortgage indebted-
ness did not create joint tenancy with right
of survivorship.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Husband and Wife (';:::>14.2(2)
Tenancy by the entirety is a unique
estate which can only be conveyed or en-
cumbered by a joint instrument or with
the consent of both tenants.
2. Divorce (';:::>321.5
Husband and Wife (';:::>14.2(5)
Decree of dissolution, by operation of
law, terminates a tenancy by the entirety
and the concomitant right of survivorship
to the entire estate.
3. Divorce (';:::>321.5
Husband and Wife (';:::>14.2(5)
When a marriage has been dissolved
and the former husband and wife continue
to hold legal title to realty, they hold that
property as tenants in common rather than
as tenants by the entirety.
4. Husband and Wife (';:::>278(1)
Divorcing parties may define by
agreement their rights in each other's
property, and those agreements, provided
they are otherwise valid contracts, are en-
titled to enforcement upon dissolution of
the marriage.
5. Husband and Wife (';:::>14.3, 279(1)
Property settlement agreement allow-
ing former wife to retain her legal title to
residence until former husband had her
1. The property was conveyed to "Donald R
name removed from mortgage indebted-
ness, but providing former husband with
sole right of possession and other provi-
sions inconsistent with rights of survivor-
ship, did not create joint tenancy with
right of survivorship to allow former wife
to obtain residence upon former husband's
death even though he died prior to his
removal of her name from indebtedness.
6. Joint Tenancy (';:::>12
Even assuming property settlement
agreement upon dissolution of marriage
created survivorship interest of former
wife in house as joint tenant, such interest
would not entitle her to same protection
against claim to house by former hus-
band's post-dissolution creditor as former
wife enjoyed as tenant by the entirety
during marriage.
Gary M. Gibbs, Henderson, KY, for Ap-
pellant.
Dorin E. Luck, Henderson, KY, for Ap-
pellee.
Before GUIDUGLI, JOHNSON and
KNOPF, Judges.
OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge.
Melody Ann Nelson (Nelson) has ap-
pealed from the judgment of the
Henderson Circuit Court entered on Sep-
tember 19, 1996, which summarily quieted
title to certain realty in Beth Mahurin
(Mahurin). We reverse and remand.
The controlling facts in this matter are
not in dispute. Mahurin was previously
married to Donald Riddle (Riddle). In
May 1978, while still married, Mahurin and
Riddle purchased a residence on Meadow-
lark Lane in Henderson, Kentucky. The
deed conveying the property clearly creat-
ed a tenancy by the entirety. Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 381.050.1 In Au-
Riddle and his wife, Beth M. Riddle, jointly
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gust 1978, Mahurin and Riddle executed a
note secured by a mortgage on the proper-
ty which was assigned to Fanners Bank &
Trust Company (Fanners Bank).
During 1988, Mahurin and Riddle di-
vorced. On October 11, 1988, they entered
into a property settlement agreement, per-
tinent portions of which provide as follows:
WHEREAS, the parties are desirous
of effecting a property settlement agree-
ment based on fair and equitable tenns
and acting as a complete and final settle-
ment of all respective claims arising out
of the marriage;
4. Marital Debts. There have been
debts incurred as a result of the mar-
riage relationship between [Mahurin]
and [Riddle], and the parties agree that
[Mahurin] will be responsible for the
payment of the indebtednesses owed to
VISA in the approximate amount of
$800; Mastercard in the approximate
amount of $2,500; Simon's in the ap-
proximate amount of $600; L.S. Ayers
in the approximate amount of $400;
Lazarus in the approximate amount of
$450; Dejong's in the approximate
amount of $200; and Sunoco in the ap-
proximate amount of $230.
It is further agreed that [Riddle] will
be responsible for the indebtedness
owed to Spiegel in the approximate
amount of $1,800 and that [Riddle] will
be responsible for the payment of any
and all other indebtednesses owed as a
result of the marriage relationship, in-
cluding the indebtedness owed on real
property located at 2809 Meadowlark,
Henderson, Kentucky. [Riddle] shall
make every effort to remove [Mahurin's]
name and the name of [Mahurin's] fa-
ther, Don Mahurin, from all indebted-
nesses on the real property. [Mahurin]
will execute any and all instruments
necessary to convey full title to the
property to [Riddle] at such time as
for and during their natural lives. and upon
the death of either of them to go to the
survivor thereof in fee simple. his or her heirs
[Mahurin's] name is removed from the
indebtedness on the real property.
6. Mutual Release. Except as oth-
erwise hereinabove provided, each party
hereby releases and discharges com-
pletely and forever the other from any
and all rights of past, present and future
support, division of property, right of
dower, right to act as personal represen-
tative of the estate of the other, right of
distributive share in the other's estate,
right of exemption in the estate of the
other or any other property right, bene-
fits, or privileges accruing to either par-
ty by virtue of their marriage relation-
ship, or otherwise; whether the same
are conferred by the laws of the Com-
monwealth of Kentucky or any other
state in the United States.
8. Full and Complete Settlement. It
is the understanding between these par-
ties that this Property and Child Custo-
dy Settlement Agreement, except as
provided herein, forever and completely
adjusts, settles, disposes of, and com-
pletely terminates any and all rights,
claims, privileges, and benefits that each
now has, or each may have reason to
believe each has, against the other aris-
ing out of their marriage relationship, or
otherwise; whether same are conferred
by the laws of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky or any other state of the Unit-
ed States, and which are now, or which
may hereafter be, in force and effect.
This agreement was incorporated into the
decree of dissolution entered on November
7,1988.
After the dissolution, Riddle remained in
the residence and was solely responsible
for its upkeep and the debt thereon. He
did not, however, refinance the debt or
otherwise obtain a fonnal release of Mahu-
rin's obligation on the mortgage held by
and assigns forever. _.... The habendum
clause contained similar language.
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Farmers Bank. On October 2, 1995, Nelson
obtained a judgment against Riddle in the
Henderson Circuit Court in the amount of
$27,911. In December 1995, Nelson filed a
judgment lien on the Meadowlark Lane
property. The judgment was not satisfied
prior to Riddle's death on January 9,
1996.%
After Riddle's death, Mahurin apparent-
ly took possession of the realty and at-
tempted to sell it. Nelson refused to re-
lease her lien and this litigation followed.
During the pendency of this action, the
property was sold. After the mortgage
obligation to Farmers Bank was paid, the
remaining proceeds were placed in escrow.
In granting Mahurin's motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court concluded
as follows:
6. The property settlement in the
Dissolution of Marriage did not explicit-
ly modify or alter the joint tenancy held
by Mr. Riddle and Ms. Mahurin. Ms.
Mahurin never conveyed full title to Mr.
Riddle, as Mr. Riddle never had the
name of Ms. Mahurin removed from ob-
ligation on the mortgage.
7. The surviving joint tenant takes
the real property free and clear of any
and all changes made by the deceased
joint tenant. Stambaugh v. Stambaugh,
Ky.App. [sic], 288 Ky. 491, 156 S.w.2d
827 (1941). The changes made by the
deceased joint tenant, Don Riddle, would
include the judgment lien on the proper-
ty which was acquired by [Nelson].
9. . . . Under the current laws and
the property settlement agreement, Ms.
Mahurin had no duty to convey her in-
terest in the real property to Mr. Riddle
until he had completed his promise to
remove her name from obligation on the
note to Farmer's [sic] Bank.
The trial court's fmal judgment awarded
Mahurin the Meadowlark Lane property
2. The record does not reveal whether Riddle
died testate or intestate, or who is serving as
free and clear of the lien filed by Nelson.
This appeal followed.
The issue presented by this appeal is
what effect, if any, the decree of dissolu-
tion, which incorporated the property set-
tlement agreement executed by Riddle and
Mahurin, had on Mahurin's survivorship
interest in the Meadowlark Lane property.
There is no question that a tenancy by the
entirety was created by the 1978 deed.
Mahurin insists that after the dissolution
she and Riddle were joint owners of the
property and that her survivorship interest
in the property survived the decree of
dissolution. The trial court agreed. How-
ever, we hold that the survivorship aspect
of the estate was destroyed by the circuit
court's decree of dissolution.
There are many cases in this jurisdiction
concerning the issue of how an estate in
joint tenancy or, as in this case, a tenancy
by the entirety, is created. There are few
cases which address how such an estate is
destroyed or terminated. Nelson relies on
Henderscm v. Baker, Ky., 362 S.W.2d 730
(1962), a case which factually and proce-
durally is nearly identical to the instant
case. In that case, real property was held
jointly with rights of survivorship between
T.E. Davis (Davis) and Virginia K. Baker
(Baker), then husband and wife. They
divorced in 1959. The judgment of divorce
"did not specifically identify any item of
property to be restored." fd. at 731.
Record title was not changed. Davis con-
tinued to reside on the property and make
all the mortgage payments. When he died
three years later, Baker asserted owner-
ship under the survivorship clause in the
deed. In an action brought by Davis'
creditor, the trial court determined Baker
to be the owner of the property and not
Davis' estate. The former Court of Ap-
peal& reversed the judgment and held that
the property should be restored to Davis'
estate and that Baker was entitled to a lien
against the real estate only for the amount
the personal representative of his estate.
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of her financial contribution during the
marriage. [d., at 731-732.
Mahurin argues that since Hendersan,
supra. was decided under KRS 403.060,
our fonner restoration statute, which was
repealed in 1972, its holding is not applica-
ble to the case sub judice. However, while
the scheme for classifying property as ei-
ther marital or non-marital and dividing it
upon dissolution has changed, the law con-
cerning estates in property that is neces-
sarily implied by the Court's holding in
Hendersan, supra. has not changed.
During their marriage, Mahurin and
Riddle held the Meadowlark Lane proper-
ty as tenants by the entirety.
A tenancy by the entirety is an estate
in land shared by husband and wife,
whereby at the death of either the sur-
vivor is entitled to full fee simple owner-
ship. Under the common law, five uni-
ties were essential to the creation and
existence of a tenancy by the entirety:
interest, time, title, possession and mar-
riage. Kentucky still recognizes the es-
tate known in common law as tenancy
by the entirety (citations omitted). A
distinguishing feature of a tenancy by
the entirety is that the survivor takes
the entire estate at the death of the
deceased co-tenant not by virtue of that
death, but because, in law, each was
viewed to own the entire estate from the
time of its creation.~
Sandersan v. Saxon, Ky., &14 S.W.2d 676,
678 (1992) (emphases original). The semi-
nal case concerning a tenancy by the en-
tirety is Hoffroonn v. NeweU, 249 Ky. 270,
274-275,60 S.W.2d 607, 609 (1932), where
the Court cited Bernatavicius v. Bernatav-
icius, 259 Mass. 486, 156 N.E. 685, 686
(1927), and stated:
One of the distinguishing incidents of
this venerable estate is that which ex-
empts it from the ordinary processes to
which all other estates are subject. A
tenancy by the entirety fundamentally
rests on the legal unity of the husband
and wife. "It is founded on the com-
mon-law doctrine of the unity of hus-
band and wife as constituting in law but
one person. A conveyance to a husband
and wife as tenants by the entirety cre-
ates one indivisible estate in them both
and in the survivor, which neither can
destroy by any separate act. Both hus-
band and wife are seised of such an
estate per tout et non per my as one
person, and not as joint tenants or ten-
ants in common. Alienation by either
the husband or the wife will not defeat
the right of the survivor to the entire
estate on the death of the other. There
can be no severance of such estate by
the act of either alone without the assent
of the other, and no partition during
their joint lives, and the survivor be-
comes seised as sole owner of the whole
estate regardless of anything the other
may have done. The tenancy by the
entirety is essentially a joint tenancy
modified by the common-law theory of
the unity of husband and wife. They do
not take by moieties but by entireties."
[1-3] A tenancy by the entirety is a
unique estate which can only be "conveyed
or encumbered [ ] by a joint instrument or
with the consent of both tenants." Peytan
v. Young, Ky., 659 S.W2d 205, 207 (19&1),
Justice Wintersheimer Dissenting Opinion;
Weindl v. Weind~ Ky., 359 S.W.2d 333
(1962). The estate arose when divorce was
rare and "functioned as a rough equivalent
of a homestead right, affording protection
to the family and the nondebtor spouse."
Graham and Keller, D011U3stic Rela1ians
Law, § 4.7 (2d ed., 1997). It is axiomatic
that dissolution of the tenants' marriage
terminates or destroys an "essential ele-
ment of the tenancy-spousal unity." C.
Bratt, A Primer an Kentucky Intestacy
Laws, 82 Ky.L.J. 29, 95 (1993-94). As a
result, a decree of dissolution, by operation
of law, terminates a tenancy by the entire-
ty and the concomitant right of survivor-
ship to the entire estate.
Divorce is not an act of the parties.
It is an act of the law. . .. That act of
the law creates a new legal status, both
for the husband and for the wife. It
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divides the common-law unity hitherto 928, 934 (1990). The trial court deter-
existing. It creates two individuals in mined that Mahurin was entitled to the
place of the unity theretofore recognized realty free of Riddle's post-dissolution
by the common law as existing. It sub- debts because their property settlement
stitutes for that unity two persons who agreement did not "explicitly modify or
thereafter are strangers to each other in alter the joint tenancy." However, this
their legal status. ... Divorce estab- reasoning fails to recognize that explicit
lishes a legal situation with respect to language was not needed to modify or
the man and woman previously husband alter that which was terminated as a mat-
and wife which is incompatible with the ter of law by the dissolution. Nothing
legal theory of tenancy by the entire- would prevent a husband and wife from
ty. . .. When persons who have been agreeing to hold title to real property as
tenants by the entirety cease to be hus- joint tenants with rights of survivorship
band and wife, the legal factors neces- after dissolution, however, such an intent
sary to that tenancy have gone out of would have to be clearly expressed in any
existence. A tenancy by the entirety agreement or conveyance. Mahurin in-
cannot be created by the most explicit sists that such an intent is evidenced by
words in a legal instrument, unless the that portion of the agreement which pro-
man and woman are in truth husband vided for her retention of legal title until
and wife. It seems to us more in har- her name was removed from the mortgage
mony with the principles governing such indebtedness to Farmers Bank. However,
tenancies to hold that they cannot con- the giving of Mahurin bare legal title until
tinue after the tenants have become di- some future event occurred did not re-
vorced and thus have ended the legal motely create a survivorship interest. In-
relationship to each other, which consti- deed, as Mahurin concedes in her brief,
tutes the essence of that tenancy. The the intent of the parties was merely to
great weight of authority supports this provide her with "some protection or con-
conclusion. trol over the situation to insure that the
debt on the property would be paid."
There is not a hint in the agreement
that the parties intended for Mahurin to
have any rights of survivorship in the
property upon dissolution of their mar-
riage. Indeed, the document contains sev-
eral provisions clearly inconsistent with
rights of survivorship. Those portions in-
clude: (1) the preamble, in which Riddle
and Mahurin expressed a desire to effect a
"complete and final settlement of all re-
spective claims arising out of the mar-
riage"; (2) paragraph 6, in which the par-
ties released each other "from any and all
rights of past, present and future support,
division of property . . . or any other prop-
erty right . .. accruing to either party by
virtue of their marriage relationship"; and
(3) paragraph 8, wherein Riddle and Ma-
hurin stated their understanding that the
agreement "dispose[d] of, and completely
terminate[d] any and all rights, claims,
privileges, and benefits that each now has,
Bernatavicius, supra, 156 N.E. at 686-687
(citations omitted). Thus, when a mar-
riage has been dissolved and the former
husband and wife continue to hold legal
title to realty, they hold that property as
tenants in common. fa.; see also BraJ1,
supra at 96. This was recognized in Co-
wan v. Pleasant, Ky., 263 S.W.2d 494, 496
(1953), in which the heirs of a man who
murdered his wife with whom he held
property in a tenancy by the entirety were
determined to be "entitled to his one-half
of the property, just as would have oc-
curred in the event the marital relation
had been severed."
[4,5] In this jurisdiction, divorcing
parties "may derme by agreement their
rights in each other's property '" [and
those] agreements, provided they are oth-
erwise valid contracts, are entitled to en-
forcement upon dissolution of the mar-
riage." Gentry v. Gentry, Ky., 798 S.W.2d
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or each may have reason to believe each
has ... arising out of their marriage ...."
Further, there is no language in the agree-
ment prohibiting Riddle's transfer or alien-
ation of the property. More importantly,
the agreement gave the sole right of pos-
session to Riddle, severing the unity of
possession necessary for maintaining a
joint tenancy. See Sanderson v. Saxon,
834 S.W.2d at 678.
[6] Finally, even if Mahurin did have a
survivorship interest in the Meadowlark
Lane property as a joint tenant, she would
not be entitled to the same protection
against Riddle's creditor as she enjoyed as
a tenant by the entirety during the mar-
riage. See Peyton v. Young, 659 S.W.2d at
207. The trial court's reliance upon Stam-
baugh, supra, for its holding that Mahurin
was entitled to the property free and clear
of Nelson's judgment lien is misplaced for
the reason that the Stambaughs were nev-
er divorced and their joint tenancy by the
entirety was not severed prior to Mr.
Stambaugh's death.
Accordingly, having held that the trial
court erred in its determination that Ma-
hurin had a survivorship interest in the
Meadowlark Lane property, the judgment
quieting title in Mahurin is reversed. On
remand, the trial court is ordered to direct
the proceeds of the sale of the realty to be
distributed to Riddle's estate where Nel-
son can litigate her rights therein, if any.
ALL CONCUR.
William F. MIZE, Sr. and William
F. Mize, Jr. Appellants,
v.
James E. HUGHES; Luther Hughes;
Margaret Ann Sumner; Edna Reed
Lindholm; Peggy Hughes Douglas;
Jane Hughes Bryan; Denzil Bridges;
Linda Joyce Hughes; Oak Grove Bap-
tist Church and Scott Bridges, Appel-
lees.
No. 1995-CA-Q02488-MR
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Dec. 23, 1998.
After the Trigg District Court admit-
ted photostatic copy of signed will to pro-
bate, will contestants sought adjudication
that will had been revoked and that copy
should not be probated as testator's will.
Following jury trial, the Trigg Circuit
Court, Bill Cunningham, J., upheld the
District Court's order. Will contestants ap-
pealed, and proponents moved to dismiss.
The Court of Appeals, Dyche, J., held that
circuit court sat as court of original juris-
diction, not appellate court, and therefore
review in Court of Appeals was properly
obtained through appeal.
Motion to dismiss appeal denied.
1. Wills <'?397
Circuit court sat as court of original
jurisdiction, not appellate court, when it
conducted de novo trial to adjudicate com-
plaint challenging district court's admis-
sion to probate of photostatic copy of
signed will, and therefore review in Court
of Appeals was properly obtained through
appeal, rather than motion for discretion-
ary review. Const. § 115; KRS
24A.120(2),394.240.
2. Wills <'?397
Review of a judgment entered by a
circuit court in a will contest action
brought pursuant to statute providing for
K(b) - 67
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commission with the approval of their respec-
tive legislative bodies." Similarly, KRS 95.-
763 pennits a mayor "by and with the ap-
proval of the legislative body," to appoint
members of the civil service commission.
We believe these statutes, and others, sug-
gest the General Assembly would have ex-
pressly required council approval of airport
board appointments if it so intended.
C3] Appellees point to KRS 183.132(5)(a),
which states that "[t]he members of an air
board composed of ten (10) members ...
shall be appointed by the mayor of the city,
witlwut approval of the legislative body."
(Emphasis supplied.) They claim this lan-
guage prevents us from concluding that the
legislature did not intend council approval for
six-member boards. "If the legislature had
intended appointment to six-member boards
without approval of the legislative body," the
argument goes, "it would have said so."
In 1984, the General Assembly amended
KRS 183.132 to include a provision for ten-
member boards. The phrase "without ap-
proval of the legislative body" was included
in that addition. Since that subsection was
added twenty-four years after the enactment
of the original provisions of KRS 183.132, we
do not believe its inclusion changes the
meaning of the original subsection dealing
with six-member boards.
[4] Finally, appellees argue that even if
KRS 183.132 grants to a mayor the power of
appointment without council approval, that
power was repealed by implication through
KRS 83A.08O.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory con-
struction that "the repeal of an existing law
by implication is not favored by the courts,
and a legislative enactment will never be
interpreted as inferentially repealing a prior
statute or part thereof unless the repugnancy
is so clear as to admit of no other reasonable
construction." Tipton v. BroiUn, 277 Ky. 625,
126 S.W.2d 1067, 1071 (1939); Holcomb v.
Mayes, 290 S.W.2d 486, 487 (1956). Stated
differently, "[c]ourts will presume that where
the Legislature intended a subsequent act to
repeal a former one, it will so express itself
as to leave no doubt as to its purpose."
Tipton, supra.. quoting Oldham County v.
Arvin, 251 Ky. 317, 64 S.W.2d 907, 908
(1933). Absent such express language, we
will not presume that the General Assembly
intended to repeal KRS 183.132 when it en-
acted KRS 83A.080.
The judgment is reversed and this case is
remanded for proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
All concur.
John SEIGLE and Darlene
Seigle, Appellants,
v.
James R. JASPER, Vemeasa Jasper,
Mildred TenniU and Robert M.
Coots, Appellees.
No. 92-CA-ooa078-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Nov. 5, 1993.
Real property purchasers brought action
against vendors for fraud and breach of war-
ranty and 'against attorney who prepared
title opinion respecting property for negli-
gence, arising from' recorded oil piPeline
easement on property. Vendors and attor-
ney moved for summary judgment. The
Spencer Circuit Court, William F. Stewart,
J., granted motions. Purchasers appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Johnson, J., held that:
(1) exceptions clauses in warranty deeds re-
sulted in exception of easement from general
warranty contained in deeds; (2) genuine
issue of material fact as to whether contrac-
tual relationship existed between purchasers
and attorney precluded summary judgment
for attorney; and (3) attorney's duty to exer-
cise ordinary care in performance of title
examination extended to purchasers.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded. '
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7. Negligence <8=>2
Concept of liability for negligence ex-
presses universal duty owed by all to all.
8. Attorney and Client ¢:::>109
Fact that warranty deeds from real
property vendors to purchasers contained ex-
ception for "easements or restrictions of rec-
ord" did not render purchasers estopped
from asserting breach of duty of attorney
who prepared title opinion to include record-
ed oil pipeline easement in attorney's title
letter; whole purpoSe of having attorney per-
form title examination was to specifically ad-
vise parties of any restriction on title.
9. Attorney and Client ¢:::>109
Language in attorney's title letter, ex-
cepting rights or claims of parties other than
real property purchasers in actual possession
of any of property, did not render purchasers
estopped from asserting breach of duty of
attorney who prepared title opinion to in-
clude recorded oil pipeline easement in attor-
ney's title letter, as oil company's acts of
occupancy were not sufficiently open, visible,
and unequivocal to put purchasers on inquiry
as to company's rights.
10. Attorney and Client ¢:::>109
Attorney conducting title search respect-
ing real property has duty to communicate to
parties any information that might reason-
ably constitute defect and restriction on title.
11. Judgment ¢:::>18l(16)
Genuine issue of material fact existed as
to genuineness of words "with pipeline" in
purchase agreement respecting real property
for purposes of determining whether pur-
chasers had notice of.. recorded oil pipeline
easement on property and were estopped
from claiming otherwise, precluding sum-
mary judgment for attorney who prepared
title opinion respecting property ill purchas-
ers' negligence action against attorney.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56.03. .
2. Easements ¢:::>1
Easement is an "encumbrance."
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and def-
.initions.
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Dyche, J., concurred in part and dissent- tive purchaser and prospect purchases land
ed in part and filed opinion. in reliance on.abstract; however, party into
whose hands abstract falls in connection with
subsequent transaction is not among those to
whom abstracter owes duty of care.
1. Covenants <8=>42(3)
Exceptions elauses in warranty deeds,
which stated that there were no encum-
brances against property being conveyed ex-
cept easements and restrictions of record and
county zoning regulations, resulted in excep-
tion of recorded oil company pipeline ease-
ment from all five covenants of general war-
ranty contained in deeds and, thus, :vendors
were not liable for breach of warranty by
virtue of easement on property. .KRS 382.-
030.
3. Appeal and Error· ¢:::>863
Standard of review on appeal of sum-
mary judgment is whether trial court cor-
rectly found that there were no genuine is-
sues as to any material fact and that moving
party was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Rules Civ.Proe., Rule 56.03.
4.. Judgment <8=>181(16)
Genuine issue of material fact existed as
to whether contr;lctual relationship existed
between real property purchasers and attor-
ney retained through mortgagee bank, who
prepared title opinion respecting property,
precluding summary judgment for attorney
in purchasers' negligence action against at-
torney. Rules Civ.Proe., Rule 56.03.
5. Attorney and Client ¢:::>109
Attorney's duty to exercise ordinary
care in performance of title examination ex-
tended to property purchasers who paid for
attorney's title examination after being re-
tained through mortgagee bank.
6. Abstracts of Title <8=>3
Abstracter's duty of care runs not only
to his customer but to his purchaser and
others involved in real estate transaction
through their relationship to purchaser when
abstracter knows, or should know, that his
customer wants abstract for use of prospec-
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12. Limitation of Actions <P95(1l)
One-year statute of limitations did not
begin to ron on real property purchasers'
negligence claim against attorney, who pre-
pared title opinion respecting property and
did not disclose existence of recorded oil
pipeline easement on property, until exis-
tence of easement became known to purchas-
ers.
VIrginia Collins Burbank, W. Reneaux Col-
lins, Burbank & Collins, Louisville, for appel-
lants.
Robert Coots, Taylorsville, for appellee,
Robert Coots.
Joseph J. Wantland, Shepherdsville, for
appellees, Thomas R. Jasper, Verneasa Jas-
per, Mildred Tennill.
Before DYCHE, JOHNSON and
STUMBO, JJ.
JOHNSON, Judge:
This is an appeal by John Seigle and Dar-
lene Seigle (Seigles) from two separate sum-
mary judgments dismissing two separate
lawsuits that had been consolidated by the
trial court. We affirm the trial court's sum-
mary judgment in favor of appellees, Thomas
R. Jasper, Verneasa Jasper and Mildred
Tennill (Jaspers-Tennills) on Seigles' claim
of breach of warranty in the deed. We re-
verse the trial court's summary judgment in
favor of appellee, Robert M. Coots (Coots),
on Seigles' claim of negligence in the prepa-
ration of a title opinion by attorney Coots
and remand for further proceedings.
On May 1, 1974, John Seigle and Carol
Seigle, husband and wife, entered into a con-
tract for deed with Thomas R. Jasper and
Verneasa Jasper, husband and wife, and
Floyd Tennill and Mildred Tennill, husband
and wife, for the purchase of real estate
known as Lot No.8 of the Ridgeview Subdi-
vision located in Spencer County, Kentucky.
Carol Seigle has died, and John Seigle is now
married to Darlene Seigle. Floyd Tennill
1. For the purposes of this Opinion, John Seigle,
Carol Seigle and Darlene Seigle will be referred
to as the Seigles and Thomas R. Jasper and
Verneasa Jasper and Floyd Tennill and Mildred
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has also died.1 In 1979 the Seigles desired to
purchase Lot No. 13 in the same subdivision
and from the same parties. The Seigles
applied for a loan from The Peoples Bank of
Mount Washington (Peoples Bank) for the
purpose of purchasing Lot No. 13 and paying
the balance owing· under the contract for
deed on Lot No.8. Robert M. Coots was a
duly licensed practicing attorney in Spencer
County who regularly performed real estate
title searches and loan document preparation
for Peoples Bank on real estate loans on
property located in Spencer County. The
Seigles agreed that Coots would perform the
title examination for their loan, and paid his
attorney's fees as a part of their closing costs
paid through Peoples Bank at the time their
real estate loan was closed. The.Seigles
obtained two separate general warranty
deeds from Jaspers-Tennills on Lot Nos. 8
and 13, on May 31, 1979, and June 11, 1979,
respectively. During 1984 Seigles borrowed
additional money from Peoples Bank which
required refinancing of the loan. Coots
wrote a second title letter to Peoples Bank
dated July 9, 1984, for Lot Nos. 8 and 13 for
which the Seiglespaid his attorney's fees
through the closing costs they paid to Peo-
ples Bank. The deposition testimony from
two off'ieers of Peoples Bank revealed that
bank policy resulted in the 1979 loan docu-
ments, including any title opinion letter from
Coots, being destroyed when the loan was
paid off as a result of the 1984 refinancing.
Coots denies preparing the 1979 title report,
but John Seigle, in an affidavit filed in oppo-
sition to Coots' motion for summary judg-
ment, states that he and an officer of Peoples
Bank, BaITy Armstrong, reviewed the loan
documents, and that Armstrong told him
"that Mr. Coots had run the title and that
everything was clear." It is agreed by the
parties that the Seigles were never informed
by Coots that each lot was encumbered by
the existence of an easement to Ashland Oil,
Inc. (Ashland Oil) for an underground pipe-
line which had been duly recorded in the
Spencer County Court Clerk's Office.
Tennill will be referred to as Jaspers-Tennills
regardless of the time period and marital status
of the parties.
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The Seigles received a letter by' certified
mail from Ashland Oil dated August 30,1988
that advised them that the placing of a mo-
bile home on Lot No.8 and a small building
on Lot No. 13 within Ashland Oil's right-of-
way and upon Ashland Oil's pipeline repre-
sented an encroachment of Ashland Oil's
right-of-way. On August 25, 1989, the Sei-
gles filed two separate lawsuits. The Seigles
sued Jaspers-Tennills for fraud and breach
of warranty, and Coots for negligence. The
two lawsuits were later consolidated; and
after the taking of depositions and the filing
of various motions and memoranda, all claims
were dismissed by summary judgment. This
appeal followed.
[1] As to the summary judgment in favor
of Jaspe.rs-Tennills, the Seigles do not appeal
the dismissal of their fraud claim due to the
nmning of the statute of limitations. Their
appeal as to Jaspers-Tennillsis solely on the
dismissal of their claim for breach of warran-
ty. The Seigles make a thorough argument
involving the law concerning covenants of
general warranty, much of which we accept.
However, the fact still remains that the deed
at issue included an exceptions clause that
excepted from the general warranty the very
easement that is at issue, and for that reason
we affirm.
Both of the deeds from Jaspers-Tennills
contained a standard general warranty clause
that read: "The first parties hereby sell and
convey v.ith covenant of general warranty
..." After the. property was described, each
deed also contained the following exceptions
clause:
The first parties further covenant they
are lawfully seized of the estate herein
conveyed with the full right and power to
convey same in fee simple and there are no
encumbrances against same except ease-
ments and restrictions of record and Zon-
ing Regulations of Spencer County.
The Seigles argue that the above excep-
tions clause does not except the Ashland Oil
easement from the covenant of general war-
ranty; but instead, the deed creates in addi-
tion to the covenant of general warranty
other special or independent covenants. The
Seigles contend that the general role is that
a subsequent limited covenant will not re-
strict a preceding general covenant, citing
the Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Joiner v.
Ardmore Loan & Trust Co., 33 Old. 266, 124
P. 1073 (1912). This is only part of the
general rule. .Joiner also recognizes that if
the entire language of the deed taken as a
whole clearly. shows that it was the intent of
the parties to limit the warranty, then the
subsequent limited covenant will restrict the
preceding general covenant. Joiner, BUpTa,
124 P. at 1075-1076. While the language
"further covenant they are lawfully seized of
the estate herein conveyed with the full right
and power to convey same in fee simple" may
be redundant since these covenants are a
part of a covenant of general warranty, we do
not believe that it creates an ambiguity. The
deed still clearly excepts from the covenant
of general warranty encumbrances (:onsisting
of "easements and restrictions of record and
Zoning Regulations of Spencer County."
The Seigles next argue that even if the
exceptions are applicable to the covenant of
general warranty that "their applicability
would be limited to the covenant against
encumbrances." This argument is based on
the generally accepted principle that the cov-
enant of "general warranty include.q all com-
mon law covenants under section 493 of the
Kentucky Statutes." (Section. 49.1 is now
KRS 382.030.) Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 27,
241 S.W. 324 (1922), citing Butt v. Riffe, 78
Ky. 352 (1880); Smith v. Jones, 97 Ky. 670,
31 S.W. 475 (1895); Waggener v. Howsley's
Adm'r., 164 Ky. 113, 175 S.W. 4 (1915). In
discussing the term "general warrdIlty," the
Court in Smith, BUpTa, stated:
This term used by the grantor in a deed
that he conveys by or with "general war-
ranty," has been often held by this court to
be in. substance equivalent to the several
special covenants in use under the common
law, as that one is seized of the land sold,
that he has good and perfect right to C()n-
vey, that the landis free'trom incumbran-
ces, that the grantee shall quietly enjoy
possession, and that the grantor Wrnwar-
rant and defend the title against all claims
of all persons.
97 Ky. at 672, 31 S.W. 475.
[2] The Seigl~s argue that the exceptions
clause only applies to the encumbrance por~
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tion of the covenant of general warranty,
thereby leaving unqualified and breached the
covenants of seizin, right to convey, quiet
enjoyment and defense of title. We do not
accept this argument because the limiting
language used in the deed is just as applica-
ble to all five covenants of a generalwarran-
ty as it is to the encumbrance covenant. It is
well settled that an easement is an encum-
brance. 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Condi-
tions, and Restrictions § 90 (1965), states:
That group of rights or interests in land,
comprehended under the broad term
"easements," is within the purview of the
term "encumbrances" as used in covenants
against encumbrances in deeds, since an
outstanding easement, . such as a right of
way across the premises, used and en-
joyed, is such a claim or right as interferes
with the possession of the proprietor, af-
fects the estate both in quantity and value,
and therefore falls within the terms and
spirit of the covenant against encum-
brances. (footnotes omitted).
By stating "there are no encumbrances
against same except easements ... ", the
deed limits all five" covenants of the general
warranty for the described real estate. The
use of the word "encumbrances" in the ex-
ceptions clause does not restrict the applica-
bility of the exceptions clause to the encum-
brance covenant alone. Rather, it is provid-
ing the grantees with actual and specific
notice that the general warranty the grantors
are giving is less than complete-that there
is an encumbrance, the easement, against the
property.
It has been held that a clause in a deed
excepting easements from the covenants is
sufficient to except from a conveyance burial
privileges in a cemetery that were only an
easement and not a fee simple interest.
Hoos v. Gahlinger, Ky., 248 S.W.2d 349, 351
(1952). The purpose of the grantors in in-
cluding the exceptions clause is to give the
grantees actual notice of the easement. In
Poole v. Young, Ky., 459 S.W.2d 162 (1970),
the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court
and allowed a lawsuit for damages for alleged
breach of the covenant of general warranty
to proceed because the deed contained a
standard covenant of general warranty but
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no language excepting therefrom an ease-
ment for a neighbor's septic tank drain field
that was of record. However, in the instant
case, since the Ashland Oil easement was of
record and since the deed provided for this
exception, it was the responsibility of the
Seigles to have a proper search of the rec-
ords performed in order to learn the details
of the "easements and restrictions of record."
We affirm the trial court's summary judg-
ment in favor of Jaspers-Tennills.
This takes us to the Seigles' claim in negli-
gence against Coots. for failing to properly
advise them of the existence of the· Ashland
Oil easement. The order of the Spencer
Circuit Court sustaining Coots' motion for
summary judgment does not provide any in-
sight into the legal reasoning underlying it.
Further, the record before us appears to be
incomplete in that Coots' motion to dismiss
with memorandum in support, answer and
motion for summary judgment with memo-
randum referred to in the Seigles' memoran-
dum in support of their motion for partial
summary judgment are not in the record.
Therefore, we will address the issues of the
case as we discern them from the record.
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR)
56.03 provides that summary judgment
should be granted "if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, answers to interrogatories, stipula-
tions, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there in no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that -
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law." The Supreme Court in
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991), stated:
While it has been recognized that sum-
mary judgment is designed to expedite the
disposition of cases and avoid unnecessary
trials when no genuine issues of material
fact are raised, see, Dossett '11. New York
Mining and Manvfacturing Co., Ky., 451
S.W.2d 843 (1970), this Court has also re-
peatedly admonished that the rule is to be
cautiously applied. See, Rowland '11. Mil-
ler'sAdm'r, Ky., 307 S.W.2d-3 (1956). The
record must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion
for sunimary judgment and all doubts are
to be resolved in his favor. Dossett v. New
SEIGLE v. JASPER
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We adhere to the principle that summary
judgment is to be cautiously applied and
should not be used as a substitute for trial.
kJ declared in Paintsville Hospital [Com-
pany v. Rose, Ky., 683 S.W.2d 255 (1985) ]
it should only be used "to terminate litiga-
tion when, as a matter of law, it appears
that it would be impossible for the respon-
dent to produce evidence at the trial war-
ranting a judgment in his favor and
against the movant." It is vital that we
not sever litigants from their right of trial,
.if they do in fact hav~ valid issues to try,
[T]he movant should not succeed unless his
right to judgment is shown with such clari-
ty that there is no room left for controver-
sy. See Isaacs v. Cox, Ky., 431 S.w.2d 494
(1968). Only when it appears impossible
for the nonmoving party to produce evi-
dence at trial warranting a judgment in his
favor should the motion for summary judg-
ment be granted. See Harker v. Federal
Larul Bank of Louisville, Ky., 679 S;W.2d
226 (1984); Green v. Bourbon County
Joint Planning Commission. Ky., 637
S.W.2d 626 (1982); Robert Simmons
Constr. Co. v. Powers Regulator Co., Ky.,
390 S.W.2d 901 (1965).
Id. at 482.
York Mining an.d Man'Ujacturing Co., su-
pra; Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, supra.
Even though a trial court may believe the
.party opposing the motion may not suc-
ceed at trial, it should not render a sum-
mary judgment if there is any issue of
material fact. Puckett v. Elsner, Ky., 303
S.W.2d 250 (1957). The trial judge must
examine the evidence, not to decide any
issue of fact, but to discover if a real issue
exists. It clearly is· not the purpose of the
sununary judgment rule, as we have often
decl:U'ed, to cut litigants off from their
right of trial if they have issues to try.
See Bonded Elevator, Inc. v. First Nation-
al Bank ofLouisville, Ky., 680 S.W.2d 124
(1983); Hill v. Fiscal Court of Warren
County, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 419 (1968);
Williams v. Ehman, Ky., 394 S.w.2d 905
(1965); Rowland v. Miller's Adm'r, supra.
Id. at 480.
*. *
[3] The standard of review on appeal of a
summary judgment is whether the trial court
correctly found that there were ilO genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the
moving party was entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Goldsmith v. Allied Building
Components, Inc., Ky., 833 S.W.2d 378
(1992).
just for the sake of efficiency and expedi-
ency. Accordingly, we readopt. the man-
date announced in Paintsville Hospital as
the proper standard for summary judg-
ment in this state as well as applying it to
the facts of this case.
Id. at 483.
There is evidence in the record supporting
the Seigles' claim of negligence. In viewing
the evidence in the .light most favorable to
the Seigles, the evidence supports the follow-
ing: (1) Peoples Bank required a title exami-
nation in order to close the Seigles' loan; (2)
Peoples Bank regularly used Coots for title
examinations of Spencer County real estate;
(3) the Seigles agreed to the use ot: Coots for
the title examination with the understanding
that they would pay his attorney's fees
through the loan closing costs paid to Peo-
ples Bank, which they did; (4) Coots wrote a
title letter to Peoples Bank dated July 9,
1984 which referenced the Seigles by name
and included several exceptions, some of
which were easements, but did not make any
reference to the kJhland Oil easmnent; (5)
John Seigle was advised by an officer of
Peoples Bank that Coots had ~ormed the
title search in 1979 also, and that "everything
was clear;" (6) the Seigles acted reasonably
in relying upon the representations made by
Coots in his title reports; (7) the Seigles
would not have purchased the property had
they been made aware of the restrictions
placed onthe property by the kJl)lan<IOil
.' easement;j. (8)tbE! Seigles have suffered dam-
ages in that their :property with the Ashland
Oil easement is worth less thaIi it would be
without the easement; and (9) Coots failed to
exercise ordinary care in preparing the title
opinion whereby he breached his duty to the
Seigles to properly advise them of the exis-
tence of the kJhland Oil easement.
***
*
*
**
**
*
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[4] Coots has contended throughout
these proceedings that he has no liability to
the Seigles because there was a lack of privi-
ty of contract. Apparently, there are no
published Kentucky cases concerning an at-
torney's liability to parties who allegedly did
not have privity of contract with the title
abstractor. See William B. Johnson, AImota-
tion, Negligence in Preparing Abstract of
Title as Ground of Liability to One Other
than Person Ordering Abstract, 50 AL.RAth
314 (1986). As stated above, the facts viewed
in the light most favorable to the Seigles
present an issue of fact as to whether or not
a contractual relationship existed· between
Coots and the Seigles, to wit: the Seigles
agreed that Coots would perform their title
examination; Coots performed the work at
the request of Peoples Bank knowing the
work was being done to benefit the Seigles in
closing their loan; and the Seigles paid
Coots' attorney's fees.
[5] The Seigles have sued Coots for neg-
ligence. One issue before the trial court was
whether or not Coots' duty to exercise ordi-
nary care in the performance of the title
examination extended to the Seigles. We
hold that it did.
[6] In First American Title Insurance
Co. v. First Title Service Co., 457 So.2d 467
(1984), 50 AL.RAth 301, the Florida Su-
preme Court held that where a title insur-
ance company had issued title insurance in
reliance on a title abstract prepared for the
seller of the property, and the title abstrac-
tor failed to note the existence of a recorded
judgment against a former owner of the
property, since the abstractor prepared the
abstract knowing, or under conditions ·in
which he should reasonably have· expected
that the seller would provide the abstract to
the title insurance company· for the purpose
of inducing the title insurance company to
rely on the abstract as evidence of title, the
abstractor's contractual duty to perform the
service skillfully and diligently ran to the
benefit of the title insurance company. We
accept the holding in First American Title
that the Court summarized as follows:
Where the abstracter knows, or should
know, that his customer wants the abstract
for the use of a prospective purchaser, and
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the prospect purchases the land relying on
the abstract, the abstracter's duty of care
runs, as we have said, not only to his
customer but to the purchaser. Moreover,
others involved in the transaction through
their relationship to the purchas~ch
as lender-mortgagees, tenants and title in-
surers-will .also be protected where the
purchaser's reliance was known or should
have been known to the abstracter. But a
party into whose hands the abstract falls in
connection with a subsequent transaction
is not among those to whom the abstracter
owes a duty of care.
457 So.2d at 473.
This holding is consistent with the Restate-
ment (Second). of Torts, § 552, Information
N egligenJly Supplied for the Guidance of
Others, which states in pertinent part:
(1) One who, in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business trans-
actions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in
obtaining or communicating the informa-
tion.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the
liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited
group of persons for whose benefit and
guidance he intends to supply the informa-
tion or knows that the recipient intends to
supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a trans-
action that he intends the information to
influence or knows that the recipient so
intends or in a substantially similar trans-
action.
Again, in viewing the facts most favorably
to the Seigles, Coots was acting in the course
of his profession for his pecuniary interest
when he failed to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating
information and supplied false information
for the guidance of Peoples Bank, Jaspers-
Tennills and the Seigles in their business
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transactions that has subjected the Seigles to strictions of record" in no way eliminates
a pecuniary loss asa result of their jilstifi- Coots'. dut! ~ include th: Ashland Oil ease-
able reliance upon the infonnation. ment ill his title letter smce th~ whole ~ur­
pose of having Coots perform a title exanuna-
tion was to specifically advise the parties of
any restrictions on the title. It is the duty of
the attorney conducting the title search. to
communicate to the parties any information
that might reasonably constitute a defect and
restriction on the title. See Owen v. Neely,
Ky., 471 S.W.2d '705 (1971). Coots' estoppel
argument based on two exceptions contained
in the title letter also fails. The letter ex-
cepted "[ulnTeCO'T'ded easements, discrepan-
cies or conflicts in boundary lines, shortage
in area and encroachments which an accurate
and complete survey Would discl(lSe." (em-
phasis added). Since the Ashland Oil ease-
ment was recorded, this exception clearly
does not coverii The letteralso eXcepted
"[rlights or claims of parties othe:r·than (ap-
pellailts) in aCtual possession of any or all of
the real property." The Texas Supreme
CoUrt in Shaver v. NatWnaJ, Title &Abstract
Co., 361 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1962), a case that
also involved a pipeline, stated:
All the authorities agree that possession, in
order to constitute notice, must be actual
possession of the party ... consisting of
acts of occupancy which are open, visible
and unequivocal, and in nature sufficient
upon the observation of a subsequent pur-
.chaser to put him on inquiry as to the
rights of the possessor ...
361 S.W.2d at 869.
Ashland Oil's acts of occupancy were not
sufficiently open, visible and unequivocal to
put the Seigles on inquiry as to Ashland Oil's
rights.
[11] Coots argues that since the purchase
agreement between l;he Seigles and the Jas-
pers-Tennills for Lot No.8 dated January
29, 1974 contained the words "with pipeline"
that the Seigles had notice of the pipeline
and ateestop~ froni claiming otherwise.
The genuinenesspf. theSe .words is strongly
disputed by the Seigles and is an issue of fact
for the jurY.
(12] Coots argues that the one-year stat-
ute of limitations ran prior to the ·filing of
this action in 1989 since the most recent title
[7] It is well established that "[t]he con-
cept of liability for negligence expresses a
universal duty owed by all to all." Gas Ser-
vice Co., Inc. v. City of Londan, Ky., 687
S.W.2d 144, 148 (1985).· ''The rule is that
every person owes a duty to every other
person to exercise ordinary care in his activi-
ties to prevent foreseeable injury." Grayson
Fraternal Order of Etigks v. Claywell, Ky.,
736 S.W.2d 328, 332 (1987). "In any negli-
gence case, it is necessary to show that the
defendant failed to discharge a legal duty or
conform his conduct to the standard re-
quired. W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 30
(1971)." MiteheU 'lI. Had}" Ky., 816 S.W.2d
183, 185 (1991). In HiU v. WiUmot4 Ky.
App., 561 S.W.2d 331 (1978), this' Court in
discussing .an attorney's duty to a third party
aCcepted language from Donald v. Garry, 19
Cal.App.3d 769, 97 Cal.Rptr. 191 (1971)"and
stated:
"An attorney may be liable for damage
caused by his -negligence to a person in-
tended to be benefited by his performance
irrespective of any lack of privity ..."
(Emphasis added). We believe this to be a
proper statement of the law in this Com-
-monwealth.
561 S~W.2d at 334.
"In determining whether that degree of
care and skill exercised by the attorney in a
given case meets the requirements of the-
standard care ... , the attorney's act, or fail-
ure to act, is judged by the degree of its
departure from the quality of professional
conduct customarily provided by members of
the legal profession. Prosser, Law of Torts,
§ 32 at 161-166 (4th ed. 1971). .As it would
be in negligence cases generally, the question
-of whether the conduct of the attorney meets
the standard of care test is one for the trier
of the facts to ..-dete~e.~' .Daugherty .v.
Runner, Ky.App.,581 S.W.2d 12,. 16· (1978)..
[8-10] Coots' other defenSes of estoppel
and statute of limitations can be dispensed
with in short order. The fact that the deed
from Jaspers-Tennills to the Seigles con-
tained an exception for "easements or re-
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letter was in 1984. The Seigles allege that
they were not aware of the pipeline until
they received Ashland Oil's letter in 1988.
We follow the widely accepted role and hold
that the statute of limitations did not begin
to run until the defect became known to the
Seigles. See Pruett v. Mississippi Valley
Title Insurance Co., 271 So.2d 920 (1973);
Shaver, supra.
We reverse the summary judgment in fa-
vor of Coots and remand for further proceed-
ings consistent wit1J. t1J.is Opinion. We affinn
the summary judgment in favor of Jaspers--
Tennills.
STUMBO, J., concurs.
DYCHE, J., concurs in part; dissents in
parl
DYCHE, J., coneu+riniin part and
dissenting mpart.
I concur in the result reached by the ma-
jority as it applies to the claim against the
Jaspers and Ms. Tennill. I must dissent in
part, however, as to the majority's holding as
it applies to the attorney involved herein.
Hill v. Willmott, Ky.App., 561 S.W.2d 331
(1978), imposes a duty toward the purchasers
upon an attorney in a situation such as this;
the attorney's responsibility, however, is lim-
~ted to damages sustained on Lot 13 only, as
appellants had already contracted to pur-
chase Lot 8 prior to any involvement oCthe
attorney.
Charles OSBORNE, APpellant,
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Kentncky,
Appellee.
No. 92-CA-I631-MR.
Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Nov. 19, 1993.
Motion to DepubliSh Opinion
Denied Dec. 27, 1993.
Defendant was convicted of second-de-
gree manslaughter, driving under the influ-
K(b) - 77
ence (DUI), operating motor vehicle without
liability insurance, and operating vehicle
without proper registration plates, in the
Letcher Circuit Court, Larry D. Collins, J.,
and defendant appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, McDonald, J., held that: (1) introduc-
tion and use of testimony and evidence re-
garding defendant's prior DUI conviction
was reversible error; (2) evidence of defen-
dant's blood test at hospital was admissible;
and (3) double jeopardy principles were vio-
lated when defendant was sentenced and
fined for both second-degree manslaughter
and Dill.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded.
I. Automobiles ep355(13)
Ample evidence was presented from
which reasonable jury could believe beyond
reasonable doubt in second-degree man-
slaughter trial that defendant was operating
vehicle at time of crash; accident reconstruc-
tionist testified that there was no doubt in his
mind that defendant was driving vehicle.
2. Criminal Law ep369.3
Introduction of defendant's prior convic-
tion for driving under t1J.e influence (DUl)
during course of trial in which defendant was
charged with second-degree manslaughter
and Dill grossly prejudiced jury and violated
defendant's constitutionally protected right
to fair trial, even t1J.ough evidence was admit-
ted to prove that present Dill charge was
second offense; course of conduct for which
defendant was charged with DUI arose out
of same event in conduct for which he was
indicted for second-degree manslaughter, in-
dictment was never amended to charge de-
fendant with Dill "second" offense, and jury
was never properly admonished that prior
conviction could not be considered on issue of
guilt on manslaughter charge. KRS
189A.OI0 (1990).
3. Criminal Law ep722*
Prosecutors comments in specifically
urging jury to consider defendant's prior
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Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Jean SEBASTIAN, Movant,
v.
Perl FLOYD and Zona Floyd, Respondents.
July 3, 1979.
Action was brought to enforce forfeiture clause in installment land sale contract. The case was
referred to a master commissioner for hearing. The commissioner recommended termination of the
land sale contract and enforcement of the forfeiture clause and the Kenton Circuit Court entered
judgment adopting the commissioner's recommendations. On appeal, the Court ofAppeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted discretionary review and Aker, J., held that when an installment land
contract is used as a means of financing the purchase of property, the vendor's interest, being bare
legal title, is to be treated as a lien on the property to secure payment, requiring a vendor to seek a
judicial sale of the property upon the purchaser's default; thus, the forfeiture clause in installment land
contract would not be enforced.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
When installment land contract is used as means of financing purchase of property, equitable title
passes to purchaser when contract is entered and vendor holds nothing but bare legal title, as security
for payment of purchase price.
There is no practical distinction between land sale contract and a purchase money mortgage, in which
vendor conveys legal title to purchaser but retains a lien on property to secure payment; significant
feature ofeach device is vendor's financing purchaser's purchase of property, using property as
collateral for loan.
Where installment land contract was used as means of financing purchase of property, vendor's
interest, being bare legal title, would be treated as a lien on property to secure payment, requiring
vendor to seek a judicial sale of property upon purchaser's default; thus, forfeiture clause in
installment land contract would not be enforced; overruling i\1iL~--l!,-EtQflill,_2fiQ_S-"-Yi...~?JLJl3.,and
Kmvi.L~.y,..D~ri111m, ...2Z3..Ky,_18,_115 ..S.:W,2d_368.
*382 Michael O'Hara, Northern Kentucky Legal Aid Society, Inc., Covington, for movant.
Clyde Middleton, Covington, for respondents.
AKER, Justice.
This case presents the question whether a clause in an installment land sale contract providing for
forfeiture of the buyer's payments upon the buyer's default may be enforced by the seller.
The movant, Jean Sebastian, contracted on November 8, 1974, to buy a house and lot situated in
Covington, Kentucky, from Perl and Zona Floyd, respondents in this motion for review. Sebastian
paid $3,800.00 down and was to pay the balance of the $10,900.00 purchase price, plus taxes,
insurance, and interest at the rate of 81/2% Per annum, in monthly installments of $120.00. A
forfeiture clause in the contract provided that if Sebastian failed to make any monthly payment and
remained in default for 60 days, the Floyds could terminate the contract and retain all payments
previously made as rent and liquidated damages.
During the next 21 months, Sebastian missed seven installments. Including her down payment, she
paid the Floyds a total of$5,480.00, rather than the $6,320.00 which was called for by the terms of
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the contract. Of this amount, $4,300.00, or nearly 40% Of the contract price, had been applied against
the principal.
The Floyds brought suit in the Kenton Circuit Court against Sebastian in August, 1976, seeking a
judgment of $700.00 plus compensation for payments for taxes and insurance, and seeking
enforcement of the forfeiture clause. Sebastian admitted by her answer that she was in default but
asked the court not to enforce the forfeiture clause. Sebastian counterclaimed for all payments made
pursuant to the contract. On advice of counsel, Sebastian ceased to make payments after the
institution of this law suit.
The case was referred to a master commissioner for hearing. The commissioner recommended
termination of the land sale contract and enforcement of the forfeiture clause. The Kenton Circuit
Court entered a judgment adopting the commissioner's recommendations. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary review to consider the validity of the forfeiture clause.
We reverse.
[1] When a typical installment land contract is used as the means of financing the purchase of
property, legal title to the property remains in the seller until the buyer has paid the entire contract
price or some agreed-upon portion thereof, at which time the seller tenders a deed to the buyer.
However, equitable title passes to the buyer when the contract is entered. The seller holds nothing but
the bare legal title, as security for the payment of the purchase price. HenkenbemsY,H'!lJGk.J14Ky,
631, 23~ S.W.2d 703 (195l).
*383 [2] There is no practical distinction between the land sale contract and a purchase money
mortgage, in which the seller conveys legal title to the buyer but retains a lien on the property to
secure payment. The significant feature ofeach device is the seller's financing the buyer's purchase of
the property, using the property as collateral for the loan,
Where the purchaser of property has given a mortgage and subsequently defaults on his payments, his
entire interest in the property is not forfeited. The mortgagor has the right to redeem the property by
paying the full debt plus interest and expenses incurred by the creditor due to default. In order to cut
off the mortgagor's right to redeem, the mortgagee must request a court to sell the property at public
auction. See Lewis, Reeves, How the Doctrine of Equitable Conversion Affects Land Sale Contract
Forfeitures, 3 Real Estate Law Journal 249, 253 (1974). See alsoKRS 44<i.9Q2, 42(i,)2~. From the
proceeds of the sale, the mortgagee recovers the amount owed him on the mortgage, as well as the
expenses of bringing suit; the mortgagor is entitled to the balance, if any.
[3] The modem trend is for courts to treat land sale contracts as analogous to conventional mortgages,
thus requiring a seller to seek a judicial sale of the property upon the buyer's default. It was stated in
Sktlml?&lv.! M~sh'!1l~_2.61Jn<;t22Jj~_3Ql.NJ~,?d ....641,.Q48_{1..97J):
"A conditional land contract in effect creates a vendor's lien in the property to secure the unpaid
balance owed under the contract. This lien is closely analogous to a mortgage in fact, the vendor is
commonly referred to as an 'equitable mortgagee.' ... In view ofthis characterization of the vendor as
a lienholder, it is only logical that such a lien be enforced through foreclosure proceedings."
See also H &_LLand_C~rnpilll).',JnG~_y,_W;:IJ]ler,fl<l~App_.~2~JLSQ2d29JJ1912). We are of the
opinion that a rule treating the seller's interest as a lien will best protect the interests of both buyer and
seller. Ordinarily, the seller will receive the balance due on the contract, plus expenses, thus fulfilling
the expectations he had when he agreed to sell his land. In addition, the buyer's equity in the property
will be protected.
This holding comports with our decision in Re'!LEst'!te<lndMQJtg,!geCo,QfLQll.isyiU~y,J.)lJke,.251
Ky,--1~65 S.W,2d-.8l11233}, wherein it was stated at ll<lg~~2_QfJi~_S_,W2d;
"The forfeiture clause was intended simply as a security for the payment of the purchase price. In
these circumstances the forfeiture provided for by the contract will be disregarded ...."
Respondents contend the preponderance of Kentucky cases permits enforcement of forfeiture clauses
in land sale contracts. However, installment land contracts were not involved in two of the cases cited
in respondents' brief. In Wl!rilJ~,e!'l,LEst<lt~y,ChiJders,22JKy,JQ2,JS.W,2dQOJ(1928),and QmYes
Y,Winer-,Xy,,-3~lS,_W,2d19J{19Jil), this court permitted retention by the sellers of "earnest
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money" deposited pursuant to an executory deposit receipt agreement. The ordinary short-term real
estate contract presents a situation very different from the case at bar. Such an agreement generally
provides that in the event the buyer fails to perform the contract, the seller may retain the down
payment (usually no more than ten per cent ofthe contract price) as liquidated damages. In Ward,
supra, and Graves, supra, the sum specified as liquidated damages clearly bore a reasonable relation to
the actual damages suffered by the seller, which damages would be difficult to ascertain. R~beJ·LF-~
Simmons and Associates v. Urban Renewal and Community Development Agencv of Louisville, Ky.,
19Z5,:W",2d}Q~(1973). Our holding therefore has no bearing on the typical earnest money deposit.
Respondents also cite Maschi!lQL'L.__MQQ~_275 Ky~6, UO S,-~2d~~JH1.23~). Their reliance on
that case is misplaced, however, because there the court dealt with the question whether the vendor
could maintain an action in ejectment against the vendee under a land sale contract; the court did not
*384 address the issue of the enforceability of a forfeiture clause such as that in the instant case.
In Miles v. Proffitt, Ky., 266 S.W.2d 333 (1954), we held that a party to an installment land sale
contract who had advanced money in part performance and then failed to make further payments was
not entitled to recover any of the money so advanced. The court relied on Kr~yitzy,QI.imm,ZT3Ky,
JR._li5 S.W.2d 368 (1938), as authority for its holding in Miles. To the extent Miles and Kravitz
uphold the validity of forfeiture clauses in installment land sale contracts, they are overruled. The
seller's remedy for breach of the contract is to obtain a judicial sale ofthe property.
The judgment of the trial court and the opinion of the Court of Appeals are reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
All concur exceptSTERNBERG, J., who did not sit.
Ky., 1979.
Sebastian v. Floyd
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insurer. PIEMutuaJ InsuranceCompany ('PIE').
KMIC filed an application for hearing pursuant
to a statute which provided that the
Commissionershallholdabearing 'upon written
application for a hearing by a person aggrieved
by any act ••• or failure of the commissioner to
act, or by any •.. order of the commissioner.'
PIE MutlUJl Ins. at 52. In determining that
KMIC lacked standing, the Court of Appeals
noted the signifu:ance of the fact that KMIC
did not point out any statute, other than the
general hearing statute, toprove that KMIC was
properly within the zone of interest to be
protected or regulated. Thus, the issue became
whether legislature intended to allow a third
party to challenge the certificate of an insurer.
Noting that the Insurance Code did not contain
a defmition of 'person aggrieved,' such as the
Court in NKC Hospital relied upon when
reviewing the meaning of 'affected person,' the
Court of Appeals held that KMIC was not a
'person aggrieved' by the issuance of a
certifae:ate to PIE and therefore KMlC lacked
standing. I
I We recognize that the factual circumstances
of PIE MutruIIlns. and NKC Hospitals differ
from the case at bar, in that the cited cases
involved business competitors rather than
candidates in competition for a judicial seat.
Nonedteless, we believe that the reasoning of
the courts in those cases can be applied to the
facts of this matter.
Appellants have failed to convince this Court
that they are 'directly involved or affected' by
KREFs actions or that they have a judicially
recogaizable interest in the subjectmatter. Like
the Court of Appeals in PIE MUIIUJIlns., we
believe it is significant that the General
Assembly didnot specifically define the phrase
at issue to include competitors and/or other
third parties. NKC Hospitals teaches that the
General Assembly has doneso when it believes
that it is important to give third partiesa greater
role in the administrative process. In this case,
however, the phrase was not defmed to include
Appellants and we can discern no way in which
either the fmding ofprobable cause or the terms
of the conciliation agreement impact upon the
Appellants in any way. In fact, any penalty
(civil or criminal) which could result from the
actions of KREF directly involves and affects
Moloney, but does not involve or affect Lee or
Schroering.
THEREFORE, after careful review of the case
law, the statutory provisions and the facts ofthe
caseatbar, we hold thatAppellants lackstanding
to pursue this action. Defendant's motion to
dismiss shall be. and hereby is GRANTED.
This is a final and appealable Order and there is
no just cause for delay.
For the foregoing reasons, we affmn the order
of the Franklin Circuit Court.
All concur.
Before: Gardner, Huddleston and Johnson,
Judges.
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MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
REAL PROPERTY
WILLS
EXECUTOR'S POWER TO SELL
REAL PROPERTY ONLY WITH
DEVISEES' CONSENT AND
VALIDITY OF CONVEYANCE
ABSENT CONSENT
Plaintiff's subsequent suit to set aside
conveyance of real property by executrix with
power of sale wben earlier declaratory judg-
ment action determined that she could not sell
in face ofdevisees' wish to have tbe property in
kind found based upon probable cause since it
was reasonable to conclude that the original
actioa had not adjudicated tbe validity of tbe
cooveyaace and so jury's verdict for executrix
la ber suit against plaintiff for malicious
prosecution reversed -Judicial notice taken of
fact that ''there is always a cbaace to lose In
oy kiad of a lawsuit" od conversely, that
there is always a clumce to win - LIIeas If.
M.lIl1erlllg boldiag tbat aa executor with
power of sale may nevertheless sell only with
the coasent of devisees to wbom real property
passes directly upoa laadowaer's deatb
reiterated although title to the property, having
oace passed, cannot be defeated ill the abseace
offraud-
Hardy v. Lucas (94-CA-2SS4-MR); Jefferson
Cir. Ct., O'Bannon, J.; Opinion by Judge Miller,
reversing, rendered 3/1196. rnts oplUaa II 1IOt .....
u4 ...... IIOt lie dUd _lIIItIJority .. uy ceurts of tile
e--wuItII of Keatllcty. CR 7'-10.)
Ben B. Hardy brings this appea1 from a June I,
1994, money judgmententered upon a jury verdict
in the Jefferson Circuit Court. We reverse.
This matter commenced on April2S, 1982, at
the instance of Mary T. Mannering's death in
Jefferson County, Kentucky. On May 14, 1982,
and in accordance with Mannering's will, appellee,
MaryC. Lucas,qualifiedaspersonal representative.
Ky. Rev. Stat. (KRS) Chapter 395. Mannering's
estate consisted of modest personal property and
approximately ten acres of land along the Ohio
River iii Jefferson County. The will devised a
parcel of land each to two of Mannering's sons -
Danny Ray Mannering and Raben Lee Landers.
The balance of the land was devised jointly to
Mannering's aforementioned sons and to a third
son, William Landers. The will authorized the
executrix(Lucas) tosell anddispose ofreal property.
Paragraph IV specifically provided:
I hereby grant to my Executor [sic] the
continuing, absolute, discretionary power to
deal with any property, real or personal, held in
my estate as freely as I might in the handling of
my own affairs. Such power includes the right
to sell and convey any ofthe assets ofmy estate
which I now possess or may acquire or become
entitled to after the execution of this Will.
Acting under the foregoing provision, Lucas
promptly sold approximately l.05 acres of the
subject land to occupants thereon - Ralph C. and
Violet M. Reidling: After Lucas sold the parcel
to the Reidlings and expressed her intent to sell
the remaining land, perhaps to other friends of
Mannering's who also resided thereon, a dispute
arose between Lucas and the Mannering sons
who wanted the property in k.ind.' Lucas deeme
she. had power to sell land at a fair price to t~.
vanous settlers thereon. Hence, the question arm
as to her authority to sell real property.
I It appears that Mary C. Lucas held a:
unmature~ mortgage upon the property. Th,
record v8?0usly suggests that she sold to Ralpt
C. ~d VUl.let M. Reidling in order to liquidal<
c1atms ~gatnst the ~tate, including attorney anc
executnx fees; to retrre her unmatured lien on the
property; ~d to comply with an oral request made:
by Mannenng that persons occupying separatf
parcels of her land be allowed to buy same.
1 Perhaps as many as thirteen or more friends
of Mary T. Mannering had leased parcels of the
land from her, and some of the lessees had buill
houses thereo~. These continuing lease arrange·
ments gave nse to multiple problems in the
settlement of Mannering's estate.
In an effort to resolve the impasse, Lucas.
~ursuant to ~S 418.040, filed a declaratory
Judgment action, No. 83-CI-04978 (herein
referred to as the "declaratory action" or "first
suit"), ~ the Jefferson Circuit Coon. Danny Ray
Mannenng and William Landers (hereinafter
referred to as Danny and William) througli their
legal counsel, appellant Ben B. Hardy, filed an
answer and a counterclaim asserting, imer alia.
their right to the land and asking that the Reidling
deed be voided or, in the alternative, that damages
be assessed against Lucas. The Reidlings were not
made parties to this action. The circuit court record
contains no specifIC ruling as to the validity of the
Reidling deed. It was contended throughout the
present litigation that the circuit coun rendered an
"oral" ruling upholding the validity ofthe Reidling
deed. It is clear, however, that the deed was not
voided nor could it have been since the Reidlings
were notbefore thecourt. The circuitcourt assessed
no damages against Lucas., although other relief
was granted on the counrerclaim. It was ordered
that no additional real property be sold. Lucas
appealed; Danny and William cross-appealed. The
decision of this Coun. affmning on appeal and
cross-appeal, is reported in Lucas v. Mannering.
Ky. App., 745 S.W.2d 654 (1987). The decision,
of course, did not address the validity of the
Reidling deed. ..
On Jun~ 10, 1988. Danny and William, through
Hardy, metr counsel, filed Action No. 88-e1-4676
(hereafter referred to as "the second suit") in the
Jefferson C~rcuit Coon, asking that the Reidling
deed be VOided. The coon dismissed the action
upon a plea in bar. The court reasoned that the
validity of the Reidling deed should have been
determined in the counterclaim filed in the
declaratory action; thus, the issue was "barred by
res judicata and collateral estoppeL" On appeal,
this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion
(No. 89-CA-833-S) rendered December 15, 1989.
Therein, we agreed with ihe dismissal noting that
the "doctrine of issue preclusion:' as enunciated
in Sedleyv. CityofWesrBuechel. Ky., 46 I S.W. 2d
556 (1971), barred litigation of the issue pertaining
to the validity of the Reidling deed. The doctrine of
issue preclusion is a familiar basis for terminating
litigation involving issues that appropriately should
have been adjudicated in prior proceedings. The
PLEASE SEE NOTE ON LAST PAGE CONCERNING FINAUlY OF DECISIONS DIGESTED.
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doctrine ispartand parcel ofthepleaofresjudicata
andestoppel.46Am.Jur.2dJudgments§§514-523
(1994).ll is based upon the public policy consider-
ations of economy and expediency.
On February II, 1991, Lucas ftled the instant
action against Danny, William, and their counsel,
Ben B. Hardy, seeking damages for "malicious
prosecution... She contends that the institution of
the second suit, med on June 10, 1988, was for
a malicious and improper purpose.lln May 1994,
the action came on for a lengthy trial before jury
in the Jefferson Cucuit Coun. After evidence was
presented, Danny and William were exonerated
by a din:cted verdict. CR 50.01. The case was sub-
mitted against Hardy and resulted in a money
judgment, to wit: $9,131.25 for attorney fees,
$12,000.00 for physical and mental pain and
suffering, and $150,000.00 for punitive damages.
This appeal ensues.
1 Lucas claims that Hardy's improper purpose
was to prosper from exorbitant legal fees from
his clients.
Hardy complains that (1) he bad "probable
cause" to file the second suit questioning the
validity of the Reidling deed; (2) the cin:uit court
committed reversible error in refusing to unseat a
juror who confessed prejudice against him; (3) the
cin:uit court committed reversible error in failing
to conclude that be acted upon advice of counsel
in filing the second suit thus affording him an
absolute defense; (4) the circuit court erroneously
&tIUCIt seven jury panel members for cause; and
(5) it was enoI'to award damages.
Before discussing the merits of Ibis appeal, we
feel c:onstrained to comment upon our decision in
Lucas v. MQIIIU!ring, sfl/Jra. That appcaI was
brought to this Court from a declaratory judg-
ment, resolving the dispute between Lucas, as
personal representative of the Mannering estate,
and Mannering's sons, as devisees. We held that
because of the fiducialy relationship between the
personal representative and the devisees, the
persoaal representative though baving power to
seD real propertydidnotbave--unqualiftcd..power
to convey same. Our decision was predicated, of
course.. upon the law of this jurisdiction to the
effect that upon the death of a landowner, tide
passes diJecdy to the heirs or devisees. Unless
authorized by the terms of the will, a personal
representative is not empowered to sell real estate
absent court order. See Strode v. Kramer, 293 Ky.
3S4,169S.W.2d29(1943).KRS395.220confinns
a testator's authority to authorize his personal
representative to sell land. Further, when a testator
authorizes a personal representative to sell real
property, a purchaser need not look to the applica-
tion of the proceeds. KRS 394.530. The net effect
of the foregoing principles is that a personal
representative authorized to sell real property may
convey good and mClChantable tide thereto. In
absence of fraud or other misdealing, the pur-
chaser's title cannot be defeated. However,
because of the fiduciary relationship with the
devisees, conveyance without their consent may
only be made incident to the proper administra-
tion of the estate, as, for example, paying debts
thereof. Breach of this fiduciary relationship
could, ofcourse, rendetthe personal representative
liable to injured beneficiaries. See generally 2 J.
43 K.L.S. 3
Merritt, KenuCKY PRAC11CE, Sales of Property
§1667 et seq. (2d ed. 1984).
We tum now to the instant appeal. This action
was brought based upon the premise that the
second suit was maliciously prosecuted, that is,
prosecuted without probable cause and for an
improper purpose. Lucas claimed that the issue of
the Reidling deed had already been litigated in the
counten:laim presented in the declaratory judg-
ment action. The case was tried along the precepts
enunciated in Prewilt v. Suton. Ky., 776 S.W.2d
891 (1989), wherein it was observed that this
Commonwealth recognizes malicious prosecu-
tion actions as wrongful use of civil proceedings.
Such actions are not favored as public policy
demands that all persons may freely resort to the
court to obtain redress of their grievances. See
Raine v. Drasin. Ky., 621 S.W.2d 895 (1981).
Without this right, an orderly government would
surely erupt into disorder and chaos. History
demonstrates thatjudicial proceedings have served
well as a safety valve to secthing turbulence that
often flows neath the simmering surface ofsociety.
The overriding and ptimary determination to
be made at the threshold ofa suit for wrongful use
of civil proceedings is whether the judicial
proceedings underattack were filed in the absence
ofprobablecause. "ProbabIecause" is a legal term,
the meaning of which shall be determined only by
the court. Weareofthe opinion that the secondsuit
was premised upon probable cause. It was
reasonable to conclude tbat the counten:laim in
the declaratory action had not adjudicated the
validity of the Rcidling deed. The second suit
resulted in a decision in favor of Lucas singularly
upon the affirmalive defense of issue preclusion.
As a general rule, we cannot conclude tbat litiga-
tion failing upon an affitmative defense is brought
without probable cause. No careful practitioner
would pursue a client's rights if there were the
·remotest chance that the litigation would be
terminated upon an atTumative plea thereby
exposing counsel to personal liability. CR 8.03.
Upon the reconI herein, we are of the opinion that
it would have required an onerous ratiocination, if
not clairvoyance, of counsel to conclude, as a
matter of law, tbat the second litigation would be
unsuccessful. Many years ago, the opinion of
learned and able counsel, Wt there exists no
chance to lose a case, prompted our highest Court
to observe that "this court knows judicially there
is always a chance to lose in any kind of a lawsuit
......Moormanv.LouisvilleTrwtCo.• 181 Ky. 30,
203 S.W. 856, 859 (1918). This being true, we
think it logical to observe that there is always a
chance to win even a case with the poorest
expectations. In the matter at hand, we are of the
opinion the circuit court erred in concluding that
the threshold requirement of lack of probable
cause was met. The complaint should have been
dismissed.
The remaining contentions on appeal are moot.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court is reversed.
All concur..
Before: Gantner, Johnson and Miller, Judges.
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
RIB STATUTE
The statute providing for retraining incen-
tive benefits in the case of workers suffering
from coal miner's pneumoconiosis and tile
classifications created therein found to be
rationally related to a legitimate state objective
and so not violative of employer's due process
under Section 2ofthe Kentucky Constitution-
Lost Mountain Mining v. Fields (95-CA-
000697-WC); On review from the Workers' Com-
pensation Board; Opinion by Chief Judge Lester.
affirming, rendered 3/1196. (This opiaioa Is _ flaal
ad ........ be deed as audlority in a.y courts 01 the
e-waItII otKentuclty. CR 700.)
This is a petition for review of an opinion of
the Workers' Compensation Board affirming the
opinion and award of the Administrative Law
Judge. The petition deals with the following
questions of law: whether KRS 342.732(1 Xa) is
constitutional under Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution in that it denies the employer the
right to due process by imposing consequences so
unjust as to work a hardship and whether this case
is governed by the amended version of OS
342.732(I)(a), effective April 4, 1994, so tbat a
working miner is not entided to directly receive
Retraining Incentive Benefits (hereinafter RIB).
In reaching our decision that the RIB slatUte is
constitutional, we borrow generously from the
SupremeCourt'sopinion in Kentucky lIarlanCoal
Compatry v.Holmes, Ky., 872 S.W.2d 446 (l994),
which declared KRS 342.732( I )(d) constitutional.
The Holmes Court rejected the notion that
OS 342.732(1)(d) violates due process under
Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution by impos-
ing unjust or irrational consequences. The statute
involves the regulation of economic matters,
therefore, it must be rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental objective to pass due process
muster. "1'be constitutionality of a statute will be
upheld if its classification is not arbitraty, or if it
is founded upon any substantial distinction sug-
gesting the necessity or propriety of such legisla-
tion." Hol~s. sfl/Jra, at 455. We believe the
SupremeCourt's holding in Holmes. supra. speaks
not only to OS 342.732(I)(d), but also to (I)(a)
and the other two subsections:
Decidedly, KRS 342.732 and the classifica-
tions created therein are rationally related to a
legitimate state objective, affording protection
to all of Kentucky industry, (and hence, the
employment/jobs of Kentucky workers) from
an economic drain caused by Special Fund
assessments for compensation claims directly
related to the coal industry, and particularly
those due to high incidence of coal workers'
pneumoconiosis. As the problem the legisla-
ture sought to solve was attributable to the
coal industry, the solution therefor need deal
. only with ~orkers of that industry. Said
otherwise, the classification of coal workers
with pneumoconiosis was founded on a
substantial distinction that was necessary in
view of the legislative history.
Id.
KRS 342.732. including subsection (I)(a),
furthers the goals of lessening the economic drain
on the Special Fund caused by claims due to coal
4 '. 36 K.L.S. 7 6/30/89
have been presented to the jury 86 bearing
upon the ultimate question of whether
IIPlleUees excrcised ordinary care. KRS 189.290
requires th..t '{t]he operator o( any vehicle
upon a higbWlly shall operate the vehiclc in
a careful manner, with regard for the safety
and convenience of pedestrians ..nd other
vehicle' upon the highways: In Commercial.
C4rrIn'J, Inc.. II. SmtrU, 217 Ky. 189, 126 S.W.2d
143 (19391, it was held that a per:lOn driving
a motor vehicle haVing a width greater thllR
the ordinary passenSer vehicle, evClt though
the width is perDliUed by statute, mullt taJte
that fact into·Consideration tlto he endeavor$ to
exercise ordinary care in its operation.
"Evidence 01 a custom in a trade, bushle~,
profe&Cion or uRinS isadnli~eto prove any
maten.al element of a claim. LaWGOll. Kentucky
Ellidena UJw Handbook 5 Z.Z5 IZd Bd. 1984).
In tl,is case. evidence of tbe custom of f.rmers
ill the area i5 admissible ..Ii bearing UpOn
appe1Ica' exercise of ordinary Clue. Mohan II.
noggetr. 27 Ky. Law Rep. 103, 84 S.W. 525
(19051. lWhere sawdust blew from defendant's
uwmiU and caused dtamage to plaintiff's
home. evidence of a custom by other sawmills
to bum their sawdust ruled admi56ible to prove
negligem:el. QlJdnngti, N.D. ... 7'exas Pac. B.C)).
v. ~r, Ky•• 328 S_W.2d 525(1959'. (Where
defmant's train&t~kplaintiff's Gtcamshovel
while steamshovel was on the railroad
crossios, evidence of a cu,toan by heavy
equipment tran&pOrters to notify ~oadwhen
the equipment would be crowns held
admiuible to prove negligence to pl..intiff,.
11116 principle iG simil8rly used by federal
courts. GriM' v. Piratone Ie: RublMr Co.• 513
P.2d 851 18th Cir. 19'15).
"In addition to the improper exclusion of
L-vidence. it WM error for the trial court to
pcrmit appellees. ovet objection by appellants,
to question him about a InJbacquent UDrcll,ted
autl)lttobile 8ceident. It is weD settled that
evidence of a penon'a tmdency to act areNDy
Ot carelessly is not admissible to prove that he
IlCted that w..y all a particular ocCASiOD.
lollw$OIl, supra S 2.25. Similarly. evidence of
otbu nesJisent acts ebould be excluded when
offered to ptOVe neslisence on a particular
oc~n.Xy·WeIt Vd. Gas Co. v. SlOfle, Ky., 238
S.W.2d 416 11951). Moore v. Bolhl!, Ky., 479
S.W.2d 634119721. An exception to these rules
has ~en permitted where the •..ets ace
connected in some special way. indiating a
relevancy beyond mere similarity in certain
particulars: Massie II. Salmon. Ky., 277 S.W.2d
49. 51 (19551. Price v. Btues, Ky., 320 S.W.2d
786 {19591. Upon retrial. evIdence of the
sllbGequent accident 'haII 110t be pennitted.
"Acc..'Ofdingly, the judgment entered JiU\uary
29. 19a8, is revened anel this case is remanded
for a new trial."
All concur.
Before: F.1~ick, Hayes and Howard. Judges.
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
EVIDENCE
FINDING OF TOTAl, DISABILITY WHILE
(~ONTlNUlNG PULL TIME
F.MPLOYMENT
Employee who died 00 tbe weekend
.'le1' hlslalt r,,11 day of war" found by the
Workers' Compen511tlon Board to have
been suffering from pncumoconlosi.. and
to have hern totally occupationally
diAbled on hiG I....' day of work-Held
that employee could Dot b.ve been totally
diHbled on hlsla" Cull day (1f work sln<:e
he had worked a full dlly, the continuation
In full time employment creatlDg ...
conduahl'e prelUrnptloD of nondlsabtHty
-Board'., declllon found aot to have been
based upon ,ub.tantlal evidence, its
opinion and award being contrary to
est.bUshed law-
&ale Y. Rutherford; Perry Cir. Ct., Manis. J.:
OpinioD by Judge Reynoldll, rt"l1ersing,
rendered S/S{89 and ordered published
6/23189. fI'hIs ttp........ tl not fln..t .......IuIU not be
cu.d ... autborlty In a ..J' court. of th..
Common..ealth of Kcalud<)'. CR74UO.1
"This is an 8ptleal by the Special Pund in (l
workers' compcn68tiou case from a Perry
Circuit Court judgmc:nt which affirmed an
opinion and award of the Workerc;'
Compensation Board finding appellee',
decedent lotally occU(llltlonally disabled as a
result of t:041 workers' pneumoconiosili at; of
Ibe last day of his employment.
"Appellee's decedent, Reuben E. J.
Rutherlord. had been employed by various
empluyers in the COlli mining industry (or
approximately 25 years. On Priday, DecembCT
28, 1984. he worked • full day fot his
employer. P.C. & H, CoQt...~ Company.
The subsequent weekend, Mr. Rutherford died
as s result of cardiopulmonary f.i1ure. An
autopsy determined that he also was suffcl'iftS
from coal workers' pneumocolllo&is which
mllY have possibly contributed to his death.
"The Wo~kers' Compensation Board found
that while there was not sufficient medical
evidence to support Ii Einding that decedent',
death was caused by pneumoconiosis he was.
lleverthek&li. toIa1ly occupiltionaUy disabled Ilf;
a result of this occupational di&ease as of
December 28. 1984, his last day of
cm(lloyment. Accordingly, the Board awarded
survivor cfuability benclits to his estate and
widow, IlpPOrtioning liebility 75% to the
Special Fund artd 25'J11 to the employer P.C.
&. H. Contracting Company.
•'On appeal appellant ali6crt, tbatthe Board
erred in ..wlIrding benefits to appellee'S
decedetlt based on the lact that he was totally
disabled by the pneumoconiosis and the
findings are not supported by substantial
evidence:. We agree.
"A reviewing court cannot substitute its
evaluation of the weiSht and credibility of the
evidence (or that of the Workers'
Compensation BOllrd, neverthelelili. the
findings of filet of the Board. when it decides
in favor of a claimant. must be supported by
liubstantial evidencc. Sm)l2er v. B. Jo: Goodflch
Chemical Company. Ky.. 474 SW.2d 367(1971).
Substantial evidence means evidence of
substance and relevant consequence hllving
the fitnesli to induce convictio/1 in the minds
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of reasonable men. O'Nun \I. Eckler Moore
Express. Inc., Ky., 339 S.W.Zd 466 119601.
"The Roard, after reviewinR both lay and
medic.al testimnny, found Mr. Rutherford wali
suffering from the (l(:CUfI.tionai disease of coal
wotkers' yneumoconio5ili. Ai • result of this
disease. It determined that he wa, totally
(l(."Cupatiol1ally disabled as of December 28,
19M, hill tut day ofenlployment lind two day'
before hili death. While the evidence in the;
reeord appeara cOJ'clu&ively to show that
decl.-dt:nt Rutherford wali suffeting from
poeumOCQniosi", we conclude that he eouId
not be totallr DCc\lpatiomd'y disahled from this
di8eBIiC 11$ CI December 28, 1984. since he had
worked a fuU day On this date.
"The continuation of 8 workman in luU time
C:lnployment creates II conclusive presumption
of nQll(li$ability. ('.aldwell v. Ynr.om, Ky. App.,
514 S.W.zd 913119"9). It has been establiahcd
that Il worker is not di5ablcd 60 long as he can
continue to perform his duticli to the
satisfaction of bill employer, even though he
may experience :lOme di6Comfort in doinS :10.
Low/I v. OJbome Mining Corporation, Ky., 395
S.W.2d 596 119651; Stepherd Elkhorn Coerl
Compall)l v. Tibw, Ky., 374 S.W.2d 50411964'.
..Appellee relies upon Beth-BlUarn
C))rporarion v. Dotl/CIll, Ky., 428 S.W.2d 32
(19681· We determine that tlte facti in thisC8lle
Ilre clearly distinguishable. We bold that the
Board's decIsion was not based upon
substantial evidence .nd that its opinion and
lIward is contrary to established Jaw.
"The judgment of the trial court i$ reversed
with directions that the case be remanded to
the Wotkers' Compensation Board for entry
of. final order consislent with tbis opinion."
DUJ'n. J. COt\C\lfS.
Clayton, J. dissents.
POWERS OF ATTORNEY
CONVEYANCH OF REAL PROPERTY
JNTnNTION
A power of attorney must ,pedflully
gr~nt. pnwrr to convey teal e.tate and •
"catch·all" provision Is not sufflclcnt-
The intention of tbe pClt1lea to a power
of attorney muat be determined from the
Instrument ItAelC and parol evtdc:nce can
be used to detcrmlne their Intention only
Whf!D the: words used are amblguou5-
Robert!lon II. Vaughh; Graves Cir. Ct..
Daughaday, J.; Opinion by Judge Dyche.
affirming, rendered 6123/89. flb" oplntQR .. not
ftoaf and IhaH not be: dIed a. authQrlty b. II"Y
(o",.-Ie of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
CR7fi.30·1
"Robert B. and Laverta R. Roberlson appeal
frOID orden of the Graves Circuit Court which
iet aside a deed of conveyllnce to them and
restored the realty transferred theteby to
James Vaughn.
"james Vaughn made C.W. VllUghJl his
attonley.in.fact on Mur(:h 4, 1986: the Power
of Attorney document lexcept fClt the notary
/itatementl re.ads as f~ll Clw':
6/30/89
'This Power of Attorney made and entered
into by Jamet; Vaughn of 2105 Ohio Street,
Paducflb, Kentucky. party of the first part;
and C.W. Vaughll, of 1401 Cumberlllnd
Avenue:, Pflducah, Kentucky, party of the
se¢<nld part.
'WitllC6Seth: 'fllal wherea$. the party of the
first part is a poot person and unable to
engage In or accept employment and is in
need of financial assistance;
'Now, therefore, the party of the fust part
d\~ hereby constitute lind appoint the party
of the second pert my true and Illwful
attorney·in-fact to make 4Wlication for such
financial assistance, I1ndlor benefits to which
the party of tbe first part may be entitled.
or eligible, to any agenCy of the Slale or
federal government, end to receive any
checks to which pony of the firat part IlllIy
be entitled to, endorse all checks made
payable to the Pllrty of the first part. lind to
deposit them in a bank accnunt; to make
withdrllwls Isicl from the account in
paymcnt for his upkt.-c:p. medical and
hospital and nursing home expenses.
'The party of the second part i6 hereby
4uthoriHd and empowered .Ienerally to do
and perform Itll acts that 1 rRlght do, and the
party of the first part does hereby ratify and
confirm all acts of the party of the second
pan lhat may be done under this power of
attorney:
James Vaughn made 'his mark' to execute the
document.
"The present conlro"er~yarose when C.W.
Vaughn executed. deed conveying James's
real estate to the appellant•• citing the power
of attorney liS authority. Arlie Vaupn, all next
friend of James, filed a comploint which
alleged that the attorney-in.faet had m> power
to convey the real estate, that the power of
attorney was obtained through fraud.
deception aod false preten$e& .nd that at the
time of the execution of the power ofanorney,
Jame5 was 'mentally retarded aDd under legRI
disability rendering him unable to contract:
The c(lInpl.int further alleged that C.W.
Vautchn had converted the proceeds of the sale
to has own u".
"Upon motion of the plaintiffs, the court
granted 8 partial summ8lfY disposition of the
case (CR 54.0! and CR 561 which set IIl>ide the
deed and re6toredthe real estate to James.
"The gr.ntees of the deed now appeal.
claiming that they should be alloweit to
introducl'! proof concerning James', 'oral
ratification' .lId 'acquiescence' to the Ale. We
disagree.
"The intention 01 the parties in executing
such an instrument must be determilJcd from
the words ill the instrument ibelf; parol
evidence cannot be \l6ed to determine the
intention of the parties unless tbe words used
in the instrument are IIombiguous. Kt"tuchy-
West Virgi"ia Gos Qlmpan)1 II. Brow"ih8, Ky.,
5Z1 S.W.2d 516 (19751.
.'The' dOClnnent involved here is not
ambiguoul>; no power to convey real estate WlI$
gnlnted. In order lor an attomey·in-f$ct to
possess su<:h a power. the language in the
power of attorney document must specifically
grant same; & 'catcb aU' provillion such as the
36 K.L.S. 7
one involved herein dOe$ not permit the
IIttorney-in.fact to cOl1vey real e$tatc.
Summary judgment was pro~r. and we affirm
the Graves Circuit Court."
All concur.
Before: Dyche, Embcnon and Miller, Judges.
FHTlnONS FOR REHEARING, ETC.
FILED AND FINALITY ENDORSEMENTS
ISSUED BETWEEN
JUNE Z, 1989,3:00 P.M. and
JUNE 23, 1989, 10:00 A.M.
(C~ Prevlou.ly Di'~$t~d1a K,L,S,)
PRTJTIONS:
FuIIrC!r:MJn II. Ford Motor Co.• 36 K.L.S. 6. p.
6, filed 615189.
MOTIONS for elltcnsion of time t(l file
petitions: None.
FINALITY ENDORSEMENTS;
During the period from June 2. 1989,
through June 23. 1989, the foflowing finality
endOr$CPlcnts were issued on opinions which
were: designated lo be published. The
following 0p'iniolls are finlllllnd may be cited
as autllorlty in all the courts of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. CR76.30.
CityofCovingtofl II. hart!. 36 K.L.S. 5. p. 12.
on 611/89.
TIpton v. Com., 36 K.L.S. 4. p. 10. on 6/16/89.
Liters Quarry, IJlc. v. Edda}' and /hale v.
Bddav, 35 K.L.S. 14, p. 8, on 6/22189.
Mo"tsomery v. Midkiff, 36 K.L.S. 5. p. 4. on
6122189.
Ramlall Co. v. Special }<)md. 36 K.L.S. 5, p.
5. on 612Z189.
Watson v. CrittendC!fl Co. Fi&ool Court, 36
K.L.S. 6, p. 15, On 61Z3I89.
RULINGS 01'1 pe:titions previously filed:
Sulton v. 1'rQn$. Cabinet. 36 K.L.s. 5, p. 3.
denied 6116189.
Gelllry II. Gentry, 36 K.L~S. 4. p. 4, granted
in part and denied in part and opinion of
3/17189 withdrawn and reissued 6116189.
(See "OTHER" 36 K.L.S. 1. p.51
Adams Y. Neil HIl/fmIJ" NWGtI, Inc., 36 K.L.S.
5. p. 9, denied 61Z3I89.
OTHER:
Stat~ Farm Mutual Automobile: lFUl. Co. v.
Maitls, 36 K.L.S. 6, p. 14: opinion modified by
order entered 619189 by adding to {oob\ote 1
the follOWing: "An Ohio court for rcasons not
made clear to this court ruled that policy was
not applicable" . and by correcting the citatiQn
in paragtaph 1 to Bishop II. Allstate ll'/$l(rance
Co.• Ky. 623 S.W.:Zd 865 119811.
Sutlon v. TransporfatilJll C~biJ1ct, 36 K.L.S. 5.
p. 3; opiniOl\ modified. by order of 6/16/89 by
deletion of the word "ate" in the lut sentence
of fourth paragtaph lind by substitution
therefor of tbe word "is".
Gentry v. Gentry, 36 K.L.S. 4, p. 4, opinion
withdrawn by order of 6/16189 and a new
5
opinion issued wherein t~ fiftJl fulllJlllBgrapb
of the cmllinal opinitln was withdrawn and tbc'
following paraglllph 5ubstihded therefor: "''h!'
wife ar8u(.~ that the agreement by its clear
terrmll related onty to the pt'opcrty rights of
lhe surviving Spou5<! in the deceased spouse's
property upon the death of either of tJlem and
that the court erred by considering parol
evidence in arriving at the parties' iIlt<:nt. We
believe that the agreement was amhiguous as
to whether it was to glwem the property right:;
of the parties in all events or only in the event
of death. Both the preamble and the body of
the agreement strongty indicate I1n intention
that the property I.!aC'h party owned at the: time
(\f marriage or thereafter acqUired should
remain the individual property of that pllrty
frcc from any ihterest in or cl.im by tbc l)ther.
Th~ final p«ragrapb of the agreement
manifests. morelimited purpose:. Under t11l~
c:ircum.tances. we do not believe the court
erred in rc:lyillg upon evidence extrinsic to thle'
agreemc:nt. Blevins Y. RiedlinJt, 289 Ky. 335. 158
S.W.2d 646 1194!. Purtheflnurc, its findings
with respect to the intetd of the partes were
supported by substintial mdenre and are
therefore, not clearly erronc:ous. Se,. CR
52.01:'
Bichel·Gibson As.~iote3. Inc. II. [lI8Uranu Co.
of North AmerlC(J, 36 K.L.S. 7. p. l' opinion
m<.Jdified~ order entered 6123189 to ~ow thal
JU~8~Gudgel dissenled but filed 110 liCparate
~lllmon.
--RNlJ COURT OF APPEALS --~
CRIMINAL LAW
KIGHT TO COUNSEL
Once III c;harl~d defendant ha.
speclficlIlUy l'cque.ted coun.el in
connedlon with ulmes for which he haa
been charged. he cannot be {urtheT
quc5tioned about tbo5e charges ot
$CpIIr4lr andinde~entC"'.5without
coun.e. belaa informed-Howe"cr,
defendaat 10\lnd not tl) belve I'equated
~ouD.el and .0 his buertoSatlon
c~ncerolagIOparlllte C!harse. (Ot which he
WillS .ub-equently eonvkted IIInd which
waa omy In the investigative stage did not
vlollllte his cOll5titudOItlll. rlghta-
Com. v. WilliQlftIOn: On review frl)111 Coun
of Appe.als: Opinion by}lWtic:e Gant. rew:rsing.
renden:d 6129/89. (ThIloplnlon Is ROt fleal .nd
IIi.O itot br- dtfll.,.utborlty lJt iny court. of the
Comlllonw".lch oC Kclltuc.ky. Ctu6.30.1
"In this case, respondent entered a plCl1 (>f
g.Ullty to four counts of second degree robbery
(amended kom firSl d"gree robbery! and to
one count of being a second degree persistent
f~lony offender. which, in turn. had been
amended from first degree PFO. He was
sentenced to 15 years in prison by judgment
of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Md. pursuant
to Rer 8.09. reserved hi6 right lo appeal. The
Court of APJ1e.als found no merit in two of hi..;
lhree allegations of error. but reversed his
conviction on the third-this beillH the legality
of a tine-up and confession.
K(b) . 86
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Case Law Update
I. Taxation - Illinois Tool Works v. Kentucky Revenue Cabinet, Franklin Circuit Court.
A. Background Generally.
1. Historically, as part of their license tax liability calculations, companies paying
taxes In Kentucky must include the amount of stock owned in subsidiary companies. In addition,
prior to 1976, Kentucky law required corporations domiciled, or headquartered, within the state to
pay license tax on the holding corporation, including stock owned in any subsidiaries. In 1976, the
Kentucky legislature recognized this as double taxation and enacted KRS 136.071, which provided
Kentucky domiciled companies with a deduction in this calculation. This deduction has been viewed
by business development organizations as a valuable economic development tool for Kentucky,
designed to encourage businesses to headquarter here and expand.
B. The IUlnois Tool Works Decision.
1. On December 5, 2002, the Franklin Circuit Court in Illinois Tool Works v.
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet declared the corporate license tax deduction available to in-state holding
corporations unconstitutional- essentially reinstating this double taxation for Kentucky companies.
The ruling claimed Kentucky tax law provided in-state corporations with preferential treatment.
2. The Circuit Court ordered refunds to be paid to out-of-state holding
companies that had not previously been eligible for the deduction. It also ruled that the tax benefits
will no longer be available to any company, foreign or domestic, beginning in the 2004 tax year.
C. Impact Of The Decision Generally And Upon Banking In Particular.
1. Majorchambers ofcorrunerce, trade associations, and business development
organizations are concerned about the impact of the decision. They have argued that within the
year, Kentucky will see its most profitable businesses moving assets to other states such as Ohio,
where holding companies are not subject to franchise tax; Tennessee, where parent companies are
given a deduction for subsidiaries; and Indiana, which does not even have a corporate license tax.
They argue that if physical facilities follow, hundreds of thousands of job will be lost. They argue
that legislation addressing the decision is necessary to prevent double taxation of holding
companies in order to encourage Kentucky·based companies to stay in the state and to encourage
out-of-state companies to relocate here.
2. Impacts On Bank Holding Companies.
a. The banking industrygenerally contends that the ruling would result in
a particularly hard hit for Kentucky financial institutions because of their unique tax structure,
designed through the Bank Franchise Tax-a tax that was to be paid 'in lieu of other taxes.'
b. The Bank Franchise Tax takes into account surplus; capital stock paid
in; undivided profit and capital reserve; net unrealized holding gains or losses on available for sale
securities; cumulative foreign currency translation adjustments and equity related to investment in
subsidiaries (net capital). The Bank Franchise Tax was designed after the banking industryand the
Kentucky Revenue Cabinet negotiated in 1996 to develop a new 'tax neutral' structure, in lieu ofall
other corporate faxes, for the banking industry as a whole. The assumption of the banking industry,
and as staled in the statute, was that the general corporate license tax (imposed by 136.071)would
not apply to banks.
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c. The Illinois Tool decision is perceived to result in essentially a double
tax on banks because of the way bank stock is held. Most banks are operated in a holding company
structure, and the holding company often has no assets or operational purpose other than to hold
the stock of the subsidiary bank. Ifyou remove the bank subsidiary deduction, the license tax on the
bank holding company becomes just a tax on the bank stock. But, because the bank Is already
taxed, this is considered inequitable and not in spirit with the assurances made when the bank
franchise tax was passed.
E. The Governor's Veto Of legislation To Address The Decision.
1. A proposal to address this problem was developed by the business
community with assistance from state revenue officials. The proposal allowed in-stale holding
companies to keep most of the deduction (90 percent), with the remainder used to cover the cost of
extending that same level ofdeduction to out of state corporations with operations in Kentucky. The
proposal was intended to address the Franklin Circuit Court's objection to the inconsistent treatment
of in-state and out-of·state corporations while having no adverse impact on state revenues.
2. The proposal was included as part of House Bill 390 during the 2003
legislative session. Although HB 390 was passed, on April 3, 2003, Governor Patton vetoed the
provisions relating to the Illinois Tool amendment The veto occurred after the General Assembly
had adjourned, leaving no opportunity for the veto to be overridden.
II. Punitive Damages.
1. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01·
1289 (4nI03)
a. Punitive damage award of $145 million in insurance "bad faith" case was
excessive and violated the Dupe Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
b. Reaffirming the three factor test of BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996): (1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed In
comparable cases.
c. Extraterritoriality concerns of the Court:
i. "A State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have been
lawful where it occurred."
ii. "As a general rule" a State does not ~have a legitimate concern in
imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts corrmitted outside of the State's
jurisdiction:
iiI. "lawful out.af-state conduct may be probative when it demonstrates
the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's action in the State where it is tortuous, but that
conduct must have a nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."
d. Punitive Damage MulUples:
I. Min practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages, to a significant degrees, will satisfy due process.·
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ii. Large ratios, however, may be permissible where "a particularly
egregious act has resulted In only a small amount of economic damages."
iii. 'When compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio,
perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process
guarantee."
2. sand Hill Energy. Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 83 S.W.3d 483 (Ky. 5/16/02).
a. Jury awarded of $20,000,000 punitive damages in a product liability action
claiming a 1977 truck transmission was defectively designed thereby causing the death ofman who
was crushed when the truck allegedly slipped out of gear and rolled backwards crushing him. Jury
awarded $3,000,000 In compensatory damages.
b. Kentucky Supreme Court acknowledged that under U.S. Supreme Court
precedent, a Kentucky appellate court must "review the amount of punitive damages de novo" and
apply the three factors set forth in Cooper v. Leatherman, 532 U.S. 424 (2001), and BMW v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
c. However, the Supreme Court also noted that "this Court has in recent years
encountered punitive damages in several cases and shown no particular disinclination to uphold
such awards where the evidence justified it." Id., 83 S.W.3d at 495.
d. After considering the factors, the Kentucky Supreme Court set aside
$5,000,000 and upheld $15,000,000 in punitive damages (five times actuals).
III. Marshalling Of Assets - M.A. Walker Co. v. PBK Bank. Inc., 95 S.W.3d 70 (12127102).
1. Gravel supplier that obtained a mechanics lien against real property in subdivision
successfully raised marshalling of assets arguments against banks that had mortgages on lots in
that subdivision and also on lots in a second subdivision.
2. Marshalling argument could be raised by subordinate lienholdereven after the senior
lienholder had entered into a settlement agreement with borrower and had released the other
sources of collateral.
3. Gravel supplier could not seek to recover on letter ofcredit issued by senior lienholder
which named Madison County Fiscal Court as beneficiary even though the purpose of the letter of
credit was to assure that the builder would build roads in first subdivision. Gravel supplier was not
the named beneficiary under the letterof credit and, as an equitable matter, the issuing bank should
not be compelled to assume the risk of the builder's nonperformance of Its contract with the gravel
supplier.
IV. KRS 376.065 & Performance Bond IndemnityAgreements -Intercarno Insurance Co. v.
B.W. Farrell, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 422 (Ky.App. 10/25102).
1. Kentucky's continuing guaranty statute (KRS 376.065) did not apply to an indemnity
agreement executed by construction companies and their shareholders in favor of an insurance
company acting as surety on construction performance bonds.
2. Although the statute "applpes] to more than just those guaranties of instruments which
qualify as commercial paper," it does not apply to "the type of indemnityagreements at issue in this
case."
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3. Test: MThe essential distinction between an indemnity contract [outside the scope of
the statute) and a contract of guaranty [within the scope of the statute) is that the promisor in any
indemnity contract undertakes to protect his promisee against loss ordamage through liability on the
part of the latter to a third person, while the undertaking of a guarantor or surety is to protect the
promisee against loss or damage through the failure of a third person to carry out his obligations to
the promisee.-
4. Kentucky trial court properly exercise personal jurisdiction over Indemnitors who
signed the agreement in Kentucky and also over indemnitorwho resided in and signed agreement in
Louisiana. The out-of-state's indemnitor's economic interest in the corporation which had an office
in and did business in Kentucky furnished the minimum contacts needed to satisfy constitutional due
process concerns.
V. Arbitration.
1. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01-800 (1210/02).
a. Where securities arbitration rules imposed a 6-year deadline for seeking
arbitration, decision about whether a securities brokerage customer had timely filed a petition for
arbitration was to be decided by the arbitrator not the courts.
b. Issues ofprocedural arbitrability such a "time limits, notice, latches, estoppel
and other conditions precedent to an obligation to arbitrate have been mer are matters
"presumptively for the arbitrator-.
2. Pacificare Health Systems. Inc. v. Book, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 02-215 (417/03).
a. Compelling arbitration of RICO claims brought by physicians against
managed care organizations for alleged failures to property reimbUrse them for health care services.
Physicians had argued that provisions in arbitration agreements prohibited the award of punitive
damages potentially precluded the award of RICO treble damages thereby rendering arbitration a
forum where they could not obtain meaningful relief if a RICO claim were proven.
b. Supreme Court ordered arbitration because it was unclearwhat the impact of
the remedy restriction would be in the arbitration since the arbitrator (a) might find no violation of
RICO or (b) might award treble damages based upon prior decisions of the Supreme Court
indicating that the purpose of RICO's treble damage award was remedial and not punitive.
3. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Sprowls, 82 S.W.3d 193 (Ky. 8/26/02).
a. Female employee could not be compelled to arbitrate sex discrimination claim
where employee did not have notice that employer was amending employment handbook to Indude
arbitration clause.
b. Denial of arbitration was not Immediately appealable under Kentucky's state
arbitration act since KRS 417.050 expressly provides that "This chapter does not apply to: (1)
arbitration agreements between employers and employees or between their respective
representatlves.-
4. Higdon v. Construction Arbitration Associates, Ltd., 71 S.W.3d 131 (Ky.App. 3/1/02).
a. Arbitrators and their sponsoring organizations are entitled to quasi-judicial
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immunity for all acts within the scope of the arbitral process.
b. Disgruntled arbitration participant cannot sue arbitrator and its sponsoring
organization for alleged errors during arbitration proceeding.
VI. Set-orrs.
1. Lopez v. Washington Mutual Bank, FA, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
No. 01-15303 (8/6/02).
a. Bank's practice of using direcUy deposited Social Security and SSI benefits to
cover overdrafts and overdraft fees did not violate the "ant-attachment" provisions of 42 U.S.C.
§407(a) because the set-off was not an "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process· but was the voluntary repayment of a debt pursuant to the account's contract terms.
b. The plaintiff's state law claims were preempted by the OTS' regulation (12
C.F.R. §557.11) which preempts all state laws purporting to regulate a federally-charted thrifts
deposit activities and deposit-related powers.
2. Washington State Dep't of Social & Health services v. Guardianship Estate of
Keffer1r;r, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01-1420 (2125/03).
a. Washington state's use of foster child's Social Security benefits to reimburse
Itself for foster care costs did not violate the "ant-attachment" provisions of 42 U.S.C. §407(a)
because the use did not arise out of a "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment. or other legal
process."
b. The phrase ·other legal process· is a "legal ter[m] of art" which "should be
understood to be process much like the processes of execution, levy, attachment and garnishment,
and at a minimum, would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasi-judicial mechanism,
though not necessarily an elaborate one, bywhich control over property passes from one person to
another in order to discharge or secure discharge of an allegedly existing or anticipated liability.II
3. In re Sharp, 286 B.R. 627 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Ky. 8/9/02).
a. Where IRS had not objected to bankrupt debtor's $1,000 claimed exemption
under KRS 427.160 to income tax refund, IRS' right to set off income tax refund against prior year's
tax liability was subject to the exemption.
VII. Uncashed Cashier's Check - Raichel v. Raiche', 65 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 2001).
1. Uncashed cashier's check found among decedenfs possession was the property of
the surviving payee where the check was payable to decedent "or" surviving payee.
2. For purposes of determining ownership of the cashier's check, majority applied the
rules of Kentucky's Multiple Party Account Statute and characterized the cashier's check as an
"account" within the meaning of KRS 391,3OO(1} since it was, in their view, an "other like
arrangemenr similar to a "contract of deposit of funds between a depositor and a financial
institution" which statutorily includes a "certificate of deposit."
3. The dissent (Justices Lambert and Johnstone) expressed concern that the decision
could effectively eliminate dower rights, and they would have had the check be part of the
decedent's estate since it was in his possession.
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VIII. IOLTAAccounts - Brown v. Legal Foundation Of Washington, U.S. Supreme Court, No.
01-1325 (3126/03).
1. The state of Washington's IOLTA program survives a Fifth Amendment "takings"
challenge on the ground that the program has no adverse economic impact on the attorney clients
since (a) the IOLTA programs constitute a "pUblic use" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment,
(b) funds that could generate net income for a client are required to be deposited in non-lOllA
accounts, and (c) use of IOLTA accounts In all other cases does not cause adverse economic
impact for which the state must provide "just compensation."
IX. Determining Reasonableness Of An Attorneys Fee Claim - Inn-Group Management
Serv.. Inc. v. Greer, 71 S.W.3d 125 (Ky.App. 1/25/02).
1. Reasonableness of attorneys fee claim is (a) an issue of law for the court when the
attorneyand/or client seeks to recover a reasonable attorney fee from an opposing or third partyand
(b) an issue of fact for the fact finder when the action is between an attorney and his or her client.
X. Loan Origination/Remedies For Breach - A marican Farm Mortgage Co.. I nco v. A G
America. FCB, 232 F.Supp.2d 721 (W.O.Ky. 10/31/02).
1. Contract between originator/sellerofagricultural loans and purchaser proVided three
alternative remedies in the event of breach by seller: (a) cure; (b) replacement or (c) repurchase.
2. Seller had the right to choose the option even though Itwas the breaching part where
the agreement did not clearly place option with purchaser and purchaser was drafter of the
agreement
XI. Corporate Successor Liability - Pearson v. National Feeding Systems. Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46
(Ky. 11/21/02).
1. In a products liability lawsuit, the purchaser of the assets of a bankrupt grain silo
manufacturer could not be held liable undera successor-in-interest theory for personal injurycaused
by silo manufactured by asset selling company.
2. General rule: Mit Is generallyaccepted in Kentucky that a corporation which purchases
another corporation does not assume the payment ofany debts or liabilities of the corporation which
it has purchased."
3. Four exceptions, none applicable under the facts of the case:
a.
other liabilities;
b.
purchaser;
c.
corporation; or
d.
for such debts.
Where the purchaserexpressly or impliedly agrees to assume such debts or
Where the transaction amounts to a consolidation or mergerof the sellerand
Where the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling
Where the transaction is entered into fraudulently in order to escape liability
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XII. Attorney-CUent Privilege· Lexington Public Library v. Clark, 90 S.W.3d 53 (Ky. 11/21/02);
Hahn v. University of LouiSVille, 80 S.W.3d 771 (Ky.App. 7/20/01).
1. Extensive discussion of the application of the lawyer-client privilege to
communications made by employees of a client that is a "corporation, association, or other
organization orentity" under KRS 503(a)(1) as part of a company's decision whetheror not to fire an
employee.
2. Sample protective caveat: "Please provide me with the information requested herein
in order to facilitate the bank's obtaining confidential legal advice in connection with the subject
matter and in anticipation of potential litigation."
XIII. Expert Witness Compensation - Tuttle v. Perry, 82 S.W.3d 920 (Ky. 8/22/02).
1. Plaintiffs In medical malpractice action could cross-examine defense expert witness
as to amount of fees earned as evidence of fee was relevant to issue of potential bias on the part of
the expert witness.
XIV. Kentucky Consumer Protection Act - Simmons v. Stephenson, 84 S.W.3d 926 (Ky.App.
8/16/02).
1. Allegations of misconduct in the actual performance of medical services or the actual
practice of medicine are not "trade" or "commerce" within the meaning of those terms as used in
Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act, KRS 367.110 et seq.
2. Only when physicians "are engaging in the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business
aspect of the practice ofmedicine are they engaged in "trade or commerce- within the scope of the
KCPA.
3. Plaintiff's claim that during cataract surgery a portion ofher lens wrongfully fell into her
eye was not actionable under the KCPA.
XV. Employee VB. Independent Contractor - Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Comm'n v.
Landmark Community Newspapers of Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 91 S.W.3d 575 (12/19/02).
1. Substantial evidence supported finding of KUIC that newspaper carriers were
employees not Independent contractors for unemployment insurance purposes.
2. Determination of whether a person is an employee or independent contractor is a
case-by-case determination after reviewing the factors set out in Restatement (Second) of Agency
§220(2).
XVI. Any Willing Provider - Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans. Inc. v. Miller, U.S. Supreme Court,
No. 00-1471 (4/2/03).
1. Kentucky's "AnyWilling Provider" statute, KRS 304.17A-270, which prohibits insurers
from discriminating against providers willing to meet the terms and conditions of participation in a
health benefit plan, is not preempted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974.
XVII. Settlement Agreements.
1. Archerv. Warner, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01-1418 (3/31103).
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a. A debt for money promised in a settlement agreement accompanied by a
release of underlying tort claims can amount to a debt for money obtained by fraud within the
meaning of the nondlschargeability provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A».
2. Cantrell Supply. Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381 (Ky.App. 12/27/02).
a. Trial court did not err In its interpretation of an ambiguous settlement
agreement between shipper of overweight package and workers compensation carrier that paid
benefits to employee allegedly Injured by shipper's negligence in labeling the weight of the package.
b. "An agreement to settle legal claims is essentially a contract subject to the
rules of contract interpretation."
XVIII. Forum Selection Clause - Kentuckv Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Henshaw, 95 S.W.3d
866 (Ky. 1/23/03).
1. Trial court properly enforced forum selection and venue selection dauses In a written
employment agreement even though employee's claim was an age-based civil right claim.
2. No special rule governs the enforceability of such provisions in the context of
employment contracts. Rather, the court applies the general rule that such clauses are prima facie
valid and the burden rests on the challenging party to prove that enforcement Is unreasonable.
XIX. Trademarks And Copyright.
1. Moseleyv. V. SeaetCatalogue.lnc., U.S. Supreme Court. No. 01-1015 (314103).
a. In order for the holder of a "distinctive and famous· trademark to obtain relief
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act for "dilution· of the trademark (15 U.S.C. §1125(c», the
holder must show "actual dilution." Where the marks are not identical, the mere fact that consumers
mentally assodate the junior's user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish
actionable dilution. However, proof of "an actual loss of sales or profits" is not a mandatory
requirement. The Court seemed to indicate that proof ofa "reduc[tion] [of] the capacity ofa famous
mark to identify the goods of its owner" is required.
b. Court's decision does not affect a trademark owner's ability to obtain relief
under traditional trademark law where the junior mark is Klikely to cause confusion."
2. Eldred v. Ashcroft, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 01-618 (1/15/03).
a. Congress did not violate the alimited times· requirement of the Copyright and
Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution (Arl. I, §8) by enacting the 1998 Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA) which extended the copyright protection for published works by an additional twenty
years to life plus seventy years.
b. Nor did the CTEA violate any First Amendment rights since a copyright dies
not shield an idea or fact but only the specific form of an author's expression and since a copyright
comes with a "fair use" exception.
xx. Sealing Court Records - Roman Catholic Diocese of lexington v. Noble, 92 S.W.3d 724
(Ky. 11/21/02).
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1. Kentucky Supreme Court recognizes that a trial court "has inherent 'supervisory'
powerof its own records and files" and has "discretionary authority to denyaccess to its records and
files:
2. In deciding whether or not to deny access, a trial court is to apply a "sliding-scale
approach" in which (a) documents and records that play an important role in determining the
litigants' substantive rights are accorded great presumptive weight" that public access is to be
granted while (b) documents and records that play only a minor or negligible role in adjudicating the
rights of the litigants are afforded little weight and the right-.of-access presumption amounts to little
more than a 'predlctlon of public access absent a countervailing reason."
3. Newspapers may have a qualified First Amendment right ofaccess, but the matters
at issue would fall outside any such qualified right so Court did not finally decide whether such a
right exists.
4. Where a trial court "strikes" materials from a pleading pursuant to CR 12.06, the trial
court's authority Includes "the power to physically remove the stricken material from that court's
record."
XXI. MAJOR TRENDS AND ISSUES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS.
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ANTITRUST
1. In Re: Visa Check/Master Money Antitrust Litigation. (E.D. N.Y. No. 96-CV-
5238(JG». Wal-Mart, other large retailers and several trade associations of the retail industry
filed suit claiming (among other things) that Visa and Mastercard rules requiring all merchants
who accept Visa and Mastercard credit cards to accept also the debit cards of those two
associations constituted an illegal tie-in in violation of the antitrust laws. The plaintiffs sought to
have the suit certified as a class action on behalf of about three million merchants who accept the
cards. The District court certified the class and the defendants appealed. On August 24, 2000,
ABA and three cosponsors filed an amici curiae brief supporting Visa and Mastercard. The brief
argues that the court misread Supreme Court precedent that does not allow a trial court to make
preliminary determinations as to the merits of a case before deciding whether to certify it as a
class action. Here, the lower court relied only upon the affidavit of a plaintiff wimess that the
class would be manageable and disregarded the opposing affidavit of a defense witness.
Choosing between the testimony of the two witnesses, the brief contends. would not constimte a
preliminary detennination of the merits, but rather was necessary to detennine the threshold
question of the class's manageability. On October 17, 2001. the Second Circuit affirmed. The
court held that at this stage the district court should not engage in a "battle of the experts It and
that the class allegations should be taken to be true for purposes of the certification issue unless
the defendant can show that the expert testimony is "fatally flawed" and would not be admissible
as a matter of law (280 F.3d 124). Visa and Mastercard filed a petition for rehearing en bane
which was denied on December 4. 2001. On March 7. 2002, without mentioning the Second
Circuit's opinion in this case. the Seventh Circuit took a diametrically opposed view. criticizing
the district court's certification as "a delegation of judicial power to the plaintiffs who can obtain
class certification just by hiring a competent expert." West v. Prudential Securities. 282 F.3d
935. Petition for writ of certiorari was filed on April 3 (S. Ct. No. 01-1464 ). ABA and several
co-sponsors filed supporting amici brief on May 3. certiorari was denied on June 10.2002 (122
S. Ct. 2382). Hearing on summary judgment motions held January 10. Mastercard has filed a
motion to sever so that there would be separate trials against it and against Visa. Trial is
scheduled to begin in U.S. District Court on April 28. 2003.
2. United States v. Visa. U.S.A. (S.D.N. Y. No. 98-CIV-7076). On October 7,
1998. Justice Department filed antitrust suit against Visa and Mastercard challenging the "rules"
of both networks prohibiting their respective member banks from offering credit cards that
compete with those two. The rules allegedly have the effect of eliminating real competition
between Visa and Mastercard and hampering competition or potential competition from other
networks. On October 9. 2001, court held that "duality" rules, by which thousands of banks can
and do issue both Visa and Master Card. are not anticompetitive. but the prohibition against Visa
and/or Master Card member banks also issuing American Express and/or Discover cards is an
antitrust violation (163 F. Supp.2d 322). In a flll31 order issued in late November, 2001, the
court made some modest changes without affecting the bottom line. The district court has issued
a stay of its order pending appeal. Notice of appeal filed April 9. Opening briefs filed May 15.
Justice Department briefs filed June 28,2002.
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ARBITRATION
3. Green Tree v. Bazzle (S. Ct. No. 02-634). A state trial court certified a class
action and then referred the underlying litigation to arbitration in accordance with a standard
mandatory arbitration clause in Green Tree contracts. In a second case, an arbitrator himself
certified a class action and proceeded to award. Green Tree appealed both decisions and the
South Carolina Supreme Court consolidated the two. In late June, 2001, ABA, South Carolina
Bankers Association and other cosponsors filed amici brief contending that class action treatment
of a claim was inconsistent with the whole point of arbitration, and that such a device could not
be lawfully used in arbitration in the absence of specific contractual language to that effect. On
August 26, 2002, South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. The arbitration agreement in question
was silent on the matter of class arbitration, creating an "ambiguity" to be resolved against the
drafter; certain otherwise relevant provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act did not apply to state
courts; class-wide arbitrations were more efficient and more protective of the rights of small
claimants than would a series of individual arbitrations (569 S.E.2d 349). Cert. petition was filed
in U.S. Supreme Court on October 23. 2002. On November 25. ABA et al. filed supporting
amici brief. Petition granted January 10. 2003. Opening briefs filed February 24, including
ABA et aI. amici brief. Oral argument April 22.
4. Betts v. Advance America (M.D. Fla. No. 6:99-593-CIV-ORL-99C). Putative
class action suit was filed against pay day lender claiming violation of usury laws. On April 27,
2000, plaintiff filed "Motion for Protective Order" directed at the lender's practice, since March,
1999, of requiring customers to agree to mandatory binding arbitration of any disputes arising
between the parties to the pay day loan arrangement. Plaintiff (who was herself never a party to
any mandatory arbitration agreement with the lender) alleges that the arbitration clauses at issue
would unlawfully diminish the size of the class she seeks to represent in that it infringes upon the
court's duty to protect the interests of potential class members and interferes with the court's
authority to effectuate the policies of the federal class action rule. The court has "abated" the
case for the time being.
5. Cruz v. Pacificare Health Systems. (Cal. S. Ct. No. 5101003). On August 28,
2001, intennediate appellate court affirmed refusal of trial judge to compel arbitration despite the
presence of mandatory arbitration clause in contract between HMO and plaintiff's employer. The
court held that claims asserted, in a class action lawsuit, under the unfair competition, false
advertising, and Consumer Legal Remedies provisions of California law. insofar as those claims
seek to vindicate "public" rights by means of injunction or "equitable money relief" are not
arbitrable (Cal. App. I. No. A093002). The California Supreme Court granted review; and
California Bankers Association filed amicus curiae brief supporting enforcement of the
arbitration clause. Oral argument held February 4,2003.
6. Mandel v. Household Bank <Nevada) (Cal. App. 4th, No. 0029531). On
January 7, 2003, in a case in which ABA appeared as amicus curiae. court upheld the
enforceability of an arbitration clause added by statement stuffer to a credit card agreement
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against a variety of challenges. The one provision of the contract the court did not approve was
a prohibition of class action arbitrations. That. according to the court, was unconscionable. One
week later. in Discover Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (Boohr. Real party in
Interest) (Cal. App. 2d, No. BI61305), a different appellate division of the state court of appeals
specifically and by name disagreed with the Mandel decision and enforced the arbitration clause
as written, including its prohibition against class action arbitrations. On February 11. 2003, the
Ninth Circuit, dealing with the same issue. sided with the Mandel court (Ting v. AT&T. No. 02-
15416).
7. Discover Bank v. Shea (N.J. App. Div. No. A-1582-0ITI). On October 26,
2001, Monmouth County Superior Court refused to enforce a mandatory arbitration clause in a
credit card agreement where that clause was added to the original agreement by means of a bill
stuffer pursuant to a "change in tenns" clause in the original agreement and where the customer
testified. predictably, that he had paid no attention to the bill stoffer. that he was therefore
unaware of the change, and that, of course, had he been aware of it he never would have
consented to give up his rights to judicial relief and to represent a class. Discover Bank
appealed. ABA, New Jersey Bankers Association and four other cosponsors fIled an amici brief
on the merits April 10. 2002. Oral argument held February 4. 2003. Meanwhile, the Third
Circuit (whose jurisdiction includes New Jersey) has held that adding an arbitration clause to a
consmner contract by means of a statement sruffer and pursuant to a "change in terms" clause in
the original contract is enforceable. The court went on to hold that an arbitration clause was
valid and enforceable even though it prevented a plaintiff from pursuing a usury claim on a class
action basis. (Cappalli v. National Bank of the Great Lakes, No. 00(2741). In a related case,
Shea v. Household Bank (Nos. 0028955, G029531), the California Fourth Appellate District
Court held. on January 7, 2003, that an arbitration clause adopted pursuant to a "change in
terms" provision of the original contract would not be enforced where the customer specifically
rejected the change and did not, thereafter, add any additional charges to his account. even
though the customer did not payoff his then outstanding balance either.
CONSUMER PROTECTION
* 8. Household Credit Services v. Pfennig (S. Ct. No. 02-857). For 30 years.
Regulation Z has instructed that "overlimit fees" on credit card accounts were "other charges"
and had to be disclosed as such; they were not "fmance charges" and did not figure in the
calculation of an APR. On April 11. 2002, a panel of the Sixth Circuit held that overlimit fees.
under the right circumstances, are charges incident to the extension of credit and, therefore, are
finance charges within the plain meaning of the Truth in Lending Act. the Federal Reserve's
long-standing regulation to the contrary notwithstanding. MBNA, successor in interest to
Household, filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en bane. On April 24, 2002, ABA and
four co-sponsors and the Federal Reserve fIled amici briefs supporting that petition. arguing that
the panel had been operating under a serious factual misunderstanding of how the credit card
system actually works. without the benefit of any evidence on that subject. The petition for panel
rehearing was denied and an amended decision was issued on July 2. 2002 (295 F.3d 522). The
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Petition for Rehearing en bane was denied in early September. Petition for Writ of Certiorari
filed December 2, 2002. Supporting amici brief filed by ABA and co-sponsors on February 4.
On March 10, the Supreme Court "invited" the Solicitor General to file a brief setting forth the
views of the United States as to whether certiorari should be granted.
9. Roberts v. Fleet Bank (3d Cir. No. 01-4420). Bank solicited applications for
credit cards with a "low fixed rate" while reserving boilerplate contractual right to alter terms
and conditions of the credit card account upon proper notice to the consumer. Plaintiff opened
such an account. When the bank, thirteen months later, notified plaintiff that the terms and
conditions of the contract would change so as to impose a different rate, plaintiff filed suit
claiming that the statement "low fixed rate" was inaccurate under the circumstances in violation
of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z. The district court dismissed the complaint and
the plaintiff appealed. On May 16, 2002, ABA and two co-sponsors filed amici brief supporting
the bank and the lower court decision.
10. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC (4th Cir. No. 01-2201). In February, 2000, a
used vehicle 'on went horribly awry, resulting in litigation by the buyerlborrower against
the vehicle dealer/lender for violation of the Truth in Lending Act and numerous other claims. A
jury awarded the plaintiff over $24,000 in damages under the Truth in Lending Act. On appeal,
the lender argued that there is a statutory cap on damages-twice the finance charge, but not to
exceed $1,000 (15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(A». Nevertheless, on February 4, 2003, the Fourth
Circuit affirmed, holding that since the 1995 amendments to the statute, that $1,000 cap applied
only to certain consumer lease arrangements. Prior circuit precedent bad held the cap applicable
to transactions of the sort at issue here as well, and there is no evidence of an actual
Congressional intent that the cap would no longer apply. Notwithstanding that, Congress did
what it did in 1995, and the court gave effect to the new "plain language of the statute."
11. Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank (5th Cir. No. 01-30104). Under Section
27 of Federal Deposit Insurance Act, a "state bank" can charge interest (and things like late fees)
at rates authorized by law of state where the bank is located. Among other things, a state bank: is
defined as one engaged in the business of receiving deposits. Louisiana resident challenged a
late fee that was legal in Georgia (where the bank was located) but allegedly not legal in
Louisiana. She contended that Monogram was not a "state bank" in that its only deposits were a
few decade-old contributions from out-of-state affiliates of Monogram and that did not constitute
being engaged in the business of receiving deposits. The Eastern District of Louisiana agreed
(Civil Action No. 98-1823, Nov. 23, 1999) and the lender appealed. On March 29, American
Financial Services Association, ABA, and Consumer Bankers Association filed supporting amici
brief arguing that FDIC bad necessarily determined, a dozen years ago, that Monogram was
engaged in the business of receiving deposits as a predicate to its having granted deposit
insurance to the bank. Only FDIC can change that determination, which is conclusive, and it is
not subject to collateral attack by private party litigation. On November 2, 2000, Fifth Circuit
held that the district court order was unreviewable as a "remand" to the state courts for lack of
federal jurisdiction (231 F.3d 994). A petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied on
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January 5. 2001, and on the same day the Eastern District of Louisiana again determined that it
did not have jurisdiction over the case and remanded it to the Civil District Court for the Parish
of Orleans. A petition for writ of certiorari was filed March 29, 2001 and the FDIC filed an
appeal of the District Court order in the Fifth Circuit. American Financial Services Association,
ABA and the Consumer Bankers Association filed supporting amici briefs in both the Supreme
Court and the Fifth Circuit in May, 2001. Supreme Court denied cert. on June 19, 2001 (No.
00(1505). Meanwhile, a state trial judge denied Monogram's motion for swnmary judgment.
conclUding that the question of whether Monogram was engaged in the business of receiving
deposits was one for the jury. An attempt to secure interlocutory review of that decision by the
Louisiana Supreme Court was denied on July 31, 2001 (No. 2001-CC-2208). On October 30.
2001. FDIC published a fonnal rule defining what constitutes being engaged in the business of
receiving deposits, replacing an earlier General Counsel's Opinion from the agency to the same
effect. According to the agency, a formal rule is entitled to more deference from the courts than
a General Counsel's Opinion. On July 8. 2002, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's
order denying FDIC's intervention motion as moot and remanding the case to state court.
Although a remand order generaUy is not reviewable, the presence of the FDIC in the case
changes everything, automatically conferring federal jurisdiction from the moment the FDIC files
its motion to intervene (297 F.3d 416). A petition for rehearing remains pending.
12. Wells Fargo Bank v. James. (5th Cir. No. 01-51298). A Texas "par value" statute
prohibited imposition of service charge upon nonaccount-holders who cash checks drawn on the
bank at which the check is cashed. Five banks filed suit challenging the validity of the statute.
On December 3, 2001. trial court granted summary judgment to the banks, holding that the
Texas statute was preempted as to national banks by the National Bank Act's incidental powers
clause and the Comptroller's interpretations thereof. That being the case, the statute could not be
enforced against state-chartered or out-of-state headquartered banks either because of the "wild
card" provision of the state Constitution (184 F. Supp. 2d 588 [W.D. Tex.]). On February 5.
2003, Fifth Circuit affinned: A regulation authorizing national banks to charge fees to customers
was within the Comptroller's authority to promulgate; it was not unreasonable for the
Comptroller to construe his own regulation to include nODaCOOlDlt-holders within the meaning of
"customers." and so that interpretation was entitled to deference; as so construed, the regulation
was in irreconcilable conflict with and therefore preempted state law.
Statutes similar to the Texas provisions at issue in this case have also been enacted in
Tennessee and Georgia. On July 29, 2002. a challenge was filed to the Tennessee version in
Bank: of America v. Lawson (M.D. Tenn. No. 3-02-Q728) and a challenge to the Georgia version
is also pending in federal court in that state.
13. lllinois Association of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks and Real Estate. (7th
Cir. No..02-1018). Trade association filed suit to block the state's predatory lending rules
adopted in May, 2001. The complaint alleged that the rules are preempted by the Alternative
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982 insofar as they would require institutions that originate
or buy "alternative mortgages" such as ARMs or mortgages with balloon payments to verify
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borrower's ability to repay, and prohibiting single-premiwn credit life insurance and other
limitations. On December 4,2001, court granted smmnary judgment to defendants. Court held
that the federal Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 was a later passed and more
specific statute than the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act and therefore had priority
over the earlier law in the event of conflict between the two. Since (the court fmds) the lllinois
regulations are consistent with HOEPA. they cannot very well be preempted by AMTPA (174 F.
Sopp. 2d 815 [N.D. lil. 2001]). On October 21, 2002. 7th Circuit reversed. holding that
AMTPA and HOEPA can and do co-exist, leading to the conclusion that at least some of the
state's rules would be preempted (174 F. 3d 762). Case was remanded to the district court to
determine which ones were, especially in light of newly promulgated OTS rules (67 Fed. Reg.
60542. September 26, 2002. effective July. 1. 2003) in which the agency seems to have changed
its views on AMTPA preemption. Previously, there was an apparent understanding that the
AMTPA preemption clause was self-executing; now it appears that preemption occurs only upon
promulgation of implementing OTS rules that specifically state that they are preemptive.
On December 20. 2002. a lawsuit was filed. challenging the validity of the new OTS rules
(National Home Equity Mortgage Association v. Office of Thrift Supervision [D.D.C. Civil
Action No. 1:02CV02506]). Plaintiff flied a motion for sununary judgment in the case on
February 7, 2003; OTS responded to it on March 7.
14. Haug v. Bank of America (8th Cir. No. 02-8009EMSL). (4th Cir. No. 01-2318).
Mortgage borrowers alleged that lender charged them $50 for a credit report when, in fact, the
lender acquired the credit repott for $15 or less, $300 for an appraisal that cost much less. and
$25 for document delivery charges that cost less. That was said to violate Section 8(b) of the
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act prohibiting overcharges for real estate settlement services.
The District Court refused to dismiss the complaint, and on June 6, 2002, the Eighth Circuit
granted leave to take an interlocutory appeal of that decision. On July 29, 2002. ABA and six c0-
sponsors fIled amici brief urging reversal of the District Court's refusal to dismiss. Two other
circuits have already dealt with this issue. On May 22. 2002, the Fourth Circuit held that
RESPA was not a price-control statute, but merely one that prohibited kickbacks to third parties.
No such kickback. is alleged in these cases; in fact the gravamen of the complaints are that the
lenders keep all of the overcharges for themselves without having performed any extra services
to earn them. <Boulware v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. 291 F. 3d 261). See also: Echevarria v.
Chicago Title & Trust, 256 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2(01). On December 26, 2002. the 7th Circuit
re-affirmed its Echevarria holding despite an amicus brief filed in the case by HUD, a brief the
court dismissed as "silly." (Krzalic v. Republic Title Co.• 7th Cir. No. 02-2285). On January
23. the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's Haug decision, following the reasoning of
the Boulware. EchevarriJJ and Krzalic cases: the plain language of the statute controls. and there
is no Chevron deference due to a contrary interpretation from HUD.
15. American Bankers Association v. Lockyer. (9th Cir. No. 03-15160). On May 24,
2002, five national trade associations and five national banks filed suit against the Attorney
General of California seeking to enjoin the operation of a California statute scheduled to go into
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effect on July 1, 2002. The law will require, among other things, that credit card issuers
disclose to certain customers. in convoluted, expensive and inherently inaccurate ways, bow long
it will take and how much it will cost to payoff a credit card balance if only minimum required
payments are made each month. The suit alleged that the state law is preempted by federal law
insofar as it pertains to national banks or federally chartered thrifts and credit unions. It also
contended that the state law is unconstitutional as an undue burden upon interstate commerce
insofar as it pertains to credit card issuers outside the state. On June 28, court granted a "stay"
of the statute's effective date. Plaintiffs filed supplemental briefs with respect to the motion for
preliminary injunction, and a motion for partial swnmary judgment with respect to the federal
preemption issue on September 20. 2002. The Comptroller of the Currency also filed a
supportive supplementary amicus brief. On December 23, court granted summary judgment to
the plaintiffs concluding that the statute was preempted in its entirety with respect to any
federally-chartered institution. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction as
"moot," even though it left entirely unadjudicated the claims made on behalf of out-of-state state-
chartered institutions (H.D. Cal. No. CIV. 5-02-1138 FCD (JFM». The parties then entered into
a stipUlation designed to extend the injunction to cover all non-federally chartered card issuers as
well. On January 14, 2003, the court approved that stipulation. Notice of appeal filed January
22. The state's opening brief is due May 12; ABA brief due June 9.
* 16. Wells Fargo Bank. N.A. v. Boutris (E.D. Cal. Civil Action No. CIV.S"()3~157
GEB). California law prohibits charging interest on residential first mortgages more than one day
prior to the recording of a mortgage deed, even though the borrowed funds may have long since
been disbursed. On January 27, 2003, national bank sued to enjoin investigation and
enforcement of the statute by the state's Department of Corporations. The complaint alleges that
only the Comptroller of the Currency may exercise visitorial powers over national banks and
their separately incorporated nonbank subsidiaries, and that the prohibition in the law was
preempted by the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, from
which California had not "opted out." On March 11, 2003, court entered a preliminary
injunction against the revocation of the lending license issued to the bank's subsidiary.
17. Riley v. Fleet National Bank (D. Mass. No. 03-10123 NO]). On January 23,
2003, a class action suit was filed by Social Security recipients claiming that it was a violation of
the anti-alienation provisions of the Social Security Act for a bank, exercising its general
contractual right of setoff, to take funds from the bank accounts of the plaintiffs in satisfaction of
overdue loan payments when the source of the funds in the accounts were only monthly Social
Security benefits.
18. Cason v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corp. (M.D. Tenn. No. 3-98-0223). Auto
dealers originate and technically mue loans to customers, then immediately assign such loans to
Nissan Acceptance. Nissan sets a "buy rate," the lowest interest rate at which it will take a
dealer originated loan. The dealer is free to originate loans at a higher rate than that, with the
dealer and Nissan then splitting the difference. African-American borrowers alleged disparate
treatment by a particular dealer in Nashville in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in
L - 18
9
that African-Americans ended up paying disproportionately greater discretionary finance charges
and higher rates that otherwise identically situated white borrowers. Nissan. though it did not
originate or make the loans. was also named as a defendant. On May 31.2000. it filed a motion
for summary judgment. claiming that only the dealer could be liable under the circwnstances.
On July 31. the Justice Department Civil Rights Division filed an amicus curiae brief opposing
that motion. claiming that Nissan had a non-delegable duty to assure that loans it took by
assigmnent from its dealers complied with ECOA. See also Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co.•
2002 WL 88431 (S.D.N.Y.• January 22, 2002) (allegation that Ford "authorized subjective
markups" having a disparate impact was sufficient to state a claim under ECOA).
In a comparable case, Smith v. Chrysler Financial Co., L.L.C. (D. N.J. Civil Action
No. 00-6003), ABA and three co-sponsors filed an amici brief on April 17. 2001, arguing,
among other things, that assignees of dealer paper are specifically excluded from the definition of
"creditor" in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act in the absence of knowledge of discrimination.
19. American Financial services Association v. City of Oakland (Cal. App. 1. No.
A100(58). On October 25. 2001, AFSA secured a temporary restraining order against
enforcement of a new Oakland "predatory lending" ordinance that had been scheduled to go into
effect six days later. The suit challenged the authority of the city to act in this area on the basis
of state preemption. The parties agreed to a delay in the effective date of the ordinance until the
completion of litigation. In light of that, a motion for preliminary injuDCtion was denied in
November. 2001. On June 21, 2002, the court granted summary judgment to the City. holding
that the ordinance was not preempted as duplicative of the state law or as intruding into a field
completely occupied by state law. The local ordinance was likewise not inconsistent with stale
law except insofar as local law did not apply to national banks. whereas state law did. The court
"solved" this problem by voiding the exception in the local law. thereby extending its scope to
parties the legislature did not intend to reach (Super. Ct. Alameda Co. No. 2001-027338).
AFSA appealed. and on February 4. 2003, California Bankers Association filed supporting
amicus brief arguing that the ordinance, as amended by the court. was preempted by federal law
as to federally chartered institutions.
In February. 2003. AFSA also filed suit in Superior Court for Los Angeles County
challenging that jurisdiction's predatory lending ordinance on essentially the same state
preemption grounds.
* 20. National Minority Mortgage Brokers Association v. Department of Banking and
Finance (Fulton Co. [GAl Super. Ct. No. 2002 CV 60063). On October 16, 2002. a trade
association for mortgage brokers flied suit challenging the Georgia predatory lending law,
claiming federal preemption and other constitutional defects. On January 22. 2003. the Office of
Thrift Supervision, in a letter from its Chief Counsel, concluded that federal law preempts the
state statute insofar as it might apply to federal savings associations or their operating subs. The
Comptroller of the Currency published a notice on February 26 (68 Fed. Reg. 8959) seeking
comment on whether he should likewise preempt the state law with respect to national banks and
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their subsidiaries. Prior to the comment due date, Georgia legislature amended the statute to
remove some. but not all, of its more onerous aspects.
Litigation over several municipal predatory lending ordinances is also in progress
elsewhere. A temporary restraining order against the effectiveness of the Toledo, Ohio,
ordinance has been extended until April 16, 2003 and the plaintiff, American Financial Services
Association filed a brief in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas on March 21. The Mayor
of New York sued the City Council over its predatory lending ordinance and sought a
preliminary injunction. Hearing on that motion will be held April 29. AFSA has intervened in
that case as well.
21. Dressel v. Ameribank (Mich. S. Ct., Docket No. 119959). Mortgage lender
prepared adjustable rate note and mortgage in connection with a real estate transaction and
charged a separate "docmnent preparation fee" for doing so. On August 3. 2001. court found
that preparing such documents for consideration constituted the unauthorized practice of Jaw.
Since Michigan's Credit Refonn Act only allows lenders to charge fees that "are not excessive,"
and that term is defined as "exceed[ing] the amount allowed in any applicable law or statute of
this state, n the plaintiffs had a valid claim for recovery of the fees (Mich. App. No. 222447).
The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal. Baolc's opening brief and an amicus curiae
brief by the Michigan Bankers Association were filed June 18, 2002. Oral argument October 4.
2002. See also O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans (S.D. Tex. No. H-OO-73 (8/24/01) (Dist
LEXIS 13103); Casey v. Acrel Mortgage Services (St. Louis Co. Cir. Ct. No. 02CC-001055 G
CV-04, complaint filed March 20,2002).
In Doe v. Condon (S.C. S. Ct. Op. No. 25508. August 5,2002), an original jurisdiction
proceeding, the court held that various aspects of real estate closings (title search, preparation of
title documents, preparation of loan documents, conduct of the actual closing) constituted the
unauthorized practice of law unless performed by an attorney or under an attorney's supervision.
On August 20, South Carolina Bankers Association filed petition to intervene and for rehearing.
Court granted that motion on September 5. The South Carolina Bar Association has intervened as
well. The bankers allege that the court's opinion sweeps too broadly, and that there are factual
situations (mostly involving refmancing or home equity loans) that ought to fall outside the ambit
of the court's proscriptions.
CREDIT UNIONS
22. Fitzgerald v. Racing Association of Central Iowa (S.Ct. No. 02-695). Iowa law
authorizes gambling at racetracks and. on board riverboats. Both forms are SUbject to taxation by
the state, and initially the rate of taxation was the same for both. In 1997. however, the rate
applicable to racetrack gambling began to increase while the rate for riverboat gambling
remained static. The racetracks filed suit challenging the disparate treatment. and the Iowa
Supreme Court ruled in their favor. The "equal protection of the laws" clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that similarly siroated entities be treated similarly by the taxing authorities
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in the absence of a legitimate governmental interest. Here. gambling is gambling. and there is
no rational basis for granting a competitive advantage to one fonn over the other (648 N.W.2d
555). In January, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Briefs from the Racing Association and its amici are due April 2. Oral argument April 29.
23. National Community Reinvesbnent Coalition v. National Credit Union
Administration (D.D.C., No. 1:02CV00098). In October. 2000. after notice and comment.
NCUA adopted a rule that would have required community federal credit unions to adopt, as part
of their respective marketing or business plans, a description of how the credit union intended to
serve its entire community, and in particular how it intended to reach out to the underserved
members of its community. The rule was scheduled to go into effect 14 months later, on
December 31, 2001. On December 20. 2001. eleven days before the effective date. witboui
notice or comment. the agency issued an "interim rule." effective immediately, that repealed the
community service plan requirement. On January 22, 2002, a coalition of consumer groups filed
suit claiming violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. In April, NCUA filed a responsive
motion suggesting that NCRC had not been injured in fact from the repeal. The rule merely set
up an information gathering regime, imposing in and of itself no substantive obligations. and the
information that would have been gathered would not have been made public any way.
=I: 24. Missouri Bankers Association v. Director of the Missouri Division of Credit
Unions (Mo. S. Ct. No. SC85170). Missouri credit union statutes generally apply to state
chartered credit unions the field of membership standards that are applicable to federal credit
unions. Nevertheless. state regulator has approved an entire series of applications from state-
chartered credit unions to expand fields of membership beyond anything that has ever been
approved for FCDs by their regulator. In this illustrative case. the state regulator approved a
credit union whose members have the common bond of an area code (417. for the curious) and
nothing more. MoBA and one of its affected members sought judicial review. The state trial
court dismissed this challenge for lack of standing to sue; that decision was affrrmed by the
appeals court January 14, 2003. On March 18, bankers fIled application for transfer to the
Missouri sUpreme Comt. ABA. as amicus curiae, filed in support of that on March 26. Other
such challenges are in the pipeline.
25. Mountain America Financial Services v. Leary (Salt Lake Co. [UT] Dist. Ct.,
No. 020910437 AA). State Department of Financial Institutions adopted regulations in which it
concluded that limits on member business loans that are. by statute, applicable to credit unions
are likewise applicable to credit union service organizations. A credit union with tens of millions
of dollars in proposed business loans laundered through its CUSO filed suit challenging the
legitimacy of such rules. and in early October, 2002. the trial court granted a preliminary
injunction against the effectiveness of the rules.
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PRIVACY
26. New York State Bar Association v. Federal Trade Conunission (D.D.C. No. --
----). Gramm~Leach-BlileyAct requires "financial instimtions" to disclose privacy policies to
their clients and establishes civil sanctions of up to $tO,ooo per violation for failure to do so. By
FTC's definition, "financial institution" is one which provides services to clients that are
"financial activities." Arguably, that would include attorneys engaged in tax planning, estate
planning, real estate closings and bankruptcy, although there is little doubt that Congress had no
such thing in mind when it enacted the law. Bar association sought an exemption from FrCts
privacy rules for such attorneys or at least an interpretation of the law or regulations to the effect
that it did not apply to attorneys. FTC refused to provide any guidance on the subject one way
or the other. On April 29, 2002, the association filed suit claiming that the agency's
unwillingness to grant an exemption was arbitrary and capricious. On September 25, 2002, the
American Bar Association filed essentially the same lawsuit in the same court. On December
27, a comparable case was ftled in North Carolina (North Carolina Bar Association v. Federal
Trade Commission [E.D. N.C. No. 5:02cv941])
27. Bank of America v. City of Daly City (N.D. Cal. No. C-02-4343-CW). The City
of Daly City and San Mateo County, near San Francisco, enacted ordinances that constrained all
financial institutions with business locations in the City or in the unincorporated areas of the
County from sharing information about their customers among their affiliates. Both were
scheduled to go into effect January I, 2003. On September to, 2002, the day following
enactment of the second of the two ordinances, two national banks and their affiliates filed suit
contending that the ordinances were preempted by federal laws, including the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, the National Bank Act and the Granun-Leach-Bliley Act, and that the ordinances
were unconstitutional insofar as they purported to have extraterritorial application. The plaintiffs
filed a motion for summary judgment on October 4,2002; ABA, California Bankers Association
and two other co-sponsors filed supporting amici brief October 9. On October 29, court denied
motion for summary judgment without prejudice pending completion of discovery. On the same
day, San Mateo County enacted an extension of the effective date of the ordinance.
28. American Teleservices Association v. Federal Trade Commission. (D. Colo. No.
03-->. Association representing telemarketers filed suit on January 29, 2003, challenging
FTC efforts to create a national "do not call" list, contending that such an initiative violated First
and Fifth Amendment rights, was in excess of stattltory authority and was arbitrary and
capricious. A companion case was filed the same day by the Direct Marketing Association in
federal district court in Oklahoma City <U.S. Security v. FrC, W.D. Okla. No. 03-122-W).
29. Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp. (D. Minn. Civil No. 01-48 ADM/AJB). State
Attorney General sued mortgage company for aUeged. violations of the Federal Trade
Commission's Telemarketing Sales Rule. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, state attorneys
general are authorized to enforce the Rule against any entities subject to the jurisdiction of the
FTC. Fleet moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it is a subsidiary of a national
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bank; national banks are not subject to the jurisdiction of the FfC; and that national banks-
including their subsidiaries of whatever form-are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Comptroller of the Currency. The Comptroller filed an amicus curiae brief in support of that
argument; the FTC filed an amicus curiae brief opposing it. On December 21, 2001, District
Court denied the motion, relying on the "plain language" of Section 133 of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act: Any entity that is controlled by a bank. and is not itself a bank. shall not be deemed to
be a bank for purposes of the Act. Fleet has sought leave to file an interlocutory appeal.
30. Evans v. Bank of Eureka Springs (Ark. Ct. App. No. CA 02-000623). Bank
filed a Suspicious Activities Report with appropriate authorities in which it charged that one of
its loan customers had committed fraud against a secured creditor by cutting and selling timber
on mortgaged land without consent of lienholder and without turning over proceeds of sale to
lender. The customer was prosecuted for the offense and acquitted. He then filed suit against
the bank for malicious prosecution, slander, invasion of privacy and other assorted claims. A
jury awarded him $400,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and the bank appealed. On
July 30, 2002, Arkansas Bankers Association, ABA and others fued amici brief in state appeals
court contending that the federal Annnnzio-Wylie Act granted immunity from such civil suits to
financial institutions that carried out their obligations under federal law to report suspected
criminal activity. Oral argument scheduled for April 3.
On February 10, 2003, in a similar case, Stonn v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (1st
Cir. No. 01-2275), the court held that Annunzio-Wylie immunity does not require that the
"suspicions" be held in good faith by the reporting bank.
31. Steve Martin & Associates v. Carter (Vanderburgh [IN] Cir. Ct. No. 82C01-
0201-PL-38). The Indiana Telephone Privacy Act of 2001 creates a "do DOt call" list. Vacuum
cleaner salesman (who had been making 17,000 telemarketing calls per month) and a trade
association filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the statute. On July 5. 2002, court held
that (1) under Indiana law, a trade association had no standing to sue in a representative capacity
on behalf of its members; (2) the federal Telephone Consmner Protection Act of 1991 does not
preempt the "more restrictive" Indiana state law; (3) there is no violation of the First Amendment
because (a) the statute does not involve the government in choosing to limit speech, but rather
the government effectuating the choices of individuals not to be bothered in their own homes by
"speech," and (b) commercial speech is less protected than noncommercial speech; (4) there is
no violation of the equal protection clause, even though real estate and insurance agents,
newspapers and charities are exempt from the law, because there is a rational basis for the
classifications; and (5) since Martin was an Indiana business seeking to deal with Indiana
residents, it lacked standing to raise Commerce Clause objections to the statute.
In a federal version of the case, National Coalition of Prayer, Inc. v. Carter (S.D. Ind.
No. lP02-Q536C-B/S), various charitable organizations challenge the constitutionality of the
statute on First Amendment grounds in a noncommercial speech context. While the statute, by
its own terms, exempts charitable organizations, it does so only to the extent that the
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organizations use only actual employees or volunteers to make the phone calls, not third party
solicitors. Plaintiffs filed motion for summary judgment September 10,2002.
32. Messing v. Bank of America (Md. Ct. App., September Term 2002 No. 27).
Noncustomer of a bank attempted to cash a check drawn on the bank. As a condition of doing
so, the bank required that he plaCe his thumbprint on the check, which he refused to do. The
bank then declined to cash the check. Noncustomer sued alleging invasion of privacy, wrongful
conversion and. other assorted claims. Trial court granted summary judgment to the bank. On
February 28, 2002, the Court of Special Appeals affinned (792 A.2d 312), joining at least four
other courts in unanimously upholding the legality of the thumbprint identification program.
Nevertheless, the Maryland Court of Appeals has agreed to review the decision. The plaintiff's
brief was filed August 5; the bank's brief on September 4. ABA and Maryland Bankers
Association filed amici brief the same day. Oral argument held October 8, 2002.
33. American Council of Life Insurers v. Vennont Department of Banking
(Washington County [VT] Superior Ct. No. 56-1-02 Wncv). In November, 2001, state regulator
of banking, insurance, securities and hea1thcare administration promulgated regulations, effective
February IS, 2002, that purports to govern the disclosure of nonpublic personal financial and
health infonnation about individuals by Vermont licensees subject to the Commissioner's
jurisdiction to non affiliated third parties. On January 3D, 2002, five insurance trade associations
filed suit contending that there is no state law that grants power to the Commissioner to issue
regulations governing this subject matter, at least as to the insurance business, and that therefore
the regUlations are in excess of her statutory authority. Commissioner filed a general denial and
asserted boilerplate affumative defenses on February 19,2002. On. October 8, 2002, ACLI filed
a motion for sunnnary judgment.
34. Martino v. Barnett (W.Va. S. Ct. of App. No. ----). Plaintiff sought
infonnation about the defendant from the defendant's insurance company in connection with the
filing of a personal injury lawsuit. The insurance company resisted the request for information,
contending that the privacy provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and comparable state
insurance regulations prohibited the company 's dissemination of nonpublic personal infonnation
about its customers. The plaintiff then sued the insurance company for bad faith. The Circuit
Court of Harrison County certified the legal issues raised by the insurance company's position to
the state Supreme Court of Appeals for resolution.
PRODUcrS & SERVICES
35. Bowler v. Hawke (1st Cir. No. 02-1738). On June 13, 2002, Massachusetts
Insurance Commissioner filed Petition for Review. of a March 18, 2002, letter the Comptroller
issued in response to a request from the Massachusetts Bankers Association preempting three
provisions of the Commonwealth's insurance laws. Commissioner's opening brief was filed June
26; Comptroller's reply filed July 11 together with an amici brief from ABA, ABIA,
Massachusetts Bankers Association and other cosponsors. Oral argument took place August 2.
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On February 13, 2003, the court dismissed the petition for review, holding that there was no
"case or controversy" present when the petitioner challenges an action by the Comptroller that
does not, and is not intended to, have the force and effect of law.
36. Cline v. Hawke (4th Cir. No. 02-21(0). On September 24, 2001, Comptroller of
the Currency issued a letter in response to a request from the West Virginia Bankers Association
preempting various provisions of West Virginia state laws purporting to regulate bank sales of
insurance. The Comptroller concluded that several of the challenged prOVisions significantly
interfered with the ability of the banks to engage in that business in violation of the Barnett
standard and Gramm-Leach-Bliley. On September 20, 2002, state insurance commissioner filed
Petition for Review, asserting that the Comptroller lacked the stamtory power to issue the letter
and contending that he got it wrong on the merits as well. ABA, ABIA and West Virginia
Bankers Association filed amici brief supporting Comptroller on October 18, 2002. On
November 19, 2002, the court dismissed the petition, holding that the Comptroller had the
authority to interpret the statute, that his interpretation was entitled to deference, and was
thorough, well-reasoned and persuasive. A dissenting opinion would have dismissed the petition
on other grounds, namely the absence of a case or controversy. On December 23, intervening
insurance trade associations, but not the insurance commissioner, filed petition for rehearing and
rehearing en bane. The petition was denied February 21.
37. Independent Insurance Agents of America v. Hawke (D.D.C. Civil Action No.
1:OlCV02356). On September 24, 2001, Comptroller of the Currency issued a letter in response
to a request from the West Virginia Bankers Association preempting various provisions of West
Virginia state laws pmporting to regulate bank sales of insurance. The Comptroller concluded
that several of the challenged provisions significantly interfered with the ability of the banks to
engage in that business in violation of the Barnett standard and Gramm-Leach-Bliley. On
November 13, 2001, associations of insurance agents filed suit challenging that determination in
several respects, asserting that the Comptroller lacked the statutory power to issue the letter and
contending that he got it wrong on the merits as well. On February 19, 2002, Comptroller filed
motion for summary judgment. flAA's cross-motion filed April 3. On May I, 2002, ABA,
ABIA and West Virginia Bankers Association filed amici brief contending that court had no
jurisdiction to entertain agents' complaint, and that legislative history supported Comptroller's
right to issue preemption letter and the correctness of the standards he promulgated therein for
granting preemption. On September 18, 2002, court denied both motions for swnmary judgment
without prejudice, inviting parties to resubmit when the First Circuit decided Bowler. In light of
how Bowler turned out, however, that no longer makes any sense.
38. Fidelity National Infonnation Solutions v. Sinclair (E.D. Pa. No. 02-6928).
Pennsylvania law, 63 P.S. §§ 457.1, et seq., requires appraisals in nonfederally related
transactions, and requires that such appraisals be performed by Pennsylvania board-certified
appraisers. Fidelity National provides, and sells to lenders, a comparatively inexpensive, largely
automated "evaluation" of the value of properties that are to serve as security for mortgages. On
August 26, Fidelity filed suit [0 enjoin enforcement of the PeIUlsylvania law, alleging that federal
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law and regulation specifically allows the use of something less than a full-blown appraisal under
certain circumstances (e.g. mortgage loans of less than $250,(00). and that that federal law
preempts contrary state law. In September, the Pennsylvania Bankers Association. on behalf of
its members who would be deprived of a valuable product by virtue of the Board I s enforcement
actions, joined the case as a named plaintiff. On February 19, 2003. ABA joined suit as a
plaintiff on behalf of its non-Pennsylvania members to allege that Pennsylvania law constituted
an undue burden on interstate commerce as well. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or to
transfer the case to the Middle District of Pennsylvania where the state capital (the official home
of state agencies) is located. That motion was denied on January 8. 2003.
39. Tennessee Land Title Association v. Flowers (M.D. Tenn. No. 3-o3...()()()4). On
January 3, 2003. trade association for title insurers in Tennessee filed suit against state insurance
commissioner and three bank-affiliated insurance agencies contending that sale of title insurance
by bank.-affiliated agencies violated Tennessee law that was not preempted by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act and that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act did not itself authorize sale of title insurance by
the defendant agencies. The opinion of the Tennessee Attorney General to the contrary was
simply wrong, according to the complaint. Dispositive motions will be due November 3. 2003.
40- American Land Title Association v. Radian Group (Cal. Super., Orange County,
Case No. ). Under California state law, it is illegal to sell title insurance in the
state without being licensed, and any insurer which transacts any class of insurance other than
title insurance anywhere in the United States is ineligible for a title insurance license. Radian
Group is a private mortgage insurer that sells. among other things, a "lien protection program-
to residential mortgage lenders. The lien protection program is said to accomplish essentiaUy the
same goals as traditional title insurance, but is sufficiently different in its structure so as to faD
outside the definition of "title insurance. It Being unimpressed by the fme points, the trade
association for title insurers filed suit in late November. 2001, contending that Radian was
engaged in the unlicensed and illegal sale of title insurance in California. On June 20. 2002. the
California Department of Insurance, in a separate proceeding, concluded that the lien protection
program was, indeed. title insurance. and issued a cease and desist order to Radian. Several
other state insurance commissioners have reached the same conclusion.
TRUST
41. Tittle v. Eoron (S.D. Tex. No. H-Ol-3913). Among the myriad of issues to be
litigated in this massive consolidated Enron case is the question of any responsibility for the
fiasco that directed trustees might have. These are the financial institutions that held the Eoron
employees' savings plans while the value of those plans. largely invested in Enron stock.
plummeted, and during a "lockout period, It during which employees were not permitted any
transactions within their respective plans. The trustees have moved to dismiss complaints as to
them on the grounds that their status, duties. responsibilities and liabilities as directed trustees
were specifically recognized and governed by ERISA, and that they lacked the legal and
contractual capacity to conduct themselves in any fashion other than the way they did in this
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case. On August 30. the secretary of Labor filed an amicus brief opposing the motions to
dismiss, seeking to impose upon directed trustees a higher duty than has previously been
recognized for them. In October, ABA filed amicus brief addressing only the Secretary's
arguments, pointing out that they were unsupported by statutory language and contradicted by
legislative history.
MISCELLANEOUS
* 42. Casa de Cambio Comdiv S.A. v. United States. (S. Ct. No. 02-710). A U.S.
Treasury check for in excess of $1 'million was presented to a Mexican currency exchange,
which accepted the check and forwarded it on to its U.S. bank for collection. That bank, in turn,
forwarded it to a Federal Reserve Bank. which gave immediate credit for the check. The
Mexican currency exchange verified that the funds had been collected. TIlree months later,
Treasury decided that the check had been stolen and had the Federal Reserve Bank reverse the
credit to the American bank which, in tum. reversed the credit to the Mexican exchange. Casa
sued the United States alleging that Treasury had not acted within a "reasonable time" to
dishonor the check as required by regulation. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the
complaint (48 Fed. Cl. 137) and the Federal Circuit affIrmed, holding that Casa was not the
proper party to sue over the untimely dishonor (291 F. 3d 1356). In November, 2002, Casa
filed a petition for writ of certiorari, alleging that the lower court decisions were inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's long-standing CleaTjield Trust case (318 U.S. 363 [1943]). On
February 12, 2003. New York Clearing House Association and ABA filed supporting amici
brief. Petition for certiorari was denied March 24.
* 43. Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson (S. Ct. No. 02-306). Usury claims against
national banks arise under provisions of the National Bank Act that, to a degree, incorporate by
reference the law of the state in which the bank is located. When a plaintiff files suit in a state
court claiming that the national bank has violated the state usury law. the defendant bank. often
seeks to "remove" the case to federal court. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit refused to allow
such "removal It on the grounds that the federal law did not completely preempt state law. Since
other circuits have disagreed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. On March 7. 2003, ABA
and three co-spom: filed amici brief urging the Supreme Court to reverse. This case will be
the last ar 0 e current Supreme Court Term on April 30.
• al Foundation of Washin ton (S. Ct. No. 01-1325). Washington.
attorneys to place those client funds they hold for brief periods of
time and that Cnll1d-fIftt-c't1ltIe:rwise be put to productive purposes, to be deposited in "IOLTA It
accounts with the interest earned thereon to be turned over to a foundation that funds legal
services for the poor. Those programs have been challenged as "takings" of private property for
public purposes without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. On March 26,
2003, the Supreme Court upheld the Washington program. IOLTA programs do constitute the
taking of private property for public purposes, but the "just compensation" owed to the "owners"
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of that private property is nil. Funds in the accounts would not have earned anything for the
owners anyway.
45. Louisiana Federal Land Bank Association v. Farm Credit Administration (D.D.C.
No. I :OOCV01582). Fann Credit Administration has historically carved up the nation into
exclusive territories for its various System institutions. It had allowed such institutions to
purchase participation interests in loans originated outside their territories if they provided notice
or acquired the consent of the sister institution in whose territory the loan did originate. On
April 25. 2000, FCA abolished this requirement. On June 30, the Fam Credit Bank of Texas
and five affiliated Land Bank Associations sued. It seems that in 1988 a different Farm Credit
Bank failed and was sold to FeB-Texas. One of the terms and conditions of the purchase and
assumption transaction was that FCB-Texas would acquire pennanent territorial service rights
over the territory of the failed institution, a deal later ratified by explicit federal legislation. The
new rule was alleged to violate the Farm Credit Act as amended. Court granted summary
judgment to Fann Credit Administration August 23,2001; notice of appeal filed October 9.
46. American Council of the Blind v. O'Neill (D.D.C. No.--------). On May 2,
2002, association representing visually impaired citizens sued the Secretary of the Treasury
seeking to compel him to alter the size and color of U.S. Currency so that the various
denominations would be distinguishable from one another on a basis other than the ability to read
the notes. Failure to do so is said to violate Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which
prohibits discrimination against the disabled in any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency of the federal government; it is also said to be an abuse of discretion because
the Secretary has almost unbridled authority to design the currency under 12 U.S.C. § 418. so
nothing prevents him from abiding by the Rehabilitation Act.
47. Community Bank: & Trust v. United States (Ct. Fed. Cl. No. 01-571 C). On
October 3, 2001, a Texas state-chartered bank filed suit on its own behalf and as class
representative of all depository institutions required to maintain reserves with Federal Reserve
Banks since 1980. It seeks to compel the government to pay interest to the depository
institutions on those reserves. Failure to do so is said to constitute wrongful conversion of the
plaintiffs' property, unjust enrichment to the government, deprivation of property without due
process and unlawful taking of property for public use without just compensation in violation of
the Fifth Amendment.
CALENDAR
April 3
April 22
April 28
Oral argument in Evans v. BanIe of Eureka Springs.
Oral argument in Green Tree v. Bazzle.
Trial date for Visa/Mastercard antitrust case.
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May 12
June 9
November 3
19
Oral argument in Fitzgerald v. Racing Association.
Oral argument in Beneficial v. Anderson.
Appellants' brief due in ABA v. Lockyer.
Appellees' brief due in ABA v. Lockyer.
Dispositive motions due in Tennessee Land Title v. Flowers.
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